Yep.

But it's become a big industry in pop-science books, like Davies'The Demon in the Machine, Gleick's The Information or Loewenstein Physics in Mind and many others.

It seems to me to be very dubious, taking concepts from less well formed sciences and incorporating them into fundamental physics to then explain mental processes.

One could approach the question by saying, like Pauli did, that these things are "not even wrong."

They can't even be evaluated along a right/wrong axis.

I'm quite familiar with panpsychism. It's a natural alternative that may be intuitive depending on how it's articulated.

You don't even need information to articulate pansychism, all you need is experience.

But that's just the thing, do things like "code" and "data" accurately capture what is actually happening in the world? A person can crack a code, build a code or get lost in code. As for data, that might be less problematic as it seems more neutral to me.

Still you need to say for something to be data it needs to be data for someone.

I know. This road can lead people into saying things like "atoms" or "particles" don't exist because we named them this way, but I don't suscribe to linguistic idealism per se. I don't think the names we give to things in nature brings things into existence.

But approaches that are laden with extremely human centric concepts like "information", "code", "processing" are problematic in a way that "particles" or "DNA" are not.

At least that's my feel of the topic.

I'd be careful with this whole information-centric approach. It's often not clear what is meant as it is used in a technical manner in engineering then borrowed to biology and physics.

The problem is that it can lead one to think that the world is literally "informed". But to be informed and to have information is something people do, not objects. Unless you are of the persuasion that objects have some kind of mind that processes information.

And if objects literally process information, then we have a bunch of intelligence all around us.

I think a more neutral term would be helpful.

Yes. Matter turns out to be rather insubstantial and abstract even, so our ordinary intuitions lead us quite astray.

You can be a materialist like Strawson and then the "hard problem" can't be posed.

Alternatively, one can agree with Chomsky who provides extensive documentation, that the "hard problem" is very misleading.

Or like McGinn, one can say that there are many mysteries, consciousness being one of them.

Consciousness is hard not because of materialism, but because of the way we think about ordinary matter, which is fine for everyday living, but extremely inadequate when looked at in detail.

Sounds good. :up:

Ah.

You already believe something akin to BIV when you say "there is no moon... only hidden states which we model as being the moon...". We are liable to find more "hidden states" the more we discover about the brain.

So it makes sense why such a thought experiment would not be appealing to you. Others might have Sellars' distinction in mind in terms of thinking about the manifest image (the world as we experience it) and the scientific image (the the world as it is absent people).

I think the impact of the BIV depends on how you think about this distinction.

All of that seems to require an external world. The stimulus or sense data of type X must come from outside of the model. — Isaac

I haven't been as clear as I would've liked.

When I say there doesn't need to be a world, I mean the world we take for granted so you look outside the window and you see all that you see: cars, sidewalk, people, trees, etc.

A moth, granted, wouldn't see these things. A moth would see whatever it is that moths see: ultraviolet light and everything else they interact with.

But it could be, in principle at least, stimulated in a lab such that the world in this sense (described above) isn't necessary for the moth to experience (or react to) its "world". It would all be a stimulation in the moths brain.

Yes, the stimulation is external. But in this case the stimulation is not caused by something in the world (the moon), it would be caused by whatever electrical signals lead the moth to behave as if a moon existed.

A mistake in behaviour though, no? It ought not have flown into the lamp (to its death), the result of any modal of lamp/world should have had it remain alive at the very least. Soft behaviourism?

How could we understand such an error, in a functionalist sense, without an external world being one way such that some model of it can be another? — Isaac

Loosely speaking, in a model in which all sensations (stimulus, sense data, etc.) of the type X are interpreted as the moon, things that resemble X close enough, would lead the moth to act as if the X is the moon.

Of course, the moon could not be out that night due to cloudy weather or it could cease to exist. The moth would still interpret anything that causes X as the moon. Something like that.

So stimuli-response then...? — Isaac

That's fine.

If that were the case, there'd be no errors, the moth would have meant to fly into the lamp. Since talk of 'errors' and 'intentions' seems so useful, I can't see the utility of a system which would exclude them.

But to be fair, I've never fully understood externalism, — Isaac

There are several versions of it, linguistic, perceptual, etc. I don't know what's supposed to be revealed in most versions of it that I can recall.

I think that for phil. of mind, what matters is how the relevant creatures acts (behaves, responds, interprets) given sensory data.

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Here we go again. Hopefully things don't continue to escalate...

These errors of modelling (the dog's, the moth's) don't make the sources of the data internal, they're about generating appropriate responses. If the model generates an appropriate response, then in what way is it an error of interpretation? — Isaac

I don't believe I said it was an error of interpretation. We would say that the moth made a mistake, on the assumption that living creatures generally speaking, don't commit suicide.

Yes, "the model generates an appropriate response...". I agree here.

Isn't the model internal?

Maybe. It seems related to me - externalism, stimuli (as in stimuli-response)... — Isaac

Fair enough.

Well that's why I asked where the stimulation comes from. Because if it comes from 'the world', then the thought experiment doesn't suggest we don't need the world, does it? — Isaac

The stimulation could come from the world or it could come from a brain in a vat. We assume, very plausibly, that these come from the world. But they could also come from a brain in a vat, given a genius scientist.

If one is interested in philosophy of mind, I think that it makes sense to see what happens in experience. After all, very similar experiences could have different causes. For example a dog starts barking when they look in a mirror, assuming they see another dog.

A moth will fly to lamp and kill itself, confusing it for the moon.

What I think happens in these cases is that the stimulus gets interpreted as belonging to something in the world (another dog, the moon, etc.). I don't think it's unreasonable to suppose that if we knew enough about moths or dogs, we could induce these experiences in a lab.

Likewise, for us, when we confuse one object for another. We interpret a stimulus in a certain manner, regardless of the source.

The thought experiment suggests that we don't need the world to have representations that we have, these could be stimulated and it would appear as if there was a world there.

I think that's accurate. The things we see in manifest reality: trees, rivers, apples and so on, need not be aspects of the world. They happen to be so recognized by virtue of the cognitive capacities we have.

I find this idea useful. If you don't or you think I'm wrong, that's fine. We initially were speaking about the usefulness of extreme thought experiments. It seems that you think you don't find them useful, or maybe I misunderstood.

Either way usefulness is subject to a person's preferences. As you said, this topic is now removed from the OP.

And the books are really expensive. — frank

Yes, stupidly expensive. :groan:

thanks — frank

:up:

I think so. Look at Bryan Magee's work, he did an excellent job in explaining philosophy.

But as far as the modern technical stuff goes, I'm not so sure. The philosophy world could surely use better communicators for the lay person. I mean Dennett's lectures are fun and Chalmers has appeared in popular science shows. But a lot of the interesting details need a bit more clarity, it's just too much jargon at this point.

From a super scientist or an alien species, or God (for those who believe in Him/Her/It). Yes, you can always ask that where is that super scientist or alien species located? It must be in a world in which all these things happen. Perhaps or maybe we lack the imagination to think of how such a situation in which a brain in a vat could be carried out. All I'm saying is that there need be nothing in the world to which our representations are about.

I think that in principle, if we knew enough about the brain we wouldn't need an external world. You would just need to stimulate the appropriate are of the brain to recreate an experience which would be indistinguishable from one in ordinary life.

Granted, this scenario is science fiction, but I think the principle is correct. The main point I take from it is that the world is not necessary to explain our experience.

But as you hinted at, what's useful depends on the person involved. I don't find the "do machines think?" question to be useful, but clearly, other people do.

It's difficult to generalize in this respect, there are philosophers who accept internalism without much problems such as Strawson, Chomsky, Haack, McGinn, etc.

I suspect some philosophers think that by sticking to externalism, they're putting aside spooky stuff like experience (looking at the blue of the sky, or explicitly thinking about a beach, etc.) and then stick to things that are publicly observable and hence be "scientific". It's hard to say.



I don't agree. Putnam, for example, suggested the thought experiment of a brain-in-vats as an exercise. Nobody literally believes we are brain in vats, though some believe in the simulation hypothesis. It's still useful to look at what extreme ideas would look like.

I think you've misunderstood what behaviourism is. None of its proponents suggest that there is no mechanism, that the brain's just a non-functioning blob. — Isaac

Which is why I used the term "strong" behaviorism, one which would do away with any innate mechanism. I agree that I doubt any proponent today would hold such a view.

Less radical versions are fine and necessary.

A human being will react to poem, an amoeba won't. — Isaac

Under strong behaviorism, how would you know that?

Any movement made by the amoeba can be taken as sign that it is reacting to the poem.

But of course amoeba's don't react to poems and humans do, as you point out. So you need to postulate an innate mechanism that allows human beings to react to poems that amoeba's lack.

If it's based on behavior alone, without assuming an innate structure to each creature, I don't see how one could make that distinction, unless you believe there is no difference between creatures.

What I don't understand is how to make sense of a strong version of behaviorism. Doesn't it rule out sense in communication? — frank

It rules out almost everything. A human being is reduced to a stimulus-reacting nothing. You wouldn't be able to tell a human from an amoeba under strong behaviorism. So it's not even good science, unless it's radically altered.

But there really isn't anything newsworthy about weak content externalism, is there? — frank

Nope. Not that I can see. Yet I see more papers talking about externalism of all varieties than internalism, which is coherent and looks to me to be scientific. Everybody's internalist when it comes to other animals, we all assume they have an intrinsic nature such that a dog will behave dog-like and not chimp -like, etc.

But when it comes to human beings, internalism becomes this mysterious magic stuff to some. This is strange to me.

That's a hard solution to avoid as "strong" content externalism just seems like a version of behaviorism.

I suppose that one can argue that the content of our perceptions are veridical only when the external content actually coincides with what we imagine. That is if the cow we think we see is actually a cow. So on this view, thinking that you see a cow that turns out to be sheep would be equivalent to saying that the content in your head is false. So even if you think you saw a cow, your thinking that you say it is not content after all.

But this just makes no sense. It's an arbitrary stipulation on what content is, which leaves out almost everything.

If, however, you use content externalism in a much less radical manner, then perhaps it can be articulated a little.

Likely the number of people involved.

:ok:

Hah. That's like asking a dog to understand itself.

We are indeed, very far away.

It's hard enough to find many people interested in these topics. Which is strange, they should be fascinating without need for further explanation.

Ah. Yeah. It's not always easy to keep one's cool about when people say really crazy stuff regarding vaccines and such, but moralizing is usually a bad idea.

So far as I see, however, I don't see a disagreement about the use of vaccines per se. Mask wearing can be nebulous, sure, but if you're in agreement about the important stuff then rest doesn't seem to matter as much.

I understand the frustration.

I don't quite understand what's the argument here. I think most of us here - with some exceptions - agree that most people should get the vaccine. For the vast majority of people it is the best way to deal with this problem.

As for masks, if you're in your house or in your car or in a park with ample room between people, you should be ok, most of the time. In closed spaces with strangers, wear them. If you have breathing problems or a panic attack or something like that, I don't think taking it off at that moment will be a massive scandal.

Otherwise, this is going to last much longer than it should.

And again, vaccine availability for all countries should really be priority no.1 for almost everybody.

:up:

Damn, I don't care if the Duck is male or female, those colours are gorgeous.

It's a complex topic. In some important respects, women are commercialized because men rule the world. There's also the fact that, on average, men are physically stronger than women.

I've read comments about women's libido being equally strong as many males. If some women say this then I can't argue with that. From my observations, I would've thought than men have quite a high sex drive and some are willing to pay money for sex. Then again, given my Latin American perspective, there may be a lot of distortion in terms of the way I view this topic.

As for the general question, it may be a cop out, but I think biology is quite strong. There's also something about the female form that has been considered a paradigm for beauty in many cultures all over the world. This probably has to do with some aspect of our innate nature.

So for us as a species, it might be a fact that it's easier to appreciate female beauty.

Really??? I wonder... :chin:

Yeah. I mean, people can build dams, construct cities, destroy mountains. But when a 8 scale earthquake hits or a tsunami or a hurricane or a volcano erupts, etc., then it's much harder.

Viruses have been around forever, so in a sense they are a dark side of nature. Climate change is on us, the planet is simply following habits of nature and we pay for it.

Life can only thrive in very specific circumstances, outside these we're nothing. Let's grant several planets have intelligent life, despite having no evidence for this, what's a few planets with intelligent life compared to the universe? It's not even possible to compare.

I mean, if we wanted to merely visit the closet star outside our sun, it would take us 4.24 light years to reach it. That is, we would have to go for over 6000 years using our fastest technology just to reach it.

Our control of nature if very much deceptive.

We can control nature until we can't, then we perish. It's not the size of the ship, it's the size of the wave that matters.

But, perhaps barring a nuclear apocalypse - and even then - give nature a few hundred thousand years, and they'll likely be somewhat intelligent life around.

I stop just short of believing in teleology, though once certain conditions are met, it looks as if life seeks to expand itself to every corner of habitability. Perhaps in most of the universe, such conditions are supremely rare, but life is quite stubborn.

In short, our control of nature is considerable up to a point, but nature wins and always will.

Sounds reasonable. Yeah, I don't see why there could not be an intelligent species that was by default much more altruistic, empathic and so on.

I don't disagree with us taking ourselves to be the norm. Just pointing out that in this planet, the more intelligent a species is, generally, the less likely they are to survive and thrive. Maybe elsewhere things are different.

Yep. It's certainly easier to just absorb sunlight or oxygen and just barely move and have no worries than it is to be human being.

There are two views here we should consider.

One would be, as Neil deGrasse Tyson said, that what we're doing is equivalent to taking a bucket to the ocean, scoop up some water, look in the bucket and then state that there's no life in the universe.

The second option, also worth seriously considering, is Ernst Mayer's view. He points out that in the only planet we know of that contains life in this universe, intelligence seems to be a lethal mutation. Look around, most of the species that survive and thrive are single cell organisms.

Likely not brilliant.

So it's not clear. I lean to the view that there is life, but I'm unsure about it being intelligent.

Sure. I only speak of an intuition or vague idea, but nothing beyond that.

We're in full agreement then. :cool:

Essentially yes. As you give more detailed analysis, I get a better picture of the dog you saw.

I'd say that in describing it as being over half white, black lips and so on, those are names you give that approximate your experience. The experience for you is private. It's a first person phenomenon.

When you attempt to describe it, you're shifting to a third person description. The change occurs in the shift of perspective. The object in experience will remain the same to you, but in the description, no matter how detailed it is, I cannot enter your body and see the dog with your eyes and conceive it with your mind.

I'll make my own description in my own mental image, likely different form yours. Perhaps the black I imagine is lighter than yours, or I have a kind of terrier in mind that is bigger than yours, etc.

So yes, no change in the "object itself", so to speak, but the object as you describe to me changes from what you actually experience.

Sure. The best you can do is have a vague feeling or sensation just prior to going to sleep and as soon as one wakes up. In the non-dreamless sleep or before non-existence, there is nothing to say. It's only in experience that we can look back on these things and comment on them.

But If I tell you that right now, thinking about dreamless sleep or the time "before my birth", I have a vague sensation of what it is. My sensation would not be the same as non-existence, of course, there is no sensation in non-existence. But I have an inkling of what that would be. I don't see a contradiction in this.