Belief A belief is a propositional attitude.
That is, it can be placed in a general form as a relation between someone and a proposition. So "John believes that the sky is blue" can be rendered as
Believes (John, "The sky is blue")
B(a,p)
There's ill will in some circles towards this sort of analysis. Think of this as setting up a basic structure or grammar for belief. A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition. That there is much more to be said about belief is not in contention; this is just a place to start. This is set as a falsifiable proposition. If there are any examples of beliefs that cannot be stated as relations between individuals and propositions, this proposal would have to be revisited.
It has been suggested that animal and other non-linguistic beliefs are a falsification of this suggestion. The argument is that non-linguistic creatures can have beliefs and yet cannot express these beliefs as propositions, and that hence beliefs cannot be propositional attitudes. But that is a misreading of what is going on here. Any belief, including that of creatures that cannot speak, can be placed in the form of a propositional attitude by those who can speak. A cat, for example, can believe that its bowl is empty, but cannot put that belief in the form B(a,p). — Banno
I think what we call belief is really a relation between different propositions, whether or not they agree, and actual beliefs are our internal models of the world. Our models of the world are not entirely conscious, and that being the case, it can't be said that we always know what we believe.
Agrees (proposition a, proposition p)
If I offer a cat an empty bowl it will not mistakenly try to eat from it. I can't lie to the cat and tell it there is food when there is not, but I can trick the cat nevertheless. I can offer a cat an empty bowl, listen to its MEOWS of protest, and wait for the timer to go off in the electronic cat bowl that opens a compartment in the bottom which reveals a delicious feline feast. The cat's internal model of the world, perhaps just that specific bowl, is revised in some way. With enough experience with the electric bowl, the cat could reliably predict mealtime or 'believe' the bowl has food even though it's not immediately apparent.
Critters compete, cooperate, and freeload just like people do, they just don't do it with conceptual propositions as we do.
We should probably use
agree instead of
believe because it is more honest.