Hello 180 Proof,

No. A much more so "weakly emergent" function like e.g. breathing or digesting or walking.

How can mental activity be both weakly emergent and irreductive? That seems, to me, like a contradictio in adjecto.

Nonreductive physicalism. I've previously (twice!) provided you a link to an article summarizing T. Metzinger's phenomenal self model which seems to me a highly cogent and experimentally supported research program within a nonreductive physicalist framework.

I see. I took a look: let me explain back to you what I interpreted PSM and PMIR to be (and correct me where I am misunderstanding).

The self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT) is split generally into two parts: the phenomenal self-model (PSM) and the phenomenal model of the intentionality relation (PMIR).

PSM is a theoretical postulation that we can possibly empirically observe that certain areas of the brain (e.g., prefrontal cortex) are responsible for producing unity of self (i.e., “mineness”, “perspectivalness”, and “selfhood”).

PMIR is the ongoing ‘mental model’, which is builds off of the PSM, that the subject is constantly using to evaluate ‘itself’ and ‘not-itself’.

Did I generally get it correct? Before I give some critiques, I want to make sure I am at least in the ball park.

Well, "no physical substance" implies there are no physical laws to "violate";

Not at all. I think you may be conflating two usages of the term ‘physical’: the colloquial (i.e., something tangible with size and shape within experience) with the formal (i.e., a mind-independently existent entity). Analytic Idealism posits that everything is in a mental substance and that includes the physical (in a colloquial sense of the term) and procludes the physical in a formal sense of the term. Matter still exists under analytic idealism, but by the term ‘matter’ an analytic idealist is referring to the extrinsic representation, which is physical in the colloquial sense, of mentality.

Or rather, how is it that "the physical" is publicly accessible if "all of reality is mental" and "the mental" is not publicly accessible?

Because the ‘physical’ in a colloquial sense is weakly emergent from the mental: it is an extrinsic representation of mentality. However, the ‘physical’ in a formal sense does not exist at all.

Bob

Hello Wonderer1,

Much more important, it seems to me, is how undisciplined is the the speculation. Scientific speculation is disciplined, by looking to external reality for support or falsification. Mother Nature can smack you upside the head if you get it wrong.

Metaphysics is just as disciplined as science: they just use different criteria to determine their respective inquiries. Also, metaphysics also looks at external reality for support or falsification, but it doesn’t only look at that (nor does science quite frankly when it comes to scientific theories).

A metaphysics that denies the existence of a non-mental external reality simply isn't comparable.

I am failing to see the relation between specifically idealist metaphysics and your previous contentions: what you said equally applies to a physicalist metaphysics. They both use the same criteria to assess what the best general account of reality is (e.g., parsimony, coherence, empirical adequacy, logical consistency, reliability, intuitions, etc.).

Bob

No. A much more so "weakly emergent" function like e.g. breathing or digesting or walking.
—180 Proof

How can mental activity be both weakly emergent and irreductive? — Bob Ross

Is breathing "reducible" to lungs, digesting "reducible" to intestines or walking "reducible" to legs? No, each is a function – "activity" – of the latter, respectively, just as mind(ing) – "mental activity" – is a (set of) function(s) of the brain-body-environment.

However, the ‘physical’ in a formal sense does not exist at all.

I don't understand what "in a formal sense" means here. The "physical" methodology certainly "exists" – and facilitates productive sciences and technologies – regardless of Analytic Idealists ignoring it "in a formal sense" or any other sense.

Hello 180 Proof,

Is breathing "reducible" to lungs, digesting "reducible" to intestines or walking "reducible" to legs? No, each is a function – "activity" – of the latter, respectively, just as mind(ing) – "mental activity" – is a (set of) function(s) of the brain-body-environment.

Of course breathing isn’t reducible to lungs, but it is reducible to the total functions and parts responsible for it. Obviously there is more to the weakly emergent property of breathing than simply having lungs. To me, that doesn’t seem like a good analogy to oversimplify the act of breathing to just lungs: it is still weakly emergent because it is reducible to the set of functions and parts which produce it.

If you think breathing has some irreducible aspect to it, then please elaborate.

To me, being “weakly emergent”, as a matter of definition, is to say that the emergent property is reducible to the set of constituents (and their relations to each other) that are responsible for producing it (regardless of whether those are functions or not).

I don't understand what "in a formal sense" means here.

The term ‘physical’ has two meanings (among more): tangible objects within conscious experience and mind-independent objects—and they aren’t the same thing. The latter is what is invoked by the metaphysical theory called ‘physicalism’.

The "physical" methodology certainly "exists"

A methodological approach that treats the world as if there are mind-independent objects is not the same as the ontological claim that there are mind-independent objects. So I agree with you here, but that’s not what I was talking about: “physical” in the formal sense, that I was talking about, is the claim that there are, as a matter of an ontological as opposed to a mere methodological claim, mind-independent objects (and that is, as well, different than merely claiming that there are tangible objects within one’s experience).

and facilitates productive sciences and technologies

I agree that methodological naturalism (although I am not convinced that the methodological physicalism, in the sense of treating everything as mind-independent, is actually necessary to produce the fruitful results) has produced many productive sciences and I do not plan on advocating their removal; however, that says nothing about ontology.

regardless of Analytic Idealists ignoring it "in a formal sense" or any other sense.

I am unsure as to what you are referring to here. One can be a methodological naturalist and an analytic idealist: the former is a methodology for inquiry about the world which takes the world to be a natural process while the other is an ontological claim that everything is fundamentally mind-dependent. A universal mind can be a part of a natural process, and one can claim that the only way to understand it is via empirical inquiry of the natural world. Supernaturalism isn’t necessitated by being an idealist whatsoever, although many end up going that route.

Bob

Having speculation be informed by the world around us is not special to science: metaphysics also tries to inform its theories based off thereof. — Bob Ross

I'd say metaphysics informed by science is informed by the world around us, as we find it both in terms of ordinary observations and inductive reasoning and in terms of science, since science is really just an extension of ordinary observation and inductive expectation.

Science and metaphysics are both engaged in abductive reasoning (i.e., trying to discern the best explanation to account for the data). — Bob Ross

Can you elaborate as to just what data is being explained by the idea of the world as will or mind at large?

It is derived from our understanding of all life: not just higher animals. Kastrup posits that all life is a grade of consciousness. Of course, we only immediately, through introspection, have access to our own, so that is where we typically start. — Bob Ross

Our introspective access to consciousness I would not class as data. I would only class as data what can be observed publicly and corroborated by repeated experiment. It's not even clear that our purported introspective access to consciousness is what it naively seems to be.

So the natural forces, as well as entropy and everything else, is within the universal mind and thusly is upheld by the will thereof. The will is ‘outside’ of the system of which represents it, just as necessarily as my mind’s will to dream of a beautiful forest is ‘outside’ of that dream forest. — Bob Ross

Yes, but all of this is purely speculative and cannot be tested.

Are you saying that you don’t think you can come to know what is right and wrong (even if the propositions are indexical: subjective)? — Bob Ross

I can come to know what seems right and wrong to me. It may not agree with what others think is right and wrong. What counts as knowledge is what can be reliably agreed upon publicly. You might object that what can be reliably agreed upon publicly or by experts in a field is just a more widespread seeming, and in the final analysis I think that is true. That is why I say we can know the world only as it appears to us.

You can’t invoke hypothetical conditionals without propositions, and, as far as I understand you, you are claiming ethics is non-cognitive (non-propositional): you can’t assess that “if p, then q” (“if we want to achieve that, we should do this”) if ethics doesn’t provide propositional or otherwise knowledge. — Bob Ross

The knowledge of what to do if you want to achieve an outcome comes from life experience. If you want to promote social harmony, don't go around murdering, raping and stealing; it is obvious that people don't like those things. If you want to promote personal physical health then eat foods which have proven to be good for the body, and don't eat foods that make it unhealthy. The ethics is not in knowing what foods are good for the body or what actions are bad for society, but in making the choice as to what outcome is desirable.

For example, if one can only gather knowledge by observation and logic, then they can never come to know what a concept of concepts is. — Bob Ross

I have no idea what this means.

everything is fundamentally mind-dependent. A universal mind can be a part of a natural process, — Bob Ross

What "universal mind"? There is not any publicly accessible evidence for such an entity. And if "everything is fundamentally mind-dependent" (including this "fundamental", which I find self-refuting), then "a universal mind" is only an idea, not a fact or "natural process".

What "universal mind"? There is not any publicly accessible evidence for such an entity. And if "everything is fundamentally mind-dependent" (including itself, which I find self-refuting), then "a universal mind" is only an idea, not a fact or "natural process". — 180 Proof

Yes, I figure universal mind is essentially a god surrogate - held in place by similar fallacious justifications and essentially by faith. Instead of (in the case of Yahweh) arguing there can't be something from nothing, therefore god - AI seems to be saying, there can't be consciousness from nothing, therefore universal mind. Universal mind still functions as 'god', as the foundational guarantor of all conscious experience.

:up:

In my mind, the intelligible question was never "whether or not something comes from nothing?" but instead How ~X transforms into X and X transforms into ~X? For me, the answer We don't / can't know suffices – no (inexplicable) "god/mind"-of-the-gaps (fiat) required.

That time of year, me ‘n’ the Better Half pack up, temporarily donate the furry grandkids to a sitter, and hit the road. Maybe there’s a message herein: last time we came here a “never-happens-here” hurricane had just blown the place into the sea, this time “never-happens-here” wildfires burnt the place to the ground. (Sigh)

My point is that under Kantianism, we don’t get knowledge of the world: we just get phenomenon; and, so, how can you claim that the world itself doesn’t change in its time as much as our knowledge does? Are you inferring from phenomena something about the things-in-themselves? — Bob Ross

Under Kantianism…yes, correct, with respect to the world, just phenomena. If folks of a certain time generally agree on much, and always agree on some, then the phenomena developed in each must be generally congruent or specifically congruent respectively, which shows the same world relative to them. If people in some other time repeat the process, with the same result, the same conclusion is given. If it happens that the folks of the later time agree with the record of the folks of a earlier time, then it is non-contradictory to posit that the world to which the agreement applies, remained constant.

No, nothing to do with the things-in-themselves. Again, that thing to which the system-in-itself is applied, cannot be the thing-in-itself to which it is not.

But, under Kantianism, I don’t see how you can claim that those observed regularties are anything but phenomena: they don’t tell you anything about the world beyond that. Would you agree with that? — Bob Ross

Observed regularities implies knowledge, which is not in phenomena themselves. Phenomena don’t tell you about the world, which implies description, but they are to inform that there is a world, which presupposes the reality of it, and thereby, the possibility of describing it.
————-

Can you elaborate on what you mean by things-in-themselves vs. phenomena? — Bob Ross

Try this on for size. Thing-in-itself is out there, just waiting around, doing what things-in-themselves do, minding their own business. Human gets himself exposed to it, perceives it, it affects him somehow, it gets translated it into this stuff that travels along its nerves to its main processing center. That stuff on the nerves represents what the perception was, but the owner of the nerves isn’t the slightest bit aware of any of that nerve stuff. That stuff is phenomenon stuff.

With respect to this particular form of dualism, the thing and the representation of the thing, the why is more interesting than the what. It is an empirically proven fact humans sometimes get what they perceive wrong, insofar as that by which they are affected (the thing) doesn’t match what the system they use tells them about it (the representation of the thing). In order to reduce the source of error, some part of the whole system must be eliminated as being a possible source of any error at all, which leaves the other part as the sole guilty party. Pretty easy to see why speculative metaphysics, in its descriptive cognitive methodology, needs to make necessary only one possible source of error, otherwise it would be monumentally difficult to place blame hence alleviate it.

Keyword: cognitive metaphysical methodology. If that by which things are represented as phenomena are not themselves part of the system that cognizes, they cannot be blamed for cognitive errors. And, again, humans are not conscious of the generation of their phenomena, so to relegate them to the non-cognitive part of the system as a whole, is not self-contradictory.
————

Would you say that the logical part of the system is a thing-in-itself or a phenomenon (or neither)? — Bob Ross

Oh, neither, absolutely. Those conceptions are already methodologically assigned; to use them again in a way not connected to the original, is mere obfuscation. The logical part is just that, a part, operating in its own way, doing its own job, not infringing where it doesn’t belong. Why have a theory on, say, energy, then qualify it by attributing, say, cauliflower, to it as a condition?
————-

”Which gets us back to why propose such a thing in the first place.”
-Mww

To give the most parsimonious metaphysical account of reality. Under your view, it seems like you may be committed to ontological agnosticism: is that correct? — Bob Ross

Ehhhh….I don’t need an account of reality. All I need is an account of how I might best understand the parts of it that might affect me, be it what it may. Ontological agnosticism sounds close enough to “I don’t really care”, so yeah, I guess.

As to the relation of this agnosticism to a universal mind, yeah, there might be such a thing, but even if there is, nothing changes for me. If I think the moon is just this kinda thing because the universal mind’s idea is what gives it to me, it is still just a moon-thing to me. It’s just like our own brain, operating under the laws developed to describe it, but we don’t use our brain under those lawful conditions. Because of those conditions, sure, by not by those conditions. We don’t think in terms of electron spin or quantum number. We never even consider ion potential….it is never given to us to consider…..when answering a question the traffic cop asks about why we were speeding.

Universal mind is just as empty a conception with respect to human cognition, as is lawful brain mechanics. As a foray into the sublime it’s wonderful; as a logical possibility its ok; as a methodological necessity, not so much. I mean, if it’s OUR intelligence, OUR knowledge, OUR reason, why examine any of it from some perspective that isn’t OURS? You and I talking here aren’t invoking any universal mind in just the doing of it, and even if such a thing is operating in the background we’re not conscious of it as such, so…..

Hello Janus,

Can you elaborate as to just what data is being explained by the idea of the world as will or mind at large?

It is the best, allegedly, the most parsimonious general account of what the world (i.e., reality) is. In contradistinction to its main competitor (which is physicalism), it accounts for the data of qualitative experience, which is arguably the most real aspect of all of our lives, much better.

The main difference, in terms of explanatory power over the data of experience, revolves around consciousness.

Our introspective access to consciousness I would not class as data. I would only class as data what can be observed publicly and corroborated by repeated experiment. It's not even clear that our purported introspective access to consciousness is what it naively seems to be.

I would. Introspection is a form of empirical inquiry; and, yes, we can have illusory ideas of what consciousness is, but this is no different for anything else. Humans have had illusory ideas of objects for as long as history can remember.

Conscious experience is what one can be the most sure of—not objects. We use our conscious experience, we trust it enough, to determine the objects.

Yes, but all of this is purely speculative and cannot be tested.

Again, empirical inquiry is only a negative criterion for metaphysics. You can test and not test physicalism in the exact same manners as idealism. There are aspects that cannot be tested, and aspects that could technically indicate their implausibility.

I can come to know what seems right and wrong to me

Then you agree that ethics is a form of knowledge?

For example, if one can only gather knowledge by observation and logic, then they can never come to know what a concept of concepts is. — Bob Ross

I have no idea what this means.

My point was that scientific inquiry and logic are not exclusive means of determining knowledge: it doesn’t work; and an example of that is the ‘concept of concepts’.

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

There is not any publicly accessible evidence for such an entity

One does not have to have public evidence of something to know it necessarily. If that were the case, then you can’t know that you have thoughts.

"everything is fundamentally mind-dependent" (including this "fundamental", which I find self-refuting)

The idea is the the universal mind is what is metaphysically necessary: what is self-refuting about that?

By “everything is fundamentally mind-dependent”, I mean that it is a part of a mental substance and not that there are no facts, if that is what you are trying to get at.

then "a universal mind" is only an idea, not a fact or "natural process".

A universal mind is not an idea, it would be an fact that it exists: it is a mind within a mental substance. Natural processes are not only physical (i.e., mind-independent) processes.

Bob

Hello Tom Storm,

Yes, I figure universal mind is essentially a god surrogate - held in place by similar fallacious justifications and essentially by faith

I did not come to say there is a universal mind on faith nor is it grounded in fallacious argumentation. What fallacies do you think I have committed?

Instead of (in the case of Yahweh) arguing there can't be something from nothing, therefore god

The Universal Mind that I am discussing is not Yahweh—not even close. Honestly, some philosophers (like Schopenhauer) are atheists that hold there is a Universal Mind.

AI seems to be saying, there can't be consciousness from nothing, therefore universal mind

This is a straw man: I never made this argument nor has any Analytic Idealist I have ever encountered.

Bob

I did not come to say there is a universal mind on faith nor is it grounded in fallacious argumentation. What fallacies do you think I have committed? — Bob Ross

I wasn't referring to your arguments. I was saying in general any argument for universal mind would be held by fallacious ideas - like the ones I already mentioned and probably others. Such as universal mind being metaphysically necessary - this is no different than a Christian presuppositional apologist making the same claim about God.

The Universal Mind that I am discussing is not Yahweh—not even close. — Bob Ross

I didn't say it was like Yahweh (in personality). I said like Yahweh it plays a similar role - I am very familiar with Kastrup's account of what he calls mind-at-large - instinctive, not metacognitive, etc.

This is a straw man: I never made this argument nor has any Analytic Idealist I have ever encountered. — Bob Ross

It's not a straw man (at least not intentionally) - it comes from Kastup interviews where he essentially says - for there to be object permanence, a universal mind is necessary. His line (I'm paraphrasing) ' It means that when I park my car in the garage it is still there after I go inside'. If I knew which interview, I would include a clip here but I don't have to time to go find it.

But you can help us all here by answering the question - does your understanding of mind-at-large provide object permanence?

Here's Kastrup August 19th 2015 from his blog:

-- You cannot explain how different people experience the same world unless you infer something transpersonal, which connects people at a fundamental level. The most parsimonious inference is to simply extend something we already know to exist -- i.e. mind -- beyond its face-value boundaries. This is analogous to inferring that the Earth extends beyond the horizon in order to explain the cycle of day and night, instead of postulating a flying spaghetti monster who pulls the sun out of the sky. It is impossible to offer a coherent ontology that (1) isn't solipsist AND (2) does not infer something beyond ordinary personal experience.

-- My formulation of idealism differs from Berkeley's subjective idealism in at least two points: (1) I propose a single subject, not many, explaining the apparent multiplicity of subjects as a top-down dissociative process. Berkeley never addressed this issue, implicitly assuming many subjects; and (2) I state that the cognition of mind-at-large ('God' in Berkeley's formulation) is not human-like, so that the way it experiences the world is incommensurable with human perception (see: http://www.bernardokastrup.com/2014/09/on-how-world-is-felt.html). In Berkeley's formulation, God perceives the world as we do.

Essentially, as Kastrup himself admits, this metaphysics is arrived at through inference rather than evidence. It's clever and I'm not saying it is junk, but I don't see how this can be certain.

Hello Mww,

That time of year, me ‘n’ the Better Half pack up, temporarily donate the furry grandkids to a sitter, and hit the road. Maybe there’s a message herein: last time we came here a “never-happens-here” hurricane had just blown the place into the sea, this time “never-happens-here” wildfires burnt the place to the ground. (Sigh)

I am sorry to hear that Mww! I hope you are all ok!

Try this on for size. Thing-in-itself is out there, just waiting around, doing what things-in-themselves do, minding their own business. Human gets himself exposed to it, perceives it, it affects him somehow, it gets translated it into this stuff that travels along its nerves to its main processing center

Here is an example of where I am confused: if the phenomena don’t provide knowledge about things-in-themselves, then how can you claim that we have a representational system which is the translation of the stuff that travels along the nerves to the main processing center? To me, that concedes that we actually do get inferential knowledge from the phenomena about the things-in-themselves: which, by my lights, negates Kant’s argument. He was claiming that we cannot know anything about things-in-themselves.

That stuff on the nerves represents what the perception was, but the owner of the nerves isn’t the slightest bit aware of any of that nerve stuff. That stuff is phenomenon stuff.

I get that, under Kantianism, each person is considered to be a representational system, so to speak, that has receptivity and sensibility which get translated into perception, and those perceptions are phenomena; but, to me, Kant’s flaw is that he then claims that, given that representational system, we shouldn’t expect phenomena to tell us anything about things-in-themselves: but that’s what he used (i.e., phenomena) to come to understand that he is fundamentally a representational system. To me, that seems a bit self-refuting, what do you think? Am I still not grasping the distinction between things-in-themselves and phenomena?

It is an empirically proven fact humans sometimes get what they perceive wrong

True, but this doesn’t matter for Kant, because, to him, sorting out the non-illusory from the illusory is just more phenomena: which says nothing about things-in-themselves.

Oh, neither, absolutely. Those conceptions are already methodologically assigned; to use them again in a way not connected to the original, is mere obfuscation. The logical part is just that, a part, operating in its own way, doing its own job, not infringing where it doesn’t belong. Why have a theory on, say, energy, then qualify it by attributing, say, cauliflower, to it as a condition?

Interesting, if the logical part of the system is not a part of the thing-in-itself and is not phenomena, then what is it? To me, it either exists as a part of the things-in-themselves (i.e., reality) or it is an appearance from our representational faculty—there’s no third option.

Ehhhh….I don’t need an account of reality. All I need is an account of how I might best understand the parts of it that might affect me, be it what it may. Ontological agnosticism sounds close enough to “I don’t really care”, so yeah, I guess.

Fair enough; however, I think that if one endeavors to give an account, idealism is the best choice.

but even if there is, nothing changes for me. If I think the moon is just this kinda thing because the universal mind’s idea is what gives it to me, it is still just a moon-thing to me

This is fair and true: the world of which we experience does not change depending on what metaphysical theory we postulate as true—but what we are trying to do is get at the truth.

Universal mind is just as empty a conception with respect to human cognition, as is lawful brain mechanics

I wouldn’t say it is an empty concept.

You and I talking here aren’t invoking any universal mind in just the doing of it, and even if such a thing is operating in the background we’re not conscious of it as such, so…..

In terms of practicality, one can live a perfectly fine life without subscribing to a metaphysical theory; but the goal is to get at the truth not what is practical for most laymen. Most people don’t need to know physics or calculus either, but that doesn’t take aware from what they get right about reality.

Bob

Hello Tom Storm,

I wasn't referring to your arguments. I was saying in general any argument for universal mind would be held by fallacious ideas

Those two statements contradict each other.

like the ones I already mentioned and probably others

Can you refresh my memory? What fallacious ideas?

Such as universal mind being metaphysically necessary - this is no different than a Christian presuppositional apologist making the same claim.

This is true of all metaphysical theories and has nothing specific to do with Christian apologists (nor any other mainstream religion): physicalists also posit something as metaphysical necessary. Atheists which subscribe to a metaphysical theory of reality necessarily posit something as metaphysically necessary. There’s no way of avoiding it.

I do want to clarify though that I am not arguing that the Universal Mind exists because it is metaphysically necessary but, rather, that, under this metaphysical theory, it is posited as existing (for other reasons); and because it exists and there is no more data of experience to explain it seems best to posit it as metaphysically necessary. Metaphysics is about giving the best general account of what reality is while increasing explanatory power and decreasing complexity. Every theory stops somewhere, and that stopping point is the metaphysically necessary stuff.

I didn't mean it was like Yahweh (in personality). I said like Yahweh it plays a similar role - I am very familiar with Kastrup's account of what he calls mind-at-large - instinctive, not metacognitive, etc.

I see.

It's not a straw man (at least not intentionally) - it comes from Kastup interviews where he essentially says - for there to be object permanence, a universal mind is necessary. His line (I'm paraphrasing) ' It means that when I park my car in the garage it is still there after I go inside'. If I knew which interview, I would include a clip here but I don't have to time to go find it.

But you can help us all here by answering the question - does your understanding of mind-at-large provide object permanence?

The idea there is not that the Universal Mind is metaphysically necessary because of object permanence but, rather, that there must be an objective world to best explain object permanence; and in the case of Kastrup, since he is an idealist, he utilizes the Universal Mind to explain it (i.e., there is an objective world which is the ideas in a universal mind and not subjectively in my mind only).

And, yes, I would say there is object permanence—but that doesn’t mean that the Universal Mind is metaphysically necessary. It’s “necessary” to explain the world around us (which exhibits permanence) by positing that there is an objective world of which we are in. The same line of argument can be used in the opposite direction for physicalism.

Bob

Metaphysics is about giving the best general account of what reality is while increasing explanatory power and decreasing complexity. Every theory stops somewhere, and that stopping point is the metaphysically necessary stuff. — Bob Ross

I think that's mostly true, but I am not certain about the 'stopping point'. But we can leave it.

I'm not motivated to explore this speculative subject much further since I've made my comments already and I would just be repeating myself. I get that you disagree. That's no problem for either of us. :wink:

Thanks for the chat. I might dip in and out later based on interest levels.

I wasn't referring to your arguments. I was saying in general any argument for universal mind would be held by fallacious ideas

Those two statements contradict each other. — Bob Ross

I don't think so. You seemed to take my comment as personal, I was talking more generally about arguments that attempt to describe mind-at-large as axiomatic. It's an inference at best. And while it might be compelling if you share certain presuppositions, it is still an inference which can't be demonstrated. And before anyone says, 'but materialism relies on inferences...' remember that's an equivocation fallacy. I am not defending materialism.

But hey, I'm not a philosopher. This matter is really best left with people who have deep understanding the full range of metaphysical implications and arguments in this space (and I am not talking about a cultre war materialists versus idealists type thing). I am in fact more interested in idealists who do not favor a mind-at-large concept.

Maybe there needs to be a separate thread on idealism and universal mind or non-solipsistic accounts of idealism - since for idealism a way around solipsism and an explanation for object permeance often seems to require a mind-at-large.

It is the best, allegedly, the most parsimonious general account of what the world (i.e., reality) is. In contradistinction to its main competitor (which is physicalism), it accounts for the data of qualitative experience, which is arguably the most real aspect of all of our lives, much better. — Bob Ross

The trouble is that there is no reliable data of qualitative experience. There are personal reports, but personal reports do no count as reliable data unless they can be checked against other personal reports, and even then they cannot be one hundred percent reliable.

I would. Introspection is a form of empirical inquiry; and, yes, we can have illusory ideas of what consciousness is, but this is no different for anything else. Humans have had illusory ideas of objects for as long as history can remember.

Conscious experience is what one can be the most sure of—not objects. We use our conscious experience, we trust it enough, to determine the objects. — Bob Ross

Introspection is not a form of empirical inquiry for the reasons I've already given. In short, empirical inquiry is a public venture, and introspection is not. Conscious experience is not what we can be most sure of, for the simple reason that there is no settled agreement about its nature. On the other hand there is agreement about the (perceptual, not absolute) nature of objects. So, humans have not had illusory ideas about the perceptual nature of objects, although they certainly may have had illusory ideas about the explanation of the existence of perceptual objects. Ideas about the absolute nature of objects are pure, untestable speculation, so it seems odd to even talk about those in terms of illusion.

You can test and not test physicalism in the exact same manners as idealism. There are aspects that cannot be tested, and aspects that could technically indicate their implausibility. — Bob Ross

This is not true. Physical attributes are testable, measurable, quantifiable and ideal attributes (whatever they may be thought to be) are not. Physicalism as an absolute metaphysical claim cannot be tested, just as no absolute metaphysical claim can be tested.

I can come to know what seems right and wrong to me

Then you agree that ethics is a form of knowledge? — Bob Ross

No, it's not a form of knowledge because knowledge is a public matter and how things seem to me is not. I should have said that what seems right and wrong to me is simply what I prefer.

My point was that scientific inquiry and logic are not exclusive means of determining knowledge: it doesn’t work; and an example of that is the ‘concept of concepts’. — Bob Ross

I still don't know what you mean by the "concept of concepts".

My basic stance is that when we come to claims about the absolute nature of things we are "all at sea"; we have no way of assessing which claims are more parsimonious because we have no way of measuring parsimony in the "absolute" context. Reality can be looked at from the perspective that consciousness is fundamental or that the physical is fundamental, and both are limited viewpoints because they are both, and the whole of language is, derived from the context of our experience of a world, which certainly looks as though it is mind-independent, even if that very claim is not. I think that when people want to take up a position, they are less motivated by reason than by other factors. So, you should understand I am not defending physicalism in anything other than a methodological sense.

I don't think we are going to agree on these things, so maybe we should leave it before we start going around in circles.

One does not have to have public evidence of something to know it necessarily. — Bob Ross

How do you know that you are not hallucinating "that you have thoughts"? or that those alleged "thoughts" are yours and not someone elses "thoughts"?

The idea is the the universal mind is what is metaphysically necessary:

I don't understand what you mean by "metaphysically necessary". At least as far as (e.g.) property dualism is concerned, the negation of "universal mind" – mental substance – is not a contradiction.

A universal mind is not an idea ...

... and yet you claim to be monist positing "mental substance" wherein there are only ideas. :roll:

if the phenomena don’t provide knowledge about things-in-themselves, then how can you claim that we have a representational system which is the translation of the stuff that travels along the nerves to the main processing center? — Bob Ross

There’s a box on the shelf at the post office….
(a.k.a., a thing-in-itself)
Guy brings you the box….
(a.k.a, your perception of a thing)
….hands it to you….
(a.k.a., square, solid, heavy, your intuition of a thing)
You open the box….
(a.k.a., the content of your intuition, packaging material, something in a plastic bag, is a phenomenon)
Phenomenon gets passed on to the cognitive part for object determination.

You still don’t know what the content of the box is, only that the box has something in it, and you never would have had the opportunity to find out if it had stayed on the shelf at the post office. You could have lived your entire life without knowledge of the content of that box even while knowing full well post offices contain a manifold of all sorts of boxes; you can only know the contents of boxes handed to you. And, at this point, the last thing to cross your mind is how the box got to the post office in the first place, a.k.a., its ontological necessity.

Analogies really suck, when it comes right down to it, there’s never a perfect one. But we still try by means of them to explain what simply needs to be intuitively understood, like a jigsaw puzzle.
—————

….to me, Kant’s flaw is that he then claims that, given that representational system, we shouldn’t expect phenomena to tell us anything about things-in-themselves: but that’s what he used (i.e., phenomena) to come to understand that he is fundamentally a representational system — Bob Ross

Phenomena are only one of three general classes of representation, the other two are conceptions and judgement, which is technically the representation of a representation.

It is an empirically proven fact humans sometimes get what they perceive wrong.
-Mww

True, but this doesn’t matter for Kant, because, to him, sorting out the non-illusory from the illusory is just more phenomena: which says nothing about things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

If you spend 12 years developing a theory on knowledge, wouldn’t the accounting for how human get things wrong matter to you? Rhetorical question; of course you would. Your peers wouldn’t give your theory a second review if you claimed a system is flawed, then don’t show the means to rectify it, or, if such flaw can’t be rectified at all, insofar as it is intrinsic to the nature of the system itself, then to show the means to guard against it.

Sorting out the illusory has nothing to do with phenomena. Reason, the faculty that subjects judgement to principles to determine the logical relation of cognitions to each other, separates the illusory from the rational. Humans can confuse/delude themselves in their thinking, without the possibility of experience correcting them, hence phenomena are irrelevant.
—————

I think that if one endeavors to give an account (of reality), idealism is the best choice. — Bob Ross

Absolutely. No science is ever done that isn’t first thought.

Hello Janus,

I don't think we are going to agree on these things, so maybe we should leave it before we start going around in circles.

Absolutely no worries! I can respond more adequately if you would like, but it seems like you are hinting that you would like to end the conversation. I appreciate you having a conversation with me about it and look forward to many more to come!

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

How do you know that you are not hallucinating "that you have thoughts"? or that those alleged "thoughts" are yours and not someone elses "thoughts"?

This is just unparsimonious hard skepticism. How do you know that you aren’t a brain in a vat? You don’t.

I know that I am having thoughts because it accounts for the data (i.e., the thoughts occuring in my head) most parsimoniously. I can’t be certain that I am not in a matrix, within a matrix, within another matrix, … .

I don't understand what you mean by "metaphysically necessary". At least as far as (e.g.) property dualism is concerned, the negation of "universal mind" – mental substance – is not a contradiction.

Of course it isn’t a logical contradiction, but, then again, literally every sophisticated metaphysical theory is logically consistent—so it isn’t saying much.

If by “contradiction” you were referring to “metaphysical impossibility”, then, yes, under Analytic Idealism, there is nothing with any potency to produce a mind-independent world. In other words, the Universal Mind is posited as existing in all possible worlds, and that excludes the possibility of any mind-independent objects.

... and yet you claim to be monist positing "mental substance" wherein there are only ideas. :roll:

I am not claiming that a “mental substance” is a substrate which only bears ideas: it bears mental properties and minds which are responsible thereof.

Bob

How do you know that you aren’t a brain in a vat? You don’t. — Bob Ross

There are not any grounds to believe I am a BiV and compelling evidence that I am not. I take your evasive reply as you conceding the point, Bob, that without public evidence one does not "know" one is not hallucinating (e.g. sensory deprivation).

... mental properties ...

Other than ideas (re: "idealism"), to what does this phrase refer?

What I really meant was that unless either of us can come up with some new and convincing arguments, neither of us seems likely to change their mind. So, I wasn't calling a halt to the conversation tout court.

I've enjoyed conversing with you, Bob, on account of your being able to engage without distorting what your interlocutor is saying, and to remain patient and civil throughout.

Yes, I figure universal mind is essentially a god surrogate - held in place by similar fallacious justifications and essentially by faith. Instead of (in the case of Yahweh) arguing there can't be something from nothing, therefore god - AI seems to be saying, there can't be consciousness from nothing, therefore universal mind. Universal mind still functions as 'god', as the foundational guarantor of all conscious experience. — Tom Storm

Yes, I think idealism ultimately entails a godhead.

quote="Bob Ross;813236"]if the logical part of the system is not a part of the thing-in-itself and is not phenomena, then what is it? To me, it either exists as a part of the things-in-themselves (i.e., reality) or it is an appearance from our representational faculty—there’s no third option.[/quote]

That which assembles the parts of the representation of a perception in order, is intuition. That which assembles intuitions in order for successive perceptions of the same thing, is logic. In this way, it is not necessary to learn what thing is at each perception, but only understanding that either it’s already been learned, and subsequent perceptions conform to it, or they do not. Already been learned taken as a euphemism for experience.

In the tripartite human logical sub-system in syllogistic form of synthetic conjunction, understanding is the faculty of rules, by which phenomena provided a posteriori are taken as the major premise, conceptions provided a priori by understanding according to rules, serves as the minor premise or series of minors, the logical relation of one to the other is represented in a judgement, which serves as the conclusion.

Thing is, we don’t notice or care about any of that, until, e.g., you perceive a thing that doesn’t match anything else you’ve ever seen. Or, you’ve satisfied yourself with some judgement regarding a thing, then someone comes along and shows you, at least, how different your judgement could have been had you synthesized the same conceptions in a different order (you can’t call that thing a dog because no dog is that big) or, worst case, how wrong you were insofar as the conceptions you did use in that synthesis were not properly related to what you perceived (you can’t call that thing a dog because no dog has horns).

Usually humans learn by being taught by other humans. But show a relative youngster a picture of a dog, instill in him the relation between the picture and perception of the real thing, and he still might see a cow, relate it to the picture, judge it as being close enough, hence blurt out DOG!!!! Dutiful adults of good humor correct the tyke, everybody’s happy. An adult has the exact same operating system, hence is liable to the same mistakes in judgement. The difference is the number of conceptions incorporated in the minor premises, which relates to the accumulation of experiences, such that the major is more precisely described, and the conclusion, the judgement, is thereby more consistent with reality.

Oh man. And we haven’t even started on the aspect of human cognition that is completely logical, which just means there’s no dogs or kids or sensations of any kind, and nobody to tell you how wrong you are. You know this is the case, because you’ve conceived the notion of a universal mind as a completely valid and no one can tell you you’re wrong, that the conception is invalid, but only that the synthesis of the manifold of conceptions conjoined to the major, used by each, don’t relate in the same way, or do not relate at all, which only invalidates the one judgement relative to the other.

That third option…..for what it’s worth.

Hello Mww,

There’s a box on the shelf at the post office….
(a.k.a., a thing-in-itself)
Guy brings you the box….
(a.k.a, your perception of a thing)
….hands it to you….
(a.k.a., square, solid, heavy, your intuition of a thing)
You open the box….
(a.k.a., the content of your intuition, packaging material, something in a plastic bag, is a phenomenon)
Phenomenon gets passed on to the cognitive part for object determination.

I appreciate the analogy: thank you!

Here’s what I am trying to say in terms of that analogy: the idea that the box is a thing-in-itself which is, by definition, that which we cannot know and my intuition of the box (when I open) it is a phenomena which is a representation of that thing which we cannot know, then it seems self-undermining; for the box as thing-in-itself on the shelf is merely an abstraction (assuming I am not looking at, then it becomes a phenomena) based off of phenomenal boxes. If one were to posit there is something of which we cannot know, then I would reckon we can’t know anything about it—including that we are even representing anything in the first place (because our notion of representating things-in-themselves is just an abstraction of our phenomenal experience, which is supposed to give us no insight into the things-in-themselves). Perhaps you can clarify my confusion with that analogy?

You still don’t know what the content of the box is, only that the box has something in it, and you never would have had the opportunity to find out if it had stayed on the shelf at the post office. You could have lived your entire life without knowledge of the content of that box even while knowing full well post offices contain a manifold of all sorts of boxes; you can only know the contents of boxes handed to you. And, at this point, the last thing to cross your mind is how the box got to the post office in the first place, a.k.a., its ontological necessity

This sounds like maybe you don’t hold that we cannot know the things-in-themselves that appear to us, is that correct?

Analogies really suck, when it comes right down to it, there’s never a perfect one

I agree!

Phenomena are only one of three general classes of representation, the other two are conceptions and judgement, which is technically the representation of a representation.

My point is that you have to use your representation to argue that we have the other two classes, and if that class is supposed to give us zero knowledge of what actually is then that makes me wonder what grounds there are to say there are two other classes beyond that class (if we are using that class to determine the other two).

In other words, we start with just empirical inquiry (which can be as basic as introspection) and so we start with phenomena. We then reverse engineer that we those appearances that we are analyzing are produced by a representational system which has two other classes of representation and what not. We use phenomena to argue there is something beyond phenomena: but this isn’t compatible with the claim that phenomena give us zero insight to non-phenomenal things.

Sorting out the illusory has nothing to do with phenomena. Reason, the faculty that subjects judgement to principles to determine the logical relation of cognitions to each other, separates the illusory from the rational. Humans can confuse/delude themselves in their thinking, without the possibility of experience correcting them, hence phenomena are irrelevant.

I didn’t follow this part. Kant is very avidly arguing that phenomena give us no insight into the things-in-themselves, and I would say his argument for them (i.e. transcendental argumentation) is predicated on reverse engineering the phenomena—so, by my lights, illusions is just the working out by comparison different phenomenal experiences from each other to see how a particular thing (as a phenomean) expresses itself sans other factors (that can produce illusions).

That which assembles the parts of the representation of a perception in order, is intuition. That which assembles intuitions in order for successive perceptions of the same thing, is logic. In this way, it is not necessary to learn what thing is at each perception, but only understanding that either it’s already been learned, and subsequent perceptions conform to it, or they do not. Already been learned taken as a euphemism for experience.

In the tripartite human logical sub-system in syllogistic form of synthetic conjunction, understanding is the faculty of rules, by which phenomena provided a posteriori are taken as the major premise, conceptions provided a priori by understanding according to rules, serves as the minor premise or series of minors, the logical relation of one to the other is represented in a judgement, which serves as the conclusion.

Thank you for the elaboration, but I am still not completely following. My question was what is the logical part of the representation system and, if I may add now, what the representation system is—not in the sense of every piece or part that produces how it works but, rather, ontologically what it is. A thing-in-itself vs. a phenomena are ontological statuses, so to speak, (viz., one exists merely as an appearance and the other the represented existent things beyond space and time): what ontological status does the logical part of the representational system have it is not a thing-in-itself nor an appearance. I get it is a logical system, but ontologically what is it?

Oh man. And we haven’t even started on the aspect of human cognition that is completely logical, which just means there’s no dogs or kids or sensations of any kind, and nobody to tell you how wrong you are. You know this is the case, because you’ve conceived the notion of a universal mind as a completely valid and no one can tell you you’re wrong, that the conception is invalid, but only that the synthesis of the manifold of conceptions conjoined to the major, used by each, don’t relate in the same way, or do not relate at all, which only invalidates the one judgement relative to the other.

I didn’t quite follow this either: someone can prove me wrong about there being a universal mind. I don’t take it as absolutely true.

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

There are not any grounds to believe I am a BiV and compelling evidence that I am not

And this is why I would claim my thoughts are mine. We aren’t saying anything different, as far as I am understanding.

I take your evasive reply as you conceeding the point, Bob, that without public evidence one does not "know" one is not hallucinating

This is just false. If you have to have public evidence to know if you are hallucinating, then you, by your own argument, even under naturalism, can’t prove your thoughts are yours. Likewise, if it were just you left on the planet, you wouldn’t, by your lights, be able to prove ever that anything is not a hallucination.

Other than ideas (re: "idealism"), to what does this phrase refer?

Idealism refers, most broadly, to any metaphysical theory that posits mind as primary (to include less conventional views like Kantianism); and, more specifically, it usually refers to a substance monist view that there is one mental substance which contains mental properties and minds which are responsible for them. The phrase etymologically stems from the word “idea” and “ideal”, but that doesn’t mean it is refers to the metaphysical theory that everything, literally, is an idea.

Bob

Hello Janus,

What I really meant was that unless either of us can come up with some new and convincing arguments, neither of us seems likely to change their mind. So, I wasn't calling a halt to the conversation tout court.

Oh, I apologize: I must have misunderstood. If you would like, then I can resume our conversation by responding to your original post (that we left off on)? It is entirely up to you and what you are comfortable with.

I've enjoyed conversing with you, Bob, on account of your being able to engage without distorting what your interlocutor is saying, and to remain patient and civil throughout.

Thank you and same to you my friend!

Bob

Oh, I apologize: I must have misunderstood. If you would like, then I can resume our conversation by responding to your original post (that we left off on)? It is entirely up to you and what you are comfortable with. — Bob Ross

No need for any apology Bob.

Perhaps it would be better to start afresh and in a more concrete way. You seem to be saying that by virtue of feeling our basic existences which you would characterize as "being a mind" (?) we can confidently extrapolate to a view of the basic nature of the cosmos. Are there other steps that need to be added in there or is that it?

:roll: