↪John McMannis, ↪LuckyR Do either of you think that we can make the world fairer? Do you think we ought?

Can we? Sure, we already have. It's a laudable goal, thus I support continuing down that path.

I don’t think the world is fair or just. I think we humans make up those ideas and apply them to nature. To say everything happens for a reason is kind of true, but not for some big plan or something. Things just happen and it’s mostly luck. That’s my view anyways

I agree, the descriptors fair, just and lucky are all subjective, post hoc labels to help humans make "sense" of individual events by making them appear to be part of a universal "plan".

The entire premise that folks are obligated to donate to a charity misunderstands the meaning of "donate".

but our personal experience of the color red may very well differ from the actual experience of the same light wavelength another may have, which we’ve all agreed to call “red.” I am speaking solely on the subjective experience of “redness.

By stipulating that you are speaking specifically of the subjective experience of red (as opposed to the ability of objects to reflect certain wavelengths of light), then redness cannot exist without an observer to interpret visual images as "red".

Happy to hear I communicated accurately, yes the fretting thing. Also glad my observations (despite your, warrantless as it turns out, concern) turn out to also be accurate. Lastly, as I predicted, the way Determinists approach decision making (as you confirm) is similar, if not identical to that of everyone else.

As to why folks who believe humans can't actually choose between options would "fret" about making "wrong" choices, I have no answers (never did). It's just a question.

I apologize for being difficult to understand. I'm not dictating how Determinists think (since as a non Determinist I have no firsthand experience), I'm reporting my observations of Determinists. If you disagree with those observations, I welcome your insight as a Determinist. Perhaps you DON'T worry about making poor or erroneous choices, since you're not really making "choices" because decision making is an illusion, we're all going to do what we're determined to do (by our initial brainstate). I don't know. You tell me.

Nope, the most free of Free Will folks.

Pardon me, but that sounds like a post hoc rationalization (not an explanation).

Not my point. Say you're absolutely correct. Believers in the idea that thoughts are "pushed forward by physical causality" could just coast along believing that their cascade of brainstates are going to arrive at the inevitable conclusion. Yet they don't. They fret about making "wrong" decisions (making mistakes), just like the 99% of the non philosophical who've never heard of Determinism.

What I will say is giving away all my possessions and living basically poor as well is definitely not the best way I can help. I can help much more effectively if I allow myself to lead a successful life and attempt systemic change or at the very least yield more lucrative donations

Exactly. Making the economic pie as large as possible makes it easier to give a meaningful slice of it to charity. Shrinking the pie requires a gigantic (and unrealistic) slice be given to charity to make a difference.

But the money to be donated by the non-poor is so ridiculously small that almost anyone without a job could make this donation. It's not a question of helping the poor buy a swimming pool, but simply lifting them out of extreme poverty. In a calculation above, I focused on ending world hunger, and that requires a donation of $3.15 a year from every non-poor person in the world (!)

I don't disagree with your posting, but that is worlds apart from the OP's notion that "it's immoral to spend money on products we don't absolutely need, instead of giving it to charities that save lives". Implying that one's money should either be spent on 1) necessities of living or 2) donated to charity.

If that's not what Singer means then he needs to reword his commentary.

The OP is incorrect that Determinists don't ponder choices in their daily lives, identically to how "non Determinists" do. Despite the fact that in Determinism the physical/electrical/chemical brainstate Determines the outcome of "decision making", as opposed to pondering and weighing options (ie thinking) within one's mind.

In other words, on Philosophy Forums folks will state that humans don't actually make true decisions, but everyone goes through the motions of decision making all day, every day as if they do, regardless of their stated stance on this topic.

Wait, is it true that if we released farm animals in the wild they would ALL just die? What if we released them in an appropriate environment? What if we were to release them gradually, to allow time for adaptation?

Alas, a non question. If everyone went vegan (highly unlikely, but it's a thought experiment), it would happen gradually. Thus as demand dropped over time, the amount of domesticated animals bred would drop to keep operating expenses down and profits up. Thus when demand hit zero, there would be close to zero animals to "release into the wild".

I get that domesticated animals aren't exactly akin to a sickle, however they're not like a wild animal either. Their genetics were crafted by humans to fulfill a human designed function. This function is their "purpose", really a quasi-purpose, hence the quotation marks.

As far as I can tell we're in basic agreement, my only point is that to be fair, we should take into account the "purpose" of domesticated animals as being fundamentally different from the lives of wild animals.

For example? And how would this be an objection? Singer would just add: use your discretionary dollars to help people in need, whether it is through humanitarian organization or not.

Oh there's plenty. Say I spend money on plane tickets to visit my daughter on vacation. Say you're employed by the airline. How much are you going to give to the poor if you lose your job? If I don't recharge my emotional batteries by taking a vacation how much quality will I bring to my employment when I'm working? Less quality equals less compensation, less compensation means less discretionary income to give to the poor.

As I used to tell the residents in training, you can't take care of patients if you don't take care of yourself.

Basically there are those who benefit others through their employment directly. Good for them. If one happens to be employed in an industry that doesn't directly help people, making maximal compensation maximizes the opportunity to help others. Who helps more poor people, a doctor working in a poor section of town or Bill Gates who made computer programs?

As to your "proof", sure one can prove that giving a million dollars can save, say 1000 lives BUT there's no proof that giving a million and one dollars saves an additional life. Well if the million and first dollar doesn't save a life, why not use it to go out to the movies?

I agree, it's worth it to me to choose higher quality (thus more expensive) meat and dairy not only for the quality of the product but also to compensate ranchers who practice more expensive techniques.

I have not yet seen a model of cattle ranching that's good for the cattle, the environment and the climate. Migrating herders of ancient times probably did no great harm, but I can't think of one good thing to say for barbed wire fences.

"good for the cattle"? What does that mean? Remember domesticated animals were invented to provide goods and services for humans. Commonly that involves their death or at minimum living in an unnatural situation. If humans don't need the goods and services of domesticated animals the option isn't living a wonderful life, it's to not exist at all.

I agree with you that small scale ranching leads to a better (less bad) quality of life for the animals, that's all I'm saying, take aim at the worst offenders, not the whole inductry.

I do object to heavily industrialized agriculture -- for both animals and plant crops -- which is driven by the usual capitalist impulse to cut costs and maximize profits. Two examples: a) producing corn for ethanol as 10% gasoline and b) massive feedlots which are harmful to both ecology and animal health.

Exactly. When addressing such a broad range of practices, better to target the very worst practices than the topic as a whole since there are both positives and (the well appreciated) negatives. Pretending that ranching is solely negative is a gross oversimplification.

If you come across a child drowning and you have merely to reach out your hand and get your arm wet to save her, do you have a duty to do so? Are you acting immorally if you let her die?

A perfect illustration of the fact that judging an action is incomplete without taking into account the consequences of not performing the action.

Thus, not saving the child is immoral since not reaching out one's arm carries no counter value that can outweigh the action of saving the child.

The OP's "giving to charity" example fails this test, as there are numerous positives associated with alternatives to where to spend one's money aside from giving to charity. Thus not giving every single discretionary dollar to charity is not immoral (even if giving to charity definitely saved lives, which in reality, is not actually proven).

Yes it appears massive. Part of this is that very few (if any) human behaviors are purely positive (good) or negative (evil) regardless of context. Thus in order to determine the morality (or immorality) of this or that choice, detailed contextual effects should be weighed. That is, the cumulative positives and negatives summed to arrive at a final answer that determine whether the overall positives outweigh the negatives. In this usage, the positives are commonly labelled as "justifications" because of their role relative to the known (or imagined) negatives of the behavioural choice.

Creators (gods) are so convenient in the absence of science, to explain all unknowns and (currently) unknowables, that human psychology guarantees humans would invent gods, whether they exist or not. Of course in order to survive after the invention of science (to explain natural phenomena), gods pivot to perform other duties, such as regulating heavenly gates, etc.

You're a shill. :roll:

I've put you on ignore. You reek of the ideology of OnlinePhilosophyClub.

Name calling?

I will specifically continue to follow your postings as you're obviously well versed in Philosophical theory. As a non expert in theory (but with practical expertise in certain areas of philosophical interest) my expectation when posting (typically with a practical slant) is not that my arguments will win the day. Rather I look forward to theoretical critiques as I find the confluence of theory and practice to be significantly more interesting (and important) than the perspective of either in isolation.

Well, in the OP you wrote:

"The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer." Thus separating hysterectomy from abortion, in your description, which only has the negative effect of fetal death. 2 vs 1, double vs single.

When in reality abortion already has two negative effects (which are in conflict), the fetal vs the maternal interest (survival vs bodily autonomy). Hysterectomy as cancer treatment in pregnancy adds a third, maternal cancer treatment. 3 vs 2, triple vs double.

The OP is NOT contending with whether or not a standard abortion is wrong or not: it is just using it as an example for the principle of double effect, and presupposes that it is wrong and offers a relevant difference between it and the permissibility of performing a hysterectomy.

With respect to whether or not abortion is wrong, which is a completely separate topic, I would say it is immoral because directly intentionally killing an innocent person is always wrong. One cannot do something immoral for the sake of producing a good end: so even if it is good to uphold the autonomy of people, it does not follow that one can kill an innocent person as a means towards that end; just as much as someone cannot violate the autonomy of one person as a means towards saving the life of another (on the flip side).

Likewise, to just anticipate the first response, abortion is not a case where one is violating the autonomy of the mother as a means to saving the life of the unborn child. There is an unborn child and its mother who does not want to be pregnant (for whatever reason) to start out, and now one must decide whether they are going to (1) kill the unborn child as a means towards respecting the mother's wishes or (2) let the woman's wishes be violated. In the case of the former, they are committing an immoral act; in the case of the latter they are letting something bad happen (at best) because they cannot do anything that is morally permissible to remedy the situation.

Again, this has nothing directly to do with the OP; but I am more than happy to discuss it.

I know that. My point was/is that the abortion/hysterectomy example is a particularly poor demonstration of the Principle of Double Effect because abortion already has two effects (maternal and fetal impacts, positive and negative) and therefore hysterectomy (as cancer treatment) adding another, makes it it a triple effect.

Is infinitely close to zero = zero? Like .999...=1?

Practically speaking? Yes. Conceptually? No.

While statistically accurate, philosophical logic/arguments should cover all eventualities.

What about the second party of the question, where I let the universe decide which world Alice teleports to?

Ah, that's an actual statistics question. The answer is it's a chance that is infinitely close to zero.

Are Bob's chances of teleporting to Alice's world zero?

I get that you're trying to explore statistics, but if one drills down into the OP, as written, it devolves into an exploration of the limits of machines to choose "randomly" among an infinite number of choices. Which is to say: wholly inadequate. Thus the answer is: not zero.

It is akin to the question: if an account holder can choose between 68 to the 8th power, number of possible passwords, what is the chance of guessing their password? This isn't a statistics question, it's a human behavior question.

The word "abortion" is for ideologues what a squirrel is for dogs. When they see the word they forget themselves immediately and are compelled to make a pro-choice argument. It cannot be denied that they have been well trained. Yet it's at least lucky Lucky didn't launch into a violin solo. :grin:

I don't entirely disagree. Bringing up abortion to make one's point is akin to bringing up Hitler to accomplish the same thing. It's not a sign of a well thought out argument. But it is what it is.

This bodily autonomy was trampled the moment a decision was made to create another body that has its own rights — among others the right to live. Even then, the argument is not about law-making.

Perhaps you're unfamiliar with the existance of sexual assault. Whose "decision" are you referring to? The rapist's?

I meant that declaring that killing is immoral while ignoring that violation of an adult human's body autonomy is also immoral, is missing the key issue of the topic of abortion.

Traditional Abortion vs. Hysterectomy

The morally relevant difference between killing an unborn human being to be rid of an unwanted pregnancy and killing an unborn human being by performing a hysterectomy to save the mother from cancer is that:

1. The former scenario uses an innocent person as a means to bring about the desired end (of not being pregnant), thereby making the killing directly intentional and (thereby) immoral; whereas

2. The latter scenario uses the hysterectomy as a means to saving the mother’s life from cancer and doing so has a bad side effect of killing an unborn human being, thereby making the said killing indirectly intended.

The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer.

Thoughts?

I don't necessarily disagree with your analysis, though it bears noting that humans are pretty well versed in decision making while weighing relative personal risks. Though human perception of risks are often skewed. Similarly, substituting societal benefits and risks for personal ones is not much of a stretch.

Part of the problem with the traditional trolley problem is that it assumes (which is reasonable in a Thought Experiment) that there is a completely accurate prediction of various outcomes.

As to the abortion example, your comments make the (common) error of omitting the immorality of trampling the bodily autonomy of an adult human should abortion be outlawed.

Right. No doubt about it, one's past experiences alters one's brain-state which at least influences decision making moving forward.

Exactly. Determinism basically is a self fulfilling prophecy in the sense that you can never "go back" and do a "do over" and make a different choice (thus disproving Determinism). Though there are numerous examples of making choices in ALMOST identical situations, yet come up with different choices, where it makes an unbiased observer wonder just how different those brain-states really are.

No it's definitely not. That's Determinism. And no, your "choice" isn't "influenced" by your brain-state, it's determined by your brain-state.

You can choose to flip a coin, you can choose to follow through with the choice determined by the coin or you can choose to go against what the coin is telling you to choose. Thus there are choices within choices. But in a Determinist universe, all of these choices feel like choices (to you), yet were always going to end up being the "choice" determined by the chemical, electrical and anatomic state of your brain at the moment of choosing. Thus not a "real" choice as most folks understand the definition of the word.

Excellent question. Either things are as they appear and you truly choose between options, or your act of choosing is an illusion, that is you go through the motions of "choosing", but it's not really a "choice" since you are destined to always "choose" a particular "optionć due to your brain-state at the moment of choosing.

Because having a dog at the low end (say, 1 bowl) and another at the high end (2 bowls), doesn't preclude having a limitless number, ie it's not limiting.

Sorry for misunderstanding. Yes, exactly my point.

You think so? In my mind dying is a process (of becoming dead), death is the last point of the process of dying and dead is one's state of being upon death.