Hello Janus,

The reflected light still enters the eyes, stimulates the rods and cones, leading to neural signals travelling to the brain and stimulating the visual cortex, but there is no subjective awareness of seeing.

I don’t see, upon looking at the empirical experiments of blindsight people, why one would conclude that they no longer qualitatively experience. Just because they don’t identify as seeing doesn’t mean that they aren’t still having it.

All those processes I just outlines are quantitative processes, equivalent in a way to the operation of a camera. You can keep asserting that it is the case that there is qualitative seeing, but I'm not seeing any explanation from you that could convince me of that.

To me, long story short, I believe that other people are typically qualitatively experiencing and unless there’s evidence that a given person isn’t having that then I default to saying they do. Kind of like how I believe that everyone (that is a live) has a beating heart, and unless there’s evidence that a given person doesn’t then I default to saying they do.

Yes you can account for awareness with such quantitative processes, but you can’t quantitatively account for qualitative experience, which to me is “consciousness”, and so I think your approach is flawed. I don’t think you should be metaphysically viewing the scenario as if their qualitative experience is reducible to a quantitative brain.

There is no reason to think that there are not many things in your visual field right now that you are not aware of at all, even though the light from those things is being reflected into your eye and neural signals are being received by your visual cortex. I don't think it makes any sense at all to call all that visual data we are not aware of "qualitative seeing".

This is what I was referring to: qualitative experience is not only what ‘bubbles up’ to the ego. Take breathing: even if you didn’t have introspective access to your experience of your breathing (because you weren’t focusing on it), that doesn’t mean that you aren’t still qualitatively experiencing the breathing.

We can be self-reflective on the small percentage of the overall visual data we have been consciously or unconsciously aware of

Then you agree that qualitative experience (i.e., consciousness) extends beyond what we can self-reflect upon and introspectively access?

but since there is no recall at all the experience os seeing I just don't see any way in which it could make sense to call it qualitiative.

This doesn’t work: think of a squirrel. It has virtually 0 introspective and self-reflective access to its own qualitative experience: is it thereby not qualitatively experiencing? Of course not! The squirrel cannot recall its experiences of seeing—does that mean it isn’t experiencing qualitatively? Of course not!

Introspective and self-reflective access are extra aspects of consciousness and do not belong to concsiousness proper.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I feel your definition is not concise enough to give a clear and unambiguous identity. "something it is like to have it in and of itself" is too many words. I can't make sense of it.

No worries. You can think of it like this:

So if I'm seeing, I'm not trying to describe or identify what I'm seeing, I'm just in the moment per say.

The sense of sight (as a qualitative experience) has something it is like in and of itself. In other words, even if I don’t understand that I am qualitatively seeing, there is still something it is like for me to be qualitatively seeing.

"What it is like to have experience". Now, I'm not saying that was your intention, but it was the closest I could get to with the definition.

I think for now this is ok, but I have a feeling I may end up disagreeing depending on how you tie it to the blindsight example.

What I was noting is that there didn't seem to be a discernible difference between qualitative experience and qualia.

The only difference is that the qualia is the instance of it:

I tried to pare this down again. "Qualia is just a stream of qualities that we experience. This is not just any experience though, but experience that we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives".

In other words, your qualitative experience is really a steady flow of experiences with no distinct boundaries between them; and you single out, or carve out, experiences to compare to others nominally. For example, you get a cut and feel the pain, but that feeling of pain isn’t truly separable from your vision that you are having at the time, your thoughts, etc.--it is a steady stream of them all globbed together. Nevertheless, it is certainly meaningful to focus on the pain and try to come up with a solution to resolve it—but the qualitative pain is a part of a mush of a steady stream of qualitative experience. Does that make sense?

Do we give attention to certain experience over others?
…
Or is this about definitions/identities we create out of the stream of experience we have?

I would say both. We have the ability to focus our attention and cognitively assess our experiences, and those are likewise experiences of their own. When we focus on the pain, or we assess “that we are in pain” (as a thought), we are singling out a portion of a inextricable whole of qualitative experience.

"Qualia is what its like to experience". Is this right?

I would say that “there is something it is like to qualitatively experience, and qualia are the singled-out instances thereof (e.g., the feeling of pain)”. I think that’s generally what you are trying say here, but I wanted to be clear.

This leaves me now with a question of what quantitative experience is. I'm going to confess something. Words which have the first few letters the same as another are something my brain easily mixes up. I looked back briefly and am not sure that I did not accidently do that between the words quantitative and qualitative. It is something I've worked on a long time, but I still slip up occasionally.

Absolutely no worries my friend!

So I want to bring back the discussion to quantitative for a second. If a quantitative experience is an experience, is there something that has that experience? For lack of a better term, this would be an "unconscious experience"?

There is nothing it is like to have unconscious experience because it isn’t qualitative; and I think this is where we begin to disagree. You would say that a camera + AI (or what have you) has something it is like to be it, but to me that is only the case with qualitative experience—instances of which are qualia.

Think of it this way, although a crude and oversimplified example, if you flick a domino to start a 1,000,000 domino chain of them hitting each other one-by-one, there is nothing it is like to be those dominos hitting each other. They just hit each other: they are unconscious.

An “unconscious experiencer”, like an AI, is just a more complex version of this: it is mechanical parts hitting each other or transferring this or that—it is quantitative through-and-through just like the domino’s hitting each other. There is nothing it is like to be an AI in the sense like there is something to be like a qualitative experiencer: qualia (in the sense of instances of qualitative experience) have a “special” property of there being something it is like to be it (or perhaps to have it).

In the case of blindsight, the person would unconsciously see the object, but has no actual qualia, or conscious experience of doing so.

In terms of my view, I disagree. The blindsight person still qualitatively experiences (in this case sees) but they have lost the extra ability to understand that they are experiencing. Just like a squirrel, there is still something it is like to view the world through their experiential, qualitative sense of sight. Under my view, they don’t need to the extra cognitive or introspective access to their qualitative experience to be classified as qualitatively experiencing.

Under your view, I think you are saying that they have lost their qualitative experiencing, which I am not following why you think that. But that is what I am understanding you to be saying.

Qualia/qualitative experience is simply subjective consciousness while quantitative analysis is simply objective consciousness. There's really no difference between them

I was so close to agreeing with you here! But the last sentence through me off: there’s a big difference between them. If objective consciousness gives you only knowledge of quantitative experiencers, then you have no reason to believe that they have qualitative experience like yourself. That’s what I meant by there being no bridge between these two concepts of yours whereof you could safely connect them as two epistemic sides of the same coin.

Likewise, if you can’t know anything about other people than objective consciousness, then you are admitting that you cannot resolve the hard problem: you cannot reduce your own subjective consciousness to the quantitative brain because that requires the same objective consciousness inquiry that you agree only gets you to a PZ. So you can’t account for your subjective consciousness as reducible to some sort of objective consciousness.

Also, it wouldn’t make sense (to me) to try to reduce the quantitative to the qualitative, but that’s what is required if you are going to claim that subjective consciousness is produced by the brain.

Here’s where I get confused. You first agree with me that you can’t account for any sort of qualitative experience about other people:

When you say we can tell objectively that a being observes, identifies, and acts upon its environment, you are describing a quantitative being through-and-through (or at least that is the conceptual limit of your argument: it stops at identifying Pzs)--not any sort of qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

Yes, I agree with this fully.

And then immediately thereafter say:

Quantitative analysis (Objective consciousness) occurs when we can know that something that is not our qualia is also experiencing qualia with identification.

If you actually agree that your objective analysis of consciousness doesn’t provide insight into qualitative experience, then you can’t know that other people (through identification) are also experiencing qualia.

The problem in knowing whether something is qualitatively conscious is that we cannot experience their qualia.

And here is the conflation: again, there is a difference between not knowing their qualia (i.e., knowing how they experience their qualia) and knowing that they experience qualia. You can’t prove either of those, and sentences like the above quote make me think that you think the hard problem only applies to the former.

Quantitative consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify

I don’t have a problem with using action, identification, and observance to determine if something is unconsciously experiencing: but this says nothing about “consciousness” in the sense of qualitative experience, and that’s all that matters for the hard problem.

So there we go, in the end we went about defining a few terms which are semantically no different from one another. :)

We are definitely getting closer, that is for sure (;

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

Let me clarify my terminology with more technical verbiage as, although I do think we are progressing, I think we are (1) using the terms differently and (2) our usages thereof still contain nuggets of vagueness.

Also, you brought up some good points, and I just wanted to recognize that: you are genuinely the only other person on this forum that I have discussed with that forces me to produce razor thin precision with my terminology—and that is a good thing! The more rigorous the discussion, the better the views become.

To better relate the terms together, in contradistinction to how you use them and to shed light on some of the issues I have with your view, I am going to revert back to ‘qualia’ being best defined as ‘instances of qualitative experience’; but by ‘qualitative experience’ I would like to include in the definition the property of there being ‘something it is like to have it in and of itself’.

I think this fits more what I am trying to convey, as I think you are thinking that ‘qualitative experience’ and ‘qualia’ are two separate things: the former being non-quantitative experience and the latter being a ‘mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. Consequently, I think you view the hard problem as pertaining to the latter and not the former; whereas, I am trying to convey that the hard problem pertains to both.

Within my terms, non-quantitative experience (i.e., the experience of qualities) is necessarily coupled with the property of there being something it is like to have it in and of itself. For you, I think your argument only works if you deny this claim.

If I see something qualitatively (viz., non-quantitatively), then I would say that there is necessarily something it is like in and of itself to see that something (in that manner as a stream of qualities). So, to clarify, ‘qualia’ is just an instance of a stream of qualities that we experience which we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives; and the experience of the stream of qualities has of its own accord the property of something it is like to have such. For me, the qualitative seeing of the green apple is inextricable from there being something it is like to qualitatively see the green apple: I anticipate you denying this claim.

In terms of ‘sensations’, I only hold they are qualitative if we are talking about a fundamentally qualitative world, which would entail a mind-dependent world, and not a mind-independent one. If we are talking about a world that is mind-independent (such as being fundamentally matter and energy) then I think, to be consistent to that view, there are fundamentally no qualities: it only exists with the emergent property of our minds from our brains. Our nerves, for example, although from our qualitative experience seem to be gathering qualitative senses, are really taking in objectively quantifiable measurements—there’s no quantities there.

In terms of ‘perceptions’, I am still referring to our mind’s (or I think in your case: our brain’s) interpretation of those sensations (which are quantitative or qualitative depending on the aforesaid factors).

By “consciousness”, then, I am referring to ‘qualitative experience’ which, I will stress, includes the property of ‘there being something it is like to have such in and of itself’.

You didn't answer my question about the difference between conscious and unconscious either.

I apologize: I must have forgotten! By “unconscious”, I mean something which is not ‘qualitatively experiencing’ (e.g., a camera taking in light and processes the environment in the form of a picture).

In every normal case of those words, we would say that what is qualitative can be received unconsciously, but what is qualia is what is received consciously.

Agreed, because “consciousness” colloquially is used very loosely. However, I must stress that there is nothing qualitative (in terms of sensations) being received by your body (and ultimately processed by the brain) if the brain is producing the mind: the qualities that you observe are soley within your conscious experience as an emergent property of a quantitative brain and body. The world, according to that view, and correct me if you disagree, would be purely ontologically quantitative. The qualities simply aren’t there—they only exist within the emergent minds.

Are we saying then an unconscious being has qualia?

I think my attempt to refurbish the terminology created some confusion: I apologize. To answer: no. An unconscious being is purely made up of quantitative, physical stuff and never comes in contact with qualities.

A P zombie would be completely qualitative right? It would have to see and act upon different stimuli. If you start to say that qualitative processing is also qualia, then is a P zombie a conscious being? Because we would be saying there is something it is like to have such in and of itself.

I am saying that the PZ doesn’t qualitatively experience and its sensory inputs do not take in qualities—it is quantitative through and through; and, consequently, there is nothing it is like in and of itself for its experiences.

and you already said that we can match the brain to qualitative experience. Which means we've now associated brain states directly with subjective experience. If it can observe, identify, and this is confirmed in its actions, we just say its a qualitative analysis or objective consciousness that doesn't concern itself with any other type of qualia.

Saying we can “match” and “associate” brain states and mental states doesn’t mean that the former produces the latter. When you say we can tell objectively that a being observes, identifies, and acts upon its environment, you are describing a quantitative being through-and-through (or at least that is the conceptual limit of your argument: it stops at identifying Pzs)--not any sort of qualitative experience.

I think if you are going to claim there is a bridge between “objective” and “subjective” conscious, then you will have to prove that the former gives us knowledge of a being qualitatively experiencing as opposed to merely observing, identifying, and acting.

So, in short:

Objectively, subjective consciousness is explained by brain states.

You have an explantory gap between the objective and subjective aspects, since objectively you are only talking about quantitative measurements and nothing qualitative. The hard problem is about how we have qualities at all that get produced by the brain, and an inextricable aspect of that is that the streams of qualities have in and of itself something it is like to have such.

This is a very real problem you'll need to address Bob. If there's no difference between qualitative and qualia beyond qualitative being a specific type of qualia, then it doesn't disprove my argument. The "subjective consciousness" of higher qualia that you note would still just be qualia. If the qualitative is just a form of qualia, brain scans can explain qualitative actions, therefore qualia.

I am not saying that qualitative experience is a type of qualia. And to clarify this, let me start here:

Self-reflection is also qualia. I don't understand how its not

Self-reflection, such as introspection and cognition, are also qualia; but my point was that the self-reflective thought “I am seeing the color red” is not the same as the qualia it is referencing, which is what I thought you were talking about. They are both a part of qualitative experience. Likewise, I was trying to note (way back when) to the fact that having a qualia in the form of a thought does not mean that you are qualitatively experiencing qualitative experience: it doesn’t double up like that (which is what you were saying about meta-consciousness). Meta-consciousness is a higher order aspect of consciousness which isn’t required to say that a being is qualitatively experiencing.

Again, I am as of yet to hear a proof from you, scientific or othewise, that “brain scans can explain qualitative actions”. Scientifically, the explanations of actions are quantitative.

Objective consciousness is the expression of the actions that something subjectively experiences

So far, I would say this is an assumption under your view. If it is not, then please provide a proof. I failing to see how the exact same expression of actions, which are supposed to be quantitative (as your qualitative experience of other peoples’ actions do not matter: they are in your head only), could not be a PZ.

Objectively, it doesn't matter exactly what the subject is experiencing from its perspective. If the person states they see a tree, we don't need to know exactly how they subjectively experience a tree to believe they see a tree right?

This is partly why I like my original definition of qualia, because I think you are conflating the hard problem with only what is it like to have qualitative experience in and of itself, when you can’t likewise even prove qualitative experience itself by virtue of the brain.

Does that negate that the truck is ultimately run by magnetism, even though we don't understand why exactly magnetism actually works? No

The problem, as I outlined in my proof, is that it is provably impossible to prove brain states produce mental states, so this is disanalogous. I agree with you here though (in terms of the actual example you gave).

But in the case of the brain, it is physical, and it impacts consciousness
…
No, the pill is physical because it fits the terms of what physical means.

It is important to note that the ‘physical’ brain and pill you are describing is only within your qualitative experience: you will have to prove abstractly that there is also a mind-independent (i.e., physical) pill and brain. I am of yet to hear a proof of this.

Its like truth Bob. We can never know the truth. The truth is what is

We can come to understand different things that pertain to the truth. Truth is just a relationship between thinking and being. I can know that 2 + 2 = 4 or a = a and that is a part of ‘the truth’.

Did you know some people cannot visualize in their mind Bob?

My point is not that we simply haven’t been able to prove consciousness arises from the brain nor that we simply cannot come to understand what it is like to have qualitative experience: I am saying you can’t prove the brain produces qualitative experience.

More than a, "But it doesn't quite answer everything." Doesn't matter.
…
There must be more than doubt, or skepticism, or the idea that our current knowledge cannot identify or understand certain aspects of reality.

This is just a straw man of my position. I am not invoking a ‘in-the-gaps’ or ‘from ignorance’ kind of argument: I already provided a proof that reductive naturalism cannot account for qualitative experience:

The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness

What does your replacement offer? If brain states do not cause consciousness, then what have we been doing wrong all these years in medicine?

Medicine is unaffected by whether the brain produces consciousness.

"All of existence consists,it is claimed,solely of ideas—,emotions,perceptions,intuitions,imagination,etc.—even though not one’s personal ideas alone."

I did look up the paper, and wanted to point this summary out. Bob, we've already discussed knowledge before. This author is a person who clearly does not understand knowledge

I don’t see how the quote you gave of him demonstrates that he doesn’t know what knowledge is.

Knowledge is not the testing of our dreams in comparison to reality, if that is what you are trying to claim. Under idealism, the ‘objective’ world is fundamentally ‘subjective’ in the sense that is mind-dependent: that doesn’t mean we can just whimsically make up what is true of reality and what isn’t.

Now move to a new location. Does your consciousness move with you? Can you by concentration extend your consciousness out past your body to where you were?

This doesn’t prove that the brain produces consciousness: this is expected under my view as well because the brain is a (parital) extrinsic representation of my mind. This just doesn’t matter if you can’t float outside of your body at will.

Therefore the only reasonable conclusion is that consciousness follows physical movement,

Consciousness doesn’t follow physical movement: it is the necessary preconditions of experiencing a physical world.

I would imagine that you hold that our dreams are purely within our minds (and not ‘of reality’). Have you ever had a vivid dream where you assume a conscious character within it? That ‘physical’ world, even by your lights, is obviously not actually physical (fundamentally). Now imagine that I told you that your conscious experience in that dream world was ‘following you as a physical being in it’--you would rightly point out that the conscious experience, being a dream and all, is the primary precondition for the experience of the physical dream world.

No different with reality for all intents and purposes.

That's an avoidant answer Bob. I don't hold to idealism and physicalism because I often find they are summary identities that are not logically consistent when examined in detail.

I don’t think I avoided anything: a view being logically consistent doesn’t make it cogent to hold as true. I can make any view, if you give me long enough time (depending on how absurd it is), logically consistent. Logical consistency is just about not having any logical contradictions which only pertains to the form of the argument.

Unless you can show me why its not logical to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally,

And this is why I brought it up: I don’t need to prove that. I agree that it is logically consistent: so is mine! Logical consistent is a basic prerequisite for candidate metaphysical theories: it doesn’t mean much beyond that. In other words, it isn’t saying much to be logically consistent (although that is a good thing).

You either need to present a logical alternative, which I have not seen so far, or demonstrate where my logical claim fails explicitly.

A logical alternative of what exactly? My purpose with the hard problem was to refute the positive claim that it is emergent from the brain—I haven’t explained my alternative view yet. I can if you would like.

Its not "associate", its real claims of knowledge and science.

It being real claims of science doesn’t mean it isn’t a proof of association.

A squirrel likely may not be able to evaluate its own qualia. That has nothing to do with being conscious at the most basic level.

Agreed! This was my point with the blindsight person! They are conscious, they have qualia and qualitative experience, but they don’t understand self-reflectively that they do.

The word includes "meta", which essentially means, "about the subject", and the subject is physics, or the physical.

For now, I think it is best to agree to disagree on what metaphysics means.

I am discussing matters of experience. Anything that cannot be experienced, is outside of what can be known.

This doesn’t work. To be brief, by your lights, we cannot know that “every change has a cause”, that “88888888888888888 + 2 = 88888888888888890”, or that ‘a = a’. You will never prove that empirically.

This is getting long, so I will stop here. I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Mww,

Working backwards: our representations are not all alike, therefore our sensations are not all alike, therefore the effects things have on sensibility are not all alike, therefore not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.

I agree and think this is true if we were speaking about what you can empirically know (but that’s just studying phenomena which tell us nothing of things-in-themselves); but how do you know metaphysically there are things-in-themselves and not a thing-in-itself?

By your own concession, we aren’t supposed to know reality fundamentally is, so how can you say that a part of that fundamental reality is things-in-themselves as opposed to one thing-in-itself?

To me it doesn’t make sense to say we can gain just enough metaphysical access to know that there are things-in-themselves, but then claim we can’t go further when it is the same exact abductive reasoning we use for all of it.

By my lights, you cannot be certain that there are things-in-themselves just as much as I can’t be certain that there is a Universal Mind.

Because appearances are necessarily of something? I’m kinda struggling with the triple negative. At any rate, appearances aren’t inferred, they’re given. Perception is, after all, a function of physics, not logic implied by inference.

What I am trying to do is show you that if you want to go the truly skeptical route that we are barred from metaphysics (or at least ontology) then to be consistent I think you would have to also rebuke transcendental philosophy: you are using abductive reasoning to infer “appearences are necessarily something?”--there’s no certainty in that. This is no different than inferring that the best explanation of what reality fundamentally is is a Universal Mind—there’s no certainty in that either.

First off, appearances are not representations, they are affects on the senses.

Appearances are perceptions, which are representations that your mind generated of the sensations.

Not yet mentioned, is the speculative condition that appearance denotes only the matter of the thing as a whole, which leaves out the form in which the matter is arranged, the purview of productive imagination, from which arises the first representation as such of the thing, called phenomenon, residing in intuition.

Oh are you saying that the “appearance” is just the impression of the thing-in-itself on you and the representation is the formulation of it according to your mind’s abilities? If so, I can get on board with that.

Odd to me as well; there is no dynamic of representations vs. thing-in-themselves, they have nothing to do with each other. Empirically, the dynamic resides in the relation between things and the intuition of them. Logically, and empirically, the dynamic resides in the relation between things and the conceptions of them. There is another dynamic, residing in pure reason a priori, in which resides the relation between conceptions to each other, where experience of the conceived thing is impossible, re: eternal/universal Mind and the like.

I think you are just fleshing out more deeply what I was trying to get at with the “representations” vs. “things-in-themselves”. You are noting that there is an impression, an intuition, and then an understanding of the thing-in-itself—and that last step is the phenomena. I don’t have a problem with this, but my point is that you can’t come to understand these functions of the mind without abductive reasoning about the phenomena--the end result of that chain of interpretation. So Kant can’t say stuff like:

We have intended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us

If the relations between the phenomena tell us nothing about the things-in-themselves, since they are just the “subjective constitution” of our senses, then you cannot claim:

Working backwards: our representations are not all alike, therefore our sensations are not all alike, therefore the effects things have on sensibility are not all alike, therefore not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.

Because this is an extroplation of the relations of phenomena: you are saying that this phenomena relates to another in a manner that suggests they are representations of different things. Kant is barring this (as seen in the above quote).

You’d pretty much have to be, holding with a Universal Mind, right?

Correct. But I don’t hold substance monism to fit the view, I think substance monism is the best explanation of the universe in general.

Nahhhh……metaphysics is an unavoidable pursuit, when reason seeks resolution to questions experience cannot provide. Transcendental philosophy merely points out the conditions under which such resolutions are even possible on the one hand, and the circumstances by which the resolutions may actually conflict with experience on the other. The mind is, as my ol’ buddy Golum likes to say, tricksie.

That’s fair, but then I would like to know the symmetry breaker between abducing there are things-in-themselves and, let’s say, everything being a part of one substance. Or that it is a part of a mental substance. Or that there is a Universal Mind. All of these are abductive, metaphysical attempts to explain the world, and some explain more of the data more parsimoniously than others.

For example, I don’t think, under your view, you can hold object permanence because you can’t know anything being your representative faculty, of which the very forms are supposed to be in your head. So how do you know the red block actually persists existing as you viewed it once you turn around? How do you know it exists at all other than a phenomena?

Ok, not an idea. If not an idea, and not a thing, for a human then, what is it? What does it mean to say it is mind, rather than it is a mind?

It was a typo: it is a mind. But it ends up arguably being the only mind and we are just off-shoots of the same mind.

To say it is mind that has ideas makes it no different than my own mind.

Because solipsism isn’t a parsimonious view. You can’t explain other people, object permanence, etc. without positing an objective world around you. Sure, you could say that it is just your mind, but it doesn’t account for the data very well.

To call it eternal mind adds a conception, but by which is invoked that which is itself inconceivable, re: mind that has all ideas, or, is infinitely timeless.

It is outside of space and time. Yes, that it a tricky conception to wrap one’s head around, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t true.

Still, as long as universal mind theory doesn’t contradict itself, it stands. If it contradicts other theories, then it’s a matter of the relative degree of explanatory power philosophically, or merely personal preference conventionally. There is the notion that reason always seeks the unconditioned, that abut which nothing more needs be said, which certainly fits here. It used to be a theocratic symbol having no relation to us, but it’s since graduated to an extension of us. Not sure one is any better than the other.

That is fair: I think that is what metaphysics is about—giving the best general account of reality.

Bob

Hello Janus,

No, Kant is merely saying that if there are appearances, then logically speaking, there must be things which appear, whatever the in itself existence of what appears might be.
…
We know there are things which appear as phenomena, but we also know that these appearances are not the things, and that we cannot know what the things are apart from how they appear to us.

This is where the obscurity sets in with Kant (for me): what do you mean “logically speaking”? If you can’t point to your experience of things being representations of other things, then why do you think they are representations at all? You can’t point to scientific inquiry into the brain: those are studies of phenomena which Kant thinks tells us nothing about what is being represented—but then why think there is something being represented in the first place?

No, I won't have to concede that, because I don't think reason without sense data produces knowledge. It is not a valid inference from the fact that sense data combined with reason produces knowledge to a claim that reason on its own can produce knowledge.

I see. This doesn’t work though. For example, if reason without sense data produces no knowledge, then you do not know that “every change has a cause”. You don’t know that “a = a”. You don’t know that “1+1=2” without counting your fingers (so to speak). You don’t even know that “reason without sense data produces no knowledge” without appealing to pure reason. Some things are a priori true, and that means they do not require sense data.

Bob

Hello Tom Storm,

I hope it's the latter and not just business as usual. Which I guess is a Christian view - love your neighbour as you do yourself. The reason being we are all the same being... :wink:

It is basically the golden rule but without Christian metaphysics per se. I don’t think most Christians agree with Kastrup, because his view is more of a pantheism/theist hybrid.

I personally can't identify reasons to change how I interact with the world, regardless of the metaphysics or ontology posited. So I am wondering how useful it is to even have views on ontology, other than a common sense account, which may not be true, but has the virtue of working well enough as a frame.

I think for most people it drastically changes their behaviors because they depend heavily on their metaphysical views to guide them; but, for me, like you, I see many rational views and all of which can contain people with fruitful, moral, and thoughtful lives.

I like to say that I worry more about the average man that agrees with me than the sophisticated man that completely disagrees with me. Not to mention I’de rather live with the latter than the former.

Bob

Hello Janus,

I think it all depends on what you mean by "qualitative seeing". People with colour agnosia can "guess" with not perfect, but greater than random accuracy, what colour card is being held before their eyes, for example. They are not actually aware of seeing the colour, but that greater than random accuracy of guessing shows that the data which would normally produce an experience of colour is registered by the brain and can be more or less reliably accessed even though the conscious qualitative experience is absent.

I would say that they are still seeing the colour card, to some degree, if they can accurately guess them; and the fact that sometimes they can’t means that they no longer have introspective access to those qualitative experiences.

By “qualitatively seeing”, I mean something which is not-quantitative (viz., it has no definite quantity) and there is something it is like to see in and of itself.

My point is that I would not refer to the brain's mere registration of the data as qualitive experience or seeing. If you don't agree, then all we will be arguing about is terminology, and there cannot be a definitive right answer. So, I'm saying that to me, it makes no sense to speak of qualitive experience in the absence of awareness of that experience.

I think you are conflating consciousness proper with meta-consciousness: there can be a qualitative experience and something it like in and of itself to see of which the person, as the ego, does not have introspective (or perhaps cognitive) access to.

Conscious modeling is conceptual modeling made possible by re-cognition. We say things have qualities because we recognize similarities. Take red as an example; we call red things red because they look similar to one another, and there is a great range of different red. But on either side towards yellow and blue we reach points where we would say a thing is orange or mauve or purple.

I see: is this like our ability to self-reflective on our perceptions? Is that what you are saying?

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

1. The definition of qualia

I think that, in hindsight, it isn’t helping our conversation to call qualia “subjective experience” (in your case) nor “qualitative experience” (in my case) because the meaning of the word just gets pushed back into what “subjective” and “qualitative” mean; and I don’t think we are agreeing on that aspect. So let me try to use a more technical definition of ‘qualia’: ‘a mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’.

Let’s go back to the blindsight person. When they see, there is still something it is like to see (qualitatively) as they do, but they cannot identify that they are the one’s having it. Another example is a person who has dreams but doesn’t identify as having them: they still have the dream and there is something like to have the dreams, but they have lost the cognitive ability to self-reflectively identify with having it. In these cases, there is still something it is like in and of itself to qualitatively experience (e.g., to see in the case of a blindsight person or to dream in the other case) and, thusly, they still have qualia. However, it is a different discussion whether they have meta-consciousness, which, to make it clearly, I would say can include both self-reflective cognition and introspection.

Let’s take another example: blinking. Most of the time, ‘I am’, as the ‘Ego’, do not have introspective access to my qualitative experience of blinking but, lo and behold, if ‘I’ focus on it (e.g., you tell me “don’t forget to blink!”) then it “bubbles up” to the “ego” and I have introspective access. In both cases, there is still something it is like to experience blinking even though I do not have introspective access, as the ego, in both scenarios. The conscious experience is still happening.

2. You believe that because we cannot measure the subjective experience of being conscious, that this proves that we cannot claim that consciousness comes from brain states. I note that science and medicine has for years evaluated objective consciousness through medicine and has determined that brain states cause consciousness. I also note that we cannot measure the subjective experience of consciousness, but that it is irrelevant to the conclusion that brains cause consciousness as objective measures of consciousness aren't trying to evaluate subjective measures, just objective outcomes

You switched the terminology mid-argument here: the first sentence is about “consciousness” in the sense of qualitative experience—i.e., qualia—and the second was about mere observance/awareness. Pointing out that science can evaluate the “objective consciousness”, which is just mere awareness with no necessity of qualia, has nothing to do with the claim in the first sentence. If you are going to say we can evaluate “objective consciousness”, in the manner you have described, then you can’t equally claim that that gives us insight into “subjective consciousness” which is what you would need to prove “subjective consciousness” is caused by brain states. This is why keeping the terminology very tight is vital, I think you conflated “consciousness” multiple times the above quote.

Perhaps its the construction of your sentence I disagree with, and maybe not your underlying point. The problem is you keep saying "impact" as if its different from "cause". They aren't. Now, does that mean they are the entire cause? No one could say that. But you can't separate "impact" from "cause". They are essentially the same thing.

Yes, agree that normally by cause we mean “physical causality”. What I mean by “cause” is the actual reductive explanation of phenomena and not necessarily a physical chain of impact. So, for me, “impact” and “cause” are two different things. If you would like to use them as synonymous, then we could use “cause” and “explanation” to denote the same distinction I am trying to make.

What I think you're trying to get at, as this is what the real problem of "consciousness" is, is that you cannot see the internal subjectiveness of a function

My problem is that you seem to be claiming that “objective consciousness” and “subjective consciousness” are two sides of the same coin, and the side we see is just relative to our epistemic access (e.g., my private qualia looks like observation, identifying, and action from a public eye); but by this “objective” observation of “consciousness” we gain absolutely no insight into the being also qualitatively experiencing—there is a disconnect there in your argument. When I refer to “consciousness”, I am talking about that private qualia that we definitely cannot empirically observe (which I think you are agreeing with me here) and this has no connection to an empirical merely observation of a being observing, identifying, and acting upon its environment.

Let me try to be very specific. I think, under your view, you cannot account for your qualia as reducible to brain states (but you can reduce your ability to observe, identify, and act upon your environment as reducible thereto) and you cannot know that anyone else has qualia—you can only effectively know the PZ aspect. Thusly, you cannot claim that science, which is empirical analysis that you concede gives us no knowledge of beings having qualia, has proven that qualia is reducible to the brain but you can claim that science can reduce our ability to observe, identify, and act upon our environment. Do you see how these are completely separate claims? And that the hard problem pertains exactly to the part which you cannot prove is reducible to brain states?

Hands down Bob, alcohol changes the brain which causes drunkenness. That's not debatable. What you seem to think is that because we cannot measure the internal subjective experience of consciousness, that we can't say the brain causes consciousness. That doesn't work. Its illogical.

What is illogical about claiming that the phenomenal world, which includes brains, is an extrinsic representation of the mental?

What is illogical about saying that we have cannot account for “consciousness” in the sense of qualia (qualitative experience) in terms of the reductive naturalist approach? Again, I think you may be conflating your use of “consciousness” in terms of “objectively” with “subjectively”--and the hard problem only pertains to the latter. The objective aspect you refer to doesn’t matter in terms of whether the brain causes or doesn’t cause mental events.

If a cue ball impacts the eight ball, it causes it to fly in a particular direction.

Correct, but from my perspective, as an idealist, what is fundamentally going on there is a representation of mental events—there are no mind-independent cue balls hitting each other: there isn’t series of cue balls that exist beyond consciousness experience (other than as ideas in a mind). The physical causality you are referring to is what it looks like from our perceptions of those ideas playing out, so to speak.

Our inability to do so does not mean that the external results of brain stimulation suddenly do not cause consciousness. Its proven. There's no gap here. The only gap is again, our inability to measure something as a subject itself.

Being able to associate people’s mental activity with brain states doesn’t prove in itself that the latter causes (i.e., reductively explains) the former: you keep bringing up examples of this as if it does prove it. Why do you think it proves it?

We're so close on agreement here Bob! The only problem is that we have reduced qualitative experience to brain states repeatedly in science and medicine for decades. I really feel at this point you're just using the wrong words to describe a situation. We can measure qaulitative brain states to measure levels of consciousness as an outside observer. we can never measure qualitative brain states to measure levels of conscousness as an inside observer, the subject itself.

I am confused, as you agreed with me that we cannot reduce “subjective consciousness” to brain states and that is all that matters for the debate on the hard problem—and there has never been such a proof in medicine nor science. Please send me anything that you think proves it in either of those fields.

What you are referring to, I think, is our ability to affect consciousness with what looks like from our perceptions as physical objects (e.g., popping a pill to get rid of my headache, cutting part of a brain off and observing the person’s personality change, etc.). This doesn’t mean that we have a reductive, conceptual account of brain states producing mental states. Within my perspective, popping a pill is just an extrinsic representation of mentality: the pill doesn’t fundamentally exist as something physical.

Again, you'll have to explain what you mean by physicalist.

I mean a person who holds that the world is fundamentally mind-independent: it is made up of non-conscious, mind-independent ‘parts’. Idealists, on the other hand, is a person who thinks it is mind-dependent: it is made up of a mind and everything is in mind.

No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.

What do you mean by “logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails”? Do you mean logical necessity?

I would say that objectivity is that which its truthity is will-independent.

Also, “a falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false” is a contradiction in terms. If it is falsifiable, then it is possible to shown to be false, whereas an unfalsifiable claim is something which cannot be shown to be false.

Would you mind linking to a philosopher who believes that mind does not come from the brain? I would like to read from one.

In terms of modern day philosophers, Bernardo Kastrup is a good one. You can read his free papers at https://www.bernardokastrup.com/p/papers.html . I would recommend reading Analytic-Idealism: a Consciousness-dependent Ontology for a good general quick-ish read.

In terms of older philosophers, which are still pertinent but didn’t flesh out the views 100% accurately, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is a must pre-requisite, then Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation (both volumes), and Berkeley’s A Treatise Concerning Principles of Human Understanding. I would suggest just starting with Kastrup for an introductory read.

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one.

Not quite. Either the brain produces the mind, and thusly the mind is an emergent property thereof (and so they are not one and the same) or vice-versa.

The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally.

Something being logically consistent doesn’t make it true in metaphysics nor science: idealism and physicalism are both logically consistent.

So I agree with you here but not with your implication that it gives your view the upper-hand.

Then this disagrees with every notion of qualia I've ever known. If "you" are thinking, that's "your" qualia. Qualia is "you" experiencing something

Not at all: if by “thinking” you mean the normal usage of the word (e.g., I am thinking “I want some bread”). Think of lower-life forms, like squirrels: they don’t self-reflectively know (cognitively) that there is something it is like to see from there eyes nor that they qualitatively experience in general. According to your definition, then, one would likewise have to have the over-and-above cognitive abilities to gain self-knowledge of one’s qualia, which is different than the qualia itself.

Your proposal of qualia seems to imply a person can be conscious of something, but not have qualia of that something.

Not under my definitions. But under yours: yes. That is the whole point I am trying to make: under your argument your “objective consciousness” is referring, in terms of what it can prove, to only PZs.

"4" and "red" are just concepts that we give a limit to, but we're talking about the qualia of experiencing "4" and "red". You're a person thinking "2+2=4". Why is that any different from "I see the color red"?

Correct. But the cogitated “2+2=4” or “I am seeing the color red” are self-reflective notions of the qualia--they are not the qualia themselves.

I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical"

This isn’t what metaphysics means: it is the “study of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience”. For example, are there Universals or just particulars? Does the ‘now’ have ontological privilege (or is it a timeblock)? Is the world fundamentally mental or physical? These are metaphysical questions.

Your definition implies more like our self-reflective cognitive abilities, which has nothing to do with the subject.

So really this is the ability for a being to be conscious of more abstracts than another. If that's the case I don't see how higher consciousness affects any of the points here. Its still consciousness, just more of it.

You can think of it as “better” consciousness while they all are still consciousness.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Mww,

Things-in-themselves can be inferred the possibility of sensations in general a priori. The thing as it appears, and from which sensation is given, makes the non-existence of that particular thing-in-itself impossible

I see. If this is true, then how is it inferred therefrom that there are multiple things-in-themselves and not a thing-in-itself?

However, I still would like to push back a bit: how can you infer that it is impossible that appearances aren’t of nothing? Is that simply absurd to you?

Transcendental analysis of the conditions for human knowledge doesn’t care about ontology; all that is represented exists necessarily, all we will ever know empirically is given from representations, therefore all empirical knowledge presupposes extant things.

I still struggle with this because, to me, I infer that the appearances are representations by comparison of other appearances (e.g., they inject me with a hallucinogen drug and my representations becomes significantly different than when I am sober, etc.). But if representations tell us nothing about things-in-themselves then it is odd to me that it can even be inferred that there is a dynamic of representations vs. things-in-themselves in the first place.

The only reason for positing the thing-in-itself, is to grant that even if things are not perceived, they are not thereby non-existent.

How do you know this if representations tell you nothing about things-in-themselves? Also, why not hold that all the “things” of appearances of one thing-in-itself?

It is meant to qualify the semi-established dogmatic Berkeley-ian purely subjective idealist principle esse est percipi, by stipulating that it isn’t necessary that that which isn’t perceived doesn’t exist, but only for that which is not perceived, empirical knowledge of it is impossible. It just says existence is not conditioned by perception, but knowledge most certainly is.

I agree with you here; but under Kantianism, how does one know there necessarily are things-in-themselves? It seems like Kant is just ruling out the alternatives because they are “absurd”.

Oh, that’s easy: once this thing, whatever it is, appears to perception, that thing-in-itself, whatever it was, disappears, that thing no longer “in-itself”, as far as the system is concerned.

Oh I see and agree—I thought you were saying something else there.

Can’t be substance, insofar as substance is never singular, which implies a succession, which implies time, which is a condition for knowledge, and by which the imposition makes the impossibility of knowledge contradictory.

I am a substance monist, so I am unsure by what you mean by “substance is never singular”: could you elaborate?

Permanence is that by which the thing-in-itself, is of. Which makes the notion that if I’m not looking at the thing it isn’t there, rather foolish.

How do you know they are permanent simply because they are beyond your representation of them?

The real world for us, is just how we understand what we are given. The world is only as real as our intellect provides. Whatever the world really is, we are not equipped to know, and if it really is as we understand it, so much the better, but without something to compare our understands to, we won’t know that either.

So would it be fair to say that you think we are barred from metaphysics (other than transcendental inquiries)?

If it’s not a thing, why does it have to exist in a thing? That which exists in a thing is a property thereof, and logic is not a property. All I’m going to say about it, is that logic resides in human intelligence, and attempts to pin it down in concreto ultimately ends as illusory cognitions at least, or irrational judgements at worst.

It has to exist in a “thing”, in the sense of of a substance and of an entity, because otherwise I don’t know what you mean by “existing”. How is logic not a property of an entity? If it isn’t a property, then I don’t have the ability to do logic because that would be a property of my mind, would it not?

There’s no legitimate reason to think that, insofar as it contradicts the notion that the universal mind does no meta-cognitive deliberations, which it would have to do in order to determine what laws are, and the conditions under which they legislate what it can do, which determines what it is.

I apologize, that was a poor choice of words: the Universal Mind does not “adhere” to the laws but, rather, sustains them.

In other words, the Universal Mind, if it doesn’t exist, cannot be legislated by law, which means if it is legislated by law it must exist. Which means it cannot be merely an idea.

The universal mind is not an idea, it is mind that has ideas and those ideas are the Platonic, eternal forms which are expressed within space and time, which are conditions of our minds.

But all universals are ideas……AAAARRRRGGGGG!!!!!!

Correct, but I am saying that those ideas are within an eternal mind.

Bob

Hello Tom Storm,

Out of interest - let's assume we do accept analytic idealism as our ontological situation - what practical changes would this initiate in terms of human behavior? How much changes in terms of morality, human rights, climate change, political discourse, in short, how we live?

There’s the answer Kastrup will tell you, and there’s a grimmer answer I will tell you.

Kastrup’s:

Morality stems from our understanding that we are fundamentally hurting ourselves when we hurt others, because we are of the same mind—so why do that? Morality for Kastrup is likewise objective, as there is Telos to the world, and something we should commit ourselves to.

He argues that physicalism leads to nihilism, whereas idealism leads to happier, more fulfilled lives.

He argues that politically we should be aiming to slower preserve all life, because consciousness is all that ontologically exists and we are a part of the same mind.

My answers (in summary):

There is no morality beyond what you hold yourself to—what lies in the depths of your heart.

Any view can lead to nihilism, although some more than others, and anyone can be happy under any of them—nihilism is a reflection of one’s psychology and nothing more.

One’s political views are going to be dependent on one’s morals and amoral goals—no metaphysical view in-itself tells us what to do here, but it can end up being what formulates our morals (e.g., if we shouldn’t hurt what is a part of ourselves and we are of the same mind, then we shouldn’t hurt eachother).

Bob

Hello Janus,

The existence of things in themselves is an inference from the invariance and intersubjective commonality of sensations.

This concedes my point about Kant: he is using phenomena to reverse engineer that there are things-in-themselves while claiming that phenomena do not tell us anything about things-in-themselves.

And I submit to you that all ideas of substance are groundless. The world seems physical and substantial and from that experience and the reificational potentiality of language we naturally extrapolate the notion of substance. We really have no idea what either physicality or mentality are in any substantial sense.

They can’t be groundless if you consider reason a valid method of gaining knowledge, which you will have to if you agree with science. In that case, we can extrapolate insofar as safely can. For example, we can know that two substances would not have interaction with each other, and this is only via pure reason. I don’t think that claim is groundless.

Bob

Hello Janus,

“I would argue that they do not “see” in the same manner (i.e., one is qualitatively seeing while the other is just quantitatively processing its environment), so I think you are equivocating when using the term “seeing” in this sentence to refer to both.”
--Bob Ross

I would argue that if there is no awareness of seeing that it makes no sense to speak of qualitative seeing.

I am unsure as to your point here in terms of your quote of me. I was saying that you were equivocating ‘seeing’ when referring to quantitative processing of one’s environment vs. qualitatively experiencing one’s environment.

Moreover, one can be qualitatively ‘seeing’ without having the self-knowledge that they are, so I am unsure as to what you mean by “no awareness of seeing” somehow entails that there is nothing to be said about them qualitatively ‘seeing’.

Again I would say that being disassocited from experience is the same as having no (qualitative) experience

This is just false. There are people who are disassociated from themselves, who have lost all sense of self, but we don’t say that they thereby do not exist simply because they can no longer identify with their existence. Likewise, one can have qualitative experience while failing to identify as having them.

Quality is a judgement which is all in the conscious modelling.

What is the “conscious modelling”?

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

We may be at an impasse here Bob. I respect your view point, but I can't agree on this one. Being able to express doubt about a theory does not disprove a theory. A scientific theory is not like the layman's meaning of theory.

Firstly, I agree that “theory” does not refer to the same thing as it is used in colloquial speech in science, and I was using it in its scientific sense.

Secondly, the problem is that the more we understand the brain + consciousness and the actual methodological approach science uses (i.e., reductive naturalism) the more we understand that our old ways of scientific explanation simply do not work with consciousness.

So I am saying that the scientific theory is wrong in the sense that it doesn’t prove what it thinks it does and, quite frankly, the only way to reconcile it in favor of it is to reach towards metaphysics.

I will refer back to the argument:

The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness

And your response:

No, there is not a conceptual gap between the biology and the experience. Get someone drunk and they become inebriated. This is due to how alcohol affects the brain. No one disputes this. The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk. Objective consciousness vs subjective consciousness.

I am not disputing, nor does the above argument contend, that medications and drugs affect our minds—I am not saying that, under a view where the brain does not produce consciousness, I would expect someone who gets drunk not to become impaired. I am likewise not claiming that we shouldn’t expect neural activity corresponding to where alcohol inhibits brain functions.

What I am saying is that explaining the qualitative experience that drunk person has in terms of the brain functions, as opposed to those functions being the extrinsic representation of mental activity, has the explanatory gap of ‘I see how those functions impact consciousness, but how do those functions produce consciousness?’. This can be clearly see, at least by my lights, in the abstract form of any argument reductive naturalism can afford in terms of explaining consciousness.
When you say “ The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk”, I feel as though you are somewhat agreeing with me but you still do not agree that the qualitative experience is different than our conceptual account of the brain functions. For example:

I'm not sure that's the right comparison. Its not "also have a qualitative experience", its "why is that a qualitative experience?" The interpretation of the wavelength by the brain is the qualia is it not?

Seeing with a brain scanner that alcholol inhibits this and that doesn’t produce any conceptual explanation of how the brain functions (inhibited or still functional) are producing the qualitative experience (e.g., the drunk person’s experience of seeing the color red) of that person. That’s where the explanatory gap is. Likewise, the interpretation of a wavelength and your brain’s ability to acquire that it is green doesn’t conceptually explain your qualitative experience of the greeness. If you already hold that the brain produces consciousness, then, yes, I would expect you to try to explain the mental event as the wavelength interpretation: but whether one can actually give a conceptual reductive explanation of that is what is in question.

I think you may agree with me here insofar as you hold some aspect of our subjective experience as off limits (and thusly non-reducible to the brain), and, in that case, it is important to note that if you agree then I think you are conceding that you do not have an conceptual account of how a mind-independent brain allegedly produces consciousness and, thusly, you cannot prove it. I am not saying it is impossible nor that it isn’t the case: I am saying you cannot prove it if you cannot conceptually reduce mental states (such as seeing the color red) to brain states—and, no, as seen in the form of the argument, appealing to how functions impact consciousness says nothing about them producing consciousness.

I'm having a hard time understanding the difference between those terms. If you have knowledge of something, you are aware. And if you are aware, that attention is qualia is it not?

No. Awareness is more generic than being conscious in the sense that I am using it. The former is just the ability to quantitatively observe one’s environment (like an AI) while the latter a qualitative experience of one’s environment (like a human). An AI does not know what it is like to see red qualitatively: when it ‘sees’ red, it is just mechanically registering that it was red based off of wavelengths, but it has no qualitative experience of it.

To me it appears you're comparing unconscious awareness with conscious awareness.

Yes I am. If a being has no qualitative experience, they may be still aware of their environment (like an AI, or a speed gun).

The man sees something that he is not aware of. I suppose I would say his unconscious mind sees the object, but his conscious mind does not. So comparing that to your point, the unconscious mind would see green, while the conscious mind would not experience the qualia of green, but he would know that it was green. Is that a good comparison to what you're saying?

This isn’t what I am saying, but I would like to go with it to explain my previous points above: when you explain that he knows that it was green you can easily explain this in terms of brain states (and what not), but you can’t explain why, when the person doesn’t have blindsight, why they consciously experience the greeness. The conceptual gap lies exactly between the explanation of how a being unconsciously knows the color and consciously experiences it. Under the conceptual explanations of physicalism (that the mind is produced by the brain), there is absolutely no reason why there would be a qualitative experience of the greenness on top of the brain merely mechanically interpreting the wavelengths.

Now I am not saying that about blindsight (but only wanted to use it to hopefully convey the conceptual gap better), I am saying two things:

1. Blindsight patients only prove that people can lose the ability to identify with the conscious (qualitative) experience, and that is indicated by them:

A) Clearly being able to see; and
B) Answering that they aren’t seeing; and because I
C) Consider it a better explanation to hold that all life is qualitatively experiencing (so long as they are alive), so I think it makes more sense to say that they are qualitatively experiencing.

In terms of C, obviously I anticipate you are going to disagree with that, but the justification is depending on the resolution of the hard problem (or lack thereof). So I will put a pin it for now.

2. Blindsight patients, if #1 isn’t the case, demonstrate potentially that they have lost (at least partially) there meta-consciousness (i.e., the ability to be aware of their qualitative experience). So, instead of being unable to identify with their qualitative experience but it still is happening, they may not even have it anymore (because of something getting damaged). Again, I think animals can be qualitatively experiencing without being aware that they are: without having self-knowledge.

Does this also fit into your definition of awareness and experience? So in blindsight terms, we would say he is aware of the object in front of him, but he does not experience it in his qualia.

Exactly! I am not actually claiming that the blindsight person is aware of the object but not conscious, but this is a perfect depiction of the conceptual gap with a reductive methodological approach. Appealing to reductive accounts only provides evidence of a person being aware and not experiencing: the experiencing they are having is extra phenomena that isn’t expected under that account (physicalism) of the world.

Now I think you may be able to see the conceptual gap in explaining the qualitative experience of the greeness (of the pen) by appealing to “the wavelengths are interpreted by the brain as green”: the latter only explains bare awareness and doesn’t explain at all why there would be qualia. Thusly, this doesn’t prove that the qualitative experience of the greeness is reducible to the brain’s interpretation of the wavelength: this is the conceptual gap.

He's asking, "Why is there subjective experience?" He's not saying, "Its impossible for the brain to produce subjective experience". He says it seems unreasonable, but it clearly does

I agree. I think that Chalmer’s is still trying to explain consciousness by a physicalist metaphysical account of the world and he didn’t fully see it as an irreconcilable problem. But that is usually how hard problem’s are first formulated: the person still has allegiance to the core theory that they are positing a dilemma for. Nowadays, I think it is recognized a lot more, by philosophers in philosophy of mind, as irreconcilable for physicalism.

My point is that “but it clearly does” is incredibly unwarranted. He give’s zero conceptual account reductively of how it “clearly does”. I think he was still thinking just in the sense that brains affect conscious experience.

Nothing we study about the brain will ever give us insight into its subjective experience. It is outside of our knowledge. That's why its a hard problem.

Given what I have said hitherto, if you agree with me that we cannot gain insight into qualitative experience then you are equally conceding that we cannot reduce qualitative experience to brain states; which means you have no proof that the former really is from the latter.

According to Chalmer's here, it is not presumption. That is the easy problem.

Chalmer’s never said that consciousness (as qualitative experience) being explained through the brain is an easy problem, he said that awareness aspects of consciousness (such as the functions which you quoted later on) are easy problems. His use of the term “consciousness” includes ‘awareness’ and ‘experience’. Within his schema, yes, the awareness aspects of consciousness are easy problems (if that is what you are talking about). But he isn’t saying that qualitative experience is an easy problem.

I do not care about physicalism, dualism, or idealism. I care about logical consistency, philosophical schools of thought be damned! :) To me its like I use a martial arts move that does not fit in with karate and someone berates me that it destroys karate. If the move is effective at defending oneself, what does it matter?

I respect that, but the terms are good quick and general depictions of the fully thought out, logically consistent, metaphysical views. If you hold that the brain produces consciousness, then the only logically consistent views available to you are physicalist accounts of the world: there’s no way around that.

It is not that the hard problem comes about from physicalism, its that the hard problem is for our ability to understand the subjective nature of consciousness an an objective manner

I have to push back here: it is absolutely due to one’s metaphysical commitment to the brain producing consciousness, which is only claimed in physicalist accounts of the world (by definition). Your second sentence implicitly depends on a physicalist account of the world being true; and this just muddies the waters when someone uses it implicitly but denounces it explicitly. Philosophim, if you think that the brain produces consciousness and the brain (and the world) is mind-independent, then you are a physicalist. By ‘physicalist’, I do not mean one oddly specific and straw manned position, I just mean that you are subscribing to a view that is a part of the metaphysical family of views under physicalism. I don’t see how you can argue around this.

Dualism and idealism are not objective, so of course the hard problem doesn't exist. When you don't care about objectivity, a lot of problems go away

If by “objective” you mean “something which we can empirically observe”, then no metaphysical theory, including physicalism (including the view that the brain produces consciousness), “cares” about “objectivity”. This is why I worry when you denounce physicalism but then implicitly use it in your arguments: it seems like you think you aren’t engaging in metaphysics.

They can know what consciousness is objectively. They simply can't know what a consciousness experiences subjectively. Brain state A can be switched to state B, and every time they do, you see a Cat, then a Dog in your mind. You can tell them this, but no one knows what that experience you have of seeing a cat or dog is like.

Again, please remember that “they can know what awareness is objectively”--not experience.

Again, I think we're in agreement that it is impossible for science to ever know what it is like to subjectively experience from the subject's viewpoint. This in no way backs a claim that the brain does not produce a subjective experience.

If science can’t prove that you experience, then (1) you are engaging in metaphysics when you claim that the brain produces consciousness and (2) experience is irreducible to the brain states because we cannot conceptually prove it (by the reductive naturalist method, which is the same one science uses).

So in your viewpoint, if I am actively thinking, "I know 2+2 equals 4", is that qualia? If not, what is it?

I would say that it is qualitative in the sense that it occurred at a timestamp within a steady flow of qualitative time, but it was non-spatial—so not qualitative pertaining to that. Likewise, I would also hold that the imagination is qualitative. I hold that our faculty of reason is a sense that takes perceptions in as its input and generates concepts of them.

Also, for my sake, instead of saying, under a philosophical theory x results, can you simply give me the logic why X results? My experience with people citing such theories is that everyone has a different viewpoint on what that theory means, so I want to understand what it means to you.

I will do my absolute best! I agree that people tend to hide being names and badges; However, I think it is important to note that you are making metaphysical claims, not just scientific ones.

What is higher consciousness? Why is higher consciousness different from lower consciousness?

Through evolution, not all conscious beings have the same capabilities—e.g., my dog lacks the cognitive capabilities to abstract his perceptions as much (or at all) like I can. Likewise, some beings are qualitatively experiencing, but have no perceptions (i.e., they cannot represent the world to themselves), such as some plants. Higher vs. lower consciousness is the abilities/faculties a being has in relation to others. We evolved to have higher capacities and abilities than other animals.

Perceptions are sensations which a mind processes into a representation of the world.

Correct.

You seem to imply that our direct attentiveness to it is not required. So in the case of blindsight, the man is conscious of that which he cannot attend to

I believe so (if I am understanding you correctly). My mind’s ability to identify with or have self-knowledge of the qualitative experience is different than merely having it. He cannot “attend to it” because he isn’t meta-conscious or perhaps he simply can’t identify as “his self” having them (so it could be an ownership thing).

Finally, here's a link to a fairly good philosophy professor online who breaks down the hard problem. I'm posting it so that you know I understand the subject, and to also help clarify what I mean by the hard problem, and why we should just separate consciousness into objective and subjective branches.

I never doubted that you have studied and looked into the hard problem! I think we have different interpretations of it.

Thank you Bob for taking the time to really break down your methodology for me. This subject comes up every so often and I find most people are either unable or unwilling to really go into the details. Another long discussion already, but one that I am glad to explore!

As always, I am glad to explore it as well!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I'm not really arguing for it. Its just what is considered fact at this time. If you want to prove that minds do not come from the brain feel free, but you'll need to challenge modern day neuroscience, psychology, and medicine.

The point is that I don’t. It is not a scientific fact that brains produce consciousness. It is a scientific theory, but scientific theories are either more facts (i.e., explaining the how in terms of another how) or metaphysical commitments. In the case of physicalism, which is the term for the claim you are making, is a metaphysical commitment that most scientists agree with. That’s not the same thing as science proving the brain produces consciousness.

As for the hard problem, I still think you misunderstand it. " Explaining why consciousness occurs at all can be contrasted with so-called “easy problems” of consciousness: the problems of explaining the function, dynamics, and structure of consciousness. These features can be explained using the usual methods of science. But that leaves the question of why there is something it is like for the subject when these functions, dynamics, and structures are present. This is the hard problem." -Internet Encyclopedia of philosophy

I partially agree with you here because “consciousness” and “something it is like to for the subject” are being used ambiguously there. This is why I always note a distinction, when discussing the hard problem, between awareness and experience: the former being “how a being has knowledge, be aware, of its environment” while the latter is “how a being has qualitative, subjective experience of its environment”. All problems pertaining to ‘awareness’ are easy problems for physicalism: the hard problem pertains to everything about ‘experience’. Explaining functions, for example, is an easy problem—e.g., a being can know that something is green by interpreting the wavelength of light reflected off of the object. However, explaining how those functions produce experience is a different story—e.g., why does the being also have a qualitative experience of the greeness of the object?

My distinction is pretty standard and honestly I think your link just explains it more ambiguously. For example, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness:

The hard problem of consciousness asks why and how humans have qualia[note 1] or phenomenal experiences.[2] This is in contrast to the "easy problems" of explaining the physical systems that give humans and other animals the ability to discriminate, integrate information, and so forth

I really like this post about it: https://consc.net/papers/facing.html . Section two really explains the distinction well (to me at least).

The hard problem even admits that consciousness is explained through the brain

I think you may be misunderstanding. Yes, the hard problem presumes, in order to even be a problem in the first place, that one is trying to explain consciousness by the standard reductive naturalist methodological approach. However, this is not the same thing as it being true. The hard problem is only such for physicalism, not other accounts such as substance dualism and idealism.

My solution to this is to just simply note that referring to the experience of the conscious subject itself is "subjective consciousness". Knowing what it is like to be the subject of any one conscious being besides ourselves is currently impossible.

This isn’t a solution, it is semantic distinction between what we can know (i.e., that beings can interpret their environment and observe it) and what we can’t (i.e., that they are conscious in the qualitative sense). To me, you are admitting that we can’t know people are conscious in the sense of the term that matters for the hard problem: the hard problem isn’t pertinent to beings that merely observe, act, and identify—those are soft problems for physicalism.

The only people questioning that mind comes from the brain are philosophers.

I generally agree and would say that this is due to the fact that mainly only philosophers are brushed up in philosophy of mind and, consequently, realize that we, at the very least, have no clue what consciousness is (and of course others try to give accounts of it). Most scientists aren’t engaged in philosophy which, like I said before, is the proper subject for this matter (i.e., metaphysics); instead, they metaphysically commit themselves to physicalism (most of the time) without every explicitly engaging in metaphysics themselves.

The hard problem does Mind coming from the brain is like oxygen theory, while the idea it does not is like phlogiston theory

I don’t see how this analogy holds. The scientific theory that brain produces mind is purely metaphysics.

But feel free to prove here first that the mind does not come from the brain and lets see where that takes us

Again, I am not claiming that the mind does not come from the brain but, rather, that we cannot prove (even theoretically in the future) because reductive physicalism affords no such answers—the methodology fails in this regard. I can prove that much, and that is all I need to prove to claim that you are not warranted in claiming that the mind comes from the brain.

To keep it short, my proof is the examination of the form, absracted, of what methodological reductive naturalism (physicalism) can afford with regards to consciousness. The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness. The best reductive naturalism can do is provide better insight into how the brain affects the mind (i.e., “this [set of conscious states] is impacted by this [set of biological functions] in this [set of manners]”), but this doesn’t afford any conceptual explanation of how the conscious states are allegedly produced by the brain states. Once one understands that, one immediately likewise apprehends that science can afford no answer either because it is predicated on the reductive naturalist methodology.

That would be my shortened argument.

Likewise, whether the brain produces consciousness is widely recognized as a matter of philosophy of mind which is metaphysics and not science. Yes, most scientists are physicalists, but that isn’t a scientific consensus—that’s scientists having a consensus. — Bob Ross

While this is an interesting thought, is this something you can demonstrate?

Taking into consideration the abbreviated argument above, it becomes clear that science cannot afford an answer and consequently the answer to the claim goes beyond the possibility of all experience which, to me, is the definition of metaphysics.

How do you explain modern day neuroscience? Medical Psychiatry? Brain surgery?

From an ontological agnostic’s perspective, those fields are getting much better at understanding the relation between brain states and mental states but they say nothing about what consciousness fundamentally is.

From an Analytic Idealist’s perspective, the strong correlation between mental and brain states is because the brain, along with everything else that is physical in a colloquial sense of the term (i.e., tangible, solid, has shape, etc.), is a extrinsic representation of the mental. I see the color green and the highest level extrinsic representation of that, when examining my brain with a scanner, is the neural activity we see within our perceptions--our representations of the world around is. Think of it like the video game analogy: if a character, Rose, hooks up another character, Billy, to a brain scanner and observes Billy qualitatively experiencing a green tree, she would be factually wrong to conclude that the Billy’s brain states were causing his mental experience of it because, in fact, the tree and his brain and body are fundamentally representations of 0s and 1s in a computer. We conflate our dashboard of experience with what reality fundamentally is—mentality.

Rose wouldn’t be wrong in noting that any scientific inquiry she could do on brain states and mental states (of billy) will be useful and will help them gain better knowledge to navigate the territory—but it says nothing about the itself.

Second, the easy problem confirms that yes, science knows that the brain produces consciousness.

What easy problem confirms that?

Please find me a reputable neuroscience paper that shows that the brain most certainly does not produce consciousness, and then also provides evidence of what is.

If I could, then I would be proving myself wrong. The point is that science doesn’t afford an answer, so it would be contradictory of me to provide you with a scientific explanation, which is a reductive naturalistic approach, to afford an answer.

Finally, just as an aside, how do you explain the mind seeing? The eyes connect through the optic nerve straight to your brain. It has no where else to go.

I would say, in summary, that the extrinsic representation of qualitatively seeing a world, from the side of another being that is qualitatively seeing, is light entering the physical eyes and brain interpreting it—but this is just the representation of it on our dashboard of experience. Under Analytic Idealism, the information is accurate (enough to survive at least), but the way it is represented is not fundamentally how it (ontologically) exists (like the tree in a video game).

This would seem to me that meta-consciousness is "qualitative experience of qualitative experience".

Not quite. Meta-consciousness is the knowledge of one’s qualitative experience: I am not qualitatively experiencing my qualitative experience—I have one steady flow of qualitative experience. The point is that, under Analytic Idealism, you are still conscious when you are in a coma—you just have lost your meta-consciousness and other higher level aspects to consciousness (such as potentially the ability to cognize). Consciousness isn’t just what bubbles up to the ego under Analytic Idealism—you are fundamentally qualitatively experiencing until you die. Under physicalism, this is not the case at all: consciousness is an emergent property and, as such, is only “on” when the higher levels of your brains abilities are “on”--thusly you aren’t conscious when you are in a coma.

At the least, I don't see how it counters my point about Blindsight. The person does not have any qualia, or consciousness, of seeing what is in front of their eyes.

Let me ask you this: what about blindsight indicates, to you, that they don’t have qualia? Simply because they can no longer identify that they are seeing?

Isn't it the attention to these, the conscious experience of them, that is qualia?

No, that is an aspect, a ability, of higher conscious forms. A being can be qualitatively experiencing while having not the capability to self-reflect about it. If you couldn’t self-reflect and acquire self-knowledge then you wouldn’t know that you just smelled that flower: you would just smell the flower—there wouldn’t be a self-reflective “I just smelled a flower”.

I suppose I'm looking for a separation between the meaning of qualia and perception or senses

To me, perceptions are representations of the world, which are qualitative (and thusly are constituted of instances of qualia). Qualia is any instance of qualitative experience, so, to me, there could be a being with qualitatively experiences but isn’t capable of providing itself with a reflection (a representation) of the world around it. For example, I think some plants, which are just strictly stimuli responses to the environment, are qualitatively experiencing (in the form of basic stimuli responses) but are not perceiving anything.

Sensations, on the other hand, are just the raw input which is also qualitative.

Generally I've understood qualia to be that conscious experience of sensations or perceptions, not the mere flooding of light or sound into one's body.

That’s fair. It is usually referred to in that manner simply because humans and higher animals are what are typically considered in the debate, but I would say that it equally applies to any instance of qualitative experience—not just higher conscious life forms.

Back to blindsight, it seems much like the inability to give a conscious focus to what one is perceiving.

But they are still perceiving and perception is qualitative.

Let me clarify what I'm stating. Qualia is the subjective experience of the thing which is observed to be objectively conscious. Qualia is not necessary for us to conclude something is objectively conscious. The reason for this, is we cannot objectively assess qualia. We cannot prove what a conscious being is experiencing, or not experiencing at a subjective level. Therefore we do not consider it objectively, but can only consider it from their subjective viewpoint.

So then are you advocating for epistemic solipsism? To me, this confirms that you can’t actually claim that objectively conscious beings are subjectively conscious and, thusly, we cannot know that there are other subjects but, rather, just that there are other observing beings.

How is this any different from magic then Bob?

Magic is when something poofs into existence from thin air—I am arguing that fundamentally reality is mind and, thusly, that the physical world is what the ideas within that mind appear upon our dashboard of experience. This is no different than when you have a dream and assume the character of a person (of which usually resembles yourself in real life) and view the “objective” dream world from that person’s perspective; and only after waking up do you realize that the entirety of the physical was just a representation of ideas. I don’t see how this is magic.

Thank you again Bob for your clear and deep thoughts on the subject!

And same to you my friend! I always enjoy our conversations!

Bob

Hello Mww,

Things-in-themselves aren’t what appear, never become a sensation, so, yes, those are what we don’t know.

If it never becomes a sensation, then it sounds like you are saying we never come in contact, even indirectly, with the things-in-themselves, is that correct? If so, then how do you know they even exist? If the representational system isn’t getting, as input, sensations of the things-in-themselves, it sounds like, to me, the former is completely accounted for without positing the latter.

Remember: the thing and the thing of the thing-in-itself are identical.

I didn’t follow this part: what is a “thing of the thing-in-itself”? Is that the substance of (or in) which the thing-in-itself is of?

The only difference is the exposure to human systemic knowledge/experience criteria, which reduces to time.

If we aren’t exposed to it as sensations (see my first quote of you), then how are we exposed to it?

We can’t know the thing-in-itself because it doesn’t appear in us. If that specific box….the only one that appeared to your senses…..had stayed at the post office, you’d never know anything of it, even while inferring the real possibility of boxes in general, iff you already know post offices contain boxes.

But when you do look in the box, are you seeing an indirectly contacted box-in-itself? Or is the box-in-itself completely barred from your reach?

If ontology is the study of what is, and what is implies what exists, and to exist is to be conditioned by space and time

If what exists is what is conditioned by space and time, then space and time do not exist.

it follows that if logic is not conditioned by space and time but only time, thereby out of compliance with the criteria for existence, then the study of its ontological predicates from which its ontological status can be determined, is a waste of effort.

Are you saying that the logical part of our representational system (for each and every one of us) only is conditioned by time? So it exists within the temporal world but non-spatially?

Keyword: things. With respect to ontology, logic is not a thing.

But it has to exist in a thing: what thing are you saying it exists in? If it is outside of space and time, then I would think you are claiming it is a thing-in-itself.

I want to get back to something you said the other day, something like….the universal mind change the world to fit out knowledge, to which I thought it better that our knowledge changed to fit the constant world. If I got that right, I might have a thought up a decent counter-argument or two I’d like you to shoot down, in accordance with your thesis.

Please feel free to critique away! I would love to hear your counter-arguments!

However, I think what you are referring to was one of my questions pertaining to your view and not mine (but correct me if I am misremembering): you were claiming that, despite us having no knowledge of the things-in-themselves which makeup the real world, we can still know that our knowledge of the world changes faster than the rate at which the world actually changes (or something along those lines); and I was merely inquiring how you could know that if you can’t know anything about the things-in-themselves—i.e., the real world. I still don’t understand, as of yet, how you resolve that.

In terms of my theory, I don’t think that the Universal Mind changes the world to fit our knowledge but, rather, our knowledge changes to fit reality (which is fundamentally a Universal Mind). The Universal Mind doesn’t have cognitive deliberation, isn’t meta-conscious, nor does it have the ability to enumerate possible motives: it is the most basic, fundamental will which makes up reality and we emerged as evolved beings which have developed the ability to do such “higher level” things. As far as I can tell, the Universal Mind adheres to strict laws.

Way back when, and in the interest of the most general of terminology, that which contacted the bottom of human feet has never changed, even though through the ages more and more knowledge has been obtained about it.

Long ago, some humans knew the moon as some lighted disk in the sky. They also knew of periodically changing ocean levels, but had no comprehension of tidal effects caused by the moon and even less comprehension of effects a mere disk can have. Nowadays the relation between the tides and the moon are the same as they ever were, but there is resident knowledge of that relation derived from principles

I have no problem admitting that our knowledge, in terms of our ability to cognize and deliberate as higher conscious forms, tries to conform to what the world is and, thusly, we slowly learn and adapt our theories to better account for it. My point was that I don’t see how you know that about reality when “reality” under your view, as I am understanding it, is things-in-themselves.

Bob

Hello Janus,

A robot, just like the person who suffers from visual agnosia can see and respond to what they are seeing, but do not have the self-reflective awareness of seeing.

I would argue that they do not “see” in the same manner (i.e., one is qualitatively seeing while the other is just quantitatively processing its environment), so I think you are equivocating when using the term “seeing” in this sentence to refer to both.

The way I interpret this is that both lack subjective experience (of seeing). To put it another way, both the robot and the blindsight person do not know that they can see.

I think it makes more sense, given that blindsight only demonstrates a disassociation with one’s experience, that the person simply isn’t meta-conscious of or perhaps able to identify with their qualitative experience.

If a person suffered agnosia in regard to all their senses, including proprioception and interoception, it would seem hard to say how they would differ from a robot that had functional equivalents of all the human senses, that is a robot that could respond to tastes, smells, tactile feels, sounds, and sights, as well as proprioceptive and interoceptive data.

As far as I understand, ‘agnosia’ is when one fails, despite having adequate senses, to process those senses; so a robot that can process senses would actually have more capability to navigate its environment than the human with agnosia. However, the human would still be qualitatively experiencing, they just fail to process that qualitative experience correctly. Part of qualitative experience, for normal people, is much more than what is required to have baseline ‘qualitative experience’ to me.

Bob

:kiss:

Hello Janus,

Perhaps it would be better to start afresh and in a more concrete way. You seem to be saying that by virtue of feeling our basic existences which you would characterize as "being a mind" (?) we can confidently extrapolate to a view of the basic nature of the cosmos. Are there other steps that need to be added in there or is that it?

Sounds like a plan!

I wouldn’t say that we should be idealists because we can “confidently extrapolate to a view of the nature of the cosmos” as mind, because one can be very confident in virtually any metaphysical theory. Here’s how I would word a simplified, general depiction of my view:

The theory of what reality fundamentally is that is the most parsimonious (viz., maximizes explanatory power while minimizing conceptual complexity), is internally & externally coherent (viz., how well does it cohere with one’s currently more highly prioritized beliefs, such as scientific facts?), is logically consistent (i.e., there’s no logical contradictions), is the most complete (i.e., what can’t it account for?), and aligns best with one’s intuitions (i.e., everyone relies, to some degree, on what “intellectual seems” to be the case). I submit to you that Analytic Idealism, that reality is fundamentally a mind, meets the aforementioned requirements better than physicalism (and any other possible metaphysical theory).

Why (is Analytic Idealism the best theory), you might ask? Well, long story short, it coheres perfectly with scientific knowledge, accounts for the entirety of our experience in the most parsimonious manner (in comparison to any other possible theory), and is logically consistent. The only areas, nowadays, where it suffers is that it is not intuitive to most people (although I think that after properly understanding it people could see it as intuitive) and it isn’t complete (but no other theory is other than the one’s that dream up magical wishful thinking to explain everything).

That would be the spark notes.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

My intention was not to address the hard problem of consciousness. From the argument I've presented, you can see there is no hard problem to address.

I thought you were arguing that minds emerge from brains? Am I misunderstanding you? Or you are saying that the objective vs. subjective consciousness distinction is the out of scope of that claim?

If so, then I think it is very relevant to your claim implicitly because your distinction is predicated, as far as I am understanding, on an outlook that the mind is emergent from the brain. For example, to say that a camera + AI has qualia only makes sense if you are implicitly claiming that consciousness arises out of mechanical (i.e., quantitative) processes which immediately invokes the hard problem.

The reason I explicitly brought it up was because that was what the article you sent was talking about; sorry, I must have misunderstood what you were trying to cite by that article.

I want to ask you what you mean by qualia Bob.

Let me layout how I use the terms in their most generic sense:

Consciousness : qualitative experience.
Qualia: instances of qualitative experience (e.g., seeing a car, feeling a pillow, tasting an apple, etc.).
Meta-consciousness: self-knowledge: ability to acquire knowledge of one’s consciousness (e.g., I not only taste the apple, but I am aware of my tasting of the apple: I can gain knowledge of my own qualitative experience).

These terms are not compatible with your terms, so let me try to cross-reference:

Your use of consciousness is broader than mine, and I think my fits in your “subjective consciousness” category; but to me, you seem to also use my term sometimes to refer to “objective consciousness” as well, or at least I am confused as to whether you think that “objectively conscious” beings have qualitative experience or not? That’s all I mean by consciousness: observation and awareness are not synonymous with consciousness to me—I have found that it just muddies the waters when discussing the hard problem (which I know you are saying you aren’t trying to discuss here, but it is inevitably pertinent hereto).

Isn't this then an example of an objectively conscious being that lacks subjective consciousness? This is actually a limited example of a P-zombie.

No it is not a P-Zombie. Like I said before: there is a difference between not having subjective (qualitative) experience and being unable to identify it. I would argue that the blindsight person is still qualitatively seeing, they just don’t identify themselves as seeing. This could be because they simply don’t think they are having the qualitative experience (like the woman giving childbirth asking “who having this child?”) or that they have lost meta-consciousness when it comes to seeing (just like how some lower life forms have qualitative experience but they are unaware that they have it). A P-Zombie is a being with no qualitative experience, and I am not seeing why blindsight would be an example of such a being.

Qualia to my knowledge, is almost always identified as the experience one has. Qualia is seeing the color green as only you see it.

Correct: qualia is the instances of qualitative experience we have, which doesn’t necessarily mean per se that you see a different color green than I do.

If you believe qualia does not require consciousness

I do believe that qualia requires consciousness, but you refer to things that aren’t qualitatively experiencing as conscious; so under your terms, yes, I do think you are arguing that there could be a being which doesn’t have qualitative experience (or at least we don’t know if they do) but yet we can decipher that they are observing, identifying, and acting upon their environment (which meets your definition of consciousness). Within my terminology one has to be qualitatively experiencing (to some degree) to be conscious: it’s your view that your critique here applies I would say (i.e., If you believe qualia does not require qualitative experience, then what is special about the word qualia at all?). For you, you can cogently claim within your terms that one can be conscious without qualia.

At that point, a p-zombie has qualia, they are just not conscious of it. And if that is the case, then my point that subjective consciousness can be separated from objective consciousness stands does it not?

Again, I hold that P-Zombie are being which observe, identify, and act (to use your terms: conscious) but do not have qualitative experience (consciousness in my terms).

No, but how is that relevant? I'm not claiming that you need subjective consciousness for someone to claim you have objective consciousness. This example once again supports the division I'm noting.

But your division is just a broader definition of consciousness than what is typically used: non-qualitatively observing beings are not standardly included in the definition of consciousness.

As far as I am understanding your terms, there can be objectively conscious beings that are not subjectively conscious, and the former entails nothing about the latter. This entails two important things:

1. There is no bridge between the two, so I don’t think you can claim by abduction with criteria from objective consciousness (i.e., observing, acting, and identifying) that someone is subjectively conscious—and this is just the definition of epistemic solipsism.

2. The terms are perfectly cogent, as laid out, because it just includes more than I would be willing to semantically associate with “consciousness”. I would argue it is leading and will lead to confusions. For example, a philosophical zombie, when they say it isn’t conscious, they are not referring to your “objective consciousness”--so it would incorrect to think that a merely objectively conscious being is “conscious” for intents of the PZ debate. Consciousness is qualitative experience.

Although, I'm once again surprised to hear from you that you don't believe qualia comes from brain states. That's the assumed knowledge of science, psychology, and medicine. Its nothing I have to prove, its a given Bob.

I don’t know why you would say that it is given: that sounds awfully dogmatic. I figured you would have a proof for it, are you saying you just assume that is the case? Am I understanding you correctly?

Moreover, when you say it is assumed knowledge of science (and the other disciplines similar thereto) I think you are wrong and right—it doesn’t entail what you are implying. There’s a difference between scientific consensus and scientists having a consensus: the former is a consensus within a subject within the field of science, and the latter is merely a consensus amongst people who also have the professional of doing science. This is important to distinguish; for example, I think it is safe to say that most scientists are atheists, but I would be wrong to claim that “there is a scientific consensus that God doesn’t exist”--rather, it is really that “there is a consensus amongst scientists that God doesn’t exist”. Likewise, I could, with some truth, claim that “it is assumed that God doesn’t exist in science”. But whether God exists is not a scientific question but, rather, a theological one. Likewise, whether the brain produces consciousness is widely recognized as a matter of philosophy of mind which is metaphysics and not science. Yes, most scientists are physicalists, but that isn’t a scientific consensus—that’s scientists having a consensus.

Can you prove that qualia does not come from brain states? As I mentioned in your last OP, it is not in dispute by anyone within these fields that the mind comes from your brain

Firstly, yes it absolutely is disputed: not every scientist is a physicalist. Secondly, science doesn’t tell us whether the brain produces consciousness.

Thirdly, no I cannot prove that qualia cannot come from brain states but, rather, I can prove that methodological naturalism (which is the same method as science) cannot account for consciousness as brain states. There’s no proof that consciousness is produced by the brain, and so, within metaphysics, it becomes a question of what has the most explanatory power (in terms of explaining the world we experience) while minimizing complexity (of the explanation). Physicalism is less parsimonious than idealism. It’s not about proving it impossible; if that was the case then I should hold that unicorns exist on the other side of the galaxy, that there is an invisible cookie monster that watches me sleep, that there is a teacup floating around saturn, that everything is within my mind, etc.

We can't under my view. We can believe them. We can observe the objective conscious actions they take and assume they must be experiencing qualia

To clarify though, you are saying that determining someone is objectively conscious does not entail that they have qualia, correct?

To clarify, we can't say its the entire cause. When something affects another, that result of that affectation is part of the chain of causality.

I was getting at that correlation is different than causation. When we determine something causes something else, we provide proof in the form of empirical observations and conceptual explanations. We don’t just say: this impact that, so this caused that if we can’t conceptually explain what is actually happening.

But we can certainly say that it has an influence in producing mind, therefore is part of the cause of qualia

I disagree. We can say that consciousness is impacted by brain states which doesn’t entail, in itself, that the brain is influencing the production of the mind.

To claim that there is something else besides brain states would require an example of something besides a brain state affecting qualia.

No it wouldn’t. The claim is that “something else is producing qualia” only has to rely on the fact that the something in question isn’t regarded as producing it. We can’t claim that we know brain states are producing it, so we venture out by claiming “something else might be producing it”. Then, we examine what is the best explanation for the mind-body problem: I would argue it is the exact reverse of what you are claiming: the physical is weakly emergent from the mental, not vice-versa. The reason there’s such a strong correlation is because the physical are representations and at rock bottom it is minds “interacting” with minds so to speak. We have direct, introspective knowledge of ideas being manifested within the physical, whereas we have no knowledge of the physical producing the mental. I think it is more parsimonious to hold consciousness as fundamental.

In what way does the brain have a qualitative state that cannot be explained by the brain alone?

All of it: science doesn’t provide any conceptual explanation of how any mental state is produced by any brain state.

Do you have any example of something else besides the brain which would affect the mind?

I don’t claim that there is something else besides mind, some other third substance, that producing mind but, rather, that mind is fundamental. Mind is affecting mind: ontologically there are ideas in a mind. In schopenhaurian terms: the world is will and representation.

Bob

Hello Janus,

What I really meant was that unless either of us can come up with some new and convincing arguments, neither of us seems likely to change their mind. So, I wasn't calling a halt to the conversation tout court.

Oh, I apologize: I must have misunderstood. If you would like, then I can resume our conversation by responding to your original post (that we left off on)? It is entirely up to you and what you are comfortable with.

I've enjoyed conversing with you, Bob, on account of your being able to engage without distorting what your interlocutor is saying, and to remain patient and civil throughout.

Thank you and same to you my friend!

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

There are not any grounds to believe I am a BiV and compelling evidence that I am not

And this is why I would claim my thoughts are mine. We aren’t saying anything different, as far as I am understanding.

I take your evasive reply as you conceeding the point, Bob, that without public evidence one does not "know" one is not hallucinating

This is just false. If you have to have public evidence to know if you are hallucinating, then you, by your own argument, even under naturalism, can’t prove your thoughts are yours. Likewise, if it were just you left on the planet, you wouldn’t, by your lights, be able to prove ever that anything is not a hallucination.

Other than ideas (re: "idealism"), to what does this phrase refer?

Idealism refers, most broadly, to any metaphysical theory that posits mind as primary (to include less conventional views like Kantianism); and, more specifically, it usually refers to a substance monist view that there is one mental substance which contains mental properties and minds which are responsible for them. The phrase etymologically stems from the word “idea” and “ideal”, but that doesn’t mean it is refers to the metaphysical theory that everything, literally, is an idea.

Bob

Hello Mww,

There’s a box on the shelf at the post office….
(a.k.a., a thing-in-itself)
Guy brings you the box….
(a.k.a, your perception of a thing)
….hands it to you….
(a.k.a., square, solid, heavy, your intuition of a thing)
You open the box….
(a.k.a., the content of your intuition, packaging material, something in a plastic bag, is a phenomenon)
Phenomenon gets passed on to the cognitive part for object determination.

I appreciate the analogy: thank you!

Here’s what I am trying to say in terms of that analogy: the idea that the box is a thing-in-itself which is, by definition, that which we cannot know and my intuition of the box (when I open) it is a phenomena which is a representation of that thing which we cannot know, then it seems self-undermining; for the box as thing-in-itself on the shelf is merely an abstraction (assuming I am not looking at, then it becomes a phenomena) based off of phenomenal boxes. If one were to posit there is something of which we cannot know, then I would reckon we can’t know anything about it—including that we are even representing anything in the first place (because our notion of representating things-in-themselves is just an abstraction of our phenomenal experience, which is supposed to give us no insight into the things-in-themselves). Perhaps you can clarify my confusion with that analogy?

You still don’t know what the content of the box is, only that the box has something in it, and you never would have had the opportunity to find out if it had stayed on the shelf at the post office. You could have lived your entire life without knowledge of the content of that box even while knowing full well post offices contain a manifold of all sorts of boxes; you can only know the contents of boxes handed to you. And, at this point, the last thing to cross your mind is how the box got to the post office in the first place, a.k.a., its ontological necessity

This sounds like maybe you don’t hold that we cannot know the things-in-themselves that appear to us, is that correct?

Analogies really suck, when it comes right down to it, there’s never a perfect one

I agree!

Phenomena are only one of three general classes of representation, the other two are conceptions and judgement, which is technically the representation of a representation.

My point is that you have to use your representation to argue that we have the other two classes, and if that class is supposed to give us zero knowledge of what actually is then that makes me wonder what grounds there are to say there are two other classes beyond that class (if we are using that class to determine the other two).

In other words, we start with just empirical inquiry (which can be as basic as introspection) and so we start with phenomena. We then reverse engineer that we those appearances that we are analyzing are produced by a representational system which has two other classes of representation and what not. We use phenomena to argue there is something beyond phenomena: but this isn’t compatible with the claim that phenomena give us zero insight to non-phenomenal things.

Sorting out the illusory has nothing to do with phenomena. Reason, the faculty that subjects judgement to principles to determine the logical relation of cognitions to each other, separates the illusory from the rational. Humans can confuse/delude themselves in their thinking, without the possibility of experience correcting them, hence phenomena are irrelevant.

I didn’t follow this part. Kant is very avidly arguing that phenomena give us no insight into the things-in-themselves, and I would say his argument for them (i.e. transcendental argumentation) is predicated on reverse engineering the phenomena—so, by my lights, illusions is just the working out by comparison different phenomenal experiences from each other to see how a particular thing (as a phenomean) expresses itself sans other factors (that can produce illusions).

That which assembles the parts of the representation of a perception in order, is intuition. That which assembles intuitions in order for successive perceptions of the same thing, is logic. In this way, it is not necessary to learn what thing is at each perception, but only understanding that either it’s already been learned, and subsequent perceptions conform to it, or they do not. Already been learned taken as a euphemism for experience.

In the tripartite human logical sub-system in syllogistic form of synthetic conjunction, understanding is the faculty of rules, by which phenomena provided a posteriori are taken as the major premise, conceptions provided a priori by understanding according to rules, serves as the minor premise or series of minors, the logical relation of one to the other is represented in a judgement, which serves as the conclusion.

Thank you for the elaboration, but I am still not completely following. My question was what is the logical part of the representation system and, if I may add now, what the representation system is—not in the sense of every piece or part that produces how it works but, rather, ontologically what it is. A thing-in-itself vs. a phenomena are ontological statuses, so to speak, (viz., one exists merely as an appearance and the other the represented existent things beyond space and time): what ontological status does the logical part of the representational system have it is not a thing-in-itself nor an appearance. I get it is a logical system, but ontologically what is it?

Oh man. And we haven’t even started on the aspect of human cognition that is completely logical, which just means there’s no dogs or kids or sensations of any kind, and nobody to tell you how wrong you are. You know this is the case, because you’ve conceived the notion of a universal mind as a completely valid and no one can tell you you’re wrong, that the conception is invalid, but only that the synthesis of the manifold of conceptions conjoined to the major, used by each, don’t relate in the same way, or do not relate at all, which only invalidates the one judgement relative to the other.

I didn’t quite follow this either: someone can prove me wrong about there being a universal mind. I don’t take it as absolutely true.

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

How do you know that you are not hallucinating "that you have thoughts"? or that those alleged "thoughts" are yours and not someone elses "thoughts"?

This is just unparsimonious hard skepticism. How do you know that you aren’t a brain in a vat? You don’t.

I know that I am having thoughts because it accounts for the data (i.e., the thoughts occuring in my head) most parsimoniously. I can’t be certain that I am not in a matrix, within a matrix, within another matrix, … .

I don't understand what you mean by "metaphysically necessary". At least as far as (e.g.) property dualism is concerned, the negation of "universal mind" – mental substance – is not a contradiction.

Of course it isn’t a logical contradiction, but, then again, literally every sophisticated metaphysical theory is logically consistent—so it isn’t saying much.

If by “contradiction” you were referring to “metaphysical impossibility”, then, yes, under Analytic Idealism, there is nothing with any potency to produce a mind-independent world. In other words, the Universal Mind is posited as existing in all possible worlds, and that excludes the possibility of any mind-independent objects.

... and yet you claim to be monist positing "mental substance" wherein there are only ideas. :roll:

I am not claiming that a “mental substance” is a substrate which only bears ideas: it bears mental properties and minds which are responsible thereof.

Bob

Hello Janus,

I don't think we are going to agree on these things, so maybe we should leave it before we start going around in circles.

Absolutely no worries! I can respond more adequately if you would like, but it seems like you are hinting that you would like to end the conversation. I appreciate you having a conversation with me about it and look forward to many more to come!

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I appreciate you sharing those links with me: blindsight is, indeed, a very interesting topic. I read through the article and, long story short, I do not think that the author provided a resolution (nor a partial resolution nor a method to providing a resolution) to the hard problem of consciousness. Although the scientific inquiry into how consciousness relates to the brain is most definitely a fascinating subject and fruitful, I did not find anything the author was citing as evidence as proof of consciousness being emergent from brains.

Firstly, blindsight, and many other related disabilities (e.g., blindhearing, blindtaste, etc.), is the dissociation of a person with their qualia and not the absense of qualia. The author even admits this implicitly:

To DB himself, his success in guessing seemed quite unreasonable. So far as he was concerned, he wasn’t the source of his perceptual judgments, his sight had nothing to do with him.
…
One of the most striking facts about human patients with blindsight is that they don’t take ownership of their capacity to see.

Of course, a person who lacks the ability to associate their qualia with themselves is going to say that they aren’t seeing anything when, in fact, they obviously are. This is no different than people who lose all sense of self: they don’t thereby lose their qualitative experience but, rather, their ability to identify it as theirs. I heard a fascinating story of a woman who suffered from complete loss of self; and during childbirth, she kept frantically asking “who’s having the child?”. Does the fact that she can’t associate herself with her own childbirth prove (or even suggest) that she isn’t giving birth to a child? Of course not! Does the fact that someone can’t associate themselves with their own qualitative seeing prove (or even suggest) that they aren’t having it? Of course not! So, right off the bat, I think the author mistakenly thought that neuroscience was proving that qualia is gone with patients suffering from blindsight: no, they still have qualia.

Secondly, I would like to note that I have no problem admitting that brain states and mental states are inextricably linked and, thusly, damage to the brain directly affects the mental activity (and abilities) of a mind. So, I have no problem admitting that it may be possible for a person to lose all sense of self (viz., self-identity), meta-consciousness (i.e., self-knowledge), etc. but as long as they are alive they are having qualitative experience to some degree—even if they don’t recognize it.

Thirdly, throughout the article the author, despite recognizing their work as pertaining to the hard problem, didn’t give any solution to it other than vague notions of evolutionary processes:

Their properties are to be explained, therefore, not literally as the properties of brain-states, but rather as the properties of mind-states dreamed up by the brain.
...
I believe sensations originated as an active behavioural response to sensory stimulation: something the animal did about the stimulus rather than something it felt about it.
…
In short, the animal can begin to get a feel for the stimulus by accessing the information already implicit in its own response. This, I believe, is the precursor of subjective sensation. But, of course, it will not at first be sensation as we humans know it: it will not have any special phenomenal quality.

In short, none of this explainshow mind-independent stuff produces mind. Also, the first sentence (I quoted) doesn’t even make any sense: if qualia are properties of mind-states rather than brain-states, then that means it is irreducible to brain-states—there’s some extra “mind stuff” happening that has those uniquely qualitative properties. If not, then the author still has to provide how the brain-states are producing the so-called “mind-states” that, in turn, produce such properties. I know you don’t like camps, but to summarize here briefly, their argument sounds like a mixture of property dualism and physicalism in a manner that is incapable with eachother. Maybe I misunderstanding something.

The last thing I will comment on (for now) about the article was the 6 criteria of investigating whether an animal is conscious (according to the author), which were:

1. Have a robust sense of self, centred on sensations?
2. Engage in self-pleasuring activities – be it listening to music or masturbation?
3. Have notions of ‘I’ and ‘you’?
4. Carry their sense of their own identity forward?
5. Attribute selfhood to others?
6. Lend out their minds so as to understand others’ feelings?

None of these have anything to do with the hard problem.

I think it is important that we separate two different claims that we have since been mushing together: knowing how qualitative experience is for a being is different than knowing that they have it. So, when you say:

Do I know the exact qualia of someone else getting blacked out? No. But I know my own.

I agree, but I want to clarify some things. Firstly, I don’t see how you can prove that a being is having qualitative experience (under your view)--not just how they are experiencing it themselves. Secondly, the hard problem has nothing to do with either of these two: it is about how something mind-independent produces mind, which is not the same claim as “how a being experiences qualia” or “how one knows that other’s have qualia”: the former doesn’t matter and the latter is a presupposition of the formulation of the problem.

If it is the case that we can use quantitative processes to change our own qualia, then the argument I made stands and you're still holding a contradiction.

Another important clarification I think we need is that knowing that something affects something else does not entail, in itself, that it causes it. You can certainly prove that quantitative processes affect qualia, but not that the former produces the latter: these are two different claims. I have no problem admitting that qualia is affected by quantitative processes; but, I would say, we cannot fully account for all emergent properties of a human being (specifically mental properties) by means of the quantitative processes of the physical properties, whereas we can with a camera + AI. So there’s a symmetry breaker there.

Secondly, I would like to note, although it may be too far beyond the scope of our conversation right now, that I don’t actually hold there are quantities ontologically. Just like how I think the “sun” is a nominal distinction, so is mathematics: it isn’t real. So yeah, I am a mathematical anti-realist: I’m sure we probably disagree on that (; But, the important thing to note is that from the perspective of everything being mind, the camera and all its “quantitative” processes are a steady flow of qualities and our quantifying of those qualities is just an approximate thereof. The reason I was using the “quantitative cannot produce qualities” argument was to keep this friendly to physicalist notions, because a mind-independent world usually entails that reality is fundamentally quantitative and qualities are only emergent with minds.

Where is the evidence of qualia? If I operate on a dog and open up the brain, do I see the image and smell the smells the dog is experiencing? No

We know by abductive argumentation: I have evidence of my qualia, and, on the other “side” of it, I am a physical organism which operates the exact same (just with more superior functionality) to a dog—so the best explanation is that the dog is also qualitatively experiencing. Otherwise, one runs into unparsimonious explanations (e.g., my dog is obviously dreaming right now….but he could be a philosophical zombie that isn’t really dreaming).

You are right that PZs can’t be disprove because they are unfalsifiable; however, they are not the best explanation of organisms around us at all.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Philosophim,

Thank you for the clarifications: now that I have a better grasp (hopefully) of what you are saying, let me offer some worries/critiques I have. To simplify it down, here are the three main ones:

1. The fact that a being observes, identifies, and acts does not entail, in itself, that it has qualia.

2. The fact that a being has qualia does not entail, in itself, that there is something to be like it.

3. Qualia is irreducible to brain states.

I will let you navigate the discussion where you deem fit. Apart from the parts of your post (that I think) fall under one of the above categories, here’s my responses:

But beliefs about something are not objective, therefore they do not belong in objective analysis or discussion

Beliefs are behavioral attitudes towards things which are objective and, as such, absolutely pertain to objective inquiry. I don’t think you can name a single field of study which isn’t predicated on beliefs—not even science.

We use beliefs to try and figure out what reality is, and most of our “knowledge” is made up of beliefs about the world (based off of evidence): this includes science and any empirical inquiry anyone can do.

For example, I believe that “every change has a cause”, and this is one of the axioms of science—one of the axioms of studying objectively brains.

I don’t think you can neatly separate beliefs from some sort of objective inquiry like you are implying.

And yet that's not logical. I can look at a brain, know what it is made of and see that there is no room for qualitative anything: it is all chemical, quantitative operations. So according to your argument, you could confidently say that you know no human being has qualitative experience, including yourself. This is a contradiction, so we know it to be wrong.

This isn’t true: you can’t account for qualia, which you do know exists because you have it, by looking at the quantitative processes of the brain. We can account for a camera simply by its quantitative processes and parts that produce those quantified measurements. I don’t see any contradiction here.

Bob, I don't care about philosophical identities. They're useful as a digest to get into particular thoughts, but the identity itself is unimportant. What's important to me is whether arguments have consistent, logical applications that allow us to function in the world optimally. If my points blow through some type of philosophical ideology but meet the criteria I value, so be it.

Fair enough! Let me re-phrase it: it is important if you are claiming that there is a mind-independent world which has mind-independent brains that produce qualia.

proof would be a logically consistent belief that is concurrent with reality

The idea that a dog has qualia is logically consistent and concurs with reality; but yet you said we cannot ‘prove’ it: why? The belief that a dog has qualia is a reasonable, cogent, and evidence based claim which meets your definition of proof.

I take you to mean that observing, identifying, and acting are pragmatically useful for determining if one has receptivity, sensibility, and some knowledge of its environment: is that correct? — Bob Ross

No, I very purposefully excluded anything that had to do with perception as a requirement for consciousness. Perception is often associated with the five senses.

By “knowledge of its environment”, I am not referring to “perception” necessarily, so I agree with you here; and “sensibility” is not referring to only human (or higher animal like) senses but, rather, sensing at all (which includes mechanical sensing).

That subjective experience is what they have, which is undeniable.

Under your view, how is this undeniable? I thought you are claiming that we can’t know.

For example, I like the color blue. Its my favorite color. No one else can say objectively that its my favorite color, because there's no way of proving it

Although you are correct that “I like the color blue” is subjective, it doesn’t follow that no one can invalidate that claim. If it turns out, unbeknownst to you, that you don’t like the color blue, then your proclamation of “I like the color blue” is in fact false. A proposition being subjective just means that the truthity is indexical (i.e., relative to the subject at hand), not that the subject is 100% correct pertaining thereto. You can absolutely get your preferences wrong (e.g., be delusional or simply really bad at psycho analysis). If the proposition “I like the color blue” is factually (i.e., objectively evaluated) as false and you claim it to be true, then you are wrong: it doesn’t matter that we are talking about your preferences.

I will stop here for now and let you respond,

Bob

Hello Tom Storm,

I wasn't referring to your arguments. I was saying in general any argument for universal mind would be held by fallacious ideas

Those two statements contradict each other.

like the ones I already mentioned and probably others

Can you refresh my memory? What fallacious ideas?

Such as universal mind being metaphysically necessary - this is no different than a Christian presuppositional apologist making the same claim.

This is true of all metaphysical theories and has nothing specific to do with Christian apologists (nor any other mainstream religion): physicalists also posit something as metaphysical necessary. Atheists which subscribe to a metaphysical theory of reality necessarily posit something as metaphysically necessary. There’s no way of avoiding it.

I do want to clarify though that I am not arguing that the Universal Mind exists because it is metaphysically necessary but, rather, that, under this metaphysical theory, it is posited as existing (for other reasons); and because it exists and there is no more data of experience to explain it seems best to posit it as metaphysically necessary. Metaphysics is about giving the best general account of what reality is while increasing explanatory power and decreasing complexity. Every theory stops somewhere, and that stopping point is the metaphysically necessary stuff.

I didn't mean it was like Yahweh (in personality). I said like Yahweh it plays a similar role - I am very familiar with Kastrup's account of what he calls mind-at-large - instinctive, not metacognitive, etc.

I see.

It's not a straw man (at least not intentionally) - it comes from Kastup interviews where he essentially says - for there to be object permanence, a universal mind is necessary. His line (I'm paraphrasing) ' It means that when I park my car in the garage it is still there after I go inside'. If I knew which interview, I would include a clip here but I don't have to time to go find it.

But you can help us all here by answering the question - does your understanding of mind-at-large provide object permanence?

The idea there is not that the Universal Mind is metaphysically necessary because of object permanence but, rather, that there must be an objective world to best explain object permanence; and in the case of Kastrup, since he is an idealist, he utilizes the Universal Mind to explain it (i.e., there is an objective world which is the ideas in a universal mind and not subjectively in my mind only).

And, yes, I would say there is object permanence—but that doesn’t mean that the Universal Mind is metaphysically necessary. It’s “necessary” to explain the world around us (which exhibits permanence) by positing that there is an objective world of which we are in. The same line of argument can be used in the opposite direction for physicalism.

Bob

Hello Mww,

That time of year, me ‘n’ the Better Half pack up, temporarily donate the furry grandkids to a sitter, and hit the road. Maybe there’s a message herein: last time we came here a “never-happens-here” hurricane had just blown the place into the sea, this time “never-happens-here” wildfires burnt the place to the ground. (Sigh)

I am sorry to hear that Mww! I hope you are all ok!

Try this on for size. Thing-in-itself is out there, just waiting around, doing what things-in-themselves do, minding their own business. Human gets himself exposed to it, perceives it, it affects him somehow, it gets translated it into this stuff that travels along its nerves to its main processing center

Here is an example of where I am confused: if the phenomena don’t provide knowledge about things-in-themselves, then how can you claim that we have a representational system which is the translation of the stuff that travels along the nerves to the main processing center? To me, that concedes that we actually do get inferential knowledge from the phenomena about the things-in-themselves: which, by my lights, negates Kant’s argument. He was claiming that we cannot know anything about things-in-themselves.

That stuff on the nerves represents what the perception was, but the owner of the nerves isn’t the slightest bit aware of any of that nerve stuff. That stuff is phenomenon stuff.

I get that, under Kantianism, each person is considered to be a representational system, so to speak, that has receptivity and sensibility which get translated into perception, and those perceptions are phenomena; but, to me, Kant’s flaw is that he then claims that, given that representational system, we shouldn’t expect phenomena to tell us anything about things-in-themselves: but that’s what he used (i.e., phenomena) to come to understand that he is fundamentally a representational system. To me, that seems a bit self-refuting, what do you think? Am I still not grasping the distinction between things-in-themselves and phenomena?

It is an empirically proven fact humans sometimes get what they perceive wrong

True, but this doesn’t matter for Kant, because, to him, sorting out the non-illusory from the illusory is just more phenomena: which says nothing about things-in-themselves.

Oh, neither, absolutely. Those conceptions are already methodologically assigned; to use them again in a way not connected to the original, is mere obfuscation. The logical part is just that, a part, operating in its own way, doing its own job, not infringing where it doesn’t belong. Why have a theory on, say, energy, then qualify it by attributing, say, cauliflower, to it as a condition?

Interesting, if the logical part of the system is not a part of the thing-in-itself and is not phenomena, then what is it? To me, it either exists as a part of the things-in-themselves (i.e., reality) or it is an appearance from our representational faculty—there’s no third option.

Ehhhh….I don’t need an account of reality. All I need is an account of how I might best understand the parts of it that might affect me, be it what it may. Ontological agnosticism sounds close enough to “I don’t really care”, so yeah, I guess.

Fair enough; however, I think that if one endeavors to give an account, idealism is the best choice.

but even if there is, nothing changes for me. If I think the moon is just this kinda thing because the universal mind’s idea is what gives it to me, it is still just a moon-thing to me

This is fair and true: the world of which we experience does not change depending on what metaphysical theory we postulate as true—but what we are trying to do is get at the truth.

Universal mind is just as empty a conception with respect to human cognition, as is lawful brain mechanics

I wouldn’t say it is an empty concept.

You and I talking here aren’t invoking any universal mind in just the doing of it, and even if such a thing is operating in the background we’re not conscious of it as such, so…..

In terms of practicality, one can live a perfectly fine life without subscribing to a metaphysical theory; but the goal is to get at the truth not what is practical for most laymen. Most people don’t need to know physics or calculus either, but that doesn’t take aware from what they get right about reality.

Bob

Hello Tom Storm,

Yes, I figure universal mind is essentially a god surrogate - held in place by similar fallacious justifications and essentially by faith

I did not come to say there is a universal mind on faith nor is it grounded in fallacious argumentation. What fallacies do you think I have committed?

Instead of (in the case of Yahweh) arguing there can't be something from nothing, therefore god

The Universal Mind that I am discussing is not Yahweh—not even close. Honestly, some philosophers (like Schopenhauer) are atheists that hold there is a Universal Mind.

AI seems to be saying, there can't be consciousness from nothing, therefore universal mind

This is a straw man: I never made this argument nor has any Analytic Idealist I have ever encountered.

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

There is not any publicly accessible evidence for such an entity

One does not have to have public evidence of something to know it necessarily. If that were the case, then you can’t know that you have thoughts.

"everything is fundamentally mind-dependent" (including this "fundamental", which I find self-refuting)

The idea is the the universal mind is what is metaphysically necessary: what is self-refuting about that?

By “everything is fundamentally mind-dependent”, I mean that it is a part of a mental substance and not that there are no facts, if that is what you are trying to get at.

then "a universal mind" is only an idea, not a fact or "natural process".

A universal mind is not an idea, it would be an fact that it exists: it is a mind within a mental substance. Natural processes are not only physical (i.e., mind-independent) processes.

Bob

Hello Janus,

Can you elaborate as to just what data is being explained by the idea of the world as will or mind at large?

It is the best, allegedly, the most parsimonious general account of what the world (i.e., reality) is. In contradistinction to its main competitor (which is physicalism), it accounts for the data of qualitative experience, which is arguably the most real aspect of all of our lives, much better.

The main difference, in terms of explanatory power over the data of experience, revolves around consciousness.

Our introspective access to consciousness I would not class as data. I would only class as data what can be observed publicly and corroborated by repeated experiment. It's not even clear that our purported introspective access to consciousness is what it naively seems to be.

I would. Introspection is a form of empirical inquiry; and, yes, we can have illusory ideas of what consciousness is, but this is no different for anything else. Humans have had illusory ideas of objects for as long as history can remember.

Conscious experience is what one can be the most sure of—not objects. We use our conscious experience, we trust it enough, to determine the objects.

Yes, but all of this is purely speculative and cannot be tested.

Again, empirical inquiry is only a negative criterion for metaphysics. You can test and not test physicalism in the exact same manners as idealism. There are aspects that cannot be tested, and aspects that could technically indicate their implausibility.

I can come to know what seems right and wrong to me

Then you agree that ethics is a form of knowledge?

For example, if one can only gather knowledge by observation and logic, then they can never come to know what a concept of concepts is. — Bob Ross

I have no idea what this means.

My point was that scientific inquiry and logic are not exclusive means of determining knowledge: it doesn’t work; and an example of that is the ‘concept of concepts’.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

Thank you for the elaboration, as I think I am beginning to penetrate into your terminology. However, I want to keep explaining it back to you to ensure I am getting it right. We simply do not use the terms the same, which is totally fine.

As I am now understanding you, “consciousness”, in general, is any being which “observes” and “identifies” its environment (and, as an optional addition, acts upon it); and “objective consciousness” is simply to be “conscious” (in the sense I defined above) whereas “subjective” consciousness is to be “conscious” plus qualia. In other words, every “subjectively conscious” being is “objectively conscious”, but not necessarily every “objectively conscious” being is “subjectively conscious”: is that fair?

However, there’s another aspect to this that I am sensing: the terms “objective” and “subjective” are meant to distinguish between the epistemic access we have to consciousness, and that is perhaps why you didn’t just use the term “consciousness” to refer to “an observing and identifying being” and “qualitative experience” (or what have you) as “an subjectively observing and identifying being”. Is that correct?

In terms of the distinction in epistemic access, I am understanding you to be claiming that we can only “know” of “objective aspects of consciousness”, where “knowledge” is perhaps restricted to what is empirically verifiable? Is that correct?

You can act as well, its just not required to subjectively be conscious. Think about someone in a coma that was unresponsive, but later comes out of it and is able to repeat conversations they heard while unresponsive. They were conscious, just unable to act.

I think perhaps “acting”, in the sense that you are using it (i.e., a visible bodily motion), is insufficient (which I think you are alluding to here). I think of being conscious as having receptivity (i.e., ability to receive input), sensibility (i.e., ability to acquire sensations from the receptors), knowledge of one’s environment (i.e., whether that be perception, self-knowledge, or basic stimulus responses), and having mental activity (e.g., qualia, thoughts, concepts, etc.). For you, I would imagine the last element there is not required (for one to be conscious), but the first three I think fit well into what I think you are trying to convey: I don’t think it matters if a being is actively displaying high-level bodily motions (i.e., actions). Maybe we can agree on that.

Observing identifying and acting are objective measures of consciousness that can be known from monitoring a thing

I take you to mean that observing, identifying, and acting are pragmatically useful for determining if one has receptivity, sensibility, and some knowledge of its environment: is that correct?

Qualitative experience would be the experience of observing and identifying from the subject observing and identifying.

This is where I get a bit confused: are you saying that the exact same “observing” and “identifying” is occurring objectively and the only subjective aspect is the viewpoint of the subject which is objectively “observing” and “identifying”? Because then it sounds like you might be saying qualia are not subjective, but merely the viewpoint of a subject that is having them is.

No, we cannot actually know whether other beings qualitatively experience, we can only assume or make an induction that they do.
…
Its like this: Both of our eyes see the wavelength for the color green, but I can never know if what you subjectively experience as green is the same as what I subjectively experience as green.

To me, your example argues a different point than your original claim (in that paragraph): the example is already conceding that “there is something to be like me” but that you can’t know what that is like, whereas your original claim was that we can’t even know that “there is something to be like me” (from you viewpoint). Are you claiming both of these claims (i.e., that you cannot know that there is something to be like me from your perspective and that you cannot know, even if there was something to be like me, what it would be like to be me)?

We can assume that there is, but we cannot know that there is. Whether a robot has qualitative experience and what its like is outside of the realm of knowledge.
…
Bob, can you prove that I have qualitative experience?

Firstly, I just want to note that I do not think I need certainty to “know” things. Yes, I think that I can “know” you have qualitative experience insofar as it would be special pleading of me to think of myself as the only human being who has it. No I am not certain of it.

Secondly, I am be confident enough to say that a camera and an AI do not have qualitative experience because I can know what they are made of and there is no room for qualitative anything: it is all mechanical, quantitative operations. I am not certain that a pool of water cannot, all else being equal, turn into a car; but I am very confident that it won’t.

If you give me something which only has quantitative measuring capabilities, then I expect it to not have qualitative experience (but I do expect it to have awareness in the sense of the ability to quantify its environment).

It is just as difficult to prove I have qualitative experience as it is to prove a dog has qualitative experience. Since we cannot, when talking about what we can know objectively, qualitative experience of beings or things other than ourselves is unnecessary.

I would like to note that it is very necessary to prove it if one is a reductive physicalist: the entire metaphysical theory is riding on it.

Also, it seems like ‘proof’ to you implies certainty: is that correct? If so, then I agree that I cannot prove that a dog has qualitative experience, but then again I can’t prove that boiling eggs in water will cook them either. If I remember correctly, then the vast majority of your “knowledge” is cogency (i.e., inductions and abductions), right? If so, then you can run a very confident and cogent argument (‘proof’) that dogs have qualitative experience, but it doesn’t provide certainty for sure.

I'll refer back to seeing the wavelength green vs experiencing the qualitative color of what green is to you. Its not that there isn't anything qualitatively happening to other people. Its that its outside of our knowledge

To me, it seems as though you are claiming sometimes that we can’t know that other people have qualitative experience (viz., that there is something to be like them: they have qualia) and other times you are conceding that point, like the above paragraph, and saying just can’t know what it would be like to be like them.

Can you prove it otherwise? Can you demonstrate with full knowledge that I have subjective qualitative experience?

Why would I need to prove it with full knowledge (and am assuming full certainty) for it to be worth believing (or claiming to know)?

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

Is breathing "reducible" to lungs, digesting "reducible" to intestines or walking "reducible" to legs? No, each is a function – "activity" – of the latter, respectively, just as mind(ing) – "mental activity" – is a (set of) function(s) of the brain-body-environment.

Of course breathing isn’t reducible to lungs, but it is reducible to the total functions and parts responsible for it. Obviously there is more to the weakly emergent property of breathing than simply having lungs. To me, that doesn’t seem like a good analogy to oversimplify the act of breathing to just lungs: it is still weakly emergent because it is reducible to the set of functions and parts which produce it.

If you think breathing has some irreducible aspect to it, then please elaborate.

To me, being “weakly emergent”, as a matter of definition, is to say that the emergent property is reducible to the set of constituents (and their relations to each other) that are responsible for producing it (regardless of whether those are functions or not).

I don't understand what "in a formal sense" means here.

The term ‘physical’ has two meanings (among more): tangible objects within conscious experience and mind-independent objects—and they aren’t the same thing. The latter is what is invoked by the metaphysical theory called ‘physicalism’.

The "physical" methodology certainly "exists"

A methodological approach that treats the world as if there are mind-independent objects is not the same as the ontological claim that there are mind-independent objects. So I agree with you here, but that’s not what I was talking about: “physical” in the formal sense, that I was talking about, is the claim that there are, as a matter of an ontological as opposed to a mere methodological claim, mind-independent objects (and that is, as well, different than merely claiming that there are tangible objects within one’s experience).

and facilitates productive sciences and technologies

I agree that methodological naturalism (although I am not convinced that the methodological physicalism, in the sense of treating everything as mind-independent, is actually necessary to produce the fruitful results) has produced many productive sciences and I do not plan on advocating their removal; however, that says nothing about ontology.

regardless of Analytic Idealists ignoring it "in a formal sense" or any other sense.

I am unsure as to what you are referring to here. One can be a methodological naturalist and an analytic idealist: the former is a methodology for inquiry about the world which takes the world to be a natural process while the other is an ontological claim that everything is fundamentally mind-dependent. A universal mind can be a part of a natural process, and one can claim that the only way to understand it is via empirical inquiry of the natural world. Supernaturalism isn’t necessitated by being an idealist whatsoever, although many end up going that route.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

Very glad to see you Bob! The reason I bowed out from your thread is I felt my points would deviate too much from your original intent. I felt that your thread was addressing those who were somewhat familiar with your topic, and agreed and understood basic points. My questions and critiques seemed too far out of place for your OP, and I did not want to derail your thread from others.

Oh I see: fair enough!

Although I understand it better, I still don’t think I have completely pinned down your terminology; so let me ask for further clarification (and then I will revisit your post to respond adequately).

Is “qualitative experience” (i.e., qualia) different to you than observing, identifying, and acting (or are they the same)?

Is “awareness” different than “qualitative experience”? Is it the same as observing, identifying, and acting?

Do those terms, to you, refer to the exact same thing?

Am I correct in saying that, under your view, “objective” and “subjective” consciousness are both referring to qualitative experience? Awareness? Both?

This is mostly because subjective consciousness of other beings is outside of knowledge. It is something we simply cannot know.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like you are saying that we can objectively know that other beings have qualitative experience and that there is something to be like that subject but we cannot know what it is like to be that subject: is that correct?

They can have robotic consciousness.

Are you saying that there is something to be like a robot as a subject (but we just can’t know what that is like) and it has qualitative experience?

Objectively, consciousness does not require you to be human, can we both agree on that? Is a dog conscious? A bat? A crab?

I agree, but I think this is equally true within your “subjective” consciousness as well. I am not sure what the distinction is doing here (in terms of specifying only “objective” consciousness does not require you to be human).

To observe, then identify, doesn't some "thing" have to observe, then match it to an identity?

So this is where I need to re-evaluate depending on what you mean by the terms “awareness”, “qualitative experience”, “consciousness”, and “observation”. I don’t hold that a camera + a computerized interpreter (of the images) equates to a conscious being but I do agree that the camera is aware (as an observer) to some limited degree (in order to take in a photo of the environment). I just don’t hold consciousness and observation as the same thing, so can you elaborate on what you mean? Are they the same to you?

Is that not the qualitative experience?

No, I do not hold that there is something to be like a camera + computerized interpreter (of those images or what have you). I do not hold that the camera has qualitative experience: all that is occurring is quantitative measurements through-and-through. It quantifies its environment and then quantitatively analyzes the image (or what have you). qualitative experience, on the other hand, can’t be completely quantified—e.g., the subjectively experienced redness of the truck can’t be accurately quantified, whereas the camera is capturing quantitatively what it thinks is there and displaying it quantitatively via pixels (in hex encoded colors or what have you), of which you qualitatively experience when you look at the image via the camera screen (after taking a picture). There’s nothing qualitative happening in terms of the internal processes of the camera nor is the camera subjectively experiencing anything (I would say).

Objective consciousness is the observation and confirmation that there is consciousness apart from the subjective experience itself.

I don’t see how you can come to understand a thing as conscious but yet say you haven’t thereby posited it as subjectively experiencing: could you elaborate?

By my lights, the whole point of saying something is conscious is to grant that it has subjective experience, and the outer, objective analysis of that looks like the an aware, organic entity. It sounds like, under your view, there could be a being which is conscious but doesn’t have any subjective experience but, to me, that’s like saying that we can determine something thinks while holding it may not have a thinker.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I know we terminated our conversation about consciousness on my thread because you felt there wasn’t much more that could be said, but I figured I would still put in my two cents into your thread to see if we can come to some agreement. Of course, it is your thread, so if you still feel as though there is nothing more to be productively said, then please feel free to terminate our discussion wherever you would like. I have a feeling that we are on polar opposites of the discussion when it comes to this topic, but that’s exactly what makes conversations the most interesting (;

To start, let me try to understand fully what you are saying. To me, it seems as though you are claiming there are two types of consciousness (i.e., subjective and objective) which are completely separable from each other; but, to me, when I read your post, it seemed like ‘objective’ consciousness is merely a more restricted scope of ‘subjective’ consciousness: the former seemed to be the latter with just the redaction of “what it is to be like a subjective experiencing” or, as you put it, “the viewpoint of consciousness itself”.

If that is correct, then I don’t see how “They are entirely separate realms of discussion and analysis”: when one analyzes how an organism has conscious experience of something, that is still “tied” to the same “consciousness” as that organism that is subjectively experiencing. I fear that this distinction implies that there could possibly be a being which has consciousness but doesn’t subjectively experience, but the consciousness we are studying objectively (from the side of behavior) is the same thing as the qualitative experience that the subject itself is having: we just don’t have direct, private access to it like that subject does.

This leads me to your definition of “consciousness” (i.e., “Awareness [consciousness] is a combination of two main factors: Observation and identification”): to me, being “conscious” and being “aware” (in the sense of observing and identifying) are not the same thing—perhaps this is a semantic dispute though. A being can be “aware” in the sense of being capable (to some degree) of observing its environment and identifying different aspects of its observation without having qualitative experience: for example, even basic AIs today can observe their environment and identify things (such as cups, tables, chairs, etc.) and they do not have conscious, qualitative experience: there is nothing to be like that AI (as of yet at least): it simply gathers input, interprets it, and produces output. When it touches something, it doesn’t feel it qualitatively; when it sees something, it has no qualitative sense of seeing happening there; when it hears, it doesn’t experience the sound itself but, rather, is just input/output like a computer. For these reasons, I think “awareness” should be distinguished from “consciousness”; otherwise, there becomes an ambiguity of what one is saying (e.g., are you talking about qualitative experience or just the ability to take in input and interpret the environment?--these are two very different things). Perhaps, is that what you are trying to get at with “objective” vs. “subjective” consciousness? Is “subjective” consciousness the qualitative experience and “objective” consciousness the mere awareness of the environment (plus the interpretation of it)?

For now, I think this is a good start.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Wonderer1,

Much more important, it seems to me, is how undisciplined is the the speculation. Scientific speculation is disciplined, by looking to external reality for support or falsification. Mother Nature can smack you upside the head if you get it wrong.

Metaphysics is just as disciplined as science: they just use different criteria to determine their respective inquiries. Also, metaphysics also looks at external reality for support or falsification, but it doesn’t only look at that (nor does science quite frankly when it comes to scientific theories).

A metaphysics that denies the existence of a non-mental external reality simply isn't comparable.

I am failing to see the relation between specifically idealist metaphysics and your previous contentions: what you said equally applies to a physicalist metaphysics. They both use the same criteria to assess what the best general account of reality is (e.g., parsimony, coherence, empirical adequacy, logical consistency, reliability, intuitions, etc.).

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

No. A much more so "weakly emergent" function like e.g. breathing or digesting or walking.

How can mental activity be both weakly emergent and irreductive? That seems, to me, like a contradictio in adjecto.

Nonreductive physicalism. I've previously (twice!) provided you a link to an article summarizing T. Metzinger's phenomenal self model which seems to me a highly cogent and experimentally supported research program within a nonreductive physicalist framework.

I see. I took a look: let me explain back to you what I interpreted PSM and PMIR to be (and correct me where I am misunderstanding).

The self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT) is split generally into two parts: the phenomenal self-model (PSM) and the phenomenal model of the intentionality relation (PMIR).

PSM is a theoretical postulation that we can possibly empirically observe that certain areas of the brain (e.g., prefrontal cortex) are responsible for producing unity of self (i.e., “mineness”, “perspectivalness”, and “selfhood”).

PMIR is the ongoing ‘mental model’, which is builds off of the PSM, that the subject is constantly using to evaluate ‘itself’ and ‘not-itself’.

Did I generally get it correct? Before I give some critiques, I want to make sure I am at least in the ball park.

Well, "no physical substance" implies there are no physical laws to "violate";

Not at all. I think you may be conflating two usages of the term ‘physical’: the colloquial (i.e., something tangible with size and shape within experience) with the formal (i.e., a mind-independently existent entity). Analytic Idealism posits that everything is in a mental substance and that includes the physical (in a colloquial sense of the term) and procludes the physical in a formal sense of the term. Matter still exists under analytic idealism, but by the term ‘matter’ an analytic idealist is referring to the extrinsic representation, which is physical in the colloquial sense, of mentality.

Or rather, how is it that "the physical" is publicly accessible if "all of reality is mental" and "the mental" is not publicly accessible?

Because the ‘physical’ in a colloquial sense is weakly emergent from the mental: it is an extrinsic representation of mentality. However, the ‘physical’ in a formal sense does not exist at all.

Bob

Hello Janus,

I see the speculative part in science as consisting in abductive reasoning

Abductive reasoning is the most speculative type of reasoning we have, and metaphysics is also engaged in abductive reasoning.

and I would say that even those speculative aspects of science are informed by the general picture of the world that is yielded by science, or else they may be informed by mathematics.

Having speculation be informed by the world around us is not special to science: metaphysics also tries to inform its theories based off thereof.

I can't think of any speculative what we might call "pure metaphysics" that is like this, but that doesn't mean there isn't any. I'm open to learning about things I was not aware of.

Firstly, I grant, and agree with you, that metaphysics is usually more speculative than science, but there’s a couple things I would note:

1. Some science is actual metaphysics (e.g., Einstein’s “scientific” theory, to explain the facts of his field equations, that there is a mind-independent space-time fabric is a metaphysical commitment—not scientific itself).

2. Science and metaphysics are both engaged in abductive reasoning (i.e., trying to discern the best explanation to account for the data). Neither claim certainty nor absolute truth, and both are meant to get at a better picture (a model) of the world. The jursdiction of the models is just different: science is about modeling the relationship between (i.e., behavior of) the world we experience, whereas metaphysics is about modeling what the world fundamentally is. For example, science tells its best guess at how a car works (e.g., gas, engine, friction, etc.), metaphysics tells its best guess at what the car fundamentally is (e.g., an instantiation of a universal Car, fundamentally mind-independent, etc.). Both, I would say, are useful in their own ways.

3. Metaphysics is ‘purer’ than science because it deals more heavily in the realm of ‘pure reason’, but science still deals with ‘pure reason’ as well. They both need it to determine their axioms, jurisdiction of inquiry, etc. ‘Pure reason’ is not special to metaphysics: it just is more prominent.

4. If one gets rid of metaphysics, as a practice, then there’s no method of inquiry for us left to decipher what world we live in. Science doesn’t tell us what metaphysically exists: it is just a pragmatic tool for navigating and discovering how things behave.

The main thing I have against Kastrup's metaphysics is that "will" or "mind at large" are notions derived from our understanding of the human and some higher animals.

It is derived from our understanding of all life: not just higher animals. Kastrup posits that all life is a grade of consciousness. Of course, we only immediately, through introspection, have access to our own, so that is where we typically start.

@Apokrisis refers to global constraints (i.e. entropy) as 'desire' sometimes, but again, in that context entropy is a scientific idea that does not derive specifically from the human. I guess we can't help being somewhat anthropomorphic in our thinking, since our thinking itself is "human-shaped".

Under analytic idealism, everything is will and representation; so entropy, as well as all observable phenomena, are extrinsic representations of mentality—of will. It isn’t that entropy is a special case of which it is associated with an extra will that isn’t the case for everything else but, rather, that the entire phenomenal world is fundamentally the representation of the will of a universal mind. So the natural forces, as well as entropy and everything else, is within the universal mind and thusly is upheld by the will thereof. The will is ‘outside’ of the system of which represents it, just as necessarily as my mind’s will to dream of a beautiful forest is ‘outside’ of that dream forest.

Right, except I don't count ethics as knowledge

Are you saying that you don’t think you can come to know what is right and wrong (even if the propositions are indexical: subjective)? Because then I don’t know how you could assess what is right and wrong (even subjectively).

I also think ethics can be framed as "if we want to achieve that, we should do this" and ethical action can be understood as what promotes rather than detracts from human flourishing
…
distinct from being determinate propositional knowledge.

You can’t invoke hypothetical conditionals without propositions, and, as far as I understand you, you are claiming ethics is non-cognitive (non-propositional): you can’t assess that “if p, then q” (“if we want to achieve that, we should do this”) if ethics doesn’t provide propositional or otherwise knowledge.

I do think we can only gain definitive knowledge from observation and logic.

I disagree if by observation you mean scientific inquiry. For example, if one can only gather knowledge by observation and logic, then they can never come to know what a concept of concepts is. One will never observe the concept of concepts and logic (which is just the form of an argument) does not provide any means of determining the content necessary to figure out what the true concept of concepts is. I do not empirically observe the concept of concepts, and simply making a logically valid argument for what it is does not entail whatsoever that I have nailed down what a concept of concepts truly is.

Bob

Hello Janus,

The difference is that scientific theories are testable by seeing if the phenomena they predict obtain. Of course, that doesn't prove they are true.

This is true that science uses testable hypothesis (and that doesn’t positively prove the theories) while metaphysics isn’t as engaged in that (all it still does to some extent): however, that would just mean that metaphysics is more speculation than science, but both are engaged in speculation. My point is that I don’t think you can consistently reject metaphysics as “pure speculation” while fully pardoning scientific theories. Once one realizes that we are fundamentally engaging in some speculation no matter what, then it really becomes a question of how much is too much.

As I understand it, scientism is the claim that science can answer all our questions and will save us. Of course, there are ethical and existential questions that science cannot answer, although it may certainly inform them.

Scientism is the idea that we only gain knowledge via the scientific method; and, thusly, that all other forms of inquiry (such as metaphysics) doesn’t get at the truth. It sounds like you may be in agreement with me that we can come to know things without the scientific method (e.g., ethics). I would merely add metaphysics in there too.

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

I conceive of the latter two as distinctly methodological approaches within the former's paradigm.

Interesting: what would you say are the methodological distinctions between them?

Well, I "subscribe" to both.

Fair enough.

Would you classify yourself as a property dualist (i.e., irreductive physicalist)? — Bob Ross
Yes, more or less.

I am never gotten the opportunity to discuss with a property dualist, so forgive me but I would like to pick your brain a bit pertaining thereto. Would you consider consciousness strongly emergent then (as opposed to weakly emergent)? If so, then how does its irreducibility not warrant the positing of another substance (i.e., substance dualism) as opposed to merely another property? Since the reductive methodology doesn’t work on consciousness (which is, and correct me if I am wrong, what I am interpreting you to be agreeing with me on as a property dualist), do you deploy a different methodological approach that still retains (ontological) naturalism? If so, then could you give a brief elaboration thereon?

If your "Universal Spirit" is conceived of as a separate nonphysical substance that interacts with (or even generates) a physical substance

I am a substance monist, so I don’t claim that one entity from a mental (i.e., nonphysical) substance is “producting” or “interacting with” an entity (or entities) within another physical substance: all of reality is of a mental substance—there is no, under Analytic Idealism, physical substance. With that in mind, do you still think it violates the law of conservation of energy (and what not)?

Bob