Language does not always map on to the world.

In addition to statements and assertions, there are questions and commands and exhibitions. In addition to narratives there are policies and instructions and poems and nonsense. This by way of noting that "mapping on to the world" is only part of what we can do with words.

But sometimes we say things that are true. To call that a "mapping" might be to adopt too referential a theory of the way language works - the credulous, overly simple view that all words are analysable as nouns.

Sometimes we say things that are true. That's pretty much what realism claims. Denying that sometimes we say things that are true strikes me as a verbal form of self-evisceration. — Banno

Yes, good points. I think there's a lot of complexity in such denials. What be a university professor? Why write books?

If Dawson's target is more political and social than methodological, then the outcome is Putin and Trump and Johnson, and in Australia Scotty from Marketing and Mr Potato Head. In denying that there is any truth, he gives such turds permission to say and do whatever they like. — Banno

I hear you and thanks for your responses. Lawson definitely argues there are better and worse positions to take in terms of social policy and government. He is committed to reducing suffering. But like a number of post-modern thinkers, he seems to be straddling a fine line. Rorty too argued that truth was chimera and yet he affirmed very strong reformist left politics. I think there's a thread of its own on how they do this. In Rorty's words, certain approaches are better for certain purposes. I am interested in his foundational justification for this and haven't read enough to know how it works. How can a criterion of value emerge from all pervasive devaluation?

I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contain'd,
I stand and look at them long and long.

They do not sweat and whine about their condition,
They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things,
Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago,
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth. — Whitman

:up: He's on the money here. Thanks for the verse.

Yes, but they are not the same. — I like sushi

That's the post-modern argument (as per Rorty's quote). There is no objectivity. It's a contrivance. What we think of as objective is actually a shared subjectivity held by communities of agreement - whether we are talking the Amish, politics or quantum mechanics. Which is why for some thinkers, objectivity and intersubjectivity amount to the same thing, function in the same way, as Rorty says. You may not agree but many do.

Only humans can consider questions such as whether there are domains of being beyond the sensory world, for example, not to mention more quotidian abilities, such a mathematics, science, and so on. — Wayfarer

Perhaps and yet I envy animals who are self-sufficient and need no cars or porn or bad movies by Disney; who have no reason and no governments and no jails and no persecutions or prejudices nor layered psychological cruelties or stupid dead end jobs. I can't help feel that it is animals who often live the superior life, precisely because they don't need to speculate, think or fester and can live in the moment, taking no more than they need, as they need it. :razz:

I find it hard to stomach reading someone talk of ‘objective’ and ‘intersubjective’ as if they are synonymous … if they are why use both? — I like sushi

The notion that 'what people think of as objective is really just a construct of intersubjective agreement' is pretty common and certainly was (one of the frames) taught at my university. Richard Rorty puts it like this - 'In philosophical terms, it is the thesis that anything that talk of objectivity can do to make our practices intelligible can be done equally well by talk of intersubjectivity.' Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 (1998).

The questions as to whether this is useful or accurate are separate matters.

I know that at bottom science rests on an axiom: the outside world is knowable. — Torus34

Yes, a metaphysical position, really - ontological realism. But I suspect it is two presuppositions 1) that there is an outside or 'real' world and 2) that humans can come to understand it.

In fact you could almost say that anything designated 'revealed truth' will be discounted at the outset of any discussion. Deserves a separate thread. — Wayfarer

Do it - I have an interest in this one. I would like to understand more about the nature of revealed wisdom. I had some interest back in the days when I read about Gnosticism and the notion of revealed wisdom through Gnosis. I spent quite some time talking about this (years ago) with one of Carl Jung's friends, who was a friend of my parents and a key expert on the Jung Codex.

The "logic" may be valid but its soundness is dubious at best. An infinity of such notions "cannot be logically ruled out", but so what? Life is short, we need to sort out which relative few ideas are worthy of our limited time and energy to seriously consider. — 180 Proof

:up: Yes, that's the conclusion I came to. And yes, you point out the other salient matter here - it doesn't make any difference to the experience wherein I exist and make choices in the only reality I know.

Thanks, yes that resonates with me.

That brings into question whether we can truly know anything at all.

Comments? — Torus34

Depends. Totalising skepticism is quite popular with students and philosophy neophytes it seems. But some level of skepticism is useful and appropriate. I don't think humans ever arrive at absolute truth or 'ultimate reality' as opposed to the truth or reality about contingent matters. We can have reasonable confidence in many things, but absolute certainty is unavailable to us. What more do you need? If we are living in the Martix, or we're a brain in a vat, we may as well enjoy/participate in the illusion. What choice do we have? :wink:

:up:

I hear you. This seems to be influenced by a more pragmatic, or post-modernist, perhaps even phenomenological account, is that correct?

I think the response from the realist side would be "what is "ultimate" doing in your sentence?" — Moliere

Indeed. I guess the reason it is there is to emphasize the non contingent nature of a theorized reality as opposed to 'what is the capital of Australia' type constructions, or cats on mats, etc.

The search for reality seems to me to be sublimated search for god.

what is the relationships between the sign and meaning? Then finding that the relationship is itself meaningful, and hence, on the other side of reality. So language is anti-real. (though reality is, by definition, real -- of course) — Moliere

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Are you saying we can encounter small "r" reality, but nothing which transcends this, hence language is anti-realism?

Catholic philosopher Pat Flynn has a robust YouTube site featuring significant Thomist content. It's a showcase for books and thinkers. Philosophy for the People.

Here's a sample.

My gut feeling is that we can talk pragmatically about a contingent reality, which works to get certain things done, but we can't make any pronouncements about ultimate reality.

No. Just making the comment that the ineffable nature of truth or reality does appear to have a buck where it stops.

Having worked in 'ghettos' and with people experiencing intergenerational poverty, my thoughts are that a society can set expectations about appropriate behaviour and expect most people to comply. That said, people are often 'rewired' by experiences of trauma, institutionalization and substance use and may effectively have brain damage and limitations to their cognition. They may not be able to assess consequences or even have access to empathy. But that would be a small group, within the cohort of people experiencing chronic disadvantage.

I've certainly had to ask people to muzzle dogs and keep them on a leash or no assistance will be forthcoming. In most cases people will accept this. I've also had to ask people to put machetes and clubs away while I am around. Particularly if it is pointed out clearly why this is necessary for safety or perceptions of safety. My experience is that people do change behavior and do learn and grow, regardless of their background.

One of the issues with ghettos is that they are manufactured - either by design as social housing, or as the result of how an economy works (slum formation, etc). What then tends to happen is people with lots of trauma and disadvantage (limited education, unemployment, family violence, AoD use, mental ill health) are bundled together in high concentrations. This in itself can create a milieu for complex and often antisocial behaviours. It's interesting how when people are rehoused in an 'ordinary home' away from a 'ghetto', the behaviours often change dramatically and they become house proud and highly social and considerate to others.

And it looks like the answer is: theology. — Srap Tasmaner

Christian theology...


I do see why philosopher George Lakoff describes consciousness as 'embodied brain'. It's hard to see how consciousness can create an awareness and point of view, without being part of a physical being. We understand the world in terms of what we can do with our bodies. We like to think of reason as being all head and no heart, but it originates from whole beings.

How is it possible to use something in the world to represent that world and at the same time refer to reality? Why can I pick up a few stones and arrange them in a tray to calculate something about the world? Is our understanding of the stone movements, and our bodies, a part of the world? But then how do we access the world? — Moliere

Yes, those seem to be the right questions.

How can we have a finite set of symbols which can produce an infinite set of meanings? What is this real relation between symbol and meaning? — Moliere

Yes, I think so. But I wonder what all this really indicates about the limitations of human knowledge. We obviously do well in a range of domains without necessarily making contact with 'reality' - maths, science, literature, art.

We also know that no matter how contingent and 'impossible' meaning might be - it is pretty clear that a significant nuclear war would wipe out innumerable people and animals and irreversibly change civilisation. We can accept this as an objective potential reality, right? And if you chop off someone's head they die. Reality is all fun and games until someone loses their head...

The only reality we describe is the reality of shared human experience and concern, as I see it. Saying that the map is not the territory is saying that the network of collective representations which constitute our real, shared world is the map, while our individual pre-linguistic experiences are the territory. — Janus

That's an interesting way of looking at it. Richard Rorty says something like truth is what communities of shared understanding describe it to be. In other words, reality is a case of intersubjective agreement, not an external certainty.

Do you share some of the post-structuralist views on language and truth?

I found it hard to grasp how you would approach that question if you couldn't answer Banno as to what 'realism' might be. — mcdoodle

Ha! That's curious. Remember my question was this:

I'm not looking for a defence of realism, I'm more interested in the implications of this matter - do we need a theory of language that explains how any realist claim is possible in order to accept those claims? — Tom Storm

My view of realism isn't really the subject at hand. And I don't have a view on this worth a pinch of shit. But I am asking about Lawson's view as expressed in the OP and what others think this says about ideas like idealism.

The point of participating on sites like this for me is to understand the range of potential questions and something of how philosophers might arrive at solutions. I'm not personally looking for answers - just the range of potential answers.

Such a debate is very like the debates we all have at work, or, to zoom in, with a loved one: the purported 'facts' matter, but it is not through reference to 'the real' or by coming to any agreement about 'facts' that we resolve the exchange, the issues that matter. Language flows through us, especially familiar language with familiars, and we find ways to move forwards. — mcdoodle

How do words map to reality? Are they just a series of arbitrary signs and signifiers (as per the post structuralists) that make it impossible for us to express certain meaning and have any kind of real purchase on the world through language? That's at the heart of Lawson's notion, I think.

Richard Rorty, (an influence on Lawson), argued that language can't mirror the world or provide a direct access to knowledge of reality. Language is a human invention used as a tool to manage our environment and is shaped by our conventions, not independent reality. Does this, if true, interfere with our capacity to know things?

:up:

Is human experience of phenomena the same thing as phenomena?

Transcendental idealists hold that the objects as we represent them in space and time are appearances and not things-in-them­selves. This, according to Kant, implies empirical realism, i.e., the view that the rep­resented objects of our spatio-temporal system of experience are real beings outside us. “

Relative to the OP’s assertion that “this forum might give the impression that idealism is more popular among philosophers than it actually is”, I would make the opposite claim concerning Kantian Idealism. It is more popular among allegedly anti-Idealist empirical realists than they realize. — Joshs

Cool. Thank you.

Thank you. Lots to follow up.

This depends on the language-game you're engaged in which uses the term "reality". — 180 Proof

Fair point.

I think Hilary Lawson loses the plot – the problem of the criterion (and its ilk) arises from confusing maps with territories and then complaining that 'maps =/= territories is an intractable paradox' when it's not: in practice, a map is made by abstracting features of interest from a given territory just as language is used to discursively make explicit (e.g. problematize) the invariant, ineluctable, conditions (i.e. "reality") of their circumstance. To avoid circle-jerking p0m0 / anti-realist nonsense, language must be shown (reflectively practiced) rather than said (theorized-using-language). — 180 Proof

Right, that's good to know. I was wondering to what extent Lawson may have become fixated and how to stop the circle-jerking...

I've read it. Bentley is a gifted thinker and writer. Even if he can be a bit of a bitch. It's pretty much your argument being made here.

As to the sense in which self is an illusion - as many have pointed out, illusions are artefacts of consciousness, a mistaken perception. I can't see how to avoid the necessity of there being a subject of such an illusion. — Wayfarer

I heard David Bentley Hart making this argument some years ago. It almost deserves its own thread.

But it's relevant to note that Dennett does defend the claim that humans are no different in principle to robots or computers. — Wayfarer

'Moist robots'... great term. Whether it is plausible or not, I have to say I greatly enjoy the idea that much for what passes as the human might be illusory.

Out of interest, what do you think is the specific harm of Dennett's view (if accurately represented)? You seem to dislike it for aesthetic reasons - that it robs us of enchantment and special meaning.

Science is set up as the relentless machine for mining the "truth" of reality. Science's problem is not that it ain't sufficiently open to having its theories confounded by surprises. It's problem lies in its failure to be holistic and realise the extent to which knowledge is an exercise that is making the human self as much as comprehending the world. — apokrisis

:up: Nice.

Lawson goes off on the usual Romantic tangent of wanting to give art the role of exploring reality's openness. But that's a bit too Cartesian again. — apokrisis

Indeed. He is member of the British progressive middle class, after all.

Science by and large accepts the Cartesian division between itself and the humanities. It's understanding of causality is limited to material and efficient cause. Formal and final cause are treated as being beyond its pay grade.

This lack of holism is why modern life seems a little shit. And any amount of art ain't going to fix it. — apokrisis

Is there a tentative solution to this? It seems to me that science does have a pay grade and the big questions we seem to like asking are outside its domain.

Thanks Joshs. Is what we call reality then an anticipatory, endlessly recreated phenomenon?

I’ve not read Lawson. A quick squizz suggests he is rather lightweight. :grin: — apokrisis

Yes, a 'popular philosopher.'

But showing that this organisational logic is indeed the way that the Cosmos “reasons its way into existence” is the big step that Peirce takes. This is the metaphysical shock that naive realism is still to confront. — apokrisis

Sounds tantalizing as an idea but I've not read enough to contextualize it.

“… “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism… Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality.” (Dietmar Heidemann) — Joshs

The world of phenomena and human experience?

This forum might give the impression that idealism is more popular among philosophers than it actually is. — wonderer1

Interesting. I would have guessed idealists here might be 25%?

But it leads to pansemiosis rather than Panpsychism or other Cartesian stories. So language as epistemic practice is also more generically the deep ontology of existence itself.

This cashes out in models of the “real material world” in terms of holistic systems of constraint rather than reductionist systems of construction.

This cashes out in self-reference being the feature rather than the bug. — apokrisis

I'm pretty sure Lawson has argued this too, but I confess to not understanding it very well.

Thank you. Yes, that all sounds familiar. We can do awfully precise things with language despite the seemingly arbitrary nature of signs and signifiers.

Realism is not a construction of facts. It is a hierarchical nest of constraints. It is a pragmatic limitation of uncertainty made efficient by our willingness to go along with the game of taking utterances at face value. — apokrisis

That's a nice frame. How contested would this account be?

Does Lawson have a point about idealism and the necessity of a realist theory of language?

Don't really know, I've never cared. Everything I experience is real enough for me. Philosophy isn't satisfied with this and seeks to find arguments to establish that realism is naïve and untenable. I don't have a philosophical view on this.

I'm mostly interested in what a realist theory of language might be.

It doesn't disprove it, so much as being incommensurable with it. The activities of reason are grounded in intuitive insight into the relations between abstractions (which we designate 'facts' or 'propositions'). — Wayfarer

Ok. But is it 'incommensurable' or seemingly so? Do you think we have enough information to make this call? Is anyone here defending mechanistic materialism? And does anyone here advocate Dennett in this space? The question seems to me to be, can we rule out naturalist explanations for reason (and what we call mental processes)?

To some extent, I think Gerson is reverse engineering what Plotinus assumed to be the case. — Paine

Got ya. Thanks.

But I have read enough text to question Gerson's assertions and look forward to challenging anyone who would champion his position as a scholar. — Paine

That's very interesting. What do you think his project is, then? Is he a tendentious advocate of Platonism at the expense of fidelity to Plato? His name comes up a lot amongst enthusiasts of Platonism.

The counter to that is that when you see causal relationships between ideas, that this is distinct from the mindless processes typically invoked by physicalism. You're seeing the connection between ideas. That is a different process to that of physical causation. — Wayfarer

So you think this process undermines or disproves naturalism?

Furthermore, if I write something that perturbs or upsets you, that will have physical consequences - blood pressure, adrenal reaction, heart rate, etc. — Wayfarer

I need a bit more than this to take a view that naturalism isn't a plausible account.

As I said, we need real expertise to determine how thought or 'mind' comes from bodies or brains. I don't think anyone has resolved this and some subscribe to mysterianism.

Either you see a reason or you don't. What I'm asking you is that if I persuade you to accept something - not even the argument at hand, but anything - has anything physical passed between us? — Wayfarer

What 'I see' is not really relevant. I see words on a computer screen typed by a person (I assume) who has beliefs/thoughts. I see nothing so far that is not physical. Are thoughts physical? Can we demonstrate that thoughts do not originate from physical brains? Isn't this where the expertise comes in?

They are only "tricky" for idealists like Wayfarer who prefer to torch strawmen – mischaracterizing a speculative paradigm such as naturalism as an explanatory theory – which is far easier to do than to demonstrate that idealism is a less ad hoc, less incoherent, less subjective paradigm than naturalism, etc. Naturalism does not explain "consciousness", yet idealism – which rationalizes folk psychological concepts (often ad absurdum) – conspicuously explains "consciousness" even less so. — 180 Proof

Yes, it's hard for me not to agree with this.

The crux of this whole thread was an un-answered question:

I can see you have not been persuaded by the argument thus far and probably won’t be, until you can see a reason why you should accept. At that point, you might typically say 'I see'. So - what is it that you see? (Or in the other case, what is it you’re not seeing?) Whatever it is (or isn’t) it won’t be seen as a consequence of anything physical that has passed between us.

What do you make of that? — Wayfarer

Yes, I read that earlier. I have no expertise in this subject. The best I can say is that intelligent, well informed people are 1) persuaded and 2) are not persuaded.

While I don't think we can demonstrate that reason can't be arrived at through natural processes, I'd be interested to learn where this is heading.

Let's say that reason can not be explained by naturalism.

What follows from this, for you?

(I know this argument is a central platform in presuppositional Islamic and Christian apologetics - that the very possibility of intelligibility can't be explained by materialism and therefore materialism disproves itself.)

For you, I imagine this reasoning is foundational to idealism, right?

These arguments seem to get messy - if idealism is true than presumably it belongs to naturalism. The natural then being an ontology of consciousness? Discerning precisely what is meant by materialism, physicalism or naturalism can seem tricky.