I believe I follow some of it, though other points seem to me somewhat dubious. It feels a bit strange to say that one is to be held responsible for making a judgement - I don't think that must follow. It seems to me as if we make judgments much the same way as we breathe in oxygen, that is automatically.

As for the revision of commitments given new data and judgements, that sounds radical, but in my personal experience it's not too frequently that I stumble upon an idea or an argument that makes me revise all or even most of my previous "commitments". That whole idea is strange to me, which is not to say it can't be useful.

As to the plausibility of Brandom's reading of Kant, I may have some doubts, but for that @Mww is your guy. He knows his Kant better than most scholars, as far as I can see. And he's quite a character to boot.



Weird rhetoric? Only if you think it'll make your point clearer. This is already rather dense.

If I understand you correctly, I think rationality (more so than norms) goes significantly beyond stop-signs or handshakes, it's an innate characteristic of a very peculiar creature, namely, human beings.

Its claims are independent of this or that observer. What's negated is not mind but personal perspective. In my view, this kind of dualism is hopeless and yet so often projected on physics, for instance. — plaque flag

That's a fair way to phrase it.

By mind-independent I mean what the word says. If we did not exist, there would still be planets and suns - in some fashion - as would there be photons and fossils. I don't believe that we literally created the world, that there was nothing here prior to homo sapiens.

But without us, these distinctions couldn't be made and what would remain as far as we can tell, is at best a bunch of fields of energy and a worst (from our want of understanding) a "I know not what" Lockean substance, or a noumenon in the negative sense, in Kant's philosophy.

That may be the case, gestures are a big form of communication. But it's also quite sophisticated, a bit more so than animals, in terms of the circumstances in which a specific gesture can mean many, many different things to different people.

As to the evolution of language, or cognitive faculties more broadly considered, here's a paper Richard Lewontin, who Chomsky often sites concerning the topic, which is quite interesting:

https://langev.com/pdf/lewontin98theEvolution.pdf

I have his 3 collected works volumes. Besides the mandatory Meditations (including part of Objections and Replies) and Discourse on Method, I'll probably read his Rules for The Direction of Mind, Principles of Philosophy and Comments on a Certain Broadsheet.

I'll probably skim some of his personal correspondence. And I'm unclear if I'll finish the entire Rules, but that's more or less what I have in mind. Although I want to understand his general thought better, I want to put special focus on innate ideas.

Thanks for the heads up. Descartes is up next on my re-read list, so once I finish that I may be able to answer some of the questions you pose.



They can't because dogs don't have a language faculty. Communication and language are frequently confused, they are not the same. All animals (or most of them) have some form of communication, but they don't have language.

the notion of them learning button-pushing communication is not far-fetched — Gnomon

They can be taught many tricks, no doubt. But I wouldn't go as far as saying that a dog knows it's pushing a button. More likely the dog reacts to a very specific environment, which we interpret as the dog pushing a button.

I really don't understand what's controversial about the idea that biological creatures have limits. It would be a miracle if they didn't. I mean, it should be completely uncontroversial, a truism.

But, apparently, it's giving up on enquiry or being arrogant or something. Oh well...

What, you come here asking for proof? What's up with that?

:nerd:

As I understand him, it is not a mark but the thing that thinks. The 'I' asserts itself. Claims its place and authority. — Fooloso4

I see. Although it has a certain intuitive appeal, it is kind of nebulous. Which occasions the question you ask:

Does he make this distinction between self and mind? — Fooloso4

I don't know. It looks like an important distinction though. Also important is to see what differences there are (if any) between "I" and self.

Sure. The "I" is a mark of mind (along with creative language use and thinking), which according to him, could not be explained by appeals to materialism, which is why he postulated res cogitans.

The issue for me is, was he aware, maybe inexplicitly, that the self is a creation of the mind, or if he took it to be a literal thing, or both? Then again, by arguing for dualism, one can take it to imply that he took it as a literal thing, maybe unconstructed...

Putting the issue in a modern way, was he aware that the given, which includes the self, is as much as a construct as the external world, which we construct on the basis of sense data?

I'll need to read him in more detail to see if this specific topic is addressed by him.

I agree, but I’m putting it more strongly: they can help, but they can also positively hinder. — Jamal

Sure, especially if you insist that if the other person is not sticking to your own definition, then that person is not talking about the same subject you have in mind. You (or I) could be wrong, or we could be misleading people.

Though we do need some common point of anchor, otherwise we can't enter into a conversation.

I don't know how simply saying that the self is a kind of fiction or a necessary social construction is any less clear than adding the aspect of a "tradition we perform", nor do I see how a scientist or a philosopher is "to accept the selftranscending bindingness and legitimacy of these norms."

What norms? If a scientist is speaking about astronomy, she is specializing in a specific branch of science, attempting to clarify what exists in the mind-independent world. I'm not sure I am seeing the rest of what you are arguing. I suppose I am missing something.

It's late here so I can't reply to your longer post.

I don't understand your problem with Descartes. What do you mean by "whence the rational norms?"

Beingthere? That's the Heideggerian critique, which is interesting, though Descartes had a specific problem in mind, to account for the mental, since for him and his contemporaries, the physical was well understood. Outside his experiment, in ordinary life he didn't live like a skeptic, nor did he act as if an evil demon was an issue.

The "I" is a construct, I am re-reading Descartes soon, but I believe he was aware of this.

If you could perhaps phrase the post in a different manner, I could better understand your criticism or concern.

Sure, I could be called a property dualist, though I think it can be misleading to think of experience and non-experience as separate metaphysical things.

God was used back then by almost everybody, Descartes had no special claim in relation to others in using God as an explanation.

As for the rest - It's a bit complex, I could perhaps follow some of it, maybe word things differently in other areas, such as the self.

As for the ghost, Ryle had it wrong, and Chomsky right, so far as I can see. What Newton got rid of was the machine. The ghost remained, and is still here.

I hear you. It's a wicked problem. Even the notion of consciousness is something I'm pretty sure we couldn't conceive of without language. — Tom Storm

We would need something within experience to be able to point out that we have experience in an explicit manner. Otherwise, we are stuck with analyzing behavior. Thus we postulate other mammals to have experience, though they lack language, based on how they behave.

It struck me listening to Chomsky recently, in his lambasting of postmodern relativism, that he seems to invoke a structural version of Platonism as a foundational grounding to avoid relativism. In other words, humans seem to have innate limitations or capacities inherent in our cognitive apparatus (is this neo-Kantian?). Not everything is possible or endlessly open if we have such limitations. I wonder also if this is an analogue for some kind of notion of human nature. Thoughts? — Tom Storm

It's a long story. The short version is that he was influenced or found enlightening the arguments given by Ralph Cudworth, a 17th century Cambridge Platonist, who essentially articulated Kant's arguments in almost the exact same words, almost 100 years before Kant published his Critique.

Difference among these two being, Cudworth give a much richer account of innate ideas, Kant seems to deny them, arguing that we have certain "filters" that are innate, but not ideas per se.

You could put it in your manner and he might agree, though he would put less emphasis on Plato per se. I think he'd simply say that, we are biological creatures like any other - albeit with unique properties (like language). For us to be able to have any nature, we have to be constrained to give shape to our experience.

If we had no constraints, we would have no nature, we would be kind of like lumps of malleable clay. Just like a dog will never understand how to use a laptop, or a dolphin never be able to learn how to drive, there are things we will never understand. Otherwise, we are not natural creatures.

Then you can add the philosophy.

Seems appropriate. But at some point experience becomes language and visa versa. Experience ends up being understood through language and I struggle to understand to what extent I 'process' through language. — Tom Storm

There is an intimate relation between language and thought, that much is crucial. And a great deal of our language capacity is unconscious and inaccessible to experience. Nevertheless, absent that layer of experience, there could be language going on in a hypothetical Martian, but it'll stay stuck in the relevant organ. So explicitness in experience is important.

I just want to avoid the po-mo orientation in which everything is language and nothing is ever complete. But, I see your point.

But hypothetically without preconceptions, ideas or language, what exactly is a planet? It seems to me to be an act of constructionism, not merely raw experience. There are understandings, if you like and then we seem to order, contextualize, name. — Tom Storm

I can't do a hypothetical if you ask of me to do away with the only things I have that I can use to relate to an object.

Yes, a planet is a construct - in large part. But if you do away with ideas, preconceptions, language, I wouldn't even be guessing.

But based on what I do have, it seems more reasonable to me to say that a planet is made of non-conscious matter, than to say it is made of ideas, which requires a subject. When things become this abstract, one is poking in the dark.

I mean, I'd say here with Russell, that we do not know enough about the external world (or physical stuff) to say if its nature is like or unlike "mental stuff" or the world of mind.

Yes, I think the case is that we know discover the world through experience, I literally can't think of another way, it all leads back to experience and how we interpret data.

But I wouldn't go as far as to say that an object, say, a planet, is literally made up of ideas. These things are discovered through experience but are made up by matter. Just like brain activity is made up of physical stuff, that leads to experience, I wouldn't say that the brain is made of experience, although we discover things about it using consciousness.

Again, these things may not be as different as our ordinary intuitions imply.

What's interesting to me is that dictionary definitions barely scratch the surface of the definition of a word. They give a hint as to what the word means, but the application of most words goes way beyond anything given in a dictionary.

Which hints at something which I think is quite profound, and not well understood, because it is obscure. We already know the gist of the meaning of the word, before knowing the actual word. Put in another way, the words add a kind of structure to what we already knew.

As Leibniz said, replying to Locke:

"[Locke]: The crime of killing an old man, not having a name as parricide does, is not taken for a complex idea. [complex idea, roughly meaning=concept]

[Leibniz]: The reason why there is no name for the murder of an old man is that such a name would be of little use... ideas do not depend upon names [words with definitions, in this context] ... If a... writer did invent a name for that crime and devoted a chapter to 'Gerontophony', showing what we owe to the old and how monstrous it is to treat them ungently, he would not thereby be giving us a new idea."

(Emphasis mine.)

I think this applies rather broadly, but there is room for exception.

So, in general, I think that we most of the time, have a decent idea or notion of what we want to communicate. The failure of communication has more to do with the ideas behind the words, than the words themselves. So, I'm inclined to agree that philosophy shouldn't be primarily about definitions, though these can help.

Hard to say. It appears as if a kind of mind or at least a central nervous system, is needed to register sensations.

Nevertheless, it does look as if plants have some type of sensation, or at least, behave as if they do. Perhaps sensation is somewhat broader than what we take it to be.

Or perhaps they're not, and they do depend on mind.

There may be such entities. I don't think it torpedoes it though.

Thanks for expanding, but I'm still not quite clear on your position. Is experience material in your view ? Why is the subject familiar with experience as opposed to simply familiar with the world ? I guess I'm a direct realist in some kind of postHegelian sense. So for me there's no image between us and the world. — plaque flag

Sure, experience is material, or physical. I distinguish here an epistemic claim with a metaphysical one. Everything we are familiar or acquainted with is through experience, this is an "idealist" claim. The metaphysical side is that everything is physical stuff.

One is top down (the epistemic claim), the other bottom up (the metaphysical claim). I think that we have an idea of the world, which is provided by the world. So, there is mediation, but it's also a direct realism, I don't understand indirect realism, despite looking at examples or definitions.

Sorry, my views sound strange given the philosophers I tend to think are correct. I take it, following Galen Strawson, that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon, it arises from configurations of matter. So, there is no "immaterial"-material problem.

Nor a mind-body problem, as these terms are used of today. I agree with Chomsky (and Locke and Hume and Priestley) that we don't know what "bodies" are. Until we know that, we can't formulate a mind-body problem.

Another issue is considering matter as described by modern physics, not much in it is "material" as that word is taken to be associated with "tangible stuff", but that's another conversation...

But what is this subject ? — plaque flag

It's a hard topic, though I agree with Descartes in so far as he takes it that experience is the phenomenon, we are most familiar with out of everything. I drop the dualism, especially the substantive kind.

A self is a "fiction" (as Hume says) of a kind - a very useful one. But is a self a subject? Probably not in all respects.

It's very dense territory.

I do think insisting on the mystery of consciousness can be done in an interesting way (forgetfulness of being), but I also think Dennett is right to be frustrated with those who block the road of inquiry. — plaque flag

I understand that perspective. But I don't see any contradiction or roadblock here by saying that experience is mysterious for us, in terms of how it arises from matter and letting neuroscientists and cognitive scientists do the hard science.

There are important discoveries to be made in these fields no doubt and even if I think they won't be able to explain the so called "hard problem", they can prove me wrong or find some other way of answering the question.

One last comment on Dennett, he has interesting things to say (outside consciousness), but regarding this question he was once asked about it in relation to other animals, and he replied, roughly, by saying "do monkeys and chimpanzees use English or any language? can they ask questions?"

I take this to mean that if monkeys or chimpanzees were capable of asking questions, then they would be capable of answering. It doesn't follow.

So perhaps you and I aren't too different in perspectives. Maybe different emphasis.

It's not that I take the issue too personally, it's that arguing against it - as Dennett does - seems to me to be irrational in the extreme. The point about limits is too trivial, a bit like denying that when we see the sky during the say, it doesn't look blue. That's what I find annoying.

But you grant it as an empty platitude. OK, better than not granting it, no doubt.

There is a fine line between arrogance in terms of saying what we can't achieve, that's correct. On the other hand, it's even more arrogant to think that we can achieve everything, if only we tried enough.

I think it's perfectly clear that we won't be able to learn much, if anything, about free will (and will actions more generally considered). Why do I say something so presumptuous? Intelligent people have been discussing it for over 2000 years without an iota of progress. Now, if someone denies that we have free will, OK.

The idea of matter thinking is one we can make no sense of, how brain matter produces thought seems to me to be a conceptual issue that we cannot understand, for similar reasons as the free-will issue.

There are other issues: in physics for instance, we still have a lot to discover, but we do have to keep in mind practical considerations when it comes to feasible experiments.

But there's obviously still a tremendous about to learn.

That's not knowledge. I'm talking about (conceptual) knowledge not sniffs and glances. — plaque flag

There's no reason to believe that we happened to evolve into a species that happens to know everything there is to know about the universe. That's simply wishful thinking.

But if you think this is wrong, because we went to the moon, then OK. You seem to believe that we are not creatures of nature. Because if we were, there would have to necessarily be limits to what we can and cannot know. In order to know something, some aspect of reality, one must be ignorant of other parts of it, otherwise, no cognition could possibly develop.

An organ like the brain and a faculty, like our minds, depend on constraints for possibility, otherwise they would have no shape, we would be very much "a blank slate", as Locke argued. That's just not true, we aren't blank slates.

Again, if this doesn't sound at least plausible, then I have nothing more to say, we are too far apart on this topic.

I predict that dogs won't understand laptops for at least 1000 years. Why? They currently don't have such a capacity. Maybe by then they will be a different species who can use a laptop, but they won't be dogs anymore.

Still, we should be skeptical, we do have good evidence that ever since humans domesticated with dogs 15,000 years. In those 15,000 years, the only evidence of change in the species is one of phenotype, not one of cognitive capacities.



If such a being exists, it would know. Not a semantic issue. Dogs understand/know/are familiar with smells we cannot, that's just a biological fact. Same with Cats and night vision.

It sounds semantic because there are no other animals that possess symbolic representations associated with language use, therefore we use the best words we can to approximate what they do that we can't.



Thanks!

His point is really not hard to understand and the opposite view, that we can in principle know everything if we "learn enough" is anti-scientific in the extreme. I won't use his words, because apparently, they aren't clearly stated.

Either we are natural creatures, or we aren't. If we are natural creatures there are things we can do and things we cannot do. We cannot fly like eagles, we don't have the visual acuity of a mantis shrimp, we don't have the capacity to smell as much as dogs and so on.

Continuing with the case of other animals, suppose someone says "dogs will learn how to use laptops, it's just a matter of "learning more" and eventually they will understand it".

That is a silly argument.

Likewise, we as human beings, while possessing properties and capacities which are unique in the whole history of life (as far as we know), are still creatures of nature. Like the dog never being able to use a laptop, there will be things we will never be able to do or understand.

We won't learn to breathe underwater like fish, nor can we understand how it is possible for matter to think. We know it can, but we don't see how it's possible. Likewise, we cannot comprehend the idea that the universe is as large as it is. Sure, we can draw a symbol representing infinity or alternatively, a very large number, but our brains quite quickly "shut down" when we start contemplating galactic distances.

But there's no reason why another, intelligent being somewhere else in the universe would have any problem understanding how matter thinks or have any issues contemplating gigantic distances.

Either something like this is true, or we are completely separate from nature and possess powers given to us by God, or whatever supernatural explanation you would like to invoke.

We actually do though, but that is not why you can't refute those ideas. Rather those are ideas science cannot test, as metaphysical claims we just cannot. Solipsism cannot be tested or proven because it says only your existence is certain and everything else is either doubtful or non existent. So it can't use any metric to support it's argument. — Darkneos

How? What you are arguing doesn't at all go against what I'm saying. You say that because these views are metaphysical (which isn't clear that they are, some are epistemic, as solipsism is about our knowledge of the world, not the world itself -as would be claim made by materialists or idealists) hence science cannot test them.

I agree science cannot not test them. If we knew more, if we had a more sophisticated and elaborate understanding, I don't see why we couldn't know enough to say for certain "solipsism or skepticism is false." We can't say they are a-priori necessarily metaphysical views.

For an advanced civilization, they may be trivial questions.

Nevertheless for us, the issues will remain problematical, so it's not as if I'm trying to refute these ideas, we can only go by probability and likelihood here, in my opinion.

Well - in a sense yes. We wouldn't have a brain if there was no gravity, nor electromagnetism, nor proteins or anything else which emerges from physics, as almost everything does.

But we look at the relevant organ to study the phenomenon. From that, we can focus on the cognitive aspects, the neurological aspects or even the phenomenological aspects, many ways to treat this topic as you say.

But I think it makes more sense to study brain behavior than looking at what physics does. So, some approaches are slightly more relevant than others.

:cool:

I think I may have an idea of what you're saying.

:scream:

Mon dieu!

You take ideas seriously? How could you?




:wink:

https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Space_Science/Extreme_space/What_is_the_Universe_made_of#:~:text=The%20Universe%20is%20thought%20to,visible%20object%20in%20the%20Universe.

Also we can make a ton of sense of the external world, that’s how we have modern society. — Darkneos

Yes, because more often that not, our perceptions and conceptions are similar enough that we understand each other more or less.

But we don't understand the external world enough to refute solipsism or skepticism, or idealism and many other ideas. If we did have a better understanding of it, these problems need not arise.

I would keep away from Hume if I were in your shoes, which in a way I am, at least at the moment you read these words.

The external world is an extremely difficult topic. Assuming more people exist other than I - which is a mere assumption, for I can do no better - we don't know what 95% of the universe is made. 27% or so, is called dark matter - which is a misleading name, it might not even be matter - the rest is dark energy, also a misleading name.

So we only partly understand 5% of the universe. But we must postulate 95% of it with stuff we know virtually nothing about, except that if it is not postulated, the 5% we do know doesn't make sense.

Now, if you take it that physics to be, outside our immediate perceptions, the most reliable knowledge we have, then it shouldn't be terribly surpassing if we cannot make much sense of the external world, because the topic is much more difficult than physics.

So, we postulate what we need, in order to make sense of the world. If that includes other people, so be it. We cannot attain certainty in empirical affairs.

It's a mere problem of taste. Didn't do it for me at all.

But I can see why other people may think it's very good.

Speaking of Zen, one "pop" book (a novel actually) that spurred on a mini-industry was Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values. I'm just looking now that according to one source, Philosophy Now, it is the bestselling philosophy book of all time. I find that hard to believe, but if true, is a shame.

That a clear example of (in my opinion, of course) pretty bad "philosophizing", it was so pretentious and vacuous that I could get more than halfway through. Though I'm sure some swear by this book...

So the pop-thing is mixed. I do think there are quite interesting and unique "philosophical" aspects to some aspects of pop-culture, which should not be looked at derisively, as can happen.

But then there's the bad stuff we all know about...

That is not panpsychism though. Matter is capable for many things under specific conditions but we don't go around talking about i.e. Pancombustism, or Panflatulencism or Panphotosynthesism.
Actually this is a great point you made, because this is the WHOLE argument of our current Scientific Paradigm. — Nickolasgaspar

That's exactly right. But then I don't see why we can't speak of pancombustism, or panphotosynthesism or pan-everything. That's a problem for the panpsychists who focus on consciousness at the expense of everything else.

Even if the claim is as broad and vague as possible, it's nonetheless true, in so far as we get all these processes from combinations or interactions between matter or "physical stuff".

Now ,we can rule out panpsychism or consciousness in structures without similar biological gear, because such structures lack sensory systems(no input) or a central processing units capable to process drives and urges (which are non existent),emotions, capability to store info (memory), to recognize pattern, to use symbolic language, to reason, etc etc. — Nickolasgaspar

But I don't see a principle by which sensory inputs and processing units couldn't be created by people, in a non-biological creation. Again, I don't think it's plausible, but I don't think it's impossible either.

As for panpsychism, the reason I don't think some formulation can't be ruled out, is that there is obviously something about matter that when so-combined, leads to experience. Granted, it's in brains that such combinations arise, so far as we can tell.

But even so, if matter did not contain the possibility of consciousness as a potential, then experience couldn't happen even in brains.

This doesn't suggest that, as some panpsychists have argued, that particles have experience. That's a bit much.

I was replying to his specific claim that we don't know if matter can be conscious. I think it can, when so modified in specific configurations leading to brains. Brains are molded matter. But I make no reference to the quantum properties of the universe to explain experience, so biology very much matters.

Yet I don't think we can rule out panpsychism, or even the possibility that consciousness could arise in other types of material, such as silicon and metal.

I don't personally believe in either of the abovementioned options, but I can't rule it out.

That specific example can be easily carried to past philosophers. But some of the stuff, say PKD writes, or Pynchon or even a character like Hannibal Lecter, these don't fit neatly into a specific philosophical lineage.

Or at least, it seems to me it could lead the conversation to the philosopher, instead of the character.

But yes, The Matrix can be used as an example for Descartes, Berkeley or Kant or Schopenhauer, Putnam, Bostrom, Baudrillard, etc.

Will some people get more out of reading Descartes and Kant? Depends on the person. They do have a larger wealth of ideas than film (in my opinon), but, there are aspects of the film which don't fit neatly with any philosopher. All I'm saying is that there can be interesting philosophical/psychological and ethical matters that could be discussed absent specific figure X.

But your point is quite valid.

I think there are historical reasons that lead us to conclude that consciousness is a property of matter. But it also depends on what you think matter (or more broadly "the physical) encompasses.

We don't know that consciousness is limited to brains. We don't know what causes it. Often when this is mentioned, the response is that we know that you can be made unconscious by various actions. Actually all we know is that we don't remember things from that period. Neuroscience says a lot about cognitive functions and their connection to neurons and glial cells and...so on. But that there is awareness/experiencing. — Bylaw

I agree. We do not know if experience is limited to brains. It could be the case that panpsychism is true, or a variant of the idea that some kind of proto-life is found in all the universe.

It could be. But it could be wrong. We don't know enough to be sure about this.

It's a delicate issue. I think there are pop tv-series, movies and maybe even games, that certainly have quite interesting philosophical concepts and art is often the most direct way to expose complex ideas pertaining to mood, insight, looking at persons thinking process and so on.

Suppose someone finds an interesting character in a TV show. They want to find out more about what makes this character "tick". These "... and Philosophy" books can be good to expand on certain themes in a show.

But then there's a bit of a dilemma: do you use the show as an excuse to introduce people to Plato, Augustine, Descartes? Or do you directly expand on the character itself, without pushing the classics on the reader?

I think there's room for both, but my general feeling is that they tend to opt with the second option, that of introducing Aristotle or Sartre or whoever. Which is fine, but then many of these books end up looking similar.

It's more honest to expand on what the person finds interesting in the show, than forcing Aristotle (or whoever) on to the reader.

Of course, there must be some authors who can combine the show with a historical figure and do a good job with it, but it often feels contrived. Perhaps a reference or two to some classics would do a better job than introducing Bentham for the 50th time. Might be a personal thing...

Sure. And some aspects of other biological organs are also quite puzzling, baffling even.

So, we have this thing in our head that produces thoughts, it has many neuronal connections and many connecting regions which cohere in very subtle and complex manners that lead to our experience.

But then we also have "the gut brain", which has hundreds of millions of neurons and can apparently suffer from Alzheimer among other diseases. Why aren't we conscious of it the overwhelming majority of the time? Why isn't it conscious itself?

https://academic.oup.com/acn/article-abstract/37/3/595/6535686?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Could nature have found a more efficient way for organisms to get rid of waste that did not include going to the bathroom, as it were?

So, one can be confused at these too, but, as you say, certain very curious psychological mechanisms apparently determine what we find baffling, and what we don't. There is only so much we can focus on at a given time, so I guess it makes some sense.

Of course, and philosophy wouldn't be nearly as interesting if we all agreed. I find unanswerable questions - especially in the pursuit of the thinking that leads to it, to be quite exquisite reasoning and I admire that process because I find a certain beauty to it and it leads to epistemic humility (not addressing you in any way as arrogant or anything remotely like that, just to be clear.)

However, I completely understand with, sympathize and enjoy people who think this specific aspect of philosophy to be a waste of time. It can be, if you don't find it interesting, it is.

As for the last part, sure, they need to present the relevant evidence for big claims, but I do believe there is a rather nebulous territory in which some scientific arguments can clash productively with philosophy. But some areas not, like, it would be silly to deny QM because you don't think it's coherent, or that someone would dispute that the amygdala plays a role in anxiety.

So, it's complex. :)

I won't quibble with the comments about animals, it's a matter that won't get us far, since we agree on the practical considerations.

The same should be true about Metabolism, constipation, mitosis, memory, photosynthesis, conductivity, liquidity, fluidity, replication, organization, emergence etc. As a scientists we should ignore the "why" questions and try to answer the how and what questions. — Nickolasgaspar

And it is a very good list, and I agree that all these things are quite baffling, as I think existence should be.

I am surely not going to get in the way of a scientists and suggest them what they should, or should not do. Science has been a spectacular success story since it lifted off in the 17th century and it should continue as far as it can.

Nevertheless, in a philosophy forum, one that features people interested say in Plato, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein and so on in the tradition, it is quite important to deal with these why questions, to differing degrees and with different perspectives in mind. It's built into the fabric of the discipline.

But on the practical dealings of the experiments, and data collection and theories, that's mostly up to the scientists.

Now, if a scientists were to say, that free will is an illusion or that we don't actually perceive colour, we only think we do, then the philosophers can have say, and rightly so, in my opinion.