Under the framework you sketch out here, that is, depending solely on impressions and not bringing in any cognitive apparatus, it would indeed be correct to say that the impression is successive in time, as "newness" would involve the registration of this concept to the mind, instead of mere perceiving.

I can't answer your second question under these constraints, because again, to register something as new would require us to recognize that the object in front of us is not exactly the same, as the object we were looking at mere moments ago.

If you introduce cognition in addition to impressions, of whatever kind, the answer is far from trivial, in my opinion. There is no neat way of introducing a new object while separating this strictly from continuity in time, in fact, this is one of the problems we've been discussing, that of trying to establish how sensible it is to speak of a distinct impression being distinctly existent.

So the idea of a "distinct perception" is something the mind produces from its own way of dealing with what it derives from the senses, The senses themselves, in no way produce distinct perceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with such a proposal and it's the mental side of distinct perceptions which is problematic, given what you correctly say about the arbitrariness of our cutting up of time.

But "reason" in its proper definition is only the rational and logical activity of the mind. This leaves a vast amount of mental, or brain, activity which is obviously not reasoning, and obviously not activity of the senses, as unassailable, in an uncategorized grey area. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. There are many powers or capacities in the brain which Hume does not recognize or spell out well enough, one area of particular weakness is his notion of ideas being faint copies of impressions. As @Mww correctly reminded me, we should be thinking of representations, which are far stronger and more stable than Humean ideas, heck, I'd even say representations are underdetermined given the brevity of our impressions.

Furthermore, the science of physics supports this position of distinct individual objects — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought physics supported the idea of the world being made fundamentally of probabilities and constant activity, individuation of objects is something we do, which is clearly helpful for all kinds of reasons. So I am unclear here of your example.

If, for example, we say that an object's spatial existence is discrete, or distinct, and its temporal existence is continuous, it appears like we might have both distinct and continuous within an object. However, as the ancients knew, objects are generated and corrupted in time, so that temporal continuity is a bit elusive... — Metaphysician Undercover

By today's standards, everything is a bit elusive, so to speak. These "fictions" or representations that come innately from us are for sake of convenience. And here we should keep in mind that we are analyzing objects (mostly, not exclusively) from a "vulgar" perspective, which is rather different than analyzing an object from the point of view of physics.

The vulgar or naive perspective fails to account for the complexity of reality. It is a simplistic view which serves us well in all our mundane activities, so it has become the dominant view, a simplistic monism. The philosopher seeks a higher understanding and quickly uncovers the problems inherent with the simplistic view. The difficulty for the philosopher is in finding a system which can resolve all the problems in a coherent way. — Metaphysician Undercover

We might disagree here. I don't think it's simplistic, even though I say it is convenient. Philosophers focus on different aspects of the world, those dealing with, say, ethics or law, will care much about the vulgar world. Those that focus on epistemology find interests in both. And then we have philosophers who focus mostly on science.

Back in Hume's day, these distinctions were not nearly as sharp as they are today.

Sorry for not commenting on your Aristotle's portion, I don't know enough about him, and would need more serious study, for some other time. Though I'm sure what you point out about him also merits consideration

Yes, but the representation of these perceptions, is not, re: consciousness. The implication of each new perception is that we have to learn a thing every time we perceive it. — Mww

Correct. The object serves as a stimulus, which leads us to develop representations of that object. So we have the representation of the object even when we are not receiving sense-data from said object. Nevertheless, the moment of perception, if you will, is still new: the object ever so slightly changes, and so do we. This us leads down some avenues, concerning rationalist thought, nevertheless, correct statement on your part.

You mean an internal cognitive power like, “… — Mww

Sure, Hume's quote is fine. But I can also say something like my comment above. An object stimulates us, we form a representation. However, each perception we have of the object is new, even though the representation is not, though we often don't register this unless the change is noticeable: a fire is still a fire, until the moment it is extinguished, then it's either tar or smoke.

so are we really looking for connection of perceptions — Mww

At t1, we are looking at a clock telling us it's 5:10 pm, at t2, it's telling us the same thing, the same thing at t3, but at t4, the clock now indicates it's 5:11. But this can be expanded to most objects.

There is a lot of material here to cover. One pertaining directly to Hume's own vocabulary, the other pertaining to your examples and illustrations. You are of course right that, perception is a complex process that we make seem instantaneously but is not. The issue is, is it correct to say that a perception of say, a curtain NOT moving in the wind, that is, appearing static, count as a distinct perception?

In this case, we have no way of establishing this, absent some environmental change such as the wind, or a person or pet moving the curtain. But plainly we must attribute distinctness to perception, if we didn't, then we wouldn't register anything, just movements of events.

On to your own examples:

The problem though is that reason works best with static descriptions, predications with laws of logic, like non-contradiction, so it does not properly apprehend what the senses give to it, change. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does, and I think we can venture to say - based on current evidence - that "higher" mammals tend to perceive this particular aspect of the world similarly, they seem to sense continuity in a single object. But we know that isn't the case, though Locke pointed this out several times, we now have advanced physics that tells us so. There are no fixed objects in nature. It's just the way we see the world.

And it isn't altogether clear that evolution-arguments about survival here make sense. Like, if we happened to see objects in an interrupted manner, kind of like an object flashing quickly on and off, we would necessarily die - depending on how quick these interruptions are, I think creatures could survive such a circumstance, or see no reason why they couldn't do so.

So this is the incompatibility between sense and reason. Sense gives us a picture of continuous change, while reason says that at any step of the way it must be describable as either this or not this, and if it is changing from being this to not being this, it must be describable as being something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

And, Hume aside for this moment, it is very curious. I mean, for us, the philosophically inclined, when we think about this topic, it just seems obvious to us that something is "wrong", or "incomplete" about objects: that's why such topics have been debated for millennia, back to Heraclitus and more.

Senses are very good at what they do: react to what they're supposed to react to. But we know that senses alone, absent some mental architecture, however minimal, would leave us no better than an amoeba or some other creature with a rather poor nature.

So, if reason is a problem, and senses don't help with objects, it is correct to postulate something else, call it nature, instinct, negative noumena - SOMETHING, that renders this intelligible. Even though Hume concludes that the imagination misleads us here, it is a faculty not explored enough, that can also be postulated.

In any case, knowledge of objects brings with it the idea of something not quite being right with naive, "vulgar" pictures of the world.

And you know as well as I, that unless the power and absolute necessity of a priori reasoning denied by Hume and continental empiricists in general, became part and parcel of the rational human condition, there wouldn’t be a sufficiently explanatory theory, ever. — Mww

I agree that these explicit a-priori conditions are missing from Hume, aside from the very broad label of "instinct". But even if you take say, Descartes, Cudworth or Kant, and add all these innate mechanisms and architecture, we can say, roughly, that the "inner side", of identity is present to us.

It is still very curious that each perception is new, and that IN our reasoning, we cannot connect our perceptions, though we can postulate an internal cognitive power, which does such binding for us. The problem of the connection of perceptions pointed out by Hume remains, or so it looks like to me, in terms of it being fiendishly difficult to focus on each perception and looking for the connection of perception of object O at T1, T2 and so on.

Yes, that sounds accurate to me. A few comments:

One part of the paradox, which he states but does not expand on, is the topic of the duration of these perceptions. Although not in the section you are discussing now, he uses examples of closing his eyes or turning his head and then states that these perceptions are new.

I think that's true, but then it also seems to me evident that even if we don't close our eyes or turn our heads, there is only so long we look at an object before we claim that we are currently having a new perception.

And, also, strictly speaking, we have a new object, say a chamber, which is extremely similar to the previous chamber, but not literally the same one, the wind might have blown a curtain to the side, particles of rock or leather have deteriorated and so on.

We are insensible of these changes, but they nonetheless occur. It is curious that reason itself can present us with such a problem, when at first glance it seems evident, we are looking at the real object in real time, but then Hume has a point with his idea of "double existence", which look quite unreasonable the more you examine it.

It is useful to note in this quote, the following:

"Whoever wou’d explain the origin of the common opinion concerning the continu’d and distinct existence of body, must take the mind in its cummon situation, and must proceed upon the
supposition, that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue to exist even when they are not perceiv’d. Tho’ this opinion be false, ’tis the most natural of any, and has alone any primary recommendation to the fancy." (p.213)

(Bold mine)

For some reason, which is not easy to discern, these we are content with these paradoxes in "vulgar reasoning", because it is "the most natural of any" and produces the least amount of trouble to postulate.

No no, I mean, it's a great post and quite methodical, I'm not quite an authority on Hume but have interests in some of things he discusses, so keep that in mind. I quoted him in the Appendix, which I will share again, this time more extensively, in which we have something very rare happening, a major philosopher admitting that his project has failed:

"But having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have induc'd me to receive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another....

But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.

In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding."

Italics mine.

So yes, his account of the way we acquire ideas is false, though somewhat intuitive. What I think he is right on, is on his phenomenological observations about objects and us not being able to find a connection of them in thought, although it must obviously exist. Also, each perception is new - it might be an empirical issue which could tell us how long a perception lasts, though maybe it is too difficult to measure.

The way it looks to me, is that he has presented us some rather big problems, which are hard to even think about for too long, it's like he says, an instinct gets us off this train of thinking.

A different approach might help us, here you can bring in Kant or others, and although the framework is improved as I believe it is, I think the problems aren't solved, they're stated in a better manner.

Well he doesn't have Schopenhauer's dual aspect view: of being an object and a subject simultaneously, at least not nearly as strongly developed.

But he does say that when we look at our bodies, we are looking at impressions, not the actual body itself. Yes, I do think a Humean mind is not tenable, he is missing out on some important categories and powers - as he more or less recognizes in the Appendix.

But if you take perception as he does, which one can do, while still knowing the mind has more capacities than Hume allows, the problems he points out are still serious problems for perception. So he can be wrong about the powers of the mind, yet correct in observation, at least as I see it.

the animal has instinct moreso than reason, while the human animal has reason moreso than instinct. — Mww

Yes, exactly.

That's how it seems to me too.

Ah, I see, sure in this sense we are talking about then, "instinct" is rather similar to "the human condition". In both cases, funnily enough, these are innate considerations not drawn from, nor extracted by, experience.

While browsing the preceding section which @Srap Tasmaner mentioned in his reply, I found an important quote, which also covers some of @Mww's concerns, and is a very important passage in general, as reading it should cure people of the misimpression of the extent of Hume's skepticism:

"Shou’d it here be ask’d me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those‘, sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falshood ; I shou’d , reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour’d by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render‘d unavoidable." (p.183)

Book 1, Part 4, Section 1

Fair enough.



My reading of Hume is that he does take reason to be a faculty on its own, but he consistently tries to show how weak it is - weaker than we would like to believe. I'd have to enter the moral domain to give a full account of Hume, but I'm not too interested with moral philosophy.

Whether reason is or is not, as strong as we would like is an open question. One can say, that the state of the world we're in certainly shows reason is not our strongest trait. Yet we know many, many instances in which reason shines quite brightly. So, it's not clear to me either way.

According to the generally acknowledged first serious scholarly work on Hume, by Norman Kemp Smith, whom you no doubt know, says that Hume is a philosopher of "passion", if I remember the exact word correctly.

We may not trust our reasons, but we have no choice but to trust reason itself. — Mww

I don't understand what you are saying here. What does "trusting reason itself" imply? I mean, reason told us for thousands of years that we were the center of the universe, which is not at all a silly view due to the evidence available at the time.

So I'm unclear on what you are saying here.

Well, someone else replied to you, which takes a task off of me, not in that I don't mind exchanging ideas with you - truth is the opposite, but I also don't want to be overwhelmingly the only person talking here.

There are many directions to go and one's own inclination will also determine, to an extent, what one finds useful or surprising or revealing. You may be of the opinion that Hume may not be too interesting. Nevertheless, one thing I'll say:

It does not necessarily follow that because he can't find convincing reasons for our belief in the continuity of external objects, that he should also "... ask for the causes by which his believing that the existence of bodies is to be taken for granted."

For him, it is too hard a question to ask. We have reason, which for Hume is "...nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls..." (p.179) Book 1, Part III, Chapter XVI

An instinct is something that cannot be explained, it is given. It is also something we just do, like perceiving or talking. One can analyze the given, but not explain it. As he says: "Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity." (Last sentence of the Appendix.)

Cool! Mason & Dixon is wonderful.

I did not like Against the Day too much, maybe your experience will differ.

Sorry for the late reply, it’s been a busy day. You raise good points, as expected. I’ll give you a due reply tomorrow. All I’d say is to try and keep going, even with those concerns being raised.

We are speaking about different things. The quoted passage is about the reasons surrounding our belief, not about the belief itself.

And even then, he admits that his "hopes vanish", he could not get himself out of his own arguments.

One deals with everyday life, "vulgar reasoning", in which we take for granted and cannot dispute the existence of objects, what you are emphasizing, are the reasons for the belief, not the belief itself, because, as Hume says:

"There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214)

You are focusing on his "profound reflections", while minimizing what "we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse".

It just means that body does not exist in the way that we commonly think that it does — Metaphysician Undercover

This must be true.

No. I'm a Chomskyian,

This is a thread trying to explain what Hume believes, I haven't said too much of what I think. In such threads, I think it makes sense to bring out what makes them special or important historical figures.

I think his idea of our minds being like an "empty theatre" and also a bundle of perceptions, to be extremely wrong, heck, Descartes had a more sensible theory of mind than Hume.

What I think Hume gets correct is concerns the nature of perception, how it works phenomenologically, it's as I experience it.

I mean, I think it does make sense to postulate something "behind" the objects as it were, and you can say that we take object X to be X, in virtue of us: we that recognize it (object X) as having the necessary properties found in all objects of X type, it has these properties and we recognize them as such, because of the type of cognition we have.

Still doesn't solve the issue of the perception being new, nor knowing virtually anything about whatever may be the cause of the object, it remains a postulate only, imo, though it is very reasonable, and I agree with it, on the whole.

Unless you had something else in mind.

It's, in a way a natural evolution of traditional propaganda as developed in the early 20th century. We just so happened to develop the internet, and why wouldn't those power not use this to their advantage?

One of the saving graces for the internet is that, if you know how to use it, you can find very good information, which would otherwise be extremely difficult to obtain.

One must assume "they" (CIA, FB - all these government and corporations) have everything on you in terms of information, and will use that info according to how they see fit.

Wars such as this one provides just more example of such a system on controlled information works.

It is a total mind-f*ck. Also that we are, strictly speaking, looking at a new object every time we open our eyes.

Makes no sense at all, but it's what we have.

On 1 and 2, yes, absolutely.

On 3, let's see... I'd only add or stress that the constant object we posit is identical (it looks to me) to the one we have in our perceptions, and it eases our contradictions with reason and reflection. But, yes, agree here too.

Very much so. Heck, we even went so far as to ban Russia Today on YouTube and other platforms. Of course, these can still be reached online. But the idea here being that it is insane to consider how the Russian government (Putin and his allies, essentially) views this issue. Obviously a big mistake, for so called defenders of "free speech". That arises in Europe when it comes to Muslims. Not here.

"Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continu’d existence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance of our sensible perceptions, that tho’ all sects agree in the latter
sentiment, the former, which is, in a manner, its necessary consequence, has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; who after all maintain’d that opinion in words only, and were never able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it. There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214)

No, he is not using the word "fiction" as is used today. A fiction can be useful, some more useful than others. The self is a fiction, yet we don't treat it as we do Harry Potter or something, much of our laws are based on the notion of morality which we attach to a person, also a fiction. Hume talks about his furniture and his chamber, true these are fictions, but very useful ones at that.

This error is a form of self-deception which further inclines the mind to create a fiction of the continued existence of an object. We readily associate distinct impressions with each other, and we have a disposition to judge them as the same. This judgement of same is an error, and this error causes us to believe in the continued existence of an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is why I provided in the OP, the following, to which I will add the whole quote:

"We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (p.187)

What he is discussing here is not the existence of these objects, it's that the reasons we give for our belief in their continued existence to be far weaker than what we ordinarily suppose. But he does not believe that we are deluded or fooling ourselves when we conclude that there are bodies.

I've talked a lot about the Appendix, I will now quote his famous passage where he argues that he cannot renounce his belief in the existence of external objects, a passage of supreme importance in all of philosophy, in my opinion:

"But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.

"In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding." (635-636) (Italics mine)

That's his own conclusion and although he says "I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions." (636), his conclusion remains true to this day.

And a final argument against such a view of denying such objects is when he says, also in the Appendix:

"As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrassed by any question." (638)

Italics his. Bold mine.

Very accurate and quite scary quotes, even some comparisons of Russia to Nazi Germany and the like.

Again, very reminiscent of how mass propaganda was discovered in WWI, turning an isolationist nation to a war crazy society in a short amount of time.

And we still have to say, that what Russia is doing to Ukraine is criminal. Because that's not obvious. If we survive this, be ready for the demonization of China, which has been developing a good deal since Trump and not slowing down with Biden.

It may be there is no purely mental difference between a veridical seeing and an optical illusion: the same predictions of your future states are generated. The difference is out in the future, when your expectation is confirmed or must be revised. — Srap Tasmaner

I suspect that this is the case in many instances of hallucinations or erroneous perceptions (visual tricks and the like). Then again, Hume does say "No simple idea without a corresponding simple impression." This is for simple ideas: red, bitter and so on. With complex ideas, it is more difficult.

I think what you say is true, provided we have had first the initial stimulus for us to recognize an object. After then we can say that optical illusions and veridical perceptions are in essence the same.

that, strangely, in analyzing the behavior of organism, we are driven to imagine that it must behave as if there were only mind, even if, as with our own case, we refuse to believe any such thing. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure. When studies are done on human beings concluding the efficacy of medicine, they assume the patients they choose will count for all people. Likewise with animals. Internalism (which is a kind of idealism) is a given, though not explicitly articulated coherently with enough frequency.

Perhaps it's that we believe in objects, but our minds do not! — Srap Tasmaner

I believe in objects, I don't separate the mind from myself, these I take "for granted". But when I analyze the reasons, as given by Hume, I see that my belief is weaker than I thought, by quite a bit. Stand in front a strobe light that goes on and off very rapidly and examine an object or person moving, you'll quickly see how fallible our reasons for certain beliefs can be, in my experience.

I think both in themselves and by environment are extremely complex. We aren't even aware of how we produce the sentences that we do at the moment we are writing them and also assuming that what I am saying right now, will resonate with you, as they resonate with me. Even how I move a finger is inscrutable to me.

Nature may find the simplest way of making things work, mind included, but look at fractals, or termite mounds or even the barest of all environmental formations, end up with spectacularly complex and beautiful constructions on the basis of quite simple "tools": rocks, dirt, perhaps rules in the case of the mind, such as recursion.

*from the point of view* of such a creature, there is only mind. On this, broadly, Hume, Kant, the Tractatus, and modern psychology are agreed. It is not so, but it *must* appear so, from the point of view of the organism. — Srap Tasmaner

That's exactly right and should not be controversial in the least.

That's interesting. And Hume was on the right track, broadly, in thinking that what you can learn from this recognition is not what's in the world -- whether there be objects, for insurance -- but something about how minds work. — Srap Tasmaner

Correct. One may disagree with his "bundle view" or his account of self, but he is right on many things, including the fact that what we see is our perception of things, not something distinct from them.

I think so too, he even states something similar in the introduction to the Treatise, with the whole "science of man" comment.

As Strawson concludes in The Evident Connection, the failure of Hume's empiricism, admitted by Hume in the Appendix, is that he is actually using more resources of the mind than what his philosophy will allow. But this will force him to explicitly acknowledge a complex mental framework, instead of this notion of a series of perceptions.

These are from Book I, section II, part VI

"...external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion." (p.67)

"...tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from- ideas and impressions." (p.67)

"The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos’d specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects." (p.68)

He does call the idea "absurd" in the chapter we are discussing, but what I take him to be saying in these quotes, is that we cannot conceive of them other than by our perceptions.

I'll later share some of Strawson's observations here, in which I think he argues, persuasively, that Hume can readily allow for these types of metaphysical issues to arise, but we cannot make a conclusion one way or the other about them.

That first quote you gave of Hume is indeed beautiful and I think, spot on. I didn't post it because I don't want to hammer home the "mysterian" angle, but it's there in the text.

But then where does that leave this argument which originally established that only perceptions not objects are present to the mind? If we can't contrast the apparent extension of the table with its 'real' extension, then we have no argument at all. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I agree that this is quite a problem for him, because if objects and perceptions were identical in all respects, there would be no way to distinguish the table or chamber because each perception is new and then what reference point would we have between my perception of the table at t1 and my perception of the table at t2?

One wouldn't even be able at t2, to call our perception "a table" at t1, it's a new object. We have to postulate a temporal space (a second, fractions of a second?) to t1 so a resemblance can arise which relates it at t2.

I think a key passage to make this less confusing is when he says:

"The only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is by means of the relation of cause and effect, which shews, that there is a connexion betwixt them, and that the existence of one is dependent on that of the other, The idea of this relation is deriv’d from past experience, by which we find, that two beings are constantly conjoin’d together, and are always present at once to the mind." (Italics mine) (p.212)

But then he goes on to say: "But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect between different perceptions, but can never observe. it between perceptions and objects." (p.212)

I think this last quote is problematic, a stimulus is needed.

To end this post, he does say:

"There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214) (again, italics mine).

So clearly a "natural impulse" is quite important in our ordinary image of the world.

Ok, now I can reply. There are many aspects one can choose to focus on in this chapter, so it can be interpreted in several ways, I want to single out a brief passage, prior to you quote of "We cannot in any property of speech...", he speaks about how time implies succession, and then says that:

"This fiction of the imagination almost universally takes place; and ’tis by means of it, that a single object, plac’d before us, and survey’d for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity." (pp.200-201)

I think it is important to point out, that in Hume's use of the term, "fiction", does not mean what we mean by it today, something not being "real", or belonging to mythical tale or a novel. It simply means "more than is warranted by the empirically available evidence." It is real, in the sense that we do experience the identity of objects, but when we look at the evidence, it turns out to be weaker than we would like.

He says, on p.203:

"When we fix our thought on any object, and suppose it to continue the same for some time; 'tis evident
we suppose the change to lie only in the time, and never exert ourselves to produce any new image or idea of the object. "

That speaks of your concerns that each perception is different, and it is by resemblance that we posit continuity. True. Now he says, on p. 204:

"I survey the furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is observ’d in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions
by the strongest relation and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. "

Italics mine. Each perception is new, and he does not want to distinguish between objects and perceptions. Yet he still speaks of "my chamber", if he didn't have a notion of identity, he couldn't speak like this, because he would have no way to separate his chamber from anything else.

An important, passage, I think, is this:

"We may begin with observing, that the difficulty in the present case is not concerning the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a conclusion concerning the continu'd existence of its perceptions, but only concerning the manner in which the conclusion is forrn'd, and principies from which it is deriv'd."(p.206)

Italics and bold mine. So, I don't think there is a tension is speaking about identity as we do, in regard to the The Ship of Theseus, only that Hume goes deeper and presents us with problems that go beyond, or are deeper in a sense, than the example of the ship.

As I said, one can pick out many quotes here, supporting different views, so one should keep this in mind. What I quoted here is what I think makes sense from a holistic perspective, but this can be debated.

Lula!! A sliver of good news. Now lets see what Bolsonaro does, stupid clown.

Yeah, this will be interesting to discuss, I'll get back to you sometime tomorrow, there's a lot to say here.

If an object has continuous existence, it must continue to be the object which it is, or it becomes something else. That's what change does, it annihilates the object as being what it was, to be something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how this follows. I mean, one can use the example of the Ship of Thesus: we replace one part of the boat with new wood and discard the old parts, it's literally not the same object - as it has new pieces in it, but we still recognize it as the same ship.

Likewise, if we are looking at a flower, miniscule parts of the flower are blown off by the wind, so it's literally not the exact same object one moment to the next, but we still recognize it as the same object. You can think of it as flower at T1 and flower at T2.

Therefore, that the object is continuous is supported logically, but that the object is distinct is not. This is the consequence of him trying to make the assumption of "object" (as a distinct individual) consistent with sense perception which is continuous. The object loses its status of being a real distinct individual, because it requires the dual status, of two separate instances, and memory to relate them. And the separate instances are similar rather than the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is this difficulty, of thinking about distinct existences, I agree. Nevertheless, it looks to me as if there is something about a given object that makes us recognize it as that specific object, otherwise, it seems to me that we would have no way to distinguish on object from another. But it is problematic, no problem granting that.

The "necessary effect" is the assumption itself, the assumption of a body, or an object. If we have no choice in this matter, as Hume says, then this assumption must be taken as necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we have cases, which aren't that rare, in which we imagine objects to exist, when they do not: mirages, dreams, hallucinations, mistaken perceptions and so on. So an object is not, strictly speaking necessary, even if in most of the cases of perception, this is what we assume to be the case.

the skeptic says that we do have a choice in this matter, and even that our belief in such objects is unfounded and therefore a bad choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

As far as I can see, he doesn't present it a choice, postulating an enduring object is kind of like breathing or perceiving. It's not that it's a bad choice, as he says, (and pardon my over-repetition of quotes, but I think they matter):

"tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings."

The issue is that the reasons the (mitigated) skeptic (he's no Pyrrhonian) teases out, turn out to be much weaker than what we would like, particularly when we look at the world through "common sense" - what he calls "the vulgar system".

So skepticism affords us the capacity to believe what you say we have no choice but not to believe. And to validate this statement "we don't have a choice", we need to determine the cause which produces this as a necessary effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that for this, I'll need to introduce the Appendix to the Treatise, there he admits of his failure to provide what you ask for, it's very interesting and also very short, the relevant pages are like 2 at most.

Reading between the lines, it seems to me an inscrutable fact about how we experience the world. We strongly believe in the continuity of objects, but they change all the time. As do our perceptions.

We postulate a continuity we are not sensitive of, and hand wave it away by ignoring that each perception is new, and that in the intervals between experiences of the object it continues to exist as we perceived it, which creates the famous two-objects argument.

So, I see where you are coming from, and it is a very sensible question. But textually, I see no easy answer. In my own opinion, putting Hume aside, it's not evident what this necessary effect would be.

He says that:

"The imagination tells us, that our resembIing perceptions have a continu’d and uninterrupted existence, and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells us, that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence, and different from each other. The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy, by ascribing these contrary qualities to different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the continuance to objects."

Nature is obstinate, and will not quit the field, however strongly attack’d by reason ; and at
the same time reason is so clear in the point, that there is no possibility of disguising her, Not being able to reconcile these two enemies, we endeavour to set ourselves at ease as much as possible, by succesively granting’ to each whatever it demands, and by feigning a double existence, where each may find something, that has, all the conditions, it desires." (p.215)

He ends this section pretty much in a skeptical crisis, or close to it. The only thing I can read into all his very penetrating critiques that could offer a way out, is the highlighted portions I show above. We grant to each what it desires (nature and reason), but it is something we do,we don't have a choice. That pretty much sounds like an instinct to me, you can also look at javra's posts, which he has been nice enough to quote some of Hume's comments on instinct.

I am starting to realize that, even though one could read this chapter in isolation, it is by going to other parts of Hume's work, that one could find potential, reliefs as solutions seem to be wanting.

I think towards the end of this thread, I'll post here the Appendix, and only focus on like 2 pages, literally, that shows that he is not satisfied with his system, I think it shows that this problem is a bit too hard for us to solve.

is indicative of the external existence of objects — javra

Yes, and that's part of what makes this so fascinating and frustrating, we have indications of the existence of external objects, and plainly we take them as a given in our "vulgar reasoning", but we can't find proof for something that should be so obvious. So, it isn't as obvious as we think it is.

It's very hard for me to sustain his though experiment, that once we stop perceiving an object, we don't have many good reasons (although something must be there, in the world) to suppose it continues to exist. For as he says (I know I'm re-quoting him, but, he articulates it so well):

"...we find ourselves somewhat at a loss, and are involv’d in a kind of contradiction. In order to free ourselves from this difficulty... by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible."

Italics mine.

Still, what I’ve read about Hume is often quite different than what I gathered from directly reading Hume. For one example, to me, Kant borrowed from Hume rather than debunking him. — javra

I think so too on Kant. He improved some of the framework, but did not solve the problems Hume raised. They're too difficult, in my opinion. You are a good reader, had I not read Strawson's work before Hume himself, I might have gotten the impression that causality is just constant conjunction, I can't be sure. But it is very, very clear, that Hume was what is now called a "mysterian", which should be the common- sense view that we are natural creatures, and hence some things are beyond our capacities, as some things are beyond the capacities of dogs or birds.

Yes, that's a great quote from his Treatise. That's exactly right, or at least, that's how it looks like to me as well. This is somewhat paradoxical, given his reputation and thrust of his thought, an argument for innate faculties, as he puts what you quoted in his Enquiry:

"...and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate Instincts, and are so apt to admire, as something very extraordinary..."

Italics mine.

He was speaking of animals in this quote, but it applies to us too. After all, Hume was a naturalist. And like you say, he had to be somewhat cautious in what he said at his time.

Some of what? — Srap Tasmaner

You're doubts about him depending on perceptions to speak about the continuity of external objects when not perceived. His gives a lot of role to the imagination.

The word might be in there somewhere, but there doesn't seem to be much use made of the idea; the whole flavor of the account is causal, mechanical. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. I think he has in mind something like mechanical, but also something like an instinct, a phrase he doesn't appear to use in this chapter. Perceiving is like breathing or seeing, we can't not have perceptions.

Even if there are principles connecting objects to each other 'out there', beyond our minds, those principles apply to objects, not to our perceptions of them — thus we must have our own mental principles, which will apply to our perceptions, in order to conceive something like causality. — Srap Tasmaner

This is tricky. He's focusing here on our reasons for believing in them, but I keep going back to the "for granted" comment. The tension here, if there is one, is that there seems to be no connection, under these arguments from perceptions to those bodies we take for granted. But when he leaves philosophy and goes to "the vulgar system" (vulgar meant ordinary people, not an insult as it taken today), there are no problems about our recognizing and interacting with the world.

we need principles that will relate certain perceptions to each other. — Srap Tasmaner

VERY perceptive. This is one of the reasons he gives in the Appendix for, essentially stating that his system fails, or as he puts it "my hopes vanish". This is one of the things he cannot account for, how perceptions relate to each other. The other being that we really do perceive continuity in the objects. In other words, he has used these two principles: the uniting principle and the continuity principle (my terminology, not his), without being able to justify them, but he isn't able to renounce either of them.

That goes way beyond this chapter in terms of pages, but it's connected. Very, very interesting. And humbling too, to be able to say that about one's own system.