Metaphysics as traditionally understood is essentially the question, what is the (fundamental) nature of the world. Of course, we have achieved considerable feats in our knowledge of the world since Aristotle.

But we've also comes to realize that what we can know of the world, is substantially reduced from what we would like to know about it. So now, if we want to engage in metaphysics, it must be done through an epistemological lens.

So, the question shifts somewhat from what is the nature of the world to: "what is it that can we say, given the creatures we are, about the nature of the world."

Why not? That person is still here, or did they leave?

All demonstrable usage of the terms "thought" and "belief" consists entirely of correlations. All talk consists entirely of correlations. The attribution of meaning consists of precisely the same. What else could we sensibly call thought/belief if it doesn't somehow involve and/or consist of mental correlations? — creativesoul

It's a bit tricky. We can say that certain objects have a kind of consistent reliability to stimulate us in a particular way. But then we have to explain hallucinations, or mental phenomena that has no immediate external anchor to our current thoughts. And in this domain, correlation is obscure to establish.

As for what we can call thoughts? That's really hard. Plainly we have thoughts about things we do not encounter in experience - morals say, or events from which we are very far removed. Then there's also me willing my fingers to type these letters, as opposed to some other letters and much else besides a correlation between something "out there" and our minds.

And now I see that his is 6 years old, so, you may no longer believe exactly what you say here, or perhaps have modified your stance.

A Man of Shadows - Jeff Noon

Critique of Pure Reason - Immanuel Kant

Honorary membership will have to do. Our views are considered very silly in much contemporary science/philosophy. Oh well.

I'm unsure why - this seems to define miracle as rare. As i understand, we could get a miracle per moment; as long as it's something which requires the suspension of established natural law, it would just be a lot of miracles. Though, this does go to the origin of those laws - and a force which overcame them. I don't think I either know enough, or care enough, to go further but 'being common' doesn't seem a defeater, to me. Might be misunderstanding! — AmadeusD

By miracles I mean something which goes beyond whatever naturalism encapsulates, naturalism meaning, in my case, a thing of nature. Mind you, my definition of naturalism allows for novels and movies and drama and all that, so it is far from being a scientisitic designator. We don't know the limits of what nature encapsulates.

By supernatural, I would mean something that goes beyond what nature can do. It's a kind of substance dualism, which can't be defended intelligibly. So, if a miracle could happen, it couldn't be part of nature by definition (my definition), but since we don't know the limits of nature, we shouldn't invoke the miraculous. So if a mind is not part of the world, and since the world is part of nature, mind must be part of nature too, unless there is argument given as to why minds cannot be natural, which doesn't make any sense.

I do, though, presuppose that if mind-at-large is a thing (in mind of panpsychism, lets say) then there will be natural laws regulating its behaviour and so there's no miracle in it. If it is somehow totally inexplicable, then yeah, it would have to be an ingression to reality, rather than some discreet aspect of reality. — AmadeusD

Well that sounds like Kastrup's idea, except he doesn't believe in panpsychism, because he doesn't believe there is mind-independent matter. But if you are a panpsychist in general (like Strawson or Goff) then, sure, that's one way to explain the mental.

I am personally a "radical emergence" guy, minds arise from configurations of natural stuff, but we have no idea how.

We do what, perceive and think? Sure.

But if it's a miracle (meaning, minds are not part of world-stuff), then maybe it happens once ever, in the whole history of the universe.

But if it happens several billion times, as is the case with our species, it can't be a miracle and thus our minds are a property of the world.

I don't see an alternative between these two options.

Yeah, you've said something similar before I believe. I think the mind is part of the world, it isn't the same thing as an object, clearly, but it is a modification of world stuff.

If that's not true, then minds are literal miracles, and I don't think we need to go that far.

I don’t think it is the case dreams are the reception of stimuli, for one thing, and for another, reception of stimuli just is sensation anyway, which is only possible by the causality of external things.

But you probably mean the brain receiving stimuli from itself, which requires no immediate sensation. But then, does any dream contain that which was not at some former time a sensation, or at least a possible sensation? If so, then external objects are at least the mediate content of dreams, even if not their cause. — Mww

Yes, that's what I should have said.

Well, if you consider say, geometrical shapes as sensations, then by definition everything in a dream would be some aspect of a prior sensation.

I think that the most we can say about objects is that they are the stimulus for our ideas and conceptions, to awaken them in a manner of speaking or to put them to work, though they were there all along, dormant.

But then the combination of actual objects to possible objects, does not involve sensation, or if it does, it would be a quite minor part.

What does serious monism look like? By what description might I understand what it is? — Mww

I think Galen Strawson's conception of materialism, in his essay "Real Materialism", would be a very good approximation. You don't even have to accept it as materialism, you could call it "actual monism" or "ideal monism" - he does have an essay called Realistic Monism, which is not as good.

You don't even have to buy into his panpsychism (I don't.)

In short, everything that is, is X, wherein X is whatever designation you want to call the stuff of the world, which include our minds. And by everything, I mean everything: history, novels, ideas, flowers, cabbages, kings, atoms, art, grass, dreams, all sensations, etc. It's all a modification of X.

It that does not sound persuasive, then, we have the classical problems, how con two (or more) totally distinct things, which appear to have nothing in common, interact? No one has been able to answer this in a convincing manner that I can see.

I'm only trying to show how the term is problematic, and I find this puzzling given all this talk about "externalism", as if this idea is so clear. I don't think it is.

If forced to pick, I'd say external is what is not literally in my mind at any moment. But I have to tweak it more.

The ideas of other people could be said to be external to you, in so far as they don't express what they are thinking, otherwise we assume they are a person-like-me.

But then we may be stretching the term "external" a bit. It would be perhaps more accurate to say, these people's thoughts are hidden from me.

We only see behavior, from which we guess internal states. Reading a good novel, is, I think, the closest you could get into the mind of another person, though of course in a much more structured form than what actually happens in our heads all the time.

As for the notion of a single mind or consciousness, that's too much Kastrup like for my tastes. But there is an interesting aspect here, and it applies to everything: if you take the brain of a person and do certain experiments, we assume that this brain applies to all other brains on Earth, given we are essentially the same creature with superficial differences.

This happens with all creatures and plants too. So there's plenty to chew on.

I agree it hasn’t to do with properties of things, but it does seem quite easy just to say…the external is that by which sensations are possible.

Wanna get stickier….the external is the permanent in time, simply because the internal never is.

Helps to be a unrepentant dualist, though, right? If one isn’t, he would have a harder job with the issue, — Mww

Well, if you want to get super sticky, then in so far as your first sentence goes, sure, in SOME cases. What happens when we receive stimulus with no external object, such as dreams? Or cases in which, for no apparent reason, we suddenly have an intense flashback and literally forget where we are at this moment. We would need to account for cases of internal stimulation too.

Agree with your second statement, quite perceptive.

Dualism, shmualisms. Seeing is extremely different from hearing, yet we say they are both senses. Serious monism requires a lot of imagination, in my mind.

I think the distinction between inside and outside the skin is a useful and valid one. A basic principle of semiotics is the idea that life and experience is only possible once there is a separation between an 'inside' and an 'outside', most primordially realized by the cell membrane.

It's true that when we think about and analyze it we may become confused due to ambiguities of terms. — Janus

Of course, I wouldn't dream of saying no such distinction exists, because, as you say, the difference between inside and outside is massive and would not be possible absent a sentient, much less a thinking being.

I only want to stress that I think it makes more sense to think of it in terms of "internal internal" and "internal external", because this latter, as you also point out, is a representation (or a presentation, whatever word you prefer) and hence not AS external as is usually thought.

At least, I find this persuasive at the moment.

I see no reason to think that what is reliably and cross-sensorially perceived is not real in some sense. After all, that is generally what is meant by the word 'real'.

So, the colours and the heat are real phenomena that exist in the interaction of the body with fire and the light reflected off objects. You say the heat is not in the fire. but the fire can burn objects and even entirely consume them, even in the absence of anyone perceiving the fire.

Heat is defined by science as the agitation of molecules caused by friction or combustion, but of course heat defined as a felt phenomenon is only possible for a percipient. — Janus

Yes, the word "real", is thorny, often distracting. Everything is real is some sense, even Harry Potter, though he would belong in the books of J.K. Rowling.

Heat and colors are quite real, they just don't belong to the objects alone, as you point out. I said heat, but heat is relative to us, a paper or piece of plastic burning, feels not heat, it disintegrates, due to an interaction between fire and the relevant object.

That's a plausible way to explain how we arrive at such an internal/external distinction, just as having a dream and waking up to discover that its content was not realized, might also lead to that distinction.

But it's still a quite fuzzy distinction that, while it may suffice for everyday dealings, becomes more problematic as we think and analyze it with some depth.

Sure, you can say external objects are real, but to go on to argue,

that our perceptions of them are real on account of the real affects they, along with environmental conditions, light, sound, molecules of scent and taste, and the nature of our bodies themselves, have on our perceptions. — Janus

Raises a serious problem.

What about the objects' effects are we interacting with? As Descartes points out, the heat is not in the fire, and as almost everyone says, the orange and yellow colour is not in the fire either, and so on down the list of properties.

Something other than the heat we feel and orange we see must account for these things, and furthermore they must be different from the heat we feel or the orange we see. For if the effects of the objects were identical with our internal causes, we wouldn't be able to make the distinction between an object and an idea.

So, we are still left with the issue, what is external? I don't see an easy answer, outside of ordinary (and I hate this word) "folk" psychology.

For if one is unable to know anything about the external world, then one can not make any claims about it at all – even claiming that knowledge about it is impossible, because that too is knowing something about the external world – namely, that it is unknowable.

In fact, wouldn’t you need to bypass your own perceptions and go outside your own mind in order to make such a claim? After all, according to the argument, your own perceptions and mind are unable to determine anything about the external world. Given that argument, you would need to employ some means – other than your own perceptions and mind – to be able to verify whether or not an external world can be accessed by your internal perceptions and mind.

Because isn’t it possible that our perceptions are a dependable means of obtaining knowledge of the external world?

If we are to know anything, then don’t we need to (somehow) have access to that object of knowledge? And to have access, don’t we need a means by which we access it?...

....

.... Aren’t sensory perceptions the means by which we gain access to – and knowledge about – the external world? Skeptics misrepresent their critics as identifying perception with the world itself. Rather, aren’t skeptics the ones conflating process with result; confusing the road with the destination; and identifying addition, subtraction, multiplying and dividing with the solutions of algebraic problems?

And one final observation: It seems to me that the skeptic is rigging the game from the start – taking away the means by which we can have knowledge of the external world in order to prove it is impossible to know anything about it. Which actually reveals another logical issue – that of assuming what is to be proven and then “proving” it (the fallacy of begging the question):

The skeptic assumes and asserts that we do not have the means by which we can have knowledge of the external world and, therefore, we can not have knowledge of the external world... — Thales

The issue is in the definition the "external world", as you point out. External is usually taken to mean, something outside our minds. So how it that we can go outside our minds (or perceptions that arise in persons with minds) to a completely external world?

In theory I suppose, it would be nice to be able to go outside one's own body to compare if our perceptions are getting something right or wrong about the world as we perceive it. But of course, this is impossible, for a view outside ourselves - and hence outside a framework of understanding - there would be nothing at all to experience.

The issue of correctness or incorrectness of our perceptions is not relevant about the external world, they are relevant in relation to our conceptions of our perceptions about the mind-dependent world: is that flower I am seeing white or grey? Is that the sound of a train or a concert?, etc.

A big issue, to my mind, is what exactly is meant by external here? People often speaking about external and internal, as if that distinction is very clear, I don't think it is. It would be replied that this sofa I am seeing is external to me, that is, it is not in my mind, so it is external in that sense.

But is that a substantial point? For the sofa I was seeing mere seconds ago tells me about how it looks to me, how it feels to me and how I conceive of and understand objects, always in relation to the being in question, in this case, a human being. So by this metric, the sofa I am seeing is not external to me, it is a representation, and representations are internal.

Perhaps a better distinction would be internal internal/ internal external, the former being ideas in my head absent an immediate object, and the latter would be objects as they appear to my senses and how my mind interprets them.

All this leaves aside the issue of the sciences, specifically physics, which is the star of the sciences, there we have good reason to believe that we are studying aspects of the mind-independent world, which is different from an "external world", because, at the end of the day, physics has to make sense to us in some manner, or it wouldn't matter at all, nothing would register.

It is in this area, in which we may come closest to something like the external world, but still with some caveats, which in fact make the science possible at all. Aspects of cosmology and classical physics seem to indicate some abstract properties of the mind independent world, which is fascinating, but structural, as in epistemic structural realism, which may be the best we can do. But, I could be wrong.

I think the knowledge you are discussing as veridical in hopes of showing that true perceptions tell us something about the external world, is more of an issue of accurateness of our perceptions given what many people report experiencing: if everybody sees the sky as blue, but I see it as yellow, then I may have some liver problems, or problems with my eye. But it doesn't reach the external world defined as, something outside our minds.

I believe I have mentioned this before, but if you can find yourself a copy of Tallis' The Knowing Animal, I think you will very much enjoy it.

I think it is his best work, by far, and I have read quite a bit of him.

Deals with this thread topic quite well, a very interesting account of the given in experience, even richer than Lewis original one back in the day. Of course, Tallis doesn't call it that.

Nevertheless, worth keeping an eye out for that one.

I think we approximate such as state if we attempt to remember a bit what existence was like prior to birth, or the instance before our first conscious experience.

But while awake and alive, it is somewhat more difficult to do so, assuming dreamless sleep is in now way similar to nothingness, which sounds wrong to me.

But then I could be wrong in this latter intuition, don't think I'm wrong about my former one. But, we cannot be certain.

Sure, which is why have literature and art. And a good deal of philosophy. Good thing too, otherwise, a world with only science (as narrowly construed) would be quite boring and dry, akin to reading calculations made by a computer.

The only philosopher I can think of who thinks science is the only game in town when it comes to human understanding, is Alex Rosenberg, as presented in his book The Atheists' Guide to Reality.

It's not only absurd and insulting, rather, it is not even wrong. Thankfully, few people are this insane.

Welcome and enjoy your time here. There are plenty of important Australian philosophers around.

As to your question and Sartre's claim, that "existence precedes essence", I believe this is as a factual claim, false. If it is intended to elaborate some kind of existentialist viewpoint, then that claim has to be defended under such a context.

Without extra content, it's not true. Without a nature (essence), existence is meaningless, one might as well be a rock.

Within our rich biological capacities, existence (experience) plays a fundamental role in our development as human beings.

At least, that's how it seems to me.

:victory:

@180 Proof

https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Redemption-Philipp-Mainl%C3%A4nder/dp/0645498076/ref=sr_1_1?crid=Q1S6IHXRFSEX&keywords=the+philosophy+of+redemption&qid=1705765531&s=books&sprefix=the+philosophy+of+redepmption%2Cstripbooks-intl-ship%2C184&sr=1-1

Not at all.

Happens to all of us. :smile:

I don't think we can say that, other than as a 'position' to take, rather than that it is the case. Isn't that what half of the questions in this arena relate to? The fact we don't know that that is the case? — AmadeusD

I think we can be highly confident thoughts arise in human beings from the brain. We can lose almost any part of our bodies and still have thoughts. But if you remove the brain, no more thinking.

The problem is not from where do thoughts come from, but the how.

Well, if you keep in mind that we do not know what 95% of the universe is, aside from naming them "dark energy" and "dark matter" and to postulate them in order to make sense of the 5% we do know, I think there's a little bit more work to do.

And even if we do get that, to say that physics can explain concepts or representations (which you have not said), is taking physics way outside of its purview.

I don't quite understand, how is it that the (to use a less problematic term - perhaps) mind/brain are not in the head?

If we read a novel, we imagine the stuff the book tells us, that would be a mental representation. If a neuroscientist examines a person reading a book, then he is talking about a brain.

But you can't invoke the brain at the level of novels, because we don't know nearly enough to say how mental representations, never mind concepts work, solely by appealing to the brain, or at least you're not going to get much depth by doing so.

I'm not sure what you mean.

You are pointing out the description of what Wilfred Sellars' says when he mentions the Manifest Image of Man, and the Scientific image of man, as you seem to indicate, two distinct perspectives which someone, at least in an ideal science, could explain with some clarity and insight, but which for now, we designate, roughly, between common-sense understanding and science.

I agree there is no mind-body problem, because we don't know what a body is, literally. Physicists don't even know what a particle is, though they do agree on some of its properties. And Newton demolished the one clear conception of materialism that existed, which was mechanical materialism. Now it's taken to mean, whatever physics says.

That can't be right, for today's physics will be different tomorrow, and physics does not tell us anything about the mind or brain, only that they are at the very bottom, made of the stuff physics describes, but that leaves a lot of stuff out.

I also agree that the hard problem of consciousness is extremely misleading, because we have many hard problems, not least the nature of motion, which Newton, Locke, Hume, Priestley, Russell and Chomsky have pointed out.

Sure, we can say that thoughts arise from brain, somehow, but we aren't too clear on how it does so.

The one explicit disagreement that I can see is that we can do so without metaphysics. Either something exists (in the world), or it does not. If we agree that something exists, it must have a nature - what's left to be determined is what the nature of the existing thing is. Crucially, whatever exists must accommodate both minds and brains, so the nature of things must allow for this continuity.

So the question is, can what is called consciousness in psychology be described physiologically? — Wolfgang

No, because we do not know enough and lack the capacity to make the leap from physiology to consciousness. Some may say that just wait for technology to advance and we'll show you. Well, it's been a good 40 years or so in research of the brain sciences, but we cannot even explain how the taste of chocolate could be explained neurophysiological. Asking for the taste of chocolate or the color blue, are not particularly ambitious things to ask an explanation for. But, so far, virtually nothing.

But this I think overlooks the issue, we have experience, through which we can see brains in other people (or more accurately, we designate an organ in another person and consider it a brain). But when we do brain science, we are not seeing the inside of persons thoughts, we are having perceptions of the brain of another person, and assume, quite correctly, that the thought comes from the brain, but we do not see how the brain yields thoughts, only that it does so.

Time for round 2 of CPR, very soon. Well, technically round 3 and 4, cause the damn book has the A and B editions in it. Ugh.

But I must. If I don't get something much more solid this time, I suppose Kant himself, isn't for me, but his successors and predecessors are.

Bring it on. :cool:

That's right.

How more right wing could they become?

I mean, Israel only has the strong backing if the US, and to a lesser but still substantial degree, Germany.

If not for them, Israel would be alone. You cannot do what they are doing and expect the world to say nothing about it. I mean the barbarity of this is unprecedented. Or at least, not seen in many years.

I don't think it's necessary to be too insistent on the topic of this statement being literally problematic.

Someone can saw they are an agnostic atheist in the following, trivial way, I am an atheist as regards to the Abrahamic religions, but am agnostic as to the topic of if there is some "higher power" or force or entity that orders the universe.

I don't see any good reasons to believe this, but, I don't think we attain certainty in the empirical world.

The Rigor of Angles by William Egginton

Quite an interesting book mixing Kant, Heisenberg and Borges to explore the limits of human understanding.

Title based on a wonderful quote by Borges:

"Enchanted by its rigour, humanity forgets over and again that it is a rigour of chess masters, not of angels”

"Encantada por su rigor, la humanidad olvida y torna a olvidar que es un rigor de ajedrecistas, no de ángeles.”

Well. It's a problem, surely. If we have half the population living in utter fantasy and we cannot even agree on facts and furthermore, tensions are rising, then somethings going to happen.

I don't like Trump, I don't like Biden. I think Trump would be worse for the world, though Biden is far, far from being good.

However, and despite my own personal wishes, if Trump is not allowed to run for president, then that could very well lead to something like a civil war.

As far as I know, experts are saying this is the strongest case they've seen in terms of "intent of genocide", so, I suppose that counts for something.

I hope South Africa will win... But there's the whole political angle that makes this more difficult than usual.



True, historical issues make this a thorny issue for Germany.

However, there seems to be a divide between the people and the government here, as is the case in most "Western" countries, but how large this gap is between public opinion and the German government specifically, I can't say, haven't seen any polls on the issue.

But this could all be rendered significantly less important if Israel goes to full scale war with Hezbollah, which could happen. It's very tense.

I'm not seeing the "any means necessary" part, in that document, not that they haven't said it, they have in many ways, maybe I'm looking at the wrong part.

But there is no argument here against intent, the intent is crystal clear. The genocide is not far away, especially if food and medicine do not come in in sufficient numbers, then we will have an exponential death and that would be actual genocide.

But, the fact they bothered to show up to court, means they can't completely disregard world opinion, otherwise they could've skipped this, as they have done before.

It's no guarantee that SA will win of course, but, it's some tiny bit of light.

Very much so.

I personally would be in favor of more evidence forcing us to reformulate our picture of the universe. It signifies progress, though if such oddities can be accounted for within our existing theories, then I suppose that's progress too, but it's a bit less exciting.

From what I've read through Haaretz, Al Jazeera and several knowledgeable people on the situation, including UN agencies, some aid is getting through, but it's nowhere near the amount of aid that needs to get through to prevent mass starvation, so it's kind of a band-aid for sawed off limbs.

I don't know if things would change if many thousands start dying from lack of food and water. Likely Biden, Blinken and Netanyahu wouldn't care, but then at that stage, maybe other Arab countries might be forced to do something much more significant.

If that includes breaking diplomatic ties, or cutting off trade or even war, I cannot say. But proportionally, what is happening in Gaza is almost unprecedented in modern war, so many doctors, journalists and babies being killed on purpose is ghastly.

Rwanda was worse, Yemen maybe, a few others. But even in terms of Israel's quite abysmal record on human rights in war, it's the worst they've done by quite a bit.

It's better than nothing, but it's still a pittance. Something's gotta give, or else this genocide may come to full fruition as mass starvation starts killing tens of thousands, maybe more.

So, there are reasons to suspect that in the short term nothing will change much, but it's also not sustainable for too much longer, Israel's economy is not doing well, and they may soon enter a full-blown war with Hezbollah. That would be quite disastrous for everybody, but Israel will be significantly harmed...

It's a powder keg.

They should.

But they also have the Samson Option, which they could use if they see themselves in an existential threat. Egypt, Jordan and others have done almost nothing.

Qatar has done good work.

Yes, Biden's policies in foreign affairs have been by and large pretty bad. Not to mention that if Israel did not receive so much aid from the US, Israel couldn't do what it is doing, with such intensity and impunity. Or at least, the conflict would not drag on so long. This also shows the Israeli government doesn't have a clue what to do with Hamas.

I think that Europe doesn't want to get dragged into a much larger conflict if things go sideways, regardless of the harm on international trade. But I'm not sure what they're thinking.

Interesting to note that the poorest and the people who have been through one of the worst wars in the 21st century are almost the only ones trying to do something to help Gaza to whatever extent it can. And Hezbollah too, but they are Palestinian so, they would do something.

Now we are all just waiting for the Israel-Lebanon situation to go completely blow up and then who knows what will happen?