Personal identity consists in "continuity of consciousness", as Locke pointed out. As you say in the experiment, yes, there would be another person identical to you being "duplicated", but it's not you.

Your consciousness is not independent of its source in the brain. Ergo, as you seem to suggest, yes, doing the experiment would kill you.

There is extreme pressure to over-sexualize and look perfect and plastic surgeries and all that. That's for the most part pretty bad.

However there seems to be a standard of beauty that most people share, with slight variations based on culture. But with these new technologies and supplements and all that, we're just abusing nature for mere aesthetic appreciation.

Not sure how good that is.

The question is, why do you assume that absent the effects of sensation, there are "objects", plural. Division into distinct objects is a part of sense perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct, individuation is something people do, hence why Schopenhauer speaks of the "thing-in-itsef", or Plotinus on the One.

It's tricky. Perhaps monism exists as a single substance, but its instantiation will be plural in some sense. This goes way back to the problem of the one and the many.

They're different formulations of the same issue. The way objects are (in themselves), absent the way they affect our sensation and intellectual capacities goes way beyond sensation, necessarily.

Now, you may think the premise does not follow the conclusion, but I don't see how I'm succumbing to the influence of sensation if things-in-themselves are intellectual posits.

As I've quoted a number of times already, "a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble." — Wayfarer

Yes, that's one interpretation of it, called the "deflationary" one by Allais. And sure, that could well be what Kant meant. That's not how I read it, but that's marginal.

The point is not Kant - it was formulated before him. More richly, in my opinion, by Plotinus, as "the One". And also, Neo-Platonists (Cudworth, More, Burthogge, etc.)

The question is if things - objects - have a nature independent of our (a way of being or existence). I think they do, but if they do, the way they exist must be completely incomprehensible to us.

I understand some will think this even if true is pointless, but it obsesses me.

That said. I do think the materialism/ idealism dichotomy is ultimately wrongheaded, but there is a deeply entrenched distinction between the ideas of things and the things the ideas are about. — Janus

Very much agree with the material/ideal distinction, I would even go so far as to say that the issue is merely terminological, not substantive, unless it is reframed.

Sure, ideas vs what these ideas are about (objects) is a problem.

And I wonder whether that isn't a "figment" generated by the dualistic nature of language―a reification or hypostatization. As I like to say "choose your poison" and it seems that people usually do, especially on philosophy forums. — Janus

The topic of things-in-themselves is just brutal. When I go down the rabbit hole, it's just total blindness.

But I think we can simplify a little, either things exist independently of us (in a manner we cannot at all conceive) or they can't.

If they cannot exist independently of us, then I can't make sense of reality. Granted both ideas are problematic, just that one is more coherent than the other to me.

That said, I have my own preference for thinking that they are actual, not ideal, existents―the 'god hypothesis' I don't find so compelling. — Janus

By "actual" do you merely mean they as a matter of fact exist?

aha. thanks man!

What is our brain made of? Literal ideas? That doesn't make sense.

Ah, well, ok, if you are talking about NDE's, then just say you are a dualist. That's fine.

These particles do not experience anything at all. That is all about physicalism. According to its believers, experience is something extra to physicalism, emerging only under certain conditions, such as when a living brain is present. — MoK

We don't know if particles have feeling or not. There is no evidence that they do, but there's no evidence that they lack it either.

Well, the point ought to be simple, show me an example of someone or something thinking or experiencing anything without a brain. If that can be done, then the "non-physical" proposal can be taken seriously.

Yes, all the smart young kids of my era were cheerfully fixated with deconstruction in the 1980’s. I never had the temperament to make it through the texts. They were so turgid and took time from women and booze. — Tom Storm

:lol:

At least most of that fad is behind us now.

It's an underrated song even if it's James Bond, he's got some great lines here.

Yes, a majestic voice, tragic to see him go so soon.

for many people — Tom Storm

That's the key isn't it? What's "many people"? If you have in mind people like us and people adjacent to us, then we are what, 5% of the population at very best?

One thing is passing interest: oh, I read Plato once or I saw this lecture on Heidegger. Another thing is to become a Platonist or a Heideggerian.

Most people - even in optimal conditions - don't care enough about these issues. Heck even interest in science is low for what I would like it to be, but philosophy today? That's tough.

It becomes more complicated if you pursue the analytic/continental tradition in which I think you do get cults. Some are mostly harmless, Wittgenstein - maybe Popper. Another thing is being a follower of Derrida or Lacan, that exists, is relatively small, but probably not good for thinking, imo.

But that's just how I see things.

"You Know My Name" - Chris Cornell

If you take a life do you know what you'll give?
Odds are you won't like what it is
When the storm arrives would you be seen with me
By the merciless eyes of deceit?

I've seen angels fall from blinding heights
But you yourself are nothing so divine
Just next in line

Arm yourself because no one else here will save you
The odds will betray you
And I will replace you
You can't deny the prize it may never fulfill you
It longs to kill you, are you willing to die?
The coldest blood runs through my veins
You know my name

If you come inside things will not be the same
When you return to the night
And if you think you've won you never saw me change
The game that we've been playing
I've seen this diamond cut through harder men
Than you yourself but if you must pretend
You may meet your end

Arm yourself because no one else here will save you
The odds will betray you
And I will replace you
You can't deny the prize it may never fulfill you
It longs to kill you, are you willing to die?
The coldest blood runs through my veins

Try to hide your hand
Forget how to feel (forget how to feel)
Life is gone with just a spin of the wheel (spin of the wheel)

Arm yourself because no one else here will save you
The odds will betray you
And I will replace you
You can't deny the prize it may never fulfill you
It longs to kill you, are you willing to die?
The coldest blood runs through my veins
You know my name

I don't see how this example attempts to show what you're saying it does. Dead people don't experience things ok. Living people do, yep.

Where's the experience distinct from matter?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_EVz2GBN3E&list=RD8eqcPsA_9sk&index=9

I dunno how to format this, but "Alter Ego" from N'to

the phenomenon experience is distinct from matter. — MoK

What is the evidence for this claim?

There are lots of teens that pretend to be radicalized by Nietzche, most of the time it looks to be a fad. Heidegger often attracts a certain kind of person but ask them to articulate what it is and the meaning is very obscure.

Novels do similar things too. Not that it's impossible to have someone change the way you view things, it just looks to be very rare.

No. — 180 Proof

:rofl:

That was funny and true.

Coping with Life's Challenges: Does your knowledge of philosophy help you deal with life's difficulties, losses, or existential anxiety?

​Balancing Depth and Superficiality: How do you find a balance between your philosophical mindset and the superficiality you encounter in others?

Does philosophical thinking change your approach to relationships, friendships, and love? If so, how? — Astorre

I think life difficulties are much more defined or informed by one's temperament more than what some intelligent person said back in the day.

You can gain perspective and even insight in philosophy, but I don't think it will change the way you face problems, not unlike thinking that studying psychology will let you read other people's minds (it won't).

But if you are interested in the questions and the discussions, then there is plenty of benefit in that. Your conclusions may differ from mine.

And if not, that's fine too.

Stronger than an assertion, methinks, but not necessarily a fact? In the text, it’s simply an analytical logical judgement, true given the relations of the conceptions contained therein.

If there ever is a body encountered that isn’t extended, the judgement would need a revision, along with our entire logical system. I mean, blow one certainty out of the water is sufficient probability for blowing them all. — Mww

So, a kind of "intuitive concept" (taking "intuition" in the ordinary usage of the term, not the technical one).

If that's more or less it, then that's fine.

But as something more definitive, I think we don't know what bodies are. That is, when a body stops and becomes something non-body.

That's the issue with carrying commonsense intuition beyond what they're meant to be dealing with: common sense issues.

I suppose I am rambling a bit.

I don't recall being in such a situation explicitly, but it wouldn't be alien either. As in, you are in crowd of people who are crying over a sad event or excited over something important, you find yourself either sad or happy without exactly knowing why, unless the event in question specifically relates to you.

But I also think the point your making is kind of similar to what I was saying. That you got angry because you were mirroring someone, you knew he was angry because when someone is angry that's how they tend to behave "like you".

But I think this amplifies to almost everything: love, pain, laughter, proudness, humiliation, etc., the reason you can feel it from others is because it comes from you too. And I'd suspect that that's how other people relate to each other, with this "like me" attitude, exceptions being granted.

Hey M! Hope this are well with you. On to fun matters:

Is "all bodies are extended" an assertion or is it a fact?

I think the example is way simpler. Yes, babies do what the video is showing, but that's not the same thing.

It's very common, as in you are walking on the street a fellow civilian gets hit by a rock or bitten by a dog - whatever. Or you find him injured and he says his leg hurts, you may either see an injury or assume the pain is not visible to the eye. You don't doubt he is in pain.

But you are not puzzled as to why he is saying his leg hurts, you would do the same thing in his position if your leg hurt too.

Or even migraines, they are very hard to detect, but if a person says, "I have a massive headache", you immediately understand and empathize, because you've head headaches before.

It left me pondering how I know what it's like to be conscious if I can't know what it's like for other people. Wouldn't I need something to compare or contrast it with? I wasn't thinking about the ineffability issue. It would be closer to a private language problem, where I wouldn't be able to speak confidently about continuity of consciousness. I wouldn't be able to say it's this and not that. Maybe I have to assume other people experience things differently so I can say pinpoint something unique about me? Is it my POV that's unique — frank

It's the other way around. We assume that other people have consciousness "like me". Based on what they do or say, I can understand what they're saying based on my own experience. In other words, it's as if I am putting on the shoes of the other person and seeing things from their perspective, except it's my own.

That's why it's not particularly puzzling why - when someone has a broken leg, or even a cut and say, "it hurts", we understand what they mean, because that's what we would say if we were in a similar situation.

There are exceptions of course, some people are born feeling no physical pain (rare exceptions) and there are psychopaths, people lacking in empathy - but they're a small fraction of the whole human species. So, I'd argue you already know what it's like to be in the consciousness of someone else. Also, reading a good novel also helps.

Marble House Murders by Anthony Horowitz

Same Bed Different Deams was phenomenal. :ok:

It doesn't have a view - it doesn't care, it doesn't have insight. It's useful sure, but a person or people who know the subject matter will be more enriching.

AI can also entrench into beliefs which may otherwise not arise, or not as strongly.

Plus, all the words it is generating or based on words said by the finest minds in human history. So, we should be careful here when saying that AI can have better discussions.

It's another tool.

There's also the risk that if AI is permitted with no restrictions, you'll see posts here by people using AI replying with AI, making the whole point of philosophical discussion a bit of mockery.

It's perfectly fine to bounce ideas off of it - but it shouldn't substitute your own thinking. Whatever we believe - a good portion of it - has been through effort and careful consideration of difficult topics. To have that be watered down by an algorithm will lead to lazy-to-no thinking.

As the saying (somewhat) goes LLM's can be a good servant, but a terrible master.

Same Bed Different Dreams by Ed Park

“Shou’d it here be asked, whether I sincerely assent to this argument… whether I be one of
those scpetics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest
of any measures of truth and falsehood; I shou’d reply, that this question is entirely superfluous,
and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion.
Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to
breathe and feel…”

- David Hume

"And, that these cogitations of the passive part of the soul called sensations, are not knowledge… is evident by experience also, not only in the sense of hunger and thirst, pain and corporal titillation, but also in… perceptions of light and colours, heat and cold , sounds… For if they were knowledges or intellection, then all men would rest satisfied in the sensible ideas, or phantasms of them and never inquire any further… as when we see the clear light of the meridian sun, or hear the loud noise of thunder, whereas… one dazzle or eyes, the other deafens our ears, but neither enlighten or inform our understandings."

- Ralph Cudworth

“If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about answers.”

- Thomas Pynchon

Philosophical naturalism (i.e. all testable explanations for nature, including the capabilities of natural beings (e.g. body, perception, reason), are completely constituted, constrained and enabled by (the) laws of nature) —> anti-supernaturalism, anti-antirealism. Re: Epicurus, Spinoza ... R. Brassier. — 180 Proof

Ah ok. Got it. Thought the "p" was physical. :up:

which underwrites my commitment to p-naturalism. — 180 Proof

P naturalism? As in physicalist naturalism?

How is that a better term than naturalism?

Some of it comes down to differentiating subjective and objective aspects of consciousness, such as Nagel's question of 'What is it like to be a bat?' We make assumptions and there is probably a lot of sense in common sense, especially in what it means to be alive. I know that Russell, my teddy bear, doesn't have consciousness other than what I project onto him. — Jack Cummins

Yes.

It has to do with how we access and interact with objects that allows us to reason about its nature. But in so far as someone is going to say a teddy bear or a particle has very very primitive consciousness, there is no evidence for the claim.

To be fair, there is no evidence against that claim, only common sense. But I think it is more reasonable to assume these things lack mind than have mind. It becomes a virtually meaningless semantic quibble.

I don't think we will agree in this one about the molecules, as we are talking in circle here.

We cannot conceive how non-mental mattter could give rise to mind, that's fine. As Russell pointed out we don't know enough about matter to say whether its intrinsic properties are like or unlike mind.

But it seems that other issues - free will, motion, life, etc.- are equally hard, but again we may agree to disagree I suppose.

No, I am not saying that completing a sentence is an idea. I am saying an idea emerges when you complete reading a sentence. — MoK

So, an idea to you is composed of words. That is, the entire content of an idea are the words we use in propositions?

Not being incredulous or anything like that, just want to clear up the issue. It's not entirely implausible.

I don't understand what you mean by particles have water in them! Water refers to a system of H2O molecules. We have a good intuition on why water changes its behavior in terms of the properties of its parts. We even have good intuition on why parts have these and those properties, such as speed, mass, spin, etc. These properties are the result of the string vibrating in different forms. — MoK

A system is composed of its parts. A single H20 molecule does not have the properties of water. And we don't understand how, by combining them together water could arise, because each individual molecule shows no "wetness".

You are correct that we have good theories on speed, mass, spin. I doubt they are intuitive. If they were, we would have figured out the chemistry behind them much earlier than we did. At least, that's how it looks like to me.

Consciousness, to me, is the ability of the mind, the ability to experience. — MoK

Yes. But does it float apart like a soul or a second substance, or is it grounded in something that is unlike it (a brain)? If you are a dualist then that's perfectly fine.

If you are a monist, then the issue is explaining how non-mental matter could give rise to experience. It seems hard to believe, but we have decent reasons for believing it is true.

Think of a meaningful sentence. The sentence is weak emergence. An idea, however, emerges once you complete reading the sentence. The emergence of the idea is strong since the idea is more than the sentence, and it is irreducible. — MoK

Is the sentence "Think of a meaningful sentence" meaningful? If it is, the meaning seems to be emergent on the order of the words.

Now you say an idea is something that emerges once you complete reading the sentence.

How is the idea more that the sentence, if you say that a completed sentence is an idea? I'm trying to understand.

This kind of emergence is fully explicable in terms of the physical properties of the components and the laws governing them. There is nothing mysterious left over once we understand the physics and chemistry. — Wayfarer

Correct, you can explain the phenomena in theoretical terms. But the phenomenal property of water is untouched even knowing the theory. The mystery is how could apparently liquidless molecules give rise to the phenomena liquidity?

Likewise, if what some assume is true that experience merges from a combination of non-mental physical stuff, we have no intuition as to how the mental could emerge from the non-mental.

But I know you don't believe this, just putting the thought out.

I don't see a fundamental difference in how puzzling these things are.

On this view, consciousness is not an inexplicable product of complex organization but a manifestation of properties already present in the fundamental building blocks of the world. — Wayfarer

And this may be true (or not, we don't know). But if it is, the claim is weak, because everything would be emergent on combination of physical stuff: solidity, stars, cells, bipedalism, apples, pain, etc.

We happen privilege experience in philosophy now. But before the problem was motion, then thought. That was clear to Locke and many others.

We have good intuition about what water is: Liquid is a state in which the material is almost incompressible, and it can take different shapes. We have a theory for it, too. — MoK

Do you have the intuition that prior to combination a particle contains water in it? I don't. We have a theory yes, but I don't know someone who says that it was evident all along that particles have water in them, you can't see it, touch it, etc. until the experiment comes about.

Or maybe there is a model, including the mind, that can explain the strong emergence. — MoK

Some emergence is more shocking to us that others, consciousness out of matter vs. liquidity in particles. But what do you gain by saying one is strong and the other is weak, if you lack intuitions (not theories) for both?

[

However, when it came to novels, I (sometimes) believed that he wrote solely to please his fans and the Western market. — javi2541997

Maybe, but if what he want to write is stuff like his last book, then I just find it very boring. I might try After Dark someday, looks interesting.

I think I remembered you saying you liked Los años de peregrinación del chico sin color (Colorless) and La muerte del comendador.(Commendatore)

But the peregrinación book looked to me to be much less "magical realist" than usual, and comendador sounded a lot like Cronica del Pajaro, which was my least favorite book of his - a minority stance.

I loved his Baila, baila, baila (Dance) , El fin del mundo y un despiadado país de las maravillas (Wonderland), Kafka en la orilla, La caza del carnero salvaje (Sheep).

Norwegian Wood was just...ok.

But after 1Q84 (which I though was one book too long - the 3rd volume) it's as if what made him fun for me just kind of vanished.

But I think this latest one is copied from el fin del mundo- it's the exact same town. Minus the extremely interesting connection he made with the other story.

It doesn’t get any better after 30% so you’re not missing anything. — praxis

That was the vibe I was getting too, thanks for confirming it. Too many books to read to finish one you are not enjoying.

:up:

Had to drop the newest Murakami after reading 30% of the book, his quality has dropped quite a bit since 1Q84, this meditative side is very boring to me.

Now nearly finished with Our Share of Night by Mariana Enriquez, very good.

The weak emergence vs strong emergence is a bit misleading. It suggests that we have an intuitive understanding of the resultant effects of a given process - say molecules giving rise to water. We may have a theory of liquidity, but we have no intuitions about it.

But if someone says I think all emergence is "strong", they think you are being a mystic. I think that's just what nature does.