I read somewhere that justified, true, belief (JTB) as knowledge originated with him — TheMadFool

Good point. I think that justified true belief certainly constitutes a form of knowledge for Socrates.

But what he tends to call knowledge as such is obtained through thought (dianoia) and insight (noesis) that result in episteme and gnosis, respectively.

He contrasts this with conjecture (eikasia) and belief (pistis) that amount collectively to opinion (doxa).

"Justified true belief" would be a form of temporarily right opinion (orthe doxa or pistis) that may serve as knowledge in the absence of higher forms of knowledge but is not quite the same as episteme and gnosis.

Yes, I think he knew human nature very well. Apparently, more than some people were comfortable with ....

But ignorance is what binds you to the cycle of re-birth, so liberation from that, and liberation from ignorance, amounts to the same. — Wayfarer

I totally agree. But Greeks were practical people. Socrates' main concern seems to be liberation from ignorance in this life, a bit like the Buddha or the jivanmukta, "liberated in life" of Hindu tradition.

If knowledge or wisdom liberates you from other things in the afterlife, should there be one, then even better. But the philosopher's aim is, as far as possible, to get that knowledge or wisdom now.

The idea of a sage as ignorant or a fool is a common one. — T Clark

Good point. This reminds one of the court jesters of European aristocrats and kings.

I suppose in the old days you sometimes had no choice but to pretend to be a fool. When there were men armed with sharp swords around, one wrong word could cost you your head.

And, of course, there are times when the whole world seems to be mad and you are the only sane person around :smile:

As St Anthony the Great (251–356 AD) once said:

A time is coming when men will go mad. And when they see someone who is not mad, they will attack him, saying, “You are mad, you are not like us

In them, what is being sought is not knowledge of the arts and sciences, but liberation from the round of birth and death - nearer in meaning to the 'vidya' of the Upaniṣads. — Wayfarer

Correct. There are definitely close parallels between Ancient Greek and Indic philosophical thought.

At any rate, Socrates does speak of the “loosing”, or “setting free” (lysis, apolysis) of the soul and this is intimately connected with knowledge or wisdom (phronesis) as in the Phaedo:

And while we live, we shall, I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free. And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure (67a)

But I think that quite aside from liberation from the cycle of birth and death, Socrates' primary concern is liberation from ignorance.

So the book is about what we are made of, how we ought to rule ourselves (claim authority over our self), what virtuous conduct is in the search for wisdom. — Antony Nickles

I agree. Plato’s dialogues can be interpreted on different levels.

The method of multi-layered interpretation was widely practiced by Greek philosophers who identified several levels of meaning, (1) literal (logos), (2) moral (nomos, typos or doxa) and (3) allegorical (hyponoia) and often applied it to Homer and other poets.

Interestingly, in the Indian tradition we find a parallel to Plato’s Tripartite City in Tripura (literally, “Three Cities”) that can refer to a legendary tripartite city existing in the sky, air and on earth, as well as to the three states of consciousness, waking, dreaming, and deep sleep (or three aspects of the soul), etc.

Tripura Rahasya - Wikipedia

Why is the country called communist? — Prishon

Because it has been ruled by the Communist Party since 1949 and for many years it tried to run its economy on Marxist-Leninist lines.

When that approach eventually failed (beginning in the 60's), the leadership decided to emulate the state-capitalism policy introduced by Lenin in the 1920's.

So, basically, it is a semi-capitalist country where capitalist methods are permitted but strictly under the control of the Communist Party.

Another way China differs from capitalist countries is that a lot of those "billionaires" operate in harmony with Party or State interests and can only exist by permission of the Party. One wrong step and you are out. A bit like in Russia, actually.

The philosopher is not different than the ordinary person; we all have equal authority to make and accept claims. — Antony Nickles

I think this is very true in a general sense. However, Socrates is advocating the institution of philosopher-kings as a ruling class. So he seems to believe that the philosophical citizen is in some ways better qualified (and therefore entitled to authority) than the nonphilosophical.

What he means by that ... ? — Prishon

That's an interesting claim, isn't it? He is not simply knowledgeable about love-matters but "skilled above anybody else"!

I guess this in itself would disqualify him from being ignorant ... :smile:

That aside, as he appears to know a lot of things relating to everyday knowledge, perhaps more so than the average Athenian citizen, I can only think that he is referring to some form of special knowledge. This is possibly hinted at in the claim that he "knows nothing fine and good" in Apology.

You seem quite sanguine about the fact that he was a dictator — RolandTyme

Well, I don't recall saying that Franco was not a dictator. My actual statement was:

In any case, I haven’t seen any evidence that Franco was a “Nazi” or "racist" or anything like that? Though I could be wrong. — Apollodorus

To which @javi replied:

No, you are not wrong. He was not racist neither nazi. — javi2541997

Why is the state good? You could say states are natural and that health and goodness are equivalent. Healthy pine trees are good. Healthy states are good — frank

Well, you could say that the state is good because it maintains cohesion in society, it provides infrastructure and services, it defends society against external and internal enemies, etc.

The state may be bad if it extracts too much taxes or interferes with civil liberties, but you could say that the average first-world state is probably sort of good on the whole.

Understanding ancient philosophical text is hard in the sense of sharing common ideas with the ancient writer through language — Gregory

Correct. All the more so as authors like Aristotle had schools where any unclear issues could be clarified with a teacher, whereas we no longer have access to the original writer.

But if you have established that your three points are correct then you can decide if they fit your description of deism.

Points 2) and 3) look OK to me and so does point 1).

Like Plato, Aristotle believes in a divine element within the human soul, viz. the nous that is immortal.

In Nicomachean Ethics (1177b-1178a) he says that the nous is divine and man’s true self.

In De Anima he writes:

Some hold that the soul is divisible, and that one part thinks, another desires. If, then, its nature admits of its being divided, what can it be that holds the parts together? Surely not the body; on the contrary it seems rather to be the soul that holds the body together; at any rate when the soul departs the body disintegrates and decays (411b24)

So, there seems to be a part of the soul that survives the death of the physical body. But if it merges with the Cosmic Soul or God, for example, then there would be no personal afterlife or separate individual existence.

This is not a moral argument, but it's a good one. — frank

But suppose we say that the state is good and that state welfare serves the purpose of preserving the state. Would this make it a moral argument?

Think in terms of surviving in the modern economy and society at large. Here, critical thinking is mostly a hindrance, and goodness (as understood in humanism) is considered naive.
An argument can be made that a person is far better off in life if they think in superficial slogans, soundbites, black and white terms. — baker

Correct. However, "goodness" in the Platonic sense means being good to others and to yourself in every respect. Naivety resulting in harm to yourself is not being good to yourself. Moreover, in the Platonic sense, goodness to yourself and others is accompanied by wisdom. In contrast, naivety is at the most goodness without wisdom, and may ultimately be no goodness at all.

People need to learn how to integrate philosophy with everyday life. It may not always be easy, but if philosophical reasoning and contemplation result in greater clarity of mind, power of discernment, better understanding of others, greater awareness of environmental issues, etc., then it can't be a bad thing.

I reread the Apology not long ago, and if I remember correctly, during his trial, Socrates WAS charged with atheism...some of you who can retrieve the passage more quickly than I can at this late hour might help me out here. — Leghorn

Regarding the motivation of his accusers, Socrates says:

From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus angered on account of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the public men (23e)

So, it appears that Anytus, Meletus and others had some grudge against him.

Regarding the charges against Socrates, "corrupting the youth" was one of them and "introducing new Gods" would amount to "corrupting the youth".

However, my comment referred to Socrates being taken to court for "making new Gods" and "not believing in the old ones" which seems different from "atheism" in the sense of "believing that there is no God"

In the Euthyphro Socrates says:

For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says (3b)

And in the Apology:

Let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is about as follows: it states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings (24b-c)

The issue is how do we reconcile Socrates' "making new Gods", "believing in new spiritual beings", and the various instances in the dialogues where he appears to be praying and/or worshiping some deity, with the view that he was an "atheist"?

Either that, or the other way around, as the case may be :smile: Anyway, have a nice day!

Don't worry, I will follow your example :grin:

Well, I don't know what you are able to know either.

As far as I am concerned, there is nothing unclear in that passage. I am not responsible for others.

And why would you bring that to my attention when I had no problem with it?

I am arguing for a distinction to be recognized — Valentinus

How was I to know that this is what you were arguing???

As already stated, I wasn't aware that this was an issue.

The importance of the statement involves the distinction between opinion and knowledge, as demonstrated throughout the dialogues. — Valentinus

Knowing the distinction between opinion and knowledge is part of knowledge. I don't think anyone would argue that Socrates did not know the distinction. :smile:

In fact, this argument was the primary reason for post war embedded liberalism. — frank

You are probably right there. I think the idea was to introduce some form of state welfare in addition to higher wages, etc., in order to keep the masses happy and dissuade them from turning to communism. Apparently, the Russians were perceived as a huge threat at the time.

But I think in Europe it started long before the war, probably in the late 1800's and early 1900's.

The text says the following:

I thought to myself, “I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either" (Apology 21d)

1. Socrates does know Greek, he knows his family, friends and other people, etc. In fact, he knows quite a lot.

2. Therefore, he means that some things are unknown to him, not all.

I thought this was obvious. If others believe that it isn't, it's their problem, not mine.

Well, Aristotle does not actually say a lot about God. In the Metaphysics he writes:

Hence it is actuality rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of rational thought, and its active contemplation is that which is most pleasant and best. If, then, the happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it is marvellous; and if it is greater, this is still more marvellous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is what God is (Meta.1072b)

I think Aquinas is trying to say that God does have some form of indirect knowledge of the world. Whether Aristotle himself would agree, is another matter.

On what Aristotle says, it may be argued that God contemplates himself at all times. That would be your point 3).

Is that to say that your many attempts to say what is being said can be struck from the record? — Valentinus

I am saying what the text of the dialogues says.

The whole discussion started when others denied some sections of the text or attempted to read things into the text that are not there.

Other than that, everyone - including yourself - is free to interpret Socrates and Plato any way they choose.

The matter I brought up bears no relationship to any claim of ignorance than that made by Socrates himself. — Valentinus

If Socrates' statements are your problem, then I'm afraid you will have to discuss that with him. I can't help you there.

He always refers to many Gods, many divine things and many 'unmoved movers'. — hairy belly

Not always, in some cases he has "God", that could be interpreted as referring to something like a superordinate divinity, e.g., "the activity of God" (he tou Theou energeia) as in Nicomachean Ethics:

But for a living being, if we eliminate action, and a fortiori creative action, what remains save contemplation? It follows that the activity of God, which is transcendent in blessedness, is the activity of contemplation; and therefore among human activities that which is most akin to the divine activity of contemplation will be the greatest source of happiness (1178b8)

Indeed it seems that Eudoxus took a good line in advocating the claims of pleasure to the prize of highest excellence, when he held that the fact that pleasure, though a good, is not praised, is an indication that it is superior to the things we praise, as God and the Good are, because they are the standards to which everything else is referred (1101b6)

Hence God (o Theos) enjoys a single simple pleasure perpetually. For there is not only an activity of motion: but also an activity of immobility, and there is essentially a truer pleasure in rest than in motion (1154b9)

For existence is good for the virtuous man; and everyone wishes his own good: no one would choose to possess every good in the world on condition of becoming somebody else （for God possesses the good even as it is) (1166a5)

Is this view based on a principle such as liberalism? Ot what? — frank

I think it's just common sense, really. In the old days there were high birthrates so a community or society could afford a percentage of citizens that failed to make it or fell on bad times.

When you had large families and close-knit rural communities where everyone knew one another, it was easier to get support in times of need. With growing urban populations where a lot of people don't know one another and are perhaps more indifferent to strangers, it tends to be more difficult.

But I think the state has an interest to eliminate poverty, disease, crime, etc. from society as much as possible. Otherwise a vacuum can develop that can threaten the state's own existence. Political groups and foreign powers are always ready to exploit any weakness in a given society to their own advantage.

It is interesting your example: "pregnant teens." this is an issue which are the states have to deal with. — javi2541997

I agree that pregnant teens may be a problem depending on the situation and circumstances, but in the Western world, Europe in particular, there is a falling population. So, we must be careful that this is not pushed in the opposite extreme where pregnancy in general comes to be viewed as undesirable.

I may be wrong but my impression is that teens get pregnant not because they don't know better but because pressure is put on them by male teens to have sex. And this has to do with the popular culture and social media that tend to override everything that teens learn in school and at home ....

but it is clear that vast resources are spent trying to eliminate the consequences of reckless behavior, and I wonder the societal effects of that. — NOS4A2

This seems to be one of the weak points where state welfare tends to go wrong.

The problem can be redressed only by establishing some form of balance and this would be for a particular society or community to decide.

But I think it would have to start with upbringing, education, and with creating adequate opportunities for all or most to avoid finding themselves in a position of being dependent on others.

I never claimed you claimed it. Your view amounts to assuming that to be the case when you do claim Socrates knew the truth. — Valentinus

I do not know what "truth" Socrates knew. My position is simply that he is not as ignorant as some claim he is. In other words, my interpretation of his statement that he "knew nothing" is that it does not refer to everything but only to some things.

But in Platonism, the goal is what? Seeing God, the One? It seems rather intangible, in comparison to what Early Buddhism promises. — baker

It does not matter what it seems. The goal is to go above and beyond prima facie appearance and experience, in a constant quest for the highest, until one reaches ultimate reality, i.e. that beyond which there is nothing higher.

What that is remains to be established when and if the highest has been reached.

In the meantime, no matter what you experience in contemplation, you need to go beyond that if you wish to attain the highest. Or, remain, at least temporarily, at a lower level should you prefer this. You do what you are comfortable with.

I did suggest your unwillingness to explain why Socrates pretended to be ignorant was less than valorous. — Valentinus

You may have suggested this, but I had no idea why as I had never claimed that "Socrates pretended to be ignorant". This has never been my interpretation of Socrates!

I only complained about your labels when you said this:

You hold identical beliefs.

You share the same anti-Platonist (and anti-Christian) commitment.
— Apollodorus — Valentinus

As a matter of fact, the issue was the claim that "philosophical inquiry leads to aporia" to which I raised an objection.

Your response was:

Now that we have properly located your vision of cowardice and despair as coming from you, and not from any of your interlocutors — Valentinus

Note that this was before my comment above and that you said "we" and it looked like you reacted in response to one of my comments to Foolo. I failed to see why you thought there was a need for you to defend him as you did on the thread on Socrates and elsewhere.

Anyway, this is quite irrelevant. People agree on some issues and disagree on others, and that is that.

When Apollodorus calls me anti-Christian, he has picked up that weapon. — Valentinus

Complete nonsense. A discussion is a discussion it is not waging war, not as far as I am concerned, in any case.

It all started when others called me "Neoplatonist", "Christian evangelist", and other names just because I disagreed with them or they disagreed with me.

I have repeatedly stated that I have no problem whatsoever with other people's views. The problem arose when others chose to deny accepted texts or provided fake translations as "evidence" against a mainstream reading and to promote what in the literature are fringe views.

Good question. The way I see it, a functional society should look after its members as and when necessary. Ideally, in a "one for all, all for one" situation.

So I agree with @T Clark, someone has to provide assistance to those in need. If family, churches, or charitable organizations, etc. cannot do it, then the state has a duty to step in and help out in some way.

I think a healthy society should have no problem in finding a solution. If society cannot do it, then something is fundamentally wrong.

Obviously this should not be allowed to lend itself to system abuse.

It's no secret that the Ancient Greeks held a dim view of women. — baker

Well, we don't live in Ancient Greece, do we?

Plus, even in Ancient Greece women could be philosophers and teachers. Don't forget that according to Plato's Symposium, Socrates was instructed in the highest teachings of philosophy consisting in how to attain the vision of the Beautiful or Good, by Diotima, a woman!

This was not in the least surprising as there were many others.

“That women actually participated in philosophic activity comes as a surprise to many. But Gilles Menage (1984, 3) in the eighteenth century names sixty-five women philosophers in the Hellenistic age alone.”

In “Women Philosophers in the Ancient Greek World: Donning the Mantle,” Kathleen Wider “examines women philosophers in the Greek world primarily from the sixth through the third centuries B.C., with a focus on women philosophers during the late pre-Classical period of Greek history (sixth century), the Classical period (fifth-fourth centuries), and during the early stages of the Hellenistic world (late fourth-third centuries).”

“Although precise dates for the women Pythagoreans are unknown, we do know that some of them flourished in the sixth and early fifth centuries B.C. These include Theano, believed to be the wife of Pythagoras and the most famous of these women, as well as Myia, Damo, and Arignote who were probably daughters of Theano and Pythagoras.

Arete was the head of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy after her father Aristippus died in 350. Hipparchia flourished around 328 and is known for the fact that she abandoned a life of wealth and ease to marry Crates and live the simple life of a Cynic. Little is known about Pamphile except that she was a disciple of Theophrastus who headed the Lyceum after Aristotle.”

“The Pythagoreans saw the family as well as the city as a microcosm of the universe and the order and harmony of the universe was to be reflected in the city and family. Women were given an important place in Pythagorean thought and society because they were an important part of the family and were a necessary component in achieving order and harmony within it. Each person within the family was to perform her/his role well and keep her/his place assign ed by nature. The place of woman turns out to be the traditional one of wife and mother, subordinate to and submissive to her husband, but a woman can perform this role well only if her intelligence is developed.”

“Plato had women disciples and Socrates refers to his women teachers … The Stoic Diodorus Cronus who was active about 315-284 had five daughters who were logicians: Menexene, Argeia, Theognis, Artemisia, and Pantacleia.”

Women Philosophers in the Ancient Greek World: Donning the Mantle – JSTOR

The concept of women being "disqualified from higher knowledge" is NOT a Platonic concept. Intelligence is intelligence, whether it happens to reside in a male or female head.

Theano of Croton (6th century BC)
Aristoclea of Delphi (6th century BC)
Aspasia of Miletus (ca 470–400 BC)
Arete of Cyrene (4th century BC)
Hipparchia of Maroneia (4th century BC)
Nicarete of Megara (ca 300 BC)
Ptolemais of Cyrene (3rd century BC)
Aesara of Lucania (3rd century BC)
Catherine of Alexandria (282–305)
Sosipatra of Ephesus (4th century CE)
Hypatia of Alexandria (c. 360–415 CE)
Aedesia of Alexandria (5th century CE)
Theodora of Emesa (5th-6th century CE)

Women philosophers – Wikipedia

And what is the place of women in all this? — baker

That would depend on what you mean by that question.

When you put it this way, spiritual advancement is sometimes indistinguishable from mental illness. This is cause for alarm. — baker

If it is indistinguishable then maybe this is what it is. But what about the other times when it is not?

I think a key distinguishing factor would be that spiritual advancement is supposed to enhance your mental abilities. Plotinus, for example, is not considered as mentally deficient.

If it has the opposite effect, and it impairs you mental faculties, then it is not spiritual advancement. This is why Platonists like Plotinus learned Platonism from a teacher and had his own school. You need a teacher to give you some guidance.

Anyway, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle, who was a long-time disciple of Plato, says:

The following considerations also will show that perfect happiness is some form of contemplative activity. The Gods, as we conceive them, enjoy supreme felicity and happiness. But what sort of actions can we attribute to them? Just actions?… If we go through the list we shall find that all forms of virtuous conduct seem trifling and unworthy of the Gods. Yet nevertheless they have always been conceived as, at all events, living, and therefore living actively, for we cannot suppose they are always asleep like Endymion. But for a living being, if we eliminate action, and a fortiori creative action, what remains save contemplation (theoria)? It follows that the activity of God, which is transcendent in blessedness, is the activity of contemplation; and therefore among human activities that which is most akin to the divine activity of contemplation will be the greatest source of happiness.
Happiness therefore is co-extensive in its range with contemplation: the more a class of beings possesses the faculty of contemplation, the more it enjoys happiness, not as an accidental concomitant of contemplation but as inherent in it, since contemplation is valuable in itself. It follows that happiness is some form of contemplation (1178b)

And, in fact, people do experience various degrees of happiness when they practice contemplation or meditation. This is an undeniable fact. So, I can see no reason why people should get attacked for practicing theoria, dhyana, or whatever you want to call it, if they choose to.

On what grounds should philosophy prohibit contemplation and declare it antithetical to philosophy?

↪Apollodorus Sure. Good idea. :up: — Corvus

I think so too. After all, if my understanding of the OP is correct, we are trying to look into the issue through philosophical inquiry. And in order to do so, we need to ask questions. Either that, or we don't have the discussion :smile:

But he never walked that path himself, did he?

This is crucial, because if he never did what he instructs others to do, then on the grounds of what should we trust him and his advice? — baker

We have no means of determining this with 100% certitude. But contemplation of higher realities was advocated by Aristotle and other members of the Platonic school and it seems safe to assume that this was put into practice at least to some extent.

Ultimately, it comes down to personal experience. If the practice of contemplation leads you nowhere, then you may discontinue it any time. But most forms of meditation seem to have some effect. You may not become "omniscient" or "enlightened", but you may still achieve a sense of calm, focus, clarity, enhanced memory, and in some cases it may lead to lucid dreaming and other states of consciousness that you did not experience before.

But can a person have this moral and intellectual foundation without first being religious? — baker

Indeed. But can one do those preparatory practices outside of religon? — baker

I believe that one can. Perhaps not in all cases, but a lot of people seem to have a sense of what is right and what is wrong, fair, just, appropriate, good, etc. through upbringing and education, and perhaps through innate psychological tendencies, and independently of religious beliefs.

We may compare this to a natural belief in goodness and ability to discriminate between right and wrong, etc. that may be useful when traveling abroad. You need to possess certain attributes to avoid getting into trouble and to make the journey successful. The same is true of journeys to different states of consciousness and realms of experience.