Suppose you believed in moral theory X. Moral theory X entails that, in a trolley car situation, one must never sacrifice an ant (or any insect) to save any people. If a bug is on the tracks, you ought not pull the switch and save the five persons. Would that consequence of moral theory X- that bugs cannot be sacrificed to save people- be devastating to moral theory X?

The intuition that I have that it is wrong to never sacrifice an ant to save a person is insufficient to disprove the theory—that’s what you are missing here. Rather, my understanding of what is actually good and bad, and how to best codify it into moral principles and what not, is sufficient to demonstrate that this theory fails.

You have not provided why it would be, e.g., wrong to never sacrifice an ant to save a person other than an intuition you have; which is not sufficient to disprove it. I want to know, and have been asking @Banno countlessly, why, under your theory, it is wrong to never sacrifice a zygote, in a manner where it is a means towards the end, to save a person (in the modern sense of ‘person’)? I still hear crickets.

Why not? Moore, at least, says that they are. And saying that they are not is presenting a particualr moral theory. Argue your case!

It is a metaethical claim; and, I would like to point out, you still have not presented a normative ethical account of your position.

Metaethically, I think Moore is a load of nonsense; and perhaps that’s the root of our disagreement. You cannot base your normative ethical theory on moral intuition; because intuition is unreliable: you must also have reasonable evidence to back it up. The whole point of normative ethics is to decipher what is actually wrong and right behavior to then correct or validate moral intuitions that we have; what you are doing is backwards.

I quite agree! And pro-life views evaluate the behaviour around abortion in an appallingly bad way! They claim that a cyst has more worth than Mrs Smith!

Why? Back this up. You never back anything you say up, and so, unfortunately, there is nothing for me to rejoin.

Sorry I didn't see this: I wasn't linked to it. Philosophim, I am not going to make your argument for you (:

If there is something in that article that you think is relevant, then you will need to bring it to our attention as it relates to what I have said.

By the way, what is the reasoning for placing high moral value on "rational will."

Because I must, in order to be a morally good agent, respect a thing relative to its nature; and in order to respect a fellow will, like mine, I must treat them as an end in themselves and never a mere means.

How are theories of morality to be judged unless on the basis of the actions they justify?

Moral theories are not analyzed based off of moral intuitions: moral intuitions are analyzed in terms of moral theories. Moral theories are evaluated based off of how well they evaluate what is actually good qua (right and wrong) behavior.

So your view follows Neo-Aristoelianism in believing that abortion is wrong because it interrupts the natural potential of the fetus to become a virtuous, rational human being, which contravenes its telos and human flourishing.

Sort of: not sure exactly what you are saying here. It is neo-aristotelian because I view personhood and rights as ground fundamentally in rational Telos—viz., in the Telos of a being such that they are marked out as supposed to be developing into a being with a rational will.

Yes, it also disrupts the human virtue that a being could have; but that’s not why. Killing a person in self-defense disrupts their ability to achieve human virtue…

I feel that it's wrong also, though I'm not anti-abortion.

Ethics doesn’t care what you feel: it cares about what moral reasons you have.

Are you anti-abortion or would you support making it legal up to, say, thirteen weeks (when over 90% are performed)?

No. Abortion is always immoral, unless you are including “abortions” in the sense of side effects, as opposed to means, of upholding the woman’s right to bodily autonomy and life (e.g., hysterectomy on a pregnant cancer patient).

All you have offered is examples which presuppose your own ethical position without offering moral reasons for accepting your position. E.g.,:

I say "yellow is the best color".
You say "why is that?".
I say "because if you have to choose between yellow and any other color you are going with yellow".
You say "how does that answer the question?".

You are analogously begging the question: I want to know why you think we can morally evaluate the zygotes as not having basic human rights which would bar you from making the conclusions you keep making in your examples. All you keep doing is presupposing your own position in your examples, just like I could presuppose yellow is obviously the best color and my example is that I would pick yellow over any other color...that just presupposes my position that yellow is the best color, and that's why I would pick it. When you say "we would pour the zygotes on the burning building", you are literally presupposing what you are supposed to be proving: the zygotes don't have a right to life.

Do you see what I mean?

I appreciate your elaboration on your thoughts, and I cannot possibly dissect all of it in one response; so I will address some key points that you may find worth digesting.

1. Persons are not, traditionally, identical to human beings. You used them interchangeably throughout the conversation, and most people are going to deny that rights are grounded in the organism—they usually believe it is grounded in personhood. The question becomes: “(1) when does a human being become a person, and (2) what is personhood?”. Conventionally (right now), personhood is mindhood: it is to be a person. The more I think about it, the more I want to use ‘personhood’ in the pre-modern sense: to have a nature that sets own out as developing into having a mind with a proper, rational will.

2. For those who are pro-choice, if I were to iron man there position, they have no problem with providing the asymmetry between infanticide and abortion: the latter is the killing of a person, the former (in all permissible cases) is not. The reason I think you, specifically, think this is a problem, is because you are equivocating ‘human beingness’ with ‘personhoodness’.

3. When life begins, does nothing to comment on when a life has rights. You are right that, scientifically, it is uncontroversially true that your life began with conception; but this doesn’t directly address if you have any rights upon beginning to exist. You need some further argument for that.

4. “killing people is bad”, as you put it, is not really a good representation of pro-life positions (if we iron man it): a pro-life person (usually) thinks that human beings acquire their rights immediately upon beginning to live and the ends do not justify the means, so it is straightforwardly immoral to abort.

5. Whether or not “we want” a “universal morality” is irrelevant to ethics: either you really should or should not do such-and-such, or there isn’t.

Just food for thought for you too chow down on and digest.

Technically, neo-aristotelian. The part I was discussing was Aristotelian in nature; but you pointed out some other point that Aristotle made, assuming you are right, about souls. I am not sure he actually believed that, and don't want to re-comb through all his literature to find out.

Yeah, I don't buy that (sorry Aristotle).

You're using math, but as I'll note, I still don't see that as knowledge independent of experience.

It is grounded in—i.e., make true in virtue of—something which is not empirical. The space which objects take up on your conscious experience is not empirical—it is not a posteriori. Any knowledge which one has which is true in virtue of the way, e.g., objects work in space is a priori.

I think you are thinking that a priori knowledge is knowledge which one has independently of ever having experienced anything; and I am partially to blame to for that: I was misusing the term a while back.

Taking space as another example, the axiom in geometry that “the shortest path between two points is a straight line connecting them” is a proposition that is true in virtue of the way we experience as opposed to what we experience—it doesn’t matter the empirical data which our brains represent, the a priori mode of representing them in space remains the same.

What I think you are thinking, is that because we can only knowledge this after beginning to experience that we do not have a priori knowledge; but the “a priori” in “a priori knowledge” is conveying how it is grounded—specifically that it is not grounded in empirical data.

a posteriori knowledge is knowledge which is grounded in empirical data, and is, thusly, about reality; whereas a priori knowledge is about how we perceive reality.

The apriori of a fish would be very different from a human.

This isn’t a coherent sentence: the a priori...what?

I'm talking about instincts as the being of a person prior to any experience.

Then the root of our disagreement there is merely semantical: that’s not usually what an “instinct” means. For example, Webster’s is “a largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli without involving reason”.

Instincts are behavior patterns not attributable to being learned through reason; and most the a priori pre-structure of cognition, intuition, judgment, etc. do not fit that bill.

The point that I was making with “applicable” vs. “distinctive” knowledge, is that it doesn’t preclude a priori knowledge; and it would be applicable knowledge in your theory (assuming I grant our theory in its entirety).

Here’s the definitions you have in your summary:

A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience...Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality.
...
What I discretely experience is distinctively known. Yet my distinctions assert more than the most basic discrete experiences about reality, such as applying meaning, consistent identities, and claims about greater reality beyond these distinctions. These types of distinctions are known to myself, but it is unknown whether their claims about reality apart from the distinction itself can be known. I find the only way to know such beliefs is to apply it beyond the distinction itself. This will be called applicable knowledge.

I discretely experience, and I extract from it the necessary forms of that experience (as opposed to the empirical data of that experience); and I apply my hypothesis without contradiction to reality, thusly making it applicable knowledge that is a priori knowledge. I don’t see anything incorrect going here, even in terms of your position.

Ok, @Mww, I see your point now: “reality” cannot include the a priori modes of cognizing it; so our a priori faculties are not technically “real” in that sense, but must be grounded ontologically in something which allows for those faculties to exist—we just can’t know definitively what that is (viz., I do not know myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself).

I noted that math is the logic of discrete experience. But it still needs to be learned through experience.

I can’t tell if you are saying we just self-reflectively use math to navigate experience, or that math is a form of how we experience—the difference between saying, e.g., the ball has mathematically features itself (phenomenally), or that we just use math to nominally understand the ball (phenomenally).

This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean all knowledge arises out of experience. — Bob Ross

A fun and poetic saying, but it does not make logical sense

You aren’t understanding it (with all due respect); and I can see now this is the root of our disagreement. You are thinking that a priori knowledge is knowledge one comes born with in the sense that they don’t have to glean it from the forms of experience—that’s not what it means.

All empirical data is from your brain Bob. All experience is in your brain.

Space data is not empirical—you are using the terms to loosely. There are aspects of your experience which your brain produces as a matter of how it is pre-structured to represent vs. the actual empirical data it is representing.

How can one have experience and also not have experience?

I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; and I can’t tell if you agree with that or not (yet).

I think that evolution and biology are the groundings for Teleology: I don't think that there needs to be an agent that designed it for there to be design.

@RogueAI

When your moral theory arrives at an immoral position, then your moral theory is wrong. Giving a zygote standing over Mrs Smith is immoral, and hence so is any moral theory that reaches that conclusion. Your moral theory reaches that conclusion. Hence it is wrong.

You are begging the question: whether or not my theory arrives at an “immoral position” is exactly the essence of the abortion debate, which you are supposed to be engaging with me on.

By positing that any moral theory which arrives an immoral position is wrong, you are not wrong (in that claim); but the problem is that you must provide an alternative moral theory in order to demonstrate that an immoral position actually was reached (unless you want to appeal to moral intuitions).

I haven't denied that zygotes have rights, but instead have maintained neutrality on that odd issue. My position is that whatever rights the zygot might have are far outweighed by those of Mrs Smith.

That is exactly the issue: you aren’t engaging with any of the ethical considerations of this dilemma. You are just keeping it vague and appealing to a moral intuition that you have (at best) that we should allow women to violate a zygote’s rights.

That little parenthetical withdrawal made me smile. You rights are ABSOLUTE, except for...

:smile: We can split hairs on what exactly the right to practice religion entails, but my point is that if it is a right than whatever it entails is absolute—surely you can agree with that?!? Otherwise, we are talking about privileges...I think we can find common ground here.

Rights are not found in the world. They are given, by us.

They are given by us to best uphold the respect we deserve; and, in this sense, are innate. If there were no societies, one would still have basic human rights.

The rights of Mrs Smith outweigh the rights of a mere cyst.

This is internally incoherent; for a right is absolute, and saying someone has the right to X but only by a degree such that someone else’s right to X can trump it is to say, in a convoluted fashion, at best, that the former only has a privilege to X. If they have a right to X, then that cannot be taken away even for someone else’ right to X.

E.g., if I have a right not to be murdered, then I cannot rightfully be murdered even if someone else could be saved from being murdered, who also has a right not to be, by sacrificing me. To say I have a degree of a right to not be murdered, is to really say I have a privilege to not be murdered (in some scenarios).

CC:@RogueAI

There is no purpose….There is no design

Then, e.g., you cannot say that a baby should have been born with two arms but was born with one instead.

I fail to see why this is morally relevant. In every case you are performing some action which kills the zygotes and saves the baby. That is all that matters

So you think a tactical bomber that kills an innocent bystander when blowing up a military building is intending the same thing in terms of killing in every morally relevant sense than a terror bomber who also kills in innocent person?

So you think that pulling the lever to save the five by killing the one is the same kind of intention [of killing] as killing an innocent person to harvest their organs to save five sick patients?

Your view is too naive. Intentions matter.

I'm claiming that even if they have a right to life this right to life is not absolute.

A right is a entitlement which one can exercise about themselves on other people which is irrevocable. What you just described is a privilege—not a right.

Whatever “right to life” entails or means, it must be absolute if it is a right. E.g., if you have a right to practice any religion (peacefully) that you want, then there is absolutely no circumstances where the nation in which you live can stop you from practicing your religion (peacefully). What you are arguing, is the nonsensical and internally incoherent position that, e.g., the right to freedom of religion isn’t always applicable; which would, in all honesty, convert the “right” to a “privilege”.

We see this in the case where we are willing to sacrifice (as an unfortunate consequence) five zygotes to save one baby. Some things are worth more than the life of a zygote (e.g. the life of a baby, or the life of the mother).

You don’t understand what a right is. Rights are not circumstantial. You cannot go and kidnap an old person who is about to die and harvest their organs to save a young sick patient: the cops would stop you, because that old person has a right not to be killed when innocent. You can’t say “well, in this circumstance, although I think they have that right, we can kill them because I value this young patient more than a really old person who is about to die anyways”. THAT’S NEVER HOW RIGHTS HAVE EVER WORKED.

this rational telos is what grounds human zygotic right to life

It grounds the right to life for all members of any rational species: it is the fundamental principle that grounds rights for persons—of any kind.

Are you suggesting that rational telos is somehow virtuous

This doesn’t make any sense to me: virtue is excellence relative to something, whereas Telos refers to the purpose(s) behind something. The Telos is what grounds what is virtuous; whereas your question presumes that virtue is absolute and wonders if a specific Telos is virtuous or not. For an aristotelian, this makes no sense at all. Virtue is determined by whether or not a thing is excellent at being something (e.g., itself, a farmer, a spoon, a clock, etc.) and usually in terms of what it is itself (e.g., the virtue of a clock, the virtue of a human, etc.).

The virtue of a person is simply certain states of being, behavioral habits, and intellectual dispositions which make a person excellent at being a person.

or maybe suggesting that human zygotes should have the right to life simply because they’re like you (instinctually valuing what is like you)?

What do you mean by “like you”? If you mean that they look like me, then that is obviously false (unless you think a zygote looks like an adult). If you mean that they have a nature such that they are marked out as a person, because their Telos dictates that they will develop rational capacities; then yes; but this does not only apply, in principle, to humans: any rational species would suffice, or even, honestly, a member of an irrational species that happens to be rational (by freak accident) or a being which is rational (in the proper sense) which is not a member of a species (e.g., certain AI).

I tend to agree with Banno on this one. If you require argumentation to establish that a bunch of cells trumps the personal autonomy and rights of a woman, there's a problem.

You are, then, begging the question; and using "obviousness" as a cop-out to actually put in the intellectual work to have a coherent position. Anyone can make an argument that X is true because if X is false then something must be wrong: that's just lazy, circular logic.

If you cannot provide any reasons for why the zygote does not have a right to life (in your view); then you are just wasting everyone's time, because you don't have a view.

My apologies on the long delay on my reply! I had intended to reply to this another time as I had some other conversations in play, and only remembered this recently.

No worries at all, my friend!

If we say 'experience' here is 'empirical data', then I'm fine with this. Our thoughts, memories, etc are all 'experience', but I suppose not define here

I would say it is also independent of the imagination, thoughts, memories, etc. being that it is the necessary preconditions for that as well.

True 'non-empirical' based experiences are what we would call 'instincts'.

Not quite: an instinct is a way one is predisposed to reacting to experience; whereas the a priori means of cognizing objects is a way we are pre-structured to experience. To your point, we could very well say that there are a priori instincts we have vs. ones we learn. My point here is just that you are invalidly forming a dichotomy between ‘instincts’ and ‘experience’ which turns out to be a false one.

A JTB theory of knowledge has long been countered by "The Gettier Problem".

I no longer see the gettier problems as problematic at all (tbh); but you are correct.

What is apriori knowledge if apriori is simply instinct? The moment a baby kicks, it knows what its like to kick through its empirical sensations. The moment a child learns about ''the number 1' its now empirical knowledge. 'Apriori knowledge' is a misnomer. It doesn't make any sense.

You aren’t thinking about it properly, and this is what is the root of the confusion. Not everything that is a priori is instinctual (like I noted before); and a priori knowledge is any knowledge which has its truth-maker in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience.

This is why Kant noted that math is a priori; because no matter what you are experiencing, the propositions in math are true in virtue of the way we cognize objects in space and time which is true for anything a human will experience. “1 + 1 = 2” is true as grounded by the way our brains cognize, the mathematical axioms which it has, and not because of something we learned about something which we experienced (in terms of its purely empirical content). This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean all knowledge arises out of experience.

All bodies are extended is something we empirically learn by experience, not anything we are born with.

Again, all knowledge begins with experience—not all knowledge arises out of it. The space which objects are presented to you in is purely synthetic: it is something your brain added into the mix—not empirical data.

The problem you are having is that ‘experience’ encompasses both an a priori and a posteriori aspect; and so there are equivocations being made here by both of us in our discussion. I will try to be more clear from now on. What we are discussing is not if knowledge begins with experience, but if there aspects of our experience which are not experiential.

Its similar, but not exactly the same. The most like apriori is distinctive knowledge

No, my point is that your theory sidesteps the question: it doesn’t address it and doesn’t eliminate its possibility. Nothing about distinctive vs. applicable knowledge negates the possibility of a priori knowledge: the a priori vs. a posteriori distinction is a different one than you are addressing in your theory; and I am merely noting that a priori knowledge is not incompatible with your view.

There is no instinct to do math in any base. It takes time for this to develop in humans.

Bases are just different ways to represent numbers: I am talking about numbers themselves

If you are going to claim, like @Banno, that a zygote does not have a right to life or (if I am being overly-charitable) that there are different degrees to a given right, then you must be able to back that up with good reasons and, overall, a cogent and internally coherent ethical theory. Neither of you have demonstrated that at all: Banno just keeps blanketly asserting "it's obvious!".

What???

You just keep asserting it, without giving any ethical reasons for believing it. Why believe that a zygote does not have a right to life? Answer that.

All your argument has been thus far, is that zygotes don't have rights. I want to know why you believe that.

Moreover, no, you cannot give zygotes a degree of rights cogently: that converts it into privileges.

So, why do you believe a zygote does not have rights, such as the right to life? Where or when does a human being get those rights?

It's not clear what you mean by teleology.

I mean it in its standard sense: science of purpose [behind things as opposed to the physical cause of things].

If you just mean that a zygote is highly likely to naturally develop a rational will

No, I mean that a zygote will naturally develop into a being with a rational will all else being equal; no different than how a zygote will naturally develop into having two hands, a body, a brain, etc. per se (whereas, per accidens, it may not fulfill the Telos of which it has for various reasons [e.g., improper gestation, etc.]). When you say it is “highly likely”, you are not noting what it was designed to become but, rather, the probability of, in reality, under the nuanced circumstances, of its environment allowing it to develop into what it was supposed to become.

3. Pulling the lever moves the box containing five zygotes onto the primary track, before the box containing one baby (stopping the trolley from travelling further).

This is an example, if I am understanding it correctly, of a trolley problem which would be analogous to @RogueAI’s example; and it would equally be immoral to do so.

#3 is fundamentally different than #2 and #1 because it is the only example Michael has (in their thought experiment) where the zygotes are a means towards saving the baby. I am suspecting neither of you understand this, and this is the root of your confusion.

But if you still insist that (1) and (3) are morally distinct, then what if you don't know which of (1), (2), and (3) is the manner in which the baby can be saved? Each is equally likely. Should you pull the lever or not?

I would say this would be immoral; because you are not noting the probability of weighing who might likely save but, rather, the probability of doing something immoral vs. permissible. This would be a sadistic game that I would encourage anyone to avoid playing.

If we were talking about probabilities of producing bad side effects then that would be a different story.

In my mind the answer is clear; always do what you can to save the baby, irrespective of how or how many zygotes are killed in the process.

That’s because you don’t believe they have rights; and I do. If you thought they had the right to life, then you wouldn’t make this kind of claim.

How many times are you going to ask the same question?

The answer is still no, I would not use the zygotes to put out the fire. I've elaborated in detail why that would be wrong: please ask questions if you are confused at all on it.



This is a really bad ethical principle. If I take it seriously, then we should kill and harvest the organs of physically disabled people to save the lives of normal, sick people. It is nonsense.

I understand your confusion, but I've clarified this many times now. A zygote is not a person (in that strict sense that you mean) but has a nature that marks it out as going to be a person (aka: "will be" a person, as you put it). It is not, under my view, the immanent personhood that grounds rights but, rather, the teleological nature.

When I said "because they are persons", I was speaking loosely in the sense of the teleological claim; which how persons were defined in the pre-modern sense. In the modern sense, you are right to point out that they are not persons.

To clarify, this teleological account of rights IS NOT equivalent to grounding rights in potential persons; for "potentiality" is a very loose term that covers more than telos (e.g., perhaps a cow has the potential to be a person since we could give it a brain chip).

For your view, as you and I have noted, you have to ground rights in actual personhood; and this leads to absurd results (e.g., a knocked out human has no rights while knocked out).

One cannot just ground rights in the organism nor personhood: it must be grounded in the consideration of the nature of the organism.

In short, to make this painfully clear, in modern terminology a zygote is not a person (nor is a knocked out adult) and I would say they are teleologically marked out to become a person; and in pre-modern terminology (which I prefer) a zygote (and a knocked out adult) are persons because their nature marks them out as such. Either way you prefer, human beings have these rights because they are teleologically set out as (becoming) persons.

It is also worth mentioning that non-persons still have rights---they just aren't the same. E.g., a cow has the right to not be tortured for fun.

I apologize: I was not intending to alter the example to my benefit. I am not following what difference it makes if the tactical bomber cannot retreat. What are you suggesting?

DID YOU READ MY MESSAGE?!? I am losing patience with you, my friend. Literally in the quote you made I addressed that!

Interesting, I guess we will have to see what happens then.

There is no such example: I pull the lever if the one is being sacrificed is substituted for any number of zygotes; and this is not incoherent with my position. Like I said, you don't understand it.

Pouring zygotes on a building to put out a fire (to save a child) is not analogous to pulling a lever to save five by sacrificing N-amount of zygotes, for the zygotes are directly intentionally killed in the former as a means towards the good end whereas they are indirectly intentionally killed in the latter not as a means but rather a bad side effect of using the means to bring about the good end (and, at this point, with my principle of double effect, saving the child is always going to significantly outweigh the bad side effect of killing the zygotes but this is only valid for analyzing side effects NOT means).

I know many Republicans that believe that abortion should be allowed up to a certain point in the pregnancy for any reason. I don't know one Republican that says that if prior birth control (condoms, the pill, etc.) failed that the woman should be forced to carry through with her pregnancy.

I could see that (although I have many examples of Republicans that do not support that at all); because they lack a coherent position.

To me, the issue becomes moral only when the fetus develops a nervous system and is capable of feeling pain. Zygotes do not have nervous systems.

None of this matters; and can be demonstrated as useless considerations simply by observing that you probably eat other animals that can feel pain and have a nervous system much more complex than a fetus’ and your argument here would apply equally to all those animals. Viz., the principles which you are analyzing and committing yourself too, would entail, if granted, veganism.

If someone was raped or the birth control they were using failed,

Also irrelevant. Aborting a child from rape or a failing in contraception is no different than killing an infant born out of wedlock—two wrongs do not make a right.

Traditionally, a rational will; i.e., a sufficiently free will. That is a serious and impactful difference between humans and other species: most, if not all, other species lack the capacity to go against their own nature and inclinations such that they are motivated by pure reason.

Traditionally, a being which has a Telos such that it will have, if not already has, a rational will are called persons (because their nature marks them out to be such); and their will must be respected.

More technically, a being which has a such a "rational Telos" is not necessarily a person but, rather, will be; and their nature marks them out as such; and this is what grounds their rights (and not whether or not they currently are a person).

The argument is pretty clear, and has been stated a few times. Whatever standing the cyst has is negligible in comparison to that had by Mrs Smith.

This is entirely too vague. Do you think the blastocyst has a right to life or not?!? You are purposefully avoiding the question, because you know if you grant it rights then you cannot make this kind of argument that Mrs. Smith has more of a right to bodily autonomy.

They are persons.

Except that the double effect was part of an extended discussion of abortion involving Philippa Foot and Anscombe, the very one in which what 'mercans call the "trolly" problem was first deployed.

What do you mean "except"?

You are confusing the end with the intentions. I can directly intend something which is not the end I am trying to bring about (e.g., start my car to go to the grocery store). A woman who opts-in for an abortion is directly intended to kill an innocent human being as a means towards the end of upholding her own bodily autonomy; because the abortion (1) at least partially (if not totally) facilitates the end and (2) it is a part of the direct intentional flow of the act.

This is entirely different than your example before, as a tactical bomber is directly intending to bomb, e.g., a military base and only indirectly intends to kill innocents (as a statistical certainty) as a side effect of the means of bringing about the end; which is evident from the fact that if there were no innocents that were to die, then the bomber would still perform the same tasks towards the same end. Whereas, with the abortion, if an abortion is not needed then it changes the act itself; for the act's end stays the same but the objects change (which is not true in the tactical bomber scenario).

The most common republican view, although not officially, is that abortion should be illegal except under certain grave circumstances. E.g., https://news.gallup.com/poll/246278/abortion-trends-party.aspx#:~:text=Views%20on%20Legality%20of%20Abortion%2C%20by%20Party%20ID .

Democrats commonly want it legal in all or most circumstances. You are making it sound like both republicans and democrats see eye-to-eye on abortion....not at all.

You don't understand my position; and have straw manned it time and time again. If you want to understand it,then we need to actually discuss it from the foundation up. Otherwise, you will continue to be confused from your own perspective.

I am assuming that this was a rhetorical question, since you quoted my answer.

Is it never warranted for military officers issue orders that are almost certain to result in the deaths of their innocent men?

Yes (under certain circumstances), and this gets into the principle of double effect; and is not pertinent to the abortion discussion.

Technically, it is always wrong to directly intentionally kill an innocent human being—I usually just shorten it to “don’t kill innocent humans” to keep it simple

I don't think that is true at all. Red states are predominantly conservative; and conservatives are not pro-choice.

I appreciate your thoughtful response. I think I understand now what you are going for, and I agree despite our semantic differences :up: .

Like I said before, I just think it is best to reserve the term 'real', 'actual', etc. for 'it exists'; and 'existence' as 'being'. Otherwise, you end up having to posit that something can not be real but exists or what exists may not be real (depending on how the semantics are hashed out).

Good discussion, Wayfarer!