This is the part I'm not understanding. Can you clarify? What does must/should mean?

Let’s skip this for now.

Correct, that's not the same as what point 2 is saying. Its an odd thing that I agree with practically everything you're stating yet I can't understand the overall point you're trying to make. :) We're almost there I feel though, so please keep trying.

We are definitely getting closer! (:

Thank you for the exposition of your logic for the argument, because I see exactly where (I think) it goes wrong:

3. If B is true, then B should not exist. B -> !B

B != “B should not exist”, so there is no contradiction.

A := “everything should not exist”
B := “reason that A”
C := “B should not exist”

Now, we see:

A ↔ B
B ↔ C

P1: A ↔ B
P2: A
C: B

P3: B ↔ C
P4: B
C: C

No contradiction. You conflated B with “B should not exist”. Those are separate propositions.

Almost, but not quite. We're assuming if 'everything should not exist', [then] there must be a reason. Its not an identity.

“There must <...>” is the same statement as “There should <...>”: same issue. — Bob Ross

Now I'm confused. Didn't you just have an issue with me swapping 'should' and 'must' earlier? I agree you had that right. What should exist is not the same as what must exist.

These two claims are not equivalent. The hypothetical in the top quote is just using ‘must’ in a non-normative ‘moral’ sense to indicate that if there is a reason, then there is a reason (i.e., it is a tautology); whereas the assertion in the second to top quote is that there simply must/should be a reason, not that if it were to exist, then it would exist.

Almost, but not quite. We're assuming if 'everything should not exist', there must be a reason. Its not an identity.

It was identity in your point 2:

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist

When reformulated, this just tautological:

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

If you are conveying, instead, that “if everything should not exist, then there must be a reason” then that is not taulogical, but that is not equivalent to point 2 (you made).

Anyways, here’s the crux though:

So if the truth of its own premise is that it shouldn't exist, but it must exist if it is to claim that it shouldn't exist, we're left with a contradiction

There’s no contradiction here. If I must exist to obligate myself to kill myself, then it does not follow that I am contradicting myself.

Since you seem to think there is, I would like to offer a suggestion, to move the conversation forward, that you provide a valid syllogism for it. If it is a logical contradiction, then explicate clearly that the form of the argument leads to p ^ !p; if it is an actual contradiction, then explicate how positing A is incoherent with natural laws; and if it is a metaphysical contradiction, then explicate how positing A is incoherent with your metaphysics; or if it is none of those, then please explicate what you mean by ‘contradiction’ and demonstrate it with syllogisms.

On my side, I am not sure how to demonstrate how this is not a contradiction anymore than reiterating that a reason entailing its own annihilation is not a contradiction and offering some analogies:

1. A thought that I have which claims “I should not have any thoughts” is perfectly coherent, but also requires that it must have existed in order for me to have the thought and that itself should no longer exist if it still does.
2. An AI can be programmed to seek nothing other than its own death, such that it must exist to have the obligation to kill itself—I see nothing incoherent with this.
3. A bomb that is set to blow itself up is setup such that it ought to blow its self up and it has to exist in order for that to be true—ditto.

I think you are trying to do a paradox move, like “all statements are false” which would entail a contradiction if it were true; but this is not analogous to a thing which must exist in order to claim that it should not itself exist.

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist

This is still incorrect: the claim is that if there is a reason that everything should not exist, then there is a reason that everything should not exist. “There must <...>” is the same statement as “There should <...>”: same issue.

If you wanted to assert there is a reason, which is different than asserting there should or must be a reason, then you would have to word it as “there is a reason that everything should not exist”. Or if you wanted, then you could say “if there is a reason <...>, then there must be that reason <...> [because it is exists]”, which is not equivalent to “there must be a reason <...>”: the latter is making a normative “moral” claim, which is not about what is but what should be, and the former is just noting that if there is a reason then there is a reason. I think we should use “there is a reason that everything should not exist” to avoid any normative “moral” vs. indicative/descriptive confusion.

So, the rewritten argument would be:


2. There is a reason, A, that everything should not exist.
7. If A exists, then it claims A should not exist. [ this should be an assertion not a hypothetical: ‘A implies A should not exist’.

And I think it is clear now that 9 is completely false:

9. Because A cannot assert the truth of its own premise, or contradicts itself, it cannot exist.
Therefore 2 is contradicted, and there cannot be a reason for why everything should not exist.

The truth of its own premise is that it shouldn’t exist, not that it should and should not exist. 2 & 7 do not imply nor claim that a part of its truth is that it should exist.

Reason's Greetings & Happy New Year, Bob! :sparkle:

You too!

If something is solely a means to an end, then it can’t be an end itself because it is just a means towards some other end. If it is also an end then it is not just a means towards an end. — Bob Ross
Repeating your definition doesn't make it more substantive than just a definition.

I am not sure how else to explain it. They are categorically different: are you asking why a means can’t ever be an end in a different context?

P2 notes that minds are ends in themselves, and this is because minds are the only beings with the nature such that they are their own end—i.e., they are an absolute end
Circular to the point of being tautological.

I don’t see how it is circular. I am saying that the nature of a mind is to set out means towards their own ends (which is what it means to have motives, desires, and a will) whereof the ultimate end is themselves. What is tautological about that?

C: One should not treat a mind as solely a means towards an end, but always as (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves.
Again, this conclusion does not follow validly from your mere 'definitions' (& otherwise 'hidden premises' e.g. what is conceptually meant by "minds").

Why?

1. It is required to note that minds are ends in themselves because the identity of ‘an absolute end’ does not entail itself that those are only minds — Bob Ross

This is why I asked earlier if you could give an example of an end in itself that wasn't a mind.

There aren’t any: my point is just that I am predicating that only minds are ends-in-themselves and not equivocating them.

Yes, this is my general problem with ethical theories and why I feel we have a lot more work to do on the matter.

Agreed. Ethics is a science, and as such we have to learn as we go: there’s not exact formula that tells us, to the T, what to do: we rely heavily on moral intuitions.

Right, but that's the answer to any valid syllogism. If we accept the premises, then the conclusion must necessarily be so. Yes, proving that first is essential. But after its proven, the question becomes, "Can you prove that I should accept your premises?"

So that’s what I was asking about before: which premise do you currently reject? We can discuss further whichever one that is.

We can revisit this later. For now, I do not believe that one should be rational is a subjective moral judgement. But we have to get the base down first before we build to that. :)

I don’t see how this would be the case, as your argument for ‘there should be something’ (which we are currently discussing) is not more fundamental than your claim that ‘one should be rational’ is objective: the former actively presupposes the former. So I don’t see how you can build off of the argument we are discussing to get there, but we will see (:

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

It is false that if a reason exists that it should exist, which is what you said in this point 2. When I convert, to try to be charitable (as shown in bold and strikeout), it becomes a mere tautology that informs us of nothing: if there is a reason <...>, then there is a reason <...>.

7. if A should exist, then it claims that A should not exist.
…
9 But if A should not exist, then it cannot assert that it should exist.

A doesn’t claim that A should exist, it claims that A should not exist. I think you are trying to infer this from point 2 (as far as I can tell), and 2 is just false or, when converted, a mere tautology that cannot be used to support the antecedent of point 7 (being that it is also false).

A contradiction is clear if the assumption of X assumption leads to its own negation

So, I would say, this is different than your claim in point 2: point 2 claims that A entails that A should exist and that it shouldn’t, whereas A negating itself, in the most loose sense of that terminology, just implies that A demands its own annihilation—which is not a contradiction. If I obligate myself to kill myself, I have not conceded that I should and should not exist: which is what you seem to be saying about A (although, of course, you are not referring to people killing themselves: just an analogy).

If you still don't see it, can you point out why A does not negate itself?

If you just mean that A is the obligation to A not existing, and consequently A ‘negates itself’ in the sense that it implies its own annihilation, then I completely agree; but this isn’t a contradiction: the negation of existence is not a contradiction. A contradiction is, in its most basic sense, when two ‘things’ oppose each other so strongly that they can’t both be true. More specifically, logically contradictory when a proposition is both true and false; metaphysically contradictory when a proposition strongly opposes (or is incongruent with) one’s metaphysics; and actually contradictory when a proposition strongly opposes (or is incongruent with) natural laws.

According to your definition of subjective, everything is subjective Bob.

Not at all; and I am talking about the standard definitions, not my specific ones. I am just noting, although you can use the definitions however you would like, that your using ‘objectivity’ in a way that is obviously ‘subjectivity’ to everyone else.

Please use the definition I've put forward for now. It doesn't mean I'm right, it just makes sure we're on the same page. We can discuss which definition should be used after we get through the meat of the argument first.

Fair enough.

What do you mean by “rationally or logically countered”? If make a syllogism that is logically valid which contains a moral judgment, is that moral judgment thereby ‘objective’ under your view? — Bob Ross

If you can prove that it is so, then yes. Rationality and logic are the best reflective tools we have about reality. It is in my view, the only way we can meaningfully assess it. Meaning if you have an argument that is air tight rationally and logically, which means it cannot be contradicted by reality in any way, you have an objective moral judgement.

Just food for thought, then:

P1: If one should eat babies, then they should find babies to eat. [p → q]
P2: One should eat babies. [p]
C: One should find babies to eat. [q] {Modus Ponens}

This is a logically sound and valid argument, and according to your own concession the contents of which are then objective. Likewise, we can all rationally agree that the logic is sound, but clearly the moral judgments are not thereby objective. Big problem for your semantics I would say…

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I'm wondering if the tie in of minds to things in themselves is this fallacy. My thinking was that if minds are the only things that are ends in themselves, you can just remove ends in themselves and just note that minds are simply the things on this planet which should be protected and encouraged. It just simplifies the argument.

Two things:

1. It is required to note that minds are ends in themselves because the identity of ‘an absolute end’ does not entail itself that those are only minds: minds are being predicated as the only absolute ends and not equivocal to them.

2. By end in themselves, I do not mean ‘things in themselves’. The Kantian idea of ‘thing-in-itself’ is that which exists independently of our sense-data of them—and independent of experience in general—whereas ‘end in themselves’ is the idea about beings with a nature such that they are absolute ends.

As a simple solution its a nice thought, but I'm not seeing how we can develop any air tight means of measurement when tough moral choices come up. Its not anything you have to debate with me about, these are just musings to think about.

FIS does not afford an equation that one can determine exactly what one should do in every given situation: it is a general formula, not an exact science. I have never heard a normative ethical theory that is able to afford such an equation without biting a lot of bullets.

So if you accept that ‘one ought to be rational’ and that ‘minds are ends in themselves’ and that ‘sole means are not ends’, then it logically follows that one should not treat them as a mere means. — Bob Ross

I get that. The question is why anyone should care if a mind thinks its an end to itself

If you agree, then you know that it doesn’t matter if anyone cares, despite the argument, about minds. If one accepts that accepting the premises entails the conclusion that one should treat minds as sacred, then if they either have deny a premise or accept that they should treat mind as sacred. Asking, on top of that, “but why should I care?” doesn’t get around this.

There's nothing requiring me in that argument to not solely treat them as an ends in themselves. All you've noted is that we cannot solely view them as a means.

Argument concludes that you cannot use a mind as solely a means, so this is false.

Vice versa it also means we cannot solely view them as an ends.

No, the conclusion is that they must at least simultaneously treat them as an end, and never solely as a means.

Is it possible that you could demonstrate why using a person for one's own end is a contradiction?

That’s the whole pseudo-syllogism I gave: you can’t do it without contradicting their nature and if you are being rational then you will not act in a way that implicitly concedes contradictions.

I believe you need to include Kant's universizability principle for it work.

I don’t agree with Kant’s universizability formulation of the categorical imperative, as it presupposes that we want a functioning society; which is not the real categorical imperative to me: it’s not treating minds as solely means towards an end.

What if I also treat myself as a means to an end?

You can’t: it violates FET. If it is a moral antinomy, then it boils down to FIS.

The problem I see is that we are talking about reasons for things existing, and so if we posit that reasons themselves are an infinite series, then it is incoherent to ask "what is the reason for that infinite series of reasons?" since that reason would actually be a part of that infinite series and not outside of it.

You are just subjectively stipulating that what one should do is what is rational, and then calling ‘objective’ whatever can be reached as a consensus by people committed to that subjective moral judgment. — Bob Ross

No, I'm just assuming you'll grant me rationality and logic are the best tools we have to measure reality. This is not an assumption I spelled out, but maybe I should have. If you want me to go into the question of whether we should or should not use logic, I can go into that as well. I leave that to you to decide if that is important at this stage or not.

My point is that your moral judgments are subjective if they are true relative to the subjective moral judgment that one ought to be rational. But, then again, you seem to be defining objectivity in a manner where it is exactly that.

Not a problem, I'll try again. If this is good, I'll likely edit the OP to make things clearer as well.

Thank you, but I still don’t see how you making that inference. Here’s the part I am referring to:

E. Assumption: There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
F. If that is the case, then according to the reason that nothing should exist, that reason should not exist. Thus a contradiction.

This is the part I need a syllogism from you about, not the rest. This is the crux that I don’t get at all. I don’t see how a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction (whether that be metaphysical, logical, or actual). Can you please give me an argument or elaboration for this part?

Just some side questions:

2. Rationality and logic are our best tools at identifying and reflecting reality as accurately as possible.

I just want to note, so far, this is a subjective moral judgment; and is the underpinning of all your moral judgments, thusly making them subjective as well.

3. An objective morality would be a morality of what should happen that cannot be rationally or logically countered.

What do you mean by “rationally or logically countered”? If make a syllogism that is logically valid which contains a moral judgment, is that moral judgment thereby ‘objective’ under your view?

I see that as a problem considering that minds and their status are the fundamental lynch pin of your argument. Perhaps this could be answered if you define whether it is possible for something that is not a mind to be an end in itself.

I think this is just the fallacy of the heap.

I understand you don't want to use the word value, but almost anyone using the theory will. In the case of choosing what must be sacrificed for another species to live, there must be a rationale behind it. In your case if you want to avoid value, you may just want to say, "Whatever is stronger." So if an insect ate a human being, it would be merely due to capability and not that one is more valuable than the other.

I understand that most people’s knee-jerk reaction is to say “humans have more value!”; but this simply isn’t true under my theory. Instead, we are pragmatically permitted to use them, with stipulations, because it is in accordance with FIS.

Likewise, it is not “the stronger wins”. It is entirely possible that, according to FIS, a mind holds higher precedence over another mind and the former is physically weaker than the latter.

I'm not seeing why that matters though. All this seems to imply is that minds are beings that are ends in themselves. It doesn't prove why anyone should value this, its just a claim.
…
Just why ends in themselves should matter beyond our desire or opinion that they should matter.

So the idea is that ‘one ought to be rational’ and an implication of that is that ‘one ought not to concede contradictions as true’; and from that that ‘one ought not perform an action that concedes a contradiction as true’; and from that one should not treat a mind as a sole means towards an end because it concedes (implicitly in action) a contradiction as true: that they are and are not an end in themselves. So if you accept that ‘one ought to be rational’ and that ‘minds are ends in themselves’ and that ‘sole means are not ends’, then it logically follows that one should not treat them as a mere means. Not sure if that helps.

I appreciate the suggestion Bob, but I don't think I use any empirical claims. In fact, when we spoke about this last time I believe the point you noted was despite the logic of the claims, you were one of the only people who noted we lacked empirical fact to back it. I agreed with you then and still do today. The claim is not that it is empirically necessary that there be a first cause, but logically based off of the definition of a first cause vs an infinitely regressive cause.

I apologize: I mis-re-read it: nevermind! I re-read it again and, yes, this is purporting that a first cause (an ‘alpha) is logically necessary, since the form of the argument is that there are 3 exhaustive options (A, B, and C) and both A and B entail C, so C is logically necessary.

I really should not indulge myself in this OP while we have two pending discussions going, but I can’t help it (:

Let me just ask: what sense of the term ‘cause’ is being used here? It doesn’t seem to be physical causality but, rather, mere explanation: am I remembering correctly?

If it is ‘cause’ in the looser sense of ‘having a reason for its existence’, then my worry is that your concept of an ‘infinite causality’ presupposes that we can validly quantify it into one ‘thing’ (to then ask of it what reason it has for its existence): I don’t think someone who denies a ‘first cause’ in this sense would agree to that. They would say that the reasons are themselves an infinite chain, an absolute infinity, such that each time you bundle up the current ‘thing’ (into a ‘thing’) and ask for a reason for its existence you can always do that for the next one and so on. Now, I would imagine your response is that we can abstract that absolute infinity such that it would have no reason for its existence, but this crucially misapprehends the concept of an ‘absolute infinity’ which has been presented, since if it existed then your abstraction of it into one thing would be impossible.

The nature of morality is what 'should' happen. That's where we've started. As I examine proposals of what should be, I ask, "Why should that reason be?" until we chain all the way down to the basic question. "Should there, or should there not be existence?" That's really all there is to it at this point.

I understand, but this has nothing to do with what the nature of objective moral judgments are, which what was pertinent to our discussion of the whether or not all moral judgments boil down to your existential question.

An objective moral judgement would be a moral judgement that can be logically concluded on no matter the difference in subjective viewpoint
…
This is something that cannot be rationally agreed upon by all people.
…
So, for a moral judgement to be objective, its 'should' must be rationally proven despite one's subjective viewpoint.

Firstly, although I am trying not to import my definitions, this is not what objectivity with respect to morality standardly means, and this would, within standard terminology, be a form of moral subjectivism. You are just subjectively stipulating that what one should do is what is rational, and then calling ‘objective’ whatever can be reached as a consensus by people committed to that subjective moral judgment.

Secondly, just to go with your terms here, if all you mean by objectivity is that there is a consensus amongst rational agents, then if your argument for ‘there should be nothing’ being logical contradictory is true then this would be an objective moral judgment by your terms.

But if that existence should not exist, then 'nothing should exist' becomes 'nothing should not exist'.

This does not follow: why would this be the case? It is a non-sequitur, by my lights, to say ‘If the existence should not exist because nothing should exist, then nothing should not exist’. — Bob Ross

Because you're forgetting the first assumption:

1. There is an objective morality

This is where I am not following: how does stipulating morality is objective entail that a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction? How does it entail that ‘nothing should exist’ becomes ‘nothing should not exist’? I am not following. I don’t think this clarified it either:

Remember, we're not proving that an objective morality exists. We're stating, "If there is an objective morality, what must its foundation be?" And when we examine this down the chain of 'should's' we are left with the foundational question, "Should there, or should there not be existence?" This is a binary assuming that there is an objective morality. Meaning if one side is false, the other side is necessarily true. If both are false, then there is no objective morality. But that's not what we're looking for. We're saying, "IF, there is an objective morality, which way should the binary logically swing?" I hope that clears it up!

Please write out a syllogism for why a reason justifying its own non-existence because ‘nothing should exist’ entails ‘nothing should not exist’; because I don’t see how this is being inferred.

@Philosophim

I would like to just make a suggestion, reading through this OP for the second time I realized you don't seem to be actually claiming a first cause is logically necessary: instead, it is from the idea that all the options lead to a first cause based off of empirical claims. So, I would suggest, to avoid confusion, amending the title. There is nothing in your OP that proves that the logic itself necessitates a first cause, and I think this is the issue for most people reading your OP for the first time, like @Banno, because they are immediately misguided by the title. Thusly, Banno is absolutely right in pointing out that a first cause is not logically necessary because logic does not necessitate anything empirical; and Philosophim is perfectly right in pointing out that this critique completely sidesteps the actual argument.

Just food for thought (:

Please remove any vocabulary like state-of-affairs in your next reply so I can understand your point. As it is, I can request that as the OP. Feel free to keep any of your own vocabulary in your head, but translate it down to the language of what we're covering because you're not at where the argument is, you're somewhere else I don't understand.

I will do my best!

Yeah Bob, I don't know what you're talking about. Please remove your own language and try to say what you want to say using the language I've put forward.

The problem is that you haven’t given any vocabulary for this, because you haven’t engaged your theory in anything related to the nature of moral properties and judgments, so there’s nothing for me to translate to.

For example, what is the nature of an objective moral judgment under your view? I don’t think you mentioned it at all in the OP, so what should I translate my language into?

If something existed that noted 'nothing should exist' then that existence should not exist.

Correct.

But if that existence should not exist, then 'nothing should exist' becomes 'nothing should not exist'.

This does not follow: why would this be the case? It is a non-sequitur, by my lights, to say ‘If the existence should not exist because nothing should exist, then nothing should not exist’.

ts very existence would be a contradiction

Why? Please explicate where in the logic there is a contradiction, e.g., !(p ^ p). There’s nothing logically contradictory with something existing that indicates that itself should not exist.

Hello Mww!

Just FYI, I modified the OP, so it has changed quite a bit (;

….basing metaethics on F.P.M.M, 1785, isn’t what that treatise is about. For ethical systems, you’d probably want Metaphysics of Ethics,1797, especially considering your sections on rights and virtue, each having a book of their own in that work as a whole

Interesting, I will have to give it a read; but I would like to clarify that I am not basing my metaethics on Kant, just normative ethics. Kant would not like me being a moral anti-realist (:

….the exchange of rational beings for minds either leaves out, or at least makes no account for the fundamental predicates of Kantian moral/ethical philosophy, re: will, autonomy and pure practical reason belonging necessarily to the former as a rational being, or person, but these need methodological justification in the latter as a simple mind;

I honestly don’t see this as a problem: I think all minds, as outlined in my argument for FET, are subjected to his line of reasoning; and not just rational ones.

….the conceptions means and ends, as they relate to moral/ethical philosophy, need to be determined before a FET with them as its ground, makes sense;

Fair enough. I added a new section on that.

….you say, “FET, no matter how useful it is itself for ethics, cannot be enough for good moral discernment”, but I rather think the intent of it was precisely for moral discernment, of the pure subjectivist account.

Yes, the original intent by Kant was a strictly deontological account which made no room for pragmatically resolving moral antinomies—my does though.

….lastly, if one thinks ethics relates to a community of persons/minds, wouldn’t each mind need a moral disposition of his own? Otherwise, they become a hive rather than a community. And if that’s the case, shouldn’t there be some necessary condition similar to a categorical imperative somewhere in this current theory?

Yes, the categorical imperative is FET, but my FET is not targeting only rational beings nor does it bar pragmatic resolutions of moral antinomies.

I should note, as a moral anti-realist, I do not think categorical imperatives express something objective but, rather, are an absolute, ultimate end—and end for its own sake which is perfectly compatible with denying any objectivity to it. Does that make Kant roll over in his grave? You tell me…

Anyway, I like the work that’s been done here, but it seems a little incomplete to me. I can’t help but think that upon more substance amended to the conditions, it may be found they don’t work as they are now.

Since I revised it, please give it another read and let me know if you have changed your mind here.

The only potential problem I see is how to justify eating or using animals for materials or labor

I just updated the OP so that it is clearer what is being argued: my answer is yes, it is justified because, long story short, it is a moral antinomy and I would intuit that, in accordance with FIS, that is permissible as long as it is done with reverence and respect for those animals.

A key feature I was not fully grasping of my (normative) theory is that practical life itself is essentially nothing but moral antinomies; and so FIS plays a much stronger role in practical life than I first envisioned.

Beyond animals, there's now also the question of insects. Do they have minds?

So, I would like to point out this is just an empirical question about what exactly has a mind, whereas my theory is simply proving that if it does have one, then what the implications (ethically) are of that. I am not sure how many insects have minds. I also added a terminology section to help define what I mean by a mind. I would say if the insect has some sort of inner life, such that there is something there is to be it in and of itself, then it has a mind.

Where does a mind begin and end?

I definitely can’t answer that, and, quite frankly, no one can. This isn’t necessary for the theory to work though, as I can prove that there is such a thing as a puddle and a lake without knowing the exact threshold where one becomes the other.

If we can't treat them as solely means, then do we have a right to eat them?

Yes, in the case that it is for nourishment. See the section on ‘treatment of other animals’ I added.

Why are animals and insects ends in themselves but clearly have less value compared to people?

They don’t have less value than humans: they are prioritized lower in the case of moral antinomies, which is most of practical life, than humans.

The only issue is that P2: Person's are ends in themselves isn't proven, its more of a given assumption.

I added more sections that pertain to ends vs. means; and there is an explanation below the argument of why P2 is true. They are ends in themselves because they are the only beings with a nature such that they are an absolute end.

But it all hinges on the reader accepting that a mind is an end in itself and that ends in themselves matter. For a person who already agrees or does not want to question this, it can work.

I gave an explanation of this, even in the previous version of the OP, so I don’t see how it is purely assumptive (in it).

I'm granting them as acceptably internally coherent.

I see!

Its not that I don't think minds are the greatest things that can be, its the 'end in themselves' argument that isn't enough for me. Why is it important to be a end in itself? What does that even mean? (I know you've answered this, just showing my thought process) Why is it that we have value and morality at all?

Which premise do you disagree with? The idea behind the premises and conclusion is that one has to disagree with at least one of them to deny FET which allows us to discuss the disagreement. I just don’t know which one exactly you are disagreeing with, but I am more than happy to discuss whichever one it is in more depth.

Also, I added a section on means vs. ends, so hopefully that clarifies that part a bit.

Is rationality different for me and for you? When you provide an argument you are assuming a common standard of rationality, and you are assuming that validity and soundness are the same for you and your interlocutor. Rational justification is similar.

I would say it is the same.

The point here is, "Because I believe it," is not a rational justification (for you or for anyone else).

This is does not follow from what was said above, and simply begs the question.

I have explained multiple times that I am contending the conclusion of your disjunctive syllogism.

Ok, either you must argue that the disjunctive syllogism, in form, is invalid (such as it isn’t actually exhaustive or something) or one of the arguments I gave are invalid (and in that case you would have to tell me which premise or premises you are contending with).

So far you seem to just be saying that you think there are reasons to deny that moral judgments express something subjective without actually demonstrating what is wrong with the disjunctive syllogism that would, in principle, make that claim true.

For example, if you said, "I have reason to believe the car is not black, and I have reason to believe that the car is not not-black, therefore I have reason to believe that the car is neither," I would point to your conclusion and give arguments for why it is incoherent.

That is disanalogous. Here’s a better example:

I say “The car must either be white or black; and I have reasons sufficient to prove it is not black; therefore it is white”; and you say “but we have reasons sufficient to prove it is not white”.

What’s wrong with the reasons I gave for it not being black? Or is it that you think the reasons are valid but are outweighed by the reasons proving it is not white? Or that it could be a different color than white or black?

Fair enough!

Sorry for the belated response!

How does it contradict it Bob? I missed or misunderstood what you were saying then.

If morality is objective, then moral judgments express something objective.

If they express something objective, then they are true in virtue of corresponding (adequately) to a (mind[stance]-independently existing) state-of-affairs in reality.

If they are true in virtue of corresponding (adequately) to a (mind[stance]-independently existing) state-of-affairs in reality, then the chain of reasoning for why any given moral judgment is true ends at that state-of-affairs—which violates your point that all chains of reasoning bottom out at “to be or not to be?”.

Why is it that the state of existence can never be a moral judgement grounded in the relevant state of affairs between existence and nothing existing?

My point is that all chains of reasoning (about morality) do not bottom out at “to be or not to be?”. Sure, “One should exist” is made true by a state-of-affairs, if it is true, and this particular chain of reasoning would bottom out there.

Likewise, this is why I wanted to start with metaethics, although we skipped passed it, because I think you think that an argument which posits two exhaustive options and proves one leads to a contradiction pertains to objective morality—which it does not. If “one should exist” is a moral judgment which expresses something objective, then there must be a state-of-affairs (which exists mind-independently) that makes it true, which is not the case with your logical argument. Anyways, I digress.

The objective judgement would be the true decision between whether there should be existence or not right?

Only if every moral judgment biols down to the moral judgment “it should exist” or “it should not exist” (or something like that), which, crucially, in order for this to be form of ‘objective morality’, would still require a state-of-affairs out there that makes either one or the other true: not that one leads to a contradiction.

And we're talking about the arrangement in which there is at least one existence, or no existence

Yes, in the case of specifically “should it exist, or not?” and not every moral judgment, which is required for your point that all moral judgments boil down to that question to work.

Also, the arrangement itself would have to be a state-of-affairs with normative ‘moral’ substance.

My point with respect to your argument for “there should be existence” is two-fold:

1. Even if I grant that it proves a contradiction with “there should be nothing”, your argument does not demonstrate any sort of ‘moral’ state-of-affairs in reality that makes “there should be nothing” false (or “there should be something” true); instead, it notes there is a contradiction, which isn’t itself a moral claim: it is an indicative statement. Thusly, your argument presupposes a moral claim that one should not accept a contradiction as true, and this is seems to be what the whole argument (morally) is grounded in; but, crucially, if your argument is within the bounds of ‘objective morality’, then what state-of-affairs entails that one ought to not accept contradictions? Otherwise, you are just being a subjectivist in disguise.

2. I don’t see at all how the reason, that provides justification for ‘there should be nothing at all’, entailing that itself should not exist is a logical contradiction.

If morality is objective, then it is necessarily the case that “why should babies even exist?” is completely irrelevant to the truth that “one should not torture babies” as a moral fact. — Bob Ross

Why is it necessarily the case?

Ok, so I misspoke: it isn’t necessarily the case; but it is possible. Because, with objective morality, the statement “one should not torture babies” is true solely in virtue of some sort of state-of-affairs in reality with moral signification. It is entirely possible that there is a state-of-affairs such that ‘babies should not exist’ and ‘one should not torture babies’. Perhaps you are saying that the morally relevant state-of-affairs within your moral theory has some sort of implication where they are related: if so, then can you please elaborate on how that works (under your theory)?

There's a very good reason I'm not using the term moral realism. It might not be true. At least, many of the tenants and contexts of it. When speaking about a foundation we should not be concerned where we are going. We're just concerned about noting the foundation first. If that is solid, we build from there. We might end up in moral realism, or not. We're starting super small first, so we assume nothing beyond it.

Philosophim, you said we are presupposing ‘objective morality exists’. You can’t presuppose that and say moral realism might be false in your view: that’s like saying we are presupposing water exists but H20 doesn’t.

Lets take it in the reverse case. "if I grant morality is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “something should exist”, then something should exist."

If we are presupposing objective morality exists, then this is abstractly exactly what you would have to claim. This is what it means for moral judgments to express something objective, or for there to be an objective moral judgment. This is why I was wanting to dive into metaethics so I could understanding what exactly the nature of those objective moral judgments are under your view. Instead, we skipped passed it to try and make headway.

So far I've presented that its logically impossible for a reason to exist that existence should not exist. If you think this is wrong, then you must prove that there exists a reason that existence should not exist. If you can't, then we go by what we have remaining: logic.

You haven’t proved it is logically impossible: that’s why I wanted to dive into the syllogism (ABC) you gave. It did not demonstrate any logical contradictions with positing a reason such that it justifies itself not existing.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Seems fine to me. Since this is based off of Kant, it might help to contrast your reasoning with why Kant chose rational minds. I explored Kant years ago and do not remember much at this point.

It is because he considers only rational agents to have the sufficient freedom to obey their own representational laws as opposed to the laws of nature.

I say all minds have sufficient freedom to do it, we just don’t have the same amount each.

Also, an animal is not a person. So no need to go into any more detail for me.

Just a note: I am saying animals have minds; but aren’t a person in the sense of being a human being. They are, as minds, covered by FET.

So I think this is in a lot better place, I just noted two questions to consider.

1. Can you prove that any of us should care about people as ends in themselves?
2. Can you make a clear contrast with how Kant determines its rational beings to consider in the FET with your line of reasoning that it should be minds?

#1 is proven by the argument for FET: if one is rational, then they cannot treat a mind as solely a means towards an end without conceding a contradiction.

#2 yes, so Kant considers freedom to be something only rational agents have; and he defines it in terms of being able to obey one’s own representations of laws as opposed to the laws of nature. He thinks this because, quite frankly, he doesn’t think most animals have the capacity to set up for themselves a law and abide by: they just go from one biological motivation to another like a slave to biology. Hence, rational beings (i.e., those beings which can hang up a law to abide by with their capacity of freedom and presumably cognitive capabilities) are the only ends. Something which is does not have the freedom (in the sense of what I described above) cannot be an end because they are not setting out for themselves means towards their own ends because they are not freely choosing them—like a robot doing exactly what it was programmed to do. Kant believed in a libertarian form of free will, and in the sense that we have free will in virtue of a soul that we ultimately are (as opposed to merely have).

I take a much more naturalistic approach: I say nature, especially evolution, makes no leaps. It is clear to me that the vast majority of animals (although I don’t know about literally all of them) have sufficient freedom to set out a means towards their end, even if they lack the highly rational capacities we humans have. My dog clearly is not rational, but she has her moments: if the matt is wet outside, then she will wait farther back for me to let her in so that her feet don’t get wet. That’s a deliberate action sparked by her making a free choice to not get her feet wet and trying to actualize that prevention by setting out waiting farther back as a means towards that end. Anyways, I am a compatiblist when it comes to free will and don’t believe in souls.

Other then that, I think its just Kant stuff, and I'm sure a Kantian will come along and be able to provide more feedback. Nicely done Bob!

I'm sure @Mww will have a lot to say (:
Thank you!

Do you agree, Philosophim, with FET and FIS? Or are you just granting them as internally coherent?

@Vera Mont

Perhaps I misread it.

Which just shows that because something is explicitly agreed to by citizens in a kind of "social contract" sense it doesn't follow that it is morally right.

True. I concede that point.

That's fine, but I'm not seeing why that denies the foundational question of all 'should's' "Should there be existence or not?"

It is because the very nature of objective morality contradicts your position, unless you are contending with my outline of its nature.

I already outlined it, and you dismissed it as “abstract”; but that is not a valid counter. Either objective morality is like I described or I am misunderstanding it and you have a different view of it.

That's the definition of a foundation Bob. When there are no more questions and reasons to be given, you have a foundation. That must be proved.

Sure, if that is what you mean by “foundation”, but moral judgments are made true by a state-of-affairs which exist mind-independently; and this contradicts your position that the chain of reasoning boils down to the Hamlet question because, like I said, any given moral judgment will be grounded in the morally relevant state-of-affairs that make them true, which would never be existence itself.

Hypotheticals are a disengagement from the discussion that will go nowhere.

This makes no sense to me. If you claim that every moral claim boils down to the Hamlet question and I explain that your assumption of objective morality entails that it boils down to a state-of-affairs (that exists mind-independently) (as per the nature of morality being objective), then I have demonstrated your claim to be false. Instead of addressing my claim, you dismiss it as a ‘hypothetical’.

So I would simply ask, "Why is this proven objectively?" Then they would need to give me a foundational reason why

That reason is that it corresponds with a state-of-affairs that exists mind-independently in reality—that’s where the foundation of the justification of the moral claim would come from, which can’t ever be existence itself: a state-of-affairs is an arrangement of existent things.

If I asked, "Why should babies even exist? If they don't exist, they can't be tortured." what would be the answer?

If morality is objective, then it is necessarily the case that “why should babies even exist?” is completely irrelevant to the truth that “one should not torture babies” as a moral fact. That is what it means for morality to be objective. It is just an irrelevant question to ask. It is a fine question to ask completely unrelated to the moral claim that “one should not torture babies”, but ,again, not relevant to it.

We're not talking about moral realism. We're talking about the logical conclusions one has to reach if an objective morality exists.

I am not arguing against moral realism, we are presupposing it. That’s what it means for morality to be objective: moral realism is true. If you don’t want to import that term, then just swap out ‘moral realism’ in my responses for ‘objective morality’: I am using them interchangeably.

I don't understand what you mean by 'current reality'. There is either existence, or there is not. The question is should there be existence, or should there not. To say something should, is to have a reason why A is preferable to B.

if:

1. morality is objective; and
2. reality has a state-of-affairs (that exists mind-independently) that dictates “nothing should exist”;

then:
Nothing should exist.

Your claim is that there is a contradiction with this, and there isn’t. I am using a hypothetical because that’s the game we are currently playing: if I grant moral is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “nothing should exist”, then nothing should exist. This hypothetical invalidates your claim that “nothing should exist” results in a contradiction. I don’t need to go beyond the hypothetical to prove that.

This is a hypothetical again. No if. Is there, or is there not a state of affairs in which there should be nothing?

Think of it this way. I claim “everyone who kills someone is a murderer”. You say “what IF someone is defending themselves?”. Imagine I say “that’s a hypothetical, so it doesn’t matter: give me something actual”. Is that a valid counter? Of course not! All that you need to do is demonstrate a hypothetical where someone kills someone and it is not murder to debunk my position: I can’t sidestep the process by banning hypotheticals.

Your argument is that there is a contradiction, irregardless of what moral facts actually exist, with positing “nothing should exist”: a hypothetical is all that is required to contend with your claim here, because as long as there is no contradiction with me positing “nothing should exist”, then I am right.

This is a fair critique of modern society, but I would equally say that child (essential slave) labor in underdeveloped countries for the sake of affordable products in developed countries is also immoral. Your argument seems to be: we do something wrong that is similar, so why not just do more wrong? Two wrongs do not make a right.

I understand from your point of view, but for the reader, its not relevant what your argument is here.

That is fair enough. I will change that later.

I could agree with you if you stated minds, which would include insects, animals, and potentially plants.

I am talking about minds, as ‘persons’ to me is a ‘being with personhood’ which, in turns, just entails that the being ‘has a mind’. I did re-google of the term ‘person’ and it seems to exclusively tend to pertain to humans, so I will rewrite the argument with ‘mind’ instead of ‘person’ to more clearly convey the point.

The only problem in the theory is proving why minds are invaluable. I happen to agree that minds are the highest values in existence, but for the theory to hold you'll need to prove why minds, even irrational ones, are priced right out of quantification.

So, I got rid of that ‘value’ language in the argument because I don’t think it really matters. If you can’t treat an end as merely a means, then it doesn’t matter if you find it invaluable or not: you will treat it as though it is anyways.

So the argument is just FET, which is just that one cannot use a mind as solely a means towards an end but also must treat it simultaneously as an end in itself; and this is demonstrated in the (new) proof by teasing out a contradiction.

1. Minds vs persons.

I agree, and I noted this in the OP (I believe). I mean personhood, or ‘mindhood’, by persons and not rational agents; which is different than Kant.

Can we justify killing an animal to eat it and survive if they are a means to us and an end to themself? If ends to themselves are invaluable, how do we justify killing and eating cows over killing and eating other humans?

This is also addressed in the OP: my answer is yes if it is for the reason of nourishment, not things like taste. I can go through the argument if you would like for why that would be the case. This is another distinguishing factor between me and Kant.

The problem with removing value entirely is that questions of relative sacrifice no longer have any justification.

That is what FIS is for: if you have to violate FET, then it does not follow that you should just pick “eenie, meenie, miny, mo” (:

If one is really taking FET seriously, then even in situations where they must violate it they should still be considering FIS which is a pragmatic formula that is centered around sanctity of minds, and it is a simple question: what action can I perform that would progress best towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds (persons)?

We have a room with 3 people. An unapologetic murderer, an unapologetic saint, and a regular person. They all must choose one of them to die for the other 2 to live. Currently, your theory has no means of stating that the murderer should be the one to die.

I would say that the murderer should die because they have a track record of violating FET outright (in a case where presumably it was nor a moral antinomy) whereas the other two do not and this is going to seem to progress better towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds (persons) than killing one of the other two.

Anytime we run into a case that conflicts with what most people would innately feel is a simple moral choice and conclusion, the theory needs to clearly and persuasively explain why we should logically dismiss that conclusion.

I don’t think we should dismiss that conclusion at all. If you are stipulating that one has to get killed by the other two, then it is just a matter of deciding who goes. If you are stipulating that they could choose not to kill anyone and all three die, then I would say that is the best option because upholding a human being’s right to life as an absolute right, like we normally do, seems to be a progression best towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds. If we just let me kill each other, even to survive themselves all else being equal, then we regress from the civil rights people have been working towards for so long. I don’t have the right to kill you so that I simply can keep living, because we have setup a system where human beings specifically have immutable, inalienable rights.

How do we treat minds that believe the best end to itself, is to end other ends in themselves? Or believes it is rational that the worth of other minds can be quantified as less than its own mind?

I don’t understand the first question, but my answer to the second is that they would be violating FET if they did all else being equal. If it is a moral antinomy, then they may be right depending on the facts in relation to FIS (in principle); but I would intuit that we would be regressing my removing human beings inalienable rights, so I would say in the case of humans we are best off (for the sake of getting to a maximal sovereignty state) to keep rights inalienable.

Finally, after fully establishing how it minds and not persons that this theory applies to, I would study the general criticisms that people lobby against Kant and see if an how your theory answers or dodges those criticisms

I have and am more than happy to answer any of them you may have!

If there is no objective morality, then there is no 'should' for anything

I don’t buy this at all (; But I digress, let’s just say I do agree.

One can do anything. But should they?

I don’t think you quite answered my question, which was:

I am noting that one could, which is what I thought your claim was: are you just saying that the word explodes into triviality if we do? Because I agree with that.

I am saying that one could decide that they should do something without any reason to do it. Anyways, let me just grant your point on this one; because I want to see where this goes.

But this isn’t relevant to your claim: it was that all chains of reasoning biol down to “to be or not to be?”, which is clearly false if the chain of reasoning about “should I torture babies?” bottoms out at a platonic form. — Bob Ross

Can you prove that it is?
…
You're making an abstract thought experiment into a concrete proof.

My point is not that Platonism is true, my point is that moral facts are true in virtue of them corresponding to a state-of-affairs that exist mind-independently; so the reasoning chain ends at that state of affairs when one asks “should one do <...>?”. The platonic form of the good is just an example of that.

It doesn’t matter what the state-of-affairs (that exists mind-independently) is to prove my point.

If I can continue to ask why should Platonic forms exist, and that reason lies beyond Platonic forms, that is the continuation of the chain, not a new chain. A chain only ends when you arrive at a foundation.

And this I think is the true disagreement: the chain of reasoning ends once sufficient reasons are provided for justifying the claim, not when one gets to a foundation. The justification, for a moral realist, for, let’s say, “one ought not torture babies” is that there is a mind-independently existing state-of-affairs which makes that sentence true. Therefore, if they demonstrate sufficiently that there is such a state-of-affairs, then thereby the statement is true and that is the end of the reasoning and justification for that claim. There’s no need to ask “but should I exist?”. As a moral realist would put by denoting sentences in quotes vs. states-of-affairs in non-quotes, if one ought not torture babies, then “one ought not torture babies”.

This is the intention I'm trying to convey. If "One should help the sick, one should exist." "Well why should the sick be helped?" Because they should live. "Why should a person live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of, "Why should anything live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of "Why should anything exist?" You're looking up higher for the answers to the questions of why a castle should be built a certain way without first asking the question of why a castle should be built at all.

Yeah, I see what you mean, but that has nothing to do with any chain of reasoning, from a moral realists’ perspective, for why one ought to do anything.

Perhaps I am just conflating what you mean by “chains of reasoning” with what I am thinking of as “chains of reasoning”: are you not talking about the full chain of reasoning which is required to sufficiently justify, in this case, the moral judgment?

I get that you are conveying that we can ask further morally loaded questions beyond “should I torture babies?” and if they are more fundamental than “should I torture babies?” and they conflict, then we would presumably go with the more fundamental one. So if ‘I shouldn’t exist’ is true and ‘I should go stop that person from torturing babies’, then perhaps I would just kill myself instead of stopping them; and you seem to be just trying to ask “what’s the most fundamental question of morality?” and concluding: “it is to be or not to be”. Is that what you are saying?

If it is the case that nothing should exist, then the reason, "Nothing should exist" should not exist. Thus the conclusion. It is a contradiction for there exist the reason, "Nothing should exist".

I underlined the problem: why is it a contradiction? I totally agree that if ‘nothing should exist’, then that very reason shouldn’t exist. Those two claims do not contradict each other. Perhaps it has to do with:

You may have forgotten the assumption that we're currently making. That is that an objective morality exists. This means that there is some foundation for 'should'.

So it seems like you are presupposing that there must exist something, which is implied by morality being objective, and this contradicts the idea that ‘nothing should exist’ because it would be nothing (hence no objective morality). If I am even remotely close here to the argument, then I would say that the flaw is that the current reality is what dictates what is objectively wrong, and so if there was a state-of-affairs such that there should be nothing, then “there should be nothing” would be true and there would be no contradiction.

"There is no fact that dictates God exists, but any sane person will agree to this judgement."

Claims like this beg challenges and can cause people to dismiss your claims outright. I'm not going to do that of course. I'm just noting that if you want to get to your point, you don't have to make claims like this. A simple "I'm not here to debate why one should choose the subjective start of, 'one ought to do what is rational.' I'm simply going to start with this and show a morality based on rationality." will work fine. So that's what I'm going to do. I'll assume that we take the prime assumption that we ought to act rationally and go from there.

That’s fair. It opens up the discussion back to metaethics; but I just wanted to make it clear that this theory was building off of the previous one, so one has to subjectively affirm ‘one ought to be rational’—there is not moral fact which makes it so.

Just to let you know, I updated and altered the proof for FET because I think some of the premises and syllogisms were off-point and incentivized derailments into unnecessary topics. So here is the new pseudo-syllogism:

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself.

P2: Persons are ends in themselves.

P3: One should abide by the law of non-contradiction.

P4: To treat a person as solely a means towards an end is to contradict their nature (i.e., to contradict P2).

C: One should not treat a person as solely a means towards an end, but always as (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves.

With that being said, let me respond to your points.

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself.
P2: To value something entails it is solely a means towards an end.
C1: To value something entails it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross

P1 is fine, but how do we get P2? Can I not value an end itself? If I valued world peace, would that not be the end of my means? Can you explain further what you mean by P2?

Although I do affirm P2, I think, upon further reflection, it is irrelevant to the conclusion I actually meant to get to, which is FET. It doesn’t matter whether or not we hold the same axiological theories. So I recant this portion of the proof.

That is fine, but what if I don't value a mind? I'm assuming with the initial premise of "we ought to be rational" that "minds are rational, therefore they should be valued for they ought to be."

So I am arguing, unlike Kant, that ‘persons’ are ‘minds’ and not just rational agents. This is because I think that persons (minds) are ends in themselves because every mind has the capability, so some extent, to set out means towards their own ends of their own free will—which is, as a side note, unique to minds.

The claim that ‘one ought to be rational’ just ties into the argument with respect to not accepting a contradiction, and the idea is that treating a person as solely a means towards an end implicitly concedes they are not an end in themselves but once one understands the nature of a person as an end in themselves the contradiction arises: we contradict the nature of a person by treating them solely as a means towards our own ends.

I'm a little confused by P5. Why are persons ends in themselves? Can't I use persons as means to my goals, even benevolently? If I send soldiers out to stop a terrorist, am I not using those soldiers, those people, as means to an end?

Yes, we can use persons as means towards an end, but not solely as a means towards an end but, rather, must always also consider and uphold that they are themselves an end. Here’s the revised explanation of the revised proof of FET, as this may help clarify:

P1 merely highlights that if something is just a means towards some end (and just a means) then it cannot be an end itself—e.g., if mowing my lawn is a means towards making my house look presentable (and that being the only consideration), then mowing my lawn is solely means to an end and that end is making my house look presentable. P2 notes that persons (i.e., minds) are ends in themselves: persons are the only type of existence in reality which is capable of having ends and of being ultimately the final end for itself—e.g., although making my house look good may have been the end within the previous example’s context, it is likewise only a means toward another end (like making myself look respectable to my guests) but it will, without any consideration of other people as ends, ultimately bottom out at the final end of myself: I ultimately mow my lawn, in the case that I am not considering other people as ends, for myself—for my benefit. Persons are the only creators capable of setting out hypothetical imperatives (i.e., contextual ends) for the sake of themselves (as the final end) and are thusly ends in themselves. P3 simply notes that the stipulation of this ethical theory is that one ought to be rational which implies being logically consistent; and P4 demonstrates that treating a person as solely a means towards an end entails (at least implicitly) a contradiction and thusly should not be done (if one is rational): when one uses another person for solely their own end, they concede in action that the other person is not an end in themselves (because they are treating them as solely a means) but are equally conceding that they are an end in themselves (due to their nature as a person)—hence the contradiction.

Persons are ends in themselves because they have the capacity to set out means towards ultimately themselves as the end; thusly, they are ends in themselves. There is nothing like this outside of minds in reality: everything else lacks this capacity.

That persons, and thus minds are means and not ends in themselves. This is because you haven't proven either of the statements, only asserted them. Still, lets continue and assume you can demonstrate C4 as true.

So the proof itself is not meant to give every detail of proof for FET, because that would take pages upon pages upon pages (: but, rather, outline the basic argument. If you don’t believe that persons are ends in themselves, then, of course, the conclusion will not follow. We can discuss in more depth what is now P2 if you would like to contend with that one.

Again I'm going to assume minds have value because they are rational and therefore have innate value. So since we should not consider minds valueless, they have value. And since minds have value, people have value. But then doesn't this prove that people are not ends in themselves?

Firstly, I would just like to note again that I am not arguing that only rational agents have value, because I don not consider all minds to even have the capacity to be rational (in any meaningful sense); or, if they do, it is a stretch.

Secondly, yes, if you thought that minds have innate value, then they have value; and if they have value, then they are not invaluable. I happen to think that it is impossible to value a mind without contradicting its nature; so I can’t even value it at 0—so it must be invaluable. However, as I noted before, I don’t think diving into a theory of axiology is all that imperative to my argument, as my revised argument leaves out how value judgments work (purposely so to not derail on that point). I understand some people use ‘value’ in the sense of also minds, like intrinsic value and the like.

That we should consider that minds have value? Then why are we asserting that minds don't have value?

Something being invaluable is not the same thing as valueless. I am arguing that if we cannot value minds, then we cannot even count them as valueless because that is to value something at 0. So they must be invaluable, which is to say we can’t put a price on it; which usually entails it is “more valuable” than anything that can be valued.

Are you stating that not valuing a mind with the representation of 0, is in fact a value? Because that just doesn't work Bob. The number zero is a representation of there not being a quantity. The number zero is not a quantity in itself. The number zero for value is a representation of there being no value, a numeric assignment of zero for value does not mean there exists a value. It means there is no underlying represented value.

Being valueless is to be valued at 0 which is a number which expresses a quantified price—thusly putting a value on it. If there doesn’t exist a value, then it isn’t valueless in the sense that it is worth nothing. I see your point though, so perhaps the confusion between our views lies in the fact that I am talking about ‘valueless’ in the sense of having the absolute least worth, which if we cannot put a worth on minds then they are invaluable, which entails the exact opposite of being valueless. Something being valueless entails you can mistreat it, abuse it, etc.; whereas invaluable means you certainly will not do such things.

Finally, the term 'invaluable' means that it has so much value, it cannot be quantified into one number. It doesn't mean it has no value at all.

That’s fair. I just mean by “we can’t value it” that we cannot put a price on it.

I think you're trying to say something here, but its just not coming across correctly. It seems to me that when you speak about valuing something, you're talking about a quantative value. For example, lets say we valued a person's worth at 10,000 dollars. If of course we could value people quantitively, then we could use them as means to an end. For example, I could use a person worth 10,000 dollars to make myself 1 million dollars. However, if human value is so valuable as to be beyond quantification, an infinite value so to speak, then we could never use a human as a means to an end. We don't use infinite money to make infinite money, that's silly. We simply enjoy infinite money.

That’s fair, and this is why I revised the argument. Hopefully it is a bit clearer now what it is arguing.

Is that what you were trying to say?

I am trying to convey that persons are ends in themselves because their nature is such that they are the creators of values (they set out things as means towards their own ends, making them the end ultimately); and if we treat them solely as a means towards an end then we are implicitly conceding the contradiction that they are and are not an end in themselves. So if we are to be rational, then we cannot solely treat someone as means towards an end, but always simultaneously an end in themselves—hence FET.

This seems to jive with your idea of your formula of ideal sovereignty. If all people are infinitely valuable, sacrificing one infinity for 99 infinities works in the moment of practical necessity, but one infinity is just as equivalent in value to 99 infinities, thus this sacrifice should be abated where possible.

Exactly! FIS is just a pragmatic principle/formula to solve moral dilemmas/antinomies.

Hopefully that clarified a bit.

namely that there is parity between the rational justification for an object's height, and the rational justification for a moral claim.

I honestly am not familiar with what this claim is: could you elaborate? I can't really comment until I understand what the claim is conveying.

"True for me," or, "Rationally justified for me," is a nonsense assertion.

You are confusing something being rationally justified for me in the sense that it wouldn’t rationally justify you in the same circumstances with my position that indexically it is rationally for everyone. But since it is indexical, it can rationally justify me without justifying you if you aren’t in the same circumstances.

Again, if your moral claims do not even pretend to possess rational justification, then clearly your moral system is ridiculous. Your disjunctive syllogism has led you to an incoherent position.

Edit: The way out of this silliness is to recognize that there are certain universal and/or objective values, such as "suffering is bad" or "suffering should be avoided" (
↪Leontiskos
). Even Hume recognized this.

Which premise are you contending with? You just keep sidestepping the whole OP.

Hello 180 Proof,

Just to let you know, I updated the section with a clearer proof; but let me respond to your contentions.

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross
This is a vacuous definition, not an ostensible claim.

If something is solely a means to an end, then it can’t be an end itself because it is just a means towards some other end. If it is also an end then it is not just a means towards an end.

P2: To value something entails it is solely a means towards an end.
Demonstrate this entailment.
…
C1: To value something entails it is not an end in itself.
Invalid inference from underdetermined "propositions". Ergo, "FET proof" (C6) fails.

So I revised the proof, and I would like you to re-read it, because I don’t think it is beneficial for us to dive into axiological theories, which is the path I inadvertently put us down with this premise. I don’t think it matters what one thinks the nature of valuing something is to prove my point (I don’t think). So I, for the sake of the proof, recant this premise.

That's fair: I just revised that section because (1) I don't think I need to get into a dispute about axiological theories to prove my point and (2) I didn't demonstrate the point clearly.

The new argument is:

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself.

P2: Persons are ends in themselves.

P3: One should abide by the law of non-contradiction.

P4: To treat a person as solely a means towards an end is to contradict their nature (i.e., to contradict P2).

C: One should not treat a person as solely a means towards an end, but always as (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves.


P1 merely highlights that if something is just a means towards some end (and just a means) then it cannot be an end itself—e.g., if mowing my lawn is a means towards making my house look presentable (and that being the only consideration), then mowing my lawn is solely means to an end and that end is making my house look presentable. P2 notes that persons (i.e., minds) are ends in themselves: persons are the only type of existence in reality which is capable of having ends and of being ultimately the final end for itself—e.g., although making my house look good may have been the end within the previous example’s context, it is likewise only a means toward another end (like making myself look respectable to my guests) but it will, without any consideration of other people as ends, ultimately bottom out at the final end of myself: I ultimately mow my lawn, in the case that I am not considering other people as ends, for myself—for my benefit. Persons are the only creators capable of setting out hypothetical imperatives (i.e., contextual ends) for the sake of themselves (as the final end) and are thusly ends in themselves. P3 simply notes that the stipulation of this ethical theory is that one ought to be rational which implies being logically consistent; and P4 demonstrates that treating a person as solely a means towards an end entails (at least implicitly) a contradiction and thusly should not be done (if one is rational): when one uses another person for solely their own end, they concede in action that the other person is not an end in themselves (because they are treating them as solely a means) but are equally conceding that they are an end in themselves (due to their nature as a person)—hence the contradiction.

I made it a pseudo-syllogism to be more concise, since I think people get the point.

Hello Janus,

Defending your society if invaded is a very different matter than conscription to fight in wars that are based on political alliances. The point really is that just because some ethos is entrenched in societal law, on what we might want to refer to as " the social contract", it certainly does not seem to follow that it is therefore somehow objectively, or even inter-subjectively, validated.

That’s fair. I was speaking more towards justified wars, and I don’t consider (necessarily) political wars to be justified.

Hello Philosophim,

Not a problem! I greatly respect your work and try to give it its full due. I have noted in the past that it is something I greatly appreciate you having done with me in the past. It is the least I can do!

I appreciate it! (:

Sorry I am playing catch up with all the responses, as I was busy, and I noticed in your other response to my normative theory:

Ah, here it is Bob! I almost missed it. We've already discussed at length on the meta-ethical considerations, but I will dismiss them here.

This is why I thought it may be better to move on to normative ethics because I think my metaethical position will make more sense in light of it, simply because my normative ethical theory outlines exactly what I think you are expecting out of my metaethical theory.

The thing in itself is objective. Truth as forever unknown to us is a thing in itself. Truth as known to us is subjective, and is at best an approximation that can never be known in the objective sense. The best way to subjectively know truth is to make a judgement that is not contradicted by reality.

I mostly agree with this, if I am understanding it correctly. We never know 100% that what we think corresponds actually does; and I think that is what you are noting by truth is objective and something we cannot “know”. I just note that we can “know” it pragmatically, and that’s all that matters to me. Truth is not objective, however, in the sense that there is an existent entity of ‘truth’, which I think we both agree on.

To me, I do not see a separation between the two with your definition of subjective. If everything we judge is mind dependent, then all moral judgements are subjective (in the fact we make them) and all moral judgements express something subjective (in the fact we make them). Since what is objective is mind independent, there is nothing we can say, do, or judge that is objective, as it is all subjective.
…
As you have defined subjective, if there is even an iota of mind dependency, its 100% subjective.

By a statement expressing something subjective or objective, I mean what it is purporting to understand. Yes, all I see is subjective in the sense that they are representations made by my mind, but those representations are somewhat accurate of whatever really is there: I am not just hallucinating. So, I can make claims which purport to, at least in principle, relate to the objects and not merely my representations of them. Again, knowing whether or not the statement actually latches onto anything objective is pragmatic: we can’t 100% know.

I really should have used another word, falsifiable. If you are making a claim that something is true, it must also be falsifiable to be considered seriously in application

Whether or not our beliefs about morality make the moral judgments true is falsifiable.

So in what case is your falsifiable claim that moral decisions are true based on our psychology?

Whether or not our psychology can be wrong about a moral judgment is independent of whether the claim is falsifiable that our psychology is what makes our moral judgments true.

I would like to note, though, that ultimately our psychology, our approvals and disapprovals, are what make moral judgments true under my view; but psyches are an influx and complicated hierarchy of beliefs, desires, etc. and, thusly, one may have to choose between beliefs they have. Also, I do want to note that this should not be confused with making the claim that everything we cognitively say about morality is thereby true in virtue of being said: I can most certainly formulate false beliefs about my beliefs. I can say “I believe torturing babies is perfectly permissible”, but I don’t actually believe that.

For something to be permissible, something else must be impermissible

I am not following why this would be the case.

A subjectively true moral judgement must at some objective level, correlate with reality. This is best known when reality does not actively contradict us.

Correct. It correlates to our psychology.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

Why even use the word 'should' at that point?"

I am noting that one could, which is what I thought your claim was: are you just saying that the word explodes into triviality if we do? Because I agree with that.

So for example, "Platonism is True because of A. It should exist because it is necessary that Platonic forms exist, and there is no other possible option." If of course there are other options other than Platonic forms, then the chain continues. If you're not seriously demonstrating Platonic forms are the foundation of 'should', just understand we're using "Platonic forms" as an abstract X for a thought experiment about the foundation of 'should' to help you understand the chain.

But this isn’t relevant to your claim: it was that all chains of reasoning biol down to “to be or not to be?”, which is clearly false if the chain of reasoning about “should I torture babies?” bottoms out at a platonic form. Sure, you can then start a new chain of reasoning by questioning why that platonic form should exist, but this example violates your claim, no?

But we're not talking about what one should do at this point. That's a few steps away. We're just talking about the foundation of good if morality is indeed objective.

I understand, but your argument claimed in one of its points that all chains of reasoning go back to “to be or not to be?”, but if “one should help the sick” is true then it would follow from that that “one should exist” which means that the former is more foundational in this example than the latter (morally: obviously not ontologically).

I never claimed that there was a contradiction.

You said that “there should be nothing” entails a contradiction, and you presented that ABC argument for it; and I was noting that your argument did not succeed in demonstrating a logical contradiction in positing “there should be nothing”. The reason entails that itself should not exist is not a logical contradiction. This seems to be the crux of your argument.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Janus,

I agree that most people don’t know what they implicitly consent to unless it relevant to their every day-to-day lives; but my thing is that conscription to the military seems fair (to me) if it is for self-defense style wars because adults in the society are benefiting from the protection and help of that society—so why wouldn’t they be obligated to defend it?

Hello Leontiskos,

Do you actually believe that moral claims are true in virtue of beliefs? That is the question. I don't think you even believe yourself.

Yes, I do. I am not playing devil’s advocate nor being deceptive: I genuinely believe that, ultimately, moral judgments express something subjective—there are no moral facts out there.

But, "No one should torture babies," is not self-referential. It is referring not just to oneself, but also to 8+ billion other people.

That’s why it is short-hand for ‘I believe no one should torture babies’. I feel like we are circling again.

I have provided an argument: "Because I believe it to be so," is not a rationally justifying statement.

No, Leontiskos, which premise of which argument that defends the thesis are you contending with? I provided a proof and you seem to just want to sidestep the whole OP.

If this is so then your response is not a (rational) justification. It does not rationally justify. Beliefs do not rationally justify moral claims. You admit that more is needed.

Again. It is rational justification for me if “I believe that one ought not torture babies” but not for you. Me disapproving of it doesn’t count as convincing justification for you but this doesn’t mean I am not justified in subjectively holding you shouldn’t do it.

First, as I requested, please stop using the term normative so that this stays simple and clear. We're not talking about any claim, but "moral claims". A moral claim involves 'should'.

Fair enough; sorry, I meant moral claim here.

'Should' requires a reason. If there is no reason, then there is no 'should'. If there is no 'should' there is no objective morality.

I asked why do normative “moral” claims need a reason and you said because “if there is no reason, then there is no ‘should’”: why?

This seems to imply that I cannot assert “one should not torture babies” without an underlying reason; but I clearly can, no?

Platonism's truth has nothing to do with whether it should be. For example, someone kills a baby. I can claim they should not have killed a baby. But its still true they killed a baby. When we say something 'should' exist, we say it that it is preferable that it be versus not be. So we can ask, "Why should Platonism exist?" To answer why Platonism or anything else should exist, we really have to answer the question, "Why should anything exist?" first.

No. Again, I think you missed the point: if platonism were true, then “I should not torture babies” does get reasoned down to “why should anything exist?” or “something should exist”: it is true in virtue of a Platonic Form. I am merely bringing this up because one of your points in your argument was that all chains of reasoning about moral claims boils down to “why should anything exist?”: they don’t.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are noting that whatever moral claims may be true they are not useful to the subject if the subject doesn’t think they should exist; and then you are applying that to existence itself: “to be or not to be?”. But, crucially, it can go the other way around just as easily: “one should help the sick” implies that “one should continue existing”--in this case, the former is not true in virtue of the latter but actually vice-versa.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. In fact, I am glad you wrote this because that is way more precisely what I was trying to convey then what I was saying! (: — Bob Ross

We are in agreement then! We can then agree the only logical conclusion is that nothing should not be. Assuming an objective morality, the only thing we can start with then is that something is what should be. With that, we can move onto the next points.

I think you may have misread my response there: I disagree with you that there is a contradiction in A B C argument you have. In order for there to be a contradiction, there must be something wrong with the form (for logic) or they most be incoherent (in content), I am failing to see that in:

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

What’s the contradiction?

Ok, that's a big chunk for you Bob! I know its busy because its Christmas season, so happy holidays if I don't hear from you before then!

Merry Christmas to you too!

I want to, firstly, express my gratitude for your elaborate response: I can tell you read through it all and I know how much effort it is to respond that lengthy and substantively—so thank you!

Before I respond, I originally was going to wait to post my normative ethical theory until it was more refined and polished up, but, like you said, it doesn’t seem to make a different how precise I think I am using my terminology nor how exact the idea is—as someone is going to find something wrong with it from their perspective. Since I don’t think we are making all that much progress here metaethically and I think you enjoy the normative ethics stuff more, I suggest we go to my new thread to discuss normative ethics and then segue back here if need be...but I will leave it up to you as I am down for either.

Since our responses are getting quite lengthy, I am going to summarize what I got out of your response instead of trying to go paragraph by paragraph because that will end up being an essay longer than the OP (:

So, for my own sake of keeping track, I think you should pick a couple or perhaps one and we focus in on it first; otherwise, there is so many disputes going on here I don’t know we can safely maneuver all of them at once (;

Here’s some of our disputes:

1. Moral judgments expressing something subjective vs. being subjective themselves. You seem to be focusing on the latter, while I the former.
2. You believe I didn’t provide a positive case for prong-2 of my thesis, but I think the proof of (1) moral judgments being propositional, (2) some moral judgments being true, and (3) that moral judgments do not express something objective entails that moral judgments express something subjective.
3. Truth-aptness for you is not contingent on a statement/sentence, but for me it is.
4. The liar paradox, stated as ‘this statement is false’, for you is truth-apt, for me it is not.
5. For you, it seems to be a problem that we cannot acquire 100% certain knowledge of what is objective because we only know it through ourselves as subjects, which I don’t see anything wrong with. I have no problem admitting that we only have conditional knowledge of the things-in-themselves, in the sense that we only every analyze representations of things-in-themselves: this doesn’t mean that we are just analyzing things which are purely subjective.
6. You seem to think that it is a flaw in my theory that moral judgments cannot never be false relative to the psychology of the person at hand, but this just seems like it is the central idea behind the theory itself.
7. I think that moral permissibility is the allowance to do something, which doesn’t entail that one should or should not do it, and you seem to think it means that one should do it; and this is why I think you think there is a symmetry behind my example of eating a sandwhich = permissible and not eating a sandwich = impermissible; but I would say being permissible is not the same thing as one being obligated to do it.
8. I don’t think moral nihilism is the view that there is no objective morality; but you seem to think we can simplify it down to that claim.
9. You seem to think you can simplify “moral judgments are propositional” to “true moral judgments are proposition”; but, to me, those are clearly too separate claims.
10. At one point, you said I don’t believe there are true moral judgments, but I do.
11. Number 11 here is this:

1. If there is not an objective morality, it means all possible claims of what should or should not happen,
even contradictory claims, correlate with reality.

This is not at all what objective morality means [in metaethics].


As a side note:

The "thing in itself" does not refer to an object. An object is a subjective attempt at understanding what a 'thing in itself is'. Our thoughts are 'things in themselves'. Their intentions, judgements, etc. about other things in themselves.

This is fair. I don’t really have a problem saying that we also don’t know ourselves except for how we externally and internally affect our sensibility. So, yeah, I agree that things-in-themselves are not objects. But truth isn’t a thing-in-itself in that sense...that just seems super weird to say that the relationship itself exists as an entity, a thing-in-itself, out there that we are grasping. This seems platonistic to me.

Which would you like to talk about, or would you like to pause and discuss normative ethics?

Bob

Yes, it does have to stop somewhere. But a reason does not have to have a prior reason. I'm saying the ultimate reason is, "It is". This is by necessity as there is nothing prior, nor nothing to negate 'what is'.
…
You would be absolutely correct if all reasons had an underlying reason. I'm noting that we reach a point in which there is no underlying reason, but a foundation. Recall we are assuming morality exists. So if this is the case, and we've reached a foundation, that is what we build upon.

I think I am understanding better now: you are saying that the “existing should be” is grounded in a the reason that “it is”, which would entail that every normative claim, assuming that’s the most fundamental one, does have a reason. But why think that all normative claims need a reason? Why can’t “existing should be” just have no reason?

For example:

I would say that's a reason. "I should help the world because I feel like it" is a reason. The point is I could then ask, "Why should your feelings matter?" In other words, asking the reason behind the reason.

What if someone just says “well, if you can have no reason for why it is, then I don’t need a reason for why it should be”: what’s the symmetry breaker here?

I could just as easily say, "I should eat children because God tells me to." A claim does not make it so. But you make a good point in the fact I have not explicitly stated a "true reason"
…
So in your example of Plato's forms, I could say, "What's the proof behind Plato's forms?" But lets say that it is true. Plato's forms DO exist. I then would ask, "Why should Plato's forms exist?" Do you see the chain now?

I think this missed my point, although I see what you are saying. You claimed all chains of reasoning boils down to “should existence be, or not?”...but my example clearly, if platonism were granted as true, that this is not true. The point was not that platonism is true, it is that if there are moral facts, then the chain of reasoning for a normative statements ends at the fact that makes it true, and not necessarily “should existence be, or not?”.

Because we're doing a test. We're saying, "If morality, or what 'should' be is apart from humanity, what logically would that be? We must first define it, only then can we apply it. To say that morality exists apart from human opinion but leave it without what that would entail means we don't know what we're talking about.

This doesn’t explain how this is a calculus of the universe: your answer seems to be that we just assume it. I guess this just boils down to me granting it for the sake of the conversation, so let’s just move past that point.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. In fact, I am glad you wrote this because that is way more precisely what I was trying to convey then what I was saying! (:

So, if you think there is a logical contradiction in that syllogism, then you will have to demonstrate it to me,because I don’t see it. If there exists a reason that nothing should exist, then it totally logically follows that that reason shouldn’t exist either. I don’t see any “p ^ !p” in that argument at all. Let me explicate the logic. I think you think the logic is:

A: p
B: p → !p
C: !p

But this is incorrect, it is actually:

A: p
B: p → q
C: q

“there exists a reason that nothing should exist” != “there should not exist the reason that nothing should exist”, and that is required for there to be a (logical) contradiction in the argument which would be at the consequent of B.

Are you claiming that there is an incoherence, i.e., like a non-logical contradiction, in it, perhaps? Maybe having a reason for that very reason to not exist seems incoherent to you?

I appreciate your response!

Firstly, I agree that the simplest way to convey something is the best but, as of now, with all due respect, I think your simplifications are over-simplifications; and, believe it or not, the OP is the most concise, precise, and simplest way I have found to convey my metaethical theory.

Secondly, with respect to the terms, I hate semantics just as much as the next guy! So I agree that we should not get caught up on the terminology: the reason I use the terms I have been using is they are the most widely accepted and precise ways of conveying exactly what I want to convey—so why would I makeup new words or use less precise words to convey the exact same thing?

Thirdly, I think there is one core issue in our conversation that needs sorting out before we can continue, namely that you seem to think metaethics is useless and normative ethics is all that matters. Of course, this metaethical theory doesn’t address what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory...it isn’t supposed to! That’s for normative ethics. So, I think I need to provide a case not for moral subjectivism (specifically) but, rather, for the study of metaethics. If you don’t see any value in metaethics, then there’s no point in discussing moral subjectivism, since it is a metaethical theory.

As a side note, I am working on a normative ethical theory, I just haven’t posted it yet. It isn’t posted with this metaethical theory because (1) I find it is useful to split the two so as to hone in on metaethical and normative ethical disputes separately and (2) I haven’t finished my normative ethical theory yet (to my liking).

Now, let me address some points you made to hopefully demonstrate why metaethics is important; but, first, let me outline some general points. Metaethics is about the nature of moral judgments and properties, and not what is right or wrong. This is incredibly important because it is important to know, beyond what is being expressed as right or wrong, what a moral judgment itself actually is (e.g., is it truth-apt? Is it expressing something subjective or objective? Are any of them true?). As an example, let’s take the metaethical claim that ‘there is at least one true moral judgment’: if this is false, then morality is pointless and always incorrect—hence, error theory. Let’s take ‘moral judgments are proposition’: if they aren’t, then we cannot use them as propositions which, in turn, entails we cannot apply logic to them—hence moral non-cognitivism. Let’s take ‘moral judgments express something objective’: if this is false, then there is no moral fact out there that makes a moral judgment true—hence moral subjectivism. You are saying all of this is useless…..but your own normative ethical theory we are discussing in the other form implicitly assumes metaethical claims.

Any statement is truth-apt Bob.

I would like to note the following:

1. Judgments are not necessarily statements. A moral non-cognitivist would say that moral judgments are emotional dispositions (i.e., they are conative not cognitive) that are along the lines of ‘boo to torturing babies!!!!!!!’, where they are not saying the moral judgment is the statement ‘boo to torturing babies!!!!!!’ but, rather, the underlying emotional attitude which can be expressed without a statement (e.g., someone looks very angry and astonished when witnessing someone torturing a baby, etc.). So when you say statements are truth-apt, even if it is true, it doesn’t get you moral cognitivism. You would have to demonstrate moral judgments are truth-apt; and you seem to just blow this off and ignore the entire literature on moral non-cognitivism.

2. Statements are not always truth-apt. For example, I would say that the statement “this statement is false” is not truth-apt because it cannot be evaluated as true or false...it lacks that capacity.

If its true, its 1+1=2. We don't call it "Cognitive number theory vs non-cognitive number theory". We call it math.

The proposition “1+1=2” presupposes that it is truth-apt; but you seem to be trying to argue that it is truth-apt because it is a proposition—that isn’t valid. If ‘1+1=2’ can be true, then you have already conceded it is truth-apt, but we are questioning why. Why think it is truth-apt? That would be a meta-mathematical debate. However, this is a metaethical debate about whether moral judgments like ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ are truth-apt or not.

Mathematics would presuppose, and does presuppose, that mathematical judgments are proposition; just like how your normative ethical theory presupposes that moral judgments are propositional.

4. Morality is what is permissible. You have not given a clear example of what is permissible with any proof. Only that we can make moral judgements, and if they correspond with reality, or what is objective, its true.

Of course not! That’s what a normative ethical theory is for! The point of moral subjectivism is to note that whatever a person judges morally, it is made true by being a fact about their psychology and not some moral fact out there in the world. I think you have missed the point if you are demanding actual normative claims out of the theory.

4. Because we are subjects, morality is subjective.

I’ve never argued this. This is clearly false.

There is nothing implicit about it though. For something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible. Does that mean that not eating a sandwich implicitly concedes it is impermissible?

No, because not eating the sandwich could have implied one finds it morally permissible not to eat it. Whereas, eating it immediately implies that it is permissible to do so—it wouldn’t make sense if it implied they thought it was impermissible.

Also, I don’t why it would be the case that “for something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible”, unless you mean that X being morally permissible entails that it is morally impermissible for X to not be morally permissible? But, then, I don’t see your point.

A theory has a conclusion with proof.

I gave an argument for all three prongs of the thesis, so it is theory. You haven’t actually dealt with all of them. They were not definitions.

Did you come up with a theory of morality that is meaningful and useful to others? That's all that matters.

As long as it is useful to me, then that’s good with me. Also, it isn’t a fair criticism to claim that a theory is false because no one thinks it is useful. Likewise, most people don’t find many things I find useful useful: why does that matter?

Take my advice here as an equal: eliminate any words or phrases that does not make your arguments as simple and clear as possible. Use George Orwells six points of writing. It is an ongoing battle for myself as well, but it is the way to make clear and meaningful arguments. An insistence on a normative and metaethical separation is missing the trees in the forest

I agree that one should keep it simple, but you seem (to me) to be oversimplifying it. With all due respect, you keep conflating the two in important ways, and that is why I keep bringing it up. For example, in your other thread you assume moral realism is true without proving it...you didn’t even attempt to. Likewise with moral cognitivism and moral non-nihilism. You just flatly assert or implicitly assume that they are true without providing an argument. That’s why each prong I have has an argument for it, even if one, at the end of the day, doesn’t agree with them.

Taken as a thesis and not a proof, this is fine. This still does not negate that there is not really anything meaningful stated here.

Correct. It is a prong of a thesis, not an argument. I outlined the thesis first, then argued for it. The argument for it is later on in the OP.

Replace, 'true moral judgements' with 'true statements' and its still the same thing. So my criticism of this lacking any meaningful weight still holds for me

That’s not the point of moral non-nihilism: it is the position that there are true moral judgments—i.e., they are not all false. Error theorists, i.e., moral nihilists, claim that moral judgments are truth-apt and express something objective but they are all false. I am explicitly denying that with this prong of the thesis, and proceed to give an argument for it later on in the OP.

If truth is objective, then yes, true moral judgements are not subjective.

No and yes. Truth being objective just means that the correspondence exists mind-independently, but to say that moral judgments express something objective does not follow from that.

2. True moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]
I would tweak this once again to, "We can make subjective moral judgements that are true."

You cannot do that validly: they are two different claims. The moral judgment is subjective and it expresses something subjective—i.e., judgments are always subjective because they are themselves an issuance by a subject and these particular judgments (moral ones) are true in virtue of projections of one’s pyschology and not some non-pyschological fact about reality.

You statement “we can make subjective moral judgments that are true” could be compatible with a moral realist’s claim that “moral judgments express something objective” just as much as a moral anti-realist’s claim that “moral judgments express something subjective”.

Ah, I see with point one. To more accurately reflect this I would change
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
into
1. True moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]

You cannot do that, because something being propositional does not entail that it is true, it entails that it has the capacity to be true or false.

By agreeing to ‘moral judgments are propositional’, the person has in no way conceded that ‘there is at least one true moral judgment’. But with your revision, they would have to accept both.

Morality is about comparing states of affairs and deciding which one is permissable, omissable, or obligatory.
…
If for example a baby is about to get shot, you have time to decide what the future reality will be. You could shoot the shooter first. Step in front of the baby. Dive Hollywoodesque in slow motion to move the baby out of the way. These choices come about because we have in our head at a minimum two outcomes. Dead baby or living baby in a future state of reality. What is permissable? We only know this by comparing the two outcomes.

This is fine, but I think we may have talked passed each other. P1 would dictate that in this baby example there is no fact you can cite which makes any of the moral judgments true, such as ‘one should step in front of the baby first’. What I am not saying, nor does P1 imply that, states of affairs inform our moral judgments—rather, P1 dictates that there is no amount of consideration of what is the case nor the possible outcomes in this baby example that tells me anything about fundamentally what I should morally judge, it just supplements it.

In other words, the moral judgments are sui generis of your psychology: there’s no moral fact you are able to cite in this baby example that tells you what to do, instead the non-moral facts inform you, based off of your psychology of what you approve or disapprove of, what you should do. The non-moral facts are not enough to dictate what should happen, there is a moral judgment, or multiple, that are just facts about your psychology that make you morally judge one way or another given the circumstances. For a moral realist, this is not the case, from the baby example there is a moral fact-of-the-matter out there in that possible world or this actual one that dictates what one should do, and one is just trying to discover what that is—they aren’t projecting their own opinions on what one should do.

All you seem to be noting, and correct me if I am wrong, is that we use the current and potential states of affairs to supplement our moral judgments, which is totally fine and I absolutely agree with...but I disagree that if you were to just give me the facts about the baby scenario, that I would be able to know what I should do—there is some ‘should’ or ‘shoulds’ which are being projected by my psychology that ultimately dictate, once I am informed of the facts about the baby example, what I decide I ought to do.

If you eliminate states of affairs, or make "reality" the combined set of all states of affairs, then you ALSO eliminate morality.

Not quite. Since I believe moral judgments are not made true by moral facts out there, I think that we project what we approve or disapprove of and use that to determine what to do. I am quite literally arguing that there are no moral states-of-affairs that exist mind-independently: “there are no moral phenomena, just moral interpretations of phenomena” as nietzsche put it.

Someone morally judging a situation based off of that situation and potential states-of-affairs is perfectly compatible with P1. P1 just says that there is no way to infer strictly from those mind-independent states-of-affairs what should be.

But even knowledge cannot know truth, as truth is an objective thing in itself.

I would say that truth is not a thing-in-itself, because things-in-themselves are objects. This is why I find it hard to say truth is objective but also that truth isn’t. There isn’t a object, abstract or not, that exists which is the correspondence of thought with reality. The mere relationship between thought and reality such that they correspond is what truth is, and this can be acquired from a subjective viewpoint so long as that subject agrees that there are objects. They don’t come to know truth itself like an object that they observe, it is the abstract relationship between thinking and being: between mind and not mind. If it were an object, like an apple, then you would be right.

Truth is only objective in the sense that that abstract relationship is not contingent on subject’s determinations of it. If you are just noting that we can’t be absolutely certain that that relationship exists from our subjective standpoint, then I wholly agree.

I look forward to hearing from you.
Bob

A belief never makes a moral judgment true. — Leontiskos
Why? Doesn’t me believing vanilla ice cream tastes good make it true that my stance is that ice cream tastes good? — Bob Ross

That's not a moral judgment, as you just admitted.

That wasn’t the point: it was an analogy. If I say “I believe one ought not torture babies for fun” is a moral judgment that is true in virtue of the belief, then you will say I am question begging.

You want to say that there are beliefs that are true simply in virtue of themselves existing. My point was that while infallible judgments do exist ("I feel pain"), they are not beliefs. We do not say, "I believe I feel pain." An infallible judgment is a matter of strict knowledge, not belief.

It is the same reasoning that leads you to believe that “I feel pain” is infallible makes “I believe one ought not torture babies” infallible: they are self-referential. “I believe I feel pain” is not self-referential: it is a belief about a fact about one’s current state of pain or lack thereof. “I feel pain”, in the sense I think you are talking about, is self-referential: if I have it, then I have it: it isn’t referring to something else, like ‘I think 1+1=2’. Same thing with moral judgments.

"I love yogurt." "I have brown hair," is not like, "Everyone has brown hair."

“I believe no one everyone should have brown hair” is like the former statements, and not the latter.

Ok, so, at the end of the day we are talking in circle because you keep asserting “beliefs have nothing to do with the moral judgment’s truthity” and I assert the opposite. To resolve this, instead of looping around and around, we need to provide arguments. My arguments are in the moral subjectivism OP: if one accepts there are true moral judgments and they are propositional and they are not expressing something objective, then they are expressing something subjective. You would have to contend with those arguments if you want to change my mind.

How is it a strawman when you agree with my claim entirely?

You used a misleading example that doesn’t fit what I am targeting. If you wanted to make your point, you should have demonstrated why “I disapprove of it for everyone” is incoherent and not “I disapprove of it for myself, therefore I disapprove of it for others”: the latter was never an inference I was making.

So then you think this is a rational exchange:
• Leontiskos: Why should I not torture babies?
• Bob Ross: Because I believe you shouldn't.

I think it is rational insofar as my hypothetical response here would justify myself in stopping you but not justify you in not doing it. I would have to convince you that you shouldn’t torture babies (by means I have described in length in the OP), but the my justification for stopping you in this case is valid but doesn’t provide you with any good reasons to believe it yourself.

The point here is that we have a moral claim that we know to be true, such as, "No one should torture babies." If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such a truth, then moral subjectivism is an inadequate moral theory.

“No one should torture babies” seems an awful lot, within the context of what you are saying, as expressing something objective, which obviously moral subjectivism cannot account for because it doesn’t think those exist. If you mean “I believe no one should torture babies, and that justifies me in stopping people from torturing babies”, then, yes, my theory can handle that just fine.