'which logic? (and for what?)' — Zophie

Let's take a logic that has as its basis: The Law of Contradiction, The Law of the Excluded Middle, The Law of Identity, and principles of inference such as Modus Ponens, De Morgan's Law, etc. And also one that believes that some statements can always be validly proven by using those laws and principles.

For example: aristotelian logic, mathematical logic, etc. Not a paraconsistent logic.

Don't you think the arguments of sceptics give important objections to those systems, even if their arguments were invalid?

All of this is trivially true. — Zophie

Do you think it is trivially true that logic should seemingly allow anyone (not just the sceptic) to validly conclude something that contradicts logic itself, and that in case the argument that proved that which contradicts logic were invalid, it was also such that we have difficulties pointing out where its error is? Well, I don't agree with that. If you do, then there is nothing else I can reply to you.

It rearranges what is already known. It's a method of translation, not of truth in the traditional sense. — Zophie

I should clarify that the argument in the OP is not one for the conclusion that “proof does not exist”, but rather for the claim that it is not necessarily inconsistent to deny the proposition “proof does not exist, implies that proof exists”, if indeed “proof does not exist” were true.

Speaking of translation, I don't know what Hume is talking about. — Zophie

Really now... I thought he was quite clear.

What about this passage of Sextus Empiricus?:

(...) just as it is not impossible for the man who has ascended to a high place by a ladder to overturn the ladder with his foot after his ascent, so also it is not unlikely that the Sceptic after he has arrived at the demonstration of his thesis by means of the argument proving the non-existence of proof, as it were by a step-ladder, should then abolish this very argument.

Chomsky was a prolific user of media in saying that media deliberately falsifies explanations as propaganda, making himself a propagandist — ernest meyer

You are generalizing a bit too much. Chomsky says many people in the media falsify explanations, not that everybody does. Some people do not only care about propaganda.

But anyway, we're already getting off topic.

I notice your explanation of there being proof prequires provability, which, like all deduction, involves a signal conversion to new rules that isn't licenced by the prior system. It is just given. — Zophie

Hmmm, not entirely sure what you are saying here.

Are you saying that the argument/ proof proving that there is no proof assumes that proof is reliable, and therefore refutes itself?

If so, what would be your response to the passage by Hume I quoted in the OP?

Cool but.. can't you prove anything from a negation? — Zophie

I suppose you are talking about the Principle of Explosion (Ex Falso Quodlibet). Indeed, if the statement “there is no proof” were false, then you could prove anything from it. But that's only if it is false (that has to be proven first). The problem is that some try to argue that it is false by saying that if it were true, then it would be false, which contradicts what seemingly valid logical reasoning tells us.

If these philosophers believe the truth is a real thing, aren't they trying to refute a tautology? Why bother? — Zophie

Which philosophers are you refering to here, the sceptics or the non-sceptics? Also, which tautology are you refering to?

3. There are no justified beliefs, you destroy your own counterargument which is a justification, no? — TheMadFool

Kolakowski sums up the situation nicely:

We can never escape the infernal circle of epistemology: whatever we say, even negatively, about knowledge implies a knowledge we boast of having discovered; the saying “I know that I know nothing”, taken literally, is self-contradictory

Given a vaild argument form and true premises (a sound argument), the conclusion has to be true. This is logic 101, right? — TheMadFool

Yes

The only reason, given a valid argument, for that argument to fail is if the premises are false. — TheMadFool

Yes

Agrippa's justification/argument
1. Agrippa's trilemma [premise]
2. If Agrippa's trilemma then there are no justified beliefs [premise]
Ergo,
3. There are no justified beliefs [conclusion, modus ponens 1, 2] This is Agrippa's conclusion — TheMadFool

Yes

Your counterargument:
3. There are no justified beliefs [Agrippa's conclusion]
4. If there are no justified beliefs then there are no justified beliefs is not justified
Ergo,
5. There are no justified beliefs is not justified [your conclusion, 3, 4 modus ponens — TheMadFool

Yes

Notice that 3. there are no justified beliefs is a premise in your argument i.e. 3. There are no justified beliefs has to be true — TheMadFool

Yes.

In the end by having to assume 3. There are no justified beliefs, you destroy your own counterargument which is a justification, no? — TheMadFool

Ah ok, so you are saying if I assume Agrippa's conclusion, then I can't even conclude that “There are no justified beliefs is not justified”, because in order to do so, I would have to justify it and then the conclusion would be justified, which contradicts 3, right? In that case though, you would be unable to justify the claim that my counter-argument destroys itself, since you are also using an argument which pretends to be a justification of the conclusion that my counter-argument destroys itself, which can't be the case if Agrippa's conclusion is right, correct?

Let's assume the opposite were true, that is: “There are no justified beliefs” is justified: Then it's a self-contradictory statement, since it itself is justified, and therefore its truth implies its falsehood, therefore via Reductio ad Absurdum we conclude that it can't be justified. The only option that we have left is to say that it is not justified.

But I suppose you will reply that even to say this is to give a justification for the claim that it can't be justified, which can't be the case if “There are no justified beliefs” is justified (and therefore true). But then Agrippa himself would have to admit that he is also not justified in thinking that my conclusion: “There are no justified beliefs can't be justified” is wrong.

...And so on, this kind of self-reference paradox will go on forever, and so my advice would be to suspend judgement.

And then I ask you: Is the Trilemma justified or not? My answer would be to say: I don't know (though even this may not be justified).

Perhaps somebody else can help us with this matter:

It was known to the ancient sceptics and it has been known ever since that any epistemology, that is, any attempt to build universal criteria of validity for knowledge, leads either to an infinite regression or to a vicious circle or to an invincible self-reference paradox (invincible, that is, unless it is spuriously solved by being converted into an infinite regression). The most vexing side of this old insight consists in that once it is stated it falls prey to its own veredict, which means that a sceptic is inconsistent by the very fact of preaching the sceptical doctrine. — Leszek Kolakowski

The solution is to accept the foundational argument: an assumption that is accepted as true without proof. — Cidat

That does seem like a plausible option, the Law of Contradiction for example can't be justified, but that is because it does not need any justification, Aristotle would argue.

The problem is that we then have to rely on criteria like selfevidence, and some beliefs which appear self-evident to one man may not appear that way to another. Some mystics may say, for example, that God's existence does not need to be justified because it's as obvious as the Law of Contradiction. For some, this is good evidence for the claim that foundationalism shouldn't be accepted.

There is of course an argument against such mystics: They may be deceiving themselves, and in fact are wrong in thinking that God's existence is that obvious or that they really experienced God and not something else.

But there is no way to tell if they are in fact deceiving themselves and/or others, or are actually telling the truth.

However, notice something interesting here: Agrippa failing to justify A doesn't contradict A — TheMadFool

I agree, that's one of the points I was making, but although it doesn't contradict A, it also doesn't confirm A, since there is another possible explanation that could account for the fact that Agrippa failed to justify A: That A is false.

i.e. instead of Agrippa's inability to justify A working against him, it actually is an instance of Agrippa's claim that A = there are no justified beliefs. What this means is that A isn't justified can't be used against A for it isn't a counterexample; to the contrary, it's a confirmatory example of A. — TheMadFool

Like I said, it was not my intention to prove that A is false. However, you say Agrippa's inability to justify his conclusion is an instance of A. But that's only if A is true.

How can we tell if A is true or not? By your own admission, if A were true, it could never be justified. But then, how can we distinguish the scenario where A is true, but not justifiable, and the one where A is not justifiable because it's false? The way we usually have to distinguish true beliefs from false beliefs, when they have to do with abstract reasoning, is to see whether they are justified or not, (except in cases like those of the so called 3 Laws of Thought) but that won't help us here. Since we have no way to tell, I say we should suspend judgement as to the truth of A. I think Agrippa himself would agree with my suggestion.

On the other hand, if A is true, and also not justified by the Trilemma, then that seems to mean that either:

1. A doesn't follow from the Trilemma

Or

2. At least one of the premises is false

Or

3. Both 1 and 2 are true.

Otherwise, A would be justified by the Trilemma. Which of those 3 options is the right one then?

If it's none of them we are in trouble: since according to logic A would be both true and justified, which contradicts A itself. And yet according to logic, A must be justified if 1 and 2 were false.

So if we are to avoid such a self-destruction of logic and reasoning, we must say that one of those 3 options is true, it would seem.

The puzzling part, however, is that the premises seem to be true, and the conclusion seems to follow from the premises, and if that's true A must be both justified and true according to logic, which contradicts A itself. In that case,sound logical reasoning would imply the truth of a claim that contradicts sound logical reasoning.

On the other hand, it could be said that sound logical reasoning could only imply anything at all if it were completely trustworthy, in which case nothing could contradict sound logical reasoning.

I see only 2 ways out of this problems: Suspend judgement or hold that either 1, 2 or 3 are the case.

What this means is that A isn't justified can't be used against A for it isn't a counterexample; to the contrary, it's a confirmatory example of A. — TheMadFool

It could be a confirmatory example, but only if A is true, otherwise it is a confirmatory example of A's falsehood. And like I said, we have no way to tell if A is true or not.

Let's make it quite concrete:

I don't mean to be rude or anything like that but I'd like to refer you to the reasons why your argument "...does show that Agrippa's argument doesn't prove that its conclusion is true". These reasons are Agrippa's trilemma. — TheMadFool

Agrippa's Trilemma= the premises of Agrippa's argument (but not the conclusion), right? If so, then no: my reasons are not Agrippa's Trilemma.

I start by assuming that the conclusion is true, not that the premises are true.

Then I say: If the conclusion (No belief can be justified) is true, then the belief in that conclusion cannot be justified by any premise or set of premises.

This means we have 2 options if the conclusion were true:

a) The conclusion (no belief can be justified) does not follow from the premises(premises=Agrippa's Trilemma).

Or:

b) At least one of the premises is false.

This is because if the conclusion of the argument:

Therefore,
There are no justified beliefs. — Stanford Philosophy Encyclopedia

Followed from the premises (and also assuming that they were all true):

1. If a belief is justified, then it is either a basic justified belief or an inferentially justified belief.
2. There are no basic justified beliefs.
Therefore,
1. If a belief is justified, then it is justified in virtue of belonging to an inferential chain.
2. All inferential chains are such that either (a) they contain an infinite number of beliefs; or (b) they contain circles; or (c) they contain beliefs that are not justified.
3. No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to an infinite inferential chain.
4. No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to a circular inferential chain.
5. No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to an inferential chain that contains unjustified beliefs. — Stanford Philosophy Encyclopedia

... Then it would be justified by those premises. But that is impossible if the conclusion is true, since it would contradict the proposition which states that “no beliefs can be justified” (the conclusion of the argument), since it also asserts that belief in itself can't be justified either.

And the same holds true for any other premises besides Agrippa's Trilemma that would try to justify the belief in the conclusion that “No beliefs can be justified”.

If the conclusion were true, and neither a) nor b) were true, then we could only conclude that the conclusion can't be true, for if it were true, then that would imply a logical contradiction. Unless we are to be also sceptical about the truth of the Law of Contradiction.

This is the logical consequence that results if “No beliefs can be justified” were true. In either case, the conclusion of the Trilemma can't be justified/proven.

That does not mean, however, that the conclusion of the argument is false, only that if it is true, it can't be proven true by any argument, since if the conclusion could be proven, then it would contradict what is logically deduced from its truth, and thus the proposition “no belief can be justified” would contradict itself if it could be justified/proved by any premises, such as the horns of the Trilemma.

Hopefully that clears up the misunderstandings.

Let's see: I say that it doesn't prove that its conclusion is true, not that it (the conclusion) isn't true. It may be true, but if it were true then, by it's own implications, the premises (the horns of the Trilemma) would not prove its conclusion (otherwise it would contradict itself).

I'm saying that if the conclusion were true (which is possible), then the premises wouldn't prove it (since in that case it would be justified by them, which would be impossible if the conclusion “There are no justified beliefs” were true).

Basically, you're using Agrippa's trilemma against Agrippa. Doesn't that prove Agrippa's point? — TheMadFool

I'm not using it “against itself”, I'm pointing out the logical implications that would result if the conclusion of Agrippa's argument were true. You can see it as a sort of Reductio Ad Absurdum, but one that instead of proving the conclusion false, proves that if it were true, then the premises wouldn't justify the conclusion (for that is what the conclusion implies).

Basically, if the conclusion were true, then the premises wouldn't give us a good reason to accept the conclusion, even if the conclusion were true.

Do you disagree with this?:

So we have 2 possible scenarios, either:

1.“There are no justified beliefs” is false, and that is why it can't be justified.

2. “There are no justified beliefs” is true, but unjustifiable, in the same way Aristotle thought the Law of Contradiction is unjustifiable, or in the same way as Gödel's “true but unprovable” statement.

So my intention with the counter-argument was not to refute Agrippa, but rather to reach a state of equipollence, where we should suspend judgement as to whether scenario 1 is the case or scenario 2 is the case, we have no way to tell which of them is true since they look identical.

I think our disagreement is purely verbal though. — Amalac

The situation is analogous to the statement, "this sentance has three erors" — TheMadFool

The statement is meaningless, because “sentance” and “erors” don't mean anything.

After correcting the words it's no longer the same statement.

Agrippa is right because Agrippa is wrong; Agrippa is wrong because Agrippa is right. :chin: — TheMadFool

If Agrippa is right, then no belief can be justified (including belief in Agrippa's conclusion). That doesn't mean that Agrippa is wrong (as in: Agrippa's conclusion is false), it means that Agrippa's conclusion can't be justified, even if it were true. That means it can't be justified by any premises, not even by the horns of the Trilemma that are the premises in Agrippa's argument.

If it were true, and also could be justified, then it would contradict itself. If that were true, then that would imply a logical contradiction. Therefore, using Proof by Contradiction, we conclude that if Agrippa's conclusion were true, then it would not be justified.



If Agrippa is wrong (meaning Agrippa's conclusion is false) then his conclusion can't be justified (since if it were justified, then it would be true, although the opposite is not true, that is: it's not the case that if it were true then it must be justified. An argument's conclusion may be true despite it being impossible to justify it with any premises.)

This video makes matters quite clear:

Carneades.org has an interesting video on the subject: https://youtu.be/_Kzhae8sFfY — Amalac

In case you are wondering, I agree with the video's conclusion.

I think Bertrand Russell provided a good solution for any problem caused by this concept in his famous essay, "On Denoting " — Wittgenstein

Yes, it's a good objection. It is similar to Kant's in that it questions whether existence is a predicate or not. My favorite illustration of the argument is Martin Gardner's:

Suppose I express my idea of ​​a blue apple by painting a picture of five blue apples. I point my finger at it and say, "This represents five blue apples." If later I discover that blue apples really exist, I can still point to the same picture and say, "This represents five real blue apples." And if I can't discover the existence of the blue apples, I can point to the painting and say, "This represents five imaginary blue apples." In all three cases the picture is the same. The concept of five real apples does not contain one more apple than the concept of five possible apples. The idea of ​​a unicorn will not get more horns just because unicorns exist in reality. In Kant's terminology, one does not add any new properties to a concept by expressing the belief that the concept corresponds to a real object external to one's mind. — Martin Gardner

Put differently, the counterargument offered by Amalac fails for the reason that it assumes 3. There are no justified beliefs, but when that's done, it self-destructs. — TheMadFool

But it doesn't self-destruct, it proves that “There are no justified beliefs” would not be justified if it were true. (As you yourself seem to understand) which is true. That does not contradict Agrippa's argument, but does show that Agrippa's argument doesn't prove that its conclusion is true. (As you yourself point out when you say it casts doubt on it). That is why in my first post on this thread I said that it was the simplest way to start arguing against it, since it's the most commonly used argument against the Trilemma, but in fact I don't intend to refute the Trilemma.

Furthermore, if the conclusion of Agrippa's argument were true, then the premises would not be good justification for believing the conclusion, and so it would seem that as an argument it would only be good enough to show that it's conclusion might be true. But the same could be achieved if Agrippa had only stated the conclusion and we had considered the implications of it being true. There is then no need for the premises, except to show that a seemingly sound use of logic can lead to strange results.

So we have 2 possible scenarios, either:

1.“There are no justified beliefs” is false, and that is why it can't be justified.

2. “There are no justified beliefs” is true, but unjustifiable, in the same way Aristotle thought the Law of Contradiction is unjustifiable, or in the same way as Gödel's “true but unprovable” statement.

So my intention with the counter-argument was not to refute Agrippa, but rather to reach a state of equipollence, where we should suspend judgement as to whether scenario 1 is the case or scenario 2 is the case, we have no way to tell which of them is true since they look identical.

I think our disagreement is purely verbal though.

Do you have any good reason to believe that things are as they seem to be? — Aoife Jones

No, but I also don't have any good reason to believe that things are not as they seem to be.

And as to the question in the title: It matters if you care about the practical consequences of believing something for which you have no good reason for believing.

How do I know that I know? — Cidat

Let's say I know with 100% certainty that I exist. — Cidat

It's a hypotetical scenario where you know that with certainty (I thought you took this for granted in your second quoted statement here). That means your belief in that must be true, and also be perfectly justified. The second statement of yours I quoted here implies that you know that you know, and know that you know that you know and so on with complete certainty. (since otherwise you would not know that you exist with 100% certainty).

But the question is: How do you know that? Once you ask that to yourself and answer it to yourself, when someone asks you the same, you'd just have to give the same answer.

But before that you should ask: Is my answer going to be such that others will also know that with certainty, or is it such that it can only can be known with 100% certainty by me?

And if your answer is: “It's just obvious”, then ask yourself: Is it only obvious to me, or is it also obvious to the solipsist?

In that hypotetical scenario, since you do know that, you must have a reason to know that, right? That reason is either accesible only to you, or to others. If it is accesible only to you, then you have no way of proving to others that you know that.

If it is a reason accesible to others, it must be one that refutes the solipsist who claims that you don't exist outside their imagination. But since it seems that solipsism is logically irrefutable, it would appear that you won't be able to prove that to others, even though you succeed in proving it to yourself (which is implied by the fact that otherwise you would not know with 100% certainty that you exist).

So to begin with: How do you know with 100% certainty that you exist?

What argument (if any) could logically refute the solipsist?

But why is "Albert not the same as Albert" an unjustified wrong statement? — god must be atheist

Because it violates the Law of Contradiction, unless the word “Albert” at the beggining of the sentence doesn't mean the same as at the end of the sentence. So unless you are a LNC sceptic you must admit that it is false and unjustified, it would seem.

The proof of proving all proofs wrong proves itself wrong... therefore all proofs are not wrong... including the proof in the trialemma; then it means the trilemma is not wrong... which means it renders itself wrong if it's right, and it renders itself right if it's wrong. — god must be atheist

It's not “the proof of proving all proofs wrong” but rather “the proof that no claim can be proved”. It may be true despite being itself unproved. And if it were true, then It would be impossible to prove it.

It would be something like Gödel's statement.

and if so, U = A is not justified, is itself not justified. This counter-argument refutes itself too. — TheMadFool

(Edit: It seems I misunderstood what you meant, I thought you meant the counter-argument to the counter-argument refutes itself too. Still, the conclusion of the counter-argument is “ If A, then A is not justified”, which is true. So I think what I say here is still relevant).

It doesn't quite refute itself, that just means that if it were true, it could not be justified/proved. It may be one of those “true but unprovable” statements.

Just as the Law of Contradiction is not justified, and cannot (according to philosophers like Aristotle) be justified, since all justifications assume its truth. (Unless we say it is justified by it's selfevidence, in which case we can either say: that that belief (“The Law of Contradiction is selfevident”) is what justifies the Law, which Aristotle won't accept, or we can say that it justifies itself/ doesn't need justification, which can be seen as either foundationalism or coherentism).

The distinction here is that between truth and justification: As Plato understood it, knowledge is justified true belief. It is not enough to believe something that happens to be true by mere chance, rather one must have a justification (reason) or proof to believe it.

For example: Suppose a child has been taught bad arithmetic, and that after being taught addition, he is also taught that A+A=A•A. When asked what's 2•2, he answers correctly: 4.

But when asked to give a justification for his belief, he answers: Well, 4+4=8=4•4, 3+3=6=3•3, Therefore 2+2=4=2•2.

It is clear that he has no justification to believe that 2•2=4, although by pure chance he answered correctly.

Carneades.org has an interesting video on the subject: https://youtu.be/_Kzhae8sFfY

what is the alleged justification for the premiss that there are no justified basic beliefs? — aletheist

On the other hand, it seems that the justification would be to say that if a belief were justified, then it would not be a basic belief (since basic beliefs are supposed to be unprovable, like the Law of Contradiction for example, and therefore can't have a belief that would justify/prove them), and that the belief that justifies it would in that case be the basic belief, unless it were also justified by another one, in which case that one would be the basic belief that justifies the other 2 beliefs, and so on.

But if we said that that justifies the premiss, it would again contradict the conclusion.

In particular, what is the alleged justification for the premiss that there are no justified basic beliefs? — aletheist

Right, if one says that belief in the conclusion advocated by the Trilemma (“Therefore, no beliefs can be justified”) is justified by the fact that logic leads to the conclusion that no belief can be justified, then that would contradict the conclusion reached, since there would be at least one belief that can be justified, namely: The belief that no beliefs can be justified.

If it's not justified, that means the Trilemma doesn't (by itself) give us a good reason to accept the conclusion, even if it were true.

The simplest way to start arguing against it is to ask whether or not what the Trilemma says is itself justified.

It's just a coincidence we have the same philosophy — Huh

Suuure, just a coincidence

I guess Nietzsches book was so good that it made him doubt himself?
I wouldn't know since I've never read a book on philosophy in my entire life. — Huh

So you haven't even read Nietzsche then?

You should read about ethics, I would suggest you start with the works of Bertrand Russell and David Hume on that subject, since they are quite clear.

Why do you believe what Nietzsche says instead of building your own philosophy then?

I think Nietzsche himself wouldn't like to see that he has dogmatic followers if he rose from his grave, but rather would like to see people who think with their own head.

Nietzsche insists that there are no rules for human life, no absolute values, no certainties on which to rely. If truth can be achieved at all, it can come only from an individual who purposefully disregards everything that is traditionally taken to be "important.

Is what Nietzsche says a rule for human life? Is it certain? Is it important? If not, why should I or anybody else believe him?

And it seems that according to Nietzsche himself, I should disregard his very philosophy as well, and create a new philosophy, which could adopt some new ideas of good and evil, and which could be similar to those of other ethical doctrines in some respects and innovative in others.

So that in the end that does not do away with the ideas of good and evil:

His (Nietzsche's) book, Beyond Good and Evil , really aims at changing the reader's opinion as to what is good and what is evil — Bertrand Russell

Lottery paradox. It's rational to conclude that you won't win, therefore you shouldn't play. But somebody must win.

I honestly don't see what is paradoxical about that.

It is rational to conclude that it is very unlikely for my ticket to win, but it is not rational to conclude that it is certain that it won't win.

Something may happen despite being improbable. Probability is all we need in practice.

When I do something why does it have to be good or evil?
Can I just trust that if I'm a good person I'll be a good person
am a bad person I'm a bad person?

If you believe an action is good you should do it, if you believe it's bad you shouldn't. That is how a sane human being justifies his actions.

What a person thinks is good or bad could be mistaken or contemptible sometimes or often, but that is a different matter.

Let me ask you something: Why are you in this site if not because you believe (for practical purposes) that it is better (or good) to be here posting rather than not? If you don't worry about good and evil, why on earth are you here typing posts? How do you justify your actions?

You may adopt some doctrine like emotivism, where what is good or evil depends upon feelings like empathy and moral indignation, but then you are no longer amoral.

you can be amoral if your dead?

Well, that came out of nowhere. What is the point of such a question?

Obviously a corpse doesn't believe that anything is good or bad, what does that have to do with what I said?

Understanding others is what keeps me safe

If you are amoral you have no reason to think that it is better to be safe rather than not to be safe, so what is the basis of this claim of yours that I quoted here?

Clearly you implicitly believe that it is good to be safe, which contradicts your supposed amorality.

If you are amoral, you don't think empathy is good, so why would you choose to be empathetic? It would seem to be a random and baseless choice.

I suppose you could start by saying what you mean by “evil” first of all. How can someone be evil and empathetic at the same time? (Now I see you edited your post and mean amoral, which is a very different thing).

But regardless, you can fantasize all you want about being evil and not caring about good and bad, in reality if you seriously act according to that thought you will simply be put in prison, get hurt or killed by the police or other people, or be involved in other conflicts and situations which are far from peaceful.

And if you don't care about good and evil, how do you justify your own actions?

Too few words in your response I'm afraid:

Ruined by what? If what happens? Are you saying if I'm not evil my life could be ruined? If so, what is the basis for that claim?

If you don't give me clear answers I'll see that you are not worth talking to.

so you don't have to worry about losing things when people saying your evil if your actually evil.

What is that supposed to mean? Could you write more clearly? Which “things” are you referring to?

No it's not? Why would anybody think that?

Only those things fall victims to it, that attempt to prove something; science does not prove anything — god must be atheist

Yes, there we go. It's all clear now (and I thought we already reached an understanding during our first exchange).

If Science doesn't claim to know that it is more likely for the sun to rise tomorrow, then I have no complaints.

Thank you, Amalac. May I make just one tiny change in the second definition, to inlcude that pragmatic sense also involves a chain of reasoning? For instance, it is pragmatic to feed chicken, if you eat chicken, because feeding the chicken will achieve a culinary end which you consider valuable.

Or it is pragmatically sensible to go to school, learn how to read and write, learn psychology and chemistry and math, and physics, and learn how to manipulate chemicals, and learn the math that underlines theory of chemistry, and then become able to concoct chemicals so you can make Aspirin, which is useful in treating pain, which people buy for money, which someone else has invented, and used chemicals to produce paper from rags, and someone had learned how to make rags, etc etc. — god must be atheist

Sure, I don't disagree with that addition (so long as we know that there isn't a significant chance for that knowledge to be used for evil purposes). It's also hard for me to tell if you are being sarcastic for some reason.

True in an epistemological sense: Can be rationally justified by a chain of reasoning.

True in a pragmatic sense: Is useful for achieving certain ends we consider valuable.

Didn't we already make it clear that we don't disagree about this?

I don't know the definition of scientific instrumentalism or what you mean by "true in an epistemological sense" — god must be atheist

“True in an epistemological sense” as opposed to “true in a pragmatic sense”.

Sure, and that all sounds perfectly consistent with critical rationalism. — Pfhorrest

Good! Then we are in agreement. (How often does that happen in a philosophy forum?)

I don’t mean to derail your whole thread about the trilemma with this debate about critical rationalism, especially when I already have a separate thread about critical rationalism that also touches on its relationship to this trilemma: — Pfhorrest

Sounds interesting, I'll check it out later.