That seems right to me. It really makes discussing a topic hard work. Nickolasgaspar might be a case in point, assuming we want to bring back the Gods and the ether. — bert1

Again you are wrong. First of all I am a Methodological Naturalist. This means that I reject all metaphysical worldviews (materialism/physicalism/metaphysical naturalism) and I stick to the paradigm : We currently don't know, so lets keep studying what is available to us by avoiding unnecessary entities and supernatural paradigms.
The problem with your claims is that you ignore our current epistemology and you keep trying to answer thing we don't know by introducing magic in the equation.

So as not to lose sight of the forest for the trees, skip to the end.

How can what is intrinsic not be co-extensive with what it is intrinsic to? — Dfpolis

What is intrinsic is basic to something. What is "co-extensive" is other than what it is coextensive with.

The problem is, the ontological status of the laws of nature is not a question of experience.
— Fooloso4
On the contrary, they are discovered via or experience of nature, and they could not be if they did not exist as an aspect of nature. — Dfpolis

What is and how it is discovered are not the same. The ontological question, whether the laws of nature are descriptive or prescriptive, is not determined by experience. All that experience tells us is that there are regularities.

If there were no laws operative in nature, anything could happen. — Dfpolis

That is a questionable assumption without evidence.

It is metaphysically possible for a rock to become a humming bird — Dfpolis

A rock does not become a hummingbird because it's a fucking rock.

quote="Dfpolis;783589"]Given your focus on Aristotle I am surprised that you import the notion of laws of nature.
— Fooloso4
You should not be. I look in many places for insight.[/quote]

Here is the problem. You say:

Aristotle’s conceptual space is unburdened by dualism.

This is true, but in borrowing from Aristotle and appending laws of nature you end up with your own dualism. On the one hand living beings that are, according to Aristotle, self-maintaining, and on the other something other than these living beings, the laws of nature, that you claim are necessary for living beings to be as they are.

However, qualia are not subjective awareness, but contingent forms of sensory experience. — Dfpolis

Yes, I think that's right. It's why I don't use the term 'qualia' - it creates too much confusion.

However, consciousness of abstract truths, such as ‘the square root of 2 is a surd,’ have no quale. Only sensations have qualia, and not even all of them. Blindsight and proprioception have none. — Dfpolis

That's interesting and not something I've thought about much. Not sure if I agree - proprioception seems to have a feel to me, although I don't doubt there's all sorts of things going on which I'm not aware of. I think perceiving a logical contradiction has a feel to it. Indeed, I'm not sure how we could know it was a contradiction if it didn't feel wrong in some way, a sort of offence to reason.

Another day, another thread I think! Thank you for sharing your views. I don't want to pollute Dfpolis's thread with a whole load of stuff about definition vs theory. I should start my own thread. If you want, you could jump in on this thread, although it is old now:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11467/poll-definition-or-theory

The acceptance of a paper does not mean it cannot be written better. — Philosophim

I agree, but quick acceptance is a sign that the reviewers found merit in it.

This is just wrong. https://opentextbc.ca/introductiontopsychology/chapter/5-2-altering-consciousness-with-psychoactive-drugs/ At a very basic level humanity has been using drugs for centuries to alter our state of consciousness. Drugs are a physical thing. We can measure how the physical introduction of drugs changes the brain. — Philosophim

This does not militate against anything I said. Since the brain process the contents we are aware of, modifying how the brain operates by drugs, trauma or in any other way can modify the contents we are aware of. Aquinas knew this in the 13th c.

The problem again though, is that your information would not be able to be objectively compared to any other person's subjective experience because you cannot experience it. — Philosophim

This misunderstands the nature of scientific observation. Generally, it does not matter if one person or a whole group witnesses a phenomenon. What is important is the ability of others to replicate the same type of phenomena -- and that is just as possible with 1st person observations as it is with 3rd person observations. Of course, I cannot know if my quale of red is your quale of red, but we can and do know that humans have such qualia. So that is a scientific fact. So also is our awareness of intelligibility.

There are plenty of commonly known emergent properties that are not impossible to deduce from fundamental principles. — Philosophim

You are free to write an article with your preferred definition. I said what I mean by the term, which is all that clear communication requires.

Natural science has never found a soul, so it is not a problem to solve. — Philosophim

Then, why did you raise it?

We can know that a being has all of the mechanical aspects of what we would identify with a conscious being. However, we can't know what that actual personal experience of being a conscious plant is. So of course the definition of a reductive consciousness cannot describe the personal subjective experience of the plant. It doesn't even try to. — Philosophim

I am not sure what point, if any, you are making. In my paper, I am not discussing plant, but human experience. We know other humans are conscious because they are analogous to us, and they verbally confirm that they are self-aware. We do not know this about other beings, but we do know that we can explain all of our observations of them without assuming that they are aware of intelligibility.

There is no problem of what it is like to be a plant or a bat, just as there is no problem of what it is like to be in another universe. These are simply things we cannot do, and we know we cannot do them.

If you believe that consciousness is only defined as, "Having a subjective experience," you are not using a reductive definition of consciousness, which is what you are supposedly railing against. — Philosophim

I think that "consciousness" is an analogous term that can be defined in many ways. I never claimed to be using "a reductive definition of consciousness." I am not railing against anything, but offering some arguments against the physical reduction of subjective awareness, none of which you have commented upon.

And I never claimed it to be a fact or evidence. I would think you would have looked into the debate of consciousness in AI and this would not be a strange thing to mention. — Philosophim

I have concluded that it is not worth more time than I have already devoted to it in my book.

Chalmers's why questions are pseudo philosophical questions (Sneaks in Intention and purpose in to nature). — Nickolasgaspar

Curious then that Chalmers is University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University, and an Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. Must have fooled a lot of important people!

So you've never heard of the idea of starting with a unity that is subsequently divided into opposites? — frank

I have heard of it, but not read Hegel, or been inclined to. I do not see him as an influence.

There was a Canadian neurosurgeon, Wilder Penfield, who was famous for conducting such tests, which he did over many years. He started out a convinced physicalist, but in the end he subscribed to a form of dualism. He noted that patients were always aware that the sensation, memory, etc., evoked by brain stimulation was done to them, but not by them. Penfield found that patients retained a “third person” perspective on mental events evoked by brain stimulation. This lead him to conclude that the patient's mind operated independently of cortical stimulation: — Wayfarer

Dr. Penfield was practicing until 1960. That's before we had computers. Modern neuroscience has come leaps and bounds along. I would be very careful of citing someone from so long ago. Check this for example:

"Using fMRI brain scans, these researchers were able to predict participants’ decisions as many as seven seconds before the subjects had consciously made the decisions. As the researchers concluded in Nature Neuroscience, “Many processes in the brain occur automatically and without involvement of our consciousness. This prevents our mind from being overloaded by simple routine tasks. But when it comes to decisions, we tend to assume they are made by our conscious mind. This is questioned by our current findings.” "
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/unconscious-branding/202012/our-brains-make-our-minds-we-know-it

If the unconscious has already made a decision seconds before the brain is stimulated to think something else, it is not a mystery for portions of the brain to realize it is affected. If I'm swinging my arm and unable to, I'm going to assume something else is stopping it because I'm not getting the expected feedback. So we know the brain can anticipate when its neuronal messages are interrupted or not completed correctly.

I have heard of it, but not read Hegel, or been inclined to. I do not see him as an influence. — Dfpolis

Where did you hear of it, if you don't mind my asking?

Dr. Penfield was practicing until 1960. That's before we had computers. — Philosophim

I don't see how the invention of computers has any bearing. The specifics of his claim haven't been shown to be incorrect, and the fact that it happened 50 years ago is not relevant. His main point is that his patients could clearly distinguish memories and sensations that were triggered by his instruments from their own volitional control. They would say 'you're doing that'. Penfield interpreted that to mean that their own awareness was separate to the reactions he was able to elicit by manipulation. That is why he tended towards a dualist view late in his career.

"Using fMRI brain scans, these researchers were able to predict participants’ decisions as many as seven seconds before the subjects had consciously made the decisions. — Philosophim

That indicates that conscious awareness of an action lags the unconscious, autonomic processes that initiate the action. I don't see how it has any bearing on the question of the nature of intentionality, and whether intentional actions can be understood as causally dependent on physical processes, which is really the point at issue. The 'placebo effect' and many other aspects of psychosomatic medicine show a 'downward causative' effect from states of mind and beliefs to actual physiology. According to the 'bottom-up' ontology of materialism, this ought never to happen. (Hence the hackneyed saying 'mind over matter'.)

As far as the overall efficacy of fMRI scans, this was one of the areas that was shown to be subject to the so-called 'replication crises' in the social sciences about ten years ago. See Do You Believe in God, or is that a Software Glitch

The problem that is always going to undermine physicalism or materialism is that being has a dimension that no physical process has. A first-person experience has a dimension of feeling that can never be replicated in a third-person or objective description. It's a very hard point to articulate, as it is more an implicit reality than an objective phenomenon. That is what the argument about 'the hard problem of consciousness' seeks to illuminate, and from your analysis of it, I'm not persuaded you see the point.

What is "co-extensive" is other than what it is coextensive with. — Fooloso4

A reasonable point. I would say that "otherness" depends on how you conceptualize things. If you think of a rock as a unity, you can say it is attracted to the earth as a unity -- and that would be true. In a different conceptual space, you can think of the rock and the earth as masses subject to the very real law of gravity -- and that would also be true -- be adequate to reality.

A reason to think of laws as distinct is that they are not confined to individuals. Instead, the same laws seem to act throughout space and time, while the things they act on come and go.

All that experience tells us is that there are regularities. — Fooloso4

Experience also tells us that phenomena have causes. So, if there are regularities, they must have a cause.

That is a questionable assumption without evidence. — Fooloso4

It is not an assumption, but a conclusion. Possibility, per se, is only limited by the impossibility of instantiating contradictions. In order to limit possibility to what is physically possible, more constraints are needed. These are the laws of nature.

A rock does not become a hummingbird because it's a fucking rock. — Fooloso4

But, a rock can become sand or lava or a plasma. So, being a rock is not sufficient to preclude change, and it alone cannot prevent it from becoming a humming bird. That it can become some things, but not others, is a consequence of the laws operating in nature.

living beings that are, according to Aristotle, self-maintaining — Fooloso4

Aristotle is well aware of the possibility of death due to external causes, and of the need for nutrients. So, living things are not self-maintaining, by exhibit immanent activity -- i.e. self-directed activity to maintain themselves and their species -- something we continue to see today.

ndeed, I'm not sure how we could know it was a contradiction if it didn't feel wrong in some way, a sort of offence to reason. — bert1

I think we can react emotionally to intellectual discord, but I think the perception of discord comes first.

Yeah, maybe

Where did you hear of it, if you don't mind my asking? — frank

I read a lot of history of philosophy -- Copleston's and others as well as articles in various dictionaries, compendia and companions. German philosophy seemed to be largely misguided from Kant on, so it did not interest me until Brentano.

read a lot of history of philosophy -- Copleston's and others as well as articles in various dictionaries, compendia and companions. — Dfpolis

I see.

I would say that "otherness" depends on how you conceptualize things. — Dfpolis

If you claim, as you do, that living things and the laws of nature are not the same then they are other to each other, but can form a unity in their duality. It is something other than the rock that keeps in on the ground. As you say, they are distinct. Hence, dualism.

So, if there are regularities, they must have a cause. — Dfpolis

I think you have it backwards. It is only when there is change, not when something remains the same, that there is a cause.

It is not an assumption, but a conclusion. Possibility, per se, is only limited by the impossibility of instantiating contradictions. — Dfpolis

You are adding one assumption on top of another.

But, a rock can become sand or lava or a plasma. So, being a rock is not sufficient to preclude change, and it alone cannot prevent it from becoming a humming bird. — Dfpolis

Again, you have it backwards. It is not that the laws of nature preclude a rock from becoming a hummingbird but rather there would have to be some cause in order for a rock to become a hummingbird.

Aristotle is well aware of the possibility of death due to external causes, and of the need for nutrients. So, living things are not self-maintaining — Dfpolis

Self-maintenance, or entelecheia, does not mean immortality or self-sufficiency. The point again is that Aristotle's conceptual space is unburdened by dualism, yours is not.

The acceptance of a paper does not mean it cannot be written better.
— Philosophim
I agree, but quick acceptance is a sign that the reviewers found merit in it. — Dfpolis

And yet you posted here for analysis and critique. The argument, "Well it was published" does not negate my point. Feel free to disagree with my analysis, but I did not hear you tie in why you needed to cover everyone you did to make your point. The fact that we're going back and forth on what consciousness is after I've read your paper should reveal to you that you didn't make a clear case of what it meant to you to your reader.

This does not militate against anything I said. Since the brain process the contents we are aware of, modifying how the brain operates by drugs, trauma or in any other way can modify the contents we are aware of. Aquinas knew this in the 13th c. — Dfpolis

Yet you stated a main goal of this paper on consciousness was: "I shall argue that it is logically impossible to reduce consciousness, and the intentional realities flowing out of it, to a physical basis."

You'll need to clarify for me. Can drugs alter our consciousness, yes, or no? If yes, then we can reduce consciousness to a physical basis. If the answer is yes, and we cannot, then please explain why. A very simple definition of what consciousness means to you could help here.

The problem again though, is that your information would not be able to be objectively compared to any other person's subjective experience because you cannot experience it.
— Philosophim
This misunderstands the nature of scientific observation. Generally, it does not matter if one person or a whole group witnesses a phenomenon. What is important is the ability of others to replicate the same type of phenomena -- and that is just as possible with 1st person observations as it is with 3rd person observations. Of course, I cannot know if my quale of red is your quale of red, but we can and do know that humans have such qualia. So that is a scientific fact. So also is our awareness of intelligibility. — Dfpolis

Then you are misunderstanding me and I will attempt to be clearer. We are agreeing here. We can know that each sees red through things like the color spectrum. But yes, we cannot know what its like for you to experience red. I know what its like for myself to experience red, but no one else can.

You are free to write an article with your preferred definition. I said what I mean by the term, which is all that clear communication requires. — Dfpolis

Hm. If you want me to pat you on your back and say, "Good job!" because you published an article, I can do that. If you want to have a discussion, then I'll stay. You should consider there are plenty of people here who have also published articles and books, but know better than to think that affords them any special consideration in a critique of their work.

Natural science has never found a soul, so it is not a problem to solve.
— Philosophim
Then, why did you raise it? — Dfpolis

I did not, you did in the original quote. I'm getting the feeling you're not really considering my points, or you are and are unable to answer them.

I am not sure what point, if any, you are making. In my paper, I am not discussing plant, but human experience. We know other humans are conscious because they are analogous to us, and they verbally confirm that they are self-aware. We do not know this about other beings, but we do know that we can explain all of our observations of them without assuming that they are aware of intelligibility. — Dfpolis

Your paper addresses consciousness. Consciousness is something attributed to beings besides human beings. Dogs for example. You can train a dog to listen to commands, and a dog can non-verbally communicate with you. Now if you mean intelligibility only terms of the written or spoken language, or intelligibility and consciousness purely in human terms, then I did not glean that from your paper. I would call this an omission in your consideration, especially if you are attempting to show that consciousness cannot be logically reduced to a physical basis. If anything, that would be odd to limit consciousness to only the the human physical form while simultaneously denying it is linked to neurons, or any other physical basis.

If you believe that consciousness is only defined as, "Having a subjective experience," you are not using a reductive definition of consciousness, which is what you are supposedly railing against.
— Philosophim
I think that "consciousness" is an analogous term that can be defined in many ways. I never claimed to be using "a reductive definition of consciousness." I am not railing against anything, but offering some arguments against the physical reduction of subjective awareness, none of which you have commented upon. — Dfpolis

And yet you said I was conflating consciousness earlier. How could I conflate if it can be defined many ways? How can you argue your points about consciousness using the word "impossibility" if it can be defined many ways? I am commenting on things you have mentioned within your paper on your way to making your goal. If you want me to address other aspects of your work, you'll need to address the points I feel unclear or problamatic first.

I have been mentioning subjective awareness repeatedly. How is my experiencing the color red a particular way not my subjective awareness? I look at red, I see red. "That's red" I think. You need to more clearly define your terms, as either I do not understand what you are trying to say, or you do not understand yourself and are answering vaguely in the hopes that I won't notice.

And I never claimed it to be a fact or evidence. I would think you would have looked into the debate of consciousness in AI and this would not be a strange thing to mention.
— Philosophim
I have concluded that it is not worth more time than I have already devoted to it in my book. — Dfpolis

You may have wanted to devote more time to it then. At least to the point where you would have understood my reference was not claiming to be a fact or evidence, and a perfectly reasonable thing to mention.

Penfield interpreted that to mean that their own awareness was separate to the reactions he was able to elicit by manipulation. That is why he tended towards a dualist view late in his career. — Wayfarer

I understood. But his beliefs as to "why" the experience happened is like a blind man feeling around in the dark compared to the lights we have today. In fact, we're still feeling around in the dark in many aspects, and we need to be careful that our opinions are not equated to anything more meaningful than our own personal satisfaction in holding them.

The 'placebo effect' and many other aspects of psychosomatic medicine show a 'downward causative' effect from states of mind and beliefs to actual physiology. According to the 'bottom-up' ontology of materialism, this ought never to happen. (Hence the hackneyed saying 'mind over matter'.) — Wayfarer

First, if you remember I don't ascribe to "materialism", or "physicalism" or really most "isms". They are often times isolated theories for a simple understanding of issues that break down when you really need to think about their subjects.

If you think about the statement, "States of mind and beliefs should never cause changes in physiology," its very quickly disproved. With concentration or distraction I can overcome hunger. Being happy and experiencing pleasant social interactions can improve your health. And if the mind is physical, then it can interact with the physical world. To say the state of one's mind couldn't impact the physical world, when it clearly is in the physical world, is the statement that is less believable.

Thank you for linking the article, but I could not read it as I do not have a subscription. I did note that article was from 2016, and found another study in 2019 that confirmed the original assessment. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions

The problem that is always going to undermine physicalism or materialism is that being has a dimension that no physical process has. A first-person experience has a dimension of feeling that can never be replicated in a third-person or objective description. It's a very hard point to articulate, as it is more an implicit reality than an objective phenomenon. That is what the argument about 'the hard problem of consciousness' seeks to illuminate, and from your analysis of it, I'm not persuaded you see the point. — Wayfarer

I may not have been as clear as I liked then. I agree with this sentence entirely. "A first-person experience has a dimension of feeling that can never be replicated in a third-person or objective description". This is the hard problem essentially. That doesn't mean it doesn't have a physical process underlying it. It also doesn't mean that we can't affect consciousness physically, or understand that though we do not know the exact mechanism, it is fundamentally a physical process.

I mean, at its basic Wayfarer, why is your consciousness stuck in your head? Why can't it float out or even extend out to your feet? Try thinking locally within your foot. Try thinking outside of your physical self. Try getting drunk and have it not affect your consciousness. Even though we can't objectively know what its like to be someone else, that doesn't deny all the very obvious facts that demonstrate consciousness is a physical thing.

Unfortunately, "consciousness" is an analogous term, and using this definition, when I define consciousness differently (as "awareness of intelligiblity"), is equivocation. If you want to criticize my work, then you must use technical terms as I use them. In saying this, I am not objecting to ypur definition in se, only to its equivocal use. — Dfpolis

-Ok I get what you mean by that word, but there is a huge practical problem in that definition.
You define consciousness as "awareness of intelligibility", to be aware of our ability to understand. What about our ability to be aware on the first place....known in Science as Consciousness!(the ability to be aware of internal or environmental stimuli , to reflect upon them with different mind properties through the connections achieved by the Central Lateral thalamus i.e.intlligibility" and thus creating conscious content during a mental state.)

Its looks like we have the practice of cherry picking a specific secondary mind property known as intelligibility or Symbolic thinking or Meaning and assigning the word Consciousness which is already in use for a far more fundamental property of the mind.

To be honest I am with you on that. I always found our ability to produce meaning far more "magical" than our ability to attend consciously stimuli in the first place. After all we have a huge sensory system constantly feeding signals to our brains.

Is this the Hard problem for you? because if that is the case a simple search will provide tones of known mechanisms on how the brain uses symbolic language and learning (previous experience) to introduce meaning to stimuli (internal or external).
i.e. How neurons make meaning: brain mechanisms for embodied and abstract-symbolic semantics
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661313001228
Huge database
https://neurosciencenews.com/?s=how+the+brain+meaning

Either way the practical problem of the suggested definition remains. We already have labels for that mind property and we experience an ambiguity issue since we already use the term Consciousness in a more fundamental mind property than Symbolic thinking.

Then you will have no problem in explaining how this hypothesis, which I am calling the Standard Model (SM), conforms to the facts I raised against it. — Dfpolis

I will agree with you that it is a Working Hypothesis since we don't already have a Theory mainly because we have to many competing frameworks at this point.
Are the facts you raised the following.
(1) The Fundamental Abstraction of natural science (attending to the object to the exclusion of the subject);
(2) The limits of a Cartesian conceptual space.
If yes I have already answered that they are irrelevant to the phenomenon. We can elaborate more if you verify those facts.
This hypothesis is the Conclusion we arrive after 35 years of systematic study of the functions of the brain.
To be clear this is not a metaphysical claim. After all I reject all metaphysical worldviews, Physicalism/ Materialism included.
I am a Methodological Naturalist and like science my frameworks and gaps of knowledge are shaped by our Scientific Observations and Logic solely based on Pragmatic Necessity , not because of an ideology.
When we don't know, we admit we don't. We shouldn't go on and invent extra entities which are in direct conflict with the current successful Paradigm of Science.

Please note that I fully agree that rational thought requires proper brain function. So, that is not the issue. The issue is whether brain function alone is adequate. — Dfpolis

-Yes a healthy functioning brain is a necessary and sufficient explanation for any property of mind known to us. We may miss many details on how specific properties correlate to specific brain functions but that's not a reason to overlook the huge body of knowledge that we've gained the last 35 years.
The question "whether brain function alone is adequate." sounds more of a begging the question fallacy based on an general argument from Ignorance fallacy.
Again our data and logic (Parsimony) doesn't really allow us to introduce unnecessary entities we are unable to test or verify as a solution to our current problems.
This is a really easy way to pollute our epistemology with unfalsifiable "artifacts" (its Phlogiston,Miasma, Philosopher's Stone, Orgone Energy all over again).

That may well be true. I do not know what neuroscientists consider hard, nor is that what I am addressing in my article. As I made clear from the beginning, I am addressing the problem Chalmers defined. That does not prevent you from discussing something else, as long as you recognize that in doing so you are not discussing my article or the problem it addresses. In saying that, I am not denigrating the importance of the problems neuroscientists consider hard -- they're just not my problem. — Dfpolis

-An important question that comes in mind is: " Is your problem relevant to our efforts to understand".
As I explained Chalmers's problem is a fallacious teleological one. Its like me trying to find intention and purpose behind behind an unfortunate event....i.e. my house is destroyed by an earthquake.
Those types of questions are a distraction.

I want to focus on a specific issue common to almost all philosophers I talk to.
You stated: ". I do not know what neuroscientists consider hard, nor is that what I am addressing in my article."
I find this to be a serious problem for any discussion. How can you be sure about the epistemic foundations of your ideas and positions when you are not familiar with the latest epistemology on the topic? How can you be sure that we haven't answered those questions when your philosophy is based on ideas and knowledge of the past?

In defining the Hard Problem, you quote a reputable secondary source (Scholarpedia), but I quoted a primary source. So, I will stick with my characterization. — Dfpolis

- I find my source pretty accurate because I have watched Chalmers asking the same "why" questions plus Anil Seth shares the same opinion with me. But my all means please share your primary source and I will retract my characterization "Teleological fallacy".

There are many senses of "why." Aristotle enumerates four. I suppose you mean "why" in the sense of some divine purpose. But, I did not ask or attempt to answer that question. The question I am asking is how we come to be aware of neurally encoded contents. So, I fail to see the point you are making. — Dfpolis

-Agreed. But if Chalmers wanted answers to his ''why" questions with a different sense, he should have been Studying Cognitive Science. i.e. his first why question "Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience?" the answer is simple. Evolutionary principles. Making meaning of your world ads an advantage for survival and flourishing(Avoiding suffering, managing pleasure etc).
The answer on the other two why question is equally simple "because it does".(example of the electron).

The question I am asking is how we come to be aware of neurally encoded contents. So, I fail to see the point you are making. — Dfpolis

In my opinion you fail because as you said yourself, you ignore the latest work and the hard questions tackled by Neuroscience.

However, if you wish to call something "pseudo philosophical" or claim that it "create unsolvable questions," some justification for your claims would be courteous. Also, since I solved the problems I raised, they are hardly "unsolvable." — Dfpolis

-I was referring to Chalmers's pseudo philosophical "why" questions. Questions like "Why there is something instead of nothing" are designed to remain unanswered.
Now what problems you raised and how they were solved???I will wait for a clarification on that interesting claim.

I have never denied that the SM is able to solve a wide range of problems. It definitely is. The case is very like that of Newtonian physics, which can also solve many problems. However, I enumerated a number of problems it could not solve. Will you not address those? — Dfpolis

-Sure there are many problems we haven't solved (yet). Why do you think that the SM won't manage to finally provide a solution and how are you sure that some of them aren't solved already. After all,as you stated you are not familiar with the current Science on the topic.
IS it ok if I ask you to put all the problems in a list (bullets) so I can check them?

Again, this does not criticize my work, because you are not saying that my analysis is wrong, or even that reduction is not involved.cogency of your objection. — Dfpolis

Well I don't know if it was a critique of your work. I only address the paragraph (Article) on Reduction and Emergence"Does the Hard Problem reflect a failure of the reductive paradigm? "
Also I addressed the following statement in your OP.
"Yet, in the years since David Chalmers distinguished the Hard Problem of Consciousness from the easy problems of neuroscience, no progress has been made toward a physical reduction of consciousness. "
The right answer is , yes they have been huge progress to the emerging physical nature of consciousness.

Maybe you use "reduction" in a different sense and if you do that is a poisoning the well fallacy imho. By default we know,can verify and are able to investigate only one realm, the Physical.
As far as we can say there are details in the physical system that we don't know or understand. Assuming extra realms is irrational without direct evidence and objective verification of their existence.

Rather, you want me to look at a different problem. Further, with respect to that different problem, you do not even claim that the named methods have made progress in explaining how awareness of contents comes to be. So, I fail to see the — Dfpolis

-As I explained if you are pointing to a different problem then you are committing a logical error. Science and every single one of us are limited within a single realm. The burden is not on Science to prove the phenomenon to be physical, but its on the side making the claim for an f an additional sub-straight. The two justified answers are "we currently don't know" Or"this mechanism is necessary and sufficient to explain the phenomenon".
In my academic links you can find tones of papers analyzing which(and how) mechanisms enable the brain to introduce content in our conscious states. I can list them in a single post if you like.

It is a definition, specifying how I choose to use words, and not a claim that could be true or false. — bert1

-My objection was with the word "prove", since in science we don't prove anything.

Sorry, I just don't think you've grasped the distinction between definition and theory. — bert1

-ok I think we are on the same page on that.

I agree. I did not say that science proved frameworks, but that we use their principles to deduce predictions. That is the essence of the hypothetico-deductive method. — Dfpolis

-Because the hard problem ...is a made up problem.(Chalmers's teleological questions).

If you read carefully, you would see that I criticized Chalmers' philosophy, rather than basing my argument on it. — Dfpolis

-Yes you did, but you also accept a portion of it...right? In retrospect you did stated that your questions seek the "how" and I pointed out that Science has addressed many "how" questions on Brain functions and meaning/Symbolic thinking.

-"Then you will have no difficulty in showing how my specific objections about reports of consciousness, one-to-many mappings from the physical to the intentional, and propositional attitudes, inter alia, are resolved by this theory -- or how neurally encoded intelligible contents become actually known. Despite the length of your response, you have made no attempt to resolve these critical issues"
- Have you look in our latest epistemology and failed to find answers.?
Can you give me an example for every single problem?

This is baloney. I am asking how questions. The SM offers no hint as to how these observed effects occur. In fact, it precludes them. — Dfpolis

-Sure you clarified that and I pointed out the problem with your "how" questions. Many "how" questions have already been addressed and if they haven't been that is not a justification to reject the whole model (the Quasi Dogmatic Principles protects the framework at all time). After all its a dynamic model in progress that yields results and the only one that can be applied,tested produce causal descriptions and Technical Applications!

Obviously, you have never read Aristotle, as he proposes none of these. That you would think he does shows deep prejudice. Instead of taking the time to learn, or at least remaining quiet when you do not know, you choose to slander. It is very disappointing. A scientific mind should be open to, and thirsty for, the facts. — Dfpolis

-Strawman, I never said he did. I only pointed out the main historical errors in our Philosophy. Teleology in nature(Chalmers's hard problem) and agency with properties pretty similar to the properties displayed by the phenomenon we are trying to explain.(your claim on the non physical nature of Consciousness)
I only hope philosophers would take half of the courses on Neuroscience I have before talking about the unanswered mysteries of consciousness. Btw I am Greek. Studying Greek philosophers is my hobby.

Nor am I suggesting that we do. I am suggesting that methodological naturalism does not restrict us to the third-person perspective of the Fundamental Abstraction. That you would think that considering first-person data is "supernatural" is alarming. — Dfpolis

-Abstract concepts do not help complex topics like this one. On the contrary they introduce more ambiguity in the discussion. Plus you strawmanned me again with that supernatural first person data.

Mario Bunge's Ten Criticisms of contemporary academic philosophy highlighted this problem.
Here is the list.

Tenure-Chasing Supplants Substantive Contributions

• Confusion between Philosophizing & Chronicling

• Insular Obscurity / Inaccessibility (to outsiders)

• Obsession with Language too much over Solving Real-World Problems

• Idealism vs. Realism and Reductionism

• Too Many Miniproblems & Fashionable Academic Games

• Poor Enforcement of Validity / Methodology

• Unsystematic (vs. System Building & Ensuring Findings are Worldview Coherent)

• Detachment from Intellectual Engines of Modern Civilization (science, technology, and real-world ideologies that affect mass human thought and action)

• Ivory Tower Syndrome (not talking to experts in other departments and getting knowledge and questions to explore from them or helping them)


Science tells us that the brain is necessary and sufficient to explain the phenomenon even if we have loads of question to answer
You see an issue in brain function being sufficient to explain the phenomenon.
So here is my question. Lets assume that our current model never manages to reduce consciousness to a physical system. Does that point to a non physical function? If yes please elaborate.

Curious then that Chalmers is University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University, and an Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. Must have fooled a lot of important people! — Wayfarer

That's an argument from false authority fallacy. Reasoning doesn't really have experts . We are all experts on matters of logic as long as we are aware of its rules principles and criteria .
Second point. Do you think that Chalmers's occupies those chairs because of this Teleological fallacy alone? Is this his only work?
Does all those accolades ensure the quality of all his philosophical ideas?
If you understand why agency (in Nature) needs to be demonstrated not asserted, then you can easily understand why looking for intention and purpose behind a natural process is fallacious reasoning and produces unanswerable questions.
Academic Accolades do not have the power to change logic or the negative value of a Fallacious statement.

Science got rid of Teleology centuries ago. The epistemic success of science is founded on that really small but important change.

There is the logic that biology alone fails in any explanation of consciousness. We communicate ideas but no biology is transfered brain to brain in the process. That points away from reductionism and suggests something emergent is necessary in understanding consciousness.

This is the science of the problem. Observable and repeatable.

Here is some Academic material for those who are interested in updating their philosophy on the topic.
Our epistemology on Consciousness is a huge mosaic of data offering answers to all kind of "how the brain..." questions.
Aristotle systematized Logic,Philosophy and highlighted Epistemology as the first and hugely import step for all Philosophical inquiries !

publications
Giving Up on Consciousness as the Ghost in the Machine
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8121175/

HOW AND WHY BRAINS CREATE MEANING FROM SENSORY INFORMATION
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S0218127404009405

https://neurosciencenews.com/?s=how+the+brain+meaning+semantics

https://neurosciencenews.com/?s=how+the+brain+consciousness

Thalamus Modulates Consciousness via Layer-Specific Control of Cortex
https://www.cell.com/neuron/fulltext/S0896-6273(20)30005-2

Moocs
https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/what-is-a-mind
https://www.coursera.org/learn/neurobiology

Lectures - talks
Alok Jha: Consciousness, the hard problem? - Presentations
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=313yn0RY9QI

Anil Seth on the Neuroscience of Consciousness, Free Will, The Self, and Perception
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hUEqXhDbVs

mark solms theory of consciousness
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=mark+solms+theory+of+consciousness

BS 160 Neuroscience of Consciousness
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UGwOfSKmo_I&t=

Brain Science Podcast with Ginger Campbell
https://www.youtube.com/@BrainSciencePodcast/videos

There is the logic that biology alone fails in any explanation of consciousness. — Mark Nyquist

that has nothing to do with logic (or knowledge). That is mostly scientific ignorance.

We communicate ideas but no biology is transfered brain to brain in the process. — Mark Nyquist

-....there are these things called eyes, ears and mouth which are connected to the brain. The communication of ideas use the exact same mechanism like any other environmental stimuli that ends up in our brains.

That points away from reductionism and suggests something emergent is necessary in understanding consciousness — Mark Nyquist

-Again, reductionism is not the only tool science have.We use Complexity Science to study the emergent properties in complex systems.
https://complexityexplained.github.io/

This is the science of the problem. Observable and repeatable. — Mark Nyquist

Actually the main problems are Complexity and Observation Objectivity collapse (our ability to make observations without interacting with the system).

So we do agree that ideas can be transfered brain to brain and no biological material is being transfered, right? That is a valid observation.

Well its true but its trivial, commonly known as a deepity. Information uses other mediums than i.e. procreation where transferring biological material is necessary. Biological organisms have sensory systems that enable them to exchange information.

But his beliefs as to "why" the experience happened is like a blind man feeling around in the dark compared to the lights we have today. — Philosophim

I really don’t accept that. You’re talking about him as if he lived in Medieval Europe. He had a career spanning 50 years, which wasn’t even 100 years ago.

I don't ascribe to "materialism", or "physicalism" — Philosophim

I had thought so based on such statements as

One way to look at life is it is an internally self-sustaining chemical reaction. In a non-living reaction, the matter required to create the reaction eventually runs out on its own. Life seeks to sustain and extend its own balance of chemical reactions. — Philosophim

However on second reading, you’re differentiating life from chemistry, by saying that ‘life seeks to sustain and extend….’ So you’ve introduced the element of intentionality which I agree is necessary and which I don’t believe has any analogy in materialism.

I mean, at its basic Wayfarer, why is your consciousness stuck in your head? — Philosophim

Don’t accept that it is. Conscious thought is an activity of the brain, but consciousness does indeed extend throughout your body and permeates all living things to one degree or another.

That's an argument from false authority fallacy — Nickolasgaspar

It wasn’t so much an appeal to authority, but the observation that a lot of people say that Chalmer’s work is pseudo-philosophy, without, I think, demonstrating an understanding of the rationale behind his ‘hard problem’ argument. And indeed, that single paper launched Chalmers into a career as an internationally-renowned and tenured philosopher, which says something.

That points away from reductionism and suggests something emergent is necessary in understanding consciousness. — Mark Nyquist

This is where biosemiosis enters the picture. I’ve learned a lot about that from this forum.

I really don’t accept that. You’re talking about him as if he lived in Medieval Europe. He had a career spanning 50 years, which wasn’t even 100 years ago. — Wayfarer

Again, you are committing a Strawman and a false authority fallacy. I am NOT talking "about him". I am criticizing the obvious teleological error in his so called "Hard problem".
The longevity of his carrier or his academic accolades do not guarantee the truth or logic in his ideas. All claims rise and fall on their own merits.
Anil Seth, true Authority on the problems of consciousness verifies my objections on Chalmers's idea.
The auxiliary principles he uses place his idea in the Medieval period, not my critique of doing so.

It wasn’t so much an appeal to authority, — Wayfarer

...but you insist on mentioning the longevity of his carrier ?

It wasn’t so much an appeal to authority, but the observation that a lot of people say that Chalmer’s work is pseudo-philosophy, without, I think, demonstrating an understanding of the rationale behind his ‘hard problem’ argument. And indeed, that single paper launched Chalmers into a career as an internationally-renowned and tenured philosopher, which says something. — Wayfarer

-Without demonstrating or understanding? Does the term fallacy mean nothing to you? I literally named the fallacy he is committing and I quoted his 2 fallacious questions while pointing out that he needs to demonstrate Intention and purpose in natural process, not assert them.

AGAIN here are his questions :

1.Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience?
2.why does a given physical process generate the specific experience it does, why an experience of red rather than green, for example?
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Hard_problem_of_consciousness

The answer for the first question is Survival advantage(Evolutionary Principles) and for the second "because it does".
So the first one can be answered Through science as if it was a "how" question while the second is just nonsensical.

As you say, they are distinct. Hence, dualism. — Fooloso4

Dualism does not mean that there is more than one way of thinking about reality.

I think you have it backwards. It is only when there is change, not when something remains the same, that there is a cause. — Fooloso4

No, even "staying the same" requires a cause -- first, because physical objects are not static, composed of Greek atoma, but dynamic, constantly oscillating at the quantum level and interchanging constituents; and secondly, because they have no intrinsic necessity and so need to be sustained in being by something that has such necessity.

You are adding one assumption on top of another. — Fooloso4

Perhaps you would give me your definition of "possible".

Again, you have it backwards. It is not that the laws of nature preclude a rock from becoming a hummingbird but rather there would have to be some cause in order for a rock to become a hummingbird. — Fooloso4

These are not mutually exclusive. There needs to be a cause both for remaining the same (e.g. conservation laws) and for changing. We live in a world of constant causation.

Self-maintenance, or entelecheia, does not mean immortality or self-sufficiency. The point again is that Aristotle's conceptual space is unburdened by dualism, yours is not. — Fooloso4

To see the world as filled with causal links is not to be a dualist.

The fact that we're going back and forth on what consciousness is after I've read your paper should reveal to you that you didn't make a clear case of what it meant to you to your reader. — Philosophim

No, it only illustrates the difficulty humans have in letting go of preconceptions.

Can drugs alter our consciousness, yes, or no? If yes, then we can reduce consciousness to a physical basis. — Philosophim

Non sequitur. It only shows that there is a dependence (which I affirm), not that the particular dependence explains all the known operations.

A very simple definition of what consciousness means to you could help here. — Philosophim

Asked and answered.

We are agreeing here. — Philosophim

Good.

Your paper addresses consciousness. Consciousness is something attributed to beings besides human beings. Dogs for example. — Philosophim

Again, "consciousness" is an analogous term. The only organisms we know to experience awareness of intelligibility are humans.

If anything, that would be odd to limit consciousness to only the the human physical form while simultaneously denying it is linked to neurons, or any other physical basis. — Philosophim

You persist in misrepresenting my position. That is not a sign of good faith. I have said repeatedly that conscious thought depends on neural representation and processing.

If you want me to address other aspects of your work, you'll need to address the points I feel unclear or problamatic first. — Philosophim

I have. I am growing impatient with going over the same ground with you, as it wastes my time.

How is my experiencing the color red a particular way not my subjective awareness? — Philosophim

I did not say it was not an instance of subjective awareness. Still, experiencing qualia is just one kind of such awareness. Knowing that pi is an irrational number is another, and it does not have a quale.

You may have wanted to devote more time to it then. At least to the point where you would have understood my reference was not claiming to be a fact or evidence, and a perfectly reasonable thing to mention. — Philosophim

I suggest you read the section of my paper addressing information in computers.

1.Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience?
[...]
The answer for the first question is Survival advantage(Evolutionary Principles) — Nickolasgaspar

How can natural selection act on experience?