Arguments against the latter "god" (absolute) are far less consequential culturally and existentially, it seems to me, than arguments against the former "God" (creator). — 180 Proof

Yes, I think this is probably accurate. I'd be interested how others see this.

I think they are mean you too have foundational beliefs that lack empirical proof, like causality and the existence of other minds. If causality isn't provable, it's equally as logically to assert teleological explanations are valid. — Hanover

In my experience (and I’ve debated many in person), they generally point to specific things like flight, crossing roads, or the efficacy of medicine. The more philosophically inclined ones - presuppositionalist Christians - are more likely to take the path you mentioned. Yes, we all hold presuppositions.

The claim “atheists live by faith too” trades on a confusion about what faith means. Atheists acknowledge basic assumptions but generally would treat these as provisional and open to revision, not sacred truths. Foundational beliefs like causality are not equivalent to teleological or theistic explanations, because they don’t posit an agent or a purpose we must subscribe to without evidence.

If you identify a difference use, you don't get to just declare your use correct and the alternative use incorrect. The OP asks what is faith, and it's clear it's used differently by different groups.

That is, you're as much guilty of the equivocation as they are if there is no agreed upon definition. — Hanover

Not really. I agree the word is used differently. I'm explaining why I make a distinction and advocating for my preference. This is a site devoted to hairsplitting definitions, so I don’t think this was remotely off track.

But let's look at the example again. Comparing faith in God with faith in plane flight, say, seems to conflate two very different things. When an evangelical says (as they often do; and I’ve heard this from Catholics too), “But you atheists live by faith all the time,” they’re committing an equivocation fallacy.

They’re comparing faith in air travel (something we can demonstrate exists, something based on empirical evidence, engineering, and training) with belief in a god, which is an idea we can’t even properly define. That seems like faulty reasoning to me.

When I board a plane, I’m not taking a leap of faith in the same sense that a theist might use the word. I know that airplanes are real physical objects, built through well-understood principles of aerodynamics. I know that pilots are trained extensively, undergo certification, and are subject to routine evaluation. I know that aircraft are maintained by engineers following strict protocols, that the air traffic control system is in place to coordinate safe routes, and that there are black boxes and regulatory investigations when things go wrong. All of this is grounded in observable, repeatable, testable processes.

So when I "trust" a plane to get me to my destination, it's not a blind or metaphysical faith—it's a reasonable confidence based on experience, statistics, and a mountain of evidence. That’s a far cry from faith in a deity, which lacks comparable foundations. Equating the two just muddies the waters.

I think these differences are worth pointing out since they are overlooked by some theists.

Perhaps I could substitute the word faith with confidence yet this would merely be linguistic. — kindred

Indeed, that’s generally what I recommend. If you have a good reason for believing something, you don’t need faith. Reasonable confidence in one’s skill and training based on evidence is not the same as faith. Some theists attempt an equivocation fallacy by equating faith in God with faith in things like air travel.

I recall the issue being a fairly serious concern back in the 1970’s. it had nothing to do with technology although back then TV was sometimes blamed. My dad remembers books being blamed back in the 1930’s.

I can’t see ready agreement on projects, goals or methods, but as a variation on the old peace corps idea it might attract some people if it is voluntary and word of mouth is positive.

I've witnessed this. Almost no ethical instruction at all. Ethical positions are simply delivered to the students as fact. I am at the point where I think that teaching kids to question ethical axioms will get them in trouble. — Jeremy Murray

Which I would have preferred when I was a student at school. I went to a very expensive elite school. It was Christian, and we had a daily chapel service. This school was modeled on Eton and followed old British pedagogical traditions. This was 45 years ago. We were given ethical instruction and read pointless New Testament stories, which had no impact on most students and were at best a source of mirth. The poor and minorities were generally held to be human trash. Everyone was acutely aware that the real goal of the school was to get one into a law or medical degree, to then make money and gain power. Many of my fellow students joined their millionaire—and sometimes billionaire—fathers in family businesses.

For the most part, despite an energetic display of Christianity and a lot of rhetoric about the centrality of morality, this school was merely churning out neoliberal toadies who, on leaving school, often treated people poorly. Which I also observed in the subsequent decades.

I do see a lot of 'moral cruelty' from the woke these days. — Jeremy Murray

There as a lot of moral cruelty in many positions including the Christianity of my early life which held to bigotry, racism and the position that we were better than others because we were part of a winning team (eg, the West and its values). We seem to be going through a period of adjustment and a period of backlash.

:up:

:up:

I went to a Billy Shorten campaign speech at a local town hall before the 2019 Federal Election. My partner then was helping the local Labor candidate to try and unseat the corrupt Liberal incumbent. Penny Wong worked the crowd up into a frenzy. "Ladies and gentleman, I give you next prime minister of Australia: Bill Shorten!" Bill trotted up on stage and turned to face the audience. His grey, anxious, face sucked the air and excitement from the room. There was a mass exhalation from the detumescent crowd. I knew instantly he wasn't going to win.

I might have mentioned I once handed out How to Vote for Greens in a state election. — Wayfarer

My partner helped support one of their campaigns. Disorganized, collectivist shenanigans.

That's the price of having good coffee. — Banno

Could be... I only drink it at home.

So I will be holding my nose and voting Labor (although I think mine is a safe Labor seat.) — Wayfarer

I did this throughout the 1980's as they gleefully thrust neo-liberalism upon us.

I think Albanese a mediocrity — Wayfarer

And boring too.

I have Greens Adam Bant and Ellen Sandall as my Federal and State reps.

March 3rd. — Banno

May 3.

I think it's going to be a very dull campaign. Anything you think we should watch for?

The moral relativist can have a moral framework
— Tom Storm

What is the difference between a framework and an objective measurement? — Fire Ologist

A framework is a structured way of describing an approach, while an objective measurement implies a standard that is independent of personal or cultural perspectives.

Looks like political art out of the old USSR.

:up: I think this could be an interesting thread.

Why does anyone have any opinion about what others do or don’t do to others and their babies?

Once you care about others, only objectivity can to mediate a mutual, communicative, interaction among them. And a moral objectivity is supposed to make the interaction a “good” one.

Like this post. There is something objective here, or you wouldn’t know I was disagreeing with you.

My question is, for all moral relativists, why do you bother?

If there is no moral objectivity whatsoever, how can you say pushing the button to prevent the baby from suffering is “actually doing some good”? If you were beyond good and evil, there is no difference no matter what you do or don’t do - no good or evil results in any case. — Fire Ologist

Is this conflating moral objectivity with the ability to have meaningful moral discourse?

The moral relativist can have a moral framework, let's say that suffering should be avoided or minimised, because their values (whether these are informed by empathy, cultural values, or personal commitments) leads them to value well-being. The fact that we can communicate and disagree doesn't demonstrate moral objectivity. It shows that we share enough cognitive and linguistic structures to engage in discussion. Moral judgments, like preferring to prevent suffering, can be deeply felt and socially reinforced without appealing to objective moral truths. The relativist can still say that pushing the button is "good" within their framework of values, even if those values are not grounded in an absolute, external moral reality. Or something like that.

Other than making them feel as if they have made a difference of historical significance what benefit do they get? Money? Seriously dumb notion that the richest man in the world is doing what he is doing, subjecting himself to such rhetorical abuse, donating time and a portion of his fortune so he can make more money. That really is just one of the dumbest things I've seen in this thread. He has more money than most human beings can even contemplate. He can literally do anything that can be done materially. He can literally buy any experience and any kind of lifestyle that can be bought and yet he chooses to participate in fixing the way this country runs. Now disagree with his communication style or his methods but please stop pontificating on his motives which you can't possibly know. — philosch

This is certainly worth stating. The assumption that cupidity is the sole motivator seems banal. Such a conclusion involves a degree of mind reading or, at the very least, constructing a narrative from selective inferences. There is always the possibility that those whose approach and values we detest are acting sincerely, believing they are doing what is best. Someone like Musk likely thrives on problem-solving and the pursuit of significance. Vainglory is surely a far greater driving force for such a personality than money. One might have deep concerns about a person so consumed by ideology and the desire for status. I suspect the key to understanding all this is in how the change is managed and what its impacts are and how much Musk cares.

Well you gave the answer by referencing to a different interpretation — QuirkyZen

God is an idea with many interpretations. The cartoonish, literalist account of God is the easiest to undermine. People focus on it most because Biblical literalists have the loudest voices (and dominate American culture), while atheists find the cartoon version of theism the easiest to refute.

i won't ask them because you are a atheist too so you pretty much don't believe in this too so their is no meaning in that. — QuirkyZen

You don’t have to believe in Brahman to be well-versed in Advaita Vedanta. But fair enough.

They claim god is all merciful and loving yet there is so much cruelty and hate — QuirkyZen

Well this is only true if you think of god as a magic sky wizard with a plan. The literalist account in Islam and Christianity, for instance. But if you consider god to be not a person at all but the source of all that is and that we can understand God not as a being among beings, but as Being itself—the foundation of existence rather than a contingent entity.

In the view of philosopher and theologian David Bentley Hart, God is the infinite wellspring of goodness, beauty, and truth, not a cosmic manager intervening in history. From this perspective, suffering and evil do not contradict God’s nature but arise from the misuse of freedom within creation, which remains ultimately grounded in divine love. At least that's a more intelligent account of theism which has a long tradition. Literalism seems to be a product of the modern period. Personally I am an atheist.

We can barely have a reasonable discussions about the kind of consciousness we all live with every day. How much more difficult to discuss kinds of consciousness we have only heard about from the writings of a tiny percentage of people, who claim it cannot be described? — Patterner

That's a pithy and reasonable observation and I've often had similar reactions.

No worries. And I hope my response didn't seem crusty. All good. We're just fumbling our way through these things. :up:

What is the way we settle these matters? Well, that's part of these matters. — Banno

Nice.

I can get behind that but this is a subtle idea and flies against traditions, etc.

What is your response against the view that if we make morality together by doing, how do we evaluate this? Is not selecting a foundation, say virtue ethics or Nussbaum's capability framework, essentially a preference and we might instead chose negative values instead like Trumpism, say, which may seem to like virtue when seen from the perspective of others. What is the way we settle these matters. Is it just old fashioned consequences regarding harm and barriers to eudaimonia?

Devine command and evolutionary necessity do not cover all the options. This also makes the mistake of thinking that morals are found, not made - discovered, not intended. — Banno

Yes, I think this may well be the critical matter - "made" by our actions.

:up: Fair enough.

I think about suicide every day and have done so for 37 years. The main reason I haven't killed myself is that it would cause suffering to my family and extended family. I would love to be happy. I would love to be cured of my CPTSD, Bipolar Disorder and Chronic Nerve Pain. — Truth Seeker

Sounds like you have a lot of challenges to manage. Your question has much more impact hearing this. For what it's worth, I wish you well. You've been resilient and strong in the face of significant difficulties. :pray:

Again, Truth Seeker asked a question, and I answered. In all honesty, having an impact upon you hadn't entered my mind. — Patterner

That goes for most answers here when others chime in. The argument from "the remarkableness of life" isn't always effective and no one else had made that point.

I don't understand what it means to imagine that one does not exist or wish that one was not born. — Paine

I don't understand when people don't understand this. :wink:

Being a consciousness of human intelligence (more or less) is the most extraordinary thing in the universe. In 13,500,000,000 years, in the universe of indescribable size, there have been an estimated 108,000,000,000 of us, and possibly nothing similar anywhere else. Being able to think and feel as we do is a rare thing, and a joyous thing. — Patterner

Who cares? A series of zeros has no impact upon me.

I hold a largely positive view about the world - for the prosperous Westerner (which I am) life is good and mine has been mostly without difficulties and yet if I were faced with the improbable thought experiment - the choice of never having been born or living this life, I'm not convinced I would pick life.

Agree.

I’ll give a short reason or two that summarizes the failure of emotivism. Emotivism can’t explain how moral language functions in arguments or conditionals (e.g., “If stealing is wrong, then murder is wrong.”), as emotional content lacks propositional coherence, which undermines it as an account of ethical reasoning.

In other words, as already mentioned, expressions of emotions aren’t truth-bearing. — Sam26

Indeed. As I understand it the emotivist doesn't believe in oughts or ought nots since they are just expressions of your preferences which are emotionally driven. When you say murder is wrong you are saying 'boo murder'.

In other words emotivism is not a normative ethical system that prescribes how one ought to act. It's is a theory about the nature of moral language and moral judgments. It seeks to explain where moral claims come from (namely, our emotions) instead of establish moral rules or duties.

Is it correct? I'm not sure. I'm mulling it over.

Allen murdered Shelley's son. Murder is wrong because of the way the community reacts to it, and that reaction is emotional. — frank

The emotivism wouldn’t say murder is wrong because of the community’s emotional reaction as if that were a causal explanation. Instead, they’d say calling murder "wrong" is an expression of the community’s emotional reaction.

As I understand it, the emotivist maintains that moral judgments aren’t factual statements about the world; they’re expressions of approval or disapproval. So when people say "murder is wrong," they’re not stating an objective fact but expressing their collective condemnation, foudned in emotions like grief, outrage, and fear. The status of murder on this view, is not an inherent property of the act but a reflection of how people feel about the act. And this is contingent upon culture language and experince. WHich is why peopel tend to share emotional reactions (for the most part).

Isn't it entirely possible for that some act be emotional disgusting or repugnant, and yet you ought do it? Ever changed a nappy? Isn't it a commonplace that you often ought do things in defiance of how you feel? What is courage? And see ↪javra's examples. The very same actions can be commendable or culpable. — Banno

Good point. I guess the response here might be that an emotivist might acknowledge that we may sometimes be compelled to act contrary to our immediate emotions, but would deny that there is an objective "ought" beyond how we feel about it.

Yes, changing a nappy might be disgusting, but if you care about the child, that feeling of care outweighs the disgust. The "ought" in that case is just another emotional response. One that wins out over revulsion.

By looking to what we might do, we bypass the opacity of thinking and feeling, refocusing instead on our acts of volition, and how we might change things. Fundamentally, ethics and aesthetics are about what we might do. — Banno

It's what you do, not what you feel or think, that counts, isn't it? — Banno

I'm not a philosopher, so here is my obtuse response:

Can't it be said that it is emotions and attitudes that ultimately drive our doing? What we do is a reflection of what we feel and value, and moral language itself is an expression of approval or disapproval rather than a statement of fact.

Yes, and it was a revelation to me when I finally saw the film and realised what the Network had left out.

Like you I love Altman's The Long Goodbye. MASH never did it for me but I appreciate its influence.

Suicide is painless
It brings on many changes
And I can take or leave it if I please

Original lyrics to the MASH theme (removed by network TV)

A lot of people have periods where they wish they never existed. And some hold the view that, although they are not particularly unhappy, the burden of living isn't all that fabulous, so never having been born at all might have been preferable.

But, having never existed seems to me the best version of reality. — AmadeusD

Yes - just as I was writing the above.

One could imagine a person not responding emotionally and yet able to recognize that a particular action is immoral. Why? Because most people recognize that certain actions are objectively immoral. The example that illustrates this point is the following: Imagine a person — Sam26

I guess that’s where we differ. I don’t believe any preference we have or decision we make is independent of our affective state. Reasoning is post hoc and the reasoning we find compelling or "satisfying" is shaped by how we feel about it. Emotion doesn’t always manifest as tears or laughter; rather, it forms the underlying foundation of our identity and preferences.

Note, I am not an emotivist, I might become one on further investigation but for now I think it is an interesting way of looking at morality. I do think emotion is critical to who we are.

Because most people recognize that certain actions are objectively immoral. The example that illustrates this point is the following: Imagine a person cutting off the arm of another without good reason. The harm done to the person is objective, viz., the blood loss, the arm on the ground, the screams, and the reactions of family and friends. — Sam26

An emotivist would likely respond that even though the physical harm of cutting off the arm is indisputable, the leap to labeling the act as "objectively immoral" still rests on subjective emotional responses rather than inherent moral facts. Your description of screams and reactions illustrates the observable consequences of the act, but it is our emotional reaction to these consequences—our feelings of horror and disapproval—that ultimately drives our moral judgment. In other words, while the physical harm is objective, the construction of this act as immoral is not derived from the harm itself but from the shared emotional attitudes that society cultivates in response to such violence. And humans (within time and place), seem to share fears, horrors, anxieties.

I disintinguish betweem emotions and moods. Anxiety and depression sometimes have emotions - some specific thing that I am anxious or depressed about. — Ludwig V

I don't currently make those sorts of distinctions. Mood is affect. Anxiety is affect. Enjoying music is affect.

As Wittgenstine said "The world of the happy man is quite different from the world of a sad man". — Ludwig V

Sure. But we can also say that the world of the happy man A is quite different from the happy man B.

So, for me, emotional reactions are the emotions. (You seem to be positing that the emotion is something orther than the reactions). — Ludwig V

Yes, I am suggesting that emotion shapes our identify and may be the foundational platform over which our identity (choices, decisions, preferences) is constructed.

That's an elegant summary.

Ok, but then my point still stands. One can't derive any consequent from "boo stealing!". At the very least a moral statement worthy of the name needs to apply to more than just oneself. — Banno

I agree with this.

A pathway to developing moral systems via emotivism would probably involve arguments about cooperation: a code of conduct that provides safety and predictability, because most humans feel more comfortable that way. Or something like this.

Emotions are not simply "expressions" like "ouch!" or "boo". They include a cognitive element, which is identified when we say "I am angry because..." or "I am afraid of..." "boo stealing" includes the belief that the addressee has taken possession of something that does not belong to them. — Ludwig V

Maybe, but I’m not sure. For me, emotional reactions are likely to be preconcpetual, prelinguistic experiences to which we apply post-hoc rationalizations. "I am angry because..." what follows is the post-hoc part. I've often held that human preferences are primarily directed by affective states, with rational deliberation serving as a post-hoc justification rather than the initial determinant of choice.

I don't like emotions or descriptions as an understanding of moral rules. Yet they include - are related to both. So a compatibilist answer is required. Perhaps something ike this. Moral rules encode our expectations and requirements of people's behaviour. There are facts of the matter whether certain rules do encode our expectations and requirements. But we do not respond to people following or violating those rules in the same way as we respond to "plain" - morally neutral - facts of the matter. — Ludwig V

You can be an emotivist and a compatibilist. I'm not sure what your points mean in relation to emotivism. Can you clarify this?