The universe at it's largest scale, seems to be a system based on disorder-order-disorder. — universeness
"Egalitarian cause" is an abstract concept. Abstract concepts can not fail. What fails is the process displaying the property described by the abstract concept. Societies are where egalitarian causes are realized. Do you agree?Never said they do fail. I said egalitarian causes fail. — frank
-So we agree there are different expressions of human behavior...not a specific type of Human Nature!I've expressed this sentiment multiple times in this thread. Thanks for repeating it. — frank
Emphasizing central/main points in statements.Just out of curiosity, why are you capitalizing certain letters that wouldn't generally be capitalized in English? Such as "Scientific Knowledge?" Capitalizing it in that way makes it look like you're using it as a proper name. — frank
That value statement lies on objective criteria.Right, and but that is smuggling in value statements as if they were objective fact about what comprises what. — schopenhauer1
-Again you are asking a "why" question in disguise. This is what emergent features do! This is why we classify them as emergent in the fist place. Just because you constructed an answerable question that doesn't make it a serious question and No....made up magical substrates do not qualify as an answer.It does not (at least now, possibly never because the answer might never be empirical) tell us how it is that emergent phenomena supervene on its constituents. — schopenhauer1
-Observations are the foundation of our evaluations. You can not go around it. If you do then you will need to lower the standards and accept Every claim out there.Facts of reality render that claim wrong. — Nickolasgaspar
Which are based observationally. Convenient. — schopenhauer1
-Your comment is irrelevant to the fact of Diachronic Emergent phenomenon (Where the low level system ceases to exist but the Emergent property persists).No the analogy of a container is wrong since Diachronic Emergence wouldn't be possible. (persistence after the causal mechanism ceasing to exist). — Nickolasgaspar
Still doesn't bypass it. You are assuming the consequent again. — schopenhauer1
And I didn't say you said ghost. You said ghostly and I pointed out that the phenomenon doesn't share the same ghostly qualities.(or the other way around to be fair -"Ghosts do not share the same qualities.".Yep they are observable indeed. And I did not say "ghosts" but "ghostly" big difference in what I am conveying. — schopenhauer1
It depends what "nature" you are looking for. If you are looking for its contingency then its nature is physical and its taxonomy is Strong Emergence.Rather, what is the nature of this emergence from its constituent parts? — schopenhauer1
Wrong accusations are not philosophical arguments.You are making an odd antagonism. Most philosophers are not denying empirical claims. Functionally, the science carries on, no matter what the argument behind the metaphysics and epistemology is, so not sure what has got you so annoyed besides just general incredulity over and over. — schopenhauer1
-you stated , I quote "Philosophy and science are doing two different things." So I pointed out that its not about science vs philosophy, its Philosophy vs Pseudo philosophy.Glad it's not science we are discussing. In Fight Club we don't talk about Fight Club. But I'm not in Fight Club, so I'll talk about it and not limit myself in such a way. — schopenhauer1
-Classifying different types of emergence doesn't change the nature of an observable phenomenon like human conscious states.Also about emergence, there are whole sections of philosophy that discuss the trickiness of emergence and reduction- how it is that the whole reduces to its parts. Weak and strong emergence, which I think you were alluding to. We know that new entities supervene on their constituents, but we aren't clear on how. — schopenhauer1
Facts of reality render that claim wrong.An Idealist, for example, could make the claim that emergence could never take place without an observational standpoint. — schopenhauer1
No the analogy of a container is wrong since Diachronic Emergence wouldn't be possible. (persistence after the causal mechanism ceasing to exist).Sort of a container. — schopenhauer1
The new emergent phenomena are observable, measurable and most of the times quantifiable. We can affect them and manipulate them by changing the setup of the responsible process. Ghosts do not share the same qualities.Otherwise, we get ghostly new entities from fiat, which itself has to be explained. — schopenhauer1
"Answering it"? I am not sure your statement is on topic. We identify the Necessary and Sufficient mechanisms responsible for the emergence of the phenomenon.In other words, answering it by giving its constituents would simply be circular reasoning and not a sufficient answer. — schopenhauer1
You didn't quote my argument so I am not sure you understood it correctlyThis is your whole argument repeated. — schopenhauer1
Correct. Science produces the most credible Epistemology while Philosophy is the tool we use to understand its implications and make us wiser.Philosophy and science are doing two different things. — schopenhauer1
Not true. As I pointed out many times before ,claims with unknown epistemic value can never be accepted as wise. (this isn't difficult to comprehend).The assumption you’re making is the value statement that philosophy is to only be subordinate to science to have any value. — schopenhauer1
-We can agree on that. The problem emerges when a dialogue doesn't start fromasturdy epistemic foundation allowing it to drift towards wishful thoughts and desires.Rather, it is a never ending dialogue that poses questions and proposes avenues to explore to answer them — schopenhauer1
-That is a factually wrong statement. Science, previously known as Natural Philosophy is a Philosophical Category with the addition of a huge set of empirical and statistical methodologies.It considers science as a methodology but is not bound to not ask questions science cannot be able to answer. — schopenhauer1
_No I am only demarcating Philosophy from pseudo philosophical claims based on fallacious reasoning and total lack of epistemic support in their metaphysical assumptions.You are asking philosophy to do something it’s not bound to do and say why isn’t it so bound. Sounds like a you problem. — schopenhauer1
-Yes that is his point and I am not saying he is not making that point. I am only saying that his objections are hugely misinformed! All Emergent properties BY DEFINITION do NOT share the same characteristics with mechanisms responsible for their "existence".You are missing his point. Rotating a cube in your mind is a phenomenon. Physiological/biological processes are a phenomenon. They are correlated. Yet that correlation, while no one is doubting its correlation through observation, has it such that a completely new kind of phenomena takes place that is different from all the other physical phenomena — schopenhauer1
You are using way to many abstract concepts for your statement to make any meaning. I will try to break it down in known processes. "Yes the ability of the brain to receive internal or external stimuli through the workings of a complex sensory system and to reflect upon them through the unique biological setup of an organism and a large list of mental properties(memory, reasoning, imagination, symbolic language, pattern recognition etc) renders its role fundamental for our ability to experience the qualities of the worlds subjectively.That is, it is the fundamental phenomena of qualitative-ness/ experiential-ness. — schopenhauer1
All emergent phenomena are different from any other phenomenon. i.e. Cellular Self Organization is a unique feature! We just cherry pick the phenomenon experience to produce our narrative for our "special nature" or to justify our death denying ideologies.That such a unique thing exists that is so different than all the physical phenomena is the question. — schopenhauer1
-Again, "why" questions are not good questions when it comes to understand Natural phenomena.Why should neural networks be correlated with qualatitiveness? — schopenhauer1
-That is a false conclusion.First all we haven't verified any other realm so a physical description is the only thing we can evaluate. Such a description could NEVER be an ism (since it is a description)....It can only be Science.A purely physical description would simply be some sort of behaviorism. — schopenhauer1
That's a wrong example. AI works on algorithms. We on an other hand work on emotions reasoned in to feelings which in turn inform our Actions.. It would be like AI that has no qualitative experience but has inputs and outputs. But that's not the case, we have experience. — schopenhauer1
You are not listening , I am not saying "we don't need to explain that". I am only pointing out that "amazing properties" are what matter is capable off. The bigger the complexity of the structure and function is the more advanced these emerging properties get.You can play ignorant hobbit, and say we don't need to explain that, but then you are just pouting that it is such a hard question and then delegitimizing it because of its difficulty. — schopenhauer1
Again these questions are not hard, they are fallacious (poisoning the well).Well, poo poo, it is a quite difficult question, and thus will remain a thorn in the side of your sour grapes that it cannot be explained. — schopenhauer1
Please, don't project your personal motivation!.I am not the one who really needs to have an answer even if it means to invent a completely new substrate (its not wise to attempt to answer a mystery with a bigger mystery). My approach is cold, scientific and in total agreement with the basic rules and principles of science.But to make the problem go away by simple fiat that philosophical inquiry just sucks is not going to do anything other than show your feeling about it. — schopenhauer1
For that...you will need to talk to materialists. I am not a materialist but a Methodological Naturalist. I reject all metaphysical worldviews and I try to keep out from our epistemology and working hypotheses all metaphysical artifacts that can't be falsified.I don't know the answer to the hard question obviously. But what I do know is that there is a hidden dualism in materialist assumptions. — schopenhauer1
-This doesn't make sense. Pls read about Scientific Emergence and Complexity science. It will help you understand the differences between Pragmatic Necessity ( to accept a empirical regular phenomenon without making ontological questions) and Idealistic preferences (making up claims for an assumed underlying ontological mechanism).Emergence/integration/binding it doesn't matter your phrasing, it is all stand ins for "magical experience takes place". You are always thus jumping from category physical to category mental activity. — schopenhauer1
Mental Activity is contingent to physical structure and function. Without the latter you can not have the first.You are always thus jumping from category physical to category mental activity. — schopenhauer1
-You need to study Neuroscience before making those false claims. Again don't talk about "correlations" . Science systematicity doesn't deal with simple correlations.The assumption is simply just put there because we know indeed we experience. Nothing is explained otherwise as to the nature of this "experience" other than it is correlated with these physiological correlations. — schopenhauer1
We Shouldn't care for any assumed, untestable metaphysical ontology.We only care about the observable ontology that enables a phenomenon to manifest in our realm.No, again, that is not ontologically how they are one and the same, just that these physical processes correlate to these experiential ones. Those are indeed the easy problems Chalmers mentions. — schopenhauer1
-Be aware of your bad language mode since it derails and pollutes your train of thought. Experience is NOT an agent. Its a label we put on a biological process where sensory systems feed stimuli to the brain and the brain process them in to meaning through the consumption of metabolic molecules and by achieving connections to different brain areas specialized on different properties of mind..Experience the very thing which observes the other phenomena. How is it this is the biological/physical substrate, and if it "arises" from the physical substrates, "what" is this "arising"? — schopenhauer1
Well the end of Philosophy came with that "why" question. There is nowhere to go from there. If we embrace the right "how/what" question there is plenty of philosophy to be done on available scientific data.Cool. End of philosophy — schopenhauer1
Again a disguised "why" question that doesn't really ask anything meaningful. Why Weak and Strong forces exist?......they just do. Why electricity exists....etc.Rather, how is it that experience is at all, along with biochemical processes. — schopenhauer1
Even if that was true...How can you ever make claim that? BUt it isn't . For 35 years we have managed to get closer and closer to a descriptive framework about the Necessary and Sufficient role of a biological mechanism in our ability to experience ourself and surroundings.Just the piling on of more biochemical (or any physical) processes is not going to get you closer to that answer. — schopenhauer1
-Again, a "why question" that doesn't have an answer is not harder....its irrelevant and without meaning.It simply answers the easier problems of what events we can observe correlating with subjectivity/experientialness. — schopenhauer1
No I am not, I am pointing to the descriptive framework of a mechanism proven to be Necessary and Sufficient for that specific property to manifest in reality.Yeah now you are just making categorical errors all over the place. — schopenhauer1
-No I pointed to Strong Correlations that render specific physical processes Necessary and Sufficient for a mental state to emerge. Strong Correlations in Science are the closest we can get to a proof(philosophy of Science-Paul Hoyningen). Of course Science is not a tool of Logic/mathematics(the other way around) so we can not prove 100% anything. What we can do is to try and falsify our working Hypothesis. For 35-40 years we are constantly failing to falsify and render thes biological mechanisms Unnecessary and Insufficient.You went from "mental state" (the thing in question), to its physical correlates, — schopenhauer1
-For that question you will need to visit Neurosciencenews.org , put the search key phrase "How the brain does" and you will learn the "hows" and "whats" for many mental functions.but no closer to how the correlates ARE the mental state (ontologically). — schopenhauer1
-Again the "hard problem" is a made problem without an answer. We don't have a way to judge the truth value of an answer in favor of a teleological question. In addition to that, Intention and Purpose need to be demonstrated before they are asserted.Homunculus here and there and everywhere. You do not seem to be getting the hard problem or are obstinately ignoring it. — schopenhauer1
-No I'm just pointing out that "why" questions (like why there is something rather than nothing) are pseudo philosophical questions. Just because we can not answer them it doesn't mean they are hard. They are nonsensical, fallacious and they are far from the real hard questions of the field.So now it really does show you do not know the difference between easy and hard problem and are repeating this error over and over. — schopenhauer1
-Please do, but I think the problem here is that you ignore the latest science what fallacies are.I can try to explain it better if you want, but I feel that I have in my last post so not sure what else to say but you are not getting it. — schopenhauer1
Of course it is. In science we are honest enough to say we don't know what gravity is, it behaves the way it does, but we won't make claims about a supernatural source for its properties. We just identity the necessary and sufficient mechanism for the emergence of the phenomenon, do our measurements and math and describe/ predict the phenomenon.That's not scientific at all. The very thing that is most well known to us (our own subjective experience) you are just saying "It is". N — schopenhauer1
-Science is based on the Principles of Methodological Naturalism.That means our methods and description can only be within the realm we can observe and investigate and we are forced to keep supernatural explanations outside our frameworks until we are able to verify/falsify them.Not very scientific. — schopenhauer1
-You shouldn't go to that debate. Idealism is a pseudo philosophical worldview that hasn't assisted our Epistemology or Philosophy. Philosophy's first stem is the evaluation of our Epistemology(what we know and how we know it). Unfortunately for idealists, we don't have any knowledge based on Idealistic principles.The other stuff you mentioned, ironically can go straight into the realist versus idealist debate for if those phenomena (scientific or otherwise) are anything beyond our empirical observation of it. — schopenhauer1
No I have not, I haven't suggested any problems. I am just addressing one of the pseudo philosophical "why" questions of Chalmers's supposedly "hard problem.[/quote]You have conflated easier problems with the Hard Problem. — schopenhauer1
No they are not Neuroscience deals with far more difficult problems than Chalmers teleological fallacious questions.[/quote]Easier problems deal with mechanisms for brain function. — schopenhauer1
-Please watch Anil Seth lectures on the subject. You will learn about our difficulties.This can be tested and is amenable to empirical verification. — schopenhauer1
Its like asking "why previously exited electrons produce a particle out of thin air"....the answer to all this type of questions is "because they do".The Hard Problem is how it is that there is a point of view. — schopenhauer1
-The question is fallacious(teleology) since the answer can only be whatever the questioner desires.The problem is that people who try to handwave the question by purporting the easier problems as the solution, aren't getting it. — schopenhauer1
If you study the scientific material of the interdisciplinary fields you will see that we are tackling far more meaningful and logical questions. As I wrote before,this why question can be answered by Evolutionary biology. Experiencing your Environment provides a Survival advantage to Organisms(animals) that aren't plants and need to move around and compete for resources. The fact that we have 2.5 milion of species (animals and insects) with different qualities of experiences verifies the evolutionary character of the property.They are ALREADY assuming the consequent without explaining it. — schopenhauer1
You are confusing the ability to be conscious with the quality of a conscious experience. That is a common error idealists do based on Bad Language Mode. You also confuse a secondary Mind Property with Consciousness which is the top 3 (According to Neuroscience).It is the Homunculus Fallacy. Simply listing off physical processes doesn't get at things like subjective qualia or imagination. — schopenhauer1
-That is a mental state. Your Central Later Thalamus has the ability to connect different areas of your brain, specialized in Memory/past experience, logic, Abstract thinking, Symbolic language, Critical thinking, Imagination etc and introduce content in that specific mental state....and all this is enabled by your Ascending Reticular Activating System.What IS that thing that mind-thing that I am doing when I am imagining a blue cube being rotated in my mind? What is THAT. — schopenhauer1
-Of course it answers a huge part of that answer and not only that!!!! We can use this knowledge either to force a brain to recreate that specific state, we can read brain scans and based on the brain patter we can accurately (up to 85%) decode the conscious thought of the subject, we have designed Surgery and Medical protocols that can reestablish or improve specific mental states in patients and we can make Accurate diagnoses by looking at the physiology and function of brains and by analyzing the symptoms of a patient's mental states. We can predict mental malfunctions by studying the pathology of brains...and the list goes on.You can say it is "such-and-such neural networks" and that it developed because of "such-and-such evolutionary reasons", but that is not answering the question. — schopenhauer1
-brains are connected to a complex sensory system and they can store images. People who haven't observed such images are unable to reproduce them. The evolution in Arts , Music, Architecture, design etc verifies the importance of experiencing existing patterns in order to be able to modify and improve on them.How is it that there is this rotating of the blue cube that is happening with the firing of the neurons. — schopenhauer1
-Why gravity has the quality it has...why it pulls but never pushes. Why conductivity manifest solely in metals. Why electricity passing through silicon ICs can produce images on a TFT or LED panel.It is superimposed, and forced into the picture but without explanation, only correlation with various obvious empirical stuff that isn't getting any closer to the answer to the question. — schopenhauer1
First of the content of a metaphysical belief(accuracy) about the nature of the world does not really play any role in our survival.Are they highly accurate? After all, for much of human history, we've had some kooky beliefs about what, exactly, the world is and is made of. — RogueAI
I really don’t accept that. You’re talking about him as if he lived in Medieval Europe. He had a career spanning 50 years, which wasn’t even 100 years ago. — Wayfarer
...but you insist on mentioning the longevity of his carrier ?It wasn’t so much an appeal to authority, — Wayfarer
It wasn’t so much an appeal to authority, but the observation that a lot of people say that Chalmer’s work is pseudo-philosophy, without, I think, demonstrating an understanding of the rationale behind his ‘hard problem’ argument. And indeed, that single paper launched Chalmers into a career as an internationally-renowned and tenured philosopher, which says something. — Wayfarer
that has nothing to do with logic (or knowledge). That is mostly scientific ignorance.There is the logic that biology alone fails in any explanation of consciousness. — Mark Nyquist
-....there are these things called eyes, ears and mouth which are connected to the brain. The communication of ideas use the exact same mechanism like any other environmental stimuli that ends up in our brains.We communicate ideas but no biology is transfered brain to brain in the process. — Mark Nyquist
-Again, reductionism is not the only tool science have.We use Complexity Science to study the emergent properties in complex systems.That points away from reductionism and suggests something emergent is necessary in understanding consciousness — Mark Nyquist
Actually the main problems are Complexity and Observation Objectivity collapse (our ability to make observations without interacting with the system).This is the science of the problem. Observable and repeatable. — Mark Nyquist
Curious then that Chalmers is University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University, and an Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. Must have fooled a lot of important people! — Wayfarer
Unfortunately, "consciousness" is an analogous term, and using this definition, when I define consciousness differently (as "awareness of intelligiblity"), is equivocation. If you want to criticize my work, then you must use technical terms as I use them. In saying this, I am not objecting to ypur definition in se, only to its equivocal use. — Dfpolis
I will agree with you that it is a Working Hypothesis since we don't already have a Theory mainly because we have to many competing frameworks at this point.Then you will have no problem in explaining how this hypothesis, which I am calling the Standard Model (SM), conforms to the facts I raised against it. — Dfpolis
-Yes a healthy functioning brain is a necessary and sufficient explanation for any property of mind known to us. We may miss many details on how specific properties correlate to specific brain functions but that's not a reason to overlook the huge body of knowledge that we've gained the last 35 years.Please note that I fully agree that rational thought requires proper brain function. So, that is not the issue. The issue is whether brain function alone is adequate. — Dfpolis
-An important question that comes in mind is: " Is your problem relevant to our efforts to understand".That may well be true. I do not know what neuroscientists consider hard, nor is that what I am addressing in my article. As I made clear from the beginning, I am addressing the problem Chalmers defined. That does not prevent you from discussing something else, as long as you recognize that in doing so you are not discussing my article or the problem it addresses. In saying that, I am not denigrating the importance of the problems neuroscientists consider hard -- they're just not my problem. — Dfpolis
In defining the Hard Problem, you quote a reputable secondary source (Scholarpedia), but I quoted a primary source. So, I will stick with my characterization. — Dfpolis
-Agreed. But if Chalmers wanted answers to his ''why" questions with a different sense, he should have been Studying Cognitive Science. i.e. his first why question "Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience?" the answer is simple. Evolutionary principles. Making meaning of your world ads an advantage for survival and flourishing(Avoiding suffering, managing pleasure etc).There are many senses of "why." Aristotle enumerates four. I suppose you mean "why" in the sense of some divine purpose. But, I did not ask or attempt to answer that question. The question I am asking is how we come to be aware of neurally encoded contents. So, I fail to see the point you are making. — Dfpolis
In my opinion you fail because as you said yourself, you ignore the latest work and the hard questions tackled by Neuroscience.The question I am asking is how we come to be aware of neurally encoded contents. So, I fail to see the point you are making. — Dfpolis
-I was referring to Chalmers's pseudo philosophical "why" questions. Questions like "Why there is something instead of nothing" are designed to remain unanswered.However, if you wish to call something "pseudo philosophical" or claim that it "create unsolvable questions," some justification for your claims would be courteous. Also, since I solved the problems I raised, they are hardly "unsolvable." — Dfpolis
-Sure there are many problems we haven't solved (yet). Why do you think that the SM won't manage to finally provide a solution and how are you sure that some of them aren't solved already. After all,as you stated you are not familiar with the current Science on the topic.I have never denied that the SM is able to solve a wide range of problems. It definitely is. The case is very like that of Newtonian physics, which can also solve many problems. However, I enumerated a number of problems it could not solve. Will you not address those? — Dfpolis
Well I don't know if it was a critique of your work. I only address the paragraph (Article) on Reduction and Emergence"Does the Hard Problem reflect a failure of the reductive paradigm? "Again, this does not criticize my work, because you are not saying that my analysis is wrong, or even that reduction is not involved.cogency of your objection. — Dfpolis
-As I explained if you are pointing to a different problem then you are committing a logical error. Science and every single one of us are limited within a single realm. The burden is not on Science to prove the phenomenon to be physical, but its on the side making the claim for an f an additional sub-straight. The two justified answers are "we currently don't know" Or"this mechanism is necessary and sufficient to explain the phenomenon".Rather, you want me to look at a different problem. Further, with respect to that different problem, you do not even claim that the named methods have made progress in explaining how awareness of contents comes to be. So, I fail to see the — Dfpolis
-My objection was with the word "prove", since in science we don't prove anything.It is a definition, specifying how I choose to use words, and not a claim that could be true or false. — bert1
-ok I think we are on the same page on that.Sorry, I just don't think you've grasped the distinction between definition and theory. — bert1
-Because the hard problem ...is a made up problem.(Chalmers's teleological questions).I agree. I did not say that science proved frameworks, but that we use their principles to deduce predictions. That is the essence of the hypothetico-deductive method. — Dfpolis
-Yes you did, but you also accept a portion of it...right? In retrospect you did stated that your questions seek the "how" and I pointed out that Science has addressed many "how" questions on Brain functions and meaning/Symbolic thinking.If you read carefully, you would see that I criticized Chalmers' philosophy, rather than basing my argument on it. — Dfpolis
-Sure you clarified that and I pointed out the problem with your "how" questions. Many "how" questions have already been addressed and if they haven't been that is not a justification to reject the whole model (the Quasi Dogmatic Principles protects the framework at all time). After all its a dynamic model in progress that yields results and the only one that can be applied,tested produce causal descriptions and Technical Applications!This is baloney. I am asking how questions. The SM offers no hint as to how these observed effects occur. In fact, it precludes them. — Dfpolis
-Strawman, I never said he did. I only pointed out the main historical errors in our Philosophy. Teleology in nature(Chalmers's hard problem) and agency with properties pretty similar to the properties displayed by the phenomenon we are trying to explain.(your claim on the non physical nature of Consciousness)Obviously, you have never read Aristotle, as he proposes none of these. That you would think he does shows deep prejudice. Instead of taking the time to learn, or at least remaining quiet when you do not know, you choose to slander. It is very disappointing. A scientific mind should be open to, and thirsty for, the facts. — Dfpolis
-Abstract concepts do not help complex topics like this one. On the contrary they introduce more ambiguity in the discussion. Plus you strawmanned me again with that supernatural first person data.Nor am I suggesting that we do. I am suggesting that methodological naturalism does not restrict us to the third-person perspective of the Fundamental Abstraction. That you would think that considering first-person data is "supernatural" is alarming. — Dfpolis
That seems right to me. It really makes discussing a topic hard work. Nickolasgaspar might be a case in point, assuming we want to bring back the Gods and the ether. — bert1
-You are wrong. You are trying to make an argument from ambiguity by using lame or specific meanings on both concepts.Sorry, I just don't think you've grasped the distinction between definition and theory. — bert1
Again A theory is the narrative that glues together definitions, descriptive theoretical frameworks, mathematical formulations,Evidence etc. This is the scientific definition of a Theory and this is how I use it.That's interesting. Sorry I still haven't read your article in detail yet, but I'm curious on where you think this definition likes on the spectrum of theory to definition. How theory laden is this? Is this what people in general mean, when talking about the hard problem? Is this what Chalmers means, for example? — bert1
.One should consider the term reductionism in a differentiated way. Those who cannot imagine the mundane physiological activity producing consciousness, or seek some intermediate step, are quick to speak of reductionism. Such nonsensical themes as the serious problem of consciousness then arise from the rejection of it. — Wolfgang
-You can not study living things without including all the tools available to us. As I just explained we can reduce a system in order to identify function and use them to pin point where emergence occurs. Science is the systematic and methodical way to understand things and it would be an error to exclude a methodology , just because it can't go all the way.Now what is reductionism? This is legitimate in physics, because there you can always (at least mentally) reduce complexities to their individual parts.
Very different from all living things. This can only be explained as a structure, so from the outset it is not just more than the sum of its parts, it is something completely different from the sum. Central nervous systems are very different from protein synthesis. The term strong emergence is actually still too weak for this. — Wolfgang
-Not really, again its an observer relative term which help us classify this emergent phenomenon based on its specific characteristics and qualities.The term strong emergence is actually still too weak for this. — Wolfgang
-....and this is why when we study life we don't "do" physics....we do "biology".However, physics has no suitable categories for life that could explain the movement, change and development of a self-active system with its own will. — Wolfgang
-One very important thing is to ask the right questions independent if we like it or not. Again the process called life is explained by Biological disciplines, not physics.Here people like to ask whether physics should not have any justification in relation to life. Of course it has, but not by being able to explain the structure called life, but by exploring the relationships between the individual parts (biophysics). — Wolfgang
"That is, the question of how physiology creates consciousness is not a physical one.
And the question of how a single individual being feels, certainly not. — Wolfgang
-You shouldn't because it describes an observable fact. A human being can NOT experience a Conscious state without the arousal of this specific brain area.Sure, this bit is reasonably theory free, and can more or less serve as a definition (I'd leave out the arousal bit):
"Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self,... — bert1
- Again I think you don't understand what "theory" means in science. Theory is the narrative that includes all our observations, available facts, math formulations etc etc. I guess you meant " just a Hypothesis. No, it isn't just a hypothesis. Its a description of a mechanism that renders its Necessary and Sufficient the for the phenomenon to emerge. Our Working Hypothesis comes later to explain how the content of an conscious experience emerges....whereas this bit (whether it is true or not) is pure theory, even if it has become so accepted in the community you refer to as to be, for practical purposes, a definition: — bert1
-You have a misconception on what Philosophy is. Philosophy is our intellectual endeavors to produce wise claims from the best epistemology available to us. By saying "we can not accept the description provided by science" you render your Philosophy Pseudo philosophy!This is a philosophy forum, not the community you are talking about. So we can't take this as definition here. This must be treated here as theory, to be shown, not assumed. — bert1
When a philosophical Speculation is in direct conflict with a Scientific Description that renders the speculation pseudo philosophical by definition. (Aristotle's 6 main steps of Philosophy)OK, that's no problem. Your theory contradicts Dfpolis'. — bert1
-Its your duty to be aware of the latest epistemology...not mine. No more Philosophy of mine on arbitrary epistemology and presumptions . That's the correct way to do meaningful Philosophy.OK, more work need to be done than just tell us we're out of date. We're unlikely to slap our foreheads and say "Whoops! Thanks Nikolasgaspar for correcting us. No more philosophy of mind. Problem solved." — bert1
- The problem is that you haven't provided a definition on the subject matter.Not at all, no. Once we have agreed on the subject matter we are talking about (consciousness) then the disagreement about the nature of it can begin. — bert1
-:"is that by which"??? ....seriously!? you are still doing philosophy by using definition that start "that by which"?????Something like "Consciousness is that by which X can have experiences" or something like that. — bert1
I recently published an article with the above title (https://jcer.com/index.php/jcj/article/view/1042/1035). Here is the abstract: — Dfpolis
-That is only true for the advances in Philosophy. Almost all the breakthroughs made by relevant Scientific disciplines never make it in Neurophilosophy mainly because Philosophical frameworks that are based on the latest epistemology are part of Cognitive Science.Yet, in the years since David Chalmers distinguished the Hard Problem of Consciousness from the easy problems of neuroscience, no progress has been made toward a physical reduction of consciousness. — D. F. Polis
This, together with collateral shortcomings Chalmers missed, show that the SM is inadequate to experience. — D. F. Polis