You see, there is epistemological sense, and epistemological sense. One answers the "why", and the other, the "how". — god must be atheist

Please forgive me if I do not understand what you mean by this: are you saying that truth in an epistemological sense answers both the “why” and the “how”?

Religion and spirituality attempts at the "how", but most (if not all) sacred religious texts, on which most of the religious humanity relies for answers to their questions, were not only not god-inspired, but also written by imbecilic philosophical dilettante, so they are full of holes. — god must be atheist

Not sure why you bring up religion all of a sudden, but I don't disagree.

Again: Science won't explain to you whether god created the world or not. This may, for you, take some significance away from science, but there is enough left in it still. Like explaining what lightning is, and helping to discard the belief that lightning is thrown by god at people who sin. — god must be atheist

Again: Not sure why you bring up God all of a sudden. And it seems you misunderstand something: I'm an atheist, so the fact that Science can't explain whether or not God created the world doesn't take away any significance from Science in my opinion.

Is that a rhetorical question? — counterpunch

Yes, that is why I followed with “Because(...)”

I do not doubt their piety - but rather suggest that they existed within a socio-economic and political context in which a massively powerful institutional body maintained, for a very long time, that science was dubious at best, and this established a direction of thought, and the philosophical endeavours of these great minds occur within the course of this narrative, to the exclusion of alternate narratives. — counterpunch

They were to some extent conditioned by the beliefs of their time in their investigations yes, but maybe they would have felt genuinely interested in the problem of induction, and thought it important even if those beliefs had been diferent. How do we know that this is not the case?

If you start from a position that science is (in some significant sense) true, things make a lot more sense. — counterpunch

I think Science is true in a pragmatic sense, is that significant enough for you?

For example, consider the fact that the discovery of penicillin has saved more lives than were lost in all the wars, ever! — counterpunch

Of course I don't deny that Science has produced great things. But one can hold that Science (at least the Science that we know can't be used for evil) is useful, without having to believe that it is true in an epistemological sense (think scientific instrumentalism).

Naturalism doesn’t really begin with foundational questions but with the observation of how objects behave. — Wayfarer

Ok, we observe that a rock falls to the ground if we let it go from a certain height, that is the fact we observe. Technically, we have not deduced that it falls due to gravity and not due to something else yet.

That it is due to gravity that it falls is a reasonable interpretation of that fact based on scientific evidence. By following the evidence, we conclude that it is reasonable to suppose that its falling was caused by gravity, or at least that it is very likely caused by that. So far so good.

But the problem arises when we ask: will other rocks or the same rock also fall like that in similar circumstances in the future? Do we have any rational justification for this claim, or at least for the view that it will probably happen?

it’s a self-defeating assumption, leaving only something within the broad scope of its negation as possible—but without affirming any one of the innumerable variants within that scope as the definite truth. — Pfhorrest

The assumption has to do with:

We can’t ever be certain that any particular combination beliefs is true — Pfhorrest

But see, though we would call someone who believed that the sun won't rise tomorrow or that he'd be able to fly in a couple of days by moving his arms really fast an insane person, there is nothing logically impossible about those things happening. They are conceivable.

Of course there is no reason to believe that the sun won't rise tomorrow, but it seems that there is also no reason to believe that it will rise (besides pragmatic reasons).

So if we look at it from the angle of pure logic, the choice between believing that the sun will rise tomorrow or that it won't resembles the choice between believing that a coin will land on heads after flipping it, or that it won't.

But the choice is illusory: since we are accustomed from early infancy to believe that it will rise, no one can get rid of this habit easily, and to attempt to do so would contradict basic human psychology.

First, science assumes the existence of nature, that is to say, of things that happen by themselves, irrespective of magic, gods and the like.

Then, science assumes that the human mind can understand or at least predict said nature. Model it successfully.

Finally, science assumes that this is a good thing to do. And I agree. — Olivier5

I see, would you say that those are the basic beliefs of Science and that it fits in the horn of foundationalism, or would you say that it is wholly outside of the trilemma?

Imagine Galileo, Hume, Russel, Kant and many others, with the blessing of the Church - had argued in course of the view that science is the means to decode the word of God made manifest in Creation; rather than follow in the view that science is a heresy. Could not Hume, Russel, Kant and many others have made a far more convincing argument that science is valid knowledge of reality/Creation, than they do of insisting I can't know - certainly, that if I drop a stone it will fall? And variations - many, thereupon! — counterpunch

Kant and Hume emphasized the importance of scientific knowledge in many of their writings, specially the extraordinary achievements of Isaac Newton. And the same can be said about Bertrand Russell and the Science of his time. He even wrote an introductory book on the Theory of Relativity.

Yet they didn't ignore the problem of induction, why? Because they thought the problems concerning the foundations of Science important. Kant even believed that he found a satisfactory solution to the problem (whether he actually solved the problem of induction or not is a controversial and difficult question).

Because to ignore problems that are inconvenient or annoying for one's beliefs was for them an act of intellectual treachery. And I try to follow them in this respect.

The Church declared science potentially heretical, and philosophy took heed, and has written around that edict; and what you put to me is the product of 400 years of philosophy that - knowingly or otherwise, follows in the course of that error. — counterpunch

I entirely concur with the claim that the Church did a great deal of harm with its absurd censorship of scientific works. But are you really going to say that the writings of Hume, Kant, Russell, etc. about induction are comparable to what the Church did, or that they contributed to that?

but you have constructed your epistemic obstacle beyond the bounds of reason — counterpunch

What do you mean by “beyond the bounds of reason”? Asking for the justification of the principle of induction seems within the bounds of reason. Hume, Russell, Kant and many others seemed to think so, and I do too.

I assume you mean “unreasonable”? Then, it would be unreasonable if I doubted those things in practice, but I do not. I only doubt them in the theory.

As for the possible practical consequences of such criticism:

The pursuit of truth, when it is whole-hearted, must ignore moral considerations; we cannot know in advance that the truth will turn out to be what is thought edifying in a given society. — Bertrand Russell

But I told you that I defend the use of Science in practice in many cases because of its technological applications that make it practically useful, even though it may not have a rational basis.

I think one should draw the distinction between the practical justification of Science, and its theoretical justification.

We have the knowledge and technology to overcome the existential crisis we face. Starting with limitless clean energy from magma, for massive base load clean electricity, we could produce hydrogen fuel, desalinate and irrigate, recycle - so we could not only survive, but prosper into the long term future - if we accepted that science is true. — counterpunch

Of course it would be ideal if what you describe were to happen, but is that a reason for thinking that it will happen? How could we even know that what you say is more likely to happen than not? Isn't that perhaps a bit too optimistic? Noam Chomsky pointed out that it is almost miraculous that humanity has not destroyed itself yet, but that would seem to imply that the end might be near:

The truly apocalyptic view of the world is that things do not repeat themselves. It isn’t absurd, e.g., to believe that the age of science and technology is the beginning of the end for humanity; that the idea of great progress is delusion, along with the idea that the truth will ultimately be known; that there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge and that mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. It is by no means obvious that this is not how things are. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

Why are you so desperate that science is not true? — counterpunch

I am not, I wish that a definitive solution to the problem of induction might be found so that philosophers can move on to other problems, but that hasn't happened yet it seems. And it may not ever be found, but that would not be my fault.

You might as well blame Hume for investigating the foundations of scientific knowledge, since apparently he was also desperate, according to you, to discredit science. But in fact he wasn't, he even wanted to deduce ethical propositions from the experimental method of Science. He failed, but that wasn't his fault.

The onus is on you to explain why, with the reasonable truth staring you in the face - you construct such an insane obstacle course? — counterpunch

Like I said, in practice I admit that I take it for granted that many scientific propositions are true, but not in the theory. In the theory, I would abstain from saying that I know that, simply.

No? We can be certain that a particular combinations of beliefs is false, if they lead to contradiction. — Pfhorrest

Ok, it seems I took your previous statement a bit too literally. I do agree that we have a right to say that some combinations of beliefs are contradictory. I thought you meant that we couldn't be certain about anything at all being true, in which case we couldn't even be certain about that.

We can’t ever be certain that any particular combination beliefs is true, but we can’t help but act on an assumption one way or the other, and only one of those assumptions can possibly hope to lead us to any greater knowledge, so that is the rational one to make. — Pfhorrest

For practical purposes, that is indeed the rational thing to do. But it seems that theoretically it is just as irrational as the opposite assumption, as I pointed out in my previous response to you.

science has ample evidence to support the view that there is a long term consistency to nature; such that allows for laws of physics, chemistry and biology, that have pertained for all of history and that, will continue to pertain, universally, into the indefinite future. — counterpunch

But the problem of induction also raises the following question: How do we know that the laws of physics, chemistry and biology won't change or cease to function in the future? Once again, we face the problem of how to justify that that is probably the case without begging the question.

If I pick up a stone and drop it, it will fall to the floor. I can claim to know this — counterpunch

Only if you assume the uniformity of nature.

But as I said, for practical purposes it is of course reasonable to say that one knows that, in light of the “language games” and “forms of life” of ordinary life. In that sense, I don't disagree.

The problems arise when it comes to the theory.

If that happened, it would perhaps prove that E=MC^2 when that happened, but it wouldn't prove that E≠MC^2 must be false in the future (not even in the next second after which that happened).

Not without assuming the uniformity of nature, it would seem.

The critical rationalist can’t ever hope to find certain knowledge about what is true, sure — Pfhorrest

And so, he can't find certain knowledge about:

but we can accumulate more and more knowledge about what is false. — Pfhorrest

That is, I think, what Kolakowski meant when he said:

he (Popper) should draw the conclusion that we never are (and never will be) able to exclude the possibility that our knowledge of the world is made up entirely of false statements. However if that is so, it makes no sense to talk about the development of science as a movement closer and closer to the truth. — Leszek Kolakowski

If all our knowledge about the world were made up entirely of false claims, then it would be wrong even to think that we are making progress or that we can know more about what is false (unless we assume that the future will resemble the past, which seems to imply that the principle of induction is the ultimate basis for Science, in which case it sounds a lot like foundationalism to me).

We can never finish accumulating all the knowledge of what is false, to pin down exactly one thing that is true, but that doesn’t change that at one point in time we thing more things are maybe-true than we do at a later point in time, and so have narrowed down on the possibilities. — Pfhorrest

But the problem is, for our everyday life activities and for science to be possible, we need to assume at least that it is certain that some beliefs are more probable than others, or that it is more probable that they are more probable, or that it is more probable that it is more probable that they are more probable, and so on.

If we don't assume that, then the choice between believing that the sun will rise tomorrow or that it won't, or that gravity will continue working tomorrow rather than not, would be like a choice between heads or tails when flipping a coin.

For example: even if we admit that we know that the claims that the sun will not rise tomorrow had always been false in the past, that gives no reason to expect that it will rise in the future, nor even that it is more likely that it will rise.

And it doesn't matter how many other instances of the sun rising we find, that would not help us make progress towards justifying that it is more probable that in the future it will rise. And we want to say: we know that it is more probable that the sun will rise tomorrow, or at least: we know that it is more probable that it is more probable that the sun will rise tomorrow, since we implicitly assume this during our ordinary life activities. But it seems neither of those claims have rational justification.

As Hume pointed out, It would seem that this is something we merely assume from custom and habit in order to continue our everyday activities normally, and which scientists assume tacitly when doing Science, since otherwise they couldn't do any.

But if that is so, then that once again sounds like foundationalism to me.

And the reason to take experience as the arbiter of truth is because the alternative leaves us with no ability to question the truth of any claims, and so removes even the above kind of progress. If things might be true or false in ways that make no difference to what seems true of false in our lived experience, then there are either questions about such things that cannot be answered, or else the answers to such cannot be questioned.

Either of those might in principle be the case, but if they were we could not know, just assume one way or the other; and to assume either unanswerable questions or unquestionable answers is simply to give up trying, so we must always assume to the contrary.

I don’t see the connection of any of this to the trilemma though. — Pfhorrest

And what you say here sounds again like foundationalism to me (maybe this is what I am getting wrong): all scientific knowledge seems to rest on that assumption you mention (the one you say we must always assume), we may even call it basic belief, which seems to be the ultimate foundation of scientific knowledge.

For I ask: Do you know that that assumption is more probably true than its negation? If not, then you must concede that your choice is, in some sense, irrational (though of course the man who assumes the opposite, if indeed such a man could exist, would be just as irrational).

But science in general can rest easily on the laurels of the technological miracles it surrounds us with — counterpunch

I also feel inclined sometimes to think that technological effectiveness should be the justification of Science.

But then I look at the regrettable situation of a possible nuclear war that might destroy the human species, and I feel unsure again.

Science escapes the trilemma because it rejects the justificationism that all of its horns rest upon in favor of critical rationalism. — Pfhorrest

I think critical rationalism is a very good practical philosophy for Science, however I am not quite convinced that it will escape the Trilemma. Let's take Karl Popper as its representative:

When Popper argues that in the development of science we can, on empirical grounds, eliminate certain hypotheses as contrary to experience, and that such an elimination never establishes the rival hypotheses as true, he should draw the conclusion that we never are (and never will be) able to exclude the possibility that our knowledge of the world is made up entirely of false statements. However if that is so, it makes no sense to talk about the development of science as a movement closer and closer to the truth. Still, this is precisely how Popper views science. I think he is wrong in this point. I believe that whoever consistently rejects the transcendentalist idea is bound to reject not only the "absolute truth" but the truth tout court, not only the certitude as something already gained but the certitude as a hope as well.
It is arguable that the controversy cannot be decided with appeal to premises which the antagonists-an empiricist and a transcendentalist would both agree to be valid. The empiricist will argue that transcendental arguments imply the existence of the realm of ideal meanings, and that we have no empirical grounds to believe in it. The transcendentalist will argue that this very argument, just advanced by the empiricist, implies the monopoly of experience as the highest tribunal of our thought, that this privileged position is precisely under question, and that it is arbitrary to establish such a monopoly. The transcendentalist compels the empiricist to renounce-for the sake of consistency-the concept of truth; the empiricist compels the transcendentalist to confess that in order to save the belief in Reason, he is in duty bound to admit a kingdom of beings (or quasibeings) he cannot justify. This was Husserl's great merit: to lead this discussion to the extreme point. — Leszek Kolakowski

They may say that, but they offer no PROOF, please get that into your head. — god must be atheist

Then I have no complaints, as I said before.

Nothing is proven that science claims, and science never claims that it has proven something.

Once you remember the rememberables, it all becomes remarkably clear: Munchausenism only applies to proofs, and science is not about proof. — god must be atheist

But don't scientists make claims about probability that they think they have proven? Aren't those the claims which are ultimately subject to the Trilemma and the problem of induction, since according to this problem we can't even know that a claim such as “the sun will rise tomorrow” is more probable than its negation?

Are you going to say scientists don't claim that it is more likely for the sun to rise tomorrow, or that if I jump from the roof of my house I will fall instead of starting to float?

If scientists see their profession as something to be used for purely practical purposes and make no knowledge claims, then I have no complaints. But it seems to me that some scientists and philosophers of Science do (at least sometimes) claim that they are proving X or Y.

According to that logical structure:

1.Bricks (A) are part of a wall (B)

2.A wall (B) is part of a house (C)

3.Therefore, a house (C) is necessarily part of the bricks (A)

... which is obviously fallacious.

You then changed it to: C has parts of A, which is not the same as: C is necessarily a part of A.

If A is part of B and then B is part of C... C is necessarily part of A. — javi2541997

I guess you mean something more like: If A is part of B, and C is part of A, then C is also part of B.

One of my university professors (the same one I mentioned in one of my threads) mentioned a similar syllogism, and put into the mouth of a sceptic the following question: How do you know that all men are mortal?

In the first place, we can't know that with certainty until all men have died, and since that includes us we will never be able to know, since even if everyone else died we'd still be alive. And we can't even know with certainty that it is not the case that someone somewhere in the world is, say, 300 years old.

(...)there is nothing logically self-contradictory about an immortal man. We believe the proposition on the basis of induction, because there is no well-authenticated case of a man living more than (say) 150 years; but this only makes the proposition probable, not certain. It cannot be certain so long as living men exist. — Bertrand Russell

You and I have no choice but to trust our own perspective because that is the only perspective that we have. Even when we trust someone else’s , we still have to interpret the other’s view though our own perspective , so there’s no getting around a personalistic vantage. — Joshs

If that is what you mean, then there is no meaning in calling a perspective “one's own perspective” rather than “someone else's perspective”, since it couldn't be any other way.

Why do moral relativists bother trying to suggest that others should act differently then, if everyone, without exception, acts according to their own perspective? There is no point for the moral relativist to say anything about moral relativism then, since so interpreted it's just trivial.

But the question is precisely: Does the moral relativist claim that we should not trust someone else (A moralist, for example) who says that the moral relativist is wrong?

If so, how do they know that that is a better way of acting than its opposite?

If they don't know, shouldn't they be more cautious by not expressing their views, since they may be wrong? Shouldn't they suspend judgement? (Though I guess they would argue that this would also be a moral exhortation).

Here, It doesn't matter if you say that in both cases one would act according to one's own perspective, what matters is whether it is better to accept what others say (even dogmatically) after interpreting them and translating them to one's own perspective, or only to trust one's own moral ideas.

If the relativist says that one should not trust what the moralist says, he should tell us on what grounds he came to that conclusion if he wants to be convincing.

And another question: Why should I believe what you just said? (In the passage I quoted here)

If you say I don't have to believe you unless from my perspective I determine that you are right, then you'd be assuming that you are right without proof, since that is only true if what you said before is true, and your hypotetical response would be what is supposed to justify what you said before (what I quoted at the beggining) , making your argument circular and question begging.

And I would once again ask the same question, and this could go on forever.

This kind of self-referential paradox seems inescapable, since even if you say ad infinitum that you don't claim that I should believe you or that you know if what you say is true, I can always ask ad infinitum: How do you know that you are not claiming implicitly that I should believe you?

How do you know that you are not implicitly claiming that you know that what you say is morally preferable?

Since relativism developed in the subculture of modern anthropology, how can an anthropologist defending these views say that they are better than their opposites, without resorting to the same universal guidelines that they claim to deny?

This is the passage of Gardner that you quoted, in context. If the moral relativist says that no moral values can be better than others on the ground that they emerge from different cultures, since their moral relativism also comes from a particular culture, it also cannot be better than others, according to what the relativist himself says.

If so, why should we believe what they say? I guess it would be a matter of taste and philosophical preference.

What is needed is to attempt to help other to see, from their own perspective , what we find to be more insightful in dealing with people, rather than resorting to condemnation and moralistic blame. — Joshs

I agree with this, however suppose a moral relativist (I don't know if you are one) said this, then I ask:

Why? How does the moral relativist know that it is better (morally) to trust his own ethical perspective rather than someone else's? If he is consistent, it would seem that he'll have to say that he also doesn't know that.

But in that case, his decision to prefer his own perspective rather than other people's perspective is arbitrary, and therefore the moralist may retort that he has no right to say that that is “needed”.

It's from “The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener”, great book, I highly recommend it.

There is also a good logical objection against cultural/moral relativism mentioned by Martin Gardner:

Many critics of cultural relativism have drawn attention to its central paradox. Since relativism developed in the subculture of modern anthropology, how can an anthropologist defending these views say that they are better than their opposites, without resorting to the same universal guidelines that they claim to deny? "If everything is relative," Hilary Putnam points out somewhere, "then so is the relative." A cultural relativist cannot even say that one culture is as good as another, since he has no objective criteria to define what is meant by "as good as."

In his book Man and His Works: The Science of Cultural Anthropology, Melville J. Herskovits praised cultural relativism for its being tolerant towards all ethical norms. But some cultures do not respect tolerance. Why did Herskovits suppose that tolerance is more admirable than intolerance? He ends the book by saying that cultural relativism "takes man one step further in the search for what he should be." What should it be? If humanity should be different from what it is, what guidelines does Herskovits rely on to make this claim?

Yes, he himself says he is simplifying it, but it does give one a rough idea about it, which I thought was a good start for TheMadFool.

[The proposition with Gödel number G is not provable] is definitely not a mathematical theorem. What gives? — TheMadFool

Maybe somebody already told you this, but Gödel also uses something called Gödel numbering.

The Gödel statement is coded in a particular Gödel number, and in that way the Gödel statement is a statement about mathematics, since it is statements about mathematics that can be coded in such a way.

This Numberphile video might help:

https://youtu.be/O4ndIDcDSGc

(Around 5:32 he starts to talk about Gödel numbering)

Truth is objective reality which can lead to wisdom while pleasure serves our subjective desires. They do seem to be mutually exclusive.
3m

I don't think they are. I and many others often feel pleasure in the pursuit of truth, and so they are not incompatible. Reading the great philosophers, for example, can give many people great pleasure.

They may be incompatible for some people, but not for everybody.

That's actually a somewhat hard question, but for the sake of discussion, how about: Has some objective reality outside human minds?

Or: It isn't merely an idea in the mind, but also something outside the mind. But maybe those are circular definitions in disguise, I'm not sure.

At any rate, I feel inclined to accept Wittgenstein's notion of definitions, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in a particular language game.

So if you could give an example to see how you would use that term, that would be helpful.

Exist - something that could have an a effect on everything else that exists

This definition is circular

If it's the God of some religion, and such a God planned to punish forever all the people who don't believe in that religion, or would justify crimes such as those of the Inquisition for example, then certainly I would not want such a God to exist.

If it's a God not linked to any religion, who won't help with any of our earthly problems and won't give us an afterlife, then it is indifferent to me whether or not such a God exists.

Drugs, then?

I don’t think that’s the answer, because... — Lavender

Since I have never tried any drugs before, I can't say much with regards to whether the sensation they give is really that great (I hugely doubt it), but some people may feel better doing other things, rather than doing drugs. That is a subjective matter.

Not to mention some drugs have harmful effects, and so one may avoid them if one values also the absence of pain as another ingredient of happiness.

I think it’s comparable to having a good, nutritious meal with varied, complex flavors, vs. a cheaply made, simple, artificially-flavored candy full of empty calories and sugar. — Lavender

I don't quite see how it's comparable.

But anyway, some of those people who feel better eating junk food rather than vegetables, also take into account the fact that if they ate just that, they would probably get sick and suffer more often, and probably die younger as well, and if they die they can't enjoy more junk food anymore.

So it could be said that happiness, or a good sensation, involves also taking future consequences into account, so as to also avoid suffering.

The ideal would be to obtain the greatest balance between good and bad sensations, as Bentham pointed out.

Also, think about sitting on the couch all day watching some shallow, guilty-pleasure TV — involves light pleasure and no pain — vs going out for a run, breathing fresh air, feeling a sense of accomplishment that you’re doing better every time you go out, and then finally getting to get home and sit on that couch — more pleasurable as a contrast — and watching some really deep and compelling film — something still pleasurable, just on a deeper level. I’m not talking about an “eat your vegetables” sort of thing (bad metaphor, since I really like vegetables, but...) — Lavender

That's why one should also take into account future pleasures and pains before making a decision. Some people value sitting in the couch more than others, that's once again a subjective matter of how much one values the total balance of sensations in each scenario.

And of course, most people don't bother to do that rational calculation, but merely act by custom and habit.

Also, if happiness were the only thing that mattered, what would you say to a world where everyone just floats in tanks and gets fed drugs that give them pleasurable dreams, but they never actually go and do anything? Would you find that satisfying? — Lavender

If that drug they are taking gives them the greatest possible sensation, and I wasn't taking those drugs, then it may not be satisfaying for me to watch them do it. But all I need to do is to take that magical drug for that dissatisfaction to vanish entirely. At that point, it wouldn't matter to me in the least whether or not an outside observer felt unsatisfied by contemplating that, he can just join for his discomfort to dissappear anyway.

If that drug didn't give the greatest possible sensation, then I would have to test it temporarily and compare it to things like the sensation I get from artistic contemplation and creation, eating good food, sex, love, etc.

If that drug were superior to all that, then it would be absurd, in my opinion, not to take it.

And there’s also the question of, that person on that island building sand castles doesn’t know the outside world, but what if the outside world needs their help? — Lavender

Good point (though we seem to be moving away from the thread somewhat), in my case I'd say contemplating the unhappiness of others makes me feel bad too, and contemplating the scenario where I help them to avoid suffering and feel better makes me feel great, and so I would help them in order to feel better myself.

I mean... there are so many problems in the world, big and small, personal, local, global, that... even if it were possible to completely ignore all of them, would that really be more satisfying than trying to solve them? — Lavender

What would be the point of solving those problems if it didn't make you as happy as you would have been if you'd instead ignored them, and devoted yourself to something else (like art for example)? Again, it seems to me that there would be no point.

The value placed in solving all those problems, some problems or none whatsoever is a subjective matter.

Maybe some would feel better if we tried to solve them, while others would not. Maybe all of us would ultimately feel better if we tried to solve them, maybe not.

Do people really know what they want? — Lavender

Everyone wants to feel happy right? (Except perhaps some suicidal people). We often disagree as to the means to achieve that end, but not as regards the end.

Well... this is obviously a hypothetical, right? — Lavender

Yes, obviously

What if a lot of people *desire* it to go back to being just one Mona Lisa in the Louvre?

What if some of the wishers *desired* to be the *only* owner of *the* Mona Lisa? — Lavender

That's correct, some wishes may contradict other wishes, as other users pointed out. To this I gave the reply, however, that we don't wish those things for their own sake, but rather for the good sensation that springs from obtaining them. So, to those who wish the Mona Lisa it can be granted, by some hypotetical God, the good sensation they would feel when they, and only they, obtained the Mona Lisa, without actually giving the Mona Lisa to them, and thus grant the wish in that way.

In that case though, the thing they would actually desire would be to feel the best way they possibly can: the greatest sensation possible, and would then have no need for any other desires.

Like, if someone wants to harm another person, what they really want is to heal the pain in themselves that they blame the other person for causing. Hurting the other person isn’t going to heal you. — Lavender

Or they just feel good when hurting others or taking revenge. It's an unpleasant possibility, but it's a possibility nonetheless.

Someone mentioned the idea that a person who spends their whole life in Plato’s cave watching shadow puppets and never realizing they’re missing anything *would call themself happy*. But is that true happiness? I don’t think it is. — Lavender

The question is: Who feels better/ who is happier? The one who is living in a happy ignorance or the one who tries to achieve happiness through wisdom? The answer to this question seems to me to be far from obvious.

That seems off topic at any rate, though it deserves a whole thread of its own in my opinion.

Or, if it is, then there are things, like wisdom, that are more important than happiness. As for the counter-example of the urban person who craves status symbols, see previous paragraph. — Lavender

What would be the point of being wise if that made you feel miserable or not as happy as being ignorant? None, in my opinion, so it's inconceivable to me why some people value wisdom more than happiness.

That is not to say that wisdom and happiness are
necessarily opposite poles, that is another question, but I don't see the point of becoming wiser if that made one suffer or feel sad.

Yes. The validity of any sensory perception is open to doubt. — I like sushi

I don’t want to interrupt your conversation, but I think this passage here might help in clarifying your discussion with Banno:

Some forms of Scepticism which, in our own day, are advocated by men who are by no means wholly sceptical, had not occurred to the Sceptics of antiquity. They did not doubt phenomena, or question propositions which, in their opinion, only expressed what we know directly concerning phenomena. Most of Timon's work is lost, but two surviving fragments will illustrate this point. One says "The phenomenon is always valid." The other says: "That honey is sweet I refuse to assert; that it appears sweet, I fully grant." A modern Sceptic would point out that the phenomenon merely occurs, and is not either valid or invalid; what is valid or invalid must be a statement, and no statement can be so closely linked to the phenomenon as to be incapable of falsehood. For the same reason, he would say that the statement "honey appears sweet" is only highly probable, not absolutely certain. — Bertrand Russell

So, really, Shopenhauer's Jack may just be left with a void of craving if he did not have to work to win Jill's love. So, it seems that the presence of craving is seen as worth having as opposed to boredom. — Jack Cummins

If he is bored because his life is too easy, all he has to do is to wish that he were not bored (if in fact any and all of his desires are to be fulfilled in that “possible world” Schopenhauer describes).

we could ask if that is an actual sensation, experienced bodily, because it could be experienced more as an absence — Jack Cummins

But see, you yourself say that it could be experienced as an absence. Whatever is experienced is a sensation, and all sensations are produced by the brain (such is the view suggested by the empirical evidence, anyway), and therefore in that sense boredom is bodily too.

Unless you are a mind-body dualist. But even in that case, even if the experience were not “bodily”, that is still something you experience and that we would call “bad” (not as bad as pain of course, but still bad) is it not?

The question is whether boredom is really the worst possible scenario. — Jack Cummins

I think it's obviously not the worst possible scenario. I'd much rather feel bored than feel a horrible pain in my stomach, for example.

at face value the desire to kill someone may appear to be based on a sensation, but it may not be that simple. It could be that the desire is based upon the way that person is having in their life. — Jack Cummins

True, it could be that they are simply accustomed to that life style and were taught since their early life that it was good or normal to do or think such things.

Though even in that case one could argue they may still act looking (indirectly) for a good sensation, since they could find it painful or annoying to act contrary to the habits they acquired from their early infancy, and since they think there's nothing bad with those actions or desires, they may act according to them since they think they will feel better than if they don't (unconsciously most of the time).

Then all desires can be considered the same, seeming. Otherwise, it turns out that there are "right" desires and "false"? — SimpleUser

They are the same in the sense that they are merely something that occurs in one's mind, that fact itself is neither right nor wrong.

What may be right or wrong is a judgement concerning that desire, or justifying an action with that desire.

So what stops us from robbing each other blind? — New2K2

The police and legal punishment do, as well as empathy towards one's neighbour (for those who feel it anyway).

If I rob you, You won't like me, not because of Right or Wrong but simply because I deprived you of something you desire. — New2K2

In my case, I'd say I wouldn't like your action (not you) because you deprived me of something I desire, which makes me feel worse than I otherwise could have felt. And that is precisely what makes your action wrong for me, that is: according to my personal ethics, and not to some universal ethical system.

If all desires are fulfilled, then soon a person will appear who wants all desires of everyone NOT to be fulfilled. And the great recursion will come. :) — SimpleUser

True, like I responded to another user the only way out of such a situation seems to be this: The man who wishes for everyone's desires not to be fulfilled actually is saying something like: It would feel so good if I could ruin everyone else's desires.

And in that case, the wish that is to be granted is just the sensation he would feel if that happened, without the need for it to actually happen.

And so, the others could still have their desires fulfilled.

I would think that the person may be best to consider why they wish for that. It may point to something deeper.We could also ask if we got everything we wished for would not develop any wisdom? So, it may be worth reaching for the heights in what we wish for, but with some awareness that it may not even be desirable to fulfill all of our desires. — Jack Cummins

I understand that many people (myself included) wish to believe that “all sin is due to ignorance”, as philosophers like Spinoza thought, and that if bad people were wiser they would abstain from evil actions.

But it's not obvious to me whether that's always true or not, since it is after all possible for the person who wishes for another's death to say: “Because I genuinely want that to happen, and I would feel so good if X, who I hate so much, dissappeared”, and even after examining all the arguments against his wish he may still not see anything wrong with his thoughts and desires.

On personal ethical matters, the final and ultimate basis of one's beliefs seems to be either some feeling, or some belief that is by no means self-evident, such as belief in God's divine punishment in the afterlife.

But people who have different feelings or different beliefs towards the same thing probably won't be persuaded by any “wisdom”. And there is at present no way of proving that they are wrong or that the ones who disagree with them are right.

However, it seems to me that we do not wish those things for their own sake, rather we wish them beacuse we realize that if they happened that would cause us to feel some good sensation (pleasure, happiness, joy, peace of mind, tranquility, etc.) in our brains/minds, whether it's an immediate or a future “good sensation”.

In that case, we only need to feel those sensations directly: the man who wishes for the other person's death actually wishes to feel the sensation produced by that other person's death. If so, it can be given to him without killing the other person, and the same could be done to all other contradictory desires among people, and in fact to all desires in general.

Even in what we THINK is paradise (like the Jack and Jill scenario you quoted), we would lack something.. even if it is just the bare restlessness of existence itself (i.e. the state of boredom). — schopenhauer1

I mean, I'm fine with lacking that. Is there a reason why we should not lack anything? In that paradise we also lack pain and despair, but it doesn't seem like that's bad in the least.

Our wishes are never-ending, even if Jack obtained his Jill, maybe life seems boring to him and he discovers a new Jill (I don't want that though, it will ruin our childhood). But yup wishes are never-ending. — theWhiteLight

But Schopenhauer said that all wishes were to be fulfilled in that scenario. Wouldn't you say Jack would also wish to never feel bored? So that wish must also be granted and then he wouldn't have anything to complain about. If he is still bored that would just mean that one of his wishes hasn't been fulfilled.

I am not the one using those terms, but rather my university professor.

But you are right in that it probably doesn't make sense when taken literally.

Perhaps he was trying to say: It was far more likely for the universe not to have existed, since such a scenario is far simpler than the scenario in which the actual world exists, for the reasons given before.

What would be your response to that then?

Why do you think its incoherent and meaningless?

You say it's wrong at every level, so perhaps you could mention why it's wrong at a few levels at least. Since as you can see, for some people the argument I mentioned appears perfectly natural.