Then why end in aporia? — Banno

I don't think we should read too much into that.

The principal purpose of Platonic dialogues is to encourage critical thought leading to rational conclusions instead of unexamined beliefs.

Of course each dialogue should be read on its own terms, but I think it would be absurd to take it to be totally unconnected with ideas expressed in other dialogues.

Skepticism and dialects seem to come from a lack of certainty. A lack of common sense. From fear. From low self esteem. Distrust of one's self. — Mystic

Not always. Philosophical inquiry can perfectly well come from the realization that appearances can be deceptive. A greater power of observation and analytical thought, curiosity, etc., etc.

Good luck then.

but it is possible to do that without diatribe. — Wayfarer

Perhaps in theory, but evidently not in practice. "You can't teach an old dog new tricks" is probably an apt description of him. But, as Frank says, he can continue the discussion on his own.

Just know: you are not recognized as a teacher here. — frank

Not even as a student. All he's got to offer is a big chip on his shoulder. Doesn't understand Greek, uses fake "translations", leaves out inconvenient bits of text, puts a materialist spin on everything, and then pretends to take offense when others contradict him. His problems seem to be more psychological than philosophical. But I could be wrong.

Of course they would. Eidos and idea are translated as Forms in English. — Fooloso4

Well, then, if Plato and his immediate disciples would think of "forms" on coming across words like eidos, idea and paradeigma, etc., in the Euthyphro, then for what reason can't we do the same?

Even if we deny that there is an early Theory of Forms in the Euthyphro, the dialogue is unquestionably concerned with justice. Euthyphro himself says that piety is a part of justice. Justice is good. Therefore, piety is clearly connected with both justice and goodness which are divine attributes (see Goddess Dike, etc.).

So, it can’t be wrong to say that the Gods love piety because of its association with divine attributes such as goodness and justice.

My argument is still correct. In fact, you haven’t refuted any part of it.

And, of course, your comments are intended to ridicule Abrahamic religions as is your use of derogatory terms like "neo-Platonism" and other invectives. You sound like a very bitter old man.

I see it as broader than the forms. With Plato, we're starting to partake of the divine. — frank

I don't dispute that.

I think the point I was making was very easy to understand and entirely reasonable. If Plato and his disciples were to read the Euthyphro, would they, or would they not think of the forms when coming across words like eidos, idea, paradigma, etc.? If they would, then so can we. Nothing to do with "neo-Platonism" which, by the way, is a pejorative term.

Incidentally, your constant diatribes against monotheism in a discussion of Platonic dialogues clearly shows that you've got a political agenda and have no interest in an objective discussion. This is not the first time either.

I know many people who have read Plato, many of them in the Greek original. Apart from you, I'm not aware of anyone who feels they deserve a medal for that. It doesn't matter where knowledge comes from. Everyone uses Internet sources these days. I bet you're doing it yourself though you may not be wiling to admit it.

I mentioned Louis Mix for no other reason than to illustrate the fact that seeing an early Theory of Forms in the Euthyphro and other dialogues is nothing new. There are, of course, others like Prof R Allen, etc.

You keep claiming that "it is not obvious how to understand terms like eidos, idea, etc." Yet the minute someone proposes an interpretation that goes against your agenda, you suddenly "know beyond reasonable doubt" that this is not what Plato intended to convey.

The fact remains that dialogues like the Euthyphro leave many questions open. This not only justifies but positively invites a variety of interpretations and answers. And as I said, the question is how would Plato and his immediate followers read the dialogues. In the light of this, I don't think that my suggestions are too far of the mark.

What Hammusrabl did, did not affect the Celts who were resistant to the written word. Celts and others rejected writing in favor of memorization and passing on stories orally. — Athena

Correct. But even in those cultures where spiritual wisdom and laws were transmitted orally, the knowledge in question was accessible to a limited number of people, such as the priestly class. It was not available to all and sundry.

Do we believe this when we argue "Belief in god is necessary for being good"? — Athena

Not necessarily. I suppose different people are good for different reasons. Some are good because they allow their innate goodness to manifest itself; some are good because they acknowledge the importance of following laws, human or divine; and others are good because they fear punishment in this life or the next.

The fact is that terms like idea (“idea”), eidos (“form”), auto to (“(thing) in itself”), paradeigma (“pattern”), etc., occur time and again in Plato’s dialogues.

In the Euthyphro we can also see how the dialogue shifts from the pious (to hosion) to piety (hosiotes), i.e., in the same general direction leading eventually to the "forms" in other dialogues.

Therefore, as a number of scholars have observed, dialogues like the Euthyphro are a possible base for identifying an “earlier Theory of Forms”. So, it isn’t anything new.

Quite possibly, Plato himself and his contemporaries, or at least his followers, saw it this way. If they did, then it is legitimate for us to see it in the same way. Pretty simple, really. I don't see why anyone would object unless they've got an agenda.

Only I did not learn these things by copying and pasting from Wiki. I spent many years reading Plato, starting long before there were such things as Wiki and google. — Fooloso4

And your point is what exactly?

1. The point that Euthyphro may represent an early form of the Theory of Forms has been made for many years in academic publications. That's precisely why it shouldn't be lightly dismissed.

2. Plato has been read by millions of people worldwide. But there is no point reading Plato if you keep insisting on reading him in a narrow materialist or nihilist light. Plato was neither a materialist nor a nihilist and even less a fanatic.

You sound like you are stuck in a bygone era and are intellectually too set in your ways to move on. But that's your problem, not anyone else's.

There is no point talking to Fooloso4 because as I said from the start and as has become more than obvious since, he's got a very specific political agenda.

Anyway, εἶδος eidos which Plato uses in his Theory of Forms means “that which is seen, e.g., form, image, shape but also fashion, sort, kind
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/εἶδος

Plato in the Euthyphro introduces the concept of idea (idea) early on, followed by eidos and paradeigma, i.e., exactly what later emerges in the Theory of Forms:

1. Socrates asks “what is the idea possessed by pious things” (5d).

2. Socrates asks “what is the eidos by which all pious acts are pious” (6d).

3. Socrates asks “what is this idea that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a paradeigma” (6e).

It is clear that this comes very close to the later and more developed concept of “idea”, “form” or “pattern”.

So, we can identify three basic stages of the concept of forms:

1. As found in deities personifying certain virtues such as Justice, Beauty, etc.

2. As found in more abstract form in the Meno and Euthyphro.

3. As found in more developed form in the Phaedo, Republic, and Phaedrus.

But let’s get back to the Platonic dialogues. As I said in my earlier post on this thread, Socrates is quizzing Euthypro about ‘the gods’ but he also asks about the ‘real form of piety’ - not what makes this or that person a pious person, but what is its essence? I have the suspicion, as yet unfounded, that lurking in back of many such passages is the dim apprehension of the forms, specifically, the Form of the Good, or in this case, the form of piety, although it is not spelled out here. — Wayfarer

Your suspicion is absolutely correct and has been discussed by Louis Mix in Ἔν τι εἶδος in the Meno and Euthyphro” (1970) and others.

This is a very important point that actually solves the puzzle. The apprehension of the forms is not "dim" at all.

Plato introduces the concept of the “idea” or “form” right from the start, by making Socrates ask what is the characteristic quality (idea) possessed by pious things (5d).

Euthyphro says that piety is “what the Gods love”.

Socrates does not dispute this. He merely asks whether (a) the pious is loved by the Gods because it is pious or (b) it is pious because it is loved by the Gods (10a).

Euthyphro says that the pious is loved by the Gods because it is pious, not pious because it is loved (by the Gods) (10d).

Socrates and Euthyphro agree that:

“The loved by the Gods is loved by the Gods (a) because it is loved by the Gods, not (b) loved (by the Gods) because it is loved by the Gods” (10e).

Socrates explains that we cannot say that the Gods love the loved by the Gods “because they love it”. Otherwise put, we cannot say that the pious is loved by the Gods “because it is pious”.

Indeed, the dictionary definition of the Greek word for “pious”, hosion, is “sanctioned or approved by the Gods”. “Loved by the Gods” is the same as “sanctioned or approved by the Gods”.

Therefore, whilst we can define pious as “loved by the Gods”, we cannot say that the pious is loved by the Gods because it is pious (or that the sanctioned/approved by the Gods is sanctioned/approved by the Gods because it is sanctioned/approved by the Gods).

The Gods must perceive some feature or features in the pious other than (or in addition to) its being pious.

What might these features be?

It may be answered that some of these features are goodness and justice.

The materialists may use this to argue that in that case goodness and justice are moral standards that are independent of the Gods, thus rendering the Gods unnecessary for moral guidance (and, therefore, redundant).

However, this argument is baseless in an Ancient Greek (Platonic) context. Justice is a manifestation of the divine principle of Justice (the Goddess Dike or Justitia) and goodness is a manifestation of the creator of the universe who according to Plato is good.

Thus Goodness and Justice are divine properties, Forms or Ideas.

Essentially then, the pious is that which is loved by the Gods because it is good, just and divine.

Humans may still be pious in the wrong, or impious, way. But this is only due to an incomplete or incorrect understanding and/or application of the concept, idea or form of piety.

PS It may also be noted that Greek culture itself had a tendency to personify abstract concepts or universals. Time was personified by Cronus, Justice by Dike, Love and Beauty by Aphrodite, Sleep by Hypnos, Death by Thanatos, etc. So, the concept of eternal, ideal Forms or Patterns was in a sense implicit in Greek thought (which is why Plato found it a convenient device for communicating his thoughts).

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11055/from-matter-to-intellect-to-the-forms-the-ascent-to-the-one-according-to-platonic-tradition

It says that piety can be used to justify any crime, even the most disgusting. And that is true. — Olivier5

I've already addressed that, but it seems you never pay attention.

Funny coming from the guy who could not grasp the problem of attempting to apply anachronistic terminology to Plato. — Fooloso4

Funny that you keep doing it yourself all the time. I don't know why Banno thought it was a good idea to choose you for this thread, to be honest.

Exactly — frank

Yep. That's why he's been choosing his words carefully and constantly distracting people's attention with nonsensical pronouncements about Abrahamic religions. Apparently, it's the "Jews fault" that Fooloso4 is incapable of understanding a simple text.

The argument does work in a monotheist context: — Fooloso4

Right. It's monotheism again. So, what you are saying is that you are unwilling or unable to focus on Plato's text.

Anyway, here are the facts of the matter:

1. Socrates himself says, and Euthyphro agrees, that:

“The loved by the Gods is loved by the Gods because it is loved by the Gods, not loved (by the Gods) because it is loved by the Gods” (10e).

In other words, we cannot say that the Gods love it "because they love it". There must be another reason.

2. Nowhere does Socrates say that “pious” and “loved by the Gods” do not apply to the same things.

3. Socrates’ argument may or may not prove that we cannot define “pious” as “loved by the Gods” if and when the Gods’ reason for loving the pious is that it is pious.

But it does not prove that pious can’t be defined as “loved by the Gods”.

4. So the answer revolves on the reason or reasons for which the Gods love the pious.

You got it all wrong.

it is an extreme example of why piety must be tempered. In fact, it often has been, but not as the result of piety. — Fooloso4

However, that doesn't prove that piety per se is bad or that the Gods don't love piety as you claim.

So it is a strawman.

The kind of people who uses pious rhetoric to justify killing their father. — Olivier5

Yes, but that doesn't say anything about true piety and the truly pious.

Perhaps Banno is just upset that his plan, for which he hired Fooloso4, hasn't quite worked out as planned.

no religions today (except some radical, politically motivated sects, proclaim "death to the infidels" and almost all moderate people, both religious and non-religious, think that is wrong. — Janus

Correct. Most murders seem to be motivated by personal conflicts. Nothing to do with religion whatsoever.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-deaths-usa-idUSTRE64C53R20100513

The dialogue ends in aporia. — Banno

And it seems so does the thread.

In that case they probably aren't pious by the dictionary definition I provided. But putting a 21st-century spin on a work by Plato isn't exactly a solution either.

Wrong. I do care. I do my best to save energy, recycle stuff, don't smoke, etc. And I vote for politicians I think are serious about finding real solutions.

Anyway, have a nice day. And enjoy your drink.

So what is the right thing to do about global warming? — Olivier5

I said "most of us have a pretty accurate conception of what constitutes right and wrong" in terms of our personal conduct in society.

I haven't studied global warming but I'd venture to say that communism does not seem likely to be the solution.

If you are suggesting that we cannot provide reasonable answers to what God does or allows to happen, then I agree. — Fooloso4

That's why you can't prove your point and why it's pointless to try especially since many have tried before you and failed.

He made them, supposedly. Don't try and use these tools on Him. — Olivier5

He did make them, but he gives humans the freedom to use them as they think best. And some humans get it wrong. Most of us though, have a pretty accurate conception of what constitutes right and wrong.

That's only pointing to more conceptual confusion. I think we can confidently conclude from human experience since Plato that not all pious person is just, and that not all just person is pious. — Olivier5

If there is no definition of terms from the start, then there will be confusion and no debate, for sure.

That's why I said that the terms involved may be interpreted in many different ways.

I for one, was using the dictionary definition. On that definition, it doesn't make sense to say that the Gods don't love what they themselves sanction.

These rules are not made FOR them but BY them FOR US — Olivier5

That's exactly what I'm saying.

And if omnibenevolent, then subject to the constraints of benevolence, thus by reason or benevolence not quite a "free will." — tim wood

Wrong. I said "good", not "omnibenevolent":

Plato refers to “the Maker and Father of the universe (Poietes kai Pateras tou pantos)” and states that “this Cosmos is beautiful and its Constructor good”, etc. (Timaeus 28a – 29a). — Apollodorus

That's why I said it is a fallacy to appeal to Abrahamic religions when discussing a work by Plato.

God is not obliged to be fair. — Olivier5

Correct. God is good, but the way or ways in which he manifests his goodness in relation to humans is subject to his own free will, not to human wishes. It would be absurd to claim otherwise.

Hence the kind of analytic theology you seem to rely on, is foly. God is not bound by human logic. — Olivier5

That's just one of the things that @Fooloso4 fails to grasp and yet he is trying to teach us.

I think it is obvious that he is unable to establish his case by keeping within the Euthyphro context and is desperately trying to bring Abrahamic religions into it as if that is somehow going to "save" him. And then he is telling us that we shouldn't believe in miracles or religion....

That's fine by me. Until next time.

I'm not disputing that. I just think @Fooloso4 is making a terrible job of it and he should let someone else do it or just give up on the project and start some other discussion that he can handle a bit better.

If he didn't know, then he couldn't rule out that it's what the gods love. — frank

Correct. Either Fooloso4 thinks we are stupid or else he's got some psychological or neurological issues that prevent him from realizing the logical implications of his own statements.

But are they not ridiculous? — tim wood

They may well be, but that is not the point. If he wants to ridicule Abrahamic religions then he can rename the thread "Fooloso4's rant against Abrahamic religions". That would be more honest IMO.

However, as it is, the discussion is of a work by Plato who was a Greek philosopher, not a religious Jew or something. Anyway, he isn't getting anywhere with his theory and it's silly to imagine otherwise. Everyone knows that the issue has been debated for centuries and Fooloso4 isn't bringing anything new to it.

And since God or the gods, if good, do not love what is wrong, then:

... piety does not equal what is loved by God.
— Fooloso4 — Fooloso4

You keep repeating yourself to no avail.

The pious (to hosion) is, by definition, what is sanctioned by the Gods.

Even you should be able to see that it is absurd to claim that the Gods do not love what they sanction.

It has nothing to do with my approval of Jesus' impiety. — Fooloso4

Why are you bringing Jesus and other Abrahamic religions into a discussion of a work by Plato?

I think you're skirting the issue — frank

More like deliberate obfuscation and smoke-and-mirrors tactics. Nothing new there.

Not every God lover is necessarily beloved of God. You may love god(s) with all you heart and not be sure that god(s) love you back. — Olivier5

Sure. The Gods are under no obligation to love you back.

However, the central issue is not the lover of God but the pious, i.e., piety - literally "the pious", to hosion, in the neutral - meaning "that which is good and just".