My point is that a belief originates when the following two come together: a spark and a fuel. The fuel could be a belief justification that is based on logic, reason and evidences OR could be of an emotional psychological or other nature. But the fuel can not light up a belief without a sparkle. Essentially, the question of this tread is: Can the sparkle be produced by our will?

I am leaning toward the idea that our will has nothing to do with it. Believing is a state, just like being happy or in love. You have control over the fuel but not over the spark.. One may travel to some sunny destination, with his friends and away from his monotone and miserable life. Yet, the journey may fail to produce a happiness in his heart. Although all the circumstances are right, and thus there are a plenty of fuel available, the spark is missing. Nobody can make themselves happy at will, in all circumstances.

Seems to me that beliefs resemble happiness, in that the sparkle is also a product of some fusion of psychological, circumstantial and other factors.

Thank you for all the responses. I am getting the impression that some of you are merely responding to the first paragraph of the tread's description, without taking into the consideration the remaining paragraphs. However that leaves the main question unanswered.

The reason I am saying is that many of you are implicitly assuming that beliefs are a choice, without justifying that opinion, especially given the criticism I have provided above. For instance:

I think you would need to divide believers into two categories: (1) those who unconsciously absorb beliefs from the surrounding society, without ever reflecting on them, and (2) those who examine their own beliefs after which they decide to either keep them or exchange them — Apollodorus

it is possible that the Earth is flat, then presumably the Flat Earther is referring to this possibility, in which case his assertion cannot be judged as false. — sime

Maybe people who are raised to accept immoral acts as the norm would want to change such beliefs in a similar way, especially if they are in prison etc. — Tiberiusmoon

But to change a belief at will, especially one aquired when raised is almost exactly the same as breaking a habit. (like smoking, drugs etc.) — Tiberiusmoon

All this responses presume that believe could be a choice. Then they are trying to explain, when they become a choice. But non entertain the possibility that believe is never a choice.

I agree with you. The thermometer is more accurate. You can call it the scientific method, if you will. My question is, what is that common denominator that makes one more accurate than the other from philosophical prospective? If we agree that both use an inductive method to assess their evidence, then what is that thing that allows for the comparison?

By what right can we say that? — Mww

I suggested that we feel it on the level of intuition. My question is meant to identify the factors that can explain the intuition.

Guys, i think you miss understood the point of the question.

Both of the justification methods are inductive by nature. Tom believes a thermometer because it has shown the right temperature every time in the past. Sam believes his observation of the passerby because such observations were generally accurate in the past. So calling one method scientific and the other inference is not correct. in their essence, they are the same methods.

The difference is in the degrees of likelihood. We intuitively feel that using a thermometer gives a higher probability that the weather outside will match your belief. Hence the question above can be rephrased to, "why the probability of having the truth is higher in the Tom's method?"

I tend to think that the solution lies in the different types of probability that each of the justification method provides. Tom's method produces the absolute probability. Sam's method produces conditional probability. (i might be using those terms wrongly)

As to your question. Exactly. I don't think that you need either to be able to work out any concrete problem. I — Manuel

Yes you don't need foundationalist or coherentist justification methods to come to a belief. Your beliefs can be prompted by an emotional impulse, social pressure or many other factors. But to have a justified belief, you must employ one of them. Justified belief is a prerequisite to knowledge. Knowledge leads to truth.

That is the benefit of this conversation number one. The second benefit i explained in my response to your previous comment. In short, your beliefs about the world can vary, depending on the method you choose to apply.

Overall i agree with you. We can argue about the fields that constitute science or about the definition of the scientific method, but in general you are right.

You are welcome. And thank you for sharing your thoughts.

No need really for me. Either is a fine choice. I will counter your question with another question.
Can you justify both without criticizing either. I think both should be embraced. In which proportions is another matter — Paul S

I think you hit the nail on the head. I am leaning toward the conclusion that one can justify both, but in different domains of knowledge. I'd argue that Foundationalist theory of justification is a default method in almost all circumstance, especially when assessing the propositions that originate in the physical world, and especially through our experiences. Coherentism must exclusively be applied to assessing the propositions that came in the form of a testimony. The reason is simple, it is often impossible to apply an inference from first principles to someone else's testimony. (At least, it is unlikely to find the basic truths that one can use for justifying his belief in the testimony)

For example, suppose your friend enters your house and says that "he feels cold" and "he has a fever". You assess your other beliefs such as that "the weather is warm outside ", "it is a flue season", "he appears sick". You conclude that those beliefs are consistent with his statements. Hence you are justified to believe the proposition that he has a cold.

Now suppose one was to apply foundationalism to justify believing in your friends statement. I don't see how one can make an inference chain that can justify it. The only possibility is something like the following: 1) i believe in his statement because he isn't a lier. 2) He isn't a lier because he has always said truth 3) ......and so on. The point is, >>the chain must start from a statement, "i believe the testimony because the source of the testimony is trustworthy"<<. The problem is that >>such chain of inference doesn't start from the basic truths<<. It starts from a necessary conclusion and goes toward basic truths. That contradicts foundationalism.

Moral decisions, in my experience, are not rational, although I guess they could be. A rational argument starts with assumptions. — T Clark

I like your insights. However i wasn't talking about decisions and rationality. I was discussing beliefs and the methods of their justifications, particularly coherentism and foundationalism. A moral proposition may lead to a irrational behaviour but doesn't mean it can't be justified.

The explicit chain of inference is justification. — T Clark

Well question was exactly, ca you justify that statement? Why does it have to be an inference chain? Coherentism reject that as a justification method. Instead, it focuses on the coherence. If you decided to choose one over another, than can you justify why? Sorry I don't mean you per say. I am just explaining the questioned I raising in here.

My opinion, what I called a model, of the world comes from the sum total of my experience. — T Clark

I am not sure what you are trying to say. Your opinion or vision of the world is a set of your beliefs. What is the connection between your experiences and beliefs. That connection is the justification method you use. You should specify what method you use and why.

Are there any parallels between the scientific method and coherentism?

I am not sure what you mean by clearly defined set. The entire calculus can be derived from 15 based assumptions. Those assumptions are reasonably basic and self evident.
Now you may point out that the assumptions that are held by science are not as self evident as "Cogito, ergo sum". I agree with you. All i am saying that scientific method tries to resemble the foundationalist approach to justification. It doesn't seem to resemble coherentism, if you ask me. And i agree that it also fails to address the challenge of justifying belief in its assumption.

The thesis claims that every scientific hypothesis requires a belief in a set of assumptions. Well, foundationalism also says that justification of all propositional knowledge starts with basic knowledge, i.e. a set of beliefs that don't require justification. So the method is essentially identical. The Duhem–Quine thesis to Scientific Method is the same as the Regress Problem to Foundationalism.

Thanks for the reference . I will definitely check it out.

Let me make a case for why the understanding of the concepts of foundationalism and coherentism is important. The entire scientific method is based on foundationalism and referred as reductionism. Although it is completely intuitive way to justify beliefs in the scientific (or physical world), it may not be such in other domains. For instance it may be reasonable to apply coherentism when justifying beliefs about metaphysical world or.....religion.

If one tries to justify his religious beliefs using foundationalism approach, he is likely to fail. Hence, the very least, he should abandon his religious beliefs in favour of scepticism. There are no basic beliefs (that i know) that can justify the entire system of beliefs of any religion. However, if coherentism is applied, one can justify adapting a religion, as long as he can demonstrate that the beliefs are coherent.

So then it is natural to ask, why should I use foundational/coherentist method at all?

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And i believe the two discussions are significantly different. One focuses on truth conductivity of the two theories. Other focuses on epistemic justification.

It seems your definition of foundationalism only applies to the physical world. For instance, do you set up an explicit chain of inference when making a moral decision? If you define foundationalism as a justification system that is only applicable to the beliefs about the physical world, then your definition may work. However some fellows may disagree with you.

Your definition of coherentism sounds right. You have a system of coherent beliefs. Hence you feel like you are justified in believing them. You accept a new proposition based on how well it fits in the system.

The question still remains, why do you set up an explicit chain of inference? Can you epistemically justify doing it? Why you don't do it when building your opinion about the world?

Sorry if I spelled the term wrong. I wasn't sure how to say it.