I'm wanting something from Kant that indicates he thinks we have an access to things-in-themselves — AmadeusD
I have never claimed anything like that, so I don’t know why you’d be looking for it from me.
Of course, I actually do. You’ve said it yourself: you think an external object just is a thing as it is in itself. But the latter is merely an aspect of an external object, the aspect that we logically cannot access (what it looks like when you’re not looking).
If you’d prefer to use a different scheme, one in which it’s all in the head, then do so if you’re into that, but don’t try to use Kant in support of your position. He doesn’t think what you think he thinks.
That said, he does appear to contradict himself quite a lot so I understand the misunderstandings.
This seems to be a fairly direct explication of what i'm positing - we can be 'sure' that intuition is 'caused by' external objects of whatever, unknowable, kind. But our experience is indirect and we do not have access to those objects. — AmadeusD
I think maybe you have misunderstood. He is saying that
inner experience, unlike outer experience, is indirect.
Here he summarizes the idealist position:
Idealism assumed that the only direct experience is inner experience and that from it we only infer external things; but we infer them only unreliably, as happens whenever we infer determinate causes from given effects, because the cause of the presentations that we ascribe—perhaps falsely—to external things may also reside in ourselves. — B276
Then he goes on to present his own contrasting position:
Yet here we have proved that outer experience is in fact direct, and that only by means of it can there be inner experience
In a footnote for “direct”:
In the preceding theorem, the direct consciousness of the existence of external things is not presupposed but proved, whether or not we have insight into the pos sibilitv of this consciousness.
Since we have direct access to external objects, their existence is not merely inferred.
So you say. But you have no addressed anything I've put forward as reasons for my position, so far. The tide example is a really good one, to my mind because (to the bolded) that isn't access to external objects. And your formulation earlier in this same comment seems to agree with that.
To the underlined: This seems to be an extremely restricted way of considering different view points. It's not idealism to contend that while we're able to reliably infer external objects (and take them as 'given' in some noumenal sense), we cannot access them. In fact, as best i can tell, that is exactly what 'transcendental idealism' amounts to. Again, why I think Kant's intention was never to pretend to overcome the mitigatory fact of sensory organs producing experience 'of the world'. — AmadeusD
Sorry, I didn’t read any of your previous posts in the thread so I don’t know your arguments. What’s the tide thing?
I won’t address your comments about transcendental idealism, because TI is not very relevant at this point. TI plays a special role in allowing Kant later on to establish human objective knowledge of the world.
Aside from Kant, for the sake of argument let’s say (which I would never say) that we
infer external things. Why wouldn’t you accept that this inference is a neural component in our access to the world outside our skulls?