Very true. Very true. The only difference is that, I would say, cognitive science can't really get at the fundamental questions that Kant was trying to answer; being that it is purely philosophical. Most people nowadays won't grant transcendental philosophy as legitimate because they think science is the only valid means of inquiry into reality---which is false.

Empirical experiences are experiences that are assumed to be sensations that represent things outside of myself. Non-empirical sensations are those which are generated inside of myself.

Two things needing to be mentioned here:

1. This “empirical” vs. “non-empirical” distinction you are making is NOT the same as my distinction between what I sense vs. I use to cognize those sensations. You, here, are making a distinction between what is sensed about external objects vs. sensed about oneself.

2. The word “empirical” does not, nor ever has, referred to only sensations of external objects (assuming, and we must assume for your distinction to work, we are excluding ourselves as an external object); because anything which is sensed about reality is empirical (traditionally); and so anything of which my brain senses about my body or its own internal processes (e.g., thinking) is empirical data—for those are sensations of something which is in reality. The only time it would make sense to say that some set of sensations are non-empirical, is if we admit, which is highly questionable, that when we are hallucinating (or something similar) our senses are generating fake data. FYI, I would say that it is much more plausible, in that case, that our brain is simply capable of using the faculty of imagination as a source of fabricated sensations rather than our senses themselves being capable of, on cue, generating fake data.

I feel the above terms are clear and largely unambiguous, which is important for any model and discussion of knowledge. My issues is, "What is apriori"? Its not clear, and its not unambiguous.

Of course, as any philosophical discussion naturally goes, each participant believes they have all the unambiguous points (:

I don’t think your terms are clear at all but, rather, are muddied.

E.g., to use your tree example, you are saying that, if I understood correctly, the experience of the tree is empirical but that your thoughts about that tree are non-empirical; and this is because the tree is a representation of sensations of something in reality whereas your thoughts are not. However, your thoughts as presented to you in your conscious experience, are representations of something in reality just as much as the tree is—so both are empirical; and this distinction sidesteps the whole discussion about a priori aspects of experience, for you completely skipped over the fact that there are pre-structured aspects to the way that you experience that tree!

In the above two paragraphs, what would you consider apriori? What clarity and accuracy would the term add?

Let’s use the tree example: you are experiencing a tree. Ok. The tree, assuming you are not hallucinating, must be the product of your senses, ultimately, being excited by something in reality and of which your brain is intuiting and cognizing; and so the sensations, insofar as they are raw data of that thing which excited your senses, must be empirical (because they are about reality). The tree, however, is represented to you in space and time which are pure forms that your brain uses to intuit those (empirical) sensations and thusly are not properties of the thing, whatever it was, which excited your senses in the first place. So the space and time are synthetic. Likewise, the tree is presented to you not just in space and time, but also with strict mathematical relations; and this is something which is necessarily something which your brain synthetically adds to the mix in order to represent the ‘thing’ which is constructing from the sensations of whatever thing impacted your senses (in the first place) (viz., it is impossible for you to come up with a way to represent, e.g., a square on a plotting graph without producing inherent mathematical relations between each line and what not when graphing it). Likewise, the tree is not just represented to you synthetically in space, time, and with mathematical relations; but also with strict logical relations. Viz., when your brain is constructing the objects to present to you from those sensations, it does it in an inherently logical way: it will not, e.g., determine that it should represent that leaf and that other leaf in the same exact place in space and time because a proposition, for your brain, cannot be both true and false in accordance with those forms of intuition—these are, viz., rules a priori which your brain has which do not apply to whatever thing excited your senses in the first place. Likewise, your brain must have, in order to cognize those sensations, certain a priori, and primitive, concepts; such as causality (viz., your brain must already be equipped with the understanding that it must seek out cause-effect relations in those sensations in order to represent them inherently causally for you in the first place—e.g., in order for your brain to represent the sensations of whatever the tree is in-itself which excited your senses, it must already have the concept of causality at its disposal and the rule that it must connect things in those sensations in a cause-effect manner). Likewise, in order to do math (which is synthetic), your brain must, as another example, have the concepts of quantity (i.e., unity, plurality, and totality).

Just try plotting a line on a graph without having the implicit understanding that, e.g., a dot is identical to itself, the line unites the dots, there are multiple dots which are required to make the line, you must add the dots together in succession, etc. It’s impossible. Your brain is plotting objects on essentially a graph, namely space and time, to represent objects to you as an experience.

No, I can't agree that the term 'discrete' references space in some way. I feel like you're confusing 'living in space' with 'knowing space'. Because we live in space, we will act and sense things from space.

‘Discrete’ is obviously referencing space, otherwise you would have to posit that a discrete experience does not contain a multiplicity of objects.

We do not live in space, our brains represent things in space. Do you see what I mean? I think you think that there’s a space and time beyond the space and time which are the forms of your experience and, of which, you live in. We only ‘live in’ space and time insofar as we have conditional knowledge about ourselves and our environment which is inherently in space and time; because that’s how our brain represents them.

All things act as if they live in space, because they are beings that live in space.

That you understand things to be in space, like amoeba, does not entail that they are in space themselves. You understand an amoeba to react in space because space is a fundamental form which your brain uses to represent amoeba; or you use, with your reason, assuming you cannot see them with your own eyes nor with a microscope, to understand, conditionally, how they behave.

But no living thing has knowledge prior to interacting with space

Your brain does NOT interact with space: it uses it to represent whatever is going on in reality. You are using your knowledge of reality, which is conditioned by those spatiotemporal forms which your brain uses to represent things, to project that onto the things which excited your senses. You cannot validly do that. All you are doing is anthropomorphizing reality with the a priori modes that your brain has for representing it.

An electron circles around a hydrogen atom. Does it do this because it knows space and time apriori?

Electrons and atoms, and one circling the other, is already conditioned by your a priori understanding of reality; because it is deeply and inextricably ingrained in the a priori spatiotemporal means which your brain uses to cognize things. You are projecting that onto electrons and atoms with respect to whatever they are in-themselves, which we cannot know.

I can give you an even easier example: my car in my garage. When I say “my car is in my garage”, I am not saying that there’s a car which exists in a garage in the sense of what they may exist in-themselves; but, rather, explaining it in terms of the only way I can: as conditioned by the a priori means which my brain cognizes reality. I cannot think away space and time from my understanding of a car, a garage, and a car in a garage not because they are actually in space and time but, rather, because all I have ever experienced, and will ever experience, of a car, garage, and a car in a garage is going to be placed in space and time (synthetically by my brain in order to represent the sensations which were excited by whatever they are in-themselves).

These discrete experiences become memories, and beliefs can form about them.

All of which assumes that your experience is fundamentally spatial; and not that reality in which you exist is spatial.

What do you see as 'apriori'?

a priori has always referenced, traditionally, that which is prior to empirical data. Prior to Kant, it was primarily used to denote the forms of reality as opposed to its content (i.e., the rationalists arguing that reality is inherently rational because it has spatial, temporal, mathematical, logical, etc. forms); and for Kant, it was used primarily to denote that those inherently rational aspects, or forms, of Nature (e.g., the inherently logical and mathematical aspects to a leaf, or the laws of which is seems to obey) are actually the forms of our modes of experience. There’s nothing ambiguous about this. When someone says something is a priori, they are saying that thing pertains to the prior forms to something as opposed to the empirical aspects to it (e.g., the inherent mathematical aspect to a wooden block as opposed to how it reacts when being lit on fire).

Does it need to have another term tied to it like experience or knowledge? If so, give both.

a priori can be a noun or an adjective; so one can denote a certain thing as being the aspect of it which is a priori by saying “a priori <thing in question>”—e.g., a priori knowledge.

Simply put, a priori experience refers to the aspects of one’s conscious experience which are prior to the empirical data being represented and which are used to cognize the sensations of those things which excite our senses; and, of which, I gave a detailed account with the tree—so I don’t feel the need to add another example of this.

a priori knowledge refers to any knowledge which is grounded in those a priori aspects of experience. Such as “1+1=2”, “!(a && !a)”, etc.

Apriori and aposteriori are often seen as divisions between 'knowledge apart from experience (I generously say "apart from the empirical"' to fix this, and "Knowledge from experience (or the empirical).

This is true, because by experience they mean the empirical aspects of experience. E.g., you don’t need to technically sense anything in reality to know that 1+1=2; but you do need an experience, even if it be merely hallucinogenic, in order to do math. Viz., a knocked out mathematician cannot do math, but a conscious one can derive mathematical proofs without any empirical experiments.

So there should be an aposteriori conception of space

Ehhh….space is pure a priori. Not everything has both aspects to it. The a priori concept of quantity does not have a a posteriori aspect to it—that wouldn’t make any sense.

If I measure the table as being 1 meter long, isn't that an aposteriori conception of space?

Space is the extension in which the table is represented; and not the exact mathematical quantity that you measured. Math, not in terms of its axioms and propositions itself but in terms of how your brain represents things with math, does have an a posteriori aspect—the idea of representing it with extension does not.

Your brain learns, arguably, how to deploy the a priori axioms and propositions and concepts of math (e.g., geometry, quantity, addition, subtraction, etc.) in manners to better represent those sensations in space and time in relation to each object it determines is a part of those sensations; and, to your real point (I would say), the exact mathematical relations it attributes to something in order to represent it are conditioned by what it cognizes and intuits it is (based off of the intuitions).

In other words, math itself, which your brain is using, is a priori; but that your brain decides to represent that table as 1 meter long (although it is uncertain what unit of measure it uses, but that’s despite the point here) is conditioned by the empirical data which it is represented with that a priori math.

Think of it this way, as an analogy, if we are playing a game where I have a plotting graph (like in math class) which only allows me to draw in straight lines and tell me to represent a shape that is almost a square (but is a little squiggly); then I will use the mathematical principles which I do not learn from the fact that you told me to represent this squiggly square nor from the idea of a squiggly square to draw the straight-lined representation of the squiggly square. You telling me to represent a squiggly square, along with the nuanced squiggly square, in this analogy, is the empirical sensations and the math which I use to draw a representation of it is the a priori, non-empirical means of me representing it. You are, by analogy, with the tree, conflating these two and saying that the straight-lined representation of the squiggly line on the plotted graph is itself purely empirical—no, no, no...some of that is a priori.

Further, what is a clear term of 'transcendental knowledge' vs 'self-reflective knowledge'?

In simpler terms, it is the differencing between cognizing and thinking—it is the difference between your brain’s cognition for representing objects and your ability to reason about that constructed experience.

This is getting really long (: , so I will end it here.

Isn't Thing-in-itself a postulated existence, rather than perceived existence?

A thing-in-itself is whatever external thing in reality impacted your senses in the first place, and of which excited your faculties of representation into producing the perception which you ended up having.

If by “postulated existence”, you mean that reason herself must posit the thing-in-itself, given that one’s conscious experience is representational, then yes: we do not perceive things-in-themselves—that’s the whole point!

Hence you need faith to perceive it, rather than knowledge?

Hmmm, you don’t perceive a thing-in-itself: it is, logically, the thing which your senses produced sensations of; and your understanding cognizes those sensations—not the thing-in-itself. No perception of a thing-in-itself is ever possible for any being which has a representational experience; which arguably is any being with experience at all.

I wonder if this post, although not addressed to you, might have been relevant to your enquiries?

I thought it was a good exposition of some of Kant’s ideas :up:

If there's something about it that you would like to discuss with me specifically, then please feel free to let me know and I would be happy to discuss. An in depth response, given how densely packed the information was, would probably to futile without us honing in on a specific aspect of the conversation.

So it is that perception is conditioned by both space and time, but thought is conditioned by time alone without regard to space.

Your recognition that space is required for outer sense because it must have the possibility of representing a multiplicity of external objects, whereas our inner sense is in time alone because we cannot exercise our inner functions other than sequentially, is an astute and fascinating observation; however, I think it oversteps the bounds of reason and presumes highly questionable teleology. For what you are positing, with respect to the former, is that our internal thinking in-itself occurs only with one occurring at a time; which already presupposes knowledge of how we think as it were itself as opposed to how it appears to itself, and it supposes that that thinking occurs in a time which is not a pure form of sensibility. With my argument to Philosophim, I was merely noting, transcendentally, that my brain must be cognizing my thoughts (that I am aware of) because they are organized in time; but I cannot claim to know that my thinking, which could be occurring at deeper levels of my subconscious and of which I am not aware of, is fundamentally conditioned itself by time and, moreover, determined in-itself to be a series of one thought per time unit. With respect to the latter, it seems like if you are right then objects external to us are themselves in space and our thoughts are in time (alone); which then, beyond overstepping the bounds of reason, incites the question of “how could the brain be so pre-constructed to happen to mirror the forms of reality-in-itself?!?”.

I don’t see how one could prove, transcendentally, that I cannot have two thoughts at a time; other than to say that my brain would fail to properly render that into my self-consciousness. Likewise, I should, rather, say that I cannot see how one could prove anything about how thoughts exist in-themselves, which my previous statement presupposed many things about them as they are in-themselves (e.g., ‘two’, ‘at a time’, etc.).

That got the Andy Rooney-esque single raised eyebrow from me. Like…wha???

Oh I see: number 2 was supposed to say that “your senses produce sensations”.

How is it not real? Its a real experience.

I am not sure there is much more I can say on this point other than reiterate: what you mean by ‘real’ here is just a vague notion of existence—i.e., that you are having an experience—whereas what I am indicating is that the a priori aspects of our experience, e.g., of a tree is purely epistemic and not ontological. If you want to use ‘real’ in your more generic sense, then that is fine: it does not avoid the issue that the a priori preconditions for that experience are not a part of reality—they are, rather, the epistemic ‘tools’ which human cognition has for cognizing reality. Do you see this difference I am noting (irregardless of the semantics)?

My point is, is that any discrete experience is real.

It is not a part of reality, though. Do you agree with that?

But I don't know 'space' as a discrete experience apart from experience

“discrete” is a word which references an idea engrained, fundamentally, in space. You may say that ‘space’ is not conceptually known, self-reflectively, by merely discretely experiencing, but do you agree that, at least, space is the ingrained form of that experience in virtue of which it is discrete? Can we agree on that, and then work our way up (so to speak)?

Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?
…
You need to be extremely clear. If I judge space as catching a ball, what part is apriori, what is aposteriori? If babies cannot grasp spatial relations prior to six months, what do they know about space apriori?

I need clarification: are you asking for an example of a prior vs. a posteriori aspects of experience OR a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge?

Your original question (above) was about the former, and now I think, based off of your response (above) that you are actually thinking about knowledge—not those innate aspects of experience.

My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space.

There is no a posteriori space—it is pure intuition. What I think you are confusing is self-reflective knowledge with transcendental knowledge (and innate capacities, as you would put it). So let’s start with the basics. Do you agree that:

1. Babies experience (outer objects) in space.
2. Babies do not have any self-reflective conceptual capacities (through reason) that they experience (outer objects) in space nor what ‘space’ is as ‘extension’.
3. A child can, at some stage of development, understand notionally what space is without being about to apply language to explain it.
4. Adults have a self-reflective understanding of what space is, and can apply language to explain it.

Let’s start there.

No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences

Hmmm, maybe I am misremembering your theory: I thought you agreed with me that our experience is inherently, innately, discrete; which implies that space and time are the forms, even if you don’t think they are pure a priori, of that experience.

No. This is just wrong. It is a fact that the concepts of space and time are developed over time. It is on you to show proof that space and time are concepts apart from experience. I'm siding with science on this one.

Again, you are confusing self-reflective knowledge with transcendental knowledge. No one is denying that we develop the concepts, in the sense of self-reflectively, of space and time over time; but this doesn’t negate the fact that space and time are the pure forms of our experience independently of our self-reflective, conceptual understanding of them.

Correct. Then everything is apriori.

???

The experience which you have, as I noted before, is as in part a posteriori; otherwise, you are doing the equivalent of hallucinating—since there is no empirical content.

Incorrect. Space is a concept we learn by bodily extension. Discrete experience comes first, the concept of 'space' comes after

Bodily extension presupposed space: your experience presupposes space as one of its forms. Space is more fundamental than what you are calling your ‘concept of space’; because by concept, you are referring to a concept derived self-reflectively.

Here’s one of the roots of our confusion: you are failing to recognize that cognition has a dual meaning on english—it can refer to our self-reflective cognition (e.g., thinking about our experience) or our transcendental cognition (e.g., our brains thinking about how to construct experience). I would like you to address this distinction, because you keep equivocating them throughout your posts.

No, I did not agree to this. Please link to a scientific reference to senses beyond the five.

You agreed here:

I'll agree that proprioception and echolocation are definitely senses, but introspection? — Philosophim

Here’s a basic article from a neuroscientist: https://www.sciencefocus.com/the-human-body/how-many-senses-do-we-have . Exteroceptive vs. interoceptive senses are just the scientific way of saying ‘outer’ vs. ‘inner’ senses.

Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them

Do you deny that your brain is organizing your thoughts in time to construct your experience of them (of which you can introspect)?

HA!!! Mysterious forces.

:smile:

One more step, and it becomes clear why there are only two pure intuitions, given the dualistic nature of the human intellect.

Could you elaborate on this? I didn’t follow this part.

I might mention your #2 from a few days ago, but that wasn’t addressed to me.

Mww, always feel free to chime in on these conversations if you have something to add (:

I don’t recall what this #2 was from a few days ago, but feel free to address it if you would like.

If reality is 'what is', then isn't anything we experience reality?
…
The problem is this assumes that experiences apart from the empirical are not reality. Every experience you have is part of reality.

Alright @Mww and @Wayfarer, your mysterious forces are beginning to sway me. In having to explain this to Philosophim, I am starting to appreciate your distinction between what is real and what exists: it seems I have to posit that distinction now to resolve the ambiguity.

Philosophim, the ambiguity is that you are using ‘reality’, like I usually do, too vaguely and loosely. The a priori aspects of your experience exist (viz., ‘there are these a priori aspects to your experience) but they are not real (viz., ‘these a priori aspects of your experience are not in reality but, rather, modes of cognizing reality).

Space, as a pure intuition, is not in reality nor it is a property sensed of the objects that are in reality: it is the way that your brain is pre-structured to intuit phenomena; and so space, as a pure form of sensibility, is not real (because it is not of reality) but certainly exists (as a pre-structured way for your brain to represent and intuit sensations).

Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?

I did that with space: what did you disagree with there?

But this is just wrong. Modern day neuroscience and understanding of brain development shows this is a learned process.

You are equivocating. The scientific fact you pointed to was whether a young person knows what space is; and not if it transcendentally uses it to intuit and cognize objects for its conscious experience; nor if it transcendentally uses it with its self-reflective reason to understand its own conscious experience of things. These are three completely separate claims, and the first one is what scientifically you were noting.

Neuroscience is useless for transcendental investigations; and to not understand that is to misunderstand, fundamentally, the Kantian problem of experience.

Space and time are identities we create to label experiences

Then, you must believe that you aren’t consciously experiencing in space and time before you conceptually understood that you were; which is nonsense.

But this is everything, and not exclusive to space and time. Any identity attributed as a representation is not the property of the thing in itself.

The difference is that properties of things are a mixture of empirical and non-empirical content. We cognize them based off of sensational data, which is empirical. Space and time are pure a priori, because they are not based off of sensations at all.

When our brains cognize a ‘ball’, you are right that it represents sensations of a thing in correspondence with certain pure and impure a priori conceptions; but there is an empirical aspect to it; whereas that it has extension and is placed in a sequential sequence is pure a priori.

How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)

It depends on what you mean. If you mean an concept which we self-reflective deploy for our conscious experience, then it is no different. If you mean a concept which is ingrained in how we represent reality for our conscious experience, then it is quite obviously drastically different. The former is an idea we have of our conscious experience, the latter is an idea which our representative faculties has for constructing our conscious experience.

This requires no innate understanding of space, just the ability to separate what one experiences into identities.
…

No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience.

That’s what conceptual space is! It is transcendental, because it is necessary precondition for the possibility of using self-reflective reason. Therefore, I am right in concluding, even in your terminology, that we must already use space even when we don’t know what space is. That was my original point that you denied.

There are only five of them.

We already agreed this is false; and scientifically it is utterly false.

Self-reflection is a type of thought, not a sense.

Let’s take the simplest example of inner sense: thoughts about thoughts. I can introspectively analyze my own thinking about other things, and this is because my inner thoughts are presented to me in time. If my inner thoughts were not presented to me, if they were not respresented to me, then they would not be formulated experientially, consciously, in succession. My brain has already sensed and properly sorted my thoughts, under the preconditioned a priori modes to represent them, for me to consciously experience my own thoughts. Time, without space, is the pure intuition for the inner sense; simply meaning, that for reflective consciousness, it is represented by the brain in time alone and never in space.

If I take your argument here seriously, then my thoughts, which are presented to me in organized succession, are somehow non-representational and my brain somehow could organize it in succession without any sensational data of its own thinking processes. How is that possible, Philosophim?!?!?

:up:

I think the consistency of normal experience and our ability to compare to perceptive fabrications (e.g., hallucinations, dreams, etc.) are evidence that something normally is exciting your senses; but what that thing is in-itself is impossible to know. It very well could be a mere idea (like ontological idealists say) or a concrete object (like materialists will say) or an object (like physicalists will say) or something unimaginable.

But how far would you go to saving a zygote?

Just like the question “how far would you go to save an adult?”, it is so nuanced I am not sure where to begin on that one. Let me address the other things you said and we can see if you want to dive in deeper.

I can envision myself maybe running into a burning building to save a person trapped there, but a petri dish or a test tube?

1. No one, per se, is obligated to save a person trapped in a burning building.
2. Some people are obligated, because of their duties (e.g., a firefighter, a father, a mother, etc.).
3. A person who is not obligated to save the person that is trapped, may legitimately decide to save an adult but not a baby; a baby but not an adult; a zygote but not a baby; a baby but not a zygote; an adult but not super old adults; etc. They are not obligated to do it, so there’s nothing immoral happening if they choose not to or choose based off of morally relevant, but not obligatory, reasons.
4. You are right to note that it is morally relevant that a zygote in a petri dish is significantly different than an adult in a burning building but this is only relevant in the case that saving them is not obligatory; and does not deny that they are persons (in the pre-modern sense) or non-persons which will develop into persons (in the modern sense).

Would you put yourself at risk to save a zygote?

If you are asking about me personally, I would not run in an incredibly on-fire house to save a stranger—no matter if they are a zygote or a child. I have no obligation to do so, because they are not related to me (as family nor as a close friend or acquaintance) and I have not assumed the role of a member of society that would (like a firefighter), and I find it not worth it.

Now, if you are wondering if I see the obvious morally relevant differences between the zygote in the petri dish and, e.g., a baby in the case that I have to save one of them (and only one) (without using one as a means towards saving the other), then, yes, I would save the baby.

All of these scenarios I give are to show we value actual persons infinitely more than one-celled organisms

You are sort of correct: we do find morally relevant differences between people in moral dilemmas (e.g., being super old vs. young, having rich vs. poor conscious experience, etc.) but, what you are missing is, that doesn’t apply to rights. This is why @Banno keeps avoiding my questions on rights, because they know that the zygote has a right to life and that the morally relevant differences between them and, e.g., an adult for purposes of certain dilemmas do not apply here because one can never violate a person’s rights for a good end or to produce a good effect.

E.g., I may, and certainly will, admit that there is a morally relevant difference between a really old vs. young person such that if I have to save a 90-year old vs. a teenager where each is in a separate, burning building; then I am going to save the teenager. However, this does not admit that the 90-year old doesn’t have a right to life; nor that I could, e.g., murder them to harvest their organs to save a teenager from an illness. Do you see the difference between these two examples? This is why this is false:

and I think obvious conclusions can be drawn from that regarding the abortion debate.

All that is relevant for your view, if I dare say, is that what you call “non-actual persons” are not persons and so they do not have rights.

You should be able to answer a basic question like that. Let me try to ask it differently:

1. What do you believe a 'right' is?
2. Do you believe anything has any rights?
3. What has rights (if any)?
4. Do humans have rights?
5. If humans have rights, then what rights do they have?
6. What rights, if any, do human beings in the womb have?

If your theory can't answer these, then it has serious problems.

What about you? How far would you go to save a dying zygote? Would you hook your body up to it for 9 months? What if it meant you would be bedridden during that time?

Good question: no, I would not volunteer to save a random zygote nor a random adult by having them use my bodily resources to save their life; and I don't think that is immoral nor would it be morally permissible for society force hook me up to them.

It depends on how difficult or easy it would be to save that life. E.g., we expect someone to call CPS when a baby randomly shows up on our front porch and we expect them to make reasonable accommodations to keep that baby alive until they show up; or we even expect, if there were no CPS, for them to take care of the baby. But if they had to use their own bodily resources to do it, or had to choose between themselves surviving or the baby, then I don't think we would blame them if they chose themselves (assuming it isn't their baby).

If, for some reason, I am forceably hooked up to someone and am sustaining their life; then that would be immoral but also it would be immoral for me to unhook myself.

Honestly, this is a good, separate question about justice which equally applies to helping anyone in society. Should you splurge on a boat, with your hard earned cash, when you could have easily helped change a homeless person's life? These are all good questions, but I don't think it is as relevant to abortion as you probably think it is. Me not helping a homeless person right now is not a violation of their rights---or is that what you are suggesting (essentially)?

But you are implying a zygote has some rights, but are not clarifying what they are; because you don't know....

You didn't answer my question Banno. Let me try again: DO YOU THINK that the zygote has a right to life? Any right to life at all? If so, then what does that right to life entail in your view?

It is simple @Banno: do you or do you not believe that a zygote has a right to life? Do they have that right?

At best, if I grant what you said here then, you are saying that the blastocyst has no right to life; which is the most basic right a human has :sad: ; or, worse, you are saying that rights have degrees.

CC: @RogueAI:

I have been trying, from the start, to get @Banno to answer similar questions; but, unfortunately, they refuse to engage. The whole argument, as far as I can gather thus far, is that it seems immoral to force a woman to continue going through with pregnancy because of any value placed on the unborn human and, therefore, abortion is permissible. This is just utter garbage: it is entirely circular.

I will say that, with respect to my view, I have been using my terms too loosely sometimes; and this is something I will avoid doing in the future. To be painfully clear to everyone, here’s what I am arguing:

I am evaluating whether not Mrs. Smith has the right to, or should, kill the human being developing in her womb in virtue of what is actually good and how I think that relates to behavior. Viz., what is actually good is what is intrinsically valuable, what is most intrinsically valuable is what is the chief good, the chief good is eudaimonia, being a eudaimon requires one to be just, being just requires one to respect other beings relative to their (teleological) natures, a person has a nature such that they havewill develop into having a rational will, and to respect a rational will is to treat it as an end in itself and never as a mere means.

@Banno refuses to discuss whether or not a zygote, embryo, or/and fetus have basic human rights; and this thwarts the conversation to a stand-still.

I would love to see a non-emotional, on point, reasoned argument from observable facts state what a human being is and when such a thing first comes into being.

If I were iron-man a pro-choice position, then I would say that you are asking an irrelevant question because you are equivocating personhood with “human beingness”; and that you are absolutely right that a new human being is create upon conception, but that a person is not thereby created upon conception and personhood grounds rights. A person, under this view, is a being which currently has a mind which has a rational will, and not a mere natural potential for one, and this is indicated, for an organism, by having a brain which is functioning aptly enough to deploy such a subjective experience (as a mind with rational capacities). Therefore, up until the unborn human being acquires the proper brain it is morally permissible to abort.

This argument sucks for multiple reasons:

1. What grounds rights is the rational nature of a being and not its mere acquisition or possession of a mind—otherwise, all animals would have equal rights—and so it is clear that infanticide would be equally morally permissible in this view (for children, especially at really early ages, clearly do not have a rational will).

2. Many human beings which even a pro-choice person wants to count as a person would not count under this view and thusly would not have any rights. E.g., a person who we know is going to wake up from their coma in 2 days time but currently does not have enough brain function to deploy a mind with rational capacities has no rights for those 2 days.

3. Dead people have no rights, which leads to the logical conclusion that one can do whatever they want to a dead person’s body as long as it serves no injustice to anyone who may have known them. E.g., sex, desecration, etc.

This is why anyone and everyone should be going for a teleological analysis of this, even if they don’t believe that we are designed in that strong, theological sense of having an agent which endowed us with purpose. I am curious what @Leontiskos thinks about this.

I am waiting for @Banno to respond with “but it’s obvious we shouldn’t value the zygote over the woman!!!!”. :roll:

I apologize: I was not intending to sidestep any of your response. If there's something I missed, then please feel free to bring it up.

Likewise, I enjoyed our conversation; and until we meet again, Praxis!

I am not in any way setting out to prove that a cyst has less value than Mrs Smith. So I am not begging the question.

Here's why I said it is question begging: you are saying that is it morally permissible to abort because it is obvious that the woman should be able to abort. You are just masking it with other words now.

We might at again flip the question you keep asking of me, and ask you why you think that Mrs Smith has only the value of a zygote.

It's not that they, in total, have the same value: it's that they both have equal, basic human rights. I have consistently kept this conversation in terms of rights, not in total value. I do not disagree that in some circumstances, like when you have to choose between saving one person or the other in a manner that doesn't use one as a means towards saving the other, that we can, and should, value a newborn over an extremely old person.

I have never suggested that all humans are completely equal in value, but have consistently held that we have basic, inalienable rights.

So the question becomes: why don't you believe that all humans have equal, basic human rights? Do you not believe in rights?

You are back to just begging the question. This has been by far the most unproductive conversation I have had in a while.

It seems your version of Neo-Aristotelianism is somehow grounded in idealism rather than practical living and achieving eudaimonia (human flourishing).

Do you know the difference between normative and applied ethics? I think that's the issue here. My starts with normative ethics, as it should, and then dives into how to best pragmatically implement it into society.

There's nothing incoherent with saying people shouldn't be gluttons but that it should be legal; because giving people rights and liberties is better for allowing people to flourish, in practicality, than giving the government too much power to control people. That it should be legal, does not mean it should be morally permissible.

Whereas your whole argument is that X is immoral because it seems immoral to you? Or because you think your invisible friend claims it is immoral?

Definitely because my invisible friend said so, and nothing to do with my response.

It's worth noticing the slip in your spiel. A person has a rational will. A cysts does not. Consistency, where art though?

I knew you were going to that (:

You want to engage in an extended debate in order to hide the simple truth that a cysts does not have the same worth as Mrs Smith.

BRO….I don’t see how that is a simple truth, let alone true. That’s why I keep asking you for an elaboration on your ethical theory. I wouldn’t keep asking if it was clear to me :smile: .

You would use sophistry as a distraction from the immoral act of forcing someone to undergo an extended and unnecessary ordeal.
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Your pretence of depth is no more than surface posturing.

I am hurt: do you really believe I am being ingenuine?!?

You still at heart want there to be an "is" from which you can derive moral truths to which all rational folk must agree.

I take the is-ought gap very seriously, unlike most Aristotelians, and my response is that the chief good is what is most intrinsically valuable; which, hence, does not fall prey to is-ought gap critiques. Eudaimonia is the most intrinsically valuable, that’s why it is the chief good.

But it can't, becasue in the end what counts as flourishing is chosen. You cannot escape the fundamental difference between what is the case and what we choose to make the case.

I thought you would have said, as a moral realist, “what is the case and what ought to be the case are different”; but instead, peculiarly, you said “what we choose” which is straightforwardly an implication towards moral anti-realism.

The flourishing of the cyst is a far less definite thing than that of Mrs Smith.

The blastocyst has a right to life, which you keep ignoring and sidestepping.

For a start, it is entirely dependent on the flourishing of the mother.

So in the violinist thought experiment, you think you are morally permitted to pull the plug? Is that the idea?

Further, the quality of life of Mrs Smith is something that we can ask Mrs Smith about, while that of the cysts is mere supposition.

You can’t ask a 10 month baby about what they think about their quality of life either...can you just randomly murder those too????

You would choose the flourishing of a cyst at the expense of the flourishing of Mrs Smith.

NO. I cannot violate the blastocyst’s right to life to help Mrs. Smith. For some weird reason, you keep refusing to engage in a discussion about rights….as if you don’t believe in them at all.

I appreciate the response, and I see that we need to address more the a priori vs. a posteriori distinction more in depth before we move on to that distinction as it relates to knowledge. So, for now, let’s forget about a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge, and focus on the generic distinction itself.

but you seemed to divide this experience between the empirical and non-empirical. This is where I'm confused.

Yes, this is the root of the confusion (I think). When I was saying, before, that a priori knowledge is knowledge gained independently of “experience”, I was using my terminology too loosely and that is my fault: what I should have said is “<…> independently of our experience of reality”, as that denotes the aspects of experience which are a posteriori—i.e., empirical.

By “experience”, I just generically mean the conscious awareness of which one is having; so why would I say there’s an a priori and a posteriori aspect to that experience? Because, simply put, there are things which my brain is adding into the mix (i.e., are synthetical) which are not actually of the sensations (of objects in reality) in order for it to represent them in the conscious experience which I will have of them.

The Kantian way of thinking about it, philosophically, is essentially:

1. An object “impacts” your senses.
2. Your sensations produce sensations.
3. You brain intuits objects from those sensations in space and time.
4. Your brain cognizes objects, according to logical rules and conceptions, in space and time.
5. You experience an object, or objects, in space and time.

If the sensations are intuited in space and time, then space and time are not contained themselves in the sensations; and it is even clearer when you realize that your brain cannot possibly learn how to represent things with extension nor succession to do it in the first place. Hence, the extension and succession which you experience things in and of, are not from the sensations and hence are not empirical (even if the brain learns how to represent the causal relations of things better with space and time as it develops).

So, e.g., space and time are forms in and of which your brain represents things and are not properties of the things-in-themselves (whatever they may be). This means that space and time are like the containers in which the content of experience is placed; and this is just a simplified way of saying that they are a priori and used to represent a posteriori content.

What you seem to be claiming, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that someone knows what space is before they've experienced it

No. I think that there’s a difference between the self-reflective reason—i.e., meta-cognition and self-consciousness—and non-self-reflective reason (i.e., cognition and consciousness). My brain has the “capacity”, as you put it, to represent in space and this extensional representation is not a reflection of any extension, per se, that an object itself actually has; but I must come to know, by experience, that I can extract out one of the forms of my experience as spatiality and that is is a priori.

This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience, but not all knowledge arises out of experience. It was an catchy way of saying “not all knowledge is acquired and grounded in empirical data—a posteriori data”: there are certain ways we are pre-structured to perceive which necessarily are not reflections of anything in reality.

How is knowledge gained apriori?

Through experience, but not through empirical data. It is a transcendental investigation into how our cognition represents things, independently of what is being represented, in pre-structured ways.

I agree with this notion, but I'm not sure that's what Kant actually believes

I can’t speak for what Kant actually believes without being in his own mind; but I can say that the CPR seems pretty clear to me that what he means is that experience contains both an a priori and a posteriori aspect because there are necessary preconditions the possibility of that experience which are about how we are pre-structured to experience as opposed to the representation of the empirical, sensational content of that experience.

If you've never experienced space or its concepts, you don't know it.

I was entertaining your idea that someone could be thinking, self-reflectively, without ever having an inner or outer sense of space. If that is true, then they still would implicitly being using the concept of space, because reason fundamentally thinks in terms of space. E.g., if I am thinking about “bawwws” vs “glipglips”, even if they are utter nonsense, I am making separations and distinctions between them, which is inherent to reason, and this is conceptually spatial. You can’t have thoughts which don’t imply any conceptual separation between other concepts and ideas which you have—viz., you cannot think without space. You may not call it “space”; you may not know it is “space”; but when you are thinking you are thinking in terms of space. If you don’t believe, then just try to come up with a counter-example, and I will demonstrate that it is still using, implicitly, conceptual separation between thoughts, ideas, and concepts in play.

"Inner senses" is a misnomer.

Of course there are inner senses: they are senses of oneself or, more broadly, any sense capable of sensing the being which has those senses. Which leads me to:

I'll agree that proprioception and echolocation are definitely senses, but introspection?

I was assuming by introspection we are talking about self-consciousness, and this requires an inner sense; for one cannot know they are experiencing by merely experiencing: they must also have the capacity to acquire knowledge about their own experience. It is entirely possible to have a brain that is damaged in such a way as to still experience but lack self-experience.

You only have knowledge of yourself insofar as you affect your own senses. Which entails that there is not “I think, therefore I am” kind of direct window into one’s own self.

I don't disagree that republics are the best political system we've got; I am saying that, ideally, allowing people to choose, per se, is not necessarily going to correlate to helping them flourish. E.g., stopping a child from eating too much candy (even though they want to keep enjoying more), stopping people from be able to try hardcore drugs that will ruin their life, etc.

We give people liberties because it is pragmatically the best thing to do; and not because it is ideally the best. See what I mean?

Another way to put this, is that it is perfectly fine to intuit based off of evidence; but a pure intuition lacks all evidence, and is invalid. Pure intuitions are just cop-outs to justify one's position without actually justifying it, and I can prove anything right through a pure intuition because it is circular.

In ethics, you have to have some sort of concept of what actual goodness is and how it relates to right and wrong behavior; or else you are just acting blindly with these pure intuitions of yours. Like I said, anything can be justified with a pure intuition.

Banno, when I say I am a fundamentalist, I think a better way for me to put it is that I am not suggesting that we can justify anything with a fundamental, pure intuition; but, rather, that there are ideas which are so fundamental that a proof is virtually impossible (such as the law of non-contradiction).

However, if I have to deny being a fundamentalist and sublate my view by saying we must have a proof for everything we say in order to avoid these nonsensical "pure intuitions", then I am perfectly happy to do that. It is nonsense to think that one can say X is wrong because it seems wrong. There has to be some evidence to support claims, otherwise we are acting upon blind faith.

Intuitions are a part of ethics: they are not sufficient themselves, as pure intuitions, to justify or annul a position. You are begging the question, and it is impossible for me to change your mind because you lack justification for you view.

Imagine we are debating if it is morally permissible to own slaves; and I say it is and you say it isn't. You bring up all these moral reasons for why it is wrong, and I say "your theory leads to the extreme conclusion that slavery is wrong, so your theory is dead". I have given myself the ultimate cop-out, which is to justify my position I am supposed to be arguing for by intuiting it is right. THAT'S WHAT YOU ARE DOING.

Either you understand what goodness is and how it relates to the problem of abortion and can justify your position, or you are just ignorant and circularly justifying your position because it seems right to you. It's nonsense.

Your whole argument is that X is immoral because it seems immoral to you: is that actually how you are thinking about Mrs. Smith?

I am evaluating whether not Mrs. Smith has the right to, or should, kill the human being developing in her womb in virtue of what is actually good and how I think that relates to behavior. Viz., what is actually good is what is intrinsically valuable, what is most intrinsically valuable is what is the chief good, the chief good is eudaimonia, being a eudaimon requires one to be just, being just requires one to respect other beings relative to their (teleological) natures, a person has a nature such that they have a rational will, and to respect a rational will is to treat it as an end in itself and never as a mere means.

Do you see how in depth my analysis is, even if you completely disagree with it, about why X is wrong? Whereas your analysis is just "uh, X seems wrong so it must be"? That's my problem with your view. Give me an elaborate explanation like I have of my position so I can actually contend with it.

If we just have a clash of pure intuitions, then I can just intuit the opposite about X and you have no basis to say I am wrong; or, at best, you would appeal the masses and make your view straightforwardly a form of moral anti-realism.

What you are describing is a secular view, which removes ethics from politics, as a pragmatic means of allowing people to flourish the best; and I agree with it other than that it doesn't actually completely remove ethics (even though it purports to). There's a difference between normative and applied ethics: I don't trust the government one bit to have the power to ban, e.g., gluttony. Gluttony, e.g., is bad for you; and the idea of banning something because it inhibits the human good is not foreign to America: we've ban, e.g., hard drugs even if those people addicted to them don't harm anyone else.

That type of discussion requires good references.

I skimmed through it, and none of it seemed to reference Kant: it was about, more broadly, how many philosophers have contended we should use the a priori vs. a posteriori distinction (and how it relates to the nature of ‘experience’). There’s so much densely packed into section 4, of which you wanted me to read, that I am clueless as to what you are wanting to discuss about it. If there is something in there you want discuss, then please bring it up specifically so I can address it adequately.

Isn't how we perceive reality also how we empirically experience reality? A color blind person would have a different empirical experience then a normal color sighted person. Is that experience apriori or aposteriori?

“empirically experience” doesn’t make sense, and is the source of your confusion: like I said before, ‘experience’ is both in part a priori and a posteriori; and it necessarily must be that way. The term ‘empirical’ (usually) refers to the content of experience which is of reality,

On a narrow account, “experience” refers to sense experience, that is, to experiences that come from the use of our five senses: sight, touch, hearing, smell, and taste. However, this narrow account implies that justification based on introspection, proprioception (our kinesthetic sense of the position and movements of our body), memory, and testimony are kinds of a priori justification. And if we had different senses, like those of bats (echolocation) and duck-billed platypuses (electrolocation), experiences based on those senses would provide a priori, not empirical, justification on this account which takes a priori justification to be independent of experiences based on the senses we have.

We do not have five senses: any pre-structured means of receptivity of objects (which includes ourselves) is form of sensibility. So, introspection, proprioception, echolocation, and electrolocation are straightforwardly senses; I am not sure what they mean by “testimony”; memory is just the reinvocation of previous experience and so is has both a priori and a posteriori aspects to it; and hallucination, although they didn’t mention it, has for its a posteriori aspects fabricated data.

Suppose there is a significant difference between a priori and empirical justification. This still does not tell us what the basis of a priori justification is

a priori justification is linked closely to knowledge: it would be evidence grounded in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience if we take the Kantian use of the terms, and more broadly it would be any evidence grounded in the way we think about reality as opposed anything about reality itself (e.g., law of identity as a logical law by which we self-reflectively reason about our experience).

What truly separates the two?

I’ve made it clear what separates them: what are you contending is wrong with my distinction?

As I've noted, there really is no mental difference between the empirical and non-empirical

How can they not be different? One is about what is in reality and one is about something other than how reality is itself: they are mutually exclusive categories.

So if I am blind and have no sense of touch, it is true in virtue of the way I experience?

In principle, there can be a human which lacks the faculty of understand and reason such that there is no space in which objects are being represented, because there’s nothing being represented (from the outer senses) at all. What you are positing, is fundamentally a person who not only is blind and doesn’t have a sense of touch, but cannot sense at all. All senses that we have which are outer senses fundamentally are cognized in space (e.g., I close my eyes, touch nothing, feel no outer objects, but can still sense where my left finger is located without touching it—that’s in space).

The point about these sort of a priori propositions being true for human experience; is that they are true for the human understanding: the way we experience; and, yes, it is entirely possible for a human to lack the proper ability to understand reality.

Everything else that we reason about in our head has its root in empirical experience. We create identities, memories, and then have the innate ability to part and parcel those memories into ideas, imagination, dreams, and other thoughts. But to say they are 'true'? What exactly about them is true Bob?

Not everything you said is rooted in the empirical aspect of experience; and that’s what you are equivocating. That a person could think without experiencing anything in space and, let’s grant for your point, which I highly doubt is possible, who lacks a concept of space does not lack it because of lacking empirical data—they lack it because one of the a priori pure forms of sensibility, space, was never used by the brain (because perhaps their brain is damaged and cannot do it). They lack the concept of space self-reflectively because they’ve never had an outer experience (which would include that a priori form).

On a separate note, this hypothetical is impossible in actuality; for one cannot think, self-reflectively, through reason without using the concept of space—even if they have never experienced it. Everything we think about implies separation between, at least, concepts.

Moreover, it is plainly seen that the lack of the concept of space is not due to a lack of the empirical aspect of experience (if I were to grant your hypothetical as possible), because if they were to be given a hardcore drug that causes them to hallucinate utter nonsense, which would not be based off of any empirical data because they have never had any, they would immediately become acquainted with space—thusly, it is a priori.

How does a person who has no senses understand space?

Assuming you mean that they have no outer or inner senses; then they cannot understand space, because they lack the ability to understand anything—what you are describing is a dead person.

(Development of spatial development in babies)

Babies from birth represent objects in space, but they do not from birth know that in which the objects are represented is space; but once they have the sufficient self-reflective cognitive abilities, they can know it and it is a priori knowledge because it is not justified by any empirical data—it is justified by the non-empirical way that their brain is representing.

Hopefully that helps clear some things up. Good discussion, Philosophim!

Bob

Firstly, again, a mother should not be asking herself if she should abort because she doesn't think she can flourish with a baby in her life: that's not the point I was making.

Secondly, the state is in charge of providing, pragmatically, an adequate basis for human flourishing; but there are limitations, and I would say that the individual should be endowed with a certain level of responsibility to figure out how to flourish themselves. I don't think societies that try to give the government full control to legislate morality end up doing to hot: that's why, pragmatically, in terms of applied ethics, I would lean towards giving the individually as much power to make decisions about themselves; instead of entrusting that to the government. However, the laws which are put in place by the state are there to help with incentivizing the human good and barring immoral acts that are severe enough (e.g., marriage, rights, murder, rape, etc.).

An odd thing to say. Moral theory is about goodness, and about behaviour, but not directly about what is good? I can't make much sense of that.

Traditionally, morality is about right and wrong behavior; and, subsequently, about goodness and badness. My point is that goodness and badness are not evaluated themselves in the theory: the theory is about what an agent should or should not be doing in light of what is good and bad. This is a substantial claim to avoid the issues you originally brought up.

What is not good is counting a cyst as having the same worth as Mrs Smith.

Again, why? What do you think goodness is? How are you relating it, normatively, to behavior?

You claim Moore is "a load of nonsense" then adopt the core of his thinking. Fine.
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That the worth of the cyst is less then the worth of Mrs Smith is what is sometimes called a "basic" claim. It is foundational, in that it is, as you say, "where the buck stops"

That is partially fair: the part of Moore’s thinking where he claims we have to use intuitions, insofar as they are self-evident facts, I think is correct. The part that is a load of nonsense (to me) about his theory is that he thinks we can literally intuit the right thing to do based off of a pure intuition of what goodness itself is; which not just totally obscure but also a cop-out.

This is the same risk you are essentially taking, because you are evaluating your moral theory, whatever it may be, based off of your core moral intuitions; whereas I don’t think there are any such self-evident moral facts, and that doing so ends up causing people to ad hoc justify their own intuitions instead of doing ethics.

EDIT: for Moore, the concept of 'goodness' is this totally mysterious goo-goo-gah-gah.

My answer is really simple, as I agree that one has to evaluate the moral theory through some standard beyond it: goodness. Goodness is not within the ethical theory proper (i.e., normative and applied ethical theories which comprise it proper), and is the presupposition for the evaluation of such.

EDIT: No, metaethics is not a part of the ethical theory; that's why it is called meta-ethics.

Morality is about behavior, and not directly about what is good. On the contrary, what is good is what is used to determine right and wrong behavior.

I would also like point out that your reasoning leads to an infinite regress: for we could ask the same for the standard that is outside of the theory which is being applied, and would have to perform the same steps.

Personally I am a foundationalist, so for me there is a place the buck stops; because it has to.

So, “neo-”Aristotelianism is not itself one specific view: it is just any view that is a modified version, a sublation, of Aristotelianism—it’s a “modded up” version of the original. Thusly, it is hard to talk about “neo-Aristotelianism” other than getting into someone’s specific (modded) view.

In Aristotelianism, the ultimate goal for each human is human flourishing; and society is supposed to be structured in a way to uphold, incentivize, etc. that as best as possible. In that view, abortion seems straightforwardly immoral; because (directly intentionally) killing an innocent human being quite literally is the opposite of contributing to flourishing or allowing them to flourish.

Giving people basic human rights seems to be the best way to respect a human’s rational nature.

Generally speaking, people seek abortion because they’re not prepared to be caregivers. They reason that they, and a child, are not in a position to flourish.

By “flourishing”, what we really mean is eudaimonia (viz., to be a eudaimon) and this is just to say that one is living well by fulfilling their Telos. To allow people to live well (in this sense), we have to respect them as persons: we cannot kill them simply because we don’t believe we can take care of them. Not only is it simply not true in the western, developed world (as there are plenty of pro-life institutions which will provide for the child) but also, even if it were true, you cannot violate someone’s rights: rights are inherently deontological.

This is a joke...right? We derive conclusions and answers to questions. Yes, literally every study has fundamental questions it is trying to answer. Propositions are just truth-apt statements that we formulate to try and answer those questions.

What?

If I understand your position at all, basically because a person has a “rational will” and an ant does not.

Correct; and I would say, to keep things less confusing, they are a person because their nature marks them out as one (even if they never fully realize their Telos—such as in a cognitively disabled person).

If abortion contravenes the telos of a zygote, making abortion illegal also contravenes the telos, rational will, or flourishing of the mother and others involved.

If I am understanding this part correctly, then yes prima facie. The right to life of the zygote is in direct conflict with the right to bodily autonomy of the mother; and my point is that the ends do not justify the means, so the mother cannot abort the child as a means towards the good end of upholding their bodily autonomy.

All moral theories fundamentally begin with "what is actually good?" and then derive principle therefrom. There's nothing intuitional about it (at least not in the Moorean sense).

I don’t know what you mean by a means to an end.

A means is anything which, at least in part, facilitates the end; and the end is the intended reason for committing the act.

E.g., killing someone to harvest their organs to save five sick patients is an example of killing someone as a means; whereas killing someone by pulling the lever to divert the train to save five people is an example of killing as a bad side effect.

Does anyone deliberately get pregnant and have an abortion as a means to some end?

Every action has at least one end; because an action is a volition of will. The end may be as simple as “I don’t want to be pregnant”.

Anyway, sure, we value what is like ourselves. That makes sense.

That’s not at all what I am arguing. Any person (in the pre-modern sense) has a right to life; and this can include, in principle other species or potentially AIs.

Wouldn’t a good moral agent respect the will of a pregnant woman?

Respecting the will of a pregnant woman is per se good; but it cannot be done with a bad means. Ends do not justify means!

It is problematic because it is circular logic: you are saying that moral judgment X is wrong because moral judgment X seems wrong to you. This kind of thinking, lands you in wishy-washy territory where you can justify anything to yourself so long as you have a strong intuition about it. It's nonsense.

EDIT:

That's like me saying it is morally permissible to enslave people because it seems morally permissible, to me (or perhaps to many people), to enslave people. It has been the case where the common intuition was that enslaving people is not per se wrong, and your argument so far would then entail that they were right; because we can evaluate moral theories based off of strong intuitions we have in examples. It is nonsense.