you might want to look at the process philosophy a metaphysics for our time. More relevant to your statement and question then the "leap to faith" versus "leap of faith".

]

I too have come to accept that 'the subjective' is irreducible, and that reality is subjective, in this radical sense. But I'm a little uneasy about the apparent pan-psychism of this excerpt. I still can't see how non-organic nature possesses a 'degree of subjectivity'. Any guidance appreciated. — Wayfarer

I am going to give you some excerpts from Whiteheads “ The Concept of Nature Chapter 2: Theories of the bifurcation of Nature” which is eminently readable compared to a lot of “Process and Reality”

“ For natural philosophy everything perceived is in nature. We may not pick and choose. For us the red glow of the sunset should be as much part of nature as are the molecules and electric waves by which men of science would explain the phenomenon. It is for natural philosophy to analyse how these various elements of nature are connected.

The theory of psychic additions would treat the greenness as a psychic addition furnished by the perceiving mind, and would leave to nature merely the molecules and the radiant energy which influence the mind towards that perception. My argument is that this dragging in of the mind as making additions of its own to the thing posited for knowledge by sense-awareness is merely a way of shirking the problem of natural philosophy. That problem is to discuss the relations inter se of things known, abstracted from the bare fact that they are known. Natural philosophy should never ask, what is in the mind and what is in nature. To do so is a confession that it has failed to express relations between things perceptively known, namely to express those natural relations whose expression is natural philosophy” ANW

“ The nature which is the fact apprehended in awareness holds within it the greenness of the trees, the song of the birds, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of the chairs, and the feel of the velvet. Nature which is the cause of awareness is the conjectured system of molecules and electrons which so affects the mind as to produce the awareness of apparent nature.” ANW

“The reason why the bifurcation of nature is always creeping back into scientific philosophy is the extreme difficulty of exhibiting the perceived redness and warmth of the fire in one system of relations with the agitated molecules of carbon and oxygen, with the radiant energy from them, and with the various functionings of the material body. Unless we produce the all-embracing relations, we are faced with a bifurcated nature; namely, warmth and redness on one side, and molecules, electrons and ether on the other side. Then the two factors are explained as being respectively the cause and the mind's reaction to the cause.” ANW

Just to throw time and space into the equation
“In succeeding lectures I shall explain my own view of time and space. I shall endeavour to show that they are abstractions from more concrete elements of nature, namely, from events. The discussion of the details of the process of abstraction will exhibit time and space as interconnected, and will finally lead us to the sort of connexions between their measurements which occur in the modern theory of electromagnetic relativity” ANW

Also Helpful from Steven Shaviro “Whitehead and Feeling”
“On Whitehead’s account, a tree has feelings – but they are probably quite different from the feelings that human beings have. A tree may well feel assaulted, for instance; we know that trees (and other plants) release pheromones when insects start eating their leaves. These emissions both act as a chemical attack on the predator, and warn other trees (or, indeed, other parts of the same tree) to take defensive measures as well. It is not ridiculous, therefore, to claim that a tree has feelings. However, it is unlikely that a tree would ever feel insulted or humiliated – these are human feelings that have no place in the life of trees.

This, of course, is the point at which many people will accuse Whitehead of anthropomorphism and projection. We can respond to this objection with Jane Bennett’s maxim that anthropomorphism helps us to avoid the far worse problems of anthropocentrism. After all, she notes, "too often the philosophical rejection of anthropomorphism is bound up with a hubristic demand that only humans and God can bear any traces of creative agency." In other words, attributing feeling to trees helps to shake us from our all-too-human, self-congratulatory belief that we are totally unlike all other entities: such as Robert Brandom’s view that we are sapient, whereas other living things are merely sentient. But actually, I don’t think that Whitehead is being anthropomorphic at all: rather, he is inverting the direction of anthropomorphic projections. For Whitehead, human feelings are in fact the exemplification, within our own experience, of a broader kind of process that is far more widely distributed among entities in the world.

The important point here is that subjective experience need not involve, and can be detached from, consciousness. On the one hand, Whitehead catergorically insists that "apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness." But he also continually reminds us that most of this "experience of subjects" is nonconscious. We feel more than we can know. And many organisms feel events in the world, without necessarily being conscious of what they feel. Trees for instance, have feelings, as many recent studies have shown (see, for instance, What a Plant Knows, by Daniel Chamovitz). Trees sense and feel the sunlight; they sense and feel water in the ground; they sense and feel when insects eat their leaves. But none of this necessarily means that trees are overtly conscious; most likely, they are not.

There is no ground for claiming that physicality somehow excludes mentality. I am inclined to agree with Strawson here; but the larger, Whiteheadian point is that the issue gets entirely confused when we simply equate mentality with consciousness. Neurobiologists have shown that many and perhaps most mental processes occur non-consciously, and may well be absolutely inaccessible to consciousness. But we need not assume, as neurobiologists and philosophers of mind generally do, that all this nonconscious mental activity can rightly be described as computation. Whitehead’s discussion of feeling gives us a broader picture of mental functioning than cognitive psychology does. I cannot develop this here, but my hunch is that feeling in this sense is a necessary precondition for cognition, but is not in itself cognitive.” SS

At the most fundamental level for one event to become data for a succeeding event (to perish) and for a new event to introduce any novelty or creativity into the world. The forming event (undergoing concrescence) must “prehend” (think primitive feeling, relatedness or external relations) both the data of the perishing event and the possibilities (eternal objects or lures) of the future. This form of prehending is a primitive form of “feeling or subjectivity”. A form of mind or experience (not consciousness) which extends to the most primitive of natural processes. The world is not a static being but a constant state of flux.

Think perhaps also of the phenomena of “quantum entanglement” where an event or measurement on one side of the universe instantaneously affects an event or measurement regardless of distance or locality, a “spooky action at a distance” which implies some connectedness throughout nature that our usual notion locality and direct contact to have effects fails to account for

In the end, purely physical explanations of nature tend to leave out elements of nature which are not directly measurable or observable. The written description of an experience or the purely physical explanation of an experience (think the color red, or a roller coaster ride) is never adequate to having the experience itself. It is very convenient to bifurcate nature and say one part is “real and objective” and the other is “merely subjective” but it shirks the real task of natural philosophy and speculative philosophy.

Too complex to detail here, but...
even empiricism is neglecting something. Feeling, is no less an organic sensation than seeing, touching, smelling, tasting, hearing. — ENOAH

You may be interested in this discussion of "feeling" written by Shaviro on Whitehead
Whitehead on Feeling
In fact "feeling", "lure", ,"satisfaction": "attraction" and "prehension" are all terms used to describe forms of non conscious, non sense organ dependent experience.
"The jellyfish advances and withdraws" a quote from ANW. Even this relatively simply creature to which we would not usually attribute anything like human consciousness or human awareness of our feelings exhibits a primitive form of awareness of its surroundings and responds to its environment with attraction or avoidance .. Feeling is universal for Whitehead and human consciousness depends on underlying non conscious experience. Even in humans most mental processing and activity never rises to the level of human conscious awareness. Mind in the form of feeling is the basis for all higher forms of experience the pinacle of which is human consciousness.

1a. Neutral monism is a philosophical theory that proposes that reality is made of a neutral entity, rather than mind or matter. It's a way of explaining how the mind and matter relate to each other.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=neutral+monism.

*1b. Neutral monism is an umbrella term for a class of metaphysical theories in the philosophy of mind, concerning the relation of mind to matter. These theories take the fundamental nature of reality to be neither mental nor physical; in other words it is "neutral".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism — Gnomon

I would not want to get too tied up trying to summarize something like process philosophy with as simple a summary or term as "neutral monism".

Process is neither materialism nor idealism. It is an ontology and is monistic in the sense that there is one ultimate entity "actual occasions" of which reality is composed. These "actual occasions" have both material (or physical) and mental (or experiential) aspects. The physical cannot be separated from the experiential in the "actual occasions" of process. Events have varying duration but they all eventually perish and become part of the data (information) along with some possibility from the future (from the realm of eternal objects, a Platonic style notion) to become (through concrescence) a new event. The way the new event incorporates data from the past and possibility from the future is part of what Whitehead terms "prehension" (a non conscious form of mentality, relatedness or experience). This introduces non sensory experience into the world. This is pretty dense with language from Process and Reality. What is mere potential or possibility becomes actual. The many become one and are increased by one.

To make a more scientific connection try correlating the above type language and ideas or notions to quantum events, quantum collapse, quantum probability and quantum field theory. I am afraid this is just the roughest of outlines. Viewing everything as a process (a becoming, system and organism) and as intimately dependent upon and related to the rest of reality in which it is embedded (thrown) is at least for me more palatable than a world of independent objects, inherent properties and a universe which is purely mechanistic, deterministic and lacking in any overall direction and purpose.

A previous thread on TPF asked "what exactly is process philosophy?" Although the discussion produced a variety of opinions on PP, it quickly got sidetracked into Us-vs-Them*1 political posturing, pro-or-con the crux of Whitehead's book Process and Reality*2 : Substance Metaphysics (Materialism) versus Relational Metaphysics (Idealism). So, it seems that whatever it "is", Whitehead's philosophy can be polarizing. I have no academic philosophical credentials, but here's what I have learned from a brief review of the book and its ramifications. What I didn't learn from the earlier thread is to avoid sticking my neck out with unpopular opinions. — Gnomon

I am late to the discussion and as usual the topic has wandered far off track.

The fundamental unit of reality in process is an "event" or "occasion" which is. a spatial temporal entity with both physical and experiential poles (or aspects). This is largely non conscious experience which falls under Whitehead's term prehension. One could consider this a particular form of neutral monism.

What we refer to as objects are really repeating patterns of events. For people used to thinking of the world as permanent objects with inherent properties the process way of thinking takes some adjustment and getting used to. Objects are repeating patterns of events and properties are relationships between these events. There are no fixed objects with independent properties. Everything that exists is in the process of becoming (not being, there is no static being) and everything depends on its relationships to the rest of reality (no independent objects with inherent properties).

What is matter in modern physics? Atoms are mostly empty "space" and subatomic particles can display both properties of "waves" and "particles". These are really just fluctuations or standing waves in quantum field theory. The distinction between matter and energy is somewhat artificial. The division of nature into separate categories of mind and matter, or subjective and objective is the "artificial bifurcation of nature" and the excessive reliance on mathematical models as a completely accurate representation of reality is the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"

One moment of experience (event, occasion) perishes and a new event is born incorporating elements of the past and possibilities from the future in the ceaseless creative advance into the future introducing novelty into the world.

It has not been a good couple of years for this Supreme Court.
Public confidence in the court as an impartial arbitrator of the law as opposed to just another political branch is at an all time low and not likely to recover soon.
I am beginning to think lifetime appointments are not a good idea and are giving us a court well out of touch with mainstream public opinion, the present and the likely future.
Packing the Court seems like a bad idea and one not likely to solve the problem
I have begun to think term limits (the 18 years and then revert to a lower federal court) which would allow and new justice to be appointed every two years (each session of congress) would help keep the court better in line with and more able to serve the society.
The affirmative action decision actually has majority public support but only because the history and present reality of systemic and institutional racism are something not experience or understood by the majority but lets not talk about teach or examine critical race theory (especially in Florida).

One can erase, change, modify or even eliminate the social constructs around gender roles in society.
Doing the same for the physical or biological aspects of sex or gender represents a more difficult problem.

Almost all of perceptual processing takes place at a level below "conscious awareness".
We as an organism are aware of much that we as a "conscious self" are not.
Experience and awareness (forms of mind) are ubiquitous in nature (unconscious experience).
That inner dialogue and self awareness that we focus on so hard is just a small portion of mental processing and environmental awareness.
Can there be any doubt that mind, experience and consciousness are evolutionary products?
"The jellyfish advances and withdraws" A.N Whitehead
Attraction and repulsion one of natures most fundamental features the forerunners to emotion and feeling which are the forerunners to what we call "self conscious awareness".
The neurology literature is full of examples of the disassociation of the conscious self from the awareness, experience and perception of the organism, blind sight is merely one example.

it would be really helpful if people would state what definition of "direct realism" and "indirect realism" they are using when they are posting.


Also explain how you think the science of color perception is compatible with "direct naive realism" as traditionally defined.
The physiology of perception of of perceptual disorders from brain injury stroke of even drug induced alterations pretty much supports the traditional concept of "indirect realism" as the term is defined in philosophy although many users here seem to have their own definitions which impairs meaningful discussion.

BTW the abstract from Penrose and Hameroff paper
Conscious Events as Orchestrated Space Time Selections
What is consciousness? Some philosophers have contended that 'qualia', or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived, exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, described the universe as being comprised of 'occasions of experience'. To examine this possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality must be re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of space-time - as is described by Einstein's general theory of relativity - and its relation to the fundamental theory of matter - as described by quantum theory. This leads us to employ a new physics of objective reduction: 'OR' which appeals to a form of 'quantum gravity' to provide a useful description of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline (Penrose, 1994; 1996). Within the OR scheme, we consider that consciousness occurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintain quantum coherent superposition until a specific 'objective' criterion (a threshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system then self-reduces (objective reduction: OR). We contend that this type of objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential feature of consciousness. OR is taken as an instantaneous event - the climax of a self-organizing process in fundamental space-time - and a candidate for a conscious Whitehead-like 'occasion' of experience. How could an OR process occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and account for other features of consciousness? We nominate an OR process with the requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal microtubules within the brain's neurons (Penrose and Hameroff, 1995; Hameroff and Penrose, 1995; 1996). In this model, quantum-superposed states develop in microtubule subunit proteins ('tubulins'), remain coherent, and recruit more superposed tubulins until a mass-time-energy threshold (related to quantum gravity) is reached. At that stage, self-collapse, or objective reduction (OR) abruptly occurs. We equate the pre-reduction, coherent superposition ('quantum computing') phase with pre-conscious processes, and each instantaneous (and non-computable) OR, or self-collapse, with a discrete conscious event. Sequences of OR events give rise to a 'stream' of consciousness. Microtubule-associated proteins can 'tune' the quantum oscillations of the coherent superposed states; the OR is thus self-organized, or 'orchestrated' ('Orch OR'). Each Orch OR event selects (non-computably) microtubule subunit states which regulate synaptic/neural functions using classical signalling. The quantum gravity threshold for self-collapse is relevant to consciousness, according to our arguments, because macroscopic superposed quantum states each have their own space-time geometries (Penrose, 1994; 1996). These geometries are also superposed, and in some way 'separated', but when sufficiently separated, the superposition of space-time geometries becomes signifcantly unstable, and reduce to a single universe state. Quantum gravity determines the scale of the instability; we contend that the actual choice of state made by Nature is non-computable. Thus each Orch OR event is a self-selection of space-time geometry, coupled to the brain through microtubules and other biomolecules. If conscious experience is intimately connected with the very physics underlying space-time structure, then Orch OR in microtubules indeed provides us with a completely new and uniquely promising perspective on the hard problem of consciousness.

I'd best not get into that here, it's completely different from whatever it is that Roger Penrose is describing. But I do agree that his 'proto-consciousness' seems pretty close to panpsychism, and also that it might be compatible with process philosophy. — Wayfarer

ok, I will tell you a search for Penrose and monism or Penrose and panpsychism makes for some interesting and relevant reading on the topic.

There are many theories that try to explain consciousness starting from non-consciousness. E.g.: identity theory, functionalism, computationalism, and others are even stranger, like Joscha Bach's virtualism. These seem to explain consciousness without mentioning the emergence from non-conscious to conscious, sometimes giving me the impression that they can be explained without this phenomenon, be it weak or strong. — Eugen

Of course the various forms of panpsychism attempt to do percisely that. Experience does not emerge mysteriously from non experiential matter. Consciousness does not pop into existence de novo. It is a particular form of mind or experience which has evolved from more primitive mental precursor states.

"Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focal
region of clear illumination, and a large penumbral region of experience
which tells of intense experience in dim apprehension. The simplicity of
clear consciousness is no measure of the complexity of complete experience.
Also this character of our existence suggests that consciousness is the
crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessary base.
(p. 267)
Whitehead is saying that unconscious experience is the ground of consciousness;
therefore, the unconscious is a necessary presupposition"

So is anything necessary regarding direct naive realism? If we’re already given that which is necessary, with respect to an answer to a question concerning some particular dilemma, what else do we need? — Mww

As long as one understands the process of perception and its inherent limitations, I do not care if you call it direct or indirect, and the distinction seems more semantic than fundamental given that understanding.

How can you speak of causal efficacy, a mysterious connective substance for sure, when you cannot see or touch a tree?

When the dog sees the rabbit, and gives chase, there is not a great deal of consideration of self, nor of causality going on. One does not say the dog's brain sees an image of a rabbit or that the dogs legs run after it — particularly, the dog or its legs cannot be running after a perception in its brain. No, the dog is running after the rabbit, that it has seen, not in its mind or its brain, but in the field, because that's where the rabbit is. — unenlightened

Of course we can both "see" and "touch" a tree using our sense and perception. It is the type of connection between the tree and our perceptual process that is up for discussion.
Dogs, I grant, are not given to discussions or considerations of direct versus indirect realism and perhaps we are likewise wasting our time engaging in them. The blind dog does not "see" the rabbit and even the "seeing dog" sees only certain aspects of the rabbit.

The post was not a response to you. Panpsychism in its various forms is pretty directly related to Penrose and his notions of proto consciousness, it just different uses of language.

ps://bigthink.com/mind-brain/the-universe-may-be-conscious-prominent-scientists-state/#:~:text=Penrose%20doesn't%20go%20so,that%20gave%20rise%20to%20it.%E2%80%9D[/url]

https://medium.com/paul-austin-murphys-essays-on-philosophy/is-physicist-roger-penrose-a-tacit-panpsychist-5591b4a65fc5

This is very much what Karen Armstrong has in mind as a 'mythos'. It's not just myth in the pejorative sense of 'a story that isn't true', but a narrative structure which accomodates all of those elements of existence by giving them a kind of over-arching metaphorical or symbolic structure. The Greek Myths and the Christian mythos are others. Even in modern Western culture many of these themes surface through super-hero movies and the like (per Joseph Campell, 'Hero with a Thousand Faces', one of the main sources for Star Wars.)

That's where I would situate your undertaking. — Wayfarer

Myths are not literally true, but they have meaning non the less in imparting values and understanding.
The story of the good Samaritan does not have to be true or even to have happened to impart the message and value that it is meant to convey. Religion as "mythos" is not meant to be an insult quite the contrary, it is meant to convey meaning. I am just agreeing with you.

Direct realism is a necessary condition for the proper functionality of sensory apparatus as such, nonetheless, and should be taken as granted from either point of view. — Mww

A direct link of causal efficacy is necessary, but that is a different proposition than direct naive realism.

↪prothero I always appreciate your contribution, and I'm interested in improving my understanding of Whitehead and process philosophy, although you're right in saying that we come at these questions from highly divergent perspectives and it's a difficult division to navigate. I've been reading a book on philosophy of physics, Nature Loves to Hide, Shimon Malin, which incorporates many of Whitehead's ideas. Still working through it. — Wayfarer

Whitehead is fundamentally a monist although the fundamental unit of nature is an "event" or "occasion" these events have aspects which are temporal, physical and "experiential". What is meant by "experience" here is not the standard implication of the word and whitehead uses "feeling" or "prehension" interchangeably with this conception of non conscious experience. Part of nature is always hidden from empirical measurement and external observation or reductionism.
You fundamentally implied you are not a monist?
You also implied you limit any type of mental aspect to living forms?
So the gap between us is wide but not too wide for dialogue.

↪prothero I would agree with you if it weren't for...well...Chalmers. He's got a paper on proto-consciousness and for him it is non-experiencial, it's not consciousness, but it's not matter either. Because of that, I can't be sure Penrose isn't on the same track. — Eugen

A semantic difference in the use of the term experience. Many types of systems take in information about the environment and respond to it. You can call that proto consciousness if you wish but others are calling it awareness or experience.

If you are truly interested try searching for non conscious experience, or Whitehead on “feeling” or “prehension”. Different authors use the terms differently and we all have our favorites but in order to discuss these issues we have to have some common concepts to work with.

Whitehead on Feelings – The Pinocchio Theory

(PDF) From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience

↪frank So far an AI would be none the wiser (with respect to direct / indirect perception). All these clouds floating around, trees in heads or not in heads--it gives one a headache. The AI overheats and shuts down. — BC

Well, yes, what is important is understanding the process of perception not engaging in a semantic argument about the meaning of "direct" or "indirect". Perception is a process with its limitations and bees have their own perceptual process which in some respects is superior to our own.

↪prothero So you're saying Penrose is actually referring to phenomenal consciousness but he calls it proto-consciousness just because most of people conflate consciousness with self-awareness? — Eugen

Well, yes, people use different terms to try to avoid the confusion which goes with using "consciousness". I am not sure what you mean by the term "phenomenal consciousness" just as you would not be sure what I mean by panexperientialism or prehension. The general idea is that some form of mind or experience is widespread (if not ubiquitous) in nature and that human consciousness is just one of many forms of mind or experience in nature. As I alluded to before the human brain takes in much more experience of the world than we are "conscious" of.

If we take the premise "god = existence", then the question "does god exist" is redundant as its like saying "does existence exist?"
— Benj96
:up: — 180 Proof

Well if one is to discuss whether god "exists" or not, it would be good to start with a discussion of what one means by "God". The source of much talking past each other.

Then why don't they just call it consciousness?
— Eugen

I'm not sure. Maybe they want to avoid potential accusations of anthrpomorphization. They perhaps want to avoid being accused of saying that atoms fondly remember days of their youth in stars and regret they are now stuck in some cold asteroid a zillion miles from anywhere interesting. So instead of this kind of conscious experience we as humans are familiar with, they give the experiences of atoms, whatever they might be, a different name to distance them from us. I don't know. I haven't read much by people who are specifically pan-proto-psychists. — bert1

Yes, I think that is precisely correct. They use different terms to avoid precisely that confusion and if reading the various posts about consciousness is any indication it is a confusion worth trying to avoid.
I did enjoy your example about atoms, stars and asteroids.

The phrase "external world" implies a separate "internal world" in which presumably "perception" happens, as distinct from "seeing" which happens in the external world when for example, the dog sees the rabbit. Indirect realists are happiest talking about seeing and most unhappy talking about touching, for reasons that are probably fairly obvious.

But the problem with this dual world that indirect realism seems to require is that bodies, sense-organs and' most of all, brains, are part of the external world that they have no direct contact with. — unenlightened

I think the distinction between self and other is pretty fundamental to human cognition and psychology.
Although I would agree we are embedded in and part of the larger world and that our perception of the tree is as "real" as the tree itself, it would seem a semantic distinction between the tree as it is separate from us and our perception of the tree as formed in the mind and through the senses is warranted.
Yes there is a direct path of causal efficacy from the eternal world to the perception and so in that sense it is "direct" but that slanders my understanding of the direct realism or Naive realism argument.

Solipsism is a rabbit hole and once you go down, it can be difficult to find your way out.
Solipsism is an extreme form of skepticism. A little skepticism is good but too much can be disabling.
It is kind of like an addiction, first you have to want to change.

Is this your argument? I can't see everything, so I can't see anything. If you have a picture of the world, how do you see it? Indirectly? — unenlightened

I do not think that was the argument; It was more we don't see everything not we do not see anything. Yes sense perception has a direct causal link to the external world but the senses are selective and perception is a process that occurs in the brain not in the external world. Again how are you defining direct realism vs indirect realism ?

Your conclusion doesn’t follow. Another possibility which is consistent with the premises is this: we see things in certain human ways, but it’s the things we are seeing, not representations thereof. That’s direct perception. — Jamal

If that's your definition of direct realism then the distinction between direct and indirect disappears but I do not think that definition is the one universally applied in the argument.

We have devices that can show us those. So, it's not the issue. — L'éléphant

Quite the contrary IMV, direct and indirect realism are questions about perception not about scientific instrumentation. Furthermore what makes you think scientific instrumentation reveals all?

Well there is faith in the scientific method and faith in religious propositions, but I am not sure we are really talking about the same methodology in both spheres?

I have never been able to fanthom the "direct realism" argument.
Our senses (body and mind) filter, organize and present information (data) from the external enviroment in a way that is advantageous (usually) for our survival. Do our senses give us an entirely complete picture of the external environment, it would seem quite clearly not; we don't see UV or Infrared, we do not hear frequencies above or below certain limits. So our picture of the world including the way we color it is a representation of reality, not a complete picture of all or nature.
So for me, it is the direct realism argument which is undermined by the science of perception.

I'll try and say what I feel is mistaken with Penrose's efforts in this regard. To me, he seems to be attempting to arrive at an objective account of the nature of consciousness (or mind). Whereas the way I see it, is that the mind (or consciousness or awareness) are not known to us as an object of experience (in the way that all material objects are, being spatially located and sense-able). Of course, I can infer all kinds of things about the nature of mind or consciousness through objective analysis within the scope of cognitive science, but what consciousness is, its essential nature, as the ground or basis of experience, is another matter. It seems to me that Step 1 in the investigation is acknowledging that limitation, which is a problem in principle, not simply a matter of acquiring more data. — Wayfarer

Here again, at a fundamental level I would take issue with your distinction between mind and matter. As Whitehead would say “the jellyfish advances and withdraws” likewise the electron is attracted and repulsed. There is (in my worldview)” no such thing as inert, independent matter with inherent properties. There are no quantum particles with inherent values. Instead there are quantum events occurring in space time with some measurable relationships. The reductionist and empirical approach of science gives a partial view of nature. There are much deeper and hidden connections between processes and events which are somewhat beyond our understanding (quantum entanglement is a good example).

There are always physical correlates to experience but measurement or observation of the physical correlate alone does not give you a complete picture of nature. Activity in certain areas of the human brain is associated with certain mental experiences (emotions, hunger, anger, etc.) but that observation or empirical measurement is not the totality of the “event” or experience. In my view that is true of all empirical reductionist approaches to nature although what is left out of the description in physics is much less than what is left out in biology.

When people have such profound differences in their ontologic worldview it is hard to see how they will ever come to agreement about more derivative matters. So such discussions may allow them to understand each other's point of view but not to agree. It is like two different cultures with two different worldviews colliding. The best we can do is better understand each other. Since so much of these discussions is speculation the best that can be hoped for is to be exposed to some new ideas to consider or new approaches to explore. These are not arguments to be won or minds (no pun intended) to be changed.

And this I profoundly differ with. I'm more inclined to accept the basically Aristotelian distinction between the living and non-living, and also between the sentient and non-sentient (e.g. animal and vegetative) and rational and non-rational (human and animal). These signify fundamental differences as far as I'm concerned. Trying to attribute consciousness to matter or work out how it is that matter can be or become conscious seems mistaken to me. And the idea that everything is composed of a single substance is lumpen materialism (which I don't think Penrose actually advocates.) — Wayfarer

As is usual in these types of discussions we would be starting from very different ontologic assumptions. I think the distinction between living and non living is somewhat artificial and any sharp line drawn can be shown to be arbitrary in nature. I also think the way people bandy the term “consciousness” about leads to considerable confusion since they do not agree on a definition or common usage. How can we discuss what “entities” might be “conscious” if we do not agree on a meaning for the term? If we do not know what “counsciousness” is how can we discuss proto-consciousness? Human consciousness is associated with human brains. What term should we use for the seeming mind or intelligence (experience or awareness if you prefer) of an ant colony or a bee hive? Since “consciousness” for most people means that self aware internal dialogue we as humans experience is it really the appropriate term for other types of experience and awareness of other creatures, systems and organizations?

I ascribe to a form of panpsychism which still strikes many as nonsense despite the increase in popularity and consideration of the term and idea among many philosophers of late. Of course the experience of a jellyfish is nothing like the consciousness of a human, but is it a difference in ontologic kind or just a difference in degree and form?

I am also a monist although a discussion of the nature of “matter” or “substance” would be in order since I would object to being categorized as a “lumpen materialist” since I am more of a process philosophy advocate.

I think even most human experience (the taking in of information from the environment, the filtering, organization and presentation of such data) to the human mind does not rise to the level of conscious awareness i.e. most human mental activity is not “conscious” in the sense lay people understand and use the term.

Well let us see a little of what Penrose has to say:
“But there is one thing that I do believe in relation to this problem [of consciousness], and that is that it is a scientific question that eventually should become answerable, no matter how far from being about to answer it we may be at present.” — Roger Penrose
“The question is significantly raised, of course, as to whether a paramecium — or, indeed, an individual human liver cell — might actually possess some rudimentary form of consciousness [].” Roger Penrose
“If we are to believe that neurons are the only things that control the sophisticated actions of animals, then the humble paramecium presents us with a profound problem.”
So what is the nature of that problem? Penrose continues:
“For she [a paramecium] swims about her pod with her numerous tiny hairlike legs — the cilia — darting in the direction of bacterial food which she senses using a variety of mechanisms, or retreating at the prospect of danger, ready to swim off in another direction. She can also negotiate obstructions by swimming around them. Moreover, she can apparently even learn from her past experiences [].”
Finally:
“How is all this achieved by an animal without a single neuron or synapse? Indeed, being but a single cell, and not being a neuron herself, she has no place to accommodate such accessories.”
“such (putative) non-computational processes [i.e., in the brain and which Penrose believes are vital for both consciousness and what he calls “understanding”] would also have to be inherent in the action of inanimate matter, since living human brains are ultimately composed of the same material, satisfying the same physical laws, as are the inanimate objects of the universe”.
Penrose also tells us that he doesn’t “perceive any necessity that such a device [one that instantiates or merely simulates consciousness] be biological in nature”. He goes on:
“I perceive no essential dividing line between biology and physics (or between biology, chemistry, and physics).”
Nevertheless [] the behaviour pattern of an ant is enormously complex and subtle. Need we believe that their wonderfully effective control systems are unaided by whatever principle it is that give us our own qualities of understanding?”

How does this differ from some forms of panpsychism? In particular panexperientialism?
I think the use of the term consciousness is confusing and there is no uniform usage or definition.
It does seem like awareness of the enviroment and adpatable response is fairly widespread (perhaps ubiquitous) in nature and so as not to confuse these forms of experience or mind with human like self awareness and reflection perhaps some other term like mind, experience or awareness is appropriate.

The all knowing all seeing invisible god once again escapes detection and destruction. It seems unlikely the argument will convince.

From Wikipedia
Throughout its history, Hermeticism was closely associated with the idea of a primeval, divine wisdom, revealed only to the most ancient of sages, such as Hermes Trismegistus.[10] In the Renaissance, this developed into the notion of a prisca theologia or "ancient theology", which asserted that there is a single, true theology which was given by God to some of the first humans, and traces of which may still be found in various ancient systems of thought. Thinkers like Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494) supposed that this 'ancient theology' could be reconstructed by studying (what were then considered to be) the most ancient writings still in existence, such as those attributed to Hermes, but also those attributed to, e.g., Zoroaster, Orpheus, Pythagoras, Plato, the 'Chaldeans', or the Kaballah.[11] This soon evolved into the idea, first proposed by Agostino Steuco (1497–1548), that one and the same divine truth may be found in the religious and philosophical traditions of different periods and places, all considered as different manifestations of the same universal perennial philosophy.[12] In this perennialist context, the term 'Hermetic' tended to lose even more of its specificity, eventually becoming a mere byword for the purported divine knowledge of the ancient Egyptians, especially as related to alchemy and magic. Despite their occasional use of authentic Hermetic texts and concepts, this generic and pseudo-historical use of the term was greatly popularized by nineteenth- and twentieth-century occultists.[13]
From this initial reading, I am not interested in Hermeticism as it seems to be a form of special revelation, have supernatural aspects and predate our modern scientific worldview but perhaps you can somehow make it interesting?

Long term safety certainly has not been established. That said, I have no doubt many therapeutics are approved prior to long term safety being established. — Janus

600,000 thousand and counting dead in the U.S. from the virus or complications. How many deaths from the vaccine? What long term deleterious effects are you rationally contemplating that could make the vaccine the less good choice?

The philosophical problem is to construct a system of thought, ideas or concepts which accommodates religion, science, experience and reason. No easy task

Maybe private morality, but public behavior or morality may be a different thing?
consenting adults in the privacy of their own dwelling and all that. I am sort of a libertarian.

There was a true story about a German man who wanted to be killed and another party who agreed to do it … would you consider this behaviour moral under the golden rule principle as long as two parties agree on something even if it borders on the absurd then it is moral? — Deus

Personally I think if two adult mentally competent individuals want to engage in BDSM of any of a number of other private personnel behaviors it is none of my business.
Likewise, I think competent adults who wish to end their own life, should have the right and maybe even to enlist assistance if needed (ALS or other limiting circumstance).
I have to wonder though under what general moral philosophical principal I am operating (certainly not the golden rule or the ten commandments).

There are many themes within religious traditions and various traditions of thought, so it is extremely complex, but some thinkers do believe that knowledge of the ultimate is beyond any one particular tradition. — Jack Cummins

Well, you know, you get quotes:
"God is too big to be put in a box", "God is too big for one religion"
that is all fine.
One can state why one ascribes to a particular religious viewpoint and respond to queries, questions and challenges.
We can exchange viewpoints and try better to understand each others point of view but there is no definitive authority for religion.
Some religious conceptions are clearly at odds with reason and science and as such probably cannot be entertained or discussed on a philosophy forum.
It seems to me supernatural theism and special revelation fall into this category. Many literal interpretations of scripture (created in six days, 6000 year old earth, etc) are also beyond rational discourse.
I think much traditional Christian orthodox theology and doctrine is beyond rational discussion. Some more esoteric or mystical version or interpretations of Christianity might be accepted.
Eastern traditions especially those which emphasize divine immanence and the impersonal nature of the divine probably are more easily accommodated into a world view which includes both reason and science. What do you believe and why? or which particular religious concept do you wish to explore?