The metaphysical implications of disquotationalism I pretty much agree with the OP, and also with
@Pneumenon. But here's a thought...
Disquotationalism might still seem to fit naturally with a kind of deflationary realism. For deflationary realists, the task is a defensive one, to deny the unwarranted metaphysical excursions of idealism in favour of what is ordinarily
evident, from life and science: I share with others a world that's often surprising—I often literally don't know what's around the next corner—and I've seen the bones of creatures that lumbered over the Earth a hundred million years ago, long before all human consciousness. The world transcends my self, my ideas, my thoughts, and at certain points the entire intersubjective world and the whole of history. It is as real as you can get.
This is naive, unphilosophical realism, and it's what the deflationary realist is defending. The idealist comes along and tries to reduce the world to a known substance or structure, that of the mental, or discourse, etc. This metaphysical move the realist cannot allow. But the deflationary realist is not offering a competing metaphysics on what the world is, but only affirming that it exceeds our bounds, as is merely evident. And this is why he wants to abandon correspondence. Correspondence is, usually, a classically realist theory, but it is too metaphysical, too positive for the deflationary realist. For him there can be no question of language vs the world, or anything that opens the door to talk of
what reality is really like. Disquotationalism could be part of a suite of deflationary tactics designed to criticize idealist metaphysics.