But it seems to me that he forgets that scientific propositions, such as those concerning gravity, do depend upon a previous premise: The uniformity of nature (“The future will resemble the past”).

Agreed. He forgot how at least logic works that thus, create science. As you explained previously, we have to start in a basic premise: The uniformity of nature. Then, all the theories about physics or nature go on like salmons in the water.
It is true that science, per se, could be explained at it is without somehow basic intuitions. But I think he is worse here too because doesn't matter how ended up the criteria but how it started all. Thus, the premises as you explained.

But it seems to me that he forgets that scientific propositions, such as those concerning gravity, do depend upon a previous premise: The uniformity of nature (“The future will resemble the past”). — Amalac

You seem to forget that Munchausenism decries the possibility of proof, and that science never claims a positive proof. Nothing is proven that science claims, and science never claims that it has proven something.

Once you remember the rememberables, it all becomes remarkably clear: Munchausenism only applies to proofs, and science is not about proof.

Nothing is proven that science claims, and science never claims that it has proven something.

Once you remember the rememberables, it all becomes remarkably clear: Munchausenism only applies to proofs, and science is not about proof. — god must be atheist

But don't scientists make claims about probability that they think they have proven? Aren't those the claims which are ultimately subject to the Trilemma and the problem of induction, since according to this problem we can't even know that a claim such as “the sun will rise tomorrow” is more probable than its negation?

Are you going to say scientists don't claim that it is more likely for the sun to rise tomorrow, or that if I jump from the roof of my house I will fall instead of starting to float?

If scientists see their profession as something to be used for purely practical purposes and make no knowledge claims, then I have no complaints. But it seems to me that some scientists and philosophers of Science do (at least sometimes) claim that they are proving X or Y.

But don't scientists make claims about probability that they think they have proven? — Amalac

Read my lips: scientists don't think they have proven anything.

Get that into your head, and everything will fall into place.

Are you going to say scientists don't claim that it is more likely for the sun to rise tomorrow, or that if I jump from the roof of my house I will fall instead of starting to float? — Amalac

They may say that, but they offer no PROOF, please get that into your head.

Okay, let's see if I can get through to you another way.

Show me the scientific article, published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, that precisely states that scientists proved that the sun will rise tomorrow, and that scientists proved that if you jump off from the roof of your house you will fall instead of float.

Make no mistake: show me the proof as articled in a published text in a scientific journal.

They may say that, but they offer no PROOF, please get that into your head. — god must be atheist

Then I have no complaints, as I said before.

Thank you. That was actually grand of you. And I am not being facetious.

Science escapes the trilemma because it rejects the justificationism that all of its horns rest upon in favor of critical rationalism.

Critical rationalism superficially bears some resemblance to all three horns:

- it resembles foundationism in that you're rationally allowed to believe things that aren't proven from the ground up

- it resembles coherentism in that you only remain rationally allowed to believe things so long as they don't lead to contradictions

- and it resembles infinitism in that the process of figuring out what possible beliefs still don't lead to any contradictions as we make more observations goes on forever without end

But it's not actually any three of those things.

Münchhausen Trilemma — Amalac

Or it could be that science doesn't require absolute and repeated proof of that which is proven to the satisfaction of reason - within the allocated budget. If this is less than satisfactory to philosophy; if science fails to clear the greatest epistemological hurdles philosophy can construct, that's too bad. But science in general can rest easily on the laurels of the technological miracles it surrounds us with, that QED; it has proven its truth value beyond reasonable doubt; beyond the imaginings of man but a few generations ago, that to deny science the title of truth now, is what I suggest, requires an explanation ... other than an interesting collision of ideas in the freewheeling course of a philosophical conversation with mi amigo over a bottle of sun warmed shiraz!

Science escapes the trilemma because it rejects the justificationism that all of its horns rest upon in favor of critical rationalism. — Pfhorrest

I think critical rationalism is a very good practical philosophy for Science, however I am not quite convinced that it will escape the Trilemma. Let's take Karl Popper as its representative:

When Popper argues that in the development of science we can, on empirical grounds, eliminate certain hypotheses as contrary to experience, and that such an elimination never establishes the rival hypotheses as true, he should draw the conclusion that we never are (and never will be) able to exclude the possibility that our knowledge of the world is made up entirely of false statements. However if that is so, it makes no sense to talk about the development of science as a movement closer and closer to the truth. Still, this is precisely how Popper views science. I think he is wrong in this point. I believe that whoever consistently rejects the transcendentalist idea is bound to reject not only the "absolute truth" but the truth tout court, not only the certitude as something already gained but the certitude as a hope as well.
It is arguable that the controversy cannot be decided with appeal to premises which the antagonists-an empiricist and a transcendentalist would both agree to be valid. The empiricist will argue that transcendental arguments imply the existence of the realm of ideal meanings, and that we have no empirical grounds to believe in it. The transcendentalist will argue that this very argument, just advanced by the empiricist, implies the monopoly of experience as the highest tribunal of our thought, that this privileged position is precisely under question, and that it is arbitrary to establish such a monopoly. The transcendentalist compels the empiricist to renounce-for the sake of consistency-the concept of truth; the empiricist compels the transcendentalist to confess that in order to save the belief in Reason, he is in duty bound to admit a kingdom of beings (or quasibeings) he cannot justify. This was Husserl's great merit: to lead this discussion to the extreme point. — Leszek Kolakowski

But science in general can rest easily on the laurels of the technological miracles it surrounds us with — counterpunch

I also feel inclined sometimes to think that technological effectiveness should be the justification of Science.

But then I look at the regrettable situation of a possible nuclear war that might destroy the human species, and I feel unsure again.

:up:

The critical rationalist can’t ever hope to find certain knowledge about what is true, sure; but we can accumulate more and more knowledge about what is false. We can never finish accumulating all the knowledge of what is false, to pin down exactly one thing that is true, but that doesn’t change that at one point in time we think more things are maybe-true than we do at a later point in time, and so have narrowed down on the possibilities.

And the reason to take experience as the arbiter of truth is because the alternative leaves us with no ability to question the truth of any claims, and so removes even the above kind of progress. If things might be true or false in ways that make no difference to what seems true of false in our lived experience, then there are either questions about such things that cannot be answered, or else the answers to such cannot be questioned.

Either of those might in principle be the case, but if they were we could not know, just assume one way or the other; and to assume either unanswerable questions or unquestionable answers is simply to give up trying, so we must always assume to the contrary.

I don’t see the connection of any of this to the trilemma though.

You're right, humankind may very well be destroyed in a big ball of nuclear fire; but take consolation in that, it proves certainly that E=MC2!

The critical rationalist can’t ever hope to find certain knowledge about what is true, sure — Pfhorrest

And so, he can't find certain knowledge about:

but we can accumulate more and more knowledge about what is false. — Pfhorrest

That is, I think, what Kolakowski meant when he said:

he (Popper) should draw the conclusion that we never are (and never will be) able to exclude the possibility that our knowledge of the world is made up entirely of false statements. However if that is so, it makes no sense to talk about the development of science as a movement closer and closer to the truth. — Leszek Kolakowski

If all our knowledge about the world were made up entirely of false claims, then it would be wrong even to think that we are making progress or that we can know more about what is false (unless we assume that the future will resemble the past, which seems to imply that the principle of induction is the ultimate basis for Science, in which case it sounds a lot like foundationalism to me).

We can never finish accumulating all the knowledge of what is false, to pin down exactly one thing that is true, but that doesn’t change that at one point in time we thing more things are maybe-true than we do at a later point in time, and so have narrowed down on the possibilities. — Pfhorrest

But the problem is, for our everyday life activities and for science to be possible, we need to assume at least that it is certain that some beliefs are more probable than others, or that it is more probable that they are more probable, or that it is more probable that it is more probable that they are more probable, and so on.

If we don't assume that, then the choice between believing that the sun will rise tomorrow or that it won't, or that gravity will continue working tomorrow rather than not, would be like a choice between heads or tails when flipping a coin.

For example: even if we admit that we know that the claims that the sun will not rise tomorrow had always been false in the past, that gives no reason to expect that it will rise in the future, nor even that it is more likely that it will rise.

And it doesn't matter how many other instances of the sun rising we find, that would not help us make progress towards justifying that it is more probable that in the future it will rise. And we want to say: we know that it is more probable that the sun will rise tomorrow, or at least: we know that it is more probable that it is more probable that the sun will rise tomorrow, since we implicitly assume this during our ordinary life activities. But it seems neither of those claims have rational justification.

As Hume pointed out, It would seem that this is something we merely assume from custom and habit in order to continue our everyday activities normally, and which scientists assume tacitly when doing Science, since otherwise they couldn't do any.

But if that is so, then that once again sounds like foundationalism to me.

And the reason to take experience as the arbiter of truth is because the alternative leaves us with no ability to question the truth of any claims, and so removes even the above kind of progress. If things might be true or false in ways that make no difference to what seems true of false in our lived experience, then there are either questions about such things that cannot be answered, or else the answers to such cannot be questioned.

Either of those might in principle be the case, but if they were we could not know, just assume one way or the other; and to assume either unanswerable questions or unquestionable answers is simply to give up trying, so we must always assume to the contrary.

I don’t see the connection of any of this to the trilemma though. — Pfhorrest

And what you say here sounds again like foundationalism to me (maybe this is what I am getting wrong): all scientific knowledge seems to rest on that assumption you mention (the one you say we must always assume), we may even call it basic belief, which seems to be the ultimate foundation of scientific knowledge.

For I ask: Do you know that that assumption is more probably true than its negation? If not, then you must concede that your choice is, in some sense, irrational (though of course the man who assumes the opposite, if indeed such a man could exist, would be just as irrational).

If that happened, it would perhaps prove that E=MC^2 when that happened, but it wouldn't prove that E≠MC^2 must be false in the future (not even in the next second after which that happened).

Not without assuming the uniformity of nature, it would seem.

The critical rationalist can’t ever hope to find certain knowledge about what is true, sure
— Pfhorrest

And so, he can't find certain knowledge about:

but we can accumulate more and more knowledge about what is false.
— Pfhorrest — Amalac

No? We can be certain that a particular combinations of beliefs is false, if they lead to contradiction. We can’t ever be certain that any particular combination beliefs is true, but we can’t help but act on an assumption one way or the other, and only one of those assumptions can possibly hope to lead us to any greater knowledge, so that is the rational one to make.

For example: even if we admit that we know that the claims that the sun will not rise tomorrow had always been false in the past, that gives no reason to expect that it will rise in the future, nor even that it is more likely that it will rise. — Amalac

You make the same argument here: but it only pertains if we have no other knowledge. We understand the mechanisms that cause the sun to "rise." In fact, the earth turns to face the sun - and it's just as beautiful to watch the sunrise with that in mind. More maybe!

If that happened, it would perhaps prove that E=MC^2 when that happened, but it wouldn't prove that E≠MC^2 must be false in the future (not even in the next second after which that happened). — Amalac

Do you mean - "might be false"? Because science has ample evidence to support the view that there is a long term consistency to nature; such that allows for laws of physics, chemistry and biology, that have pertained for all of history and that, will continue to pertain, universally, into the indefinite future. And science can, and does make predictions of future states of affairs, based on this knowledge. That is the very nature of scientific experiment.

I understand entirely your high principled philosophical objection; right through from Descartes cogito ergo sum. 'I can know certainly that I exist, but all else could be an illusion. So all knowledge of an objective reality is an assumption.' But that's a sceptical argument. It plies its trade from beyond reason; the embodied reason that requires everyday, we accept the existence of an objective reality. If I pick up a stone and drop it, it will fall to the floor. I can claim to know this.

science has ample evidence to support the view that there is a long term consistency to nature; such that allows for laws of physics, chemistry and biology, that have pertained for all of history and that, will continue to pertain, universally, into the indefinite future. — counterpunch

But the problem of induction also raises the following question: How do we know that the laws of physics, chemistry and biology won't change or cease to function in the future? Once again, we face the problem of how to justify that that is probably the case without begging the question.

If I pick up a stone and drop it, it will fall to the floor. I can claim to know this — counterpunch

Only if you assume the uniformity of nature.

But as I said, for practical purposes it is of course reasonable to say that one knows that, in light of the “language games” and “forms of life” of ordinary life. In that sense, I don't disagree.

The problems arise when it comes to the theory.

No? We can be certain that a particular combinations of beliefs is false, if they lead to contradiction. — Pfhorrest

Ok, it seems I took your previous statement a bit too literally. I do agree that we have a right to say that some combinations of beliefs are contradictory. I thought you meant that we couldn't be certain about anything at all being true, in which case we couldn't even be certain about that.

We can’t ever be certain that any particular combination beliefs is true, but we can’t help but act on an assumption one way or the other, and only one of those assumptions can possibly hope to lead us to any greater knowledge, so that is the rational one to make. — Pfhorrest

For practical purposes, that is indeed the rational thing to do. But it seems that theoretically it is just as irrational as the opposite assumption, as I pointed out in my previous response to you.

But the problem of induction also raises the following question: How do we know that the laws of physics, chemistry and biology won't change or cease to function in the future? Once again, we face the problem of how to justify that that is probably the case without begging the question. — Amalac

Okay, but we cannot ignore the unreasonableness of the argument! If you insist that, upon picking up a stone - and dropping it, I cannot know; which is to say know with absolute unshakeable and certain knowledge, that it will fall to the floor, then you're correct - but you have constructed your epistemic obstacle beyond the bounds of reason, and consequently, I see no obligation to clear that obstacle to claim I know the stone will fall to the floor.

What interests me is that, for the past 400 years philosophy is characterised by the endless regurgitation of such arguments against science; ever since the trial of Galileo for the heresy of proving the earth orbits the sun. This had a subtle, but dramatic effect on the subsequent development of philosophy - beginning with Descartes, the combination of which effectively stripped science of any moral authority as truth, and allowed science be used - without regard to the understanding of reality science describes.

In terms of a scientific understanding of reality, it is not necessary that we are threatened with extinction. We have the knowledge and technology to overcome the existential crisis we face. Starting with limitless clean energy from magma, for massive base load clean electricity, we could produce hydrogen fuel, desalinate and irrigate, recycle - so we could not only survive, but prosper into the long term future - if we accepted that science is true and applied technology accordingly.

Is not the fact that we approach needlessly upon catastrophe instead, sufficient proof we are mistaken in our relationship to science; and that it's the endlessly repeated, unreasonable objections of philosophy over the past 400 years that are to blame? I feel I'm entitled to understand your motives. Why are you so desperate that science is not true? The onus is not on science to satisfy your impossible demands for absolute proof. The onus is on you to explain why, with the reasonable truth staring you in the face - you construct such an insane obstacle course?

but you have constructed your epistemic obstacle beyond the bounds of reason — counterpunch

What do you mean by “beyond the bounds of reason”? Asking for the justification of the principle of induction seems within the bounds of reason. Hume, Russell, Kant and many others seemed to think so, and I do too.

I assume you mean “unreasonable”? Then, it would be unreasonable if I doubted those things in practice, but I do not. I only doubt them in the theory.

As for the possible practical consequences of such criticism:

The pursuit of truth, when it is whole-hearted, must ignore moral considerations; we cannot know in advance that the truth will turn out to be what is thought edifying in a given society. — Bertrand Russell

But I told you that I defend the use of Science in practice in many cases because of its technological applications that make it practically useful, even though it may not have a rational basis.

I think one should draw the distinction between the practical justification of Science, and its theoretical justification.

We have the knowledge and technology to overcome the existential crisis we face. Starting with limitless clean energy from magma, for massive base load clean electricity, we could produce hydrogen fuel, desalinate and irrigate, recycle - so we could not only survive, but prosper into the long term future - if we accepted that science is true. — counterpunch

Of course it would be ideal if what you describe were to happen, but is that a reason for thinking that it will happen? How could we even know that what you say is more likely to happen than not? Isn't that perhaps a bit too optimistic? Noam Chomsky pointed out that it is almost miraculous that humanity has not destroyed itself yet, but that would seem to imply that the end might be near:

The truly apocalyptic view of the world is that things do not repeat themselves. It isn’t absurd, e.g., to believe that the age of science and technology is the beginning of the end for humanity; that the idea of great progress is delusion, along with the idea that the truth will ultimately be known; that there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge and that mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. It is by no means obvious that this is not how things are. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

Why are you so desperate that science is not true? — counterpunch

I am not, I wish that a definitive solution to the problem of induction might be found so that philosophers can move on to other problems, but that hasn't happened yet it seems. And it may not ever be found, but that would not be my fault.

You might as well blame Hume for investigating the foundations of scientific knowledge, since apparently he was also desperate, according to you, to discredit science. But in fact he wasn't, he even wanted to deduce ethical propositions from the experimental method of Science. He failed, but that wasn't his fault.

The onus is on you to explain why, with the reasonable truth staring you in the face - you construct such an insane obstacle course? — counterpunch

Like I said, in practice I admit that I take it for granted that many scientific propositions are true, but not in the theory. In the theory, I would abstain from saying that I know that, simply.

First, science assumes the existence of nature, that is to say, of things that happen by themselves, irrespective of magic, gods and the like.

Then, science assumes that the human mind can understand or at least predict said nature. Model it successfully.

Finally, science assumes that this is a good thing to do. And I agree.

But it seems to me that he forgets that scientific propositions, such as those concerning gravity, do depend upon a previous premise: The uniformity of nature (“The future will resemble the past”). — Amalac

I think your philosopher friend is falling into the trap of scientism, i.e. trying to make a religion out of science. Science is not grounded in the notion of indubitable facts, but on observation and hypotheses, or ‘conjecture and refutation’ in Popper’s words. There are many fundamental questions about life and mind that are not explained by science - nor have to be, in order for scientific method to be effective.

The point about science is it starts with some assumptions, and brackets out any others that are not relevant to the matter at hand. Naturalism doesn’t really begin with foundational questions but with the observation of how objects behave. When it comes to the question of the ultimate identity of physical objects - what is matter? - there are still many fundamental questions unanswered. Indeed in the LHC, science has built the largest and most expensive apparatus in history to explore that very question but at this point there are more questions than answers.

Physics is universal only insofar as it can be applied to the motions of bodies and the forces that act on them. The belief that everything can be explained in terms of physics, or reduced to physics - scientific reductionism - is not itself part of physics, but a philosophical view, strongly motivated by Enlightenment attitudes.

A lot of what drives this is indeed cultural dynamics, the European conception of the nature of science, religion, and philosophy. There are many deep questions involved but the belief that only science can provide the answers is a pretty precise definition of ‘scientism’.

But it seems that theoretically it is just as irrational as the opposite assumption, as I pointed out in my previous response to you. — Amalac

I think more in terms of the opposite assumption being “pragmatically falsified”, in that it’s a self-defeating assumption, leaving only something within the broad scope of its negation as possible—but without affirming any one of the innumerable variants within that scope as the definite truth.

What do you mean by “beyond the bounds of reason”? Asking for the justification of the principle of induction seems within the bounds of reason. Hume, Russell, Kant and many others seemed to think so, and I do too. — Amalac

Imagine Galileo, Hume, Russel, Kant and many others, with the blessing of the Church - had argued in course of the view that science is the means to decode the word of God made manifest in Creation; rather than follow in the view that science is a heresy. Could not Hume, Russel, Kant and many others have made a far more convincing argument that science is valid knowledge of reality/Creation, than they do of insisting I can't know - certainly, that if I drop a stone it will fall? And variations - many, thereupon!

Had the brilliance of these great minds been directed instead in the course of showing the degree to which science is true knowledge of reality/Creation, might that not have been more constructive with regard to human affairs? Would we now be stuck pointing nuclear weapons at each other while waiting for the sky to catch fire from climate change?

Probably not; because if science were imbued with the authority of God's word, pursued and integrated into politics and economics naturally; technology would have been developed and applied as directed by a scientific understanding of reality - and the philosophy would have justified all this - as apparently good and true, and therefore right with equal philosophical ingenuity.

That's not what happened. The Church declared science potentially heretical, and philosophy took heed, and has written around that edict; and what you put to me is the product of 400 years of philosophy that - knowingly or otherwise, follows in the course of that error. Despite my best efforts - I am quite overwhelmed by the brilliance, ingenuity, and sheer volume of their arguments; but they have proven an error, over and over for 400 years - because that's what was required of them, making brilliant sense in terms of that mistake. It is only from where you are you see science as amoral, arrogant and potentially as dangerous as beneficial. You have ample evidence, but evidence, similarly - produced in the course of science decried as heresy and abused for ideological, industrial and military power. It's the same with philosophy.

I'd really like to move on to what this implies; but I've written long enough. So suffice to say, this argument is intended to illustrate a philosophical point that, we then need to bring home - and act upon pragmatically rather than ideally.

Imagine Galileo, Hume, Russel, Kant and many others, with the blessing of the Church - had argued in course of the view that science is the means to decode the word of God made manifest in Creation; rather than follow in the view that science is a heresy. Could not Hume, Russel, Kant and many others have made a far more convincing argument that science is valid knowledge of reality/Creation, than they do of insisting I can't know - certainly, that if I drop a stone it will fall? And variations - many, thereupon! — counterpunch

Kant and Hume emphasized the importance of scientific knowledge in many of their writings, specially the extraordinary achievements of Isaac Newton. And the same can be said about Bertrand Russell and the Science of his time. He even wrote an introductory book on the Theory of Relativity.

Yet they didn't ignore the problem of induction, why? Because they thought the problems concerning the foundations of Science important. Kant even believed that he found a satisfactory solution to the problem (whether he actually solved the problem of induction or not is a controversial and difficult question).

Because to ignore problems that are inconvenient or annoying for one's beliefs was for them an act of intellectual treachery. And I try to follow them in this respect.

The Church declared science potentially heretical, and philosophy took heed, and has written around that edict; and what you put to me is the product of 400 years of philosophy that - knowingly or otherwise, follows in the course of that error. — counterpunch

I entirely concur with the claim that the Church did a great deal of harm with its absurd censorship of scientific works. But are you really going to say that the writings of Hume, Kant, Russell, etc. about induction are comparable to what the Church did, or that they contributed to that?

First, science assumes the existence of nature, that is to say, of things that happen by themselves, irrespective of magic, gods and the like.

Then, science assumes that the human mind can understand or at least predict said nature. Model it successfully.

Finally, science assumes that this is a good thing to do. And I agree. — Olivier5

I see, would you say that those are the basic beliefs of Science and that it fits in the horn of foundationalism, or would you say that it is wholly outside of the trilemma?

it’s a self-defeating assumption, leaving only something within the broad scope of its negation as possible—but without affirming any one of the innumerable variants within that scope as the definite truth. — Pfhorrest

The assumption has to do with:

We can’t ever be certain that any particular combination beliefs is true — Pfhorrest

But see, though we would call someone who believed that the sun won't rise tomorrow or that he'd be able to fly in a couple of days by moving his arms really fast an insane person, there is nothing logically impossible about those things happening. They are conceivable.

Of course there is no reason to believe that the sun won't rise tomorrow, but it seems that there is also no reason to believe that it will rise (besides pragmatic reasons).

So if we look at it from the angle of pure logic, the choice between believing that the sun will rise tomorrow or that it won't resembles the choice between believing that a coin will land on heads after flipping it, or that it won't.

But the choice is illusory: since we are accustomed from early infancy to believe that it will rise, no one can get rid of this habit easily, and to attempt to do so would contradict basic human psychology.