Antirealists point out that for "The kettle is boiling" to be true, we need "The", "kettle", "is" and "boiling". And seem to stop there. — Banno

Do they? I thought they were more crafty. I thought they were more likely to accept that there is empirical justification for holding that (in this example) something is happening, subject to a contingent activities and discourse. A kettle and boiling would work in English and pragmatically if you are steaming a hat or making tea, etc. But what do I know?

What is the 'it' that rains? Really there is no such object, there is simply 'raining' but the structure of our language is such that it has to be expressed in those terms.
— Wayfarer

It's obvious; the sky rains. — Janus

The it = It is the case that it is raining? :wink:

One example arises from the propositional structure of the language which differs from the inflected languages like Latin, where the declensions of verbs are given in the verb suffix rather than distinct particles 'I', 'we', 'they' etc. The effect of this is seen, for example, in the expression 'it is raining', which suggest 'an object which rains'. (This is something I remember Alan Watts commenting on.) What is the 'it' that rains? Really there is no such object, there is simply 'raining' but the structure of our language is such that it has to be expressed in those terms. This underlying structure tends to make English a rather transactional language, comprising objects, subjects and activities, which reflects a somewhat 'atomised' conception of reality, rather than imparting a sense of flow or union which is suggested in other languages. — Wayfarer

That's an interesting example worth noting.

The way I have come to understand it is that there are domains of discourse within which words derive their meaning. I don't know if there is anything like a universal language in that sense (although maths and physics would come close, but they're not languages in the sense being discussed.) Hence the significance of hermeneutics, which is mainly aimed at understanding language within its particular domain of discourse. — Wayfarer

This echoes what Richard Rorty says about truth as being the product of a domain of discourse rather than attached to 'reality'. Which potentially brings us back to Lawson's point about language not being connected in a discernable way to reality.

Which may lead one to thinking this (Rorty this time):

To drop the idea of languages as representations, and to be thoroughly Wittgensteinian in our approach to language, would be to de-divinise the world. Only if we do that can we fully accept the argument I offered earlier – the argument that since truth requires sentences, since sentences are products of vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths. For as long as we think that ‘the world’ names something which we ought to respect as well as to cope with, something which is person-like in that it has a preferred description of itself, we shall insist that any philosophical account of truth save the ‘intuition’ that truth is ‘out there’. This intuition amounts to the vague sense that it would be hubris on our part to abandon the traditional language of ‘respect for fact’ and ‘objectivity’ – that it would be risky and blasphemous not to see the scientist (or the philosopher, or the poet, or somebody) as having a priestly function, as putting us in touch with a realm which transcends the human.

d guess that you weren't able to follow the OP due to reading it using your understanding of morality rather than mine. As I don't understand your critique either, unless I just think of it as a critique of my explanation of morality. — Judaka

Could be.

Though, by the way, what do you mean by "aesthetic"? — Judaka

I think people often select positions based on whether they find them attractive or ugly. Like selecting some music. 'I think homosexuality is wrong' for instance, may just be a synonym for, 'I find it gross'. The statement, 'I believe in god' may just mean, 'The world is more beautiful when I attribute a creator to it.' That kind of thing.

I'm not entirely sure I follow your argument. I guess morality is social behavior and probably only significant where there are other conscious creatures. You don't really have or need morality if no one else exists. In this way, morality must essentially be a code of conduct or a set of 'traffic lights' to regulate behaviors. It's true that (outside of societal rules) we tend to pick moral behaviors that appeal to our preferences but this is culturally generated - a result of education and socialization. Morality doesn't vary all that much across cultures - not stealing, killing or causing suffering within communities of concern are the classic themes. The community of concern may widen or shrink, depending upon what the values of the culture. Not everyone counts as a citizen in some cultures.

One has moral views such as that a man beating his wife is "cowardly", that "incest is disgusting", or that "a man should provide for his family" or whatever else — Judaka

Are they moral reasons or aesthetic? Beating anyone may or may not be cowardly, the salient moral issue is it is causing suffering to another conscious creature. Incest being disgusting is an aesthetic response, isn't it? It may be a moral transgression, where it doesn't involve consent and results in significant birth defects and suffering.

If the subject were a still life with flowers, vases, glasses and fruit, for example, and the instruction to represent every item, I have no doubt that most people would do that, which shows that people see the same things. — Janus

I think that's right. Painting is likely to depart from realism when the deliberate stylization (expressionist, impressionist, etc) result in aesthetic variation. But this isn't because the artists see the flowers differently, it's because they depict them using a particular style.

:up:

— William Shatner, actor — 180 Proof

Wow! Amazing quote.

Every time we think it's aliens, it's never aliens. — RogueAI

DItto god/s. :razz:

But still there are countless truths that deal with the natural constraints of a physical world: I can't walk through or see through walls, I can't fly, I can't even entertain two thoughts simultaneously, I cannot increase or decrease my size, weight or strength instantly, I can't know things I haven't learned, I can't change my appearance without resorting to disguise or plastic surgery...the list is huge... — Janus

No question about that.

If the postmodernist says all is text, and we construct the world through and through, they go far too far, in my opinion. — Janus

I've never quite known if they go as far as the critics suggest. :wink: I think they are probably an easy target... relativism this... relativism that... blah, blah blah. Like Chomsky I find them too complex to formulate a clear understanding, and I've never had the time. But I have to say, what I do know I find fascinating.

When I read Rorty, I am sometimes stuck by the romanticism underpinning the thinking - 'My sense of the holy is bound up with the hope that some day my remote descendants will live in a global civilization in which love is pretty much the only law.'

The basic truths, which are countless, like you will die if you try to swim across the Pacific Ocean, jump off Mt Everest or try to fight a tiger bare-handed don't change. — Janus

It's funny how truth only seems to take something closer to solid form when death is the accompaniment.

Seems perfectly reasonable to me. I think that is a very succinct summary of the matter as understood by Lawson et al.

What do we mean by reality? There is no one answer to this question, there are just answers that fit within the context of a particular language-game. If you're an idealist or realist depends on what language-game you believe best describes reality, or best maps reality. If you're religious, then you accept those views of reality as interpreted by a certain view of metaphysics. If you're not religious you'll latch onto views that have another view of metaphysics. If you hold to a third view, as I do, then you'll hold to another view of metaphysics. — Sam26

Thanks Sam. I have sympathy for this view.

Do they believe the way we divide up the world is arbitrary and entirely dependent on us? Well, they believe that there are better and worse, more or less valid ways to carve up the world, but the arbiter of validity is itself a construction. Put differently, the world speaks back to us in the language in which we couch our questions, so truth is the product of a ceaseless conversation between personal and interpersonal construction , and events. — Joshs

It's hard for me not to agree. I wonder what the best arguments against this might be?

How do they determine what is a better or worse way - a type of pragmatism - useful for certain purposes? How is that determined?

Whilst it might be virtuous and practical to pursue minimalism and a frugal lifestyle, there’s nothing much in the public sphere that encourages it, and there’s no philosophical rationale for it. — Wayfarer

Yes. I think the more recent interest in Epicureanism is heading in this direction. It seems capitalism and marketing rule the world - not just in terms of consumerism, but models of reality and human behaviour. I recall a huge movement of countercultural, anti-consumerist philosophy back in the 1970's, some of it was not aligned with Eastern beliefs, it was just anti 'the man' and anti spending on 'rat race' nonsense. Much of this seems to be aligned with aesthetics and oppositional world views.

What would you consider to be an example of a robust philosophical foundation for a frugal lifestyle (as opposed to religious asceticism)?

There is no countervailing ideology to consumerism, because there's no philosophical or social framework that recognises anything other than consumption and material goods. — Wayfarer

Minimalism is growing in scope. It's generally secular and tends to eschew consumerism and owning lots of objects. I have been an informal and not very focused minimalist for many years. I am currently working to get rid of my car - I lived without heating and cooling for many years and own few appliances. I have noticed over decades that many people who profess spirituality are curiously tied to consumerism and seem to love their creature comfort - pools, cars, clothes, appliances, holiday homes, overseas trips, interior decoration, etc.

So, I am asking, how do you see the 'self' as coexisting as subject and object? — Jack Cummins

I'm not sure I understand the nuances of your construction, but I'll have a go. I do think about myself in third person or as a kind of protagonist in a drama. It might be me at an event recently experienced, or the banal drive in to work that morning. I am certainly accustomed to seeing my contributions or behaviours in a sort of panoptic overview, as a nominally detached observer of my behaviours. When doing this I am sometimes surprised by what I see.

What I notice when I do this is a gap between how I justified a particular behaviour to myself in the experience and how it must look to others. When I think about myself 30 years ago I view this person as a quite different being, whose behaviour and actions are sometimes as puzzling as those of a stranger. I wonder if this is a common thing for people as they age.

What we tend to forget when we look back at behaviour are the invisible pressures, social expectations, peer pressure, mores that contribute to the behaviour and often leave no trace.

It's important to note that this understanding of myself as an object is a contrivance and is probably fraught with contradictions and problems and I can't vouch for its accuracy.

Ever run across the Saphir-Whorf hypothesis? Also known as linguistic relativity, — Wayfarer

Thanks, I have, but I didn't know this name or source. Is this not Wittgenstein's understanding too, as in, “The limit of my language is the limit of my world."

:up: Fair enough.

Could be but I thought your question was about why people use the terms interchangeably on this thread. Sounds like we’ve covered it then. Cheers T.

Well, on what I have read Lawson asserts this, but without argument. Have you seen something with a bit more substance? — Banno

Yes, he says we don't have to abandon criteria of value (these are 'closures' which can be of great use to us), we just need to recognise their contingency and that they are there to achieve a shared purpose - ie, morality. He often seems to say (paraphrasing) 'Things don't need to be objectively true in order to be extremely useful.' And I think you and I both have the same follow up questions to this.

I have read a number of interviews and papers on line and I am pretty sure he raises this point in a couple of YouTube lectures.

The reason I highlighted Lawson is precisely because he is a 'lightweight' or more accessible thinker and somewhat derivative of Rorty and other more complex thinkers. It is instructive to see how some of these ideas look without the decorative filagree of more impenetrable scholarship. I'm sure the university types resent his work and popular appeal. I have no real commitment to Lawson, I'm just curious about the argument he presented in the OP.

Language does not always map on to the world.

In addition to statements and assertions, there are questions and commands and exhibitions. In addition to narratives there are policies and instructions and poems and nonsense. This by way of noting that "mapping on to the world" is only part of what we can do with words.

But sometimes we say things that are true. To call that a "mapping" might be to adopt too referential a theory of the way language works - the credulous, overly simple view that all words are analysable as nouns.

Sometimes we say things that are true. That's pretty much what realism claims. Denying that sometimes we say things that are true strikes me as a verbal form of self-evisceration. — Banno

Yes, good points. I think there's a lot of complexity in such denials. What be a university professor? Why write books?

If Dawson's target is more political and social than methodological, then the outcome is Putin and Trump and Johnson, and in Australia Scotty from Marketing and Mr Potato Head. In denying that there is any truth, he gives such turds permission to say and do whatever they like. — Banno

I hear you and thanks for your responses. Lawson definitely argues there are better and worse positions to take in terms of social policy and government. He is committed to reducing suffering. But like a number of post-modern thinkers, he seems to be straddling a fine line. Rorty too argued that truth was chimera and yet he affirmed very strong reformist left politics. I think there's a thread of its own on how they do this. In Rorty's words, certain approaches are better for certain purposes. I am interested in his foundational justification for this and haven't read enough to know how it works. How can a criterion of value emerge from all pervasive devaluation?

I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contain'd,
I stand and look at them long and long.

They do not sweat and whine about their condition,
They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things,
Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago,
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth. — Whitman

:up: He's on the money here. Thanks for the verse.

Yes, but they are not the same. — I like sushi

That's the post-modern argument (as per Rorty's quote). There is no objectivity. It's a contrivance. What we think of as objective is actually a shared subjectivity held by communities of agreement - whether we are talking the Amish, politics or quantum mechanics. Which is why for some thinkers, objectivity and intersubjectivity amount to the same thing, function in the same way, as Rorty says. You may not agree but many do.

Only humans can consider questions such as whether there are domains of being beyond the sensory world, for example, not to mention more quotidian abilities, such a mathematics, science, and so on. — Wayfarer

Perhaps and yet I envy animals who are self-sufficient and need no cars or porn or bad movies by Disney; who have no reason and no governments and no jails and no persecutions or prejudices nor layered psychological cruelties or stupid dead end jobs. I can't help feel that it is animals who often live the superior life, precisely because they don't need to speculate, think or fester and can live in the moment, taking no more than they need, as they need it. :razz:

I find it hard to stomach reading someone talk of ‘objective’ and ‘intersubjective’ as if they are synonymous … if they are why use both? — I like sushi

The notion that 'what people think of as objective is really just a construct of intersubjective agreement' is pretty common and certainly was (one of the frames) taught at my university. Richard Rorty puts it like this - 'In philosophical terms, it is the thesis that anything that talk of objectivity can do to make our practices intelligible can be done equally well by talk of intersubjectivity.' Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 (1998).

The questions as to whether this is useful or accurate are separate matters.

I know that at bottom science rests on an axiom: the outside world is knowable. — Torus34

Yes, a metaphysical position, really - ontological realism. But I suspect it is two presuppositions 1) that there is an outside or 'real' world and 2) that humans can come to understand it.

In fact you could almost say that anything designated 'revealed truth' will be discounted at the outset of any discussion. Deserves a separate thread. — Wayfarer

Do it - I have an interest in this one. I would like to understand more about the nature of revealed wisdom. I had some interest back in the days when I read about Gnosticism and the notion of revealed wisdom through Gnosis. I spent quite some time talking about this (years ago) with one of Carl Jung's friends, who was a friend of my parents and a key expert on the Jung Codex.

The "logic" may be valid but its soundness is dubious at best. An infinity of such notions "cannot be logically ruled out", but so what? Life is short, we need to sort out which relative few ideas are worthy of our limited time and energy to seriously consider. — 180 Proof

:up: Yes, that's the conclusion I came to. And yes, you point out the other salient matter here - it doesn't make any difference to the experience wherein I exist and make choices in the only reality I know.

Thanks, yes that resonates with me.

That brings into question whether we can truly know anything at all.

Comments? — Torus34

Depends. Totalising skepticism is quite popular with students and philosophy neophytes it seems. But some level of skepticism is useful and appropriate. I don't think humans ever arrive at absolute truth or 'ultimate reality' as opposed to the truth or reality about contingent matters. We can have reasonable confidence in many things, but absolute certainty is unavailable to us. What more do you need? If we are living in the Martix, or we're a brain in a vat, we may as well enjoy/participate in the illusion. What choice do we have? :wink:

:up:

I hear you. This seems to be influenced by a more pragmatic, or post-modernist, perhaps even phenomenological account, is that correct?

I think the response from the realist side would be "what is "ultimate" doing in your sentence?" — Moliere

Indeed. I guess the reason it is there is to emphasize the non contingent nature of a theorized reality as opposed to 'what is the capital of Australia' type constructions, or cats on mats, etc.

The search for reality seems to me to be sublimated search for god.

what is the relationships between the sign and meaning? Then finding that the relationship is itself meaningful, and hence, on the other side of reality. So language is anti-real. (though reality is, by definition, real -- of course) — Moliere

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Are you saying we can encounter small "r" reality, but nothing which transcends this, hence language is anti-realism?

Catholic philosopher Pat Flynn has a robust YouTube site featuring significant Thomist content. It's a showcase for books and thinkers. Philosophy for the People.

Here's a sample.

My gut feeling is that we can talk pragmatically about a contingent reality, which works to get certain things done, but we can't make any pronouncements about ultimate reality.

No. Just making the comment that the ineffable nature of truth or reality does appear to have a buck where it stops.

Having worked in 'ghettos' and with people experiencing intergenerational poverty, my thoughts are that a society can set expectations about appropriate behaviour and expect most people to comply. That said, people are often 'rewired' by experiences of trauma, institutionalization and substance use and may effectively have brain damage and limitations to their cognition. They may not be able to assess consequences or even have access to empathy. But that would be a small group, within the cohort of people experiencing chronic disadvantage.

I've certainly had to ask people to muzzle dogs and keep them on a leash or no assistance will be forthcoming. In most cases people will accept this. I've also had to ask people to put machetes and clubs away while I am around. Particularly if it is pointed out clearly why this is necessary for safety or perceptions of safety. My experience is that people do change behavior and do learn and grow, regardless of their background.

One of the issues with ghettos is that they are manufactured - either by design as social housing, or as the result of how an economy works (slum formation, etc). What then tends to happen is people with lots of trauma and disadvantage (limited education, unemployment, family violence, AoD use, mental ill health) are bundled together in high concentrations. This in itself can create a milieu for complex and often antisocial behaviours. It's interesting how when people are rehoused in an 'ordinary home' away from a 'ghetto', the behaviours often change dramatically and they become house proud and highly social and considerate to others.

And it looks like the answer is: theology. — Srap Tasmaner

Christian theology...


I do see why philosopher George Lakoff describes consciousness as 'embodied brain'. It's hard to see how consciousness can create an awareness and point of view, without being part of a physical being. We understand the world in terms of what we can do with our bodies. We like to think of reason as being all head and no heart, but it originates from whole beings.

How is it possible to use something in the world to represent that world and at the same time refer to reality? Why can I pick up a few stones and arrange them in a tray to calculate something about the world? Is our understanding of the stone movements, and our bodies, a part of the world? But then how do we access the world? — Moliere

Yes, those seem to be the right questions.

How can we have a finite set of symbols which can produce an infinite set of meanings? What is this real relation between symbol and meaning? — Moliere

Yes, I think so. But I wonder what all this really indicates about the limitations of human knowledge. We obviously do well in a range of domains without necessarily making contact with 'reality' - maths, science, literature, art.

We also know that no matter how contingent and 'impossible' meaning might be - it is pretty clear that a significant nuclear war would wipe out innumerable people and animals and irreversibly change civilisation. We can accept this as an objective potential reality, right? And if you chop off someone's head they die. Reality is all fun and games until someone loses their head...

The only reality we describe is the reality of shared human experience and concern, as I see it. Saying that the map is not the territory is saying that the network of collective representations which constitute our real, shared world is the map, while our individual pre-linguistic experiences are the territory. — Janus

That's an interesting way of looking at it. Richard Rorty says something like truth is what communities of shared understanding describe it to be. In other words, reality is a case of intersubjective agreement, not an external certainty.

Do you share some of the post-structuralist views on language and truth?

I found it hard to grasp how you would approach that question if you couldn't answer Banno as to what 'realism' might be. — mcdoodle

Ha! That's curious. Remember my question was this:

I'm not looking for a defence of realism, I'm more interested in the implications of this matter - do we need a theory of language that explains how any realist claim is possible in order to accept those claims? — Tom Storm

My view of realism isn't really the subject at hand. And I don't have a view on this worth a pinch of shit. But I am asking about Lawson's view as expressed in the OP and what others think this says about ideas like idealism.

The point of participating on sites like this for me is to understand the range of potential questions and something of how philosophers might arrive at solutions. I'm not personally looking for answers - just the range of potential answers.

Such a debate is very like the debates we all have at work, or, to zoom in, with a loved one: the purported 'facts' matter, but it is not through reference to 'the real' or by coming to any agreement about 'facts' that we resolve the exchange, the issues that matter. Language flows through us, especially familiar language with familiars, and we find ways to move forwards. — mcdoodle

How do words map to reality? Are they just a series of arbitrary signs and signifiers (as per the post structuralists) that make it impossible for us to express certain meaning and have any kind of real purchase on the world through language? That's at the heart of Lawson's notion, I think.

Richard Rorty, (an influence on Lawson), argued that language can't mirror the world or provide a direct access to knowledge of reality. Language is a human invention used as a tool to manage our environment and is shaped by our conventions, not independent reality. Does this, if true, interfere with our capacity to know things?