My preferred example is 'the principle of noncontradiction' (PNC).

I don't think the concept of PNC is primitive: it is the idea that a proposition cannot be both true and false. However, and what I think you are getting at is that, PNC cannot be proven without circular reference. I am uncertain if that makes it a primitive concept or not, since it technically can be defined in terms of other concepts.

I don't think so. For example, try to define what 'true', as a concept and signifier, NOT 'truth', refers to without begging the question. I don't see how it can be done, and I don't see how it reduces to being.

If you would like to end our discussion, then I completely respect that. I am more than willing to continue, but I only want to if you want to—afterall, this is your thread!

I will respond to your post, and will leave it up to you, since this is your thread, if you would like to continue the discussion, segue into a different discussion, or end the discussion (altogether).

You ask me to give you a definition of existence that doesn't devolve into circularity, then when I do, you're saying my definition doesn't fit what you think it means. Do you see the problem? You can't ask me to give you a definition, then say, "That's not what I wanted you to define it as."

I completely understand the frustration you are expounding here; but I don’t think you are being charitable to my challenge. Let me briefly explain.

Imagine I asked you: “Can you non-circularly define what an orange is?”
Imagine you answer: “Of course, an orange is a really fast truck”.

Technically, you “beat” the challenge; but, in a more meaningful sense, you evaded, inadvertently, the challenge. I was asking about the fruit we are both thinking of, what is commonly referred to by an orange, and not whether you can come up with any non-circular definition that you could semantically assign the term “orange” (such as “a really fast truck”).

So, since this doesn’t address the intentions of the challenge, I have no choice but to try to guide you to what I mean by an orange, which is that fruit, to try to get you to try to define that thing. You could easily, and analogously, complain, rightly, that you did exactly what I asked (technically); but it misses the intentions of the question.

I was asking you to define what it means to exist (which is what is usually referred to as ‘existence’), and not asking you to come up with any definition that you could semantically assign the word ‘existence’. Do you see what I mean?

If existence = X, then existence = plurality of X. Your use of 'existence', and its variants, betray your own meaning. — Bob Ross

No, now you're disregarding things I've written. Existence = X. Being equals "some piece of X". Existences are the reference to beings, so "pieces of X".

I apologize: that’s a typo. It was supposed to say “if existence = X, then existences = plurality of X”. My point was that in your own sentence, which referred to ‘existence’ in a singular and plural fashion, betrayed its own meaning; insofar as the plural version didn’t make any sense.

No. Because I already mentioned that 'to exist' is a synonym of being, not existence.

Philosophim, do you see how that indicates you have a bad schema? That ‘exist’ doesn’t refer or relate whatsoever to ‘existence’? That violates basic grammar rules. A better explanation would be that ‘being’ is a synonym for ‘existence’, which is how it is usually used.
That’s like me saying ‘red is the number 2 and blue is the number 3’ and then saying “but ‘to be red’ is referring ‘blue’, not ‘red’”. It’s ungrammatical, even if one accepts the semantics.


Bob

The confusion lies in the fact that I am using there term “probability” in a looser, more colloquial sense, than you. If we are talking about “probability” in strictly the sense of a mathematical, quantitative likelihood; then I completely agree with you.

If we use it more loosely, as also “plausibility”, then your issues disappear. The probability, in this sense, of me writing this message is qualitative and to the degree of confidence I have, given the evidence I have to support it, that would suffice for me to claim it is true.

:up:

Would you include the so-called 'primary intuitions' of time and space? (It might be their very 'primitiveness' that makes them so hard to explain!)

I do consider the concept of space and time, in a phenomenal sense, to be primitive.

In terms of numbers, I am not sure that they are all primitive---perhaps they are. We can represent the number 2, for example, as the conjunction of the concepts of number, repetition, and the number 1. It is definitely word-resistant to explain, but conceptually I don't think it is circular. "2 = 1 1"

I’m ok with that; word-resistant just means the concept is difficult to represent for the use of expression, and prior to language just means the concepts have no relation to communication.

“word-resistant” isn’t a good way to describe it, as that implies that the qualification of conceptual simplicity is linguistic (as opposed to conceptual) and some complex concepts which are word-resistant (e.g., non-spatiality) are thereby simple.

That is exactly the issue, and what I was trying to convey to @Janus.

You didn't define what it means to exist; and that was the whole point.

It irrelevant what you call the entirety of reality, or a parcel of reality. I want to know how you define what it means to exist (which is what 'existence' commonly refers to).

It was meant to emphasize we're talking about existence, not existences.

"existence" here is supposed to be referring to the general and generic quality of existing; and not 'the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved': your definition just doesn't cover what the word refers to. If I take your definition seriously, then:

"It was meant to emphasize we're talking about existence, not existences." = "It was meant to emphasize we're talking about the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved, not multiple sums of all discrete identities observed and unobserved."

If existence = X, then existence = plurality of X. Your use of 'existence', and its variants, betray your own meaning.

This completely misses the mark, and is confusing.

You don't say "Existences to exist". You say, "That" exists

Correct. But do you see how the word 'exist' here isn't referring to what you have been calling 'existence' and how that is really weird?

According to your logic:

"that exists" = "that is the sum of <...>"

There's no escaping that under your terminology, because that's how you defined it. Obviously, this doesn't work, as 'that exists' is referring to the quality of existing; and you haven't defined that. This is what I have been trying to get you to define.

'to exist' is just another terminology to note that something is a slice, or discrete part of existence

The quality of existing, property of existence, 'to exist', does not refer to a slice of existence: it refers to existing itself.

So, let me ask one more time in different terminology: how do you define the generic quality of existing?

Or another way: how do you define what it means to exist?

Or another way: how do you define the concept of existing?

I feel like, at this point, my question is very clear: do those questions not make sense to you?

Bob

Well, you are claiming that the concepts are a priori, and thusly are concepts which our representative faculties, in-themselves, have for the act of representation; so I would count that as at least sort of ontological. I understand you are not commenting on what exactly those concepts exist in.

My thinking is even more basic than this: I don't even think our faculty of self-reflective reason can define certain concepts, like 'being', without merely pointing to an intuition (in the non-kantian sense of an intellectual seeming).

I can envision a concept which, in principle, could be a priori but isn't simple; because our representative faculties could be acquainted with it, but yet it is a concept which inherits from more fundamental concepts. E.g., the concept of 'two triangles' is the concept of 'two' + 'triangle' and so there is no circularity in its definition and this could be, in principle, a priori (although I am not trying to say it is). You know what I mean?

First of all, all definitions are essentially circular, as evidence by somebody not being able to immediately glean a language simply by by being handed a dictionary

Non-sequitur.

But with some ideas, the circularity of the definition becomes very short, such as in your example.

Firstly, I am NOT referring to linguistic definitions: I am referring to conceptual definitions.

Secondly, if you are just noting that all complex concepts will relate to some set of primitive, simple concepts (and that is what you mean by 'they are all circular'), then that's fine. But the definitions of the complex concepts are not themselves circular: they don't refer to themselves in their definitions.

Do you have others?

Yes. E.g., 'value', 'true, 'false', etc.

That peculiarity renders the chosen definition rather empty in my opinion.

Hence why it is unanalyzable.

I shy from such definitions and prefer something more pragmatic such as a relational definition. A exists to B if A in any way has a causal effect on B. Hence the nonexistence of unicorns because no unicorn seems to have a causal effect on humans, despite the legends to the contrary.

Firstly, not all definitions are about causality.

Secondly, I don't see how this would provide non-circular definitions for concepts like 'being'.

I appreciate you re-quoting your definition!

So, here’s your definition:

Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved

The first thing I am going to do, is slash out ‘as a whole’, because I am not asking you to define the totality of things that exist but, rather, what it means to exist (and ‘as a whole’ is indicating your are speaking about the totality of what exists, and not what it means to exist). So, your definition is really:

Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved

So we have:

Existence is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved

Now, remember you supposed to be defining what it means ‘to exist’.

To be charitable, I don’t think you even tried to define existence in the sense of ‘to exist’ but, rather, are defining ‘existence’ as the ~‘the whole’. I can demonstrate really easily how ‘to exist’ cannot be defined as what you have defined as ‘existence’:

If ‘existence’ is ‘the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved’, then we should be able to substitute anything relating to the word ‘existence’ in for ‘the sum of all <...>’. But if we do this, we get weird results. For example:

‘this thing exists’ = ‘this thing is the sum of all discrete identities <...>’.

At best, your definition of ‘existence’ can’t be used to refer to many instances of the usage of ‘existence’ (such as ‘to exist’, ‘exists’, ‘existed’, etc.) and thusly you haven’t answered my original question, other than to use the term ‘existence’ to refer to something it normally doesn’t refer to.

At worst, your definition is circular, if I assume you mean to define:

’to exist’ is to be the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved

‘to be’ is ‘to exist’. See the circularity?

To be fair, I think you are just defining ‘existence’ in a rather peculiar way, which is obvious in many examples (e.g., ‘this thing existed’ = ‘this thing was the sum of <...>’, etc.), and I think all you are noting is the totality of existence, instead of what existence is itself. If I, to be charitable, assume you mean it in this sense, then it is not circular but equally doesn’t answer my challenge: I was asking about what it means ‘to exist’? That is what ‘existence’ usually refers to.

Do you see what I mean? You seem to be confusing ‘what is the totality of what exists?’ with ‘what does it mean to exist?’. I don’t believe you are even claiming to answer the latter, which was the subject of discussion.

Bob

:brow:

If the actor is playing the part of Hamlet, then Hamlet. This is not an example of a valid analysis of 'to be': 'to be or not to be?' ungrammatical, old english for "should something exist, or not?".

I believe you are giving more of an ontological account of why it is absolutely simple (viz., the categories of the understanding), which, by my lights, means you accept it is absolutely simple. :up:

:up:

This was not in your initial request. You just asked me to define being, then in the next request, existence. Lets go over those first instead of continuing to add new requests.

It was the initial request, because we were referring to different things by the word ‘being’.

I was meaning in the traditional and common sense of ‘to be’; and you meant is as ‘a part of existence’.

To avoid getting into a debate about that, I simply semantically refurbished the term in my challenge. You have not succeeded in beating my challenge as of yet. You defined something which was not meant by ‘being’.

Please go down my response where I lay out what existence is

You did not provide a definition in this response, and you gave the definition “Existence being defined as 'everything'” in this response.

Philosophim, a really easy way to help, would be if you just clarified what the definition is. I have tried to be charitable here, but you are starting to evade the question. Just answer it clearly, or quote where it is that I missed it.

If you wish to apply everything as a synonym to existence, that's fine.

This is a straw man. I said that ‘being’ is a synonym for ‘existence’; and this is true in standard terminology (in both colloquial and formal areas of discourse). I think you are confusing ‘a being’ with ‘being’. Either way, it doesn’t matter: all I want you to do is define what it means ‘to exist’: does that make sense?

Please go over the concepts I put forward and demonstrate where I fall into circularity please.

Philosophim, I have linked TWO TIMES my demonstration; and you have ignored it TWO TIMES.
I will link it again: here’s my response.

Also, I am not asking for a definition of what the 'totality of existent things' is: I am asking for a definition of the concept of 'to exist'. It almost sounds like you may be conflating them, with "existence as a whole".

I did read it, and didn't see a definition (e.g., 'existence' is <...>, 'existence' = <...>, etc.). What was it?

The closest I see is:

Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved

Which is the same definition you gave originally, with the addition of more clarification of what you mean by 'everything'. This has the exact same issues as my response I linked; and you still haven't addressed any of it.

Am I missing something? Is that ^ your definition? Do you not see how that is circular (as I described in my response)?

Philosophim, that's the challenge: can you provide a definition of 'existence' (of 'to exist', 'to be', etc.) which is not circular?

So far, you have failed to do so: you saying "I can" doesn't beat the challenge: you have to provide the definition.

Your entire schema that uses 'existence' is circular with respect to the definition of that word: nothing you have provided in your analysis has amended the issues I spoke of in my response.

I am going to tell you right now, you can't do it. That's why I am challenging you to do it, so I can break you out of this illusion that only concepts with analyzable definitions are valid definitions. Some concepts are primitive, and are not non-circularly definable; and they still valid.

So, what is your definition of 'existence' (i.e., 'to exist')?

I see where the confusion lies: you don’t think ‘being’ = ‘existence’.

I disagree, but that is despite the point. My challenge needs to be semantically refurbished, then: I challenge you to define ‘existence’ (i.e., ‘to exist’) without using it in its own definition. Fair enough?

You took a jab at it here:

Existence being defined as 'everything' and being as 'a part'.

Ok, so you define ‘existence’ as ‘everything’. This doesn’t work and is circular.

If ‘existence’ = ‘everything’, then:

1. ‘to be’ = ‘to exist’ = ‘to be everything’. the latter presupposes a concept of ‘to be’, ‘to exist’, which was supposed to be being defined.
2. “this exists” = “this is everything”. Same problem as #1, and it makes no sense.
2. “that should not exist” = “that should not be everything”. this clearly makes no sense, and same problem as #1.
3. “discrete existence” = “everything that exists discreetly”. Same problem as #1.
4. “amorphous existence” = “everything that exists amorphously”. Same problem as #1.
5. etc…

Remember, if you say X = Y, then I can substitute Y for X. If I say that ‘to be flub’ = ‘to be red’, then ‘this is red’ = ‘this is flub’. Of course, to be charitable, one may have to linguistically refurbish a bit of the language to make it grammatical; but that doesn’t help your case here.

If ‘to be’ = ‘to be everything’, which is what you are claiming by ‘existence’ = ‘everything’, then we can abstract this to a definition:

‘X’ = ‘X + Y’.

See how it is circular? And how you provided no clarification nor definition of what it means ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’ by noting ‘existence’ = ‘everything’?

Bob

From what you say it follows that we don't know that we know. If knowledge must be true and everything I think is true may not be, then I cannot be confident that I possess knowledge, even though I may, despite not knowing it or even being able to know it, possess knowledge.

You are confusing absolute knowledge with knowledge.

If knowledge is a justified belief that has a high enough probability of being true, then you can know you know X IFF you have a justified belief that has a high enough probability of being true that X.

All you have noted, is that you can’t be absolutely certain that it is true; which is not a qualification of knowledge.

If we have no knowledge, then by what standard could we assess the likelihood of something being true?

One’s theory of knowledge, just like truth, will be used to examine itself: it is necessarily circular.

For example, take correspondence theory of truth: what makes the correspondance theory of truth true? If one accepts that theory, then they would say: it is true IFF it corresponds with reality. See what I mean?

If you ask “how do we know what knowledge is?”, then same deal: you have to evaluate that from the perspective of your theory of knowledge.

It is not that we have no knowledge, it is that we only have probabilistic reasons to support the truth of things. There’s nothing particularly wrong with this: the alternative is absolute truth.

I think there many things I can know to be true, or at least can be certain are the case

The only way this negates my position, is if you could validly claim to it is absolutely true; and you can’t. The things you know, are based off of probability: all you are noting is a high probability.

People who think that something is morally permissible but yet no one should do it, are either (1) confused about what morality is, (2) what they believe is actually immoral, or (3) holding onto an irrational belief.

Philosophim, I know you think you are providing key counter-points to my theory: but you are not at all. You don’t understand the theory completely yet, and this the source of your counter-points. I think you appreciate, even if you disagree, this, because I have, from your perspective, done the same with your theory.

Minds are like ship docks/ports, ideas are like barrels of merchandise, and explanations are like ships that carry those barrels to another ship dock.

We may completely understand our own theory, but sometimes it is difficult to get those barrels to another dock. I have sent all my finest ships, and none of docked at your shores. Therefore, I need to try different avenues of explanation, because I know you aren’t quite getting the theory.

Forget about value for now. Let’s talk about being. Why?

Because you accept that being is unanalyzable and primitive; but you just don’t completely realize it yet. I think I can convey the idea of a primitive concept with being, if I am allowed to smooth out some of the wrinkles in your analysis of being. Then, I think I can at least convey how value is analogous. That’s the vessel I am going to try, because nothing else has worked.

So I want to emphasize that I am not ignoring your responses: they are just completely missing the mark; and we need to take things more systematically and try other ways of explanation.

So, let’s talk about your definition of being: “a slice of existence”. Philosophim, are you telling me ‘existence’ is different than ‘being’?

A slice of existence is a discrete section of existence.

This is a circular definition, because you are using the term to define it. I can swap ‘existence’ with ‘being’ and lose no meaning: “a slice of being is a discrete section of being”.

Circular would be if I said 'being' is defined as 'narsh' and when you asked what narsh is, I replied with 'being'.

That is exactly what you just did!!!! You just said “being” is “a slice of being”. Unless you are really about to tell me that “existence” is different than “being”, which is obviously isn’t, then you are using the term in its definition.

We need to address your definition here, because if we cannot agree that you are defining it circularly, insofar as it circularly references itself in its own definition, then we are hopeless for any discussion about value.

There are several other philosophers who have also defined being

No philosopher has ever been able to define being validly: it is the grand-daddy of primitive concepts; and the vast majority of philosophers understand this.

Your link didn’t contain any definition of being that was not circular; and some of them weren’t even definitions, but an analysis of different ways we can separate being.

Ok, so either give me (1) a different definition which actually defines 'being' without circularly referencing it, (2) explain how 'existence' is different than 'being', or (3) concede it is undefinable without circular reference. This isn't a gotcha, by the way: I need us to get on this common ground if we are to have any hope of progressing our conversation.

I look forward to you responding,
Bob

Let’s take a different approach, because I think our heads are in totally different spaces; and that’s fine, but we need to converge somewhere if we want to progress. So, let’s talk about being.

My challenge to you is simple: (I want you to) define ‘being’ without circularly referencing it. Fair enough?

No, its not. Being is a slice of existence.

Do you see how you just circularly defined ‘being’ by referencing it as ‘existence’ in its definition? So this fails to beat my challenge.

Besides that, there’s just a couple clarification questions I have about your response.

No, its very different. Because I proceed to explain that it can be quantified in a moral sense.

1. That value can be quantified, does not entail any sort of definition of value itself. Are you asking for how, in my theory, we quantify value, or what value actually is itself?

2. When you say it is ‘very different’, are you referring to that you explain how to quantify value, or that you don’t think ‘importance’ and ‘worth’ are circular references to ‘value’?

Its not Moorean, its incomplete and ill defined

Moore held that goodness, and ‘good’, is undefinable, unanalyzable, and primitive. Your objections to my view, hold the same to Moore’s arguments. I am just noting that it is not uncommon in metaethics for moral realists to consider goodness primitive in this sense without conceding it is subjective.

I am going to stop here, because I want to see how you define ‘being’ without circularly referencing (: , and we will go from there.

Bob

My definition of value, is Moorean—not subjective.

What value is itself, is not something contingent on subjective dispositions: it is to have worth. Just like being is itself not something contingent on subjective dispositions: it is to be.

By your reasoning, being is also subject; which is clearly false.

Value: A designation of importance.

This is no different than defining it as ‘value: a designation of worth’. Philosophim, you haven’t done anything here but use a (rough) synonym for value: you have done nothing to expound the idea of value. Rather, you have pushed the question back, just the same as if you would have said ‘worth’ instead of ‘importance’.

Likewise, value isn’t a designation: it would be, by your definition here, equal to importance. Something designates value, value is not some sort of designation itself; just like how someone can designate tasks, but a task isn’t defined as a designation <of something>.

Irregardless, I am confused why you are insisting on disregarding the whole theory, in the sense of not even granting my definition of value for the sake of the conversation, when you clearly understand that my use of ‘value’ is ‘to have worth’; and you know darn well what ‘to have worth’ means, and that it is not itself subjective.

You are playing word games and trying to win on technicalities.

In terms of competing definitions of value, I have never heard a satisfying one other than one’s which reiterate the primitive meaning (such as ‘to have worth’ or ‘to be important’). People use the term ‘value’ exactly, by-at-large, how I am using it: I am not using it in some toto genere different way, so I am confused why you ignored the real content of my responses.

I have been thinking about how to express my view differently, in light of your currently way of thinking about it, so as to hopefully provide more clarity. I came up with one more way to express it.

"Intrinsic motivation" is anything which is its own source of motivation; whereas "extrinsic motivation" is anything which depends on something else (as a source of motivation) to motivate anything else about it.

An example of intrinsic motivation, that you can agree with in your current mode of thought, is subjects--specifically their psychologies. I can very well become motivated to do something, because of my interpretation or (subjective) disposition towards it; and, thusly, I am a source of motivation for myself, and so I am an example of intrinsic motivation.

An example of extrinsic motivation, that you can agree with in your current mode of thought, is one being motivated to play basketball because they like the sport. Basketball itself is not motivating anyone, but, rather, the subject's interpretation (or subjective disposition) towards it motivates them; and so this motivation to do basketball is extrinsic to basketball itself.

Now, something which has intrinsic value, has a (1) mind(stance)-independent source of (2) intrinsic motivation. This is a combination that you currently haven't completely incorporated into your mode of thought and is why, I think, you are having a hard time understanding what intrinsic value would even be.

So, I devised a simple test, for all intents and purposes, that will get my point across. We can test if something is intrinsically motivating by asking: "if all other sources of motivation are removed which are not from X, does X still motivate?".

For example, if we ask "if all other sources of motivation are removed which are not from basketball (itself), does (playing or what not) basketball still motivate?", then the answer is clearly "no"; because if we remove our own motivation, then there is no motivation left. If I remove my own subjective disposition about basketball, then I am no longer motivated to play it; because all my reasons for doing it were from my own preferences about it. So basketball is not intrinsically motivating.

Now, let's contrast pain to basketball. "If all other sources of motivation are removed which are not from pain (itself), does pain still motivate?". The answer is 'yes'. If I remove my own subjective disposition towards pain, which could be a subjective understanding that it is worthless or valuable, I am still motivated, in a state of pain, to avoid it. Thusly pain is intrinsically motivating. Since it exists stance-independently--insofar as the state of pain is not dependent on our feelings, preferences, or cognitive approval/disapprovals--and it is intrinsically motivating, it has intrinsic value.

What you are having a hard time understanding, I think, is that every mind-independent state is NOT analogous to the basketball example because some states, per their nature, motivate independently of our own internal motivations about them.

Hopefully that helps.

Bob

Knowledge requires that it is true, and not just a belief. Now, whether or not it is true is probabilistic, so it could turn out that what we think is true isn't; but that doesn't negate the importance of knowledge (i.e., true, justified, belief) vs. belief.

Likewise, a belief could be justified, insofar as the probability of it being true is sufficient to warrant a belief, but not considered knowledge; because the probability of it being true isn't high enough.

Knowledge, to me, denotes sufficient confidence (credence) in it being true, given its probability/plausibility of being true.

I would suggest reading (in this order):

1. The Gay Science.
2. Twilight of the Idols.
3. Beyond Good and Evil.

Then, let me know if you still feel the same about Nietzsche. I find it really odd that you don't consider him a very influential philosopher akin to Kant, Plato, etc. and that he is basically for preschoolers. His work is very complex, and has (at least some) merit (even if you don't agree with him).

I think we have made progress! (:

For example you start with "goodness" before you define 'good'. Reverse that. Because if you do, you get this:

Good = value

What is value? Something primitive that cannot be analyzed.

The reason I don’t start with it, is because I don’t feel the need, when initially explaining the theory, to explain what ‘value’ is itself: I just use it. Every theory starts with something presupposed; and I find it satisfactory to start with ‘goodness is identical to “having value”’: this is generally, immediately understood by common folk.

Which leads me to:

So value IS something that can be analyzed.

I think we are referring to two different things by ‘value’ here. When I say ‘value’ is unanalyzable, I mean it is the sense of ‘what does it mean to be valued or have value?’ (i.e., what is value itself?); whereas you talking about ‘what has value, and how much?’. I totally agree, as is clear in my responses, that we can answer the latter, just not the former. If you ask me ‘what has value?’, I can answer; but if you ask me ‘what does it mean for something to be valuable?’, my answer is just a reiteration (such as ‘it means that something has worth’). See what I mean?

How do our experts determine intrinsic value?
…
Yes, but we know science is objective because of the scientific method. What method are we using to find intrinsic value?

This is a good point: I actually think now that valuableness being a non-natural property does not entail that it is not capable of scientific investigation.

I think we can investigate intrinsic value, by means of the scientific method, as it would pertain to the study of discerning value which is derived from a person’s (conative or cognitive) dispositions vs. what mind-independently pressures, by its own nature, a person into valuing it. I think that answers your question pretty well.

You are confusing the fact that I evaluate what to do about a state as if the state has value apart from my evaluation

No. Take the same pain example, but imagine you genuinely believe, while in that state, that pain has no value: your body will betray you. You can only deny its value superficially. See what I mean? Your ‘evaluation’ of the state is irrelevant to the value it has, insofar as we are talking about the value it has innately.

I think this is enough for now. Instead of going line by line I've tried to get the overall concept and issues I see.

I appreciate that! (:

Bob

With all due respect, there was a lot of straw manning going on in your reply; and I could tell that you responded by way of reacting to each paragraph in chronological order (instead of analyzing my response as a whole) because you raised objections to things which you then disregarded further along as you were reading (my response). Reading your response, was like witnessing a live reaction (:

In order to convey this theory to you, I ask that you read my responses in their entirety first; and then respond with the whole in mind.

The good news, amidst the straw mans, I did notice a glimmer of progression! I think you are at least one step closer to understanding the basics of the theory. So let me address what you got right first.

What you call ‘moral value’ is equivalent to ‘intrinsic value’, and ‘moral goodness’ is equivalent to ‘intrinsic goodness’. I was hesitant to concede any sort of ‘moral value’ distinction, but that’s fine. I am claiming that morality is the study of what is intrinsically good, and not generically good—and there is good reason for that. Traditionally, morality has always been about actual (i.e., intrinsic) goodness and not extrinsic goodness. For example, morality has never, ever, been the study of the utility of a thing, which is to assess how good a thing is relative to a subjective purpose. If you want to claim morality is the study of generically what is good, then you will have to include studies, like axiological pragmatism, which have never been included in the study before. I am not willing to do that: I want to keep morality the study of what it traditionally has been.

There are some interesting things to note in here as well:

In conclusion:
valuableness is more fundamental than goodness
Value = Goodness (What is goodness? Is value less fundamental than valuableness?)
Moral goodness = that which has intrinsic goodness.
Moral value = that which has intrinsic value.
Value = that which has extrinsic value

You are absolutely right that valuableness = goodness; and that valuableness is not more fundamental than goodness: I was thinking of ‘value’ when I said that, not valuableness.

It is worth noting a blunder I made: when I was claiming valuableness is unanalyzable and primitive, I was actually thinking of ‘value’. Valuableness is easily definable, and it is ‘to have value’ (duh!).

‘Value’ is a more fundamental building-block of goodness and valuableness, because it is used in their definitions—that’s what I was meaning to convey before, but muddied the waters with my explication. Likewise, my example of ‘beingness’ was a bit off too: the property of beingness is not unanalyzable but, rather, ‘being’ is. Same analogy holds though, for ‘value/good’ and ‘being’.

So:

1. Goodness = valuableness = to have value.
2. moral goodness = to have intrinsic value (or to be intrinsically good: take your pick, it doesn’t matter since they mean the same thing).
3. value != goodness. The former is not a property, and the latter is.
4. moral value = intrinsic value.
5. value = good = ? . Both are unanalyzable and primitive, like being.

Hopefully that clarifies the confusion on that part. Good point, Philosophim!

Now, let’s dive into all the things you misunderstood (and I say that with all due respect).

This statement has unnecessary redundancy Bob. Lets simplify this to clearer language. Intrinsic value is what a thing demands.

NO. Intrinsic value is value that a thing demands of is own accord (i.e., from its nature). Saying it is ‘what a thing demands’ leaves out what is being demanded: I don’t mean it that generically.

But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value

Epistemically, of course we determine value: just like we determine truth, what exists, etc. The question is whether or not what we deem is valuable, actually is. And it only actually can be, if it is intrinsic. Otherwise, one is talking about how well a thing sizes up to its subjective purpose, which clearly isn’t actual value.

The state is not compelling anything. We are reacting to a state and have to make a decision. I don't understand the rationale behind the personification of states still.

You don’t think the state of pain compels you to eradicate it? Come on, Philosophim, I find it hard to believe you don’t understand this example.

So in your view, it seems my Dad violated the intrinsic value of pain and committed an immoral act.

Philosophim, did I not say to forget your parents and think only about the state of severe pain you are (hypothetically) in?

The answer to this, though, is no: on the contrary, it would be immoral to be addicted to opioids insofar as it is a state with intrinsic negative value. Why? Because the state of addiction has a compelling to be avoided. Another way of thinking about it, is that it violates what is most intrinsically (positively) valuable: universal flourishing.

When I am using the example of pain, I am using it just to convey the idea of intrinsic value to you, because you don’t seem to be able to even grasp that, and not to say that avoiding pain has the most intrinsic value nor that one should strive, as The Good, to always void it. You are skipping steps: we are talking about lego blocks, and you want to skip to sky-scrapers.

And no, the 'insistence' to get off the pain pills was not stronger.

Of course not, because he was not in a state, such as flourishing, which compels stronger than a state of degeneracy (such as severe addiction). I am not claiming that a person in the state of pain nor addiction will experience (necessarily) a stronger compelment towards flourishing; but if they were placed in such a state, which is a state without addiction, they would surely recognize, if they are sufficiently cognizant and unbiased, that it has more (positive) intrinsic value than their opioid addiction.

You are having a hard thinking of the strength of a state in terms of itself because you are trying to compare it in a different state. When one is in a state of severe pain, they aren’t in a state of extreme flourishing; so obviously, from that state of pain, the pain is stronger because they aren’t in a state of flourishing. But when they are in a state of flourishing, true flourishing, it is stronger, and in a positive sense, than a state of severe pain. Do you see what I mean?

Imagine you are in severe anger: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of anger compels you to value its acceptance, and stab that guy with a knife because he insulted you, all else being equal?

A couple things to note:

1. Perhaps I didn’t clarify this before, but there are two types of intrinsic value: negative and positive. The former is value in its negation, whereas the latter is value in its presence.

2. Anger itself has negative intrinsic value, and this is easily recognized when in a state of extreme anger: the emotion of anger is something which compels one to avoid and eradicate it, and that is what compels them to give in to whatever will help subsidize it. This is no different than pain: put a person in enough pain, and they commonly will do anything to eradicate it.

3. You are confusing whether or not anger has intrinsic value, with whether or not the thing which one does or strives towards due to their anger has intrinsic value. If I am really angry and I could subsidize it by punching someone in the face, then that wouldn’t make ‘punching someone in the face’ intrinsically valuable: the anger is intrinsically negatively valuable because it naturally compels one to value its avoidance and eradication.

What you're doing here Bob is saying that whenever we are compelled to make a decision one way, that it is the state of the experience expressing its intrinsic value, or good.

Not at all. I am saying that IF the state itself compels us to some degree, then to that degree it has intrinsic value; and whether or not it is negative or positive is dependent on whether it compels its avoidance/negation or its presence. See what I mean?

So whatever we are most compelled to do is good. Meaning if I'm strongly compelled to gas some people because I'm a Nazi and love my country, that's intrinsically good. There are some serious problems here.

This is beyond a straw man, and I am genuinely surprised you responded with this. Philosophim, when did I ever say “whatever we are most compelled to do is good”? What nonsense! What we are compelled to do, can be utterly subjective (such as a desire or cognitive approval).

You're saying that moral evaluation is to be done by majority vote of what people really want to do?

This was the most prominent straw man in your response, and I am disappointed in it.

As an institution, knowledge is preserved by way of majority vote of experts in the respective fields—e.g., that’s how peer-review studies work, Philosophim—but does that mean or even imply that truth is subjective? Of course not: what nonsense!

I am, and never was, claiming that what is intrinsically valuable—i.e., what is morally good—is contingent on our vote; I was saying that any institution we could create would preserve and gain knowledge of what is intrinsically valuable by way of convergence of experiences of states, as agreed upon by experts in the field.

Philosophim, this is no different than science. Our institutions safeguard and declare scientific knowledge by way of expert consensus. As humans, we have no other way of doing it (institutionally). Does that mean what exists is subjective? Of course not! What nonsense!

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements

Think of yourself in severe pain. Forget everything else.. Imagine you believe that the avoidance of pain is completely valueless: you will still behave like it has some value (in a negative sense). Why? Philosophim, if pain has no intrinsic value, then your belief or desire that it has no value should be enough to conclude it isn’t valuable; but it clearly isn’t enough, because pain, by its nature, compels you to value it.

Now, to clarify further, I get the sense sometime you think that by intrinsic value, I mean ~”anything that compels a subject to value it”. I, of course, don’t believe this; as other subjects can compel each other, and this is not an example of intrinsic value. The state of pain is objective, insofar as it is there irregardless of your feelings or approvals/disapprovals: states are objective in this manner—irregardless if one accepts the existence of qualia.

The rest of your response, was just a reiteration of the above misunderstands and straw mans, so I don’t feel the need to repeat myself in response.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Now you have to identify worth though. None of my questions have changed, just replace my points about 'value' to 'worth' now.

I already noted, and was the first to note, that ‘value’ and ‘worth’ are synonyms: I already answered objection by explaining that valuableness is a primitive property, like beingness.

I still think you are misunderstanding what the property of valuableness, in principle, is. It doesn’t reference how much value a thing has—only that it has value. That is the property we discussing: it is the very idea of ‘value’.

Also, I think you completely misunderstood my response (with all due respect) because you kept using ‘moral value’ throughout your response, demanding an analysis of it, when I clearly indicated it does not exist. My theory doesn’t have any notion or idea of ‘moral value’, because it is does not exist. Now, what I have not noted, is why it does not exist. If you reflect back on my definitions, you will notice that valuableness is more fundamental than goodness. Moreover, you will notice that goodness is only where a moral distinction is made: this is because morality is about what is good, not what is valuable (although valuableness is relevant insofar as it is part of the definition of goodness). Value itself has no ‘moral’ markers: it is just value. Where a ‘moral’ marker comes in, is when one denotes a specific type of value, that being intrinsic value, and this is called ‘good’ in a moral sense. I am assuming you mean to ask about an analysis of intrinsic value, and not moral value.

I’ve already outlined very clearly what I mean by the properties themselves, so I will not reiterate them here.

I think the real issue you are having, is that you don’t think intrinsic value, in the sense I am using it, exists; nor how it possibly could; nor how one could go about deciphering what has it, and to what degree.

So, let me try again. Intrinsic value is ‘value which is demanded by virtue of a thing’s nature’. The only kind of thing which can demand value, is a state because it the only kind of thing, other than a subject, that can ‘enforce’ its own value (and a subject doing so is the enforcement of value derived from subjective purposes: i.e., extrinsic value: and so it doesn’t count here).

I blundered here before, by saying, at this point in my analysis, that only states which are associated with (sufficiently) living beings: I was confusing epistemology with ontology. A state which can demand (i.e., innately insistence on having) value is one which IF it were experienced by a subject, then it would compel that subject to value it to a degree equal to its insistence; but such a state could exist, of which no current subject has the capacity to experience it. So that was my mistake, I recant that portion of my analysis.

So, how do we determine that a state has intrinsic value? By experience. No subject can know that a state demands value if they lack the representative faculties, or over-arching cognitive faculties (aka: reason), to recognize it; albeit really there. However, the epistemic window we have, for everything, is experience. We experience a state, such as pain, and it is clear (to any reasonably rational person with the proper capacities to produce pain [neurologically]) that it compels value in its avoidance. Think about, Philosophim, from your own perspective: forget your parents, forget everyone else. Imagine you are in severe pain: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of pain compels you to value its avoidance, all else being equal? I genuinely doubt that. You may have further reservations, but I am just trying to convey the basics to you here. Now, like all other empirical studies, our knowledge of intrinsic value as an institutionalized study would be a convergence of perspectives on empirical studies of states, such that we could sufficiently conclude that certain states do compel to be valued, and to a degree equal to its force of compelment.

It is important to note, that my view, unlike yours, is not a form of moral naturalism: it is form of moral non-naturalism. I don’t hold that valuableness, and subsequently goodness, is a natural property: you can’t scientifically investigate the property, because it is supervenient on the physical constitution of entities (viz., it is supervenient on the natural properties). For example, let’s say the fair market value of a diamond is $1500: can you figure that out solely from an investigation into the diamond’s physical properties? Of course not! You have to have further knowledge of the fair market to determine such. You need to examine the diamond to acquire its physical properties, and then, in addition to those properties, understand the fair market; then, you can attribute the property of value, and specifically a quantitative value of $1500, to the diamond—and this property which is does possess is no where to be found in its physical constitution. Therefore, the property is non-natural, because natural properties are physical properties (of things).

Now, it is equally important to note that by saying we cannot scientifically investigate the value (and moral properties) of things, I am not meaning to say that it is not an empirical investigation. We come to know that what states have the ability to demand value, by (1) understanding our representative faculties (such as their limitations) and (2), if our faculties are sufficient enough, empirically investigating, by means of experiencing, the state and seeing (A) if it compels, simply from its own nature, to be valued (e.g., if I really like pizza being thrown across the room, that doesn’t make pizza being thrown across the room inrinsically valuable: whereas, whether I like it or not, being in pain, by its nature, compels me to avoid it) and (B), if so, by how much force (of compelment).

Intrinsic value is factual, because it is value which is objective; and it is objective because its value is exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter whether it exists is stance-independent.

Does that help?

This still doesn't answer what value or goodness is. This doesn't answer what good is, or how we can objectively evaluate it.

I was surprised you responded with this: you even quoted my definition which clarified this. Goodness is ‘to have value’: so how can you say I haven’t answered what goodness is? You can disagree with what I claimed it was, but you certainly can’t say I didn’t answer. Likewise with valuableness: I said it is an unanalyzable property, like beingness, which is akin to beingness. That’s an answer.

We evaluate what is good, by analyzing what has intrinsic value; and we understand what has intrinsic value, as per my explanation above, by experiencing states and determining whether the state itself compels the valuing of it.

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then?

Ah, I am not intending to use ‘moral’, as the adjective here, in the sense of ‘being good’—as that is circular—but, instead, to denote a sub-type of goodness which pertains to morality.

Moreover, you asked why is intrinsic value morally good? I answered this a while back: it is because moral goodness is identical to ‘having intrinsic value’; and it is identical to it because otherwise goodness pertains to what is and not what should be.

so then a state that can have intrinsic value must be something that is alive

Two things worth noting here:

1. I have altered my understanding of states such that a state which can have intrinsic value is not only states which subjects are capable of experiencing; and

2. Even if I didn’t, it would not follow (from what I said) that alive beings are intrinsically valuable (which is what you said here). Rather, the state, which only an alive being could experience, would be intrinsically valuable.

Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

Correct. This is because the states which have intrinsic value, are only possible for beings which are sufficiently alive.

If only states of life can have value, why?

No. States which are not attributable to beings that are alive can have value—it just isn’t intrinsic. — Bob Ross

There's a bit of a contradiction here. Are you trying to say, "Those with intrinsic value cannot be outright destroyed, but those with value can?" If so, once again, how do we determine value objectively?

I apologize, I read your first quote wrong in haste. Whether or not one should destroy matter which doesn’t affect a life, depends on whether it has value—irregardless of whether it is extrinsic or intrinsic. A state which cannot demand to be valued, could still have value—it would just be endowed to it by a subject (viz., it would be extrinsic value). Extrinsic value is value determined by how well a thing serves a subjective purpose. There isn’t any intrinsic value in a clock; but I nevertheless won’t destroy mine because I value it for telling the time.

No, Kant isn't confused here.

I think Kant is, but I don’t think this is very important to what I am saying. By noting that a thing has value in-itself, I am noting that it has value intrinsic to its nature. I don’t see why our dispute here matters for intents of this conversation: do you deny that we can obtain conditional knowledge of the natures of things? I doubt it.

Bob

Sounds good!

Reading through your critiques of my view of valuableness, I get the feeling you may be making the same conflation between “valuableness” and “what has value”, just like your conflation between “goodness” and “what is good”. “Valuableness” is a property, and thusly does not mention what can be predicated to have it. To evaluate whether something has the property of valuableness, is just to assess that it has worth and not how much; which is to say nothing beyond saying it has value. How much value is not something determinable from the (general) property of valuableness itself: if that were the case, then we would have to posit an infinite amount of properties to account for each value—which is clearly misguided. So, how one can determined the exact value of something, which is an ‘evaluation’ in the sense that you implied, has no bearing on whether or not the property of ‘having value’ is primitive or not because the property will necessarily, even if it could be defined, not contain a means of evaluation but rather is the mere idea of ‘worth’ in general.

Because I genuinely do not understanding what you are claiming is valuableness nor goodness; I am going to refrain on commenting on my objection that valuableness != ‘to ought to be’. Please give me a clear analysis of the following:

1. What is ‘goodness’? NOT MORAL GOODNESS
2. What is ‘moral goodness’?
3. What do you consider to be validly predicated as morally good?
4. What can be predicated as the highest moral good?
5. What is ‘valuableness’? NOT MORAL VALUABLENESS.
6. What is ‘moral valuableness’?

I will answer all 6 for mine now, to provide reciprocal clarity to my position:

1. Goodness = ‘to have value’.
2. Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’.
3. Anything which has intrinsic value—e.g., pain, pleasure, flourishing, happiness, prosperity, etc.
4. Universal flourishing.
5. This is ‘to have worth’, and this is just to reiterate ‘to have value’ with a synonym. The property itself is primitive, and unanalyzable.
6. This subdistinction within the property of valuableness does not exist.

Why should anyone care about what I insist my intrinsic value is?

Whether or not someone should care about what has intrinsic value, does not in takeaway from the fact that it has intrinsic value.

Moreover, that you insist on your own values being imposed on me, is not the same as an innate insistence from a state: the former could be the imposition of extrinsic value, whereas the latter is always the imposition of intrinsic value.

Likewise, why you should care about intrinsic value, is that it is morally good; and if you are a virtuous person of morally good character, then you will. There is nothing that forces, per se, anyone to value anything—but this does not takeaway from the fact that there are moral facts. All you are noting, by asking why anyone should care, is that people can devalue (or not value at all) facts.

A rock can have a state of being.

I wasn’t using ‘state’ this generically, but that is fine. It is fine to think of states as ‘states of being’, for all intents and purposes, and, to that, I would then clarify that the state of being that a rock has does not have intrinsic value because that state is incapable of any innate insistence/demand (of value).

Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

Correct. This is because the states which have intrinsic value, are only possible for beings which are sufficiently alive.

If only states of life can have value, why?

No. States which are not attributable to beings that are alive can have value—it just isn’t intrinsic.

They do not have intrinsic value, because those states do not have the ability (innately) to compel or demand value.

Intrinsic value, is value which is demanded in virtue of the nature of the state: that is a very clear definition. It is value a thing has in-itself; which leads me to give a comment on transcendental idealism:

The chief mistake Kant made, is thinking that because a thing-in-itself is not directly experienced that it cannot be known at all—which is clearly false. Appearences, phenomena, are indirect experience of the things as they are in-themselves, and thusly give conditional knowledge of the nature (the things in-themselves) of the things. In a sentence, he is confusing absolute knowledge with things-in-themselves: no one has to concede that they have absolute knowledge of a thing-in-itself to say they have conditional knowledge of it, by way of theirs senses. Noumena, in the traditional sense before Kant butchered it, was the nature, the in-itself, as it expresses itself in appearances (phenomena): and this is more correct of a way to think about it than Kant’s way.

For example, let’s take your reasoning seriously that a thing-in-itself is unknowable because we only every directly experience a representation of it. Ok. Take an apple, for example: does it have mass in-itself? It seems like it does: every bit of evidence points to that conclusion—but, Kant will insist that we can’t absolutely know it is true, because we only have representations to go off of. That’s fine, Kant; that doesn’t takeaway from the fact that we have good conditional knowledge to claim that the apple itself, which is to immediately discuss as it is in-itself, has mass. See the conflation Kant made?

So, I have no problem analyzing the nature, the essences, of things—which you cannot do if you take your position seriously because the essence doesn’t pertain to mere appearances but, rather, what a thing’s actual properties are as it is in-itself—while conceding I have only conditional knowledge of it.

Even if you disagree, I don’t think this makes a difference for my use of value of a thing in-itself: by ‘in-itself’, I am not referring to absolute knowledge of the nature of a thing, but, rather, conditional knowledge of the nature of a thing. I doubt you deny we can evaluate the natures of things.

Which implies that healthy rational people automatically choose better states. This absolutely begs the question: "Why are healthy and rational people always able to evaluate higher value states 100% of the time?

Begging the question is when one presumes the truth of the conclusion in a premise, and that is not what is happening in your example here. Even if I were claiming that healthy and rational people always recognize intrinsic value 100% of the time (which I am not), that isn’t presupposing that my claim (conclusion), that we should think of what has intrinsic value in terms of value that a rational + healthy person would recognize in that state, is true as its own premise.

Now, I don’t think a rational + healthy person would always 100% of the time recognize that something has intrinsic value but, rather, that 99.99% of the time a rational + healthy person would behave as if it had value when put in that state—and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. Whether they recognize the value, cognitively their faculty of reason, is a separate question; and the answer is the vast majority probably wouldn’t conclude it has intrinsic value; because they don’t know what that means.

Bob

Great response! However, I don't think we are making any real progress, because we are having ~10 discussions about ~10 different subjects at once (:

Therefore, I would like us, if you agree, to dive into one of those subjects; and then move onto the next once we finish (and so on and so forth). I would like to leave it up to you: which major point do you want me to respond to (in depth) first?

Bob

@Corvus

(A -> B) -> (~A -> ~B) is false. "A -> B" is not biconditional implication (i.e., IFF): it means that if A is true, then you can infer B is also true.

If A is false, it is entirely possible for B to be true; because all you know is that when A is true, B is true but not that B can only be true when A is true.

To prove this, flannel jesus, you would need (A <-> B) -> (~A -> ~B).

Great discussion! Unfortunately, as I was parsing your response, I have found it to be going in too many directions for my mind to manage properly. So I have condensed it into the parts I think are most critical to our conversation (so far). Feel free to include more if I have missed something that you deem also critical. Let’s dive in.

Firstly, you demand an analysis of valuableness, and I expected no less. However, I must note that you seem to be conflating this a bit, in the way you were expressing this concern, with an analysis of intrinsic value. I was not intending to give an analysis of valuableness thus far, and am only attempting it for the first time in this discussion right not.

Valuableness in an unanalyzable, primitive property: all that can be described of it is with synonyms (e.g., ‘to be of value is to have worth’, etc.). Now, to substantiate this claim and be brief, I need to (1) demonstrate that your idea of valuableness (as identical to ‘to ought to be’) is a blunder and (2) provide an analogy to another unanalyzable, primitive property that I think you will be able to appreciate.

With respect to #1, it is obvious that valuableness is not identical to ‘to ought to be’ by way of examples (of its valid use). For example, when one says “that diamond is worth $1500”, they are not commenting on whether it should exist per se but, rather, that it has a specific, quantitative worth. In short, it is impossible to convert quantitative values to the property of ‘to ought to be’. Only after a comparison of value, can one determine which things out of the things which have value should exist and, thusly, the two properties are not identical.

With respect to #2, a great example of an unanalyzable and primitive property is ‘beingness’. It is impossible to explain ‘beingness’ without circular reference (e.g., it is ‘to exist’, it is ‘to be’, it is ‘presence’, etc.). There is simply no way to analyze ‘beingness’, and this is because it is so primitive of a property: we can only explain properties by means of other properties when they are not primitive. The primitive ones are what we use to describe the non-primitive ones, leaving us nothing but intuitions to guide us for the former. I submit to you, that ‘valuableness’ is akin to ‘beingness’. We say it is ‘to have worth’, but ‘worth’ is just a synonym for ‘value’; just like ‘being’ is synonym for ‘exist’.

If you cannot grasp, by way of intuition, what ‘beingness’ is, then I simply cannot afford any help other than to cite synonyms for it (e.g., ‘to exist’, ‘to be’, ‘presence’, etc.). Likewise, if you cannot fathom what ‘valuebleness’ is, then I simply cannot afford any help other than synonyms, like ‘it is “to have worth”’.

You find this unsatisfactory, but I urge you to think about ‘beingness’, and see if you feel the same about that property—I doubt it. If you do, then we will just have to agree to disagree on this part; being that we are disputing a primitive property, which makes the dispute very peculiar indeed.

Secondly, I don’t see it as an advantage to posit rights as relativistic. I absolutely agree that our moral principles cannot be absolute; but what it is a right, for it to be a right in the traditional sense, requires that it is irrevocable but does not require us to posit an absolute principle—e.g., the right to life is not the same as the absolute right to live nor the right to everything one needs to stay alive, but this takes nothing away from the fact that the right to life is irrevocable.

Of course, I also agree that we refurbish them; but this is not because the fact of the matter about what is a right has changed but, rather, our understanding of it.

When you relativize rights, you mask mere privileges under the name of something with much more vigor to its name.

Thirdly, you ask for evidence of intrinsic value. I have already given it, but there are some things worth clarifying:

1. You are correct that the nature of a thing demanding value is a personification: I was mistaken on that.

2. When I say a thing demands value, I mean it in the sense of innate insistence.

3. One thing I have failed to mention, is that intrinsic value is only possible for states; because nothing else can provide innate insistence on value. Thusly, to take your rock example, a rock can’t have intrinsic value, simply because it cannot innately compel whatsoever. However, the state of pain can.

4. A very legitimate concern when endeavoring on the discovery of intrinsically valuable states, is how one can safely distinguish the value of a state due to extrinsic vs. intrinsic value; and this I think you have mentioned a couple times (in different words). I answer, to your dissatisfaction, that a rational and healthy person would only be able to superficially deny its value when in that state. This does not beg the question, because I am not presupposing the truth of the conclusion in an (implicit) premise; and it is not confirmation bias because I am not saying that a person is definitely unhealthy or irrational if they deny it in a non-superficial sense: I am saying that, based off of the empirical knowledge on rational + healthy people in such states, it is sufficiently proven that they confirm the value of such states.

Fourthly, you noted the Kantian position on things-in-themselves again; and I wanted to briefly note that I deny that altogether. I think you are conflating absolute truth with things-in-themselves: the former is what you are really arguing is unobtainable (by my lights).

Fifthly:

"Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is".

“what should be” and “what is” are both not properties. You have failed to give an analysis of the property of goodness again. I am assuming, to be charitable, you mean that goodness is identical to ‘to ought to be’. If that is wrong, then please correct me.

Sixthly:

Explicated and identified Good = moral value

&

I have the answer of what a value is (what should be)

I am not following. First, I thought you were saying ‘goodness’ is ‘to ought to be’; now you seem to be agreeing with me it is ‘to have value’. You have also said

Good = "what should be"

but now are saying it is “moral value”: which is it?

Are you saying ‘to ought to be’ and ‘having value’ are identical?

Then, to make matters more confusing, you have also said that

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is

: that implies you need to determine the value of a thing before you can determine whether it ought to be, but you have also indicated (above) that what is good is both ‘to have value’ and ‘to ought to be’ which indicates they are simultaneous judgments one would make.

Seventhly, morality does not boil down to the question of “should there be existence?”, nor is that a moral foundation. A moral foundation is the core of an ethical theory, and that is going to be, in any good theory, an outline of the hierarchy (i.e., the ontology) of things with intrinsic value.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

We don't exactly get to tell a hungry lion, "I have a right to life." No one is there to care.

That one has a right, is different than whether anyone else recognizes it.

Its the right of a society of 1.

A right is innate to a person, if one admits that it applies even if there is one person left: saying there is a “society of 1” is confused language for “one individual”.

But if they are societally objective, as in these rights to individuals improve and strengthen societies more than those who do not have them by fact, then there is data for one society to point to.

This gets you out of the first objection, but not the second: a right is something which cannot be violated in any circumstances. Within your idea of a right, it is something that can be taken away in various circumstances where it benefits the society (e.g., sacrificing one innocent citizen to save 1,000,000 citizens)—that is what is normally called a privilege.

I believe your real issue is that in both cases, these things are determined by societies and not any one individual

It is more than that though: if the society needs to violate one citizen’s rights to save itself, then, unless I am misunderstanding, in your view that is morally permissible (at best) and obligatory (at worst). It is not a right if it can be taken away: that’s a privilege.

How would you define a right then?

A ‘right’ is an innate and unalienable entitlement to be in (or not in) certain states (and, consequently, to be permitted [or not permitted] to perform certain actions which do not [or do] violate those entitlements).

Our difference, is that you consider entitlements to always be created by societies; whereas, I think societies create laws to uphold entitlements, of which are derived from innate features of the ‘thing’ which is entitled.

Your ‘rights’ are alienable; mine are not.

For example, it does not matter if me sacrificing you could save the entire rest of my city: you have a right to life, being that you have not forfeited that right (either voluntarily or by way of violating someone else’s rights), and I cannot violate that to save my city. Your right is unalienable: it is not something I can decide, upon the circumstances, to (validly) revoke.

You have to understand that in 'the traditional sense' we have not had an objective morality

There has never been, to my knowledge, a society which was predicated off of the use of moral anti-realism: they have always been forms of ‘objective morality’.

You may not found their versions of ‘objective morality’ compelling or true; but it is a misconstrual to think society has, by-at-large, been operating in institutionalized moral anti-realism: people are largely moral realists, and laws are derived, historically, from what has been considered moral fact.

robbing someone is generally bad because of the expected outcome.

Then, under your view, robbing someone isn’t wrong in-itself; because you are not looking at the nature of the action but, instead, looking at its consequences. I think the nature of the action demonstrates sufficiently that it is wrong to do.

True, but it must be objectively demonstrated why robbery is bad in itself. I haven't seen that yet in a way that isn't subjective.

It is wrong in-itself because it is a form of depravity and a violation of a person: that why it is generally held by people, even throughout history, as morally (factually) wrong.

More specifically, under my theory, the reason depravity and the violation of a person in this sense (of robbery) is wrong, is because it is anti-thetical to universal flourishing—which is what has the most intrinsic value.

I can objectively conclude robbing others is generally bad due to probability.

I don’t see how the probability would not be 100% that it is wrong: the nature of the crime is itself immoral. That’s like saying rape is sometimes good, because there isn’t a 100% probability of it being bad: the nature of the crime is abhorrent, irregardless of what consequences may be brought about by committing it (in each circumstance).

My overall point is that if intentions are good in themselves regardless of the outcome, then logically we can create a situation in which an intention always has a negative outcome and yet it would be considered moral.

I didn’t understand this part. An intention can be bad, and its nuanced consequences good; and vice-versa. This makes sense to me: are you contending with that?

Now, on to answering your questions about my theory.

By ‘objective value’, I am assuming you mean value which is objective; and this is not synonymous with intrinsic value per se. Any value which is objective, is just any value which exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter (whether it has such value) is stance-independent. Where intrinsic value ties in, is that it is the only possible form of ‘objective value’ because it is the only type of value which is inscribed, so to speak, on the thing per its nature: it is the only form of value that is of the thing in-itself. The only other option is extrinsic value, that it is obvious why that is not objective.

Now, my view allows for value, which is intrinsic, that is not merely an axiological judgment made by a subject: intrinsic value is embedded, superveniently, in the thing which has it. Whether or not a subject values it, is independent of the truth of the matter of whether or not it has value.

A useful way of thinking about intrinsic value, by my lights, is that the thing which has it demands recognition as valuable; and that is how one can decipher whether or not one simply values the thing because of their own (cognitive or conative) disposition, or whether it has actual value. I do not mean ‘demands’ in a personified sense.

A great example is the pain example, but I have already explicated that one; so I will leave it there.

In an abstract armchair sense of 'people will always choose the more positive state', it sounds good. In reality, people aren't like that. Many people choose the state that we we would consider less valuable.

This isn’t a contention with anything I said, and I wholly agree. Some people simply lack the cognitive ability, or the wisdom, to see that the state is better; and some are so defective or damaged that they no longer can recognize it, even though they could have earlier in their life.

Your mother is a great example (and by the way, I am sorry to hear that your parents were addicts and I hope that they both find a way to beat it!): the addiction of alchohol, like many drug addictions, is so damaging, after a long time of abuse [of it], that it negatively affects the person into yearning for it over and over again. This does not mean that the state they are in is the most valuable, nor that it has intrinsic value (in a positive or negative sense).

My point was that, in isolation, and reasonably healthy and intelligent person will not be able to deny the value of a state that has (negative or positive) intrinsic value if put in that state. Of course, if you put a defective person, a damaged person, a really cognitively impaired person, in such a state, then we would not expect them to fully grasp that state properly (due to their condition).

Now, on to your analysis of goodness.

1. Good = "what should be" A clear definition.

“Good” is not a property. Your definition needs to of the form “goodness is <insert-definition-here>”. Likewise, “what should be” is not a property. Thusly, you have not analyzed the property of goodness whatsoever in making this remark.

To be charitable, let’s just say you mean that “goodness is ‘to ought to exist’”. Ok, let’s break this down.

The first issue with this was, interestingly enough, already explicated by you:

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is

If:

1. the property of goodness is not ‘being valuable’; and
2. one needs to know the value of what is to know what to predicate as ‘”oughting” to exist’; and
3. you reject the idea of intrinsic value

Then what can be predicated as good under your view is dependent on subjective dispositions because what is valuable is always extrinsic.

The second problem with this is that, on a similar note, what we determine as good is relative to what is valuable; and it seems incorrect to posit vice-versa (or something else entirely). One cannot tell what ‘should be’ without ‘what is valuable’; but, of course, I guess, depending on how you hash out the terminology, there may be a coherent way to posit ‘goodness’ as ‘to ought to be’--I just don’t see it.

The third problem is that by ‘goodness’ I am assuming you mean ‘moral goodness’ with your definition, and the property of ‘to ought to be’ is not a purely objective analysis and, consequently, your view of moral goodness is not solely about what might be objective.

With mine, on the other hand, moral goodness is ‘to have intrinsic value’, and so it is always an objective matter of dispute what is morally good; with respect to how you defined it, that is not the case. Disputes about what ought to be by means of subjective dispositions are still about what is morally good under your metaethical view of ‘goodness’.

Existence should be is logically concluded as being the most reasonable conclusion when faced with our limitations. So existence has the property of being good.

Your argument here is:

If it is most reasonable to conclude that something should exist, then it should exist.

This is not morally objective at all, because it does not reference any sort of objective value nor normativity. One can simply deny it without violating any objective value nor normativity.

On the other hand, a claim like:

If something has intrinsic value, then it should be.

This is morally objective, because what is intrinsically valuable is a matter of objective dispute; and should is entailed from value. To contrast, if I were to say:

If something has value, then it should be.

This is not expressing anything normatively objective specifically; because it entirely possible to value something extrinsically.

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. What does [than ...] mean?

I added in ‘[than ...]’ because your original formulation of ‘more existence’ doesn’t make literal sense: ‘more’ implies a comparison—so I added in a filler [than …].

Bob

:up:

Vehemently disagree, but I also have no idea how I would enunciate why. I don't think he did philosophy. I do not take Shakespeare to be a philosopher, either.
…
Nietzsche would be analogous to something more like Sunday school, in my eyes. Interesting ways to teach children fairly obviously co-operative strategies.

What books have you read of Nietzsche?

Perhaps I should elaborate more on the difference between answering "what can be considered good?" and "what is [the property of] goodness?".

When one says "this car is red", they do not mean to explain anything about the property of redness; but, rather, that the car has such a property. It is still perfectly valid to ask: "what is redness?".

When one says "more existence is good", they do not mean to explain anything about the property of goodness; but, rather, that "more existence" has such a property. It is still perfectly valid to ask: "what is goodness?".

Your theory presupposes a property of goodness, of which your analysis (so far) is the discovery of what can be predicated to have such a property, but, interestingly, doesn't give any analysis of the property itself--it is merely a presupposed, notional, property that is utilized for the rest of the analysis.

Now, instead of meaning "more existence is good" in an analogous sense to "this car is red", you may mean it as an identity relation---that 'is good' here refers to "goodness is identical to the property of 'having more existence' [or something like that]" (i.e., goodness = having more existence). I think there are good reasons to believe that goodness cannot be reduced to such a claim.

Firstly, goodness, then, would not be normative; because it only refers to whether something has or does not have 'more existence' than some other possibility. This transitions ethics into a science of what is, and not what should be.

Secondly, it doesn't seem correct that "having more existence [than ...] is to have more existence [than ...]" is identical in meaning to "to be good is to have more existence [than ...]": the latter seems to add something extra, in meaning, by denoting what is good as opposed to expressing a tautology. It is important to note that, if a property is identical to goodness, then the sentence that expresses a tautology [of the property] must be identical to a sentence that expresses the property as goodness---and this is true because they are (supposed to be) identical, which makes them interchangeable.

Just something to think about (;

Bob

I need to define society. A society occurs when there is more than one person involved.

Ok, I was using society in the sense of an institutionalized state.

Rights only come about with the interplay of the individual and societies

They are only explicated in societies. You still have a right to life even if you are the only human left.

If we are talking universal rights, yes. Because what we also must consider is the interplay between societies.

The interplay of societies doesn’t imply rights in the sense that you have set up: if the societies determine rights, then two societies which are not subsumed under another, larger society would have no way to resolve any disputes between society members of one vs. the other.

Privileges are permissions from society. Rights are restrictions on society.

If society is making up rights, then they are also permissions.

I think your main issue is that I've noted society is the one that grants rights, and you see that no different than granting privileges except by degree. The point I'm trying to make is a right is a restriction on society that provably benefits it overall. So even if a society does not grant free speech for example, it would be better overall if it did grant such a right.

Correct. A ‘right’ in the traditional sense of the word does not exist in your view; and both what you call a ‘privilege’ and a ‘right’ are subcategories of what I would call ‘privileges’.

You have removed the possibility of having rights despite what one’s society considers a right.

What do you mean 'all else being equal'? That doesn't convey anything to me in this sentence.

It means ‘excluding all other factors [than what was explicated in the sentence]’.

Right, but why was your intention bad? With my answer, its easy to understand. Lets say that 99% of attempted robberies result in harm. Just because this 1% resulted in something good, doesn't suddenly make attempting to rob people a good intention. This is about expected results.

It is bad because it violates a general moral principle that robbery is (generally) wrong. It is generally wrong, because it is morally bad, when analyzed in isolation, to rob someone. Why this is the case will depend on the ethical theory in play.

It isn’t about what one expects to happen if people start robbing by-at-large per se, although that is relevant too, but, rather, about whether or not robbery is bad in-itself. If robbery is bad in-itself, then an intention to do it is bad.

When they get angry and explain that it is also an insult, I insist that I will continue to the use the word as my principle demands that I use 'sir' when talking to people

This is just a conflation of words, and not an absurd insistence on one’s duty to a principle. The principle would be ‘one should be polite’, not ‘one should say the word ‘sir’, specifically in English’.

Without outcomes to measure intentions, there's nothing to back 'what is virtuous' besides subjective op
inion

What backs it is if the action is virtuous or not. Whether it is virtuous depends on moral principles.

I admit to a little confusion. How is pointing out "The Good" missing an analysis of The Good?

“The Good” refers to what can be predicated to be good (i.e., what has the property of goodness) in a supreme and ultimate sense (viz., the highest good); whereas ‘goodness’ is the property being predicated to “The Good”.

When you say “existence is good”, you are saying “one can validly predicate ‘existence’ with the property of ‘goodness’”. It is still an entirely valid question to ask: “what is ‘goodness’?”.

The Good and goodness are not the same thing.

To be objective, you need a solid foundation. What is objective value? What determines value?

Not at all. To be objective, is to exist mind-independently. Goodness is identical to ‘having value’ because that is, at its core, what the ‘being good’ is about. An easy way to demonstrate this, is to think of what ethics, axiology, and pragmatism would be if it had nothing to do with value: it would be merely about what is and not what ought to be—and this is a fundamental shift from what the studies traditionally are about.

“Objective value” is just intrinsic value; for it is the only type of value which a thing can have in-itself. The other option is extrinsic value, and this is not itself objective.

If I'm going to get surgery, feeling the pain from the knife serves no purpose at that point.

The point is that, all else being equal, avoiding pain has value in-itself.

But this is not intrinsic value, but extrinsic value. If something motivates you to do something that is good, it is good in virtue of its ultimate outcome, not good merely in itself.

The value is intrinsic, because it is value a thing has in-itself. Another way to describe it, is that intrinsic value is value which if a thing has it will be value demanded solely due to its nature.

The fact that someone can be motivated to value or not value it, is not relevant itself to whether the thing demands to be value because it has intrinsic worth.

Why is flourishing valuable?

It is intrinsically valuable, because, as per its nature, it demands value. Which can be easily understood when one is in such a state.

My mother desires pleasure far more than flourishing.

Flourishing has more intrinsic value than pleasure, and this can be demonstrated with a hypothetical.

Imagine two states that your mother could be in. The first is constant pleasure obtained by being an alcoholic. The second is a persistent state of flourishing, happiness, and prosperity.

She may say, without being put in both states (to compare), that she prefers the first; but really, the second is better. And she would realize that if she were put in the second.

Are we saying my mother determines value? Or is there a value beyond a person's personal desires? If so, what objectively determines that value?

Intrinsic value is objective. She does not determine whether or not a state of flourishing has intrinsic value nor how much.

How is it undeniable? Where is the proof?

It is impossible to non-superficially deny the value of a state that has intrinsic value when they are in that state: it is, of course, easy to say when not in the state.

That's a fine opinion, but not an objective argument.

I don’t see how it isn’t an objective argument; insofar as the argument demonstrates (to my satisfaction) that morality is objective, and The Good is universal flourishing.

There are a lot of assumptions here that need clear answers.

In a trivial sense, of course. I can’t write an 800 page book as my response (:

Besides that, what assumptions?

My question is what is objective value, and why is flourishing part of that objective value?

“Objective value” is another phrase for ‘intrinsically valuable’; and flourishing has intrinsic value because the state demands to be valued in virtue of its nature, and this is hard to demonstrate if you haven’t experienced it—this is an empirical claim, and not something abstract.

Of course, because your criteria for goodness is mutual flourishing.

No. Goodness is not ‘mutual flourishing’, let alone ‘flourishing’. Goodness is the property of ‘having value’.

Well done Bob, I'm enjoying digging into these ideas.

You too, my friend!

Bob

A 'right' would be a limitation on society that has been deemed to be of greater benefit for the individual to have for the benefit of society

Under your definition, then, people who are not a part of a society do not have the right to life nor bodily autonomy.

I would say that rights are innate. It is a mistake to think of rights as relative to societies, because they are then subject to the whims of the society and not subject to what is good (morals).

It may be for the benefit of one society to persecute and enslave outside members, whether they be a member of another society or not, and I would say that this still violates their rights.

Also, I would consider your definition to be a form of privileges, because it makes no difference to me if society is constraining themselves from doing something to the individual or allowing the individual to do things—and, as a matter of fact, they sound like essentially the same thing: an allowance requires others to constrain themselves insofar as they cannot violate what has been allowed.

Everyone is someone's son/daughter. How many parents would want justice or revenge? Society runs on trust.

This is a perfectly fair point, and I see why you would conclude this in your theory. I think that, still your view also agrees (along with what you said here above) that all else being equal it is better to save the 5 by sacrificing the 1. I don’t think we are going to progress anywhere on this point, but it was worth mentioning that the two claims are perfectly compatible with each other.

Why is the intention, not the result, good? Can this be proven?

I agree that results (consequences) can be good or bad, as I am not a deontologist, but the point is that intentions are also either good or bad. Whether the intention is good or bad is completely despite any consequences that my be brought about.

For example, if I intend to rob someone and end up accidentally saving their life, then my intention was bad and the consequences of my actions was good. If one is only evaluating how good or bad intentions are relative to the consequences (actualizing it) brings about, then there is no room to declare the intention bad in this case: the intention of robbing them was good. This is obviously wrong.

The intentions and consequences matter; hence why I am not a consequentialist nor a deontologist.

I have a hunch that you do not mean ‘consequentialism’ in the traditional sense of the term, and probably agree with me on these points.

They have a choice to torture or not torture Billy; but the reason Dave should not torture billy is certainly should not be relative to what else they could be doing — Bob Ross

Under this theory, it certainly is. Can you explain in this moral theory why its not?

If whether it is immoral to torture billy is undefined without explicating all possible skills Dave could be acquiring instead, then something is very wrong with your theory.

Honestly, I am not going to go into detail, because I think you simply aren’t appreciating what ‘excluding all other variables’ means.

The word 'seeming' implies its an inductive reason.

A seeming is not an induction, and seeming is a grasping of something. It could seem to be correct to induce or abduce X, but the seeming is not identical to the induction or abduction itself.

I don't think there's any 'seeming' to it. 1+3=1 is just objectively wrong. This phrase seems confusing at best and unnecessary at worst. Is there anything this phrase serves that cannot be conveyed using common language?

The difference between an ‘intellectual seeming’ and ‘feeling’ serves the purpose of distinguishing a cognitive grasping of something vs. having a particular feeling towards it.

Let’s take a different example that may suffice to elaborate. Imagine you get up in the morning, walk into the bathroom, and start brushing your teeth. The question pops into your head: “am I in a simulation?”. You conclude: “Nah, it seems like, given my experience and knowledge, I am not in a simulation, although it is actually and logically possible.”. This abduction is your reasoning, sherlock-holmes style, about the information you have that makes you conclude that your aren’t in a simulation; and the seeming is that you find the abduction valid and correct: it seems right that this abduction demonstrates that you are not in a simulation.

EDIT:

Silly me forgot to completely convey the point. Imagine that I added to the hypothetical that you really wanted to be in a simulation: would that change that it seems to you that you are not in one? Of course not.

Oh, please do! I understand the respect here, and yes, feel free to give your own moral conclusions and why you believe they are objectively true.

I shall indulge myself then, and briefly explain my theory and apply to an example.

Firstly, when analyzing morals, it is chiefly important to understand the an analysis of ‘what is good’ is split into two main subsections: (1) an analysis of the nature [of the property of] goodness, and (2) what can be predicated to be good. Most people skip #1 and go straight to #2, it causes all sorts of problems.

For example, I, with all due respect, consider your theory to be making such a mistake (of skipping #1): when you declare, even if I were to grant it as true, that “existence is good”, I do not take you to mean that “[the property of] goodness is identical to [the property of] beingness” but, rather, that “what can be predicated as good, in a supreme and ultimate sense, and of which all other ‘things’ which could be predicated as good are good, is existence [or, if you like, more existence]”. Such a statement says nothing about what goodness actually is, but rather what can be said to ultimately be good. Your is missing an analysis of the nature of goodness: it only covers, at best, The Good.

For me, I will briefly say that goodness, in my theory, is identical to ‘having value’ and moral goodness is identical to ‘having intrinsic value’. I will leave out the details on why for now.

‘What is good’ in the sense of ‘what can be predicated as being good?’, in my theory, is thusly identical to asking “what can be predicated as being intrinsically valuable?”. To answer, I am required to give an analysis of intrinsic value.

To keep things brief, I consider ‘intrinsic value’ to be value which is demanded by the ‘thing’ in virtue of its nature: it is value which can be ignored or denied, but only superficially. A great example (to initially convey the point) is pain: pain has intrinsic value (in the sense of avoiding it) insofar as one can superficially say or feel that “avoiding pain is not valuable” but when put in a state of serious pain it is undeniable that it there is value (all else being equal) in avoiding it . It is hard, in an active state of pain, to actually believe that the avoidance of it has no value: this kind of demand from the nature of the ‘thing’ is what I mean by ‘intrinsic value’. Now, it is common to take the analogy too far, and conclude that pleasure and pain are themselves, beings intrinsically valuable, are The Good: this is a mistake. There are states which demand more value which, if grasped by the person, can lead one to overcome (some or even all) pain or pleasure to acquire it; and the end result is far better than mere avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure. An easy example of this is Aristotle’s eudamonia (i.e., ‘flourshing’ or ‘happiness’, as roughly translated): for one to truly flourish, they must overcome and even volunteer to be in pain or give up pleasure. This state is, when properly understood, more demanding of value in the sense that it, when compared to other states (such as a state of pain), is even more difficult to deny the value of it (over other states [such as a state of pain or pleasure]). A person can easily say “this pleasure I am currently having, albeit it fleeting and swift, is more valuable than a state of supreme flourishing”, but if that person were put in such a state of (supreme) flourishing (viz., they had a deep sense of fullfilment, their goals were being realized, they were optimally mentally and physically healthy, they had loving relationships with others, etc.) then it is hard to imagine, if that person has reasonably sufficient cognitive capacities, they could genuinely deny its superior value (over that pain or pleasure): if they did, then it would be very superficial of a denial indeed. Now, although eudamonia (i.e., ‘flourishing’ or ‘happiness’) is intrinsically valuable, it is not The Good. Just like how it may be hard to understand how more demanding (of value) flourishing is over pursuing pleasure but, nevertheless, if one were placed in such a state their denial (of the supremacy of such a state) would be superficial, so it is when one who is taken out of a state of flourishing and put in situation wherein there are mutually, harmonized flourishing between subjects. For example, if one who has achieved an optimal state of flourishing must relinquish or sacrifice some of it, or even most of it, to help them and another achieve mutually beneficial flourishing, then this will be an undeniably better state than the first. One can deny it, but have a person who was alone in their flourishing achieve mutual flourishing with another, and this achieved state will demand recognition as better than the first—any denial of it is superficial. In fact, one can abstract these movements of reason, as exemplified in my examples, until they get to one supreme state (of which nothing can be demanded with more vigor): universal flourishing.

The Good, in my theory, is thusly universal flourishing (which relates very closely to universal harmony).

This theory, since it posits the The Good as universal flourishing, is not subjective: whether or not a ‘thing’ is flourishing is not stance-dependent—it is not dependent on conative nor cognitive dispositions. There is a fact of the matter, and we can investigate and acquire these facts because moral judgments are cognitive and some are true. Therefore, this is a form of moral realism.

Let’s take the Dave example to illustrate one difference between our views. In your view, whether or not it is immoral to torture Billy to acquire the skill of torturing is undefined; in mine, it is immoral, because torturing a person for the sake of acquiring a skill does not uphold nor progress towards a state of mutual flourishing between them.

This is getting long, so I will stop here (;

Bob