I was kidding. No, I entered the conversation because you had gone off the rails into the Torah.

It seemed we needed to talk about what this thing called piety was: what life and death issues were attached to it, how we might compare piety with science as a way to shape events.

Then I noticed you wanted Socrates to be a humanist, so I asked you how he would determine righteousness. You said he would muddle along. :lol:

Ok. I get your point. Philosophize in peace. No harm intended. Just know: you are not recognized as a teacher here.

Of course they would. Eidos and idea are translated as Forms in English. — Fooloso4

Well, then, if Plato and his immediate disciples would think of "forms" on coming across words like eidos, idea and paradeigma, etc., in the Euthyphro, then for what reason can't we do the same?

Even if we deny that there is an early Theory of Forms in the Euthyphro, the dialogue is unquestionably concerned with justice. Euthyphro himself says that piety is a part of justice. Justice is good. Therefore, piety is clearly connected with both justice and goodness which are divine attributes (see Goddess Dike, etc.).

So, it can’t be wrong to say that the Gods love piety because of its association with divine attributes such as goodness and justice.

My argument is still correct. In fact, you haven’t refuted any part of it.

And, of course, your comments are intended to ridicule Abrahamic religions as is your use of derogatory terms like "neo-Platonism" and other invectives. You sound like a very bitter old man.

No, what you are saying is confused. What you say in one sentence, you take back in the next. — Bartricks

A work in progress. Sorry if it messes up the discourse.

And the challenge is that moral content will be arbitrary if it is constitutively determined by God's attitudes. — Bartricks

Agreed but you might want to take a closer look at the appropriateness of the word "arbitrary" in your statement above. Hint: Is there any moral theory till date that's managed to invent/discover a comprehensive moral formula that can be applied in a mechanical manner to all moral issues such that it always outputs a course of action that's unambiguously good. By moral formula I refer to a rule that when applied to an ethical question will spit out the answer as to what we should do given a particular situation; some examples of moral formulae are Kant's Categorical Imperative (CI) (Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law) and Bentham's Greatest Happiness Principle (One must always act so as to produce the greatest aggregate happiness among all sentient beings, within reason).

I wouldn't be wrong if I say that given no moral formula seems to cover all the bases, something that seems to be a requirement for any moral theory to gain currency, our only option, our last resort, is to approach the issue of good/bad on a case by case basis i.e. we have to exercise our rationality instead of relying on a moral formula. How different will this approach in which each ethical issue is treated as unique and requiring a solution tailored to it be from one that's arbitrary in nature? In both cases, you won't find a pattern in the way moral issues are judged, something that could be abstracted as a moral formula however the crucial difference between them is that one utilizes rationality and the other doesn't. At this point your statement below,

God is Reason and Reason is God — Bartricks

enters the picture so to speak. The first point to be noted is that rationality (reason) = morality for reasons cited above - our only workable solution to moral matters is to exercise reason/rationality - the moral universe doesn't seem to function under a unified, single moral formula, forcing us as it were to treat every single situation as deserving of a solution specific to it which, if the solution is to distinguish itself from mere arbitrariness, requires the exercise of rationality/reason. Thus, if God = Reason, as you seem to be saying, God = morality itself [Reason = Morality & God = Reason. Hence, Morality = God] and the Euthyphro dilemma is no longer a problem. It isn't the case that God's commands are arbitrary, it isn't the case that anything goes and if one feels this way it's only because both morality that's arbitrary and morality that gives due consideration to features unique to individual cases are missing a moral formula the likes Bentham's greatest happiness principle.

As you can see, if one refuses to accept the absence of a moral formula in morality, we could justifiably say that the moral formula = reason/rationality itself; after all, we're endorsing the use of reason/rationality in all moral issues despite the fact that we agreed that each one of them be treated as unique enough to require a solution that's meant for it and it alone.

At this point Kant and his CI comes in. The CI basically states that immorality is irrational given that it leads to contradictions. According to Kant, immorality is an affront to reason/rationality - they're contradictions. It's very similar to what we said earlier: Reason = Morality but in an entirely different context. When we said Reason = Morality (see vide supra), we were talking about the absence of a moral formula like Bentham's greatest happiness principle but in the case of Kant's stand that immorality is irrational or, conversely, morality is rational (Morality = Rationality), the CI is a proposed moral formula.

How can we make sense of this? On the one hand, Reason = Morality means there is no moral formula (like Bentham's greatest happiness principle) and on the other hand, Kant claims that Reason = Morality because there is a moral formula (Kant's CI). It's a paradox.

Regarding the paradox above, all I can say is if Kant's CI is applied universally, we can achieve a perfectly moral world and Reason = Morality. In case Kant's CI is either not applied at all or only partially in effect, we would need to tackle moral issues rationally even if individually as opposed to applying the moral formula CI and again Reason = Morality. To make the long story short, whether Kant's CI is being followed or not, Reason = Morality and that's revelation insofar as I'm concerned. There's probably more that can be said but I'll leave that as an exercise.

Now, let's revisit the Euthyphro dilemma. It seems the right thing to do. Reason = Morality. We've established that above. The metaethics of virtue ethics states that the prime virtue is reason/rationality. God is the most virtuous being and so must be the perfection of reason/rationality i.e. God = Reason. Therefore, because Reason = Morality and God = Reason, God = Morality. Thus, against the backdrop of virtue ethics, the Divine Command Theory is validated - something is good because God (Reason itself, Morality itself) commands it.

I support @Fooloso4's efforts in these threads. It is extremely useful to have methodical expositions of Platonic dialogues such as these. I take issue with some aspects of his intepretation, but it is possible to do that without bickering over it diatribe.

Just know: you are not recognized as a teacher here. — frank

Not even as a student. All he's got to offer is a big chip on his shoulder. Doesn't understand Greek, uses fake "translations", leaves out inconvenient bits of text, puts a materialist spin on everything, and then pretends to take offense when others contradict him. His problems seem to be more psychological than philosophical. But I could be wrong.

Yea, let's leave him alone.

but it is possible to do that without diatribe. — Wayfarer

Perhaps in theory, but evidently not in practice. "You can't teach an old dog new tricks" is probably an apt description of him. But, as Frank says, he can continue the discussion on his own.

@Fooloso4 started an interesting thread and he presented his position clearly. He certainly taught little me about this dialogue. So he can be a teacher to me.

Good luck then.

I support Fooloso4's efforts in these threads. It is extremely useful to have methodical expositions of Platonic dialogues such as these. I take issue with some aspects of his intepretation, but it is possible to do that without bickering over it. — Wayfarer

Thank you. I have decided I will no longer respond to those who are here only to bicker.

In fact, I thought of using you as an example of how philosophically and emotionally mature people can disagree. We go way back and often disagree but we always present our reasons for the position we hold, and listen respectfully.

:up:

Fooloso4 started an interesting thread and he presented his position clearly. He certainly taught little me about this dialogue. So he can be a teacher to me. — Olivier5

Thank you. If you are interested in Plato you might want to look at my thread on the Phaedo.

Then why end in aporia? — Banno

I don't think we should read too much into that.

The principal purpose of Platonic dialogues is to encourage critical thought leading to rational conclusions instead of unexamined beliefs.

Of course each dialogue should be read on its own terms, but I think it would be absurd to take it to be totally unconnected with ideas expressed in other dialogues.

don't think we should read too much into that. — Apollodorus

Turning to the gods (or more precisely priests) to learn what righteousness demands is moral externalism. Things are changing, though.

True, the forms are independent, but we seem to know them by an internal source. Socrates is said to have followed an internal voice, so with Phaedo, Meno, and to some extent Euthyphro, we have a rising tide of internalism: justifications can be found within.

To the east of Athens, the Persians are also headed toward the idea that you're born with the knowledge of good and evil. It could be that Plato knew about that, or it could just be convergent evolution.

Do you agree with any of that?

Agreed but you might want to take a closer look at the appropriateness of the word "arbitrary" in your statement above. — TheMadFool

Er, I did. I was describing the Euthyphro challenge to DCT. Not making it. Describing it. I think the Euthyphro challenge fails. It fails precisely because God's edicts and attitudes will not be arbitrary. Why?

Because arbitrary means 'without reason'.

God is Reason. (Not God is morality - morality is a set of prescriptions and valuings, not an agent - God is Reason, the issuer of those prescriptions and the valuer).

So God's edicts and values are not 'without reason'. They define the content of reason. Thus they are the benchmark against which arbitrariness is measured.

As you can see, if one refuses to accept the absence of a moral formula in morality, we could justifiably say that the moral formula = reason/rationality itself; after all, we're endorsing the use of reason/rationality in all moral issues despite the fact that we agreed that each one of them be treated as unique enough to require a solution that's meant for it and it alone. — TheMadFool

I do not understand your meaning there.

The metaethics of virtue ethics states that the prime virtue is reason/rationality. God is the most virtuous being and so must be the perfection of reason/rationality i.e. God = Reason. Therefore, because Reason = Morality and God = Reason, God = Morality. Thus, against the backdrop of virtue ethics, the Divine Command Theory is validated - something is good because God (Reason itself, Morality itself) commands it. — TheMadFool

There is no such thing as a metaethics of virtue ethics. I've already explained that they are fundamentally different kinds of theory. You're just persisting in thinking they're two sides of the same coin. They're not.

If divine command theory is true, then virtue ethics may be true too. The point the Euthyphro makes is that virtue ethics - or whichever normative theory is actually true - would be true arbitrarily.

Virtue ethics may be true today. But tomorrow utilitarianism might be true. And the day after, deontology. And so on.

That's the Euthyphro problem.

It isn't a problem. But no matter how good the evidence may be that virtue ethics is true (and there isn't good evidence of this - it's false), it will not do anything to overcome the Euthyphro. For all you will have shown is that God approves of certain character traits and wants us to cultivate them and express them in our actions. To which the critic will simply say "so? the criticism I am making is that whichever normative theory is true today, it is true due to the arbitrary whims of God". Replying "yes, but virtue ethics is true" will not address their concern.

Showing that God is Reason and thus arbiter of what is and what is not arbitrary, overcomes the problem. Not because it establishes 'reason' as a virtue (presumably that virtue being the virtue of listening to and following Reason). But because her attitudes constitutively determine what is and is not arbitrary. So whether something is arbitrary or not is in her gift. The buck stops with her.

I'm out!

Don't you worry about me. I'm a master at spotting good masters.

If you are interested in Plato you might want to look at my thread on the Phaedo. — Fooloso4

Thank you. I'm not much into Plato to be honest, but your summary in the OP was well done, a very decent work of extracting the gist, and I know that is difficult to do. You made this one dialogue alive for me. I went back and read it, found the conclusion quite witty although the dialogue procédé is tiresome at times.

Also I owe you one because I misunderstood you at first in this thread.

So yes, I'll check your Phaedo thread.

Turning to the gods (or more precisely priests) to learn what righteousness demands is moral externalism. Things are changing, though.

True, the forms are independent, but we seem to know them by an internal source. Socrates is said to have followed an internal voice, so with Phaedo, Meno, and to some extent Euthyphro, we have a rising tide of internalism: justifications can be found within.

To the east of Athens, the Persians are also headed toward the idea that you're born with the knowledge of good and evil. It could be that Plato knew about that, or it could just be convergent evolution.

Do you agree with any of that? — frank

There is no reason why I should disagree with any of it. In fact, I have been saying that myself. There was a general movement from the concrete to the abstract and thus from the external to the internal. When we analyze external reality in mathematical terms as Pythagoras did, we internalize it.

Interiorization of consciousness is central in Plotinus but it started with Plato. The direction is absolutely clear. It describes the journey of return from the periphery of the circle or sphere of reality back to the center. The external Gods are interiorized and replaced with ideas, forms or patterns leading to the unfathomable and indescribable One within us and above us.

It may well be possible to see this in latent form in the Euthyphro. In fact, as already noted, we can be certain that Plato himself and his immediate disciples saw it this way. But this is far from explicitly stated and it doesn’t change much about my central argument.

Socrates has refuted Euthyphro’s belief that the pious is loved by the Gods because it is pious, but not that the pious is pious because it is loved by the Gods. As that is the definition of "the pious" (to hosion), he cannot reject it, and nor does he attempt to.

He does not deny the existence of the Gods, either. Therefore, it stands to reason to say that the Gods love the pious because it is good and just, at the very least. And because the good and the just are attributes or properties of the divine, we may even say that the Gods love or approve of the pious because it is divine.

Though the dialogue appears to end in “aporia”, this is no reason to claim that it has nothing else to offer and that we can’t draw any positive conclusions from it other than atheism and nihilism as some seem to do here.

:up:

You made this one dialogue alive for me. I went back and read it — Olivier5

In the Phaedrus Socrates says of a well structured speech:

Every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own, it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work (264 c-d).

Plato does the same for his dialogues. They are wholes with all the parts having a function and working together. It is up to the reader to see the whole and how the parts fit together, to make it more than just inanimate words on a page, but as something alive.

Then why end in aporia? — Banno

To show that the whole issue of piety is silly.

So the question is, is stuff good because it is loved by god, or is it loved by god because it is good? — Banno

In a monotheist setting, you need to start with the premise that God sets all the terms.
As such, good is what God says is good.

Phrasings like "stuff is good because it is loved by god" or "stuff is loved by god because it is good" are not consistent with classical monotheism. They're formulations that are consistent with a demigod, ie. an inferior god who doesn't set all the terms.

To show that the whole issue of piety is silly. — baker

I think Socrates is taking issue with wrong interpretations of piety, not piety itself.

Though the dialogue appears to end in “aporia”, this is no reason to claim that it has nothing else to offer and that we can’t draw any positive conclusions from it other than atheism and nihilism as some seem to do here. — Apollodorus

I think the - shall we say - irreligious reading of Plato is owed to the irreligious nature of today's culture. It's not that Plato was 'a believer' - I think he would have firmly rejected any such designation. It's more that there is a latent and sometimes explicit philosophical spirituality in many of the dialogues which sits uncomfortably with our secular age. And because of the non-dogmatic nature of the dialogues, then they are, for that very reason, open to a variety of interpretations - one of the great things about Plato.

Some notes from an excellent introductory essay on Plato's dialogues:

Plato hardly claims the power to grasp absolute truth for himself. Very often, when approaching the territory of final metaphysical ideas, he abandons the style of logical exposition for that of myth or poetry. There is something characteristically unfinished about his thought; he eschews neat systems and his intuitions often jostle one another. By contrast, the works of any commonplace thinker leave an impression of extreme artificiality in their orderly array of premises leading inevitably to the one possible conclusion. That is not -- one reflects -- how the thinker actually arrived at the solution; those neat proofs do not represent the complex processes of his mind in its fumbling quest. Only after he had worked out his thought to its conclusion, did he conceive of the systematic pattern which he sets down in his book. Nor is he really as pleased with the solution as he claims to be; in his mind, the conclusion is rather a tentative answer standing uncertainly against a background of aggressive alternatives impatient to replace it. Now, in Plato's works, we have not the manufactured article, but the real thing; we have the picture of a mind caught in the toils of thinkings we get the concrete process by which he struggled to a conclusion, the hesitation amongst the thousand different standpoints, the doubts and the certainties together. The dialogues are, each one, a drama of ideas; in their totality, they depict the voyage of a mind in which any number of ports are visited before the anchor is finally cast. And at the end, it is as though the ship of thought were unable to stay in the harbor but had to cast anchor outside; for according to Plato the mind must be satisfied with a distant vision of the truth, though it may grasp reality intimately at fleeting intervals. — Rafael Demos, Introduction to Plato: Selections

Towards the end of this essay (published 1927) Demos notes that Plato and Platonism have rather fallen from favour:

Recent years have witnessed a powerful reaction against Plato; in the minds of a good many philosophers, reverence has been replaced by execration. Plato is now being seen as playing the role of the villain in the drama of philosophy, so much so that in some circles, merely to characterize a doctrine as Platonizing is to damn it. The attack has focussed particularly on two features of Plato's thought: his theory of ideas, and his social-political philosophy. In so far as Plato's ideas have been represented as absolute ideals, it is now widely maintained that moral principles and ideals are social conventions, varying from one community to another and from one time to another. This is a return to Protagoras. Perhaps existentialism also is a return to Protagoras in its assertion that values have their source in the free choice of individual man. Going beyond these two anti-Platonizing schools, there is another group which holds that values do not exist in any sense, not even as depending on human beings. An ethical sentence is neither true nor false, for it is not an assertion, not a statement; it is an expression (for instance, hurrah!); its meaning is emotive, not descriptive. To take an analogous case, when I say 'alas!' I am saying something meaningful, but I am not saying anything which could be true or false; I am only giving vent to my feelings. There is nothing in the world which would correspond to my 'alas.'

In so far as Plato's forms are properties common to many things, and therefore also independent of the latter, once more Plato's theory of ideas is rejected. The real is the concrete and the particular, and there is nothing else, so we are told. Tom, Dick and Harry are real beings, but there is no such entity as humanity. The latter is a word and a word only. As to theory of knowledge, Plato was a rationalist, but today the prevailing doctrine is empiricist. Reason, it is held, can discover no truths about reality; at best, it can only analyze its own meanings. All concepts originate in experience, and sense-observation is the only possible evidence for any theory. And since metaphysical sentences can neither be verified nor falsified by sense-experience, logical positivists have declared that metaphysics is meaningless.

These strains of thought are clearly discernible in a good deal of the discussion on this forum. But I think part of the learning is to be able to recognise it without the need to leap in and try to set others straight (a temptation that I, of course, often succumb to).

Anyway, take all this as a footnote to the discussion.

In a monotheist setting, you need to start with the premise that God sets all the terms.
As such, good is what God says is good. — baker

The question of whether Plato (and Socrates) were actually monotheistic is a vexed one. I think the most straight-forward reading is that they were not - at least, monotheism is not an explicit theme in this dialogue. But as I noted previously in this thread, because of the subsequent adoption (or appropriation) of Plato by the Greek-speaking theologians, then it's common to read monotheism into the dialogues even if it's not explicitly present.

One more footnote, on the dialectic of belief and un-belief. Because of the constitution of the Christian faith, religion is to all intents equated with belief as distinct from knowledge, in Western culture. Christianity is a doxastic religion as distinct from a form of philosophical rationalism or gnosticism. The latter seeks to 'ascend' to a higher perspective, as it were, through the disciplined analysis of ideas traced to their origin. Christianity rejects that in favour of 'simple faith' which is open to all. The distinctive problem of post-Christian culture is that the platonic kind of philosophical spirituality is automatically characterised along with belief and rejected on that account. That is the dialectic of belief and un-belief that underlies many of the debates. See Metaphysical Mistake, Karen Armstrong.

Anyway, take all this as a footnote to the discussion. — Wayfarer

Thanks for the quotes. I would like you to consider the following.

Euthyphro makes the following key statements regarding piety:

1. Zeus, the supreme God, is the best and most just of the Gods. Therefore, Zeus should be the standard for what constitutes pious human behavior.

2. People agree that the above is the case.

3. Piety is that which is loved (or approved) by the Gods.

4. Piety is a part of justice.

5. The Gods love the pious because it is pious.

6. Piety is to prosecute wrongdoers, i.e., those who are impious, whoever they may be.

7. Not to prosecute wrongdoers is impiety.

8. Piety is what he is doing now, i.e., prosecuting his father.

9. His views of piety and his actions are backed by the law.

Whilst Socrates appears to be critical of Euthyphro’s views, we cannot overlook or ignore the fact that he criticizes some points but not others.

Significantly, Socrates disputes particular actions attributed to Zeus, but not that Zeus should serve as the standard of human conduct.

Similarly, Socrates disputes certain points such as that the Gods love the pious because it is pious, but he does not dispute that the pious is pious because it is loved or approved by the Gods, etc.

What this logically means if we put all the above together, is that Socrates has no intention to denigrate piety or to demolish Euthyphro’s beliefs about piety – which he could easily do were this his intention – but simply to look for a more universal, unified, and better thought-out definition of piety.

It follows that the “aporia” is only apparent. If we think it through keeping in mind the cultural and religious context as well as related views held by Socrates and Plato as expressed in other dialogues, everything becomes clear: Socrates wants to establish what true piety is but wants the reader to come to the right conclusion following Socrates’ pointers.

Arguments along these lines have been made by Prof Diamond and others. I don't think they should be dismissed out of hand.

Eli Diamond, Philosophical Piety in Plato's Euthyphro - Academia.edu

Now, in Plato's works, we have not the manufactured article, but the real thing; we have the picture of a mind caught in the toils of thinkings ... — Rafael Demos, Introduction to Plato: Selections

This surprised me. The dialogues are mimesis, an imitation of act of thinking. The dialogues are highly crafted wholes.

Recent years have witnessed a powerful reaction against Plato

Times have certainly changed. There is now a great deal of attention being paid to Plato. There is a difference, at least with regard to one approach to the dialogues. These scholars reject "Platonizing".

As to a "theory of knowledge", I have started a new thread "Socratic Philosophy. I will be discussing this in light of his "second sailing". Bottom line, Plato does not have a theory of knowledge.

There is now a great deal of attention being paid to Plato. — Fooloso4

Sure, but I think major parts of his philosophy is still out of harmony with today's zietgeist, pretty much as Demos says.

Arguments along these lines have been made by Prof Diamond and others. I don't think they should be dismissed out of hand. — Apollodorus

Thanks, that's an interesting paper, I shall read it.

Sure, but I think major parts of his philosophy is still out of harmony with today's zietgeist, pretty much as Demos says. — Wayfarer

The Demos essay was published in 1929. I don't think the zeitgeist then, either in general of in philosophy, is today what it was then. But perhaps you are right about today. I don't keep up with the journals. I used to read Richard Marshalls interviews on 3 AM though, and my impression is that there is that things are pretty eclectic these days. I tend to look at what interests me, which is probably not representative of the mainstream if such a thing still exists or of current trends.