:up:

That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles

No, this is not logically necessitous; and therefore is not tautological. This is a proof derived a priori in our intuition.

What of this:
Φ∨¬Φ
Which Intuitionist logic denies; or this:
Φ,¬Φ⊢Ψ
which paraconsistent logic denies?

What relation does intuition logic denying the law of excluded middle have to do with the geometrical intuition you expounded (above)? I am completely lost at your point here, other than that there are many theories of logic; and to that I say that there is only one, and each is merely arises out of a (human) disagreement about the one: they are competing theories about whatever logic really is, and is objective.

That is not quite the point I would make, though. That relates to your thread on unanalysable concepts. Both "absolute" knowledge and "absolute" simples depend on context. They depend on what one is doing. Some things are held constant in order for us to be able to move other things. Some things are held indubitable in order for us to doubt other things. Some things are held to be simple in order for us to be able to analyse other things.

I am not seeing how the concept of ‘being’ is merely being ‘held constant’ for us to ‘move other things’: it seems, to me, to really be absolutely simple, and that it is not as malleable as you seem to think.

And we sometimes change what we hold constant in order to change something else.

What you are describing is humanity learning; which is not a negation of the existence of absolutely simple concepts.

All the reasons I have for doubting that I exist are highly implausible thought experiments (e.g., the evil demon, simulation theory, etc.) and given the immediate experience I am having, I have no good reasons to doubt my existence; although I cannot be absolutely certain I am, because those highly implausible possibilities are actual and logical possibilities.

I cannot doubt legitimately that 'a = a' because any reason to doubt it I could conjure springs from a misunderstanding of what it is. 'a = a' is a tautology and logically necessitous: there is no possibility of it being false. Any doubt I have will thusly be illegitimate.

I'll contend that the notion of "concept" is an hypostatisation of word use. After all, if the concept gives the meaning of some word, and the meaning of a word is its use in a language, then the concept is pretty much just the way a word is used.

The problem I have is that concepts are more fundamental than language, and it is a mistake to reduce the former to the latter.

For example, we cannot properly express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english; but this is just a linguistic limitation. I can only say "a non-spatial entity would exist 'beyond' what is in space", but the concept of a non-spatial entity's relation to space as 'beyond' it is perfectly sensible albeit linguistically nonsensical.

Likewise, if you're position is true, then that which cannot be currently express with all (or perhaps a given) language cannot be a valid concept (since what we linguistically express, for you, is the concept); but this is clearly not true. There are languages which don't have any words which express things which other languages do. The concept of a triangle is still such even if we have no language capable of conveying it.

Conceptual analysis is surely restrained, to some extent, by language (as you are correct that we convey concepts with language) but they are not thereby themselves reducible to language. As we expand language, we are capable of explicating more concepts--and that is there relation to each other.

Failure to commit? No, rather "absolutely true" is like "solicitous chalk" or "oligarchic sandwich"; putting two words together doesn't necessitate that the result makes sense. You perhaps can't afford an answer because "absolutely true" is a nonsense.

Absolute truth would refer, in your terminology, to anything that is considered true with absolute certainty; and 'absolute certainty' would refer to a level of certainty which cannot be doubted legitimately (e.g., a tautology) as opposed to what one doesn't have good reasons to doubt.

Could you take the statement "the cat is on the mat" and spell out all of its presupposed concepts, and the underlying fundamental concepts which are implicit in those presuppositions?

I can certainly make my best attempt, although I do (already) concede that it will be highly improbable that I will be able to explicate recursively all of them.

The concepts that come to mind to me, in terms of “first-order” concepts in play, are:

- Cat
- Mat
- Predication
- The concept of ‘horizontally on top of’: not sure if there is a word in english for this.

Of course, there are sub-concepts at play that I can’t take the time to expound. The most fundamental would probably be:

- Spatiality
- Being
- Identity
- Temporality

Perhaps more, as well.

Does that help?

The prospect of cleanliness strikes me as an illusion though? I don't believe concepts have a linear progression of articulation like that, especially in discrete stages of clarity.

Agreed. However, I still think the elaboration is necessary for the demonstration of the (general) evolution of “ideas”.

That history illustrates two things, in my view, that definition is in some sense derivative of communally negotiated understanding -even of intensionally fixed analysands like the concept of the Eulerian polyhedron -, and that communal articulation changes such conceptions.

Are you saying that concepts get their meaning from social interaction? This may be the source of our disagreement, as I think words are very much like you described, but not concepts.

We can call a ‘triangle’ whatever we want linguistically, and conceptually our understanding of a ‘triangle’ is limited or has evolved through social interaction, but the concept of ‘triangle’ is left unaffected by our understanding of it. I do NOT mean to say that there is an abstract object of ‘triangle’, or anything like that, but I do think that there is a distinction between the concept itself and our understanding of it; whereas, if I am understanding you correctly, there is only the concept insofar as ‘we’ (society or what not) understand it. Am I understanding correctly?

Understanding what a chair is must include the act of sitting upon it, not just the words "something you can sit on" - which includes the floor and rocks. And there are no speech acts which are behaviourally equivalent to the act of sitting, since that's not what words do, they don't sit down.

That’s fair. I don’t see anything wrong with that.

Because the majority of the concepts we enjoy in our lives are more analytically fuzzy, their "full" explication, something maximally clear, cashes out in a pragmatic - perhaps even phenomenological - understanding rather than explicating word strings. Even if that pragmatic understanding must be accompanied by the appropriate words. eg "I sit down in my chair", and I am sitting, I illustrate this by sitting down.

Where I think it gets even more interesting, is with primitive concepts. It doesn’t seem like there is an analogous action you can take, to sitting down, to implicitly demonstrate the concept of ‘being’. You know what I mean? Likewise with space, time, true, false, value, etc.

That strikes me as most concepts must, thus, be fundamental. If they are constituted by being unable to be explicated.

I don’t think so, or perhaps you are referring to something else by ‘fundamental’ (such as ~’unable to be completely explicated’). I still think you would agree that there is a sufficient, albeit not complete, definition one can give of a ‘chair’ (or ‘sitting down’, etc.); I think this cannot even be done for primitive concepts.

I split concepts into two general categories: simple (i.e., primitive) and complex (i.e., non-primitive). The former cannot be broken down into any concepts which it relates to, and the latter can be.

For example, the concept of a cat is complex; because it comprised off other concepts (e.g., ‘organism’, ‘number’, ‘(the number) four’, ‘leg’, ‘color’, ‘texture’, ‘teeth’, etc.): once one understands, whether that be implicitly or explicitly, the concepts, and their relations, that comprise the concept of a cat, the concept itself is understood. This is not the case with simple concepts.

The concept of being cannot be broken down into any smaller conceptual composition; and so it is impossible to convey (implicitly or explicitly) it by appeal to other concepts (and their relations to each other)(like the concept of a cat): only by pure intuition do we grasp what it is, and it is an absolutely simple building block of all other concepts. I cannot perform an action that demonstrates the concept of being, nor explicate it in words (without circularly referencing it). I cannot add anything new to any analytical work on the ontology of Being; because it is absolutely simple.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think what you are noting is that the fact that we cannot explicate (fully) a concept, it does not follow that it is (1) circular nor (2) primitive; and I actually agree with that. I just think that trying to explicate (sufficiently) a primitive concept demonstrates quite conclusively that it is really such—absolutely simple. Try to ask someone to define ‘being’, and, if they grasp what is being asked, they will appeal to it in its own definition.

Bob

But "time dilation" doesn't refer to a condition in the temporal form of our experience: it refers to conditions of how time works independently of our forms of experience. The temporal sequencing of events changes depending on one's inertial frame, and this doesn't seem like it is something that is merely an a priori condition of our experience. Doesn't that suggest there is a cosmic time?

But regarding your concern, maybe it is that appeal to phenomenal intuitions of time isn’t really necessary to explain the scientific experimental result

How? I don't see it.

Again, you are confusing language with concepts. The dictionary doesn't define concepts, it defines words (in a particular language).

That would just be ungrammatical. I am unsure, then, what contention you are making with the OP: I am not claiming that ungrammatical sentences make sense.

It seems like you are taking a scientific anti-realism approach; whereas I think that what we scientifically know, is a rough estimation of what is really there in-itself.

The peculiarity with space and time, is that positing them scientifically doesn't itself lend support to there being space nor time per se; but that we have to posit them in a way incongruent with our modes of intuition does.

Without taking an anti-realist position, I don't see how you can explain the observable phenomena of 'time dilation', for example, by appeal to "phenomenal", a priori, time.

So you think that the concept 'triangle' doesn't make any sense in itself?

'beingness' is a property, 'being' is a concept: the former is 'to have "being"'. Properties are attributes a 'thing' can have or possess; a concept is an idea of something that could be possessed.

The property of redness is 'to be red'; and so it presupposes a concept of 'red' in its definition. If one doesn't understand the concept which the property refers to (e.g., 'red'), then one can only understand that the property expounds a concept that is possessable, but not anything more than that.

You are confusing what it means to exist, with the relationship existent things have with each other: you are expounding an ontology in the sense of the structure of what exists and NOT in the sense of the structure of 'being' itself.

Sorry, I missed this response initially.

I have no problem with what you are saying, because you are using the term 'certainty' in the sense of ~'that which one doesn't have good reasons to doubt': in that sense, I agree that I am 'certain' that I am writing this reply.

In terms of whether it is absolutely true that I am writing this reply, I cannot afford an answer.

I would say the property is less fundamental than the concept it refers to; because it presupposes it.

The interesting thing with 'being', is that it isn't really a property: that opens up the discussion to absurd ideas, like beings which themselves contain being in their essence and other beings which do not (e.g., Spinoza's view).

I just want to clarify, that I was in no way intending to convey that it is your fault that you don't understand what I mean by an absolutely simple concept; I was just noting that, for whatever reason, I was unable to convey it to you. It happens, unfortunately.

I also had a definition of value that was analyzable that you did not refute

If you are referring to the definition that it is 'what ought to be', then I did counter that.

So its fairly reasonable that I wouldn't consider intrinsic value if I had no reason to accept your definition of value right?

I agree insofar as, at the end of the day, you could say "Bob, I reject your view because I disagree with your definition of 'value'"; but not in the sense that you should shut down the conversation without one (in my opinion).

I could have easily shut down the conversation about your theory at the beginning with your proof that 'existence is good' is objective, since I completely reject it altogether, but I granted it to see where the conversation goes.

Perhaps I am wrong, but I don't see why you can't grant 'value' as 'worth', even if that disatisifies you, to discuss the aspects of intrinsic value we were conversing about. I don't think the definition is as important as you may think; and perhaps that is the real source of our disagreement (;

Not a problem, you already got a free handwave as I mentioned earlier. :) I appreciate the discussion and had a lot of fun diving into it with you. I'll catch you on another post Bob.

To you as well, my friend!

What definition does Plato give that isn't circular?

Teaching children primitive concepts are the easiest to convey, ironically, because they strongly intuition. E.g., conveying what space is super easy to a child and much easier than explaining the concept an combustion engine. Complex concepts require more experience and knowledge, than their primitive siblings.

I'd very much like to see an example of this. I'm not saying I don't understand or have any idea of what you mean, I'd just like to see where you're coming from with this distinction between deploying a concept and explicating its meaning.

I think ‘using’ a concept is more generic than ‘presupposing it’: both are ‘using’ it, the former is just what it means to ‘use’ generally, and the latter is to leave it unexplicated.

You are absolutely right that one can learn a concept through merely interacting with it or observing other people discuss about it, without its exact definition being clarified. I just don’t see how this negates my position, I guess.

If we want to be really technical, then I would say that we first, in our early years, learn notions; then we (tend to) refine them in our young adulthood into ideas; then we (tend to) refine them more in our older years into concepts. I just mean to convey that we sort of grasp the ‘idea’ behind a thing slowly (usually) through experience (whether that be of other people conversing or interacting with something pertaining to the ‘idea’); and I sometimes convey this by noting a sort of linear progression of clarity behind an ‘idea’ with notion → idea → concept. It isn’t a super clean schema, but you get the point.

In terms of giving an example, I would envision that one could grasp the idea of a ‘triangle’ without ever knowing any precise sort of definition, by merely experiencing triangles and what not, and using the idea of ‘triangle’, conceptually (in a less refined conceptual sense), such as to separate shapes into their own groups or what not, would be an example of presupposing the ‘concept’. There’s not explication of what it actually means, but, rather, just an implicit, assumed, understanding of it.

To ‘use’ a concept in an explicated sense, would be have some sort of sufficiently robust concept of what it is, which is explicated sufficiently. Such as ‘a triangle is a three sided shape, whereof the sides connect at three points, each line is straight, the angles add up to 180 degrees, etc.’. Of course, the level of precision and robustness will vary: an expert in the given field that the concept relates to will probably have a more robust analysis than a layman (which gives most likely a basic definition).

I can imagine a world in which deploying a concept is an instance of explicating a meaning, regardless of whether a definition is offered.
…
But you do pick up and refine concepts just by listening and chatting.

That’s fair, and I agree. I just don’t think one can explicate what primitive concepts are, albeit understood by pretty much everyone.

‘being’ is the best example, but also ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘true’, ‘value’, and ‘false’ are good ones. They are very intuitional, and inexplicable (and some more than others).

Concepts have their own meaning despite how they relate to concepts. The concept of the number 3 is obviously distinct from the number 2, and they don't rely on how they relate to each other to be defined.

???

You just tried to prove 'being' is vague because 'to be or not to be' doesn't refer to Hamlet's existence: why would Hamlet not existing have anything to do with it?

I think physics demonstrates quite sufficiently that space and time are valid 'entities' in our calculations, and not in the sense that they are merely our modes of intuition, but I would be interested to hear how you would interpret it (since you obviously disagree).

I don't think that space and time are proper substances, because I don't think literal extension and temporality exist in reality (beyond our modes of intuition): but I do think, at a minimum, the things in themselves must be related to each other with the concepts of space and time---it just seems like physics goes out the window otherwise at this point.

I think we know exactly what being is: I just don't think we can properly explicate it. Knowledge isn't just the sphere if explicable information.

We can have an idea of what it is to be, but we can't say exactly what is its essence. But there is one thing we know about it: it is counterfactual to any action or state of a subject.

Yes, subjects are negativity; insofar as they negate what exists. But this seems like you are agreeing now with me that you cannot define being.

You posts often do not come up in mentions and are not flagged. Something to do with the way you are editing them, at a guess.

Oh, I am sorry to hear that. Unfortunately, I am unsure as to what mistake I may be doing—all I do is hit the reply button and it adds a reply link at the top of my response.

In terms of your response, I only have one problem with it: you are analyzing “is” in the english language when you refer to ‘being’ and not the concept of being.

I have no problem with you analysis that ‘is’ is deployed in various different ways, and that some of them do not even make any sort of existential claim—all of that is completely correct. However, “is” is linguistic, not conceptual. I am asking what it means ‘to exist’, not how we use the term ‘is’ (or similar words).

This is important, because your definition of ‘being’ is really the valid definition of the usage of ‘is’; and not the definition of ‘being’ in the sense of the concept of ‘to be’.

An easy example, is your existential quantification sense of ‘is’:

the "is" of existential quantification ∃(x)f(x), "there is something that is green".

Existential quantification presupposes, and does not answer itself, what it means ‘to exist’. It is a way to quantify existence (in a way). E.g., by claiming “there is something that is green” in the sense that there exists something green, presupposes the concept of what it means to exist—so it can’t itself being a proper analysis of ‘to be’. See what I mean?

Apart from that, I totally agree (:

I am sorry you feel that way. From my perspective, I gave you two different ways to think about intrinsic value, you ignored both, and segued immediately into a discussion about how you will reject the whole theory if I cannot define 'value' other than as an unanalyzable, simple concept.

Therefore, I had no choice but to try to convey to you the Moorean idea of primitive concepts; but that didn't latch. So I tried giving the example of 'being', because that is the most obvious example of it (that every philosopher I have ever known recognizes as such); but that didn't latch either. I was hoping to then, by analogy, demonstrate why some of your critiques of an unanalyzable concept were completely off (such as claiming it is 'subjective'); but I have failed to even get the idea across to you of what an absolutely simple concept is: if you don't understand how it is impossible to define what it means to exist, then I am at a loss of words how to explain what a simple concept is to you.

My ethical theory is Moorean, insofar as it posits the concept of 'good' and 'value' as primitive and absolutely simple. Ironically, I don't think people are going to care about that part of the analysis: when I say 'value' is 'worth', people will understand sufficiently what I mean, just like how they will understand that 'being' is 'existence'. Maybe I am wrong about that, but we will find out soon enough when I open a thread on it.

In terms of your theory, I think I understand it more than adequately (at this point), and disagree with it. So I don't think there is much more to discuss.

Until we speak again!
Bob

:lol: :kiss:

That you are reading this now is not just "plausible"; rather if that is to be doubted, we no longer have a footing for this conversation to proceed.

This is the part I don't see why it is necessary (for knowledge). Are you saying that we must be certain (which, to me, requires absolute truth) of something to have any knowledge?

I would say that we must be very confident that we both exist and are in a discussion to continue the conversation: I don't see why we need to add in 'and I am certain of it'.

No, it is necessary for a thing to exist for it to undertake an action

But you haven't defined what it means to exist: you have just noted that only existent things can undertake action. This doesn't define being at all.

Concepts are more universal than words, because words refer to the concepts. I think that, despite whatever limitations we may have in our language, there are concepts which are absolutely simple.

To discuss which words are absolutely simple, is to just critique a particular language; and, although that can certainly be done, it is not really what the OP is about.

I am not merely claiming that 'being' cannot be defined linguistically non-circularly: I mean the very concept is absolutely simple. No matter what conceptual analysis we give, it won't produce anything meaningful about 'being'.

:up:

You don't think concepts are determinate? How is the concept of a circle not determinate?

I don't see a definition of 'true' anywhere in your response, and am a little confused. What's your definition?

You are presupposing that space and time are only (presumably synthetic) a priori. I accept that the space and time which are our forms of experience are a priori, but not that space and time do not exist beyond that in reality.

By 'phenomenal' sense, I mean space and time as it pertains to our experience (of reality) and not reality itself; to be contrasted with 'cosmic' space and time.

Under what conditions do you believe a concept presupposed in an act of speech?

I didn’t understand this question: can you re-phrase it?

Can you distinguish presupposing a concept from using a concept?

To use a concept, is to deploy it; and to presuppose a concept is to use a concept in a manner whereof one does not explicate its meaning (but, rather, uses it implicitly in their analysis).

I am not following how this relates to the OP.

Or needing to learn a concept before deploying it?

I agree that one needs to learn a concept, or idea, at least notionally, before deploying it.

How could you come to understand what a bike is without understanding what "is" means?

Oh, I think I understand where your are heading; so let me clarify: by claiming ‘being’, or any absolutely simple concept, is unanalyzable and primitive, I DO NOT mean to convey that we cannot come to know what they are. I mean that we can’t come to know them through conceptual analysis: they remain forever notions, which are acquired via pure intuitions (about reality).

We all know exactly what ‘to be’ is, yet we can’t explicate it without circularity.

"To be or not to be" means "should something exist, or should it not?"

I don't think concepts are culturally relative. The words we use to describe them are, and the ones we expound may be a reflection of cultural interests, but they aren't relative to cultures themselves.

To be could be defined as that which is necessary for any subject to undertake an action.

So 'that thing exists' = 'that thing is necessary for any subject to undertake an action'? This doesn't address what it means 'to exist' at all.

All you have noted is that being underlies everything else; which is true, but not a valid definition of what it means to exist.

Normally, colloquially, knowledge does not refer to absolute truth. When someone says "I know that the distance to my local grocery store is 10 miles", they do not mean that they are absolutely certain nor that it is absolutely true that <...>; rather, they mean that they are (1) have a belief that , (2) are justified in, (3) and have high enough credence levels to claim that it is true that <...>.

There is a valid distinction between conceptual vs. linguistic circularity: the former is circularity in the underlying idea, and the latter is circularity in the given language.

E.g., the analysis of "Non-spatiality" is not conceptually circular, but is linguistically circular. What exists non-spatially, exists beyond, sans, without, etc. space; which is linguistically circular. However, conceptually, it is perfectly valid to ask what is "beyond" space.


Some of your examples aren't even circular. E.g., a "word" is a string of symbols which signifier a particular underlying meaning in the given language.

To exist is to be the subject of a predicate.

This doesn’t refer to being at all.

If ‘to exist’ is ‘to be the subject of a predicate, then Unicorns exist because “Unicorns are red”. This obviously doesn’t work.

You aren’t capturing what it means ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’ itself in your definition. Likewise, it is circular, as indicated with the underlines.

I think your are very close to my meaning, it is just a bit linguistic instead of conceptual--is all. :up:

How do you define 'true' (and NOT 'truth')?

I guess I didn't understand your definition of 'being': can you give it again?