t's the only school of philosophy to which I ever felt attracted. Not a card-carrying member, mind you, but it sure sounds better than most of them. — Vera Mont
Further Epicurus' theory gets at something fundamental about desire -- that our desires can be the reason we are unhappy, rather than us being unhappy because we're not satisfying those desires, and so the cure of unhappiness is to remove the desire rather than pursue it. Which is a very different kind of hedonism from our usual understanding of the word since it's centered around limiting desire such that they can always be satisfied and you don't have to worry about them rather than pursuing any and all of them. — Moliere
The desire for riches should perhaps not always be understood as a simple hunger for a luxurious life, a more important motive might be the wish to be appreciated and treated nicely. We may seek a fortune for no greater reason than to secure the respect and attention of people who would otherwise look straight through us. Epicurus, discerning our underlying need, recognised that a handful of true friends could deliver the love and respect that even a fortune may not.
I would say that "confidence" is often directed towards oneself, internally, as an attitude toward one's own actions, while "faith" is most often directed outward, as an attitude towards what is external to oneself. — Metaphysician Undercover
Economics is entirely faith based - but they call it "confidence" — unenlightened
It's basically an American phenomenon, because only Americans can both distrust their own government and yet think their government bureaucracies can be so capable at the same time to have these huge cover ups. — ssu
I have made no defence of religion. I am appealing for an attempt at understanding the meaning of religious texts to people, which I believe is rather more than mere the commercial advertising bullshit of the marketplace. — unenlightened
Do economists really believe in the invisible hand? This is a fatuous ignorant insulting question, surely. — unenlightened
This is very binary, and rather the problem with this thread - and that is my fault for framing things that way. — unenlightened
Rationalist politics is necessarily dehumanising, because the defining feature of life is emotion. to be alive is to care about something. Having a home, for example. Accordingly, a worldview that rejects everything that is not rational or factual, is inimical to life. — unenlightened
Yes. I am a reluctant post-modernist.
— Tom Storm
That's a pity. You're missing out. The original guys enjoyed it. (The dialogue between Searle and Derrida is a good example.) It was having a sure-fire way of tweaking the lion's tail - where the lion was the orthodox academy. The sense of fun that I found in them was part of the appeal. (I also realized that it must have been part of Socrates' appeal when he revealed Socratic method to his friends. I suspect that it was one of the reasons he lost the trial.) — Ludwig V
My experiences of writing philosophy include the slightly weird experience of finding an argument taking charge and leading me down a path I didn't intend to go down and don't want to go down. — Ludwig V
That's a situation that post-modernists particularly enjoy(ed). — Ludwig V
But sometimes people forget that many texts are read and are important to audiences far beyond their original context The question of interpreting them in those circumstances must go beyond their origins. Indeed the problem starts to arise as soon as the text is published. — Ludwig V
But are you really telling me you didn't know what you intended to write, that you just had some kind of vagae association, when you were writing it? — Vera Mont
I see ↪Tom Storm has made pretty much the same point. Perhaps it's different for different writers. Anyway, I'm happy to leave it there and agree to disagree, because neither of us is going to be able to prove their point. — Janus
The only thing I will not countenance is : "He didn't know what he meant." — Vera Mont
Is that not the story of Jesus, whose necessity arose from the eating of that impregnated apple?
But that's not a story I focus on, but I get it. We don't need any actual apples, serpents, or crucifixions for that to have meaning.
Importantly, that story has the attention of a culture, and so it matters. That is where we look for meaning, so that's where we find it. — Hanover
I've mentioned throughout that it's partly the fault of literalist theists who insist on the truth of the scriptures that this is a common line of attack. Many an atheist, and I include myself in this group, has been dissuaded byof theological convictions on the basis of literal interpretations of scripture being a central part of a particular community. — Moliere
So to insist on the truth of talking snakes or the existence of Jesus is to miss out on what makes these stories compelling. — Moliere
What would this movie be without the music? — Mikie
Metaphysics is about giving the best general account of what reality is while increasing explanatory power and decreasing complexity. Every theory stops somewhere, and that stopping point is the metaphysically necessary stuff. — Bob Ross
I wasn't referring to your arguments. I was saying in general any argument for universal mind would be held by fallacious ideas
Those two statements contradict each other. — Bob Ross
Otherwise: Lucas was a master of merchandising on the moment! :D — Moliere
I did not come to say there is a universal mind on faith nor is it grounded in fallacious argumentation. What fallacies do you think I have committed? — Bob Ross
The Universal Mind that I am discussing is not Yahweh—not even close. — Bob Ross
This is a straw man: I never made this argument nor has any Analytic Idealist I have ever encountered. — Bob Ross
-- You cannot explain how different people experience the same world unless you infer something transpersonal, which connects people at a fundamental level. The most parsimonious inference is to simply extend something we already know to exist -- i.e. mind -- beyond its face-value boundaries. This is analogous to inferring that the Earth extends beyond the horizon in order to explain the cycle of day and night, instead of postulating a flying spaghetti monster who pulls the sun out of the sky. It is impossible to offer a coherent ontology that (1) isn't solipsist AND (2) does not infer something beyond ordinary personal experience.
-- My formulation of idealism differs from Berkeley's subjective idealism in at least two points: (1) I propose a single subject, not many, explaining the apparent multiplicity of subjects as a top-down dissociative process. Berkeley never addressed this issue, implicitly assuming many subjects; and (2) I state that the cognition of mind-at-large ('God' in Berkeley's formulation) is not human-like, so that the way it experiences the world is incommensurable with human perception (see: http://www.bernardokastrup.com/2014/09/on-how-world-is-felt.html). In Berkeley's formulation, God perceives the world as we do.
Thoughts on this are very welcome. The one bit of theory neutral-evidence I can think of is exactly related to consciousness, and that is the insight that I am conscious. — bert1
I call it reading while awake. In some cases, it may be necessary to do it twice, because the author is smarter, wittier, better-informed or more subtle than I am. I never assume he just didn't understand what he wrote. — Vera Mont
What I object to is reducing the author of a literary work to the unconscious amoeba at the bottom of its evolutionary pond. — Vera Mont
Their problem, not his. Marx made his observations and wrote what he saw in his own world, in his time — Vera Mont
What "universal mind"? There is not any publicly accessible evidence for such an entity. And if "everything is fundamentally mind-dependent" (including itself, which I find self-refuting), then "a universal mind" is only an idea, not a fact or "natural process". — 180 Proof
Would you agree that there are such consistent , recognizable behavioral differences between the genders in dogs and cats? Would you then agree that there are also such robust inborn gender differences in behavior between male and female humans? — Joshs
I haven't heard them do so. And I don't see why they'd need to. — Vera Mont
Whom? — Vera Mont
I became an atheist directly through the Jesus story. — Vera Mont
I should have stuck to real life to avoid your criticism about contrivance. True crime would be better, and that's really what I meant. — bert1
I was going to write a different OP titled something like "Is there any theory-neutral evidence for consciousness?" — bert1
But with consciousness, what do we use to determine what to admit as evidence? Do we look in dictionaries for definitions? Well, I think we should. That will help. But people typically don't do that, and that's really weird. — bert1
To make that work, seems to me you have to either 1) show that rocks have mental processes or 2) show that consciousness in humans is not a mental process at all. If you can't do that, you should just come up with a different name for the process you're describing. — T Clark
We're familiar with TV crime dramas. We have a suspect we think may have done a murder. Why do we think that? We have some evidence. And we are seeking more evidence in order to obtain more certainty on the matter. So what might we look for? In the case of this crime, we might look for:
- a dead body
- proximity of people to that body in time and space
- a report on the cause of death
- fingerprints on the crime scene
- alibis
- motive
- opportunity
- DNA
...etc. All the usual stuff. — bert1
Would it be unnatural for example, for a human to try to live life as if they were an ant or a fish or a god? — universeness
One persons truth is another persons lie, is a fair definition of subjective truth, but I think if your epistemology is the scientific method or scientific empiricism, then I think increasing your credence level to a level of an (to you) acceptable truth, based on demonstration of a process with observable predicted outcomes, is valid. — universeness
Yeah, but does that make guns, atom bombs, gods and murder, natural, merely because they are products of the human mind and also, would it follow that the word unnatural has no existent. — universeness
This is just the basis for the Kalam Cosmological argument, yes? Which has been fairly convincingly debunked, yes? — universeness
Do you think that it does not matter, either way? If so, why? — universeness
The concept of natural can be so strongly related to 'moral' by nefarious individuals. — universeness
3. The idea that some activities are "intrinsically worth while". This is a popular concept in philosophy of education. I learnt of it from R.S. Peters' work, but I don't know if he originated it. This amounts to declaring that some ends need no justification, though if you look at the examples (art, music, philosophy &c.), there is a widespread fondness for turning them into the means for other ends. Perhaps those are intrinsically worth while. I think the idea is that these are axioms, from which it is rational to deduce means. So this too amounts to incorporating means into a rational framework. — Ludwig V
4. Naturalization of values. By this I mean argument from what are posited as human needs or instincts, shaped by the natural and social context. — Ludwig V
But not the temporary death of god? — universeness
Winnie the Pooh taught me that people can be all different and all have different weaknesses and strengths, and yet be good friends to each other and live lovingly together even if they all make mistakes. — unenlightened
The Star Wars stories are historical analogues of Beowulf repeated ad infinitum with Jane Austin thrown in for romantic interest. — Paine
