Saying that something is not reducible to one of two options is to say that it is false dilemma: you are claiming that there is at least one other option, because not all particulars can be reduced to the two options proposed.

Again, I don't see how this true: give me an example of goodness that cannot be categorized under pragmatic or moral goodness.

Universal harmony is just a state whereof everything is living and existing peacefully; which includes everything. — Bob Ross

This is the opposite of what we find through most of history!

My argument does not depend on historically everything being in universal harmony and unity; rather, I am arguing that goodness is a form that the vast majority of people have recognized throughout history, even though they may have never recognized with with such refinement nor were capable of bringing it to its highest form: universality.

I don’t think any person of good character would disagree that ideally we should not eat other animals ... — Bob Ross

Where is the historical evidence to back this up?

Anyone who thinks that it is morally permissible to kill and eat an animal for purely trivial reasons has not understand the highest form of the good. Nevertheless, they usually understand it at a much lower form, the lowest of which being egoism (viz., they usually understand, even if they don’t care about other people or other animals, that what is good for them is for their body and mind to be in harmony and unity with itself; and so they work towards it via self-actualization).

Yes, those are standard, colloquial definitions; but they, like all colloquial definitions, are rough estimations, and do not accurately describe in a field of profession (in this case, ethics) what the term means. In fact, it is wholly inadequate to explain the vast majority of prominent ethical theories (throughout history) this way.

Let's take real, prominent examples (historically) of ethical worldviews.

Christianity, by-at-large, views morality, at its core, as embedded into God's nature: goodness is in God's nature. This is goodness is not dependent on any conduct, code, or behavior: it exists stance-independently; and God will's what is good exactly because His nature is good. This is incoherent with your definition, insofar as Christian Ethics is not solely about moral behavior but, rather, it is also about what is good (and this is independent of behavior and guides that behavior).

Same with Islam ^

Platonism, by-at-large, views morality, at its core, as the Form of The Good, and this is also stance-independent and independent of behaviors. The Good is what guides behavior but is not reducible to ethical behavior, which is incoherent with your colloquial definitions with this regard.

Aristotelianism, by-at-large, views morality, at its core, as fulfillment of a thing's purpose; and this is stance-independent and what is the form (note the lowercase 'f') of the good. This is incoherent with your definitions insofar as what is good is not about behavior itself but, rather, behavior is guided by it.

Kantianism, by-at-large, is about, at its core, a priori moral principles which are what is considered what's good; and this moral law, which exists transcendentally, is stance-independent and independent of human behavior. This is incoherent with your definitions insofar as behavior is guided by the a priori moral law and not identical to it. Considerations of the moral law itself are considerations which are a part of morality but do not pertain themselves to behavior.

Etc.

So why does the internet purport such inadequate definitions? Because those definitions are completely adequate for common use: most people don't study ethics, and they just notionally mean 'the study of right or wrong behavior' when they use the term 'morality' in colloquial speech. Prominent dictionaries, especially google's version of it, are notoriously bad at giving techincal definitions but are proficient at giving colloquial ones.

Your definitions aren't bad as a general, practical notion; but will never stand up to scrutinous refinement in ethics.

I think this is just a strange way of defining the idea of flawless. You may as well say that perfection is an erect penis flawlessly being used for hanging up a dressing gown.

It is not a definition of flawlessness nor perfection: it is an example of a specific type of perfection; and, yes, if the purpose being endowed onto an erect penis is to hang up a dressing gown, then its hypothetical perfection is directly proportional to how well it fulfills that purpose.

What benefit does the word prefect bring you here? Does it not just mean 'working as intended'?

Hypothetical perfection is about ‘working as intended’, and actual perfection is about ‘being in a state of harmony and unity’.

The moment it is called perfection it suggests the goodness is far from pragmatic and constitutes that which cannot be improved upon.

This is how we use it in language all the time. We say “that’s a good clock” when contextually we think the clock is telling the time very accurately; we say “that’s a horrible clock” when contextually we think it is not telling the time correctly; etc.

These are all examples of perfection for <...>.

I'm assuming you are joking about a clock being morally good, with self-unity, etc.

Although I understand we don’t usually think about actual perfection when it comes to inanimate objects, but, nevertheless, moral goodness equally applies to them; so, no, I am not joking but merely using a weird example to break you out of your current mindset. If I used a human behavior example, or something similar, then you wouldn’t probably understand the nature of moral goodness as depicted in this OP because you wouldn't be considered exactly what it means for something to have the form of 'unity and harmony'.

I think the problem you might be running into here Bob is the fact that "good" is a broad word that is highly contextual. Its kind of like debating "tree". Good has multiple contextual meanings like: Happy, positive, perfection, not bad, moral connotations, etc. Perhaps a better focus to the thread would be harmony and unity. How are harmony and unity moral goals, and what is the difference between the ideal and real for example.

I think that, when the dust settles, goodness does boil down to the two categories described in the OP. I think the 'highly contextual' aspect you are noting is really just due to people's hazy notions of what is good, and what goodness is, rather than a property of goodness itself.

I do not think history supports this claim. Both of the terms, goodness and perfection, have various meanings. You move from a claim about the historical meaning to a meaning you favor. In the middle is a questionable assertion of what morality is based on what you claim to be its its "most commonly used sense":

I absolutely agree with you that people have used it in various different ways throughout history, but my point was to refine the general notions (that were used throughout history) to a concept. Viz., when I say that ‘goodness’ boils down to two categories historically, I do not mean that historically people recognized with full clarity these two categories but, rather, their notions of goodness do, nevertheless, in fact, boil down thereto.

An argument can be made that morality is a response to the lack of universal harmony and unity. It is because there is no actual perfection in the world that we must choose and act so as to attain and maintain what we value, and that in our imperfect world these values may conflict with those of others.

I would simply add that morality, as a practice, certainly is the response to a lack of goodness; and this is the same as a lack of universal harmony and unity.

Some believe that to be moral is to be obedient to a higher power and so regard moral deliberation as immoral since it wrongly puts the individual in a position of authority.

Yes, I know many the type. I am not here trying to argue that everyone ends up using the concept of goodness like I have; but I do think an analysis of ‘goodness’ throughout history demonstrates that, at its core, even these types of people recognize what is good as universal harmony and unity. They just aren’t satisfied with stopping there: they require further justification, and they ‘find it’ in an authority figure—like God.

What does universal harmony mean? In pursuit of universal harmony do I confer equal moral standing to humans and rats? Do I allow rats to live in my home? Do I allow every human beings who may want to live in my home?

Universal harmony is just a state whereof everything is living and existing peacefully; which includes everything.

However, as you noted correctly, it is an ideal and may not be every actualizable down to the T; and we are far from it and we have limited resources; so it is perfectly reasonable to prioritize life over non-life, humans over other animals, etc. to try to progress towards it as best we can.

I don’t think any person of good character would disagree that ideally we should not eat other animals; but whether or not we can to survive is a separate question.

I'm not so sure that you do see, cause then you'd understand boiling something down to dichotomies is a reduction of their true form down to a "dumb" stripped down version that is only useful for talking about, rather than making concrete observations as Goodness is more than just "pragmatic" and "moral" forces. There's ignorant goodness, beautiful goodness... all you've really done here is tell us about your own values on what you think is good, "moral and pragmatism."

I don’t think it is a false dilemma. Let’s take your examples as examples.

Ignorant goodness, assuming I was able to parse this correctly, is any good act which is unintentional or lacks the proper foreknowledge required for it to be intentional. This is NOT a subcategory of the property of goodness but, rather, an adjective of goodness—i.e., saying an act that was good was made in ignorance is just to predicate what was good with the property of ignorance WHICH IS NOT an extension property of goodness itself. This is why, in truth, a moral or pragmatic act that is good could be predicated in this manner with ‘ignorance’. So this example doesn’t prove your point.

Beautiful goodness, if I understood your meaning here correctly, is anything that meets the standards of beauty (and not that goodness is beautiful itself). This is just a subcategory of pragmatic goodness: one is evaluating if the thing is good based off of a purpose of being beautiful. Perhaps it is causing confusion calling it ‘pragmatic’ goodness and if so, then think of this as hypothetical perfection instead. By it being pragmatically good because it is beautiful, I mean that it is good only insofar as it fulfills the purpose of being beautiful and this is the measure of its usefulness (towards that purpose).

That pragmatic vs. moral goodness is not a false dilemma, I can easily prove. One is about a thing being perfect for something (i.e., pragmatism) and the other is for nothing. There are only two options here (legitimately): either a thing’s perfection is being sized up based off of its fulfillment to a purpose, or it is being sized up based off of its fulfillment of no purpose at all. If the latter, then the only other option is it is being sized up to perfection as it is in-itself; otherwise, the person is not actually evaluating its perfection (for example, if they were to determine it arbitrarily).

Yet, Nietzsche would argue "moral" is likely fuel for resentment towards difference and not Goodness. And Nietzsche makes quite the compelling arguement for amoral goodness.

I honestly don’t think so. But I am more than happy to discuss it in more detail if you would like!

Sure Goodness contains aspects of pragmatism and moral, but those aren't the only two factors of Goodness, just like I'm more than merely two factors.

If you disagree, then please provide more examples of goodness that do not fit into the categories, or demonstrate how my dilemma is false by refuting my previous proof of it. So far, I am not convinced.

"Hypothetical and Actual... Pragmatic and Moral... High and Low" why not left and right? Oh right because perhaps for you ranking is up and down vs left and right.

What do you mean by “right and left”? I don’t know what that would even mean in this context.

First, it is unnecessary to know specifically what a fundamental entity is, only that it is.

It is necessary to know specifically what a fundamental entity is and which ones are exist within the context in question in order to make the morally relevant calculations.

It is a really simple dilemma:

If fundamental entities are morally relevant to calculations, then one must have knowledge of the specific ones at play within the context being morally evaluated; or if fundamental entities are not morally relevant to the calculations, then they are useless for making moral calculations.

You seem to be trying to avoid accepting one of these lines of thinking, when it is inevitable.

To be charitable, I think what you are trying to convey is that what is morally relevant for moral calculations is expressions of fundamental entities but not the fundamental entities themselves. In other words, moral calculations are always about expressions, and not fundamental entities. If this is the case, then we are in agreement; and you have chosen the second line of thinking (above)(i.e., that they are useless themselves for moral calculations, since you need to know nothing about them to make the calculations).

Staging is the idea of setting up a scope of what is morally being calculated to simplify the situation for general moral inquiry.

It is not at all clear to me within a ‘staging’ (i.e., a context) that calculating, for example, it in terms of molecules is better than calculating in terms of atoms; and it seems like which one a person chooses will have a huge impact on the results of those calculations.

Same with the piece of paper vs. molecules of paper. It is very clear that 2 pieces of paper is more identifiable ‘existences’ than 1 piece IF we are talking just about pieces of paper; but if we talk about molecules then it isn’t so clear.

The key for me is "What is an identity"? And I think its having attributes that have unique results when interacting with another existence.

A piece of paper fits this description.

Implicit in my notion of identities is grouping. Every atom, even of the same element is different from another atom in some very small way. But I can't very well be looking over the minute individual make up, where each proton and neutron is located as well as the exact place of each electron in orbit can I? And for general discussion and physics, we don't. Hydrogen atoms in a general sense work a particular way. This is a change of staging. There is a limit down that we go in each stating to make calculations when we're talking about atoms in particular.

That’s why I went with pieces of paper, but you resorted to a much harder, smaller entity to calculate—namely, molecules.

This becomes a new foundation, though not a material foundation, but a foundational identity. Now that I've worked through it, perhaps it needs to be pointed out with some name. So: Material foundation, expressions, material foundation combinations into new identities, and these new identities follow the pattern of material foundation by being foundational identities.

By ‘foundational identity’, are you referring here to just the smallest ‘building block’ one is willing to consider within the context? Otherwise, I didn’t really follow this part: a foundational entity is a material entity under your previous definitions.

I'm not really favoring the molecules over the paper.

Yes, you absolutely are! You refuse to calculate it with pieces of paper; instead, you insist on using molecules. If you used pieces of paper, then my conclusion would inevitably follow.

If you aren’t, then please justify why you refuse to use pieces of paper instead of molecules. You still have not provided any reasoning for why we should use one over the other, as they are both expressions under your view and, thusly, at equal par.

Bob

Bob, morality is by definition, historical convention, and common sense related to human actions. Do you not see that by redefining morality in this way you are completely altering its fundamental meaning?

Morality is not conventionally nor historically only about human actions. The vast majority of human beings have been, historically speaking, moral realists; and they believed in The Good (i.e., an objective goodness) which is independent of any stance a subject may have on the matter. To think that these moral facts are only about human actions is an incredibly narrow interpretation of morality.

Plato, for example, surely never thought that the Form of the Good was about specifically human actions nor, as a matter of fact, about solely actions.

The moral code by which humans live is predicated on and informed by The Good.

There is no moral agency in that example, because morality is not restricted to agency. Moral goodness, as described in the OP, is actual perfection; which is not contingent on agency itself. Either something is in a state of self-harmony and self-unity or it is not.

Moral agency comes in with the introduction of subjects capable of trying to uphold moral goodness and transform reality into the highest (moral) good.

I take it you didn't elaborate on it then, and agree with me that you made blanket assertions. I am more than happy to discuss your thoughts in more detail, but I am not willing to pretend like something is happening that isn't: you made blanket assertions with no elaboration (on them).

It is nearly impossible for me to understand what you are saying, if you don't give me an elaboration on your assertions.

Please prove how Goodness is the property of moral or immoral.

Being 'moral' or 'immoral' is a property of something that is good, not vice-versa. The properties of 'being moral' and 'being immoral' are extensions of 'being good' or 'being bad'.

One cannot evaluate what is moral without knowing what is good; but one can determine what is good without knowing what is moral, because they determine what is moral from what is good.

Is there such a thing as moral goodness as actual perfection? Goodness for who? An act is either moral or immoral on the basis of many different factors related to the act and the agents. But where does goodness come from? What is moral goodness as actual perfection?

I outlined this in the OP: what did you disagree with? Actual perfection isn't 'goodness for someone', it is perfection as it is in-itself.

My analysis of goodness does not find moral goodness contingent on agency: it is simply self-harmony and self-unity; and applies to everything--not just subjects.

What I meant was an actual instantiation of perfection, not more abstractions or discussions of usage. Let's look at something in the world which we can agree upon is an example of perfection.

I gave you an example and you completely ignored it: please re-read my previous response.

Well if that's the case then we can't say what perfection in a clock looks like since there will be multiple competing possibilities as I have already described.

I don't think you are quite understanding pragmatic goodness. It is perfection for some purpose. You are contending in the above quote that we can't say it is perfect because there are multiple purposes for a clock; but the whole point of pragmatic goodness is that its perfection is hypothetical--i.e., it is perfection relative to a purpose.

In terms of actual perfection, the clock is perfect (morally good) if it is in self-harmony and self-unity.

What is a concrete explanation of what that would be?

The property of ‘being in self-harmony and self-unity’ is what perfection in-itself is: they are identical.

In terms of an example, imagine a two rocks just laying there on top of a table vs. two rocks violently colliding with each other constantly: the former is in a state of harmony and unity, while the latter is clearly not.

Is harmony and unity with itself a common feature of the normative principle of every major ethical theory?

That is not a requirement for me to be right.

harmony and unity are still not concretely defined.

Harmony is a state of peace; and unity is oneness.

By your terms, a machine that pumps water up and down with 100% efficiency would be high on moral goodness

No. The efficiency only matters if we are talking about pragmatic goodness. As long as the water-pumping machine has harmonious parts and is unified, then it is actually perfect—even if it is not hypothetically perfect.

What you wrote is suggestive that you are trying to describe a type of goodness that is related though different from moral goodness proper, and calling it "moral goodness" confuses your argument.

I was trying to describe what moral goodness is—I was not describing an offshoot of moral goodness.

But isn't moral goodness a superfluous term? Why not just say, moral or immoral, instead of moral goodness and moral badness?

Goodness is the property that ascribes whether or not something is moral or immoral, not vice-versa.

But morally good? It sounds unclear. Is there such a thing or situation as morally good? Good for who? Isn't just being moral enough?

The OP argues that moral goodness is actual perfection, which is self-harmony and self-unity.

I see. I don't understand how I have reduced goodness to something it isn't: how did I do that?

Pragmatic vs. moral goodness is a valid dichotomy, as far as I can tell: it is not a spectrum.

Got it. By substance I was more thinking of just something that exists, an entity, in reality.

Recommending readings isn't a valid justification of your contentions. You just claimed that my use of goodness is context-dependent, without elaborating on what that even means: that's the definition of a blanket assertion. If I am wrong, then please quote where you elaborated on what that means, and I will gladly concede.

Yes, human made objects are made with human intentions and values. However, the purpose for that human made object is whatever a person wants it to be, because pragmatism is just about gathering knowledge about utility of objects to obtain particular goals. Yes, this can imply that people will make objects crafted specially for their own purposes. I don't think the OP disagreed with that in any way.

Any.

Ok. Perfection is identical to flawlessness. There are only two types of perfection: hypothetical and actual perfection. The former is pragmatic goodness; the latter moral goodness.

To try and bring out the contrast, let me use a perhaps odd example. A calculator would be hypothetically perfect if my purpose for it is to hold up books and it is flawless at fulfilling this task.
The calculator is actually perfect if it is in a state of 100% (flawless) self-harmony and self-unity—i.e., all the parts are in agreement and peace with the other parts. The calculator isn’t broken, it doesn’t have parts that oppose other parts in a manner that brings disunity, etc.

Only if you agree that telling time is the chief function of a clock

I did not argue this in the OP: I said that pragmatic goodness is about utility towards a purpose (or purposes), and an example of this is a ‘good’ clock in ordinary language: we say a clock is ‘good’ when it can adequately tell the time—because it fulfills the commonly accepted purpose of telling the time that it was designed for. — Bob Ross

You've just repeated my point in different words

There is no chief function of a clock, unless by that you just mean the most commonly accepted pragmatic purpose of a clock. Then I agree.

Is goodness defined by the actions it is able to perform as part of its inherent design or evolution ?

This question is predicated off of the assumption that one is talking about pragmatic goodness; and, with respect thereto, it would defined in terms of how a thing fulfills its purpose. This is not dependent on actions necessarily, unless its purpose entails some sort of action(s).

Thinking here of man made objects and natural organisms if they’re not able to fulfil the function/s of their intended design would you say that such organisms or inventions are not good in this sense?

When speaking of pragmatic goodness, I would say that purpose is subjective and it is different than function. Either way, if the generally acknowledged purpose of something (in the sense of its function, as you noted) is not being fulfilled, then it would be (pragmatically) ‘bad’.

This is a separate question from whether it is morally ‘bad’.

A paper printer that does not print correctly or not print at all by virtue of not fulfilling its function would lack goodness

It would be pragmatically bad, if its purpose is to print paper; but not necessarily morally bad.

Man though is different and able of goodness or lack of, so it’s inherently neither, as goodness is judged upon the actions one performs and whether they’re beneficial to the individual within the context of the society they operate in, in obedience to its laws, customs and regulations. A breach of such laws would be considered not good as the punishment would be to the detriment of the individual.

Humans are evaluable under the same criteria as anything else: they are pragmatically good iff they fulfill their purpose, and they are morally good if they are actually perfect.

Why? You gave absolutely no justification for your assertions.

By 'context-dependent', I am assuming you don't mean 'subject-dependent'; so if it is not sociological or psychological, then what context are you referring to here?

The property of being measured by any standard is always going to be subjective.

If by ‘standard’ you are referring to something normative, then I completely agree; and this does not negate the OP.

human intentionality is literally constitutive of what a car or a clock or a radio is

Yes, but pragmatic goodness applies to everything: it is just goodness in the sense of utility.

Natural systems are in a constant process of evolution and change, so there is never any criterion for preferring one configuration over another, let alone a perspective from which to apply it.

That natural systems have a constant process of evolution has nothing to do if there is a (non-normative) standard of moral goodness. This is just a non-sequitur, until you justify this comment.

Although I don't completely agree with Nietzsche, he is one of my favorite philosophers. However, I don't think he adequately refuted moral realism; but his work on individuality is unmatched.

Likewise, I don't see (as of yet) how any of your responses adequately refuted or contended with moral realism--let alone the particular one explicated in the OP.

The problem with metaphysicians is their dependencies to take what exists in various gradations and go on to reduce them two values.

I am not following: could you please elaborate?

This doesn't really negate my example though...

I struggle to follow your argument - possibly because I am not a philosopher and also because I regard words like goodness, evil and perfection as being contingent and subject to personal or intersubjective worldviews.

Which part did you disagree with or were confused by? I am more than happy to elaborate.

Only if you agree that telling time is the chief function of a clock

I did not argue this in the OP: I said that pragmatic goodness is about utility towards a purpose (or purposes), and an example of this is a ‘good’ clock in ordinary language: we say a clock is ‘good’ when it can adequately tell the time—because it fulfills the commonly accepted purpose of telling the time that it was designed for.

Can you demonstrate an instantiation of perfection about which we can all agree upon so that I can see what perfection 'looks' like?

Which kind of perfection?

So with that under consideration, space and time are, in fact, a physical reality. My starting point that human cognition is temporal (as well as spatial) is well within the dimensions of spacetime.

I see, so you are claiming space and time are substances—contrary to your original claim. Unless you are just noting that they are not separate substances when you said they are not substances.

I am honestly starting to think goodness is simply identical to 'being in self-harmony and self-unity'; and flourishing, prosperity, is simply what a standard, biological organism is going to need in order to completely actualize their self-harmony and self-unity.

Thank you for sharing! I will give it a look.

Because you said "They are not substances" and:

We cannot separate space-time from the universe, therefore we cannot separate space-time from existence. It is a zone -- a multi-dimensional zone in which things exist. To speak of space-time as thing in itself is nonsensical. A thing in itself is anything that has its own properties and dimension existing within space-time. Tangible objects are things. Humans are things. But a universe is not a thing.

Which sounded to me like you were arguing that we cannot determine what is exactly a posteriori and what is a priori, and that space/time are so entrenched in our thinking (being the forms of our experience) that we cannot make sense of a world without it.

This sounds like space and time for you are just the forms of our experience, and we cannot say anything about reality as it is in itself because we cannot think away these forms.

Was I misunderstanding?

Oh, I see! :up:

Perhaps this entire discussion needs a summary again, as your latter points seem to wholly miss the mark. This is not normally like you, so I feel that the discussion needs a recentering if this is the case.

I apologize: I may be misunderstanding, misremembering, or both. Likewise, I can assure you I am not disinterested in the topic: I just think our heads at different places right now.

To hone in on the conversation, I will focus on the unit of measure being used to make these calculations, and see if you can steer me on the right course.

If our unit of measure is ‘a piece’ and ‘more pieces is better than less’, then two pieces of paper are better than two.

The only way for you to deny this, under your theory, is if you explicate clearly what unit of measure a person should be using to calculate “more existence is better”; and you have still as of yet to clarify it. — Bob Ross

Have I not listed the three unit types, fundamental, expression, and potential?

Ok. So if your units of measurement are fundamental, expression, and potential entities; then we are back to my original worries.

Firstly, we have no knowledge of fundamental entities; and stipulating something which is clearly not a fundamental entity, such as an atom, can help clarify what you would do to make moral calculations ideally but does not clarify how you are making the calculation in actuality.

It is akin to if you were to give an elaboration speech on how to walk from point A to point B while also admitting that no one could ever possible walk at all: ok, I get how ideally one could walk from A to B, but, since no one can nor will ever be able to walk, isn’t this all useless in practical life?

If you rely on factoring in fundamental entities in the formula to make moral calculations and we can never know anything about them, then you can’t make moral calculations. I understand that you think you have made general patterns, but these cannot be defended properly unless you overcome this objection.

To be honest, my understanding so far is that you are not using, in actuality (as opposed to ideally), fundamentaly entities to arrive at these general patterns because, by you own admission, you can’t. So, then, you are only using expression and potential entities—and, consequently, fundamental entities are useless for moral calculation in actuality.

Am I missing something?

Let’s assume I am on the right track (which I bet you will not think so (; ): your moral calculations are using only expression and potential entities as factors. Ok, let’s start with expression entities: you seem to use molecules to represent this type, but how are you determining which expression entity to factor into the moral calculation? You seem to just arbitrarily pick one for the sake of example.

Let’s take the paper example to illustrate the problem: a piece of paper and a molecule are both expression entities. By your own admission, anything comprised of, that originates out of, fundamental entities is an expression entity; so, by your own lights, the piece of paper is an expression entity, comprised of a bunch of smaller expression entities—namely molecules. You seem to arbitrarily favor the molecule over the paper itself; but the paper is an expression of molecules, among probably other expression entities, thusly making it also an expression entity. The fact of the matter is that reality as we will ever know it is comprised of what you call expression entities, and it is a pattern of composition—i.e., any given expression entity appears to be comprised of smaller expression entities. So, you must clarify and justify which expression entities are valid factors for making moral calculations; otherwise, it is just arbitrary (from my point of view).

"A piece" is not an accurate description of the existence. A piece is a generic summary which can vary in size and shape.

Hopefully it is clear that, as you have defined it, a piece of paper is an expression entity: it is comprised of, something that arises out of, fundamental entities: it is an expression of fundamental entities. A molecule is also just like it in that sense: the paper arises out of, is an emergent property of, the molecules.

Even if you have a quibble with comparing a piece of paper and a molecule in this manner, then please swap it for an atom vs. a molecule (which are both also expression entities, one of which is comprised of the other) and you will see that, by-at-large, my critiques still stand. You keep arbitrarily picking one, as far as I can tell.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I don’t think you are entirely understanding what is under contention the OP; so let me try to convey it using your more traditional, Kantian, usage of the term ‘thing-in-itself’.

Just to clarify the terminology, as I am understanding you to mean it (roughly), a ‘thing’ is a sensible object; a ‘thing-in-itself’ is that ‘thing’ as it is independently of any sensibility; a ‘noumena’ is an insensible object (for us); and a ‘phenomena’ is the ‘thing’ as it is perceived, and not merely sensed.

Ok, with the terms out of the way, you seem to be taking the traditional, Kantian approach that a thing-in-itself, being that it is how a ‘thing’ is independently of any sensibility, is completely unknowable—which makes sense granted the terms I just outlined.

So, the OP’s contentions do not revolve around one denying this schema (outlined above) or the conclusions therefrom: the question would just need to be refactored slightly.

Instead of asking “is space and time properties of the things-in-themselves and, if so, what are their natures?”, the question would be “is space and time at least in part a posteriori and, if so, what can we say about their natures?”.

In other words, you have shifted the conversation from things-in-themselves to things, and the question then shifts to whether or not things should be attributed as having spatiotemporal properties or if spatiotemporal properties are only the modes by which we cognize and intuit objects (i.e., pure a priori).

Claiming that “because we experience things in space and time, space and time must be properties of things” does not hold, because that we experience things in space and time would be equally true if they are pure a priori.

Hopefully that helps clarify, as I think we have derailed a bit into our differences in use of the term ‘thing-in-itself’.

Bob

I see what you mean. I however have a problem with this premise. I don't see how "then it cannot be subjected to temporality" follows. Do you mind elaborating?

P1 was just my best guess at what you were trying to convey in the OP—but it may not be. The reasoning behind P1 would be that something that is the pure negation of all possible existence would be, as per its nature, NOT something that exists and time only affects things that exist; therefore, if there is nothing, which is the negation of all possible things (hence the ‘no’ + ‘thing’), then there isn’t anything to be subjected to time.

The way I conclude that was based on two assumptions, spacetime is a substance and there is no spacetime in nothing.

Oh, well, then, your argument would need to clarify your metaphysical position on time and space; which sounds a bit like you believe (1) time and space are substances (which I deny), that (2) they are united (which I deny), and that (3) nothing be subject to space-time (which I agree with if I grant the previous two).

The problem, though, is that this doesn’t negate the possibility of things that ‘pop into’ existence with no reason behind it. This just implies that there isn’t anything a part of nothing.

Well, to me motion is a sort of change in which the position of an object changes so to me motion is not identical to time.

That is fair. I would say, more generally, that there’s nothing incoherent with positing the actual temporal sequences of things as simply the form or mode by which one experiences and thusly they are not substances in reality.

I would say that there must be a change from nothing rather than nothing must change.

Then I don’t see how your argument holds: a change from nothing but not a change in nothing does not violate that “there is no spacetime in nothing” because the change is ‘outside of’, or ‘beyond’, the nothing—it is in something that the change occurs: there exists something in which there is no X, and then X poofs into existence out of thin air.

I think you are talking about the block universe (correct me if I am wrong). I however have a problem with the way you describe motion from a motionless thing. Mainly our brains are parts of the universe so how can we perceive any change considering that everything in the universe, including our brains, is changeless?

Yeah, it’s a real pickle. Honestly, I lean back and forth between block universe and transcendental idealism style nihilism on time and space; and both are subjected to your worry here.

If we are representing reality to ourselves via our representative faculties, then doesn’t that imply a temporal process? I would say no, and this leads me to a much stronger agnosticism on the ontology of reality than I would suspect you are willing to accept.

Take traditional transcendental idealism (i.e., Kantianism): if space and time are purely the modes by which we intuit and cognize objects, then it necessarily follows that however we are representing, truly as it is in-itself, objects to ourselves is completely unknown to us other than indirectly via our [human] understanding of that process (which is inevitably in the form of space and time).

'Metaphysics', by my lights, is the study of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience, but is necessary to understand that experience.

Things exist in minds as well as in empirical world. When things exist in mind, they are called concepts and ideas.

Not necessarily; but I don't see the relevance of this.

They are not substances. If you recall Aristotle, and others, have written about things like substance, form, essence, etc., all within the template of space-time, and never outside of it. We cannot separate space-time from the universe, therefore we cannot separate space-time from existence. It is a zone -- a multi-dimensional zone in which things exist. To speak of space-time as thing in itself is nonsensical. A thing in itself is anything that has its own properties and dimension existing within space-time. Tangible objects are things. Humans are things. But a universe is not a thing.

It sounds like you are saying they don’t exist in reality at all, and then noting that we cannot think them away.

Then you're ascribing an identity to a thing in itself. There is no indirect or direct knowledge of anything about a thing in itself besides the fact that it is logically necessary that there be something for us base our conceptions off of. Anything more is using our conceptions.

So this just depends on whether one believes one can have knowledge of the things-in-themselves or not; and I think we are basically saying the same thing—but our schemas are different.

I would say we ascribe properties to the things-in-themselves conditionally [as conditioned by the human understanding]; whereas, you would say we ascribe properties to things and things-in-themselves are completely ineffable as a pure negative conception.

Either way, the OP is about whether or not space and time are properties of things or things-in-themselves (depending on which description you like best above) and what nature they would have.

Its real because it affects us despite our perceptions. That's the 'drop a rock game' :D

There is nothing about space and time in terms of literal extension and temporality that affects you despite your perceptions: an object affects you despite your perceptions of it—not space nor time.

We experience everything. If they mean the pure form of experience is something that does not represent reality, that's what empirical testing is for. They can claim space does not represent reality, but then we can test it and show that it is. If they're talking about something else, it sounds like its gobbledygook.

You do not experience space and time: they are the forms of your experience.

If by empirically test them you are referring to scientific tests of how space and time behave (e.g., special/general relativity), then none of it requires space and time to exist (e.g., time dilation is just one’s representative faculties representing temporal sequences differently depending on speed of light and gravitational displacement, etc.). There’s always to metaphysical ways of interpreting that stuff, at its core: there’s actual time and space that affect oneself (and one’s representative faculties are representing that) or one’s representative faculties represent things in space and time differently depending on what it is interpreting as there in reality).

Productivity is being used in the sense of ‘having the quality or power of producing especially in abundance’; and the hypothetical is that IF a person is being more productive at creating model airplanes than finding a cure to cancer AND they can only do one or the other AND one is analyzing what is good in terms of the production of concrete entities in reality (such that more is better), then that person should (in a moral sense) choose to create model airplanes over finding a cure for cancer. — Bob Ross

That's fine then, yes. But as I've noted, make sure you make explicit the other outcomes as well. For example, if the person works on cancer and saves billions of lives, but is more productive working on model planes and saves no lives, this is not all else being equal.

Good. My only point is that that is incredibly counter-intuitive to predominant ethics: pretty much everyone who studies ethics will agree that trying to find a cure for cancer has more moral worth than working on model airplanes even if one is more productive at the latter than the former.

If this is a bullet you are willing to bite, then so be it: I am just explicating the bullets you are biting.

All I am including is what I included. IF ‘more existence is better’ THEN it is better to have two pieces of paper rather than one. That’s it. In isolation, is two pieces of paper better than one in your view? — Bob Ross

Not necessarily. Its because we're tearing a piece of paper into two, not creating two equal sizes of paper.

If our unit of measure is ‘a piece’ and ‘more pieces is better than less’, then two pieces of paper are better than two.

The only way for you to deny this, under your theory, is if you explicate clearly what unit of measure a person should be using to calculate “more existence is better”; and you have still as of yet to clarify it.

I have not made this explicit enough. Working out the math from an atomic level all the way up to humanity is outside of my purview. I do not have the time, interest, or mathematical skill to calculate things to precision

My point was not that you need to calculate every minute detail: it was that, in principle, it is impossible for you to; and, thusly, your theory is useless if you insist on demanding these calculations to determine what is right or wrong.

There’s two ways to raise this objection to your theory. The first, which relates to the quote above, is: if the unit of measure is something incredibly small, then one cannot calculate what is right or wrong in practical life—and to provide ‘general patterns’ requires you, by your own criteria, to make these incredibly large calculations with these incredibly small units.

The second is: if the unit of measure is ‘material existence’ (which is whatever fundamental entities exist) and one cannot have knowledge of ‘material existences’ (which by your own concession in your conversation is true) and one needs to use those units to calculate what is right/wrong, then it is impossible for them to calculate what is right/wrong—full stop. This simply follows from your own concessions.

With respect to your elaboration, which included more examples, my point here is that if the two formulations of my objection are correct (as explicated above), then it is not clear at all how you are calculating these general patterns.

I would like to stop there so that I can get you to address these points first, as the rest depends on your answers.

Bob