Very much so. He has other philosophical ones too, but this is among his very best.

And it covers quite a lot of territory. Not a bad idea to do a thread about this novel or PKD in general.

Hope you like the whole thing. It's quite a trip!

Also looking forward to your thoughts about it.

In some ontologies based on objective idealism, all thinkable, perceivable and feelable objects exist regardless of whether they are the objects of any finite subject's consciousness. — Ø implies everything

This sounds like a complication. An object is an idea regardless of the subjects experience? Why postulate an object which can (perhaps) never be encountered by a subject and also claim its ontological status beforehand?

There could be some phenomenon that cannot be encountered by our kind of experience.

In an ontology based on objective idealism, there could be a "place" for its intrinsic nature to exist as well, despite perhaps our fundamental incapacity to mentally access that nature. — Ø implies everything

I think that's fair.

Can you bring awareness to your awareness itself? Can a subject be its own object? Even if it can, we know from experience that it is not so at all times. — Ø implies everything

Correct. Schopenhauer addresses this point rather well, about us being both subject and object. And yes, our self-consciousness fluctuates.

However, for this to then be idealism, experience would need to be derivative from experience; if not, then one would not be dealing with a monism, and thus, it would not be idealism. Bernando Kastrup conceptualizes this derivativity as experience being to experiencer what waves are to water. — Ø implies everything

Why can't idealism be monist? One could speak of the different aspects of the mental.

Kastrup uses this analogy, and it has some force. Sure, there is only water, but the activity of waves is an attribute or property of the water: water can be wavey, given certain circumstances.

In other circumstances, water can't be wavy, for instance if it is forzen. So while we are still speaking of water, we should consider the epistemic conditions that allow us to label something as wavy, or frozen. Which takes us somewhat beyond "just" water.

What if it is all an illusion; what if the self is just a construct of thoughts that belong to no-one, but that insist on belonging to someone? Can I not write on a paper, "Hey, I (this paper) am alive!". Perhaps an idealist reality can have objects that falsely proclaim the existence of a self. — Ø implies everything

There is a sense in which the self is an illusion, or rather, a fiction, in Hume's phrase. But beyond our own conditions of having selves, to extend that to objects and attribute to them this aspect of "self", is not warranted, regardless of ones ontology.

just consciousness when seen from the dissociated boundary. — Tom Storm

That's the one aspect of Kastrup which I think goes way beyond any evidence or even intuition. To extrapolate from dissociative personality disorder and apply it to objects is a massive leap, which doesn't look tenable.

I think Kant suffices, or Cudworth - whom Chomsky specifically references.

Still, Kastrup is quite interesting on many topics.

I suppose one formulation of idealism would be: there are only ideas and nothing else.

So, all there is are ideas, and ideas come from minds. If this is the argument, then we cannot say that there is non-mental stuff. The interaction problem does not arise.

One problem that arises out of such a formulation is pointed out by Galen Strawson, I think correctly. If there are only ideas, then the person who has the ideas, is also an idea.

But this is a problem, because an idea is (or should be) an idea for someone, a subject. But if the subject is an idea, then who is it that has the idea? Another idea? We could say a mind has ideas. But then the mind too would be an idea. That's not too coherent.

But, that's a very vulgar and general formulation of idealism, there are many others, which are quite sensible.

it is reasonable to suppose by the term appearance is meant mere presence, by them both — Mww

One has some leeway in how these terms can be used, it's not something set in stone.

Why "mere" presence? As opposed to presence.

I'm not much into the philosophical dimension of ethics, but this topic sounds somewhat interesting. I suppose I'd take the pragmatic approach here and ask the question, what practical differences in our conception (and action) of morality follows from one being either a moral realist or an anti-realist?

I mean, one can claim that they don't believe that murder is a crime. But rarely do such views lead to such acts. On the other hand, those who are serial killers, may actually believe this, and act according to this belief.

But then even they (frequently, not always) acknowledge that what they did was morally wrong, and society labels them as lacking a fundamental component of being a human being, correctly, in my view.

Aside from related examples, I don't see a big issue. But someone could clear up my confusion here, as I know almost nothing about such topics.

I'd have to go back to my paperback copy of Hume's Treatise to confirm. I don't think he denies that the mind attributes properties to objects in a certain way. In other words his attribution of effects coming from objects as opposed to us attributing effects to objects is not entirely clear, it can be read in several ways.

But being a good empiricist, he calls effects brought forth by the mind "animal instinct", which is a definite downgrade from Kant's more sophisticated account. His focus suffers, in that he doesn't, and probably cannot, given his principles, elaborate on many functions of said instinct.

Other than this caveat, I have no issues with what you have said, which is well put, as usual.

I assume that this particular charge was brought forth because the prosecution thought it was the strongest case against him, legally speaking. After so much time - and with the campaign for the White House going strong, they wouldn't want to bring forth charges that might be easier to get out of.

And yes, there are strong political currents guiding this investigation. And US presidents have committed far worse crime than using campaign funds to pay off a porn star - that is mere peanuts.

It will be interesting to see if this somehow complicates his candidacy for the White House, or if it will only strengthen people to support him more.

Perhaps looking at several of Susan Haack's articles - many of them freely available on academia.edu, could offer some help.

Alternatively, you can try to look at Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed.

I have not found exactly that, there are several versions, some take articles from different periods of his life and arrange on a topical basis: the introduction to some of these books can offer some framework. So too could Peirce's correspondence with Lady Welby.

Thing is, his writings in a single volume can be erratic, as he wrote on everything. Editors have tried to correct this.

Good luck.

Do you want me to argue against that or to comment? I don't disagree with what you say.

People insist they see a tree, and they are correct, but only as a consequence, without knowing or caring about the antecedents necessary for how it is a tree, only a tree, and not any other thing. — Mww

One can - and should - speak about the necessary cognitive conditions that allow us to classify something as this particular tree as contrasted with some other tree, or indeed some completely different object.

And absolutely, the ground of phenomena as (re)presentation is very interesting and important. But it can be parsed out of the question of "do I directly see a tree", that is, for the sake of answering the question narrowly, it need not enter.

You could include it and argue, correctly in my view, that this unknown thing is the ground of my presentations, but since we (arguably) cannot cognize this is any positive manner, I don't see how this helps in answering the question.

Hoffman incidentally disagrees, he does think we can get to the grounds of things, by pursuing theories that suggest that spacetime is not fundamental. I think this is a mistake.

There is plenty more to say, but it would lead to issues that could take this conversation significantly outside of Hoffman's thinking, and this thread already is veering off the OP.

What justifies that assumption ? How is he seeing around his own wall of perceptions ? — green flag

Around the wall of his own perceptions? I don't quite follow. You can think about your thoughts - as in, I can think about me typing these letter right now, but I don't get "out" of myself, in fact cannot do so.

He is interpreting beingthere in terms of perceptions given to a self. This is not starting without presuppositions. This is picking up a tradition uncritically. This is taken inherited frames as if they are the deepest and truest necessity. — green flag

Of course we have a given, and of course it is a construction. We cannot help doing so. But "dasein" is also an assumption - giving primacy to a certain kind of unreflexive action, but why is that mode of being more primordial than another mode of being?

It looks to me as if one chooses what aspect of our lives we want to take as a given, and give that primacy. It can be practical activity, it can be perceptions, it can be economic conditions or even word -use.

Why isn't it "We think, therefore we are" ? I am not saying that people are plural. I am saying that the 'virtuality' of the self (as a way of being a body and a social institution) is probably singular because it's easier to manage a single body in a social structure with a single set of statements to be responsible for. Imagine two souls in one body. — green flag

It can be. Several propositions can be taken to be primary or obvious, from "I am" to "We are" (taking into account that we are made of many organs that work is co-operation, or we can think about ourselves as particles) and even "thinking an idea". Thinking of a diamond is arguably as good as thinking of a self, in terms of such foundational experiments.

Well - he is consistent though, in his discussion of the self he famously said:

"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception."

You may reply that he is using "I" here in a misleading way, because by using that word, he is assuming what he is denying. No quite. In all these topics, he has in mind something like an empirical criteria: that which we can check with the restraint of empirical evidence. And while I agree that there is no such independently existing entity "I", we cannot, not use it - in fact, it's part of world law.

We enter into serious problems here, because a tree, is just as much a construction as an "I" or almost anything else. If you want to be radical about it (as some are), you can say that there only are fields of energy, or strings.

but somehow he can see outside of his narrow compass and determine that I too am trapped in my own narrow compass — green flag

He's assuming you are a creature similar to him - a fellow human being. And since it is true that both are human beings, he feels confident in saying that his "narrow compass" will also apply to others.

If something along these lines is not true, empirical psychology and ordinary communication would be much easier, as everything can be put forth in a transparent manner. If there is no "inner consciousness" (and I don't know of an alternative), then we should be open to inspection in a manner that should be less difficult than it currently is.



I respect having arguments in which we can disagree, without getting mad or angry, it's useful. :cool:

And you obviously have a good formation as well.

Very true about copying our elders. I agree about the ideas mattering, more than belonging to a tribe, no doubt. It's also hard to not sympathize with some of these people.

As far as I'm aware - in this thread - I don't believe I have made a metaphysical distinction, one between "body" and another of "mind" nor one of "internal consciousness" as opposed to "external consciousness".

I did mention that Hoffman's reasons for defending a kind of idealism, were not very convincing, but I doubt he would call himself a dualist either.

You've talked about the problems with the metaphysical notion of an inner mind, and you seem to say it is a confusion. If you can say why it is a confusion, maybe I can follow.

As far as "monism" goes, yeah, I think it's a sound idea. I personally like Galen Strawson's "Real Materialism", but not his panpsychism. Some people call that view "dualist" because he accepts what most of the great figures in the past have taken for granted, that we start with experience.

Maybe all of them are wrong in this respect. I'd be very dubious, but I cannot rule it out.



As with many philosophers, there are different perspectives on who is or is not important or should be. I think Wittgenstein's ending in the Tractatus, the last few pages, are his best work.

A lot of the Investigations are also great. But some have taken him to be the solution for all (of most) of the problems in philosophy. It often boils down to, one is using a word incorrectly, hence this word causes your thinking to be wrong.

That can solve problems. But it's also a way of avoiding them. But as with everything in philosophy, this too is debatable.

I have heard of him, but have been warned by a very good philosopher - Susan Haack - to steer clear of him.

I suspect that too much emphasis on certain late-Wittgenstein ideas might not be to my taste. But, there are other to keep in mind too, some, like C.I. Lewis, who introduced the concept of "qualia" in analytic philosophy, did say very interesting things about describing "what we mostly taken from granted explicit", as does Raymond Tallis.

But perhaps you can say the main point. I say that we have internal mental lives. So does Hoffman - and perhaps most people, which is no indication of its correctness of course. Hoffman calls his view "conscious realism" - I take it to be "common sense", which again, does not imply it is correct.

You say that it is misleading or confused somehow to believe in these things? Why?

I didn't presuppose that you were leaning on authority nor that you were being condescending, I am only pointing out that anyone can refer to distinguished historical persons to elucidate almost any kind of argument. Another matter is if those persons referred to makes convincing arguments that are better than arguments made by opposing views.

The hard problem of consciousness is that people think they know what they mean by consciousness in a metaphysical context. — green flag

Perhaps - it can happen. There is plenty of "woo", as is popular to use here, associated with consciousness.

Nonetheless, I don't think there is a way to phrase the mind-body problem in a manner that is understandable, as these terms are commonly used in (much, but not all) contemporary philosophy. So here we may agree.

The issue of an internal mental state is more of an epistemic issue than a metaphysical one. At least to me.

Having said that, one cannot completely disentangle epistemology from metaphysics, but one can attempt to keep them apart.

The thing is, I wouldn't say it's an assumption (re: we infer that they are (conscious), based on how they behave, which most of the time mirrors the way we behave in similar circumstances), I'd say it's a factual claim of how this actually plays out.

Sure, you can refer me to Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Ryle. I can refer you to Russell, Chomsky and Strawson...

We have no way of knowing, according to a certain type of idealist, whether other people's consciousness is at all like ours -- or whether it is there in the first place. But this would mean the sign could have no meaning. — green flag

But this is true independent of a belief in idealism. We don't know if other people are conscious, we infer that they are, based on how they behave, which most of the time mirrors the way we behave in similar circumstances.

The purely mental is understood to be known directly by exactly one soul. But 'consciousness' is tossed around as if it's obvious that we all have the same 'internal ' 'experience.' — green flag

While I would agree that the brain is physical, in that it is molded matter, I don't see why this denies the mental aspects of matter, which are found in animals that have certain nervous systems, such as mammals, and most refined in us.

The soul is by now an outdated concept, which was quite fruitful in the classical and early-modern periods in philosophy. Yeah, there is "internal experience." You can easily remind yourself of this evident fact when, for instance, you toss around in bed before going to sleep, perhaps you are thinking of something which makes sleeping difficult.

Or when you read a book, or meditate, or remember something that happened last week or years ago, and on and on and on.

Where is the problem here? This is pretty trivial, as far as I can see.

It can be difficult, especially trying to give a comprehensive account of everything involved, because the phenomenon in question is complex and multifaceted, involving many organs, and much mental processes of which we are not aware of.

But it need not be. Consciousness is direct experience. What you are reading right now, what you see when you look at the window, what you listen to when you put on music, all of that is consciousness.

It needs organs to get information inside, but without it, nothing would happen, senses would merely pass through such an organism.

Not at all. That fly analogy is a nice one and can sometimes be used (arguably) correctly. For instance, if someone argues that there is a "mind-body" problem, that's assuming we know what bodies are and furthermore know enough about them to conclude that bodies can't have minds.

Of course, that is debated.

But to me it looks like the opposite, trying to deny we have private experiences, or that consciousness is just a way we use a certain word, signaling "to know with", instead of an actual, concretely existing phenomenon, of which we have the most confidence in anything in the empirical world of possessing, then I think this supposed Wittgensteinian view is the one that twists itself into a pretzel, in order to avoid facing hard problems by setting them aside.

So, depending on your perspective, several flies are stuck in several bottles. But we won't easily admit that we are the ones inside. As it should be. These views take time to develop.

Well, I mean, it's not that we "can just be naive realists" - it's that we are naive realists the vast majority of the time, despite how incoherent it may be to us.

We don't have a choice.

Maybe if someone is mystical or something, maybe they can avoid being naive realists most of the time, we can't.

The funny thing is that really simple arguments begin to show how weak such belief actually is.

If someone can tell me what it is, maybe I could reply. But if it has to with, say, marginalizing sensations and mental states, then I don’t even see what there’s to argue.

We sure can say quite a bit about idealized states- no doubt. It’s pointing out that this knowlege too is representational. So I don’t think we have substantive disagreement that I can see.

Ah, you are a follower or fan of Wittgenstein. Then we will probably disagree. Words get meanings in several ways- it’s context dependent. I don’t see any problem with the idea of a private mental state.

Sure, all those things you point out are true, there is a tremendous amount of filtering, selecting of information, unconsciouss processess and so forth that provide us with the image we end up seeing, that is a fact for us as creatures endowed with the capacities we have. And, of course, if we lacked these things, we couldn’t construct anything. But then we’d have to grant that some aspects of the things science discovers, are also so aftected by us - if we had no capacity for mathematics, say, or if we categorized things differently, then we might construct a slightly different theory about, say, the brain. Alternatively, if we had acute enough vision, we could see photons. But it sounds misleading to me to say “we percieve objects indirectly”, as if there is some other possible way to percieve objects at all- absent some system that constructs sense data into something intelligible. The object directly causes our own innate systems to react the way they do- by the methods you describe. We see something indirectly if something is obstructing our vision, or if we find evidence of some force we cannot detect with our sense organs. And I say all this while accepting or agreeing with the concept of things-in-themselves. Hoffman thinks we can have knowledge of this based on some theories that suggest that spacetime is doomed. Fine. I don’t think things in themselves are of a representational nature.

:clap:

He got me into philosophy and his ease in explaining philosophers is unparalleled.

I am forever in his debt.

Which objects do you know of that exist, but do not affect us?

If something exists, that doesn't affect us in any way, then I don't see how it could be called anything.



The human genome was completely mapped, what in the early 2000's or so? I wasn't consulted about it, that I know of.

And when new drugs are created, I'm not invited to take part in the test trials.

But then, how does this work? It is assumed, correctly, that we share the same nature, so that if the genome of another person is mapped, then mine is as well (at least to a massive degree, perhaps a difference of .00001% or something.)

How do I know a person is depressed? If he tells me, and is honest about it, then I can assume he is depressed. He could be lying. I cannot enter his head.

But if I observe his behavior and see that he acts in a way consistent with a way I would act if I felt depressed, then I have a good reason to believe that he is depressed. Add that to his own description, and we can proceed.

Generalize this to virtually everything, and you can see how what Hume said is not a contradiction. There will be a tiny portion who diverges from this norm, but that's to be expected.

We are the same creature, and thus overwhelmingly act in a similar manner, given similar situations. So, I don't see a problem.

So the world is intelligible only for those for whom it is intelligible.

Yep. Not exactly Berkeley, is it.

What is it that makes this a form of idealism, I wonder, since it seems to be something with which a realist would agree unproblematically? — Banno

It's not intelligible to a rock, so far as I can see. Other animals don't seem to have concepts, so the issue of intelligibility doesn't arise.

It's a form of idealism because it is only through the way objects affect us, that we are able to form any picture of the world at all. As I quoted Hume before:

"Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass."

The fact that we can attribute independent existence to the entities postulated by science is a (reasonable) postulate, subject to further refinement.

For instance, Pluto was downgraded from a planet to a minor planet, after more information was gathered. GR and QM were discovered and used as a way to complete a picture that what once held as absolute, Newtonian physics.

And on and on, from re-labeling species to the age of the universe, if these refinements don't come from a mind capable of analyzing, conceptualizing and so forth, I don't see how it would be possible.

Finally, science studies appearance, not inner natures or "things in themselves". We observe what gravity does, we don't know what it is.

And we can't get out of our bodies and see how the world is, absent us.

Nope, it is not. The idealism I defend, posits that the world we belong to, this world here, is only intelligible to creatures with the capacity to use cognitive faculties to make sense of that world.

It doesn't deny evolution, nor QW. These things happened independent of us but can only be discovered to animals endowed with reason.

There is time as we experience it, and time as it occurs in the universe, which doesn't have subjectivity.

I don't defend Hoffman, in fact, I'm critical of his formulation of the problem as you can see.

But, as you will tell me, I am confused in my use of words - because since you studied Wittgenstein with a magnifying glass, you understand the actual meaning of words, as opposed to the clowns.

But then, don't bother with clowns, myself included.

Berkeleyan idealism is hard to defend. So is something like Hegel's idealism.

Even worse is the whole Chopra-like industry.

It's very different with people like Cudworth, Schopenhauer and Kant. You can add Hume too, within an interpretation, as well as Locke.

I don't need to mention how much the fathers of QM - or least several distinguished figures like Einstein, Schrodinger and Wolfgang Pauli thought of Schopenhauer, and Kant.

This whole tradition of marginalizing consciousness is rather recent, arising after WWII, and now slowly losing force.

These types of idealism are far richer, and in fact, without them, science wouldn't be possible.

So, it very much depends on what "idealism" one defends.

Kastrup is very interesting, though his notion of "depersonalyzed complexes" referring to objects is not convincing. I much prefer Raymond Tallis, who isn't an idealist per se, but certainly has very rich things to say about consciousness.

As for Hoffman, his value, I think, is to make idealism a respectable position in the sciences, which it should be. These metaphysical questions are quite enriching and offer plenty of food for thought.

As for ordinary people, I don't know - some of the more informed (which does not mean they are correct) might say that science tells you what there is. Most, I'd guess, would be baffled to think that anything other than naive realism could be true. If you add in religion, they may have some ideas about the "in itself" - or similar notions.

But at the same time, despite the noises made by some of the rowdier types, scienticism isn't taken seriously by most scientists.

The computer analogy breaks down quickly, so while it has its pedagogic value, it is limited.

But then I agree with the content of your post, so I'm not sure what you want me to reply to, or comment on.

Those are hard questions. If we look at most living things virtually all of them lack reason.

Maybe higher mammals have some glimmerings or sparks of reason, but nowhere close to us. Which is to say, that it could be "dumb luck" that we are here.

If that's true, that might cause us to pause and marvel that we are lucky enough to have reason. But with a sample planet of one, it's hard to say.

I read Hoffman's book and have seen interviews. I don't recall him explicitly mentioning reason in any exulted manner, though he pre-supposes it.

I agree with you. I'd only accentuate that if we look at a river - conditions being good, we being mentally healthy, etc. - that's a remarkable achievement of reason, by sense alone we wouldn't discover them.

Since we are alive, we must have gotten many things right (and true), despite numerous errors in perception.

At bottom pure experience? Sure, I agree with you that there is no good evidence for this.

The given is a fascinating topic, though Sellar's own arguments are complex, and I often don't follow his reasoning. I prefer C.I. Lewis' take on the subject, or Raymond Tallis, but I don't see much disagreements here.

I mean I am a rationalistic idealist in these topics, so the idea is far from foreign.

As for the analogy, there's a limit, it's fine for a video game. For real life it's different. If I see a tree, and am confident I am not dreaming, nor hallucinating, then I take the tree not merely seriously, but literally, there's a tree outside my window.

Now so far as the transistors go, they play a massive role in its constitution, and if our best theories say there are transistors, then I take them literally. The transistors are at a deeper layer, but I wouldn't say that the transistors are "more real" than the tree.

There are other questions too, crucial ones, like the idea of "things-in-themselves", which I take very seriously, but I don't think science can speak about these.

I agree that it's with organs like eyes and ears that we acquire data of objects. These sensations evoke in the mind/brain a powerful interpretive apparatus that includes things like: interpretation, imagination, combination, continuity in time, concept formation, classification and so on.

We could call these things "ideas", but to imply that we are "stuck" in them suggests that it's a prison. We can also call them thoughts, perceptions, goings-on, object processing, object reactions or any other word.

Without the mind/brain doing this, we would have no registration of the data of sense, it would be like using a flashlight on lump of wax or a chunk of clay - nothing happens.

I don't get why this process isn't "direct". I take it that it is directly caused by the object, as we react to them given the brains we have. Why would I doubt the existence of the world and its objects? I have no reason to take skepticism too seriously, or otherwise I couldn't move.

It depends on how the veil of idea is formulated, if it as was done by Locke and Hume, I don't see it as a trap, but then it is also misleading to call it a "veil".

As for Hoffman, it's not his idealism or his "consciousness realism", that I have any issues with, it's that the foundation of said arguments are flimsy.

It even becomes obscure what "truth" or "reality" means as used by Hoffman. It almost sounds like what's true is what we don't find useful for survival.

I have seen it and it does not address the issue. It goes against what he is saying, if he is giving evidence that our senses mislead us, why trust the evidence? It too is misleading.

He goes on to say that in fact, "spacetime is doomed" - meaning, it is not fundamental enough, there has to be something beyond it, or something which supersedes it. But then why trust the data of physics?

Physics is based on what our senses can capture, which then combine with our intellect to either accept or reject the data within a theoretical farmwork.

But perceptions systematically mislead us...

He would need to explain why evolution and physics are special in relation to all other types of knowledge. I don't recall him replying to this rather important point.

I think Raymond Tallis put it best when he said that if Hoffman really believes we didn't evolve for truth, but only for survival, then why should he trust his experiments which rely on evolutionary arguments being true as a necessary condition for how own view?

I'd elaborate that: either evolution is misleading Hoffman and we can't attain any truths, rendering his view incoherent, or evolution is correct, then Hoffman must grant that we evolved for truth (in some instances), rendering his views false.

Not that I have any problems with idealism - or at least some versions of it - but the way Hoffman proceeds is far from being a good way to present idealism.

I don't see how it is possible to "bypass" emergence, of any kind.

Just as liquid can arise in a specific combination of molecules, which lack liquidity individually, so does consciousness arise in a specific configuration of matter, while the separate parts of matter constituting a brain are not themselves conscious.

It's a fact about the world as well as a fact of our cognitive makeup, that we cannot understand how this could be possible. Too bad for our understanding.