Hotel California (Live Acoustic) - The Eagles

The best version of this song by far. :wink:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1mbI74lV68

Yes, I agree with this. I used to really like Heidegger. When I read him now, it does little to me. It doesn't connect nearly as much, though I do still find some value in him.

I had a "postmodernism" phase many years ago, in which I liked Foucault, Deleuze and Lacan. I now think Lacan and some parts of Deleuze are just awful, unhelpful and can quite literally make you think irrationality about how the world works. But my opinion on Derrida never changed, he just plays with words and tries to sound complex. Other would fiercely disagree. That's fine.

The opposite happened to me with Whitehead. I use to think his main work was mostly incomprehensible jargon, with little to no value. I now think he's very interesting, even if his verbosity takes away some extra value that would be there had he been better in expressing his ideas.

And is it unreasonable to consider a mind that exists when the body and brain dies that makes us away or possible past lives and a world beyond this one? A mind that is too quiet in the presents of brain minds? — TiredThinker

It's quite unlikely I think, there's no good reason to believe mind goes on absent certain configurations of matter, like brains.

As for mental distinctions, it's an open question. The distinction we make on the world may or may not "cut up" nature in the proper manner. I think there is good reason to believe that when a physicist postulates an atom, he is correct in also postulating electrons and protons, that is it's a successful separation of nature.

But as for making a natural distinction between mind and matter, that does not seem justified. As for mind itself there's many aspects to it. Intentionality goes from the subject to the world, perception comes from the world to the subject. Both are mind-involving acts, but I don't think postulating intentionality on one side and perception on the other is a real cut in nature, as atoms and electrons are.

Memory involves mind, but need not be necessary in some instances. So that may be a good distinction. On the other hand having no memory at all, not even one that lasts, for example .5 seconds, might make experience impossible.

Skimming is fine, for anything, I think. But that's just to get a general idea. Sometimes a philosopher/scientist/author is simply not for you.

Sure, technicalities in science are quite difficult for the non-expert, which is why popularizers such as Sean Carroll, Brian Greene and others are very, very helpful.

I've read Pynchon, which I've heard is as hard to read as Joyce, though this is debated. I think part of Finnegans Wake is simply meant to frustrate the reader.

Which is why I choose a thermometer, not a random lone person out the window. If, however there were a crowd outside and they all wore cold weather clothing, I might be more likely to go this path. — Tom Storm

It becomes complex quite quickly.

Perhaps you can say that looking at a thermometer gives you more reasons yo believe it is cold outside as opposed to looking at a person. A thermometer isn't subjective, perhaps the person you are looking it is particularly sensible to slight changes in weather or perhaps that person looked at the same thermometer before choosing what to wear.

Then again someone can always come back at you and say that this thermometer might be broken or misleading, etc.

So you can add all the extra complications you'd like. In such a scenario I tend to prefer trusting a thermometer over a person because more people are involved in making sure the thermometer is working properly as opposed to what a single person may feel.

Fallibillism (originally CS Pierce) may be the best approach. — Tom Storm

:up:

Yes. He's an excellent choice on these matters.

That's part of it sure, we don't have absolute certainty in any case. But I think the problem with Gettier paradoxes lies in some measure, with the concept of "knowledge". It's not a straightforward word that applies in all instances and it has certain English specific idiosyncrasies.

We can speak of a person knowing the history of WWII and while we can say that a person knows that he sees a lake, these are very different uses of the word, established by very different criteria. Some could argue that speaking about "knowing" that you see something is not really knowledge, it is perception. This is debatable though.

And then we also have knowledge by accident, as in bumping into a tourist from a particular country and happening to know the language they speak. And many other cases.

So instead of knowledge we may be better off using "understanding" or some other term.

It's likely inevitable. It forms part of our innate categorization of things to belong, at the very least, to a community of people which today is associated with a nation state.

It's not as if you could reject your national identity even if you wanted to, some of sticks, the extent of which this happens varies. A closely related question is to what degree can you try to reject those aspects of nation identity which you may not like. Some may be strongly bonded with national identities. Others may think it's more silly than useful. It has its good and bad sides.

I hope such feelings diminish to the extent they can. The problems we are facing cannot be adequately solved by identities belonging to a nation state. We need the world in some fashion.

So how do people stay endlessly fascinated? How does one master the capacity to stay engaged? I believe this is a topic that demands more attention. — Benj96

First of all, this is an excellent question. It's something I struggle with with relative frequency.

If I had to guess, I think that in large part the capacity to sustain fascination is person dependent. There are times in which I just cannot bring myself to care, be invested in, or think about certain topics that on most other times, are just the most interesting topics of all: philosophy, science, international relations and literature.

Maybe there is something to be said about discipline. It probably helps you to stay connected with a topic even if it's not being interesting at the moment. It's probably also good to engage with something you normally wouldn't, it could lead to new things.

Then again, if something is not connecting with you at the moment, you might be actually be better served doing something else.

There is a world of difference in the capacity for retention and engagement with serious issues if you are interested or fascinated as opposed to moments when, for whatever reason, you aren't so interested.

I'm sure others have different experiences.

No problem at all.

Yes, I agree with your statement. It's a very different idea of thinking about God, which is what makes it unique.

But it is extremely dark, maybe the most pessimistic system in the whole of philosophy.

Dark sentiment indeed. Interesting project you have going on here. :)

You are open to many possibilities, that's a good trait in general.

I'd only be careful in taking science out of context, that could be if not dangerous, then problematic at least when attempting to make sense of evidence.

Some people love Finnegans Wake. Can one call it a novel? I suppose. I can't read much into it. But in the arts, whatever moved you or gets you thinking is legitimate, I think.

A classic from the 90's. What a fantastic band. Underrated in the US sadly.

Don't Look Back in Anger - Oasis

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cmpRLQZkTb8

Sooooo Sally can wait...

:cool:

Very much so. One can get caught up in fancy jargon and people get confused unnecessarily.

Since this is a philosophy forum, I won't mention any specific philosophers, but, I had in mind people reading someone like, Deepak Chopra and getting lost in almost total verbal salad which often grossly distorts the relevant science, usually quantum physics in his case.

But there are certain philosophical traditions that I personally think lead to irrationality. Of course, that's a very personal preference which varies from person to person.

I thought Chalmers was more of a property dualist. Which is a weaker view than substance dualism.

Yes, you can say "fundamentally different", but I had in mind metaphysically different, meaning a completely separate or distinct aspect of nature. I think we have good reasons to believe that experience is physical.

The problem with substance dualism, as I understand it, is that of interaction: how can two completely different aspects or features of nature interact?

With property dualism, this doesn't need to arise. One can speak of those aspects of nature that are experiential and those aspects of nature that are non-experiential. Of course, this can be endlessly debated.

Yes, reading is fundamental. So is interchanging ideas with others.

On the other hand, I've known cases of people who read certain books and just get completely lost from rational discourse. So, one has to be a bit careful.

No.

It means there is only one kind of thing to study: different instantiations of physical stuff.

We don't study ghosts, Gods or angels...

Yes, those are the options we have.

I still think that monism and property dualism are essentially the most often pursued views. I don't know many people who believe in substance dualism, aside from theologists.

And maybe a few people here and there. But it's a difficult view to articulate, it seems to me.

These tables and chairs and river, what makes them up, deep down is not solid concrete stuff.

Sure.

It's also intentional.

Yes. All very hard questions. I guess one big problem is having people around which you identify with and ground your meaning or add substantial value to it. It would be better if they had the option too.

On the other hand, being put in such a place, by your own volition, to choose to end your life given immortality, would be a very devastating situation to be in.

Then again, maybe not in some cases. But it would be a problem for some and not a small one.

I think one of the problems we tend to have we trying to understand experience, is that our intuition tells us that most things are non-experiential. We seem rocks, rivers, land, the sky, tables and so forth and even (some) planets to be solid objects.

It's a powerful intuition.

Then we have this thing, this simultaneously abstract and concrete aspect to us, experience, which appears to be completely different from "solid" rocks and rivers. But we now know, relatively recently actually, that deep down, these solid things we see are inherently much stranger than we could have ever guessed. We no longer think of particles even, but of waves and ultimately, fields.

Once we take this into account, this strange thing experience, is comparatively less strange to assimilate relative to everything else.

But it took thousands of years to discover these strange aspects of matter. So our intuitions lead us astray...

Maybe. I think it's extremely unlikely, but it could happen. It's tough.

Existing forever. What about the loved ones forever gone? Would we not eventually be bored beyond reason? To be fair, I think that those that always say that it is because we are finite that we are able to give meaning to life is not that clear to me.

I believe it was Wittgenstein that said this, but I don't remember. He said something like death is not something we experience in life, it is not an experience for us. Dying yes, but death, no. We live each moment assuming we are not going to die the next second.

There is something strangely timeliness about this attitude. Because if we did know exactly the time we had left, we might do things with extreme urgency, but few of us do.

As for getting rid of death anxiety. Only when I'm not in my right mind am I terrified of death. When I'm fine, it does not bother me rationally. I wasn't bothered before I came here. I doubt I'll be bothered afterwards.

For the time being we take what we have and live this incomprehensible "now".

Which isn't much different from a creationist argument: this creature has the capacity because God willed it so.

Evolution certainly plays a factor in change, but appealing to it alone does not offer much by way of explanations.

It's almost impossible.

I've always thought that music points to the most profound experiences we can have as intelligent creatures of some kind.

On the other hand, not being to see, to read, to take in. That's a high price to pay.

Maybe deaf. Maybe. It would still suck as hell....

You're right, we can't know. We can only work with our intuitions. I assume our intuitions about dogs and monkeys are more or less correct. It may even be richer than what we may think. "Below" that, as it were, I don't trust my intuitions anymore. It looks unlikely that animals have an issue with experience, but they may.

In this instance I think we just have to approach the subject as we do in real life, the way we treat cats or dogs as opposed to butterflies or lizards. I don't see any alternative for the time being. Maybe sometime in the future we may learn something more than changes this.

I don't follow. Can you explain a bit?

We use consciousness before saying anything. Learning consciousness is akin to saying that we learn how to grow legs or learn how to digest food.

A child may be living with non-human animals and will be conscious, though doubtless it will be somewhat restricted compared to human being than speaks.

One thing is understanding, another is having. Or so it seems to me.

It's quite late here, so if you don't mind, we can continue whenever you want. Maybe I learn more about consciousness, no doubt. :cool:

I think we see it others because we recognize it in ourselves. If we didn't we wouldn't be able to recognize it in others. The idea is that person is like-me, because s/he is doing things I would do if I were in that situation.

In any case, I agree with Russell when he argues that our most intimate acquaintance with things consist of our own percepts followed by the percepts of other people and finally to theories of the world, in that order. In short, I don't think that communication is essential to private life.

But the etymology you present is quite interesting. The word "consciousness", according to Udo Thiel, was first given philosophical use by Ralph Cudworth. He clearly thought we had private experience. But that's besides the point.

Yeah, no doubt there's a lot to learn about animals.

I have some big doubts, even if I grant your point about anthropomorphism. I think there are aspects of human beings which belong to us alone such as creativity, language (human language is unique compared to animals communication), aesthetics, etc.

But on some aspects such as ethics, perception and intelligence, we may be less special than we think.

In any case point registered.

I know individuals, and individual segments of society, then and now, from different societies, and geographies, are just as impressive. But I would have hoped that by now our dumbest people would be as smart as Plato, et al. Hell, it's been about 2,500 years! No joy. — James Riley

We've progressed in some fields which are important, but it's small slice of the whole of life.

Where we haven't advanced, we're the same as your average well educated Athenian.

Consciousness is not private. — Banno

What does that mean?

Something like we don't have our own thoughts, feelings and sensations if they're not expressible to other people?

By Russel, is that Bertrand? — James Riley

Yes. He's great and can be quite clear. He wrote over 30,000 articles in his life, so there's a lot of stuff you can choose to look at.

Yeah. Schopenhauer would take some dedication, but he was a fantastic writer and very insightful. But it would take some time.

Can't go wrong with the dialogues. ;)

To me the issue of a sense of self isn’t a pure self-identity separate from but accompanying all my experiences of objects. I think it has to do with the relative integrity and internal coherence of my moment to moment changes in experience. In other words , self is a structural feature of the relation between my anticipative projecting and the objects that occur into that anticipation. — Joshs

Sure. But do you think that in, for example, seeing your hand and recognizing it as such, as belonging to you would be somewhat similar in the case of an animal with one of its limbs? The recognizing the limb as a part of you?

I don't know. But I intuit a difference. I admit, it could be way off.

I think the at normative projecting gives the experienced its sense of a relative self identity over time. — Joshs

Perhaps. The issue for this thread would be, do you think animals recognize experience as an issue for them or would they take it as a given that is nothing that raises "reflection" in such an animal?

Schopenhauer will not put you to sleep.

A portion of Russell as well as William James should even fun to read in short bursts. :)

Dan Zahavi has made this his central focus, but there is growing concensus that all experience presupposes some primitive sense of self. Infants have been shown to differentiate self from others. — Joshs

His work is very interesting.

It makes sense, but a primitive sense of self would seem to be weaker (by definition) than a robust sense of self, as is the case of people. I think that what matters in the case of experience is being able to separate the knower from the known, in a way that one can even pose these questions.

Otherwise, although there may be a very primitive self idea, I don't see how awareness itself becomes a problem for such creatures, as opposed to a matter of survival.

But I could be way off...

We know that we have some kind of knowledge, and this fact is puzzling, why do we have this thing, experience? I doubt animals get near that, as it would also require language and much else, which is not to deny in the least the amazing capacities animals have in there own right.

Well, if by "word games" you also have in mind conceptual distinctions, which aren't only verbal, then I'd agree.

I think there is content in philosophy, not just talk about words.

I actually like "self-awareness" more than "consciousness" to describe the phenomena we're talking about, but "consciousness" is the word used most often by others. People don't talk about the hard problem of self-awareness. — T Clark

But isn't the problem with self-awareness that it goes a step beyond experience ("mere" consciousness)? We cannot know at all, but let me articulate an intuition:

Take an animal, maybe a bat, maybe a lizard. They likely have experience, they are aware of things in the world: prey, food, shelter and the like. I am skeptical that such creatures would have "self awareness" as opposed to awareness.

What is added by self-awareness that is absent in experience? The apparent fact that one is aware that it is oneself that is having the experience, not another person nor another creature.

Like almost any other aspect of nature, experience is very multifaceted and rich. I think that you are correct in that what's causing most of these discussions is self awareness: "I know that I am staring at a screen", "I know that WWII ended in 1945", "I know that song".

If I can't separate experience from me, how could it arise as a question?

Haha.

Philosophy.

It never ends.

Oh sure. I'm perfectly fine with that. I think we only approximate too.

I suppose it would be more accurate to say we are no longer led in mistaken paths as to what one tentative answer could look like. By abandoning contact mechanics or substance dualism, we are less mistaken.

So in this case "solved" would imply something like "no longer a pressing problem down this path of inquiry", but this should not be taken as meaning that all problems are eliminated.

They never are. They are either modified, put aside or discarded.

Leave the woman alone, ffs.

I don't see many people complaining when a guy uses porn for release. That's genocide...

:shade: