Which scores a stupendous predictive hit for Hume, even if I got it wrong. — unenlightened

Yes, I think that's right. The gist of the color constancy effect is that your brain prepares an interpretation of your visual environment and part of that is that objects have distinct and continuous colors (just along Humean lines) and it is this idealization of the objects in your environment that you are conscious of, not a faithful recreation of the color patches that make up your putative visual field.

and it is this idealization of the objects in your environment that you are conscious of, not a faithful recreation of the color patches that make up your putative visual field. — Srap Tasmaner

Because, of course, one is not normally interested in colour patches in one's visual field, but the latest dresses and trainers in the material world that material girls live in.

...what you are emphasizing, are the reasons for the belief,... — Manuel

Sure, that's what Hume has explicitly said is the subject of this section of the book. The section is not really concerned with the vulgar beliefs themselves, it focuses on the causes of these beliefs. And, when it is found that a principal cause of one such belief is an error, this presents us with a problem.

If his reason cannot be trusted with respect to determining the existence of bodies, why would it be trusted to reasonably ask for the causes by which his believing that the existence of bodies is to be taken for granted? Furthermore, why would we be “induced to believe”, when the principle which grants the existence of bodies has been given to us, insofar as Nature has “….not left this to his choice….”? — Mww

I believe that this is exactly the unresolvable inconsistency which Hume finds himself up against. Overly simplified, it's reasonable to take the existence of bodies for granted, But it's also reasonable not too. What I think this indicates is that we ought not claim certainty about the existence of bodies.

Sorry for the late reply, it’s been a busy day. You raise good points, as expected. I’ll give you a due reply tomorrow. All I’d say is to try and keep going, even with those concerns being raised.

…..unresolvable inconsistency which Hume finds himself up against. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely, and when he says…

“…. And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation….”

….in which it is easy to see the obvious inconsistency. It may well be the case that the science of man underpins all the other sciences, but to treat of that science by using the same conditions as the other sciences, it cannot then be the ground for them.

Still, consider the times. In the treatise, Hume mentions God four times. Count ‘em. Four. In however-many-hundreds of pages. This goes great lengths to show the separation from the philosophical standard of the time he is making, and for which he is, as says, definitely of historical importance. Can’t really blame the guy for not getting the finer points out in the open, when he was the first to seriously open the box out of which his successors would step.

And if historical precedent is any indicator, it stands to reason the current philosophical paradigm will be shown its own inconsistencies, sooner or later.
————-

What I think this indicates is that we ought not claim certainty about the existence of bodies. — Metaphysician Undercover

From Hume’s point of view, from the Treatise, you mean? I’d agree with his premise, or principle, that our reason is insufficient for grounding the certainty for the existence of bodies. But it isn’t reason by which that certainty arises anyway, so his claim with respect to reason does nothing to prohibit some other means by which the certainty of the existence of things is given.

You know…..it’s awful hard to maintain the conceptual schemes of outdated philosophies. One has to keep in mind what the original author knew about, and from which his terminology derives, even if he himself alters its meaning. For instance, perception. Perception now means something very different than how Hume wanted it to be understood with respect to his “new” philosophical approach. The concept of mind itself was still taken to be one half of the entirety of human nature, while in later times it became merely an apex placeholder, having no exacting import of its own, at all.

Still, consider the times. In the treatise, Hume mentions God four times. Count ‘em. Four. In however-many-hundreds of pages. This goes great lengths to show the separation from the philosophical standard of the time he is making, and for which he is, as ↪Manuel says, definitely of historical importance. Can’t really blame the guy for not getting the finer points out in the open, when he was the first to seriously open the box out of which his successors would step. — Mww

It was a time when human beings were stepping away from God as an explanation for what is natural. This was opening up the field of natural philosophy allowing speculation into other causes as to the existence of natural things (previously attributed to God). This was relatively early in the study of natural philosophy, so the fundamental principles were still being established.

From Hume’s point of view, from the Treatise, you mean? I’d agree with his premise, or principle, that our reason is insufficient for grounding the certainty for the existence of bodies. But it isn’t reason by which that certainty arises anyway, so his claim with respect to reason does nothing to prohibit some other means by which the certainty of the existence of things is given. — Mww

The issue is not so much certainty about "the existence of bodies", as such, because we take that for granted, with great certainty. But the uncertainty arises when we question what does this mean. What does it mean to be a body, and to exist. Then we find great uncertainty. And this is why we have the contrariety. There is extremely little certainty concerning the meaning of a phrase which we accept with great certainty.

Here is a brief exegesis of the next section (p205-208):

After determining that the idea of continued existence is a fiction, he proceeds to question why we produce such an idea. So he considers the following contradiction:

The smooth passage of
the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions
makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The interrupted
manner of their appearance makes us consider them as
so many resembling, but still distinct beings, which appear
after certain intervals. — p205

This contradiction causes an "uneasiness" within us, and begs to be resolved. One or the other, of these contrary principles must be sacrificed. The notion of identity supports smooth passage of our thoughts, so we are very reluctant to give up that idea in favour of each perception existing as a distinct being. So we turn to that side, the idea that our perceptions are not interrupted. However, the interruption can be so extensive that we are forced to consider that the perceptions may have existence independent from the mind.

Now there are two questions raised (p207) relating back to the stated contradiction. How can a perception be absent from the mind without ceasing to exist, and how can it become present to the mind without creation, or become present again to the mind without some form of recreation. So he proposes that a mind is nothing more than a unity of perceptions, united by relations, allowing that any particular relation may be broken and outside the mind, thus allowing the separation of a perception from a mind, thereby apparently resolving both of these two questions.

The problem I see with this proposal is that he does not ascribe a cause to these relations. The mind exists as a unity of perceptions, such that we have a "connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a. thinking being". But "thinking" is an activity, and he has posited no real cause to account for his proposal of a unity of perceptions in the act of thinking. There is no cause given for a perception to establish a relation and become part of the unity, and no cause given for a perception to break its relation and become independent from the mind.

Because of this problem. the assumption of continued existence is said to be a "feigning" (208). If we could identify the cause of perceptions coming into the unity (which is the mind) and going out of the unity, then we would have the reason for this, and we would not have to resort to invoking a feigning to account for this. So the issue here is that thinking is an activity, and thoughts or perceptions come into and go out of the thinking mind, but we have no identified cause of this activity.

If we had an identified cause, we could accurately, and truthfully say (without feigning) whether the perceptions are recreated each time they come into the mind, and annihilated when they leave it, or whether they are passed off whole into an independent space, and later come back from that independent place.

Because the cause is not identified, Hume is left saying that we "feign" continued existence. He then proceeds to analyze why we have a propensity toward believing this idea which has been feigned.

You know…..it’s awful hard to maintain the conceptual schemes of outdated philosophies. One has to keep in mind what the original author knew about, and from which his terminology derives, even if he himself alters its meaning. For instance, perception. Perception now means something very different than how Hume wanted it to be understood with respect to his “new” philosophical approach. The concept of mind itself was still taken to be one half of the entirety of human nature, while in later times it became merely an apex placeholder, having no exacting import of its own, at all. — Mww

I try to maintain a chronological order to my understanding of philosophy. It is always good to put a philosopher's writing into a temporal context. This is why I believe it is imperative toward understanding philosophy, to have a good training in ancient philosophy. This allows one to conceive of ancient ideas, how things were understood in those times, and grasp how different ideas evolve over the course of time through different influences.

Well, someone else replied to you, which takes a task off of me, not in that I don't mind exchanging ideas with you - truth is the opposite, but I also don't want to be overwhelmingly the only person talking here.

There are many directions to go and one's own inclination will also determine, to an extent, what one finds useful or surprising or revealing. You may be of the opinion that Hume may not be too interesting. Nevertheless, one thing I'll say:

It does not necessarily follow that because he can't find convincing reasons for our belief in the continuity of external objects, that he should also "... ask for the causes by which his believing that the existence of bodies is to be taken for granted."

For him, it is too hard a question to ask. We have reason, which for Hume is "...nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls..." (p.179) Book 1, Part III, Chapter XVI

An instinct is something that cannot be explained, it is given. It is also something we just do, like perceiving or talking. One can analyze the given, but not explain it. As he says: "Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity." (Last sentence of the Appendix.)

Because the cause is not identified, Hume is left saying that we "feign" continued existence. He then proceeds to analyze why we have a propensity toward believing this idea which has been feigned. — Metaphysician Undercover

A worthy exposition of the issue, I must say. The solution….of a sort…..must await the “transcendental unity of apperception” for its sufficient analysis. But, being nonetheless a metaphysical analysis, however logically coherent it may be, it is still a kind of feigning, insofar as it remains a speculative causality. The unity of apperception is, of course, represented by the concept of consciousness, which in its turn, we can say truthfully is the source of recreation of impressions/ideas from thought after annihilation from perception, and, even more importantly, maintains an impression’s successive identity. Hume did actually touch on this condition, but didn’t give to the conception of consciousness itself, enough systemic power.

But all that aside, you’re right, I think, in that Hume didn’t identify a sufficient cause for continued existence of our impressions. And I think there is a very good reason why he didn’t carry his theory further, re: he mistakes that all perceptions of the mind, which are only one of either impressions or ideas, can only be derived from “experience and observation”, and that impressions and ideas are necessarily connected to each other.

The times. Always the times.

he was the first to seriously open the box out of which his successors would step. — Mww

Two ways to look at this. (1) When Hume say 'Nature' deemed this matter, the belief in body, so important that it did not leave it up to our fallible reasoning, he might well have said 'God' but didn't. So that's a pretty daring step, and we have to remember he's writing more than a hundred years before Wallace and Darwin, though 'anticipating' them here and there in the Treatise. (2) On the other hand, you could say that the structure of the argument is the same, just substituting 'Nature' for 'God', so it's not such an advance as it might seem.

*

Hume is quite clear that the belief in body does not arise either from the senses or from reason, but from a sort of instinct, and much of this chapter is in some ways a description of how we adapt ourselves to having this instinct — thus the 'double existence' theory.

But more than that, the senses alone or reason acting upon the deliverances of the senses, would seem to support the opposite conclusion, that there are no bodies distinct from us and continuous over time. The senses and reason are not just unable to deliver the belief in body; they support disbelief in body.

If we want to say, as @unenlightened suggests, that Nature is trustworthy here, that there are bodies, then not only is looking for reasonable grounds for that belief a mistake, because it won't deliver them, but the use of reason will actually lead us astray, so far as it is able. Hume is just as clear that reason is impotent to overcome the instinctive belief in body, but it is trying.

That ought to bother us. The short chapter before this, on scepticism with regard to reason, was all about our failings as reasoners in fact, our simple fallibility. But here, someone is lying to us. If it's Nature, and there's nothing we can do about it, that's troubling. If Nature tells us truly that there is body, but our senses and reason tell us there isn't, then our senses and our reason are mistaken.

What we don't have from Hume — not to my memory, maybe someone else who's been in the Treatise more than I lately could say — is an extended discussion of how the senses or reason subtly go wrong in this matter (or in any of the others in the Treatise, for the matter, such as causality). We might have. If he thought Nature had gotten everything right for us beforehand, then he would assume, I think, that the reflections which lead to the opposite conclusion must have a flaw somewhere, and we would have hundreds of pages devoted to finding those quite subtle flaws. This would not be a matter of reason and experience grounding the belief in body, say, but of them at least not kicking against it. Then, at least, while there would remain important beliefs beyond the reach of reason and experience, we could continue to trust them regarding such beliefs as they do ground.

As it is, Hume of course accepts that our senses can deceive us, but he's very specific: our senses tell us that the table grows smaller as we withdraw from it, though it does not; but our senses are completely honest and trustworthy about the table appearing to grow smaller. They may lie about the objects that occasion them, but not about themselves. In the end, he will not lay this charge of deception at their feet, because the senses are not responsible for our belief in the table as an external object in the first place! That belief is implanted in us by nature. (But not by being implanted in the senses or in our reason.) But if nature has done right by us, the senses deceive us by their very nature, by providing the mind with changing and interrupted perceptions rather than the distinct and continuous bodies that we should be perceiving. But if that is the nature of our senses, and they are blameless in doing only what they can do, then it must be down to reason to find the necessary connections among those scattered perceptions and assemble them into the proper wholes nature has rightly told us there are; but reason cannot do so. Instead we must feign such unity in our perceptions, using not reason but fancy.

Our senses, then, lie, by telling the only truth they can; our reason lies by preserving only such truth as it is given by the senses; and imagination tells the truth by lying to us ('double existence') about the incompatibility of our instinctive beliefs with the beliefs we derive from experience by reason.

I don't want to be overwhelmingly the only person talking here. — Manuel

Ehhhhhh….it’s your tread, so you’ve the onus for responding to everyone writing to you, so you’re potentially the most talkative anyway, assuming folks don’t just talk among themselves. Which is sorta disrespectful, I should think.

It isn’t that we can’t find reasons. It’s that our reason, the faculty, can’t be trusted. But Hume had to have trusted his reason in order to claim “experience and observation” is all we can trust.

Do you think, given this…..

“… We may here take occasion to observe a very remarkable error, which being frequently inculcated in the schools, has become a kind of establishd maxim, and is universally received by all logicians. This error consists in the vulgar division of the acts of the understanding, into CONCEPTION, JUDGMENT and REASONING, and in the definitions we give of them.…”
(1., 3., VII…..page number unavailable, sorry)

….that Hume didn’t even consider reason to be a dedicated faculty of its own? If not, I could see why he would consider it untrustworthy, insofar as the quote implies other influences on it, or, it is dependent on or conjoined necessarily with, other aspects of understanding. E.C.H.U. probably answers that, but we’re not there, so…..

We may not trust our reasons, but we have no choice but to trust reason itself. It is what makes us human, after all, along with morality.

Fair enough.



My reading of Hume is that he does take reason to be a faculty on its own, but he consistently tries to show how weak it is - weaker than we would like to believe. I'd have to enter the moral domain to give a full account of Hume, but I'm not too interested with moral philosophy.

Whether reason is or is not, as strong as we would like is an open question. One can say, that the state of the world we're in certainly shows reason is not our strongest trait. Yet we know many, many instances in which reason shines quite brightly. So, it's not clear to me either way.

According to the generally acknowledged first serious scholarly work on Hume, by Norman Kemp Smith, whom you no doubt know, says that Hume is a philosopher of "passion", if I remember the exact word correctly.

We may not trust our reasons, but we have no choice but to trust reason itself. — Mww

I don't understand what you are saying here. What does "trusting reason itself" imply? I mean, reason told us for thousands of years that we were the center of the universe, which is not at all a silly view due to the evidence available at the time.

So I'm unclear on what you are saying here.

While browsing the preceding section which @Srap Tasmaner mentioned in his reply, I found an important quote, which also covers some of @Mww's concerns, and is a very important passage in general, as reading it should cure people of the misimpression of the extent of Hume's skepticism:

"Shou’d it here be ask’d me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those‘, sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falshood ; I shou’d , reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour’d by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render‘d unavoidable." (p.183)

Book 1, Part 4, Section 1

substituting 'Nature' for 'God', so it's not such an advance as it might seem. — Srap Tasmaner

Hmmmm. 1., 3., sec XIV intimates Hume considers them as quite different, even if one follows from the other.
———-

Hume is quite clear that the belief in body does not arise either from the senses or from reason, but from a sort of instinct, and much of this chapter is in some ways a description of how we adapt ourselves to having this instinct — thus the 'double existence' theory. — Srap Tasmaner

I’d have to examine deeper, to affirm adaptation to instinct suffices for a cause. I can see where he denies senses and reason as being sufficient cause of belief, but not that some kind of instinct, is.

But your comment is quite beautiful in itself. I’ll work on incorporating as much of it as I can justify.

My reading of Hume is that he does take reason to be a faculty on its own, but he consistently tries to show how weak it is — Manuel

Ahhhh….cool. Thanks. There are places where he seems to give that impression, but doesn’t come right out and say it.
————

….reason told us for thousands of years that we were the center of the universe, which is not at all a silly view due to the evidence available at the time — Manuel

Yep. Judgement parsed the evidence, reason found no contradictions. POOF!! Knowledge.

Later, judgement parsed new evidence, reason found no contradictions: new knowledge.

Evidence, judgement and knowledge changed over time, reason did not.
—————

The reason we trust is reason the human condition, not reason the cognitive faculty. The former is a logical system, the latter is an aspect of the system. That’s what I meant to say, but I strayed from a thread concerned with a philosophy that doesn’t have this as a precept. My bad.

Ah, I see, sure in this sense we are talking about then, "instinct" is rather similar to "the human condition". In both cases, funnily enough, these are innate considerations not drawn from, nor extracted by, experience.

Agreed, neither drawn from, nor extracted by, experience, and both innate conditions. I might add that the animal has instinct moreso than reason, while the human animal has reason moreso than instinct. He became civilized, donchaknow. Instinct no longer serves as well as reason.

Like Hume…..diminuating degrees regarding instinct, but accumulating degrees regarding judgement, kinda like the argument in your 1. 4. 1.

the animal has instinct moreso than reason, while the human animal has reason moreso than instinct. — Mww

Yes, exactly.

That's how it seems to me too.

But all that aside, you’re right, I think, in that Hume didn’t identify a sufficient cause for continued existence of our impressions. And I think there is a very good reason why he didn’t carry his theory further, re: he mistakes that all perceptions of the mind, which are only one of either impressions or ideas, can only be derived from “experience and observation”, and that impressions and ideas are necessarily connected to each other. — Mww

I think I am beginning to see things your way, more and more. Hume seems to rely here on two important premises, or principles. The first one is stated clearly and explicitly, that we cannot doubt the existence of body, that to do so would be unreasonable. The second premise appears to be a bit more obscure, but it has to do with what is present to the mind. Simply stated, the principle seems to be that the only thing present to a mind, is perceptions. This is made very evident from his description of mind as a simple unity of perceptions.

Because of this second premise, only perceptions are given real causal efficacy within the mind. So as a case in point, identity is seen as a mistaken idea because it is demonstrated to be impossible that identity has been derived from perception. However, to maintain this conclusion, it is necessary that identity could not have been truthfully, accurately, or reasonably derived from a source other than perception. That the idea of continued identity has a valid cause which is other than perception would make it more than just an imaginary and erroneous fiction.

Now, when we look at the tradition involved with the law of identity, it was proposed by Aristotle as a way to account for the reality of what was demonstrated by Socrates and Plato, that our conceptions of the way that things are, is often wrong, i.e not consistent with how things actually are. So Aristotle proposed a separation between how we perceive and conceive things, as abstract forms, and how things really are in themselves, as particular material forms. The identity of a thing is the latter, the thing itself, as a material form.

Since this principle, the law of identity, implies that individual, particular things are actually different from the way that we perceive them, our perceptions of them, it is necessary that the law of identity is derived from something other than perceptions. We cannot conclude directly from our perceptions that things are not as we perceive them to be.

And, we can also understand that a human being having itself a body has access toward understanding the nature of body, or in Hume's perspective, the human being has causes which influence one's understanding of body, which are other than perceptions. We have a vast array of emotions, desires, and intentions, which influence the judgements made by our minds, which do not appear to the mind in the form of perceptions.

Here we can turn to the Platonic tradition of "the good". For Plato the good is the source of, and cause of all true understanding. But the good is not properly apprehended by the mind, like a perception would be. Also, Aristotle proposed intuition as the source of knowledge and intuition as a cause of judgement, does not appear as a perception either.

Ah, I see, sure in this sense we are talking about then, "instinct" is rather similar to "the human condition". In both cases, funnily enough, these are innate considerations not drawn from, nor extracted by, experience. — Manuel

I believe "instinct falls into the category of things I mentioned above, intuition, intention, and the good. These things have a great causal efficacy over our idea formation, yet they do not necessarily exist within the mind as perceptions. So Hume, by narrowing the field of things which are present to the mind to perceptions only, wrongfully excludes the influence these other things have within the mind. Then, when he considers identity, and continued existence, and finds these not to be supported by perceptions, he wrongfully concludes continuous identity to be imaginary, fictitious, even erroneous. But this is only because he doesn't consider the other category of influences in the mind, the causes which come directly from one's own body, instinct, intuition, desire, intention, and the good. Therefore if we allow that we can derive valid information about "body" directly from one's own body, without the medium of perception, these ideas about the nature of body, identity, and continuous existence, may be supported that way.

Hume seems to rely here on two important premises, or principles. The first one is stated clearly and explicitly, that we cannot doubt the existence of body, that to do so would be unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Unreasonable" cannot be the right word here.

The second premise appears to be a bit more obscure, but it has to do with what is present to the mind. Simply stated, the principle seems to be that the only thing present to a mind, is perceptions. This is made very evident from his description of mind as a simple unity of perceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's no "seems to be" about it. He says it in so many words. I quoted him saying it on page 1 of the thread.

However, to maintain this conclusion, it is necessary that identity could not have been truthfully, accurately, or reasonably derived from a source other than perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think your disagreement is with Book I Part I Section I, where Hume claims that all our ideas are derived from impressions. Thus, no innate ideas.

Then, when he considers identity, and continued existence, and finds these not to be supported by perceptions, he wrongfully concludes continuous identity to be imaginary, fictitious, even erroneous. But this is only because he doesn't consider the other category of influences in the mind, the causes which come directly from one's own body, instinct, intuition, desire, intention, and the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call Impressions and Ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only, those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. — The very first words of the book (after the Introduction)

So, no, Hume is not ignoring other causes that arise from within your own body: they are all impressions.

"Unreasonable" cannot be the right word here. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it's a fair word, because he states in the very first sentence of the section, that the skeptic concerning the existence of body, "cannot defend his reason by reason". Therefore we can conclude that this is unreasonable.

I think your disagreement is with Book I Part I Section I, where Hume claims that all our ideas are derived from impressions. Thus, no innate ideas. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so the premise is clearly stated at that part of the book. Now we ought to dismiss this premise as false, mistaken,for the reasons discussed.

So, no, Hume is not ignoring other causes that arise from within your own body: they are all impressions. — Srap Tasmaner

This cannot be true. He describes the perceptions (or "impressions" if you prefer) as having "relations" with each other. Relations are different, distinct from the things which are related. Yet the relations are necessarily present within the mind, and are part of the mind. Therefore it is false to claim that the mind consists only of impressions, or perceptions. It is becoming very clear that this is Hume's mistaken premise. Look at his description of mind at 207 for example:

As to the first question ; we may observe, that what we
call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different
perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos’d,
tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and
identity. — 207

The problem is, that Hume's former premise, that the mind consists only of perceptions, or impressions, is what is actually proven to be false here. The concept of identity is not proven to be false. This scenario, of perceptions passing in and out of the mind, while maintaining continued, independent and distinct existence, is supposed to be the falsity, the error, which he exposes. But if this were really the case, of how the mind exists, then what constitutes being in the mind, is having "certain relations". Now, in this scenario, where perceptions have identity, "relations" are what is essential to being in the mind, not perceptions, as the perceptions maintain their identity in a continuous manner, even while outside the mind.

If it is the case that having relations with other perceptions is what constitutes being within the mind, as this is what is necessary to justify the belief in independent objects, then we need to account for what having a relation is, because this is now the essential aspect of the mind. The perceptions are allowed to exist independently, so perceptions by this description can no longer be considered to be the essential aspect of mind. The mind now must be understood as this activity which produces these relations between perceptions. So we have Hume implying that having "certain relations" is what is essential to being within the mind when he tries to justify independent existence from the premise that the only thing present to the mind is perceptions.

So he starts with that premise, that the only thing present to the mind is impressions, or perceptions, and then he tries to justify our belief in continued distinct (independent) existence of body, from this premise. The attempt to justify this belief in body fails, and he is inclined to say that the belief in independent continuous existence is an error of judgement. However, he has really demonstrated that this premise is wrong because it is inconsistent with his other premise, the belief in independent bodies, which he says we cannot deny. In other words he has taken two incompatible premises. The premise, that mere perceptions are the only thing present within the mind, is not consistent with the belief in independent bodies. To establish consistency with the belief in independent existence, he must reformulate the premise, so that the mind now consists of relations between perceptions, and these relations are what is essential to being within the mind, rather than simply perceptions themselves.

…..two important premises (…) The first one (...) we cannot doubt the existence of body, that to do so would be unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kinda-sorta. What he says first about the existence of bodies, is, “…it is in vain to ask whether there be body or not.…”, which is a weak euphemism for, don’t expect an answer if you do ask. It isn’t so much unreasonable to ask, as it is unreasonable to expect an answer.

This section regards skepticism with respect to the senses, which follows the section on skepticism regarding reason, so the beginning of this section carries over from it, in which it is reiterated that, “…so the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even though he asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason…”. It appears then, that Hume, after tacitly relegating reason to an indefensible power, yet acknowledging that it is reason itself that allows one to ask about the existence of objects, the implication is that it is in vain to ask an indefensible power, pretty much anything at all. The skeptic continues to reason and believe, but simply cannot justify his reasoning and believing with the very tool he used to acquire to them.

I agree Hume intends it to be the case we cannot doubt the existence of bodies, insofar as he explicitly states, “… but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.…”. So yes, we take for granted that there are bodies, but under one and only one condition, which is…as long as we don’t reason or believe. Which still leaves us to prove what we’ve merely taken for granted. And how do we prove anything, without the trust of reason, for which we have been rightly shown we should be skeptical.

Do perceptions of the mind, re: impressions and/or ideas, count as reasonings? If they do, then bodies are granted. If they are not, bodies are not necessarily granted. Hume says, “…. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul…”. Apparently, then, impressions are not reasonings, from which follows the existence of bodies is not granted to impressions.

Ideas, on the other hand, he says, “…. By ideas I mean the faint images of these (impressions) in thinking and reasoning….”. Here it appears bodies are to be granted, insofar as “in all our reasonings” is the condition necessary for taking bodies for granted.

Now we got a problem, caused by, “… it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas...”, and, “…. impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions…”.

Holy Crap, Batman!!! We cannot grant the existence of bodies to sensations, where it belongs as a seemingly “first appearance”, because impressions are not reasonings, but the existence of bodies is granted to ideas, because it is reasoning, but impressions cause those ideas, so….sensation of an object cannot be so low as to be the same as its idea, impression of an object causes our reasoning to an idea of that object……the very reasoning of which we have already been shown we should be skeptical of.

We’ve been granted the very thing we’ve no warrant to trust. The skeptic cannot defend his reason by reason, so how does he defend it, or does he not bother defending the very thing by which he acquires his ideas?

Disclaimer: It must be in the “in all our reasonings” by which this apparent absurdity arises, to which I admit. I hope you notice that by quoting Hume verbatim I am making a concerted effort to suppress my Kantian prejudices.

Where did I go wrong? And if I didn’t, or not enough to bother, then is it any wonder that dogmatic slumbers awoke?

Well he doesn't have Schopenhauer's dual aspect view: of being an object and a subject simultaneously, at least not nearly as strongly developed.

But he does say that when we look at our bodies, we are looking at impressions, not the actual body itself. Yes, I do think a Humean mind is not tenable, he is missing out on some important categories and powers - as he more or less recognizes in the Appendix.

But if you take perception as he does, which one can do, while still knowing the mind has more capacities than Hume allows, the problems he points out are still serious problems for perception. So he can be wrong about the powers of the mind, yet correct in observation, at least as I see it.

Relations are different, distinct from the things which are related. Yet the relations are necessarily present within the mind, and are part of the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is exactly the point of difficulty. I know I'm going to have trouble explaining it, because I can't quite see it clearly myself, but here goes.

I think these relations are, let's say, of the mind, but not present to mind; that distinction belongs exclusively to perceptions, and the relations among perceptions are not themselves perceptions.

What are they then? I think they are something like laws. You do not directly observe the law of gravity, you do not observe the force of gravity causing the tree limb to fall onto your car, you only observe the limb first there and then here, your car first fine and then smashed. Something, we believe, caused this passage from one state of affairs to another, but what it was is not something we can observe, but only postulate. (The passing itself, the atomist Hume might even say, we do not observe, but only the limb first attached to the tree, then at many points between the tree and your car, then on your car. I'd have to go back to see whether Hume thinks we actually observe motion.)

The laws of nature are there in somewhat the same way the laws of inference are in an argument. We have our premises, we pass from one formula to another, reaching a conclusion, but if we rely on modus ponens or conjunction elimination, they are not there in the argument as premises, but as the laws that carry us from one formula to the next. We're used now to axiomatic deduction systems in which the rules of inference are explicitly chosen — and thus part of the system though part of no argument — but in olden times, modus ponens would be present only implicitly, and perhaps postulated, or discovered, as a legitimate way of getting from some claims to others.

With those analogies in mind — and I think they're close to Hume's intentions and world-view — most of the book is an exploration of the mechanisms by which we pass from certain perceptions, be they impressions or ideas, to other perceptions, generally (but not always) to new ideas. He says something like this on almost every page of the book — we pass smoothly from this one perception to this other one because of the resemblance between them, that sort of stuff. It's everywhere, because it's the whole point of the book. But those resemblances, for instance, they're something we can reflect on and have ideas about, as he has done, but they are not themselves perceptions present to the mind. (There's a regress argument here, but I'm not sure it's Humean. It's the same problem you would have if you had nothing with the status of an inference rule, and had to take modus ponens as a premise. That doesn't work.)

Our subject here, the belief in body, I believe is something like one of these laws of thought, not an idea we have but how we pass from the lamp impression to the lamp object belief, from the book impression to the book object belief, and so on. The double existence theory is an idea we have about this habitual passage from one perception to another, something like our ideas about causality, an attempt to justify to reason our expectation that one perception will follow another because it has in the past. (A rule of inference in psychology is more naturally seen as a habit or custom of inference.)

But aren't I loading up the mind with stuff, when Hume says it's simple? I don't think so, but I'd have to look closely at the text. Certainly the spirit of the thing is as I've said: he's looking to understand how we pass from one perception to another, so he's going to postulate laws of the mind somewhat as Newton postulated laws of the physical universe. The insight which captivated and shook him, is that those laws don't look much like reason.

No no, I mean, it's a great post and quite methodical, I'm not quite an authority on Hume but have interests in some of things he discusses, so keep that in mind. I quoted him in the Appendix, which I will share again, this time more extensively, in which we have something very rare happening, a major philosopher admitting that his project has failed:

"But having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have induc'd me to receive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another....

But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.

In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding."

Italics mine.

So yes, his account of the way we acquire ideas is false, though somewhat intuitive. What I think he is right on, is on his phenomenological observations about objects and us not being able to find a connection of them in thought, although it must obviously exist. Also, each perception is new - it might be an empirical issue which could tell us how long a perception lasts, though maybe it is too difficult to measure.

The way it looks to me, is that he has presented us some rather big problems, which are hard to even think about for too long, it's like he says, an instinct gets us off this train of thinking.

A different approach might help us, here you can bring in Kant or others, and although the framework is improved as I believe it is, I think the problems aren't solved, they're stated in a better manner.

Holy Crap, Batman!!! We cannot grant the existence of bodies to sensations, where it belongs as a seemingly “first appearance”, because impressions are not reasonings, but the existence of bodies is granted to ideas, because it is reasoning, but impressions cause those ideas, so….sensation of an object cannot be so low as to be the same as its idea, impression of an object causes our reasoning to an idea of that object……the very reasoning of which we have already been shown we should be skeptical of.

We’ve been granted the very thing we’ve no warrant to trust. The skeptic cannot defend his reason by reason, so how does he defend it, or does he not bother defending the very thing by which he acquires his ideas? — Mww

Addressing your question with the presumption it addresses (non-Cartesian) skeptics in general:

Unless the skeptic is Pyrrhonian - whom I so far gather would claim to suspend all reasoning (though I am very dubious of this being actualizable in practice) - I take the skeptic to not be capable of finding any rational alternative to so trusting. And, due to this reason alone, the skeptic thereby trusts. Despite the mistakes we can on occasion make in our reasoning.

In Hume’s case, the very faculty of reason is again ascribed to natural impulses, instincts; such that it is as inescapable (and I’ll add, a-rational) as is the natural impulse to breath: A toddler does not reason that one breaths in order to live and thereby breaths; nor does it reason that it is using its faculties of reason to develop its reasoning skills in order to better live; yet it inevitably engages in both activities a-rationally - this, the argument would then go, just as much as we adult humans do.

But this issue isn’t one confined to the particular worldview(s) of skeptics. The provision of a reason for the trustworthiness of reason squarely lands one into Agrippa’s trilemma: circularity or reasons (a is so because a; as in: reason's trustworthiness is so because x, y, z, etc ... all of which are to be deemed valid because reason is trustworthy), ad infinitum regression or reasons (which never provides a foundational reason), or axiomatic dogma (which would here translate into “it is so because I/you/they so state”). None of which are deemed rationally satisfactory by most. And, despite this irking a good deal of rationalists among others, no human in the history of mankind has been able to envision any alternative than the three just provided.

But one can abductively infer that reason of itself is a natural impulse in us … whose trustability as impulse can neither be rationally supported not rationally renounced.

In reference to the first quoted paragraph of yours, I’m not claiming to not find problems in Hume’s arguments. But I so far do agree with Hume’s general perspectives on this point, as I so far best interpret them, and as they would likely stand in relation to your question regarding trust: our trust of reason as a faculty can of itself only be instinctive and in this means unavoidable. And to this I’ll add foundationally a-rational (i.e., neither rational nor irrational).

While I can’t support all of the just stated by Hume’s writings, nothing in Hume’s writings regarding reason being an instinct will to my mind contradict this affirmed stance being one that a skeptic can take. To re-quote this, one such writing is from Part III Section XVI of the Treatise:

“To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls,”

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As an afterthought: One cannot rationally doubt the faculty of reasoning without trust in the very faculty of reasoning one claims to doubt. Which to me only further evidences the claim I've intended to make.

Thanks for the added information. However, what you've provided, I think, only confuses the issue more. It's been a long time since I picked up that book, and I never read it in completion. I suppose I was unimpressed by Hume's perspective.

I do not like the idea of classing all things which appear to the mind, together as perceptions. Clearly a sense perception has a completely different type of existence from an emotion. How can we say that an emotional feeling such as anger, for example has the same type of existence and effect on the mind as a visual image? Aren't emotions affections, implying that the mind has already been affected by the time that the emotion exists. The emotion seems to have an inner source, and is directed outward toward something external, while the sense perception seems to have an external source making an impression on the internal.

And I really think we need clarity on what Hume means by "reasoning". Where does reasoning fit in to this structure? It is clearly not the same as sensing. But if sensing is the means by which the mind creates sense perceptions, what does reasoning create? Is there a different type of perception created by reasoning, or does reasoning just do things with preexisting perceptions?

We’ve been granted the very thing we’ve no warrant to trust. The skeptic cannot defend his reason by reason, so how does he defend it, or does he not bother defending the very thing by which he acquires his ideas? — Mww

Here's the thing. By what means can we say that ideas are acquired by reasoning? Without a separation between the different types of things which are present to the mind, we have no basis for saying that some perceptions are produced from the senses, and some are produced by reasoning. This comes back to the issue of the difference between sensing and dreaming. If we cannot make any separation between the things within the mind which are directly derived through sensation, and the things which are directly created by the mind itself, then we will be hopelessly lost when approaching skepticism. Since there is always elements of uncertainty in anything we do, the only way to get beyond skepticism is to set up some divisions, some categories to properly classify the different types of things which are present to the mind, thereby attempting to isolate the uncertainty. Without this, the uncertainty will appear to be everywhere.

I think these relations are, let's say, of the mind, but not present to mind; that distinction belongs exclusively to perceptions, and the relations among perceptions are not themselves perceptions. — Srap Tasmaner

If only perceptions are in the mind, and relations are not perceptions, then where are the relations? Does this mean that they have separate, independent existence? But this doesn't seem right, because when we say that something is bigger than another thing, this is a judgement made in the mind. Now we could say that this relation, "bigger than" is an idea in the mind, but since this idea relates perceptions, one to another, it must be something other than a perception. This is why we need to allow distinct categories of the different types of things which exist in the mind.

What are they then? I think they are something like laws. — Srap Tasmaner

This is where the issue gets very tricky, and difficult, I believe. Relations such as the one mentioned above, "bigger than", can be described as laws, like you propose. However, these laws are universals, the same law is applicable to the relations between many different individual perceptions. But when we assume that perceptions are particulars, individuals with a unique identity, as Hume does, then applying the universal laws reveals the uniqueness of each individual's particular relations with others. This we know as measurement. So in a sense then, we assume universal laws as a means for determining each individual's unique relations. This means that the relations are of the particular, the thing being measured, not of the law, which is the thing being applied in measurement.

The laws of nature are there in somewhat the same way the laws of inference are in an argument. We have our premises, we pass from one formula to another, reaching a conclusion, but if we rely on modus ponens or conjunction elimination, they are not there in the argument as premises, but as the laws that carry us from one formula to the next. We're used now to axiomatic deduction systems in which the rules of inference are explicitly chosen — and thus part of the system though part of no argument — but in olden times, modus ponens would be present only implicitly, and perhaps postulated, or discovered, as a legitimate way of getting from some claims to others. — Srap Tasmaner

This is why it is important for us to determine exactly what Hume means by "reasoning", if there is any understanding to be found here at all. We do not really follow laws in reasoning, the laws are just stated in attempts at formalizing reasoning, describing what reasoning consists of. So for example, if I say all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal, I draw this conclusion without following any rules or laws. I just know somehow, that if everything in this class is mortal, and Socrates is in this class, then Socrates is mortal. It's because it makes sense to me, it is reasonable to me and everyone else, that it becomes a rule. It is not reasonable because it is a rule. We can see this more clearly with something like the law of noncontradiction. Contradiction does not make any sense, it is unreasonable, and so it was unacceptable long before anyone formulated the law of noncontradiction. So reasoning doesn't follow laws, the laws follow from the reasoning.

With those analogies in mind — and I think they're close to Hume's intentions and world-view — most of the book is an exploration of the mechanisms by which we pass from certain perceptions, be they impressions or ideas, to other perceptions, generally (but not always) to new ideas. He says something like this on almost every page of the book — we pass smoothly from this one perception to this other one because of the resemblance between them, that sort of stuff. It's everywhere, because it's the whole point of the book. But those resemblances, for instance, they're something we can reflect on and have ideas about, as he has done, but they are not themselves perceptions present to the mind. (There's a regress argument here, but I'm not sure it's Humean. It's the same problem you would have if you had nothing with the status of an inference rule, and had to take modus ponens as a premise. That doesn't work.) — Srap Tasmaner

This does not seem like a good way of describing reasoning, the act of passing from one perception to another. It does not account for the creative aspect of reasoning. Reasoning creates ideas. Consider the example above, All men are mortal, Socrates is a man. What is created by this reasoning process is the idea that Socrates is mortal. So we start with a universal law, and make a conclusion about a particular. And of course there are other forms of reasoning, like inductive, where we take particulars and create a universal.

Our subject here, the belief in body, I believe is something like one of these laws of thought, not an idea we have but how we pass from the lamp impression to the lamp object belief, from the book impression to the book object belief, and so on. — Srap Tasmaner

Th problem though is that Hume gives an account which is incoherent. So we must ask why, determine where his mistakes lie, which render the subject as incoherent.

But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head. — Manuel

I think that this is the key to the issue, the concept of unity. Thinking, or reasoning, is not a simple matter of successive perceptions. There is a unity of perceptions created, through categorization, or logic or other means. So when Hume talks about recognizing resemblance relations, this is only a part of the operation. Such relations allow us to categorize things as being of "the same" type, thereby creating a unity of different things that are the same type. But we do not believe that the things classed as the same type, and being part of that unity, are the very same thing, in the sense of perfect identity. So reasoning concerns itself with creating unities out of distinct parts, and it really has no interest in whether the distinct parts have a proper. or "perfect\" identity within themselves. Reasoning is only concerned with the identity assigned to the distinct parts, as member of such and such categories, the part's position in the unity.

This does not seem like a good way of describing reasoning, the act of passing from one perception to another. — Metaphysician Undercover

The insight which captivated and shook him, is that those laws don't look much like reason. — Srap Tasmaner

”… Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding…." — Manuel

The times. Always the times. It was difficult for Hume and everyone else of those times, for none of them gave space and time, for the missing principle of simple inherence, and matter and form, for the principle of common connection, the re-consideration required to construct the foundation of a new and sufficiently explanatory theory.

Still, neither of those hypotheticals would work if the mind was not relieved of its being the seat of perceptions. Once perception became the purview of sensibility, the physical apparatus alone, then it became possible to separate cognitive functionalities, and at the same time connect them all together into a system.

And you know as well as I, that unless the power and absolute necessity of a priori reasoning denied by Hume and continental empiricists in general, became part and parcel of the rational human condition, there wouldn’t be a sufficiently explanatory theory, ever.
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The way it looks to me, is that he has presented us some rather big problems — Manuel

Exactly right: he presented the problems better than anyone else, in which his true claim to fame resides, but realized his inability to solve them. Highly commendable, I should think.

the very faculty of reason is again ascribed to natural impulses, instincts; such that it is as inescapable (and I’ll add, a-rational) as is the natural impulse to breath: A toddler does not reason that one breaths in order to live and thereby breaths; nor does it reason that it is using its faculties of reason to develop its reasoning skills in order to better live; yet it inevitably engages in both activities a-rationally - this, the argument would then go, just as much as we adult humans do. — javra

Overall, a well-thought post. Nothing in it to counter-argue conclusively. That being said, it might be worthwhile to consider the different between reason the faculty, which the infant hasn’t developed, and reason the innate human condition, by which development of the faculty is possible.

The infant human brain is sufficiently complex to imbue an autonomous nervous system, which is itself sufficient causality for the infant to breath without either reason or instinct.

That an infant doesn’t reason to the development or use of his faculty of reason, makes explicit something by which such development and use is possible to begin with. It becomes, then, perfectly logical for there to be an innate human condition, not itself a faculty but that which is antecedent to the faculty such that the faculty is possible. Such must be the case, for otherwise all humans would be born with immediate empirical knowledge, immediate language use, and the immediate ability for abstract constructs. They are not so born, which makes necessary nothing but the possibility for all that stuff they eventually do accomplish.

On the other hand, instinct, supposed as that by which an action is prescribed, but without any judgement whatsoever. Instinct says….do this, do this this way and do this now. No negotiations, no explanations, no if-ands-or-buts.

With these notions in mind, it is clear reason the innate human condition, and instinct the innate human capacity, are very different. Or, if not very different, then different enough such that it is unintelligible to interchange them. Like….can’t use a baseball bat to tell you what time it is kinda thing.

Which gets us inevitably to Hume, in that, being an empiricist relying exclusively on experience and observation for his philosophical precepts, says while it is not perfectly legitimate to use a baseball bat to tell him what time it is, he doesn’t have much choice because he doesn’t have a clock.

Anyway…..Hume came so close “…to consider the matter aright…”. Reason is wonderful and unintelligible in itself, but it is not so much an instinct in our souls, as a necessary condition of our humanity. Reason the faculty, then, reduces to merely a necessary condition of our intelligence, our humanity being presupposed.

I do not like the idea of classing all things which appear to the mind, together as perceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Neither do I, and nowadays, most people don’t. But in 1738……

Clearly a sense perception has a completely different type of existence from an emotion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely, and they were duly distinguished beginning in Germany, mid-1700’s, not long after Hume’s Treatise. In fact, emotions…..for better or worse…..were removed from empirical cognitions entirely. Ramification here being the post-Renaissance reinstatement of an intrinsic human dualistic nature. Anathema to the then up-and-coming scientific/industrial revolution, indeed.

And I really think we need clarity on what Hume means by "reasoning". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, my question as well, as relayed to . He says what we get from it, re: ideas, but doesn’t go very far in describing what it is. Nowadays, we understand the missing exposition of reasoning in Hume, simply from the texts not having a theory specifying a system capable of it. He’s content to say this happens because of that, but not how this happens.

It is remarkable, that Hume often says stuff like….no one in his right mind can argue with me here….but that’s exactly what his successors did. Nevertheless, it is impossible to tell whether his successors argued because Hume was so obviously misguided, or because arguing is just what humans do.
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Without a separation between the different types of things which are present to the mind, we have no basis for saying that some perceptions are produced from the senses, and some are produced by reasoning — Metaphysician Undercover

Not only a separation in things presented to the mind, but separation in the ways the mind treats those things. Senses present to the mind nothing but empirical data; the mind presents to itself everything except empirical data. We know both of those kinds of things happen, so the account for them must accord with the differences, from which arises the internal/external, subjective/objective dichotomies.

And we’re off to the races…..