You don't know and have no way to prove the existence of an underlying ontology so it is irrational to keep pushing this ideology on the excuse "conscious experience appear to be magical"! — Nickolasgaspar

This is your whole argument repeated. Philosophy and science are doing two different things. The assumption you’re making is the value statement that philosophy is to only be subordinate to science to have any value. Rather, it is a never ending dialogue that poses questions and proposes avenues to explore to answer them. It considers science as a methodology but is not bound to not ask questions science cannot be able to answer. You are asking philosophy to do something it’s not bound to do and say why isn’t it so bound. Sounds like a you problem.

"conscious experience appear to be magical"! — Nickolasgaspar

Literally nobody ever says that. Not that I've heard anyway.

Declaring the failure of reductionism seems premature. — Fooloso4

When the OP first started posting on this forum a while ago, I was driven by curiosity to quick-read some sort of paper or book chapter that he shared. I remember being struck by the breathtaking ease with which he solved long-standing problems of philosophy. He proved the existence of God in one short paragraph, then went on as if that question was now settled once and for all. He established the truth of determinism even more simply: by quoting Laplace's famous maxim (Laplace's demon). Later he did think it necessary for some reason to revisit the question of determinism in light of the challenge supposedly posed by quantum mechanics, but dismissed it right away with a reference to Bohm's pilot wave theory - thus settling, in passing, the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

This is your whole argument repeated. — schopenhauer1

You didn't quote my argument so I am not sure you understood it correctly

Philosophy and science are doing two different things. — schopenhauer1

Correct. Science produces the most credible Epistemology while Philosophy is the tool we use to understand its implications and make us wiser.
When our Philosophical doesn't start from an epistemic foundation then we are guilty of pseudo-philosophizing. (like Chalmers did with this idea).

The assumption you’re making is the value statement that philosophy is to only be subordinate to science to have any value. — schopenhauer1

Not true. As I pointed out many times before ,claims with unknown epistemic value can never be accepted as wise. (this isn't difficult to comprehend).
We can not do science without philosophy and we can not do meaningful philosophy without credible knowledge.

Rather, it is a never ending dialogue that poses questions and proposes avenues to explore to answer them — schopenhauer1

-We can agree on that. The problem emerges when a dialogue doesn't start fromasturdy epistemic foundation allowing it to drift towards wishful thoughts and desires.
Philosophy is an exercise in frustration NOT a quick fix for our Existential and Epistemic anxieties.

It considers science as a methodology but is not bound to not ask questions science cannot be able to answer. — schopenhauer1

-That is a factually wrong statement. Science, previously known as Natural Philosophy is a Philosophical Category with the addition of a huge set of empirical and statistical methodologies.
Science IS philosophy practice on far better Data(this is why we also have theoretical frameworks, hypotheses and interpretations!). When data are available we do Science, when they aren't we do Philosophy.
What we don't do in Natural Philosophy is to accept pseudo philosophical worldviews like idealism, occasionalism,solipsism as frameworks of our epistemology.
There are many reasons why some questions can't be answered, but not all sentences with a question-mark at the end qualify as real philosophical questions.(look Chalmers's fallacious teleological questions).
The problem we are dealing with here is not between Science and Philosophy, but Philosophy and Pseudo Philosophy.

Idealism is Pseudo philosophy. ITs principles are assumed, they aren't founded on observations or epistemology and an assumed conclusion not a testable hypothesis to put on the test.

You are asking philosophy to do something it’s not bound to do and say why isn’t it so bound. Sounds like a you problem. — schopenhauer1

_No I am only demarcating Philosophy from pseudo philosophical claims based on fallacious reasoning and total lack of epistemic support in their metaphysical assumptions.

When someone assumes an unobservable untestable ontology in addition to a necessary and sufficient scientific description , then the source of that ontology is not distinguishable from Magic.

This thread isn't about Dfpolis's paper any more is it?

What we don't do in Natural Philosophy is to accept pseudo philosophical worldviews like idealism, occasionalism,solipsism as frameworks of our epistemology.
There are many reasons why some questions can't be answered, but not all sentences with a question-mark at the end qualify as real philosophical questions.(look Chalmers's fallacious teleological questions).
The problem we are dealing with here is not between Science and Philosophy, but Philosophy and Pseudo Philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar

Glad it's not science we are discussing. In Fight Club we don't talk about Fight Club. But I'm not in Fight Club, so I'll talk about it and not limit myself in such a way.

Also about emergence, there are whole sections of philosophy that discuss the trickiness of emergence and reduction- how it is that the whole reduces to its parts. Weak and strong emergence, which I think you were alluding to. We know that new entities supervene on their constituents, but we aren't clear on how.

An Idealist, for example, could make the claim that emergence could never take place without an observational standpoint. There has to be "something" for which emerging happens in. Sort of a container. Otherwise, we get ghostly new entities from fiat, which itself has to be explained. In other words, answering it by giving its constituents would simply be circular reasoning and not a sufficient answer.

Humans evolved as cooperative social creatures. Like many other mammals, we are born with certain moral emotions , such as the protection of our young and the ability to experience pain at the suffering of others in our group. Sacrificing oneself for the protection of others is seen in other animals. Anthropologists hypothesize that conscience evolved in order to protect tribes from the violence of alpha males. Even behaviors which on the surface appear unadaptive, such as suicide or homicide, are driven by a combination of such moral emotions.

It is not the self strictly defined as a body, that our biologically evolved motivational processes are designed to preserve. Rather, it is social systems ( friendship, marriage, family, clan) that sustain us and that we are primed to defend. — Joshs

In regards to the boundaries of 'self', it is interesting to consider Bateson's view on the 'unit of evolutionary' change:

Let us start from the evolutionary side. It is now empirically clear that Darwinian evolutionary theory contained a very great error in its identification of the unit of survival under natural selection. The unit which was believed to be crucial and around which the theory was set up was either the breeding individual or the family line or the subspecies or some similar homogeneous set of conspecifics. Now I suggest that the last hundred years have demonstrated empirically that if an organism or aggregate of organisms sets to work with a focus on its own survival and thinks that is the way to select its adaptive moves, its "progress" ends up with a destroyed environment. If the organism ends up destroying its environment, it has in fact destroyed itself. And we may very easily see this process carried to its ultimate reductio ad absurdum in the next twenty years. The unit of survival is not the breeding organism, or the family line, or the society.

The old unit has already been partly corrected by the population geneticists. They have insisted that the evolutionary unit is, in fact, not homogeneous. A wild population of any species consists always of individuals whose genetic constitution varies widely. In other words, potentiality and readiness for change is already built into the survival unit. The heterogeneity of the wild population is already one-half of that trial-and-error system which is necessary for dealing with environment.

The artificially homogenized populations of man's domestic animals and plants are scarcely fit for survival.

And today a further correction of the unit is necessary. The flexible environment must also be included along with the flexible organism because, as I have already said, the organism which destroys its environment destroys itself. The unit of survival is a flexible organism-in-its-environment. — Gregory Bateson, Form, Substance, Difference

While this is not the same as Nietzsche's view of nature, perhaps it touches upon Nietzsche's dislike of the 'survival of the fittest' model because it did not express the superfluity or over-abundance of life.

Kant attributed apriori categorical content to the subject.
— Joshs
I am neither Kant, nor a Kantian. I think his approach is fundamentally wrong.

I am an Aristotelian. — Dfpolis

Aren’t we all Kantians now , including those physicists who extend the scope of Quantum theory? That is to say, even though Kant’s ideas have been subject to a variety of critiques within contemporary philosophy and science, I know of no major theorist who has rejected his key premise, that the mind contributes to the organization of our experience, and this organizing, categorizing and synthesizing activity of the mind is the condition of possibility for empirical knowledge. What most disagree with is Kant’s claim that the mind’s organizing capabilities are grounded in a metaphysical a priori. Are you rejecting Kant’s central premise or offering a critique of Kant which preserves this premise?

So far, you have not criticized one argument in my paper. Instead, you have accused me to the errors of others and made unsubstantiated claims. Perhaps if you addressed what I actually wrote, we could make more progress. For example, in an earlier post, I listed 7 problems I have with the Standard Model. You could explain why these are not real problems — Dfpolis

As you have pointed out, your use of the term Standard Model is you own invention. This is a bold and risky move for an outsider to philosophy of mind. By creating a single overarching category de novo, and attempting to squeeze a diverse assortment of philosophical views within it, you are turning your back on an entire community of thought. Perhaps your Aristotelian-inflected model is a truly fresh perspective, but it could also be a reinventing of the wheel born of a lack of exposure to the relevant philosophical
history, beginning with Kant. After reading your article I am tending toward the latter conclusion. As you grapple with a solution to the Hard Problem alongside those you mention in your paper, it is clear that what you have in common with your interlocutors is the acknowledgment of contributions from two domains , the subjective and the objective. For you there is no split between what you call intention and the physical world. You say there is an identity between them: “the object informing the intellect is, identically, the intellect being informed by the object.”

Where you differ from ‘SM’ concerns how much work you expect intention, intellect and will ( form, potency) to do vs the physical pole (act, matter) . That is, how you define their relative attributes , functions, capacities and essence.Writers like Chalmers and Dennett will argue that concepts like ‘material’, ‘physical’ and ‘natural’ have evolved alongside our philosophical understanding. As a result, much of what was formerly attributed to the non-physical in the form of the subjectively mental can now be placed within the category of the objectively natural and material( although ‘physical’ is a more contentious term). This includes epistemological and logical-mathematical forms of meaning. This gives the subjectively mental little to contribute other than an affective feeling of what’s it is like to experience. For you, by contrast, epistemology, logic, Will, intentionality, propositionality and mathematics still belong to the subjective pole as pre-given capacities or attributes. Is it your hunch that these are divinely given?

The flexible environment must also be included along with the flexible organism because, as I have already said, the organism which destroys its environment destroys itself. The unit of survival is a flexible organism-in-its-environment. — Gregory Bateson, Form, Substance, Difference

Yes, the adaptive continuation of a system of interaction with a niche, rather than the survival of a human self(genetic or tribal) , is the focus of selective pressure.

Glad it's not science we are discussing. In Fight Club we don't talk about Fight Club. But I'm not in Fight Club, so I'll talk about it and not limit myself in such a way. — schopenhauer1

-you stated , I quote "Philosophy and science are doing two different things." So I pointed out that its not about science vs philosophy, its Philosophy vs Pseudo philosophy.

Also about emergence, there are whole sections of philosophy that discuss the trickiness of emergence and reduction- how it is that the whole reduces to its parts. Weak and strong emergence, which I think you were alluding to. We know that new entities supervene on their constituents, but we aren't clear on how. — schopenhauer1

-Classifying different types of emergence doesn't change the nature of an observable phenomenon like human conscious states.
We can talk about Emergence if you want but your starting point needs to be anchored on our current epistemology and go from there. You shouldn't start from the actual metaphysical claim you have the burden to prove!

An Idealist, for example, could make the claim that emergence could never take place without an observational standpoint. — schopenhauer1

Facts of reality render that claim wrong.

-"There has to be "something" for which emerging happens in."
_Correct. We observe physical systems producing emergent phenomena ,either Synchronic or Diachronic. (Taxonomy of emergence).

Sort of a container. — schopenhauer1

No the analogy of a container is wrong since Diachronic Emergence wouldn't be possible. (persistence after the causal mechanism ceasing to exist).

Otherwise, we get ghostly new entities from fiat, which itself has to be explained. — schopenhauer1

The new emergent phenomena are observable, measurable and most of the times quantifiable. We can affect them and manipulate them by changing the setup of the responsible process. Ghosts do not share the same qualities.

In other words, answering it by giving its constituents would simply be circular reasoning and not a sufficient answer. — schopenhauer1

"Answering it"? I am not sure your statement is on topic. We identify the Necessary and Sufficient mechanisms responsible for the emergence of the phenomenon.
We do it so well, that we can even make predictions when specific aspects of a mechanism is damaged (brain injury, pathology, intoxication) ,we can make diagnosis and design surgical and medical protocols to treat and improve the quality of the emergent property.
THERE is nothing circular in this approach.
The suggested magical idealistic ontology of the phenomenon has nothing to contribute to the discussion other than stating "wow its so different so a magical source should be hiding behind it".
Sorry this is not Philosophy!

Philosophy vs Pseudo philosophy. — Nickolasgaspar

Right, and but that is smuggling in value statements as if they were objective fact about what comprises what.

-Classifying different types of emergence doesn't change the nature of an observable phenomenon like human conscious states.
We can talk about Emergence if you want but your starting point needs to be anchored on our current epistemology and go from there. You shouldn't start from the actual metaphysical claim you have the burden to prove! — Nickolasgaspar

Not getting where you are coming from here. Rather I am saying science can certainly tell me the empirical findings of said phenomenon. It does not (at least now, possibly never because the answer might never be empirical) tell us how it is that emergent phenomena supervene on its constituents.

Facts of reality render that claim wrong. — Nickolasgaspar

Which are based observationally. Convenient.

-"There has to be "something" for which emerging happens in."
_Correct. We observe physical systems producing emergent phenomena ,either Synchronic or Diachronic. (Taxonomy of emergence). — Nickolasgaspar

Right observing. Already in the equation.

No the analogy of a container is wrong since Diachronic Emergence wouldn't be possible. (persistence after the causal mechanism ceasing to exist). — Nickolasgaspar

Still doesn't bypass it. You are assuming the consequent again.

The new emergent phenomena are observable, measurable and most of the times quantifiable. We can affect them and manipulate them by changing the setup of the responsible process. Ghosts do not share the same qualities. — Nickolasgaspar

Yep they are observable indeed. And I did not say "ghosts" but "ghostly" big difference in what I am conveying.

"Answering it"? I am not sure your statement is on topic. We identify the Necessary and Sufficient mechanisms responsible for the emergence of the phenomenon.
We do it so well, that we can even make predictions when specific aspects of a mechanism is damaged (brain injury, pathology, intoxication) ,we can make diagnosis and design surgical and medical protocols to treat and improve the quality of the emergent property.
THERE is nothing circular in this approach.
The suggested magical idealistic ontology of the phenomenon has nothing to contribute to the discussion other than stating "wow its so different so a magical source should be hiding behind it".
Sorry this is not Philosophy! — Nickolasgaspar

It's the same problem as other posters are making. Being incredulous isn't philosophy, rather. However, even the way you are phrasing is distorting the questions at hand. Rather, what is the nature of this emergence from its constituent parts?

You are making an odd antagonism. Most philosophers are not denying empirical claims. Functionally, the science carries on, no matter what the argument behind the metaphysics and epistemology is, so not sure what has got you so annoyed besides just general incredulity over and over.

... pre-given capacities or attributes. — Joshs

Aristotle begins with living beings that have certain capacities, including consciousness. If one starts here there is no answer to a question that is not asked, no solution to a problem that is not raised. No hard problem, or so it seems Dfpolis would have us think.

I suspect that if Aristotle were around today he would not be an Aristotelian. For one, in line with contemporary science, his concept of matter or material (hule) would have undergone a radical transformation. He would retain his focus on intelligible wholes and living beings, but he would no longer regard matter itself as something unformed. Matter or material is self-forming. Matter too is "being at work", energeia. A living organism is not simply a whole but a whole of wholes, a system of systems, self-organizing structuring structures.

I wanted to point out that Bateson's statement goes beyond your observation regarding us being social animals. If the image of a Cartesian self is a mind stuck in a particular body is at one end of the scale, Bateson is looking at mind at the opposite end that excludes anthropomorphic models of an activity.

A certain stripe of 'physicalist' and 'meta-physicalist' needs the Cartesian end in order to claim title to a contested real estate. That fades away pretty quickly when one leaves the pool of Narcissus. That is why I responded to your post about Nietzsche to wonder about the uses of 'laws of nature'. They require a formal introduction to any party they are invited to.

Aren’t we all Kantians now , including those physicists who extend the scope of Quantum theory? — Joshs

There are certainly many who have been confused by Kant. I am not one.

I know of no major theorist who has rejected — Joshs

I reject it, and I do not find myself alone in doing so.

his key premise, that the mind contributes to the organization of our experience, and this organizing, categorizing and synthesizing activity of the mind is the condition of possibility for empirical knowledge. — Joshs

I see Kant's thesis as the mind imposing, rather than organizing, content. Our minds do organize content, but that is hardly a Kantian insight, as the idea precedes him by millennia, with the traditional definition of scientia as organized knowledge.

The conditions for empirical knowledge were outlined by Aristotle in De Anima. They are (a) that the world be intelligible (if it were not knowable, it could not be known), (b) that we have a mind capable of being informed by that intelligibility, and (c) that we have the capacity to actualize both potentials in a single act by which the intelligible informs a mind capable of being informed to produce actual knowledge. Absent any of these conditions, we could not have empirical knowledge. None of this involves, or needs to involve, the mind imposing forms of thought as Kant believed.

I would ask you to reflect on your claim, "this organizing, categorizing and synthesizing activity of the mind is the condition of possibility for empirical knowledge." It is prima facie impossible. Why? Because the mind could not possibly organize, or categorize facts it does not know. If it synthesizes a judgement, that judgement is neither empirical nor a fact. Thus, empirical knowledge must precede organizing and categorizing, being the precondition for those activities, rather than the reverse.

Are you rejecting Kant’s central premise or offering a critique of Kant which preserves this premise? — Joshs

I am rejecting the premises that (1) the mind imposes forms on experience, (2) we cannot know noumenal reality (the ding an sich), and (3) that we synthesize facts. We know reality, but not exhaustively, as God does. We know it in a limited way, as it relates to us.

This is a bold and risky move for an outsider to philosophy of mind. — Joshs

I would not call myself "an outsider." There is no club to which one must belong. One must only study and reflect -- and I have done both for decades.

you are turning your back on an entire community of thought. — Joshs

Not at all. Having studied them, I can see what is common to most schools in the community. I am open to suggested refinements, but I think that most subscribe to the SM.

While you say I am ignoring an entire community, another critic says I cited too many sources. [De gustibus non est disputandum..

quote="Joshs;784300"]As a result, much of what was formerly attributed to the non-physical in the form of the subjectively mental can now be placed within the category of the objectively natural and material( although ‘physical’ is a more contentious term).[/quote]
No doubt. Many things are "attributed." I am more concerned with the justification of such attributions. Having a doctorate in physics, I have a reasonable idea of its explanatory capacity. It does not extend to the intentional theater of operations. I am open to correction.

This give the subjectively mental little to contribute other than an affective feeling of what’s it is like to experience. — Joshs

Then you will have little difficulty in disposing of the seven problems I have enumerated. I only ask you to be critical in accepting the "common wisdom."

For you, by contrast, epistemology, logic, Will, intentionality, propositionality and mathematics still belong to the subjective pole as pre-given capacities or attributes. — Joshs

You have a very mixed bag here. Some are contentless capabilities, while others are laboriously elaborated sciences.

God is the completion of scientific analysis -- the end of the line of causal explanation. If you think that everything has an explanatory dynamic, then there must be an end of the line of causality, for mathematical induction allows us to show that an infinite regress is an inadequate explanation.

There is a theme associated with Aristotelian and Thomist philosophy that arises from the hylomorphism of Aristotle. It is conveyed in this passage:

if the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner. This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.

“Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

From Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan, O.P.; Macmillan Co., 1941

This is part of a more general thesis that knowledge involves the union of knower with known:

In knowledge we become intentionally the object known, and thus acquire a new perfection for ourselves, the same perfection of the things we know. And since, for Aquinas “form” is the principle of perfection, knowledge consists in acquiring or receiving the forms of the things we know and thereby becoming one with them:

The perfection belonging to one thing is found in another. This is the perfection of a knower insofar as he knows; for something is known by a knower by reason of the fact that the thing known is, in some fashion, in the possession of the knower. Hence it is said in The Soul that the soul is “in some manner, all things,” since its nature is such that it can know all things. In this way, it is possible for the perfection of the entire universe to exist in one thing.

De veritate 2, 2

Is this something considered in your philosophy?

Are you rejecting Kant’s central premise or offering a critique of Kant which preserves this premise?
— Joshs
I am rejecting the premises that (1) the mind imposes forms on experience, (2) we cannot know noumenal reality (the ding an sich), and (3) that we synthesize facts. We know reality, but not exhaustively, as God does. We know it in a limited way, as it relates to us. — Dfpolis

At this point in my reading of your work, I find I understand it most coherently by placing it within a pre-Kantian and likely pre-Humean historical context. That is, despite your embrace of Aristotle, your thinking on God and nature is much more compatible with Enlightenment philosophical ideas circa 1650-1750 than anything produced in Classical Greece. I suspect the clarity of your work would greatly benefit by close readings of the writings of Spinoza , Locke and Leibniz. This is the wheel I think you’re reinventing.

I would ask you to reflect on your claim, "this organizing, categorizing and synthesizing activity of the mind is the condition of possibility for empirical knowledge." It is prima facie impossible. Why? Because the mind could not possibly organize, or categorize facts it does not know. — Dfpolis

According to Kant, it is not that the mind organizes or categories facts, it organizes and categorizes the manifold of sensory intuitions according to the categories of the understanding.

According to Kant, it is not that the mind organizes or categories facts, it organizes and categorizes the manifold of sensory intuitions according to the categories of the understanding. — Fooloso4

I don’t think this will make sense to him. I really think he is operating from a pre-Kantian and pre-Humean framework.

I am disappointed by this remark.

It is one thing to challenge a point of view and another to ask for shared judgement in your register.

This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.

I am writing an article for publication in a Thomist journal rebutting this idea. I laid some foundations in my two articles on the evolution in Studia Gilsoniana, where I argue the relativity of the species concept.

I hold, against Aquinas, that (1) we can encode universal representations materially (as exemplified by connectionist models) and (2) have an intellectual knowledge of singulars/individuals.

Aristotle is quite clear that the senses already separate form from matter. We also have intellectual ideas of singulars, which abstract away temporal variations.

This is part of a more general thesis that knowledge involves the union of knower with known: — Wayfarer

I think that the union of knower and known is independent of the thesis that the essence of intellectual knowledge is universality.

for Aquinas “form” is the principle of perfection

This thesis needs elaboration. Form is the principle of actuality of individuals, who strive toward perfect self-realization. There is no universal form. Universals are abstractions, existing only in the minds thinking them. If they are well-founded, they have a sound basis in reality. Still, they have no independent existence and are descriptive, not normative. Thinking that they are normative is the basis of moral condemnation of, and prejudice against, individuals whose self-realization is not "normal."

Is this something considered in your philosophy? — Wayfarer

I agree with the quotation from De Veritate, and speak of it in terms of "shared existence." Shared existence is an essential aspect of knowing.

So I take then that you don't subscribe to scholastic realism concerning universals? 'Universals, strictly speaking, only exist in minds, but they are founded on real relations of similarity in the world. Scholastic realism goes beyond moderate realism and affirms that universals also exist transcendently; but instead of having a separated existence, transcendent universals exist in God's mind.'

At this point in my reading of your work, I find I understand it most coherently by placing it within a pre-Kantian and likely pre-Humean historical context. — Joshs

That is its context, though I agree with Hume's observations on the lack of necessity in "causality" as he defines it.

hat is, despite your embrace of Aristotle, your thinking on God and nature is much more compatible with Enlightenment philosophical ideas circa 1650-1750 than anything produced in Classical Greece. — Joshs

If you read De Anima, you will find that most of my theory is based on its analysis. I found Spinoza's more geometrico is an irrational approach (see my Metaphilosophy article). Leibnitz's monadology assumes Cartesian dualism, which I find wrong-headed. Locke misunderstood the nature of ideas, distorting epistemology. (See Veatch's Intentional Logic.) So, I think you misunderstand me.

According to Kant, it is not that the mind organizes or categories facts, it organizes and categorizes the manifold of sensory intuitions according to the categories of the understanding. — Fooloso4

Not "according to the categories," as I understand him, but by imposing the categories. For example, Hume rightly found causality as he defined it lacked necessity. Kant saw the mind as imposing causal necessity on the succession of events.

So I take then that you don't subscribe to scholastic realism concerning universals? 'Universals, strictly speaking, only exist in minds, but they are founded on real relations of similarity in the world. Scholastic realism goes beyond moderate realism and affirms that universals also exist transcendently; but instead of having a separated existence, transcendent universals exist in God's mind.' — Wayfarer

According to Copleston, Aquinas is a moderate realist. So, Yes, and no. I am a moderate realist, and see God as having exemplar ideas in the sense of intending to create whatever He creates (which is what Aquinas holds). I do not think God has any universal ideas. I explained this in detail in my 2021 article. (http://gilsonsociety.com/files/847-891-Polis.pdf).

his concept of matter or material (hule) would have undergone a radical transformation. He would retain his focus on intelligible wholes and living beings, but he would no longer regard matter itself as something unformed. Matter or material is self-forming. Matter too is "being at work", energeia. A living organism is not simply a whole but a whole of wholes, a system of systems, self-organizing structuring structures. — Fooloso4

Aristotle already said much of this. https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=POLANR&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPOLANR.DOC

Not "according to the categories," as I understand him, but by imposing the categories. — Dfpolis

The categories are the architecture of mind. They are not imposed in the sense that one can either impose them or not. They are the way the mind makes sense of sense data.

I get a message stating that I cannot open files from Microsoft 95 or earlier

A follow up. You skipped right over the point:

According to Kant, it is not that the mind organizes or categories facts ... — Fooloso4

↪Joshs
I am disappointed by this remark.

It is one thing to challenge a point of view and another to ask for shared judgement in your register. — Paine

I was advocating for shared judgement in his register, not mine. Otherwise we will just be talking past one another.