It's a nice example of how simple words that are seconded into philosophy become enormous problems. In its natural home it has various uses, but when philosophers try to pin them down they start to mix them up.

So a fact can be a truth-bearer, in which case it's a statement; because it is statements that are able to be true or false.

And a fact is also a state of affairs, and so not a sentence at all.

So some conclude that a fact is sui generis, because they think the word "fact" is the name of something.

And they would be correct in that conclusion. Facts are names but not ridged designators regardless if they are contingently true or necessarily so.

Hm. Not all nouns name something. It would be misleading, knowing that "fact" is a noun, that there must be something that it is the name of.

But if something attains the status of a fact, for example in science, then it by extension becomes a name, albight a complex one.

If you combine all three categories given in the OP, then a fact seems to become a name, no?

I don't think so. We have statements on one hand, states of affairs on the other, and we do different things with each.

But - there is a way of understanding (defining, knowing the meaning of...) the statement that cannot be set out in words, and instead is shown by what happens in the world.

So "The cup is in the cupboard" is a statement, used to tell Fred where the cup is, and Fred shows his understanding when he goes to the cupboard to retrieve the cup.

Then I again ask, what is the difference between the fact that the cup is on the table and the cup being on the table?

If you are using "fact" to mean the sentence "the cup is on the table", then, one is a state of affairs, the other a sentence.

If you are using "fact" to mean a state of affairs, then there is no difference between the cup being on the table and the state of affairs of the cup being on the table.

Confusion arrises when these two are mixed.

No, I mean to use fact in all of the possible senses provided in the OP. There seems to be a fundamental difference in stating something as a fact in the specific senses provided instead of treating it as a speech act of some sort.

In other words what is the performative meaning of something being a fact under the above uses?

The customary definition of a fact is ‘whatever is the case’. To ask why a fact is the case is like asking why two and two equal four.

A fact just is.

can you use a claw hammer to hammer and pull at the same time?

Not all nouns name something. It would be misleading, knowing that "fact" is a noun, that there must be something that it is the name of. — Banno

Fact is the name of a category or set of data.

Like cheese is the name of a category or a set of curdled milk.

I've been reading and rereading the SEP entry on facts, and am still as puzzled about what facts are as I was before reading the SEP entry. — Posty McPostface

Is that unusual for SEP, or academic philosophy in general?

Specifically, I have issues with understanding this part:

1) A fact is just a true truth-bearer,
2) A fact is just an obtaining state of affairs,
3) A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations.
From.

But the SEP article says that the word "fact" is used with more than one meaning,and so isn't necessary to reconcile those different definitions, or to choose one to be the correct one. Isn't it just a matter of agreeing on which meaning is meant in a discussion. And don't we here always mean "state of affairs"?

Referring to those alternative meanings:

One thing that SEP suggests at one point is that a fact is what makes a truth-bearer true. So, by that meaning, a fact isn't the truth-bearer itself. That agrees with how I'd interpreted the meaning.

A statement is an utterance that (truly or falsely) tells about a fact.

As used here, doesn't "fact" always mean "state of affairs", where "a state of affairs" can also be worded as "an aspect of the way things are."?

Another meaning the SEP article states, which seems to mean the same thing, is that a fact is something that contains one or more objects, and a property, or a relation among them. That sounds like just a different wording of "state of affairs" or "aspect of the way things are".

So, regarding how "fact" is used here, there doesn't seem to be a disagreement or confusion about what we mean when we say "fact".

Of course any word could be analyzed-to-death, finding endless confusion, because no finite dictionary can non-circularlly define all of its words.

...and of course Western academic philosophers exploit that to the hilt. .(probably to provide themselves with endless topics for publishing and debating--an endless gravy train and meal-ticket)..as is so often evident at SEP.

Michael Ossipoff

SO facts are statements?

Couldn't "fact" simply be a sort of ontological/epistemological primitive?

Thus defying proper definition, or at least non-circular ones.
Like a pure demonstrative, but for "that which is true".

If you are using "fact" to mean the sentence "the cup is on the table", then, one is a state of affairs, the other a sentence.

If you are using "fact" to mean a state of affairs, then there is no difference between the cup being on the table and the state of affairs of the cup being on the table.

Confusion arrises when these two are mixed. — Banno

This doesn't seem to apply to some cases, especially when it comes down to epistemological degrees of knowledge. Take for example,

Sally loves Harry.
and,
That Sally loves Harry is a fact.

Again, different statements that hold different meanings. How? Well, one has the exclusivity of being verified to some degree of knowledge, up until the utterance can be said to be certain. Leaning on this one can say that some facts are indisputable because of their ability to verify and ascertain their true value.

So, the truth bearer of Sally loves Harry has been verified, by for example asking the question, how do you know? I know because they told me they're getting engaged, and is not something I have heard from Joe in the workplace. This is more apparent in cases of scientific facts, think water boiling at sea level at 212°F.

How do I know? I have verified it! Thus it is a fact.

Going all Wittgenstein on this Sunday, there are other cases of using facts that do not have epistemological content, such as;

2+2=4 is a fact

Nothing has been said on face value, but, it could be understood that adding 'is a fact' denotes that the person understands the rules of the language game (in this case a formal language) and has verified the truth of 2+2=4 by understanding the rules of the formal language game. This is just another instance where verifying something lends it to being 'a fact', depending on one's level of knowledge about the world.

What is the difference between :

1) The snow is white
2) It is a fact that the snow is white
... Could even go further and say
3) It is that the snow is white.
?

Well, going back on my previous post, it can be asserted that the snow is white because we know that the snow is white due to it being an established fact through many observations. It just so happens that this is a trite fact that has no content. More like a tautology.

The point is that nothing else is added by stating that a proposition is a fact. Stating the proposition is already stating something as a fact.

Not true. A claim that something is a fact is already assuming that the proposition is true, through verifying it via different means, depending on the context of the proposition.

See:
1) A fact is just a true truth-bearer

How is a fact a true truth-bearer? Through further examination/investigation of the utterance or verificationism.

I mean, the prominence of 'facts' started with the logical positivists after all. So, verificationism is somewhat a given.

But, what's most interesting is that the notion of the discovery of scientific truths is upheld through (in this case of facts and scientific facts) verificationism and not fallibilism.

Not true. A claim that something is a fact is already assuming that the proposition is true, through verifying it via different means, depending on the context of the proposition. — Posty McPostface

No, because 'the snow is white' is not ' "the snow is white" '. both 1) and 2) state the proposition as a fact, only 2) makes it explicit. We could distinguish :

1) The snow is white = assertion
2) It is a fact that the snow is white = explicit assertion
3) It is that the snow is white = assertion
4) "The snow is white" = non-assertion

Couldn't "fact" simply be a sort of ontological/epistemological primitive?

Thus defying proper definition, or at least non-circular ones.
Like a pure demonstrative, but for "that which is true". — Akanthinos

That sounds right.

Michael Ossipoff

Going all Wittgenstein on this Sunday, there are other cases of using facts that do not have epistemological content, such as;

2+2=4 is a fact — Posty McPostface

It seems to me that 2+2=4 is best regarded as a hypothetical fact that's the "then" conclusion of an inevitable abstract if-then fact:

Definitions::

"1" means the multiplicative identity specifed in the multplicative identity axiom of the real numbers (or rational numbers, or integers)...

...and 2 means 1+1
....and 3 means 2+1
...and 4 means 3+1...

"If " Premise:

If the additive associative axiom of the real numbers is true...

"Then" Conclusion:

...then 2+2=4.

...an inevitable abstract if-then fact.

Michael Ossipoff

SO facts are statements? — Banno

A fact is a group of words that express an idea that has a positive truth value. Whether that counts as a statement would depend on the definition of statement. And yes that does seem circular.

It's a nice example of how simple words that are seconded into philosophy become enormous problems. In its natural home it has various uses, but when philosophers try to pin them down they start to mix them up. — Banno

Then other philosophers reject bivalence in an attempt to justify the mixing...

It seems to me that 2+2=4 is best regarded as a hypothetical fact that's the "then" conclusion of an inevitable abstract if-then fact: — Michael Ossipoff

This. '2+2=4' doesn't seem to be anymore a fact in itself than '2+2' or '2=2'. It is a mathematical proposition, which means that it is dependant on mathematical forms of assertion. A proof is probably is good way.

Here's how I think one ought approach answering "What is a fact?"

It is important to treat this as an epistemological question, not an ontological one. That is, "What is a fact?" is a question about how best to use the word "fact", not a question about what sort of thing a fact is. We don't need to make assumptions about there being things called facts.

So the question becomes one of working out a suitable grammar for epistemological reflection. We are looking for the place "fact" occupies amongst other words like "sentence", "statement", "true", "false", "belief", "justification" and so on. Our task is to understand how we can coherently and cogently talk of facts.

Thoughts?

More to come.

Sentences are well-formed strings of words.

Some sentences have a simple subject/verb structure, and are called declaratives or statements. Other sentences can have other structures.

Statements can be used to make assertions.

Statements can also, generally, be assigned a truth value. That truth value will be a second-order predicate ranging over some group of statements.

Like truth, beliefs range over statements, but also over people - they set out a relationship between someone and a statement: John believes the cat is on the mat.

"...is true" gets complex.

For starters, for any statement p, (p) and ('p' is true) have the same truth value.

So at least in that sense truth is redundant.