There's no significant dispute that I know of. Most of us not in foundations or set theory are not concerned with "actual" infinity.

I think there is a big enough recognition of it, for the sake of the essay, to clearly and concisely define the terminology. However, I agree that more than likely most people think of one “infinity” when they conceive of that concept.

I assume what you are talking about is moving backward through causation chains with no recognizable beginnings.

In terms of infinities, here’s what I mean:

“infinite” = limitless in content (with no specification, at this general level, of its form)
“unbounded infinite” = limitless in content (infinite) and unbounded in form.
“bounded infinite” = limitless in content (infinite) and bounded in form.

So an example of an “unbounded infinite” could be moving backward through causation chains with no recognizable beginnings; however, that is not the definition: it is an example of one specific defined infinite I discussed in the essay.

Like backward iteration in which there is no end to the number of iterative steps, but the process is either bounded or unbounded.

So, in the sense you put it here, a bounded backward iteration with no end to the number of iterative steps would be what is traditionally called an actual infinite and unbounded potential—which is what I was essentially noting in the essay (when defining). However, just to clarify, I am not defining an infinite nor bounded/unbounded infinities in that manner, but I could see them as less precise examples. Am I understanding you correctly?

Bob

I apologize my friend! I honestly could not tell, but I see now that it was most certainly in good faith! With that being said, let me address your questions.

But then you go on to explain the perspective that we should have on several different semantic metaphysical concepts and tools yet not one time question if any of those tools should even be considered to actually be what they came to be?

Before I can adequately respond, I would like to inquire exactly what you mean by “semantic metaphysical concepts” and “tools”? Are you saying that the essay defined terminology but yet didn’t elaborate why they weren’t simply semantically defined differently?

You tell us how we should view and use and judge each of these semantic tools but once again not once question if they should be tools or if it's even possible to know if they actually are what they say they are before contemplating if they should be added into the tool belt or not

If you could give me an example, then that would be appreciated—as I don’t think I am quite following. Are inquiring why an in toto and in total were defined the way they were? As opposed to simply defining them differently?

And as far as my understanding goes when you investigate something you investigate it is far down to the root core as you can which in my eyes means investigating if we should even consider it a tool if it's possible to call it a tool and if it could ever actually be what it says is before then learning how to utilize it

The essay doesn’t invoke the term “tool”: what exactly do you mean by that term? I am not attempting to ban its use but, rather, just wondering what exactly you are referring to?

And lastly you touched on so many different tools and in such great depth on each one of those tools do you really expect people to do what you said? Or should I say do you think it's possible that a person can sat their tool belt down and pick up that one you just laid out in your essay? Do you think a person can remember that many new tools?, and utilize only those tools in the exact way you explained in your next essay that you write?

The essay concedes that anyone can reject it; however, a sufficient proof has been established for it being true regardless of whether it is affirmed by any particular human being. Again, if you could elaborate, then that would be appreciated.

I'm not even sure if that's possible I don't know if anybody could remember that many methods of how to use that many tools and properly utilize them without their old habits kicking up causing them to judge things the way they're used to

Prima facea, I think this is a different contention than the validity of the actual content of the essay. As far as I am understanding you (and correct me if I am wrong), it seems as though the entirety of the essay (and subsequent essays) could be true and yet there is still the contention that people may not be able to remember it. Is that correct?

Or am I just completely missing the entire boat on this one? Let me know please

I wouldn’t say you are missing the boat, my friend! I am just not of yet completely understanding what you are conveying and that’s on me.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Nice to meet you Cuthbert!

From the OP I get the impression that you think people may not behave well in the discussion

I have observed many discussion boards on this forum which do not exemplify what I am envisioning as a productive conversation and, therefore, I was merely, by established some rules, attempting to ensure some (what I would deem) methodological principles of discourse. My intention was not to make any commentary on the forum as a whole or to foreshadow a wave of bad actors.

and now you have raised a suspicion that someone is trolling - on no grounds at all that I can see.

I was incorrect in that judgment, although I think there are grounds to argue such (just given the one post), but that is why I simply responded to them stating that I wasn’t sure what to make of it (and if it was trolling, then to stop or if it is of good faith, then I cannot wait to hear their feedback). I hope that my response was not taken with any offense: if so, then I apologize.

Do you think you might go with the flow of posts to some extent and see what results? You may get different and interesting points of view that way.

I am all for the idea of allowing the conversations to flow as long as they pertain to the essay (i.e., the OP). I do not see how the few rules I declared stunt any conversations, unless they are derailments. If you think that they are hindrances, then I would appreciate further elaboration on how. Nevertheless, I agree in that allowing a flow (as opposed to rigid, constant policing) is preferable and is my intention.

Regarding the essay, I think it is so far an answer without a problem - or at least without a problem having been stated clearly. Maybe we need a principle of regulation. Maybe we don't. What problem(s) are you trying to solve by proposing one?

What exactly are you referring to by “problem”? A problem that majority constitute as such? What I constitute as such? The essay is meant as an articulation of the foundation(s) of my views and, hereafter, further essays will build off of it. I guess if one wanted to, they could view the problem as whether or not there are sine qua nons or not. The way I was positing the essay was more about a purpose rather than a problem—and that purpose is clearly stated in the introduction. Someone can most certainly come along and hold no value in it (as I specified in the essay): I find nothing wrong with that, as this essay is for those who would like to discuss foundations in the sense that I described as a sine qua non. Is that what you are asking?

In other words, if one doesn’t want to partake in such a purpose, they don’t have to.

How have other people approached those problems?

I have a couple in mind that were influential in my thinking, but they have no direct relevance to the essay: the essay is not meant to expound on the history of ideas (or the history of solutions to problems). If you have someone in mind (or some idea or solution) that you think contests with my views in the essay, then I would love to hear about them!

Bob

Although I understand the point pertaining to the dispute amongst mathematicians over "potential" vs "actual" infinities, I am not sure how that objection relates to my essay. If you could please provide further elaboration, then that would be much appreciated.

Cheers,
Bob

Nice to meet you my friend!

To be completely honest, I am not sure if your post was out of good faith or simply trolling. If the former, then I look forward to your assessment of the essay! If the latter, then I respectfully urge you to refrain from further trolling.

Thank you and have a great day,
Bob

Absolutely no problem! Take as much time as you want: I would imagine we both prefer substantive responses that take some time over swift, insubstantial ones. I have no doubt that you are an excellent, well-educated philosopher and, therefore, I am incredibly interested in what you make of the essay.

In terms of the question-begging, specifically as it relates to logic, I share with you in that concern and hopefully I can provide elaboration on why I don't think it is the case. For now, to keep it brief and allow you to navigate the discussion as you please, let me provide the following:

By a "logical language", I mean a formal logic (e.g., classical, intuitionist, paraconsistent, etc.) or an informal logic (which I am defining in its most general form: the attempt or practice at deriving logical thought and principles of logic outside of a formal setting). I am using "logical language" and "theory of logic" synonymously for the intents of the essay.

The proposition in the essay does not pertain to the logical axioms utilized in the examples (which would be what I was constituting as a consideration "of derivation" as opposed to the consideration of derivation of derivation--and its abstraction towards its recursive use). It is about the higher performance of derivation itself and, in the case of the essay, a proof of the principle of regulation as being a true sine qua non.

In other words, to keep this brief, the reader can most certainly reject and utilize whatever axioms they would like (or even attempt with none, at least prima facea), as the attempt to produce a logical language (i.e., formal or informal theory of logic) is only by means of the principle of regulation (as a sine qua non).

That is why I did not, to my self-assessment at least, invoke logical axioms as the grounds of any of the proof but, rather, only as an example derivation to demonstrate the proof of the sine qua non: I could have, for the sake of what I was trying to convey, utilized even the most irrational of premises (I just thought it would be harder for people to understand if I did). If there's anywhere that you deem question-begging in terms of logic, please let me know as I would love to reevaluate the essay if that is the case.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

@Philosophim,

First and foremost I want to thank you for a wonderful discussion (as always)! I appreciate you taking the time to respond the points I made that had no relevance to your epistemology and for being willing to discuss it in this forum. However, as you suspected, I don't think you quite understand my epistemology (and that's no fault of your own) nor do I 100% understand yours. I think it is best if we actually just pause the conversation here and reconvene after I post my epistemology. Then, you will have a fair grasp of what I am trying to convey and we can revisit our conversation of your epistemology. Then we can juxtapose them and explore them more adequately. With that being said, I think it is best that I actually leave it with your last post having the last word: although there is much I would like to say, it will all be addressed properly in my epistemology post (once I get the time to post the whole thing).

I look forward to our next conversation,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Hello again Bob, this was more delayed than I had liked due to Memorial week activities and summer starting here, thanks for waiting.

As always, take your time: no worries! I have no problem waiting for substantive, well-thought out replies (:

The goal of this exploration was to see if someone could poke holes in the d/a distinction within the argument itself. I feel that has been adequately explored. At this point, it seems to be the dissection of your theory, and I'm not sure I want to do that on this thread. It is unfair, as you have not had the time and space to adequately build it up from the ground floor.

That is absolutely fair. This is your thread and, thusly, I want this conversation to be directed exactly where you would prefer: if you think that the discussion has met its end (in this discussion board at the least), then by all means we can conclude whenever you deem so! I completely understand the desire to prevent irrelevant derailments on the thread, and I can see how diving into my epistemology could do just that. With that being said, someday soon I am planning on posting an in depth analysis of my epistemology and, as always, feel free to rip it apart (: It may be a little while though as I want to ensure its quality before posting.

With that being said, I will respond to your post with the intention of keeping it relevant to your epistemology but also very briefly responding to some of the points you made about mine (or alluded to them in your responses). After that, if you wish to cease the conversations on grounds of derailment, that is totally fine my friend.

To be honest, I don't think you are entirely understanding what I am trying to convey, but that is by no means your fault and it is entirely possible that you do and I am failing to perceive it. To keep it brief, let me address your points on PoN and how it relates to what you defined as PoI.

Lets list what the PoN is. In Western Philosophy it is often associated with Aristotle and comprises several principles. The law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction for example.
'if p, then not not-p,'
'if not not-p, then p.

My contention here would be that the LEM (law of excluded middle) is by no means apart of the law of noncontradiction even with respect to classical western logic: they are completely separate principles. Instead of positing it as "not-p" and "p", which are meant to presuppose the use of LEM and PoN together, there separability can be more easily demonstrated as follows:

"B cannot be A and not A" (or more precisely "B cannot be A and not A at the same time")
"B is either A or not A"

The former does not directly necessitate the latter in this terminology, but using "not-A" instead of "not A" implies LEM--as anything that is A = not not-A and thusly anything that isn't A is a not-A, which means that the if conditionals "if A, then not not-A" and "if not not-A, then A" directly necessitate the law of the excluded Third. But within the refurbished terminology it is quite clear that B necessarily not being "A and not A" does not necessitate that B is thereby one or the other. This is the wiggle room where paraconsistent, paracomplete, and, as you noted, eastern logic, such as catuskoti (tetralemma) notions, are able to be conceived. Also, as you noted, the kotis actually do allow for B to be A and not A . To keep it brief, my point is that my use of PoN is not meant as a logical construct like those, and its precise definition holds no immediate favoritism on the battle between paraconsistent vs consistent logical languages. I am defining PoN in the form of predicate-logic:

"a predicate cannot contradict its subject concept"

Or even more precisely:

"a predicate cannot be true and false of its subject concept"

This move is admittedly subtle, potentially sneaky, which turns out to be vital. This is not equivocal to "B cannot be A and not A" nor "B cannot be A and not A at the same time"! To keep it brief, here is an example where the distinction matters:

"circles are green and not green" (aka: "Bs are A and not A")

A more classical logic enticed individual will deny this sentence in virtue of the obvious (A and not A), while a more paraconsistent minded individual will allow it in at least some circumstances. However, using the predicate-logic definition of PoN, the aforementioned sentence, at face value, is not violating PoN, contrary to popular, classical logic belief. Firstly, let's allow ourselves to refurbish the subject concept "circles" how we please (with the exception of holding fast to the concept of plurality: i.e. circles), given that the sentence wasn't given any prerequisite definitions of the concepts. One particular scenario of the definition of "circle" pops out: what if "circle" is defined to contain "has essential property of being green and not green". Now the sentence "circles are green and not green" makes perfect sense: apart of the definition of being a "circle" is to have a "contradictory" state of greeness, which is perfectly definable and describable by human reason. Now, this definition of "circle" is perfectly coherent, yet does not entail any sort of "circles in 'reality' that are green and not green". Secondly, let's analyze it from the understanding of the colloquial use of the term "circle": nothing in the concept of a "circle" necessitates a certain color nor that it cannot be "green and not green". However, we have violated the predicate-logic PoN in the colloquial use of the term "circle" because stating is permits the non-necessity of color in the definition of a "circle" with its necessity in a coexistent state, which amazingly has nothing to do with the fact that we posited the color in contradictory states, this violation can also occur without it:

"circles are green"

Given a "circle" inheriting the colloquial definition, this violates PoN. With a bit more clarity, we can also violate PoN with the contradictory greeness:

"a circle, by definition, can be any color"
"circles are green and not green" (which could equally violate PoN with proposing any color even in a "non-contradictory" state in this case)

Now, I am skipping a couple steps here, but I think you get the point. This is why subjects can posit and bend "PoN", because they are not referring to what I am referring to. It is perfectly possible to hold sincerely that something is A and not A without contradiction as long as the subject concept is not contradicted by the predicate: this is the aspect of reason which is always abided by, not "B cannot be A and not A" or "B cannot be A and not A at the same time". If someone defines B as X and then posits B is not X, they will not hold it unless there is some other variables at play which resolve this predicate contradiction as no longer existent or they simply do not recognize the contradiction (regardless of how valid their derivation actually is or is not). The important aspect here is that I am trying to derive and convey how reason works as opposed to developing a logical language. Maybe PoN is the wrong term? People can most certainly construct PoN how they like as long as they abide by the PoN I am proposing (I would argue).

And, yes, I am using a constructed logical language's, predicate-logic's, form of PoN and still claiming that it precedes constructed logic, because this is analogous to simply deriving that one discretely experiences by constructing it from discrete experience. I can most definitely propose a constructed logical language which embodies a more fundamental principle than logical languages.

Now, with that in mind, let me address your PoI. Yes, one could, prima facea, construct a logical language wherein the classical logic PoN is accounted for but LEM is non-existent (which is exactly, I would say, what you did in creating PoI). In fact, there are many logical languages which deny LEM without any issues, such as fuzzy logic (https://www.globaltechcouncil.org/artificial-intelligence/fuzzy-logic-what-it-is-and-some-real-life-applications/), which doesn't utilize boolean logic (which by virtue of being boolean requires LEM) but, instead, uses values from 0 to 1. It is actually very useful in certain situations where boolean logic doesn't cut it. Logical systems, such as fuzzy logic, necessarily cannot hold LEM as that would necessitate it to be boolean logic, which would defeat the purpose.

Now, what you described in PoI is a much bolder constructed logic which is like but not equivocal to our fuzzy friends: you posited three outcomes (true, false, and indeterminate). Firstly I want to note that this is entirely possible to construct, prima facae, using the predicate-logic formulation of PoN. One can produce sentences with PoI in which the subject concept is not contradicted by its predicate, such as:

"B is in an indeterminate state"

That's fine. This makes no inherent position on what "state" must be in terms of possibility (it doesn't contradict its subject concept)--it doesn't specify that an indeterminate state must be either A or not A (LEM). Indeterminate could be ineffable, neither both, both, true and not false, or false and not true (the kotis for example). Let's take your sentence:

"Somewhere out there, I believe we'll find a thing that both exists and doesn't exist at the same time"

The reason this is possible for you to construct this sentence is because the subject concept, implicit here, isn't contradicted by its predicate: the concept of ignorance could potentially be enough wiggle room for one to posit such a sentence about the unknown. My main point with respect to your epistemology is that you are using, inadvertently, this more fundamental PoN (more like the form of predicate-logic) to formulate discrete experience. I was never trying to convey that you have been involuntarily using classical logic PoN and LEM.

What we cannot do is applicably know such a thing, which is why it is not used by anyone seriously within science.

Although I understand what you are trying to convey, logicians and mathematicians (and scientists) do not disregard logic simple based off of classical logic principles. There are perfectly applicable logics, like first-degree entailment logic, which allow for koti-like truth value systems: f (false and not true), t (true and not false), b (both true and false), and n (neither true nor false). Wherein the output of a given function is a set: {f}, {t}, {t, f}, and {} (empty set being n).

But more in terms of every day to day application, four possibility systems are also applicable, albeit not as applicable as classical logic is. Imagine I am eating cereal and claim:

"I am eating bread"

That's false and not true. Imagine I am eating cereal and claim:

"The bread I am eating is purple"

Well, I am not eating bread. So I am neither eating bread that is purple nor bread that is not purple, because I am not eating bread. Therefore it is neither true nor false. Imagine I am eating cereal and I claim:

"this sentence is false"

I could simply concede that the liar paradox outputs {t, f}, which is essentially the same thing as defining a liar paradox sentence as having a property of being contradictory (just like being green and not green). I could also simply deny its truth-aptness, which is the exact same thing as claiming the output is {} (i.e. n). As you can probably see, there are application, even in mundane life, for first-degree entailment logic.

This is incredibly relevant to how you are trying to resolve this within your epistemology:

But after determining the d/a distinction, I can then go back and ask myself, "Is the PoI something I can applicably know?" No, using the theory from there, I determine I cannot applicably know the PoI. Therefore its a distinctive theory that cannot be applicably known, and is unneeded. At best, it would be included as an induction.

You are subscribing your epistemology to LEM and PoN, most notably as described by classical logic. This rules out the actual applicable usages of paraconsistent, fuzzy, and first-degree entailment logic. My epistemology still accounts for these within their own respects.

Thus I would conclude using the POI that what is distinctively known is what we discretely experience, and I would add the claim we could discretely experience both something, and its negation at the same time.

I don't think you can posit this unless you are redefining discrete experience: the subject concept necessitates, categorically, that it be distinct, which necessitates that one cannot experience both something and its negation at the same time in the same place. As you described it, technically speaking, that is possible. I could experience a blue car and a not-blue car at the same time as long as they are not in the same place. My main point here, in relation to predicate style logic PoN, is that the subject can only posit your claim here if they either don't recognize the contradiction in the predicate or they convinced themselves of some sort of wiggle room (which requires, I would argue in your case, some refurbishing of the term "discrete experience").

What I could do is form the PoN to make the proof cleaner, but it is not required.

You can most definitely posit it without classical aristotilian logic which uses PoN and LEM, but that's not what I am referring to. You cannot help but use predicate style PoN to determine discrete experience.

Without the d/a distinction, there is a problem that the PoN must answer. "Just because I have not experienced an existence and its contradiction at the same time, how do I know I won't experience such a thing in the future?

You could, if it isn't in the same place at the same time. But let's refurbish the claim to append "at the same place" into your inquiry here to try and steel man it: the concept of space and time (in terms of their overlying references and not different theories out there such as string theory) would be contradicted by a predicate which states "Space/time contains A and not A in the place at the same time". This is why it is important to note the necessary inseparability of time and space, for the sentence "Space contains A and not A" does not violate predicate logic PoN, nor does "Time references A and not A at the same time": it's only when combined, the union of the two concepts, where the predicate contradicts the subject concept. I don't see how this is a problem for PoN as I've described it.

You have never observed these contradictions, but as noted earlier, how do you explain that this gives you knowledge that it is not possible somewhere in reality?

It doesn't. Firstly, I am deriving the possibility of reason, not constructing rationality. Secondly, there is application, rationally, for logical systems that do not use LEM and even some that do not use traditional PoN (from classical logic). What isn't possible is to sincerely posit a claim wherein the predicate contradicts its subject concept. It is only possible if one refurbishes the terminology or simply doesn't recognize the contradiction: that's the only way. At this point, I am not attempting to construct a logical system I deem most rational for a given context, I am noting the possibility of reason and therefrom asserting the fundamentals thereof.

Then this is absolutely key. If there is any doubt or misunderstanding of the idea that we discretely experience, that has to be handled before anything else. Please express your doubt or misunderstanding here, as everything relies on this concept. You keep not quite grasping the a/d distinction, and I feel this is the underlying root cause.

I think I understand that we discretely experience. However that doesn't necessitate it is a fundamental. We utilize predicate logic style PoN to derive we discretely experience. Someone could possibly deny this by introducing "wiggle room" into the concept of discrete experience to abstract applicable non-LEM scenarios or even non-PoN scenarios. Maybe my use of PoN is misleading, maybe I need to use a different term?

Without applicable knowledge, how can your theory compete with someone who uses a completely different theory using different definitions for words and concepts?

They would be using mine fundamentally. I cannot say the same for classical logic, fuzzy, etc. I can't say the same for every definition of PoN, LEM, law of identity, etc. I am speaking much broader than I think you may believe me to be.

Yes, absolute truth outruns proof.

That's not quite what I meant, but I agree. I'll refrain from further elaboration to keep this shorter and more relevant to your epistemology.

A potential infinite regress is an induction. You can deductively ascertain this induction, but it is an induction. Potential means, "It could, or could not be." If your theory has a potential infinite regress, you have an unresolved induction as the base of your argument.

Every valid epistemology must have an absolute as its point of derived contingency. Mine is no exception. A potential infinite regress is not an induction. Again, uncertainty is not equivocal to an induction. The absolute wherefrom contingency arises is utlimately reason in my epistemology. A potential infinite, of the type I am describing, is not claiming "it could, or could not be", it is claiming that a particular finite operation would be infinite if given the sufficient resources to continue. For example, counting the positive integers starting at 1 is a potential infinite. This claim is not an induction whatsoever. I deductively know that given sufficient resources counting the positive integers would be an finite operation occurring infinitely: there is no uncertainty in the claim here, only uncertainty in whether there is sufficient resources or not (which is not the actual claim here). This is clearly different, I would say, than an induction, such as, for example, if I were to claim that because I've seen white swans my whole life that all swans are white. Any sort of epistemology which grounds itself in an induction is faulty.

Mine contains no potential infinite regress.

I think it does. You can construct PoN and LEM based off of my definition of PoN, but cannot prove my definition of PoN without recursively using it. This is just like how you can't ever stop counting positive numbers granted enough resources and claim you've hit the last positive integer.

The key between us at this point is to avoid repetition. I fully understand that two arguments can be made, and eventually it may be that each side is unpersuaded by the other. It may be time where if you feel you are repeating yourself, feel free to state, "I disagree because of this previous point." and that is acceptable.

I feel I understand your positions at this point, and they are well thought out. But there are a couple of fundamental questions I've noted about your claim that the PoN is fundamental that I think need answering. Neither are a slight against you, you are a very intelligent, philosophically brilliant individual; the best I have encountered on these boards. So, if you would like, either we can start a new thread addressing your knowledge theory specifically, or we can simply spend the next post only going over your theory from the ground up, without the d/a distinction. I leave it up to you!

I understand and that it completely fair. If you would like to end the conversation in this discussion board here, that is totally fine! Sometime soon I will post a discussion board of my epistemology anyways. If you feel like this post has been utterly repetitive, then feel free to simply respond stating that, there's no need to repeat yourself countering my claims herein if you think you will indeed be reiterating.

I really appreciated our conversation, and I look forward to many more! You are also a brilliant, respectful, and genuine philosopher, and I respect that. It may be that we just agree to disagree, and continue this conversation (if you are interested) on another discussion board in the future.

Bob

I think they did. They had doctors.

"Psychological and mental illnesses were viewed as the effect of nature on man and were treated like other diseases.Hippocrates argued that the brain is the organ responsible for mental illnesses and that intelligence and sensitivity reach the brain through the mouth by breathing. Hippocrates believed that mental illnesses can be treated more effectively if they are handled in a similar manner to physical medical conditions"

I don't think this really contended with anything I wrote. The main point was that the reason "self-consciousness" didn't exist back then for the greeks is simply because contextually they didn't view it that way. Another example is still mental illness: I was speaking predominantly not in terms of one particular. The greek mythology clearly indicates a lack of "mental illness" in greek culture. That's why plato isn't writing in those terms (nor in terms of self-consciousness in that sense). One person paving the way towards acknowledging mental illness does not negate what I was trying to convey.

Science claims only physical particles are real.

Not at all. That is ontological naturalism and, by extension, materialism, which is not synonymous with "science". The only requirement to partake in science is methodological naturalism.

Christianity claims the spirit is real.

"spirit" is not necessarily equivocal to "subject". Moreover, there's a multitude of religions which claim there's a spirit. Hindus claim it is all one spirit, is that also something science is dependent on?

Thus science is the outer and Christianity is the inner. A dialectical relation.

Not at all. One can claim there is a "subject" or "subjects" without ever subscribing to Christianity. One can even scientifically posit a "subject" without invoking any religion. There's no dialectical relation here between Christianity and science: at best, there is a relationship between positing 3rd person knowledge and 1st person knowledge, that's it.

Same metaphysics. Science needs to treat subjectivity as an opposite.

This is true of every metaphysics that even hints at any kind of "subject" / "object" divide. This has no specific reference to Christianity and science. Moreover, to perform scientific investigation, one must, at a minimum, adhere to methodological naturalism, which is not required for one to practice Christianity. Likewise, most scientists tend to be also ontological naturalists, which is incompatible with Christianity. The metaphysics is drastically different, but not necessarily mutually exclusive. In other words, their metaphysics (in totality) is not even remotely close.

First person, third person. Isomorphic. Back and forth, back and forth. Each concept depends on the other.

This did not originate nor is specific to Christianity, so I am not understanding why you are specifically comparing the two. Likewise, this doesn't entail that two metaphysics are equivocal in virtue of sharing some particular aspect. Science and Christianity do not depend on one another.

Yes. Notice the fruitless debate between science and religion. They need each other to protect their knowledge domains.

How so? Science and religion are not yin and yang. They are not the same as cold/hot. Yes science needs "subjectivity" to assert "objective facts", but that has nothing to do with religion. Religion is not the source of the concept of "subjectivity".

Why did Aristotle and the ancient Greeks never talk about self-consciousness?

Same reason the greeks didn't have such a thing as "mental illness", instead they attribute it to contact with a god: during their time the knowledge they had suggested no such thing as brain malfunctions. We are heavily influenced by the context of our era.

Was there some huge leap in evolution where the brain developed self-consciousness? I think not.

I am not sure what you are trying to imply in that question. They were self-conscious back then, but that has no bearing on whether such a term or any notion of it existed back then. Contextually to us, mentally ill people existed back then, even though it didn't "exist" for them (in their context, it was a god of some sort inflicting or supplementing the person). Nowadays you hear God, you are schizophrenic, back then it was divine experience. Nowadays a psychedelic trip is simply the manipulation of neurotransmitters, but for them you were meeting god(s).

Subjectivity is that which, generally speaking, pertains to the 1st person experience of an individual. I think science actually denies any such truth in its methodology: it necessarily approaches empirical knowledge from the perspective of 3rd person as a methodological approach.

The Christian tradition--which science participates in--uses subjectivity as the site of truth.

I am not sure how science participates in (1) christian tradition or (2) subjectivity: with respect to the latter, it tries to eliminate it into 3rd person light and with respect to the former I see no relevance whatsoever.

Sometimes called inner experience, it is supposed to make the reality of humans unique, which other things in the universe do not have.

I think both more materialist and idealist minded people would agree to this. Even if one is reducible to the brain, that doesn't eliminate the real 1st person experience.

The error is that only humans can have or use intelligence. Thus intelligence is a function of the human mind and the subjective.

How is this a flaw? Ideally, what would constitute as "without flaw" then?

Hello @RolandTyme,

I may not be able to solve the dilemma in its entirety for you, but, as this was an issue I used to have constantly as well, perhaps I can provide a bit of exposition.

As you explicated in your post, your contentions (or more like doubts) pertain to a very specific flavor of Christianity, and that is totally fine. However, at face value, I think you can rule out the possibility of a literal hell, in the sense you described, because in order for someone to be in eternal torment, they must necessarily have the capacity to feel it, and there's legitimately no possibility of feeling without a body: there's no possibility of pain without objects. This inevitably transitions the conversation towards a transference of an individual from their body to another body, as any non-spatialtemporal consideration of a "being" would be incoherent with the conceptualization of a burning hell. With regards to physical-to-physical transitions from one "world" to another "world", prima facea, it would not be impossible but it has no grounds. If one were to fret about every possible proposition, regardless of what grounds it may stand, then they would have an infinite amount of highly intensive claims to contend with, of which they definitely won't be able to deny outright. For example, I could claim to you that the mind, once the body dies, transfers to another body and depending on your karma you will either be one of the unlucky individuals that gets tortured your whole life or one of the lucky ones that lives lavishly. This proposition, even if it is deemed "possible", does not entail any legitimacy. Likewise, I could worry every second of every day that someone is always scheming to kidnap and torture me, without a shred of evidence, but what about the concept of possibility necessitates that I ought to take it seriously? I submit to you: nothing. Again, it could be the case that there's a drunk driver on the road and they could hit me with their car if I decide to go take a walk, but if such a mere possibility were to guide my actions then I would never take a walk!

Now, at a deeper level, I do think that transcendent concepts, like most conceptualizations of God and an afterlife, are contradictions: there are no actual infinites. The idea of eternity only exists insofar as it exposes a concept that encapsulates a contradiction (albeit not obvious). The concept of eternity simply concatenates the concept of a potential infinite with the concept of actuality, which doesn't actually produce a new concept beyond a potential infinite. Likewise, to claim there's an actual infinite of anything implies that the claim is truth-apt but, in fact, it is not. If I told you there's an undetectable unicorn next you right this very moment, is that truth-apt? I submit to you that it is not. To try and pursue an answer (i.e. true or false) with regards to that proposition is in vain because to pursue it implies it is truth-apt, which it is not not: therefrom the contradiction arises. So, I would submit to you, at a deeper level, an eternal damnation is, at best, nothing more than a potential infinite of inflictions on an object that produces some form of pain, which would be a contradiction to even attempt to prove that it actually occurs forever (transform it to an actual infinite), and, at worst, it simply exposes a concatenation of concepts, as opposed to a unionization, in a contradictory manner (no different than concatenating the concept of "square" and "circle" together, which does not produce a union of the two).

To keep it brief, I will stop there. I hope that helped a bit.
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Please do Bob! You have been more than polite and considerate enough to listen to and critique my epistemology. At this point, your system is running up against mine, and I feel the only real issue is that it isn't at the lower level that I'm trying to address. Perhaps it will show a fundamental that challenges, or even adds to the initial fundamentals I've proposed here. You are a thoughtful and insightful person, I am more than happy to listen to and evaluate what you have to say.

I appreciate that, and same to you! Most of my conversations on this board, apart from ours, hasn't been very fruitful. It seems as though most people on here like swift abrupt responses and then get bored and move on to the next topic. I, and I think you as well, like longer, thought-out discussions that really go much deeper. That's why I really enjoy our conversations, as you are very respectful, genuine, and are providing thought-provoking responses.

The fundamental issue between us is becoming clearer and clearer for me, and I suspected as much but now I think it is pretty solidified. I think this is the pinnacle of our fundamental disagreement:

Philosophically, you seem to be taking a heavy realist methodological approach whereas I seem to taking a heavy anti-realist methodological approach.

Consequently, I am performing derivation starting with the mind and working my way outwards onto the "real" world, whereas you seem to be starting with the "real" world and working towards your mind. Now, firstly, I want to disclaim that I am not in any way trying to put words in your mouth or unfairly fit you in a category, I am merely explicating what I think is the root issue here, which is reflected quite clearly (I think) in our disagreement in terms of what a "fundamental" is. Secondly, when I stated you seem to be working "towards your mind" from the "real" world, obviously you are thinking and therefore are starting with your mind in that sense, but what I mean is that you are grounding fundamentals in the "real" world, whereas I don't. Subsequently, I think you would hold (correct me if I am wrong) that your mind is from a brain (which the latter would be more fundamental than the former) and, as you mentioned, the atom is would be more fundamental than the brain. That kind of derivation, if I am allowed to say so, is a realist approach which I would gather, if I may guess, you are probably somewhere along the lines of an ontological naturalist. Again, not trying to put words in your mouth, just trying to get to the root of the issue between us, as I don't think that our disagreement is as easy as "fundamental" semantics.

I, on the other hand, although I used to be in that boat of thinking (ontological naturalist, materialist), approach it from a heavy anti-realist position. It took me a while to recognize the shift in my thinking over the years, but in hindsight it is quite obvious. I start with the mind and, therefore, only subscribe to methodological naturalism (as opposed to ontological).

I think, in light of the aforementioned, it is glaringly clear to me why I am thinking PoN is a fundamental whereas you think it is discrete experience. I don't think going back and forth about "you had to use PoN to claim that" (me) and " one cannot think about the PoN without first being able to discretely experience" (you) is going to get us anywhere productive. I would simply respond with the same counter argument that you already know well, and thusly I don't think you find it productive either.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are arguing for discrete experience in virtue that the brain (or whatever object is required, to keep it more generic) must produce this discrete experience for me to even contemplate and bring forth PoN (in other words, I must discretely experience). Now, I don't think that is how you explained it, but I think that is a pretty fair (admittedly oversimplified) generalization.

I understand that, and in contemplation of my body as an object I agree. In contemplation of other bodies, objects, I agree. But in relation to myself, wherefrom derivation is occurring, I start with PoN and derive the relations of objects (and one conclusion is that the brain produces discrete experiences wherefrom it makes sense contemplation of PoN can arise). However, to claim that that is truly a fundamental in relation to the subject is to take a leap, in my opinion, to bridging the gap between mind and brain, which, as of now, I do not hold.

Before I dive into direct responses, I want to explicate clearer what I mean by "fundamental". I am not talking about a contextual fundamental in relation to another object. Yes, atomic theory is more fundamental than molecular theory (I vaguely remember that conversation, and if I argued the converse then I was mistaken) contextually within that relation. I am talking about, do I dare say, the absolute fundamental. By absolute I need to be careful, because what I don't mean is that it is unquestionable: I mean that amongst all contexts (and the derivation of what a context is in the first place) it is necessarily true.Now, what I mean by "all contexts" is in relation to the subject at hand: I am not extending this out objectively or inter-subjectively at this point.

Let me try to explicate this clearer in my direct responses:

Discrete experience is the fundamental simplicity of being able to notice X as different from Y. Non-discrete experience is taking all of your experience at once as some indesciphable.

This is simply outlining the fundamentals of how a brain works. I find nothing wrong with this. I do not hold the brain as the subject, which I think is clearly where we are actually disagreeing (realist, materialist vs anti-realist, idealist--generally speaking, I'm not trying to force us into boxes).

You are explicating a correct derivation of a fundamental contextually in relation to when discrete experience arises out of objects (this is an analysis of the mereological structure of objects, which is fine in its own accord) . However, the flaw I think you are making is bridging the gap, so to speak, between mind and brain in virtue of this: there are aspects of the brain which will never be explained from it. The brain is simply a representation of the mind, which can never fully represent itself.

But we could not begin to use deduction about discrete experience, without first being able to discretely experience. We cannot prove or even discuss the PoN without being able to understand the terms, principle, negation, etc.

Apart from the fact that, again, you are fundamentally positing objects as more fundamental than subjects, I want to clarify that explicating PoN and utilizing PoN is not the same thing. I am not talking about what is necessary to argue for PoN, I am talking about the actual utilization of PoN regardless.

Yes, but you must first understand what the terms "true" and "false" are.

I don't want to be too reiterative, but this argument is sound in relation to the utilization of PoN: without PoN, the best way to describe it would be "indeterminacy". That claim doesn't thereby grant you some kind of obtainment outside of PoN, or what exists beyond it because you just thereby used it.

In the most radical example, if I could hypothetically prove without a doubt PoN was false (even just in terms of some kind of distinction), that would be in relation to PoN. Again, I think this disagreement is really at a deeper level than this because I suspect you were anticipating this response.

While I do believe that fundamentals can be applied to themselves, an argument's ability to apply to itself does not necessitate that it is a fundamental.

In terms of fundamentals contextually in object relations, you are correct. But in terms of the absolute pin point of derivation, I think you are incorrect: that is why PoN is called an axiom: you can't prove it in the sense that you can prove something via it.

I will create the PoN using the a/d distinction now. Instead of truth, its "What can be discretely experienced", and instead of false its, "What cannot be discretely experienced. What is impossible is to discretely experience a thing, and not the very thing we are discretely experiencing at the same time. Such a claim would be "false", or what cannot be discretely experienced. As you see, I've built the PoN up from other fundamentals, demonstrating it is not a fundamental itself.

I appreciate you demonstrating this, but I think it is fundamentally still using PoN. First your entire derivation here is utilizing it: "truth = what can be discretely experienced" is an argument from PoN and so is "false = what cannot be discretely experienced". To claim that impossibility is to discretely experience and not discretely experience in the same time is utilizing the more fundamental aspect of your mind: spatiotemporality. Our minds will not allow for something to be in two places at the same time, nor one place at the same time. This is because the mind considers it a contradiction in its continuous understanding, which inevitably is based off of PoN. I don't think this is going to be productive, but my ask back to you would be to try and "create" PoN using the a/d distinction without utilizing PoN: you can't. Likewise, try to justify not that one thing being at two places at the same time is a contradiction but why it is a contradiction without using PoN: you can't. Try to point to something objective to prove it, I don't think you can: not seeing something right now in two places at the same time is not a proof that it cannot occur.

Fundamental to me means the parts that make up the whole

In mereological consideration of objects it does: not holistically. I am using it more in terms of (from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fundamental):

"serving as an original or generating source"
"of central importance"
"belonging to one's innate or ingrained characteristics"

I am not referring to what constitutes as the parts of an object or all objects (like fundamental particles).

I've used the a/d distinction to demonstrate an explanation for why the PoN is not a fundamental as it is made out of component parts

Hopefully I demonstrated why it is not made of component parts. You aren't contending with PoN itself but, rather, utilizing it to define it differently (which is completely possible).

Barring your agreement with my proposal, you would need to identify what "true" and "false" are.

It is the transcendental aspect of the mind which determines what is a contradiction and what is not. I didn't choose that something cannot be in two different places at the same time, nor that two objects cannot be at the same place at the same time. Likewise, I didn't choose the validity of the causal relations of objects. The contemplation of the understanding is fundamentally in terms of spatiotemporal references (e.g. I can redefine PoN in terms of something else as long as it does not violate these underlying principles, if I were to define it as "discrete experience of X and Y at the same place in the same time" then that obviously wouldn't fly, but why?--because I am inevitably playing by the rules of my own mind and so are you regardless of whether either of us realize it). This happens before consideration of what must exist for us to transfer our views to one another.

I am not sure how relevant defining "true" and "false" are with this respect, because "true" is simply a positive affirmation, and "false" is a negative affirmation (denial). I think this derails quickly though because I can posit PoN for the terms as well: it isn't that X can't be "true" and "false", it is that it can't be true and false at the same time. Likewise, if X had the capability to be in two different places (even merely in abstract consideration), then X can be "true" and "false" at the same time because it isn't in the same place.

I think the problem is you are trying to use terms for synonyms to the a/d distinction. It is not as simple as "abstraction vs non-abstraction" or "creation" vs "matching". I can use these terms to assist in understanding the concept, but there is no synonym, as it is a brand new concept. Imagine when the terms analytic and synthetic were introduced. There were no synonyms for that at the time, and people had to study it to understand it.

I can assure you I am not meaning to straw man your position: if it is the case that not even "certainty" and "uncertainty" relate to it, then I am not sure yet what to do with your distinction. I am not saying it is wrong in virtue of that, I am simply not understanding yet.

I think part of the problem is you may not have fully understood or embraced the idea of "discretely experiencing". If you don't understand or accept that fully, then the a/d distinction won't make sense

I most certainly have not fully embraced it. I am not sure how that would make the a/d distinction make sense, but you definitely know better than me.

You are still at a higher level of system, and assume that higher level is fundamental.

For you it is higher, for me it is lower. For you "higher" is the mind, "lower" is the objects which constitute the production of the mind. For me, "lower" is the mind, and "higher" is the derivation of the objects. For me, "lower" and "higher" aren't really sufficient terms because they more relate to mereological structure, which pertains to objects alone.

Can you use your derived system without my system underlying it? No. Until that changes, it cannot be used as a negation of the very thing it uses to exist.

I feel like my response so far should clear up the confusion here (not saying you are going to agree with me though of course (: ).

"I" is the discrete experiencer. You've been attributing the "I" as having free will. I have not meant to imply that or used those terms.

I have no problem if you aren't trying to convey any position on free will in your epistemology, my problem is that when you state "I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively", that implies free will of some sort (I am not trying to box you into a specific corner on the issue). I don't see how that could imply anything else. If I walk up to a hard determinist and say that they are definitely going to catch on to that implication very quickly.

Where does the idea of negation come from? True and false?

Metaphysically the mind. Explain to me how you can derive PoN without using PoN to derive PoN. I don't think you can. Explain to me how you can validate causality holistically: the best one can do is systematically validate one connective (relation) of two objects by virtue of assuming the validity of another connective (or multiple): this occurs for a potential infinite.

Did you mean to say, "One cannot distinctively know their own definition before they perform application to obtain that?" That doesn't work, because distinctive knowledge does not require applicable knowledge.

The entire point was not to conflate or omit your terminology, when I used "application" I was referring to "applicable". I should have been more clear though: the point is that one does not know distinctively anything without performing application to know it. Your distinction is not separable in that sense like I would imagine you think it is.

Please clarify what you mean by this in distinctive and applicable terms. I didn't understand that point.

Of course. Forget for a second that you have obviously imagined a "pink elephant" before (or at least odds are you just did). Now image you "discretely experience" "pink", in isolation. Now, imagine you "discretely experience" "an elephant". Now, without imagining a combination of the two, you assert "I have imagined a pink elephant". That is a conceptual conflation. You did not, in fact, imagine a pink elephant. The concatenation of concepts is not the same as the union of them.

What I meant by "proving itself" is it is consistent with its own rules, despite using some assumptions or higher level systems like the PoN.

I wasn't referring to consistency, I was referring to completeness. Consistency is when the logical theory proves for all provable sentences, S, either not S or S. Completeness is when the logical theory proves all sentences in its language as either S or not S.

Also, I am not using truth. If you wish to use Goedel's incompleteness theorem in relation to this theory, feel free.

I was never attempting to argue you were using "truth". You are arguing for what is "true", which is "truth", but you are refurbishing its underlying meaning (to not be absolute). That is what I meant by "truth outruns proof".

What I am noting is that an infinite regress is something that cannot be applied, and therefore an inapplicable speculation.

It is applied. I think I noticed clearly in my previous post how one could negate it. Also, I want to clarify I am referring to a potential infinite regress, not actual.

My system can be constructed distinctively, and applicably used, while not using infinite regress

You just previously conceded "despite using some assumptions...like PoN". You can't finitely prove PoN. It is not possible.

Mine does not rely on such an induction, and is therefore more sound.

If I were arguing for an actual infinite regress, then it would be an induction. A potential infinite regress is deductively ascertainable.

Because I am not fully understanding (I would suspect) the a/d distinction I am going to end this with a step by step analysis of your definition here and you tell me where I am going wrong (thank you by the way for elaborating):

Distinctive knowledge is a deduced concept. This deduced concept is that I discretely experience. Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience. This is distinctive knowledge. This involves, sensation, memory, and language. This is not the definition of the Principle of Negation, though we can discover the principle of negation as I noted earlier.

1. Distinctive knowledge is a deduced concept.

Makes sense.

2. This deduced concept is that I discretely experience.

The justification for this seems to be "Anytime I discretely experience, I know that I discretely experience". The question is why would this be valid? I would argue it is valid in virtue of PoN, spatiotemporal contemplation, etc. You know it because your mind related the objects in that manner in accordance to the rules you inevitably submit to. Causality are simply the connections of your mind. There's nowhere to point to in objective "reality" that validates the causal connection of two objects in space and temporally in relation to time: it is a potential infinite regress of validating connectives in virtue of assuming the validity of others and so on and so forth.

3. This involves, sensation, memory, and language.

I think all of these are aspects of the brain in a derivation of objects and their relations. But the relations themselves are of the mind. This is why I am careful to relate my position to reason as opposed to consciousness.

4. This is not the definition of the Principle of Negation, though we can discover the principle of negation as I noted earlier.

I agree that it is not PoN, but you are necessarily using it here. Just because you can discover it doesn't mean you weren't using it fundamentally to discover.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

A moral interpretation of the phenomena implies that phenomena have inherent morals, as interpretations are phenomena.

A moral interpretation of a phenomena implies a distinction between "phenomena" and "the interpretation". An interpretation is not a phenomena and is likewise not an object (I would hold phenomena and object as synonymous). The main point I was trying to make is that morality is projection as opposed to discovery, so to speak. A moral interpretation does not imply anything moral about the objective nature of the phenomena (or object) in question.

That means that there are no goodness and badness in people or other creatures, which is contradicted by the phenomena.

Other humans are subjects, not objects. Subjects are not phenomena. In other words, there is no inherent moral "goodness" or "badness" in objects.

In practice though, what is interpreted as good or bad, can be annihilated.

I agree. But that wasn't what I was explicating: there's a difference between annihilating what one interprets as bad or good and annihilating what is bad or good. I don't think there are any valid ontic or phenomenological traits or properties or essence of objects that make them bad or good, nor any relations that produce "badness" or "goodness": it is solely a matter of contemplation of subjects.

History is full of examples.

I agree that history is full of examples of trying to fight (or even annihilate) what people (in their time) interpreted as wrong or right: that's doesn't have any relation to any objective morality.

The question is, should we allow irrational annihilation of the interpreted evil?

The way that question is framed heavily implies a specific answer (e.g. irrational annihilation pretty much turns the question into a statement hidden as a question). I'm not sure what you mean here. I think most humans would agree that we are striving to remove "evil" or even "annihilate" it if you will. Do you mean more like "should we walk to the edge of extinction to prevent 'evil'"?

Isn't annihilating interpreted evil even bigger (and objective!) evil than the evil being annihilated?

Again, I don't see how it would be objective. But, furthermore, how is annihilating evil, evil? Is this a question of "does the end justify the means"? I think the question would need to be formulated more precisely for me to give a substantive response.

Still, it seems to be happening.

If by "seems" you are trying to convey that it seems as though humans are naturally going to self-extinction, then I think that is a defensible position (I am not thoroughly convinced of it though).

The path of western man away from nature seems a path away from a natural moral.

I don't see how advancing society away from nature strays away from "natural" morals because they don't exist: morals aren't something objectively real in the universe. Sure, there's benefits to being connected with nature, but I don't see how that has anything to do with straying away from morals: our morals and ethics have progressed substantially over the millennia.

The digression from this moral translates in natural chaos and chance of natural annihilation.

There's no "natural" morality. Deviating into what most people may consider "evil" nowadays (or what they considered it three thousand years ago) does not imply that "natural chaos" ensues.

Let's face the fact. The evil is undeniably with us. It's an undeniable part of us. Of me, of everyone, of the universe, of the eternal gods.

I would take more of a cognitivist anti-realist position on morality: there are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena. I don't think the universe instantiates any "good" or "evil".

The question is, what shall we do with it?

"good" and "evil" are essentially the projection of subject's onto the world. Depending on the intellectual capacity of a given subject's faculties of reason, they will have a different interpretation of what the terms encompass.

However, this doesn't mean no one is correct (or more cogent) or wrong (or less cogent) in their views: varies based of off their intellectual capacities. I think the best we can do is slowly progress towards the most cogent positions by means of those subjects who can contribute, but ultimately there's no telling the capacities (and thusly interpretations) of those in power (or/and the masses) as time moves forward.

Shall we let it persist, shall we restrict it, even annihilate it?

What one annihilates today as "evil", is only an annihilation of what they considered "evil": there's nothing objective to annihilate that instantiates evil.

The last seems even worse than evil itself, for shouldn't we then annihilate the whole universe?

Do you interpret existence itself as "evil" or partially so?

Is this chance of total annihilation a means of the universe to cleanse itself from the evil we introduced, to restore the balance.

I don't think the universe has some sort of plan to restore "the balance". Humanity may annihilate itself, but I don't see how that equates to somehow "annihilating evil", unless one is referring to the fact that interpretations arguably won't exist anymore: I guess it is amoral at that point.

Hello @Philosophim,

No need to apologize for long pauses between replies, I believe we are both out of our comfort level of easy response at this point in time. I find it exciting and refreshing, but it takes time to think.

I likewise find it exciting and intriguing. If one isn't out of their comfort zone, then they aren't learning.

The problem I have with your fundamental concepts, is I do not consider them the most fundamental concepts, nor do I think you have shown them to be.

I suspected this would be the case, and I agree to a certain level: in my previous post I purposely refrained from going into a meticulous derivation of the fundamentals so as to prevent derailing into my epistemology as opposed to yours. I can most certainly dive in deeper.

The most fundamental concept I introduced was discrete experience. Prior to discretely experiencing, one cannot comprehend even the PoN.

"discrete experience" and any argument you provide (regardless of how sound) is utilizing PoN at its focal point. Nothing is "beyond" PoN. Therefore, I view "discrete experience" as a more ambiguous clumping of my outlined fundamentals. There's nothing wrong, at prima facea, of thinking of them in terms of one lumped "discrete experience", but this cannot be conflated with "differentiation" nor "spatiotemporality".

That being said, I don't necessarily disagree with your fundamentals as system that can be derived from the fundamental that you discretely experience.

You derived this via PoN. A common theme that I view as a misunderstanding is to think that the derivation of a "fundamental" should be what one can determine as what they are contingent upon: they were required in the first place. It is not what one can derive via PoN as the grounds which is the fundamental, it is what was used in the first place to derive it (e.g. PoN). A "fundamental" is that which is an unescapable potential infinite of the subject's manifestations ("thoughts", "reasoning" if you will). I claim PoN is false, it is thereby true. I claim X, it used PoN, I verified that because PoN is true. I verified "because PoN is true" via PoN: it is a recursive potential infinite. That is the nature of "reason": a succession of finite operations which are constrained to necessary principles.

But I don't think you've shown that it isn't derived from the more fundamental a/d distinction.

At this point, I still don't think a/d distinction is very clear. Some times you seem to use it as if it is "abstract" vs "non-abstract", other times it is "creation" vs "matching": these are not synonymous distinctions. Sometimes it is:

I've noted you can create whatever system you want distinctively.

Other times it is:

Free will is not necessary to my epistemology. Free will is a distinctive and applicable concept that is contextually formed.

The former implies some form of "free will" regardless of whether the term is constructed or not. The latter denies any such implicit necessity.

The way I understand it is:

- If distinctive knowledge is "creation", then by virtue of the term it implies some form of "free will" to "create" whatever one wants. Unless you are positing a "creation" derived from an external entity or process that is not the subject.

- If distinctive knowledge is "abstract", then it renders "free will" irrelevant, but necessarily meshes "creation" and "matching" into valid processes within "distinctive knowledge" due to the fact that "abstraction" can have both.

Quite frankly, your descriptions are "free will" heavy (in terms of implications): I think you are frequently mapping "distinctive knowledge" to a distinction of free construction, whereas "applicable" is outside of that construction. I don't think you have offered an adequate reconciliation to this issue (but I could be simply misunderstanding).

Furthermore, being able to always classify something under one of two categories does not entail that that those two categories are fundamentals. Your a/d distinction is like a line drawn in a potential infinite beach of sand, whereas I am trying to examine it by granule. Sure, the granule is either on the left or the right of the line, but that doesn't have anything to do with fundamentals.

What is necessary is the concept of a will.

Is this will "creating" the distinctive knowledge? I get heavy vibes that that is not what you are saying, but I could be wrong. If not, then there's a heavy "free will" implication. Even in terms of this will, if it is directing the constructed "distinctive knowledge" and it isn't an act of free will of some sort, then it isn't the subject "creating" anything: therefore they cannot do whatever they want distinctively, but maybe the rudimentary will can?

But, when your reason is placed in a situation in which it is provably uncertain, the deduced results of the experience are applicable knowledge.

This leads me to believe, instead of "creation"/"abstract" vs "matched"/"non-abstract", you are really trying to convey "certainty" vs "uncertainty", which, again, is not the same thing.

Let me invoke your definitions from a while back:

Distinctive knowledge - A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience.


Applicable knowledge - A deduced concept which is not contained within its contextual distinctive knowledge set. This concept does not involve the creation of new distinctive knowledge, but a deduced match of a discrete experience to the contextual distinctive knowledge set

This is a "creation" vs "matching" distinction. "creation" does not equate to "abstract consideration". "matching" does not equate to "non-abstract consideration".

You've typically been thinking at a step one higher, or one beyond what I've been pointing out. Your ideas are not bad or necessarily wrong.

I think it is essentially the converse. However, what makes it tricky is that your definitions think higher and equal to mine, which clouds the waters.

I am talking about a system from which all systems are made, while you're talking about a system that can be made from this prime system.

I am arguing the exact same thing conversely. I don't think your "discrete experience" is the fundamental: it is an ambiguous lumping of the fundamentals into one term. It works fine prima facea, but as I have been examining your epistemology it slowly breaks down when one gets to a/d. Neither of us can derive a/d, or any distinction, without first using PoN, connectivity, negations, equatability, spatiotemporality, and a will. These are not after nor do they arise out of discrete experience. PoN is the focal point and thereafter the other fundamentals follow logically. "discrete experience" is an ambiguous sort of equivalent to the lumping of these concepts: it is the realization that one is experiencing differentiation via the PoN, connections, negatiability, equatability, and spatiotemporal references: we cannot go beyond those, they are apodictic.

As you've noted, you had to use the d/a distinction to use the concepts that you created. I'm noting how knowledge is formed to create systems, while you are creating a system.

I wasn't trying to note that I used a/d: I was meaning that it seems as though (in anticipation) that I am given the murky waters in the definitions of a/d. You are drawing a line in the sand, I am noting the granules and the granules that make up those, etc to derive what is necessarily always occurring in the finite procession of the manifestations of reason. I am not convinced that a/d somehow is being used to derive PoN, when PoN was required to derive a/d.

As I mentioned earlier, your fundamentals are not fundamentals. I can both distinctively and applicably know what you claim to be fundamentals. I distinctively know the PoN, and I applicably know the PoN.

Being able to categorize one granule of sand either as on the left or the right does not have any bearing on what is fundamental. Even if the a/d distinction works for all granules, it wouldn't thereby be a fundamental. The derivation of a/d, I would argue, utilizes my fundamentals to get there. Try to derive a/d without using PoN. Try to derive anything without it.

Likewise, depending on what distinction you mean by "distinctive" and "applicable" it may or may not be the case that one can derive PoN in those two contexts separately. There's a definition of "PoN" in my head, which I abstractly had to perform application to know that, and I abstractly apply it to my previous abstract thoughts to determine whether it holds as apodictic: and it does. I would suppose I had to "applicably" know that I "distinctively" knew, not the other way around, because I don't know I had a definition of "PoN" until after I perform the necessary abstract applications to determine I do. "Application" and "definitions" is a murky distinction (just like creation and matching), no different than a/s.

One cannot know of their own definition before they perform application to obtain that. Once they know, then they can distinguish that from whether the definition's contents hold. It would be a conflation to claim that the definition proves it owns validity beyond it: which doesn't have any bearing on a/d. I claim "I cannot hold A and not A". I didn't know I made that claim until I applicably determine via PoN that I did claim it. Thereafter, it is a conceptual conflation to claim that in virtue of the claim it is true: this is the distinction I think should be made.

Conflation is not a function of my epistemology, but a way to demonstrate separations of knowledge and context

That is my point: there is only one form of knowledge. No matter what distinction is made, the subject is necessarily following the same underlying process. All the issues your distinction are supposed to be demonstrating can be resolved simply by noting conflations.

If you imagine a pink elephant combining your memory of pink and elephant, that is distinctive knowledge. There is nothing wrong with that.

Depends on what you mean. If you are conflating concepts, then there is something wrong. A "pink elephant" in combination is not the same as "pink" + "elephant" in isolation, it would be wrong to abstractly conflate the two.

If we distinctively identify a square and a circle to have different essential properties, than they cannot be the same thing distinctively.

This is necessarily the case because we fundamental utilize PoN as the focal point. This is not a choice, it is always abided by.

But my point was that concepts can be conflated abstractly and, potentially depending on how you are defining "distinctive", distinctively.

I may try to apply whatever my contextual use of square is, and find that I run into a contradiction

The real underlying process here I think is trying to relate, whether abstractly or non-abstractly, concepts to one another and whether it results in an invalid conflation. You tend to be using "applicable" as if it is "non-abstract".

But, when you make the claim that your derived system invalidates the underlying system, you are applicably wrong.

There is no underlying system. My proposed system is meant as the underlying system. Your definition of "possibility" implicitly uses mine. The mind necessarily considers in terms of how I defined it. Now, semantically, that is a whole different question. Your possibility's function was to note a contextual conflation, which is accounted for in my system without redefining possibility in a way that creates confusing different "could" terminology (i.e. "I speculate I could" vs "I possibly could").

This would be a flaw in your proposal then...An infinite regress cannot prove itself, because it rests on the belief in its own assumptions.

Firstly, a finite regress of reason should never prove itself: that is circular logic. Secondly, a system cannot prove all of its true formulas. Goedel's incompleteness theorems thoroughly proved that truth outruns proof: it is an infinite regress wherein a system has at least one unprovable, but yet true, formula which is only proven by using another system (aka it is non-computational).

Although I am interested to hear your reasoning, I didn't get the impression that your epistemology proves itself in that sense: it is consistent, but not complete. There's nothing wrong with that.

Thirdly, I think this is a strength of my system is that it explicates the true nature of reason: potential infinite regressions and one circular reference. This is why PoN is the focal point, as it is the one valid circular reference:

It is a potential infinite circular cycle of "X is true because of PoN", where X can also be PoN. There's nothing wrong with that: that is why it is an axiom. The reason that isn't special pleading is because all other circular logic depends on PoN and we can demonstrate therefrom their invalidity. Apodictic doesn't mean complete, it means demonstrably true (not to be confused with absolutely true). When a subject tries to prove PoN, they have to eventually give up under the conclusion that it is true as they follow the potential infinite path of derivation, which is cyclical. I don't think, in action, you can demonstrate that to be false (as that very proposition is presupposing PoN). That's why it is an axiom.

The potential infinite regressions (recursions to be specific) is simply noting what concepts are and how they exist in a infinite recursive pattern. Similar to how PoN is cyclical but yet valid, noting that when one derives any concept they can perform the finite operation to all of its properties, sub-properties, sub-sub-properties, etc for a potential infinite. All concepts, even in your derivation, are referencing other concepts in a potential infinite fashion. This is provable by means of simply trying to invalidate it: try to come up with a concept that isn't derive from other concepts. The nature of reason is a continuity: there's no stopping point. This does not rest on its own assumptions.

If you are the creator of the definitions of A and B, then there is no uncertainty.

There's always uncertainty. When someone claims they are certain of what they defined as A, they really mean that they very quickly ascertained what they defined, but necessarily had to perform application to discover what it was. They had to dissect the concept of A, and the act of dissecting implies uncertainty. This is not the same as claiming they are formulating inductions.

Let me be clear by what I mean by distinctive. Distinctive is like binary. Its either on, or off. Either you have defined A to have x property, or you have defined A to have y property.

This is not " A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience", you have defined PoN here, which is true of both of your distinctions.

I really think going through the terms has helped me to see where you are coming from, and I hope I've demonstrated the consistency in my use and argumentation for the a/d system. Everything we've mentioned here so far, has been mentioned in prior topics, but here we have it summed up together nicely.

I appreciate your response, I hope I wasn't too reiterative from previous posts here.

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

You have brought up some very thought-provoking points and, thusly, it has taken me some time to really give it its due. I realized, with aid of your contentions, that the synthetic/analytical distinction is also not actually directly exposing what I want (just as, I would argue, the applicable/distinctive distinction isn't) and, therefore, I can no longer invoke it legitimately to convey my position. Consequently, I was forced to really dive into what I am actually trying to convey and, therein, really clearly define each fundamental building block. So, I now going to share with you what I believe to be a much more clear, distinct representation of what I am trying to convey (but of course it could not be as well (: ).

As a general overview, I still do not think (as I alluding to above) either a/s or a/d properly convey the distinction I am addressing and, quite frankly, I don't think it quite explicates properly what you are trying to convey either. I think both distinctions are missing the mark: in hindsight, the a/s more than a/d. It is like at prima facea a/d makes sense, but at a deeper evaluation it diverges from the rightful distinction. Let's dive in.

First I need to start my derivation not at the distinction I want to convey but at the groundings, fundamentals, of everything. That is, a deeper analysis of reason to determine, recursively, what is occurring across all instantiations (because reason is the focal point of all derivation, I think we would agree on that at least generically). If this endeavor is accomplished, then I submit to you that it will be relevant, at the very least, to your epistemology as it would be the protocol by which all else conforms.

I think that, although I am open for suggestions, there are two groups of fundamentals worth mentioning right now: the most fundamental and some sub-distinctions therein. It is important to note, before I begin deriving and defining them, that I only giving ordering in terms of those groups and not in terms of the items therein: in the case of the most fundamental I am not particularly convinced one can make a meaningful order and in the case of the sub-distinctions therein I don't find it relevant at this point to parse it.

Most Fundamental:
In the case of the most fundamental, they are as follows:

- The principle of non-contradiction (PoN): subject concept which is not in contradiction by its predicate.
- Negatability: the ability to conceive of the direct opposite (contradiction) of a given concept.
- Will: a motive.
- Connectivity: the ability to construct connections via connectives.
- Connective: a concept which relates two other concepts in some manner (relations).
- Spatiotemporality: the spatiotemporal inevitable references of concepts.

These are the fundamentals which are such because they are the utmost (or undermost) conceptions that one can derive. Any other concept is thereafter.

It is important to note that by "spatiotemporal" I am not referring to "space and time" (as in two separate distinctions) but more as "space and time juxtaposed as one". Time and space cannot be separated in a literal sense.

Sub-distinctions Therein
There are two sub-groups worth mentioning at this time. First is the sub-group of connectivity:

- Possibility: a predicate which does not contradict its subject concept.
- Necessity: a predicate which is true of all possibilities of its subject concept.
- Impossibility: a predicate which contradicts its subject concept.
- Conditional (Contingent): a connective which relates two concepts in some sort of dependency. This includes, but is not limited to, biconditionals (IFF) and uniconditionals (IF).
- Unconditional (Not Contingent): a connective which relates two concepts in a manner that has no dependency (e.g. the connection that A and B are not related is a relation determined by a connective which dictates their unconditioned nature).
- Communal: two concepts share a concept.

The second relevant sub-group is of spatiotemporality:

- Quantity: A concept which is numerable. Such as "particular", "singular", "three", etc.
- Quality: A concept which is innumerable. Such as degrees on a spectrum from 0 to 1.

Immediate Productions of The Fundamentals and Sub-distinctions
Now, from those fundamentals, along with the understanding of the relevant sub-distinctions therein, arises immediate processes of reason which are identifiable, which are:

- Concepts
- Properties
- References
- Contexts
- Conflations
- Conceptual Conflations
- Contextual Conflations
- NOTE: probably many more, but the aforementioned are the relevant ones.

These immediate processes, derived ultimately from the fundamentals, are, in fact, arranged in order (unlike the two groups I mentioned previously) as their definitions rely on the previous to understand each other. They are what I would consider the "fundamentals" which can be constructed given the actual fundamentals (previously explicated).

Concepts:
A "concept" is spatiotemporal connection(s) composed of spatiotemporal connection(s).

E.g. Concept A is comprised of other concepts:

NOTE: apparently philosophy forum strips white space characters and won't let me upload any images, so I am going to have to represent by diagrams a bit odder.

'=' will be assigning operator
'[ ]' will be a set
'&' will be a reference operator
'<=>' biconditional operator
'( )' order of operations

A = [P1, P2]

Properties:
A "property" is a concept, P, which is connected (related) to another concept, C, in a manner of necessity as one of C's comprised parts. In the above example, P1 and P2 are properties of A.

References:
A "reference" is a connective, R, which connects its concept to another separate concept, wherein "separate concept" entails that the given concept is not a property of the other concept.

Concept A, which has two properties, is referencing concept B, which has a property that is not equal to either of A's:

B = [P3]
A = [P1, P2, &B]

Contexts:
A reference which dictates its concept as conditional on another concept in the manner of IFF (biconditional).

There are two concepts defined as A, but each is biconditionally referenced to concept B and C respectively (B and C would thereby be considered contexts):

B <=> (A = [P1, P2])
C <=> (A = [P3, P4])

It is important to note that the properties of both A's must be different, otherwise it is not a biconditional and, therefore, not a context.

Conflations:
The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their properties or/and references (see subsequent examples).

Conceptual Conflations:
The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their properties.

A = [P1, P2]
B = [P3, P4]

Conflation: B has property P1 because A has property P1.

Contextual Conflation:
The use of two or more concepts as synonymous when they are differentiable in terms of their references.

B <=> (A = [P1, P2])
C <=> (A = [P3, P4])

Contextual Conflation: A from C has property P1 because A from B has property P1.

Brief Explanation:
The entire point of the previous derivation is so that I can more accurately and precisely convey my point of view and is not in any way meant to derail the conversation into a discussion about a different epistemology (although it inevitably sort of requires such insofar as it is my position). To keep this brief, let me elaborate on my previous definitions in contrast to your epistemology:

Advantages Over Your Epistemology

Free will is irrelevant. The determination of "knowledge" is not related directly to control, which dissolves any issues or paradoxes related thereto.

Creation & Application are irrelevant. The distinction being made has no direct relevancy to whether a given concept was "created" or "applied", just that the conceptions appropriately align with the fundamentals. In relation to concepts, dissolving of the distinction of "distinctive" vs "applicable" resolves a lot of issues, such as the fact that contextual conflations can occur in distinctive knowledge which seems, in your epistemology, to be an exemption wherein no conflations can occur. Take the elephant example, here's your response:

Distinctively, there is nothing strange about taking the terms pink and applying it to an elephant. We create whatever definitions we wish. The part that doesn't make sense is stating there is some unknown distinctive identity apart from our imagination or fiction that matches to the identity of a pink elephant. The creation of distinctive knowledge does not necessitate such knowledge can be applicably known. The a/s distinction is what causes the confusion, not the d/a epistemology.

The problem is that I can conflate distinctively concepts. If I, in isolation, imagine the color pink and, in isolation, imagine an elephant, it would be a conflation to claim the concatenation of the two produced a literal "pink elephant". Given the nature of imagination, it isn't so obvious that there's a conflation occurring, but a more radical example explicates it more clearly: I imagine a circle and then imagine a square, I then declare that I distinctively know of a "a circle that is a square". What I really distinctively know is a square, a circle, and a contradiction (impossibility in this case).

The concept of "square", and its properties (essential properties in your terms), as a predicate (such as "this circle is square") contradicts the subject concept "circle" and is therefore "impossible". It contradicts it because the properties are related to the concept as necessitous by nature and therefore a contradiction in the predicate to the properties of "circle" (the subject concept) results in rejection (due to PoN): this is what it means to be "impossible".

Potential vs Possibility is now resolved. There's no more confusion about possibility because what you are defining as "possibility" is not fundamentally what it should be, however the distinction you made is still relevant. "Possibility" is truly when a predicate does not contradict its subject concept. Thereafter, we can easily explain and justify the validity of what you are meaning to distinguish with "possibility". We simply need to provide the concepts of "reality" and "self" (for example) and demonstrate that the two concepts have at least one different properties and, therefore, they are two different subject concepts. Therefore, it would be a conceptual conflation to relate a predicate to both by mere virtue of them being considered synonymous (because they aren't). It is important to note here, as I have defined it, that this would not be a contextual conflation but a conceptual conflation. This is because the approach previously mentioned is differentiating the two concepts by means of their properties and not their references to other concepts. If it were the case that "reality" referenced a context and "reality" referenced a different context, then the use of a predicate for both in virtue of being synonymous would be a contextual conflation. But in the case of comparing properties, the conflation is not occurring contextually. To be clear, a "conceptual conflation" occurs by means of properties and "contextual conflations" by means of references.

Further, notice that properties, as I defined them, are only essential (because they are utilizing a connection of the nature of necessity) and never accidental (unessential). I think this nicely portrays what the mind really does: if something is an accidentally property, what is actually happening is the mind is determining the accidental property to be "possible" (as I defined it) and therefore noting that the given concept could reference another concept but it is not necessitous. For example, if concept A has one property of "being circular" (to keep it simple) and concept B has one property of "being green", then it is "possible" for A "to be green" (reference concept B: A = [..., &B]) because "being green" does not contradict A. Now, what you are noting, and rightfully so, is that A referenced in the concept of "reality", so to speak, cannot be conflated with a reference to "imagination", which really looks like:

Reality <=> (A = [Circular])
Imagination <=> (A = [Circular])

A contextual conflation arises if one were to claim X of Imagination's A in virtue of Reality's A (and vice-versa) because of the referential difference (even though they are the same conceptually in this case, so there's no conceptual conflation). Likewise:

Reality <=> (A = [Green, Circular])
Imagination <=> (A = [Circular])

This would be a referential and conceptual conflation if one were to claim X of one in virtue of the other. In this case the conceptual conflation would determine that the concepts of A are not synonymous when compared with each other (in their contexts). Which I think is important as well.

I think, overall, this really gets at the fundamental situation of reason and how it operates, which is the pinnacle in relation to a given subject.

As you probably noticed, there is a recursive nature to my definitions: they are all concepts. This is purposely so because, quite frankly, it is an inescapable potential infinite regress of reason. Which I think is important to note that the epistemology is never complete, only consistent. The most fundamental is that which is apodictic.

The last thing I will say is that I can see how this all, at prima facea, seems like I really used what your epistemology states to even derive these terms (e.g. I "created" definitions and applied them without contradiction). However, I actually think that the previously mentioned process is what occurs as the fundamental building block of reason (at least human reason) and your epistemology happens to align with it pretty nicely, but the subtle but vital differences required me to really derive and explicate my position to figure out what wasn't quite adding up for me: I think mine explicates the situation more clearly and precisely. Hopefully that makes sense.

In terms of your post, I am now going to try to respond to what I think is still relevant to our conversation, but feel free to prompt me to respond to anything you think I left out.

I define a synonym as "Two identities which have the same essential and non-essential properties.

I would define synonyms as two concepts which have the same properties, where property is connected as necessary. Apart from the obvious difference in semantics, the important part is that non-essential properties no longer exist: they are references to other concepts determined by "possibility".

But there is no uncertainty involved. How I define A, B, and synonyms are all in my solo context.

There's a difference between saying A and B are synonyms, and trying to discover if they currently are synonymous. Maybe the latter is applicable knowledge? However, that would be solely abstract consideration, which I think you were stating was only possibly distinctive.

applicable knowledge always involves the resolution of a distinctive uncertainty

Would you agree with me then that there is such a thing as uncertainty distinctively? Because prior it felt like you were stating there's never uncertainty because I am "creating" the definitions:

Distinctive knowledge has no uncertainty.

I see this as a direct contradiction. Which I think is resolved in my position because we no longer need a/d.

No, taken alone, the process of distinctive and applicable knowledge do not explicitly involve context.

I think that I was wrong to think the distinction needed to be contextual conflations, it is actually simply conflations in general (both).

No, X alone is not an induction. "IF X" is an induction.

In the way you have defined it from the dictionary, I am no longer certain "hypothetical" is the correct term. There's a difference between stating "I believe it will rain" and "I don't know if it will rain". The former is an induction, the latter could be either: both are expressing uncertainty. The latter is not a hypothesis, it is a certainty of uncertainty (assuming it was deduced). if I state "IF it rains, THEN ...", I may not be claiming that I "believe" it will rain, I could be claiming "I do not know either way" which is not an induction. That's my only point.

Therefore it is more cogent to act as if the known certainties of today such as logic and needing to breath and eat to survive, will be the known certainties of tomorrow. My inductive hierarchy can justify itself. Can any other rationalization of inductions do so? I leave that to you.

I still think hume's problem of induction isn't really answered here. But I completely understand and agree that the most rational thing to do is the hierarchy of inductions. But more on that later as this is very long.

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Well I have clearly missed the mark yet again ): It seems as though we are not semantically disagreeing but, rather, fundamentally disagreeing. I understand now that you are by no means making a synthetic/analytic distinction. It is becoming exceedingly difficult to map d/a to s/a because, quite frankly, they aren't the same distinction. However, I am making that kind of s/a distinction (as opposed to d/a), so I want to clarify that my usage of a/s hereafter isn't meant as a depiction of your distinction but, rather, of mine in contrast to yours.

Are the names I made very good. Probably not. I'm not great with coming up with names! I like distinctive, as it flowed nicely from discrete experience. "Applicable" is probably not very good, but I'm not sure what else to call it. I view words as place holders for concepts, and I view placeholders as contextual. As long as the word works in some sense within this context, that's fine by me. I see it as "Applying distinctive knowledge" to something other than itself.

But I am very open to new naming! Perhaps creative and comparative knowledge? Identity knowledge and confirmable? Dynamic and static? The problem of course with all of these comparisons is if you interpret the word meaning a particular contextual way, they don't quite work either. The contextual implication of the words in their general use gets in the way when trying to apply them in context to the argument. The reality is, the knowledge I'm proposing has never existed before. Its a concept no one (I have read) has proposed. So perhaps I need new words entirely and should research some latin.

People are indeed diverse, and I can definitely see how some people simply either don't engage with refurbished terminology or misunderstand your points due to the previous definitions of the terminology: fair enough. In that case, latin may be a good choice; Simply as a means of forcing them to understand the underlying meaning and so they don't get upset by the refurbishment of terms.

Out of the terms you suggested, I think "creative" and "comparative" was the closest to what I think you are trying to convey. But I think you are only constituting something as "applicable knowledge" if it is a match, with no relation to contrast (so comparative may not be the best word: "matched" might be, I am not sure). For example, if I begin the act of matching and thereby determine that concept A is not a match of concept B, then do I, under your terms, "applicably know" they aren't a match? In other words, is contrasting, as opposed to simply comparing similarities, an aspect of "application" in your terms? I am understanding you to more be making the distinction strictly in the sense that "a successful match" is "applicable knowledge".

...analytic expresses the contrary: "a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept" — Bob Ross


To compare to distinctive knowledge, we need to remove proposition, predicate, and subject.

I understand now that one would have to remove "proposition, predicate, and subject" to roughly map it onto "distinctive knowledge" because, quite frankly, we aren't speaking of the same distinction (which I previously thought was the case). To my understand, the fundamental reason for your distinction was meant to expose indexical conflations in a given claim presented by a subject . However, I think that I can achieve that underlying meaning, assuming I understood it right, by using the most fundamental distinction in terms of how reason works: a proposition (all reasoning beings are capable of such) wherein the predicate (all propositions must have a predicate, and therefore all claims made by a subject that must recognize the distinction of indexical relations must have a predicate) is contained (or not contained for the contrary) in its subject concept (all propositions must have a subject concept). If the sentence doesn't meet these fundamental underlying requirements, then the distinction I think you are trying to make isn't applicable anyways (by applicable I am not referring to your term, just normal use). Now, I want to clarify that I am not referring to diction, semantics, or syntax: those all can be contextually redefined (or defined) in terms of both societal and personal contexts. I am referring to the underlying concepts. The given individual doesn't have to call it a "predicate" nor do they have to syntactically abide by the english language, but they necessarily must have a "predicate" concept which refers, in terms of underlying meaning, to a predicate. If not, then it is incoherent to consider it in terms of indexical conflations (e.g. "oranges" therefore "oranges" makes no valid references, therefore it isn't possible to conflate anything that we would like to expose in terms of indexical conflations).

Here's some examples:

If I propose "B", it is not a proposition.

If I propose "B is", it is not a proposition.

If I propose "is blue", it is not a proposition.

If I propose "B is the same as A", then either B matches the definition of A or it does not. However, to know either way, I have to compare and contrast. This is the first issue I have with your terminology: I have to compare and contrast everything to know even if it is distinctive or applicable, but yet "applicable" is supposed to be the area in which I "match" (and potentially contrast?): which doesn't really fit the distinction that I think should be made. In the case that B is a match of the definition of A, then I recognize that there is not an indexical conflation occurring if I were to make claims about B which were derived from claims about A. You would call this "applicable knowledge". In the case that B does not match the definition of A, I recognize that it would be fallacious to make claims about B which were derived from claims about A. At first glance, it feels like that is what you mean by "applicable" and "distinctive", but I don't think it is holistically. I have to perform this for everything, which is the problem with your distinction. For example, if I distinctively define A and distinctively define B, but they are by happenstance defined the exact same, my conclusion that they are defined the same is a comparison of the two distinctively defined concepts, A and B, to derive that they are indeed a match: this didn't involve anything "outside of my control", so to speak. I think you would regardless consider it holistically in the realm of "distinctive knowledge", which I would disagree with. The concept that "concept A = concept B" is a different concept which is not contained in the subject concept of either A or B (therefore it is not analytical): it is a synthetic unity of both A and B under equivocation from matching their definitions all abstractly. The definition of A did not contain the necessity that the concept of B is equivocal to itself. I have to use both: I analytically unpack the definitions of A and B to then synthetically compare the two. Maybe I am just misunderstanding you (I probably am), but here's your definitions:

Distinctive knowledge - A deduced concept which is the creation and memorization of essential and accidental properties of a discrete experience.


Applicable knowledge - A deduced concept which is not contained within its contextual distinctive knowledge set. This concept does not involve the creation of new distinctive knowledge, but a deduced match of a discrete experience to the contextual distinctive knowledge set.

It is tricky to map onto a/s because both distinctive and applicable are synthetic and analytic in their own regards: I am starting to see there's no line that can be drawn in the fashion I think you are trying to in order to provide a distinction that exposes indexical conflations.

Applicable knowledge does involve the creation of a new concept: the synthetic joining of "A = B", which is a separate concept from A and B. There was a concept A and a concept B, now there's a new concept that "A = B". This is not necessitated in the concepts A nor B, but yet true of them (i.e. it is synthetic). But there was an analysis that was required to determine "A = B" which was the analysis of what is contained in the concept A and, likewise, what is in the concept B, which is analytical. So both were used to obtain "applicable knowledge". I think this, as of now, is the true pinpoint of the distinction we are both really trying to portray (but I may be wrong, as always).

Both distinctive and applicable knowledge can be seen as the extension of one's creation on the world. A discrete experience (the rock) has no inherent properties that necessitate it be called anything. Distinctive knowledge is when we create those essential and accidental properties that allow it to be called a "rock". This is our creation upon the world. Upon finding finding a new discrete experience (potential rock) we attempt to match our definition of a "a rock" to "the discrete experience". If we deduce that the essential properties match, we have applicable knowledge that "the discrete experience" is a match to "A rock". This is another extension of our creation upon the world.

I think you are right and that is why I need to be careful with my verbiage: synthesis and analysis are both projections in a sense. However, in terms of a/s, there's a meaningful distinction between the joining of two concepts and what is contained within a given concept. Another reason why we are disagreeing here is because I am viewing the "matching" you described as synthetic and analytic. So matching "a rock" to the what is called "a rock" would be projection (the connection of concepts together) whereas the derivation of the properties of "the rock" would be analytical (which wouldn't be meaningfully depicted as projection, but technically would be in a sense). Projection probably isn't a good word here, so I am going to stop using it.

It is more about creation of identities versus deduced matching of experiences to already established identities.

I don't think this directly explicates the recognition of indexical conflations. It is more of a byproduct.

To translate into this epistemology, we always start with distinctive knowledge.

I think that we start with analysis (which is empirical observation) and therefrom derive synthesis. I haven't found a way to neatly map this onto your d/a distinction. I don't think we always start with distinctive knowledge as you've defined it.

For example, take the concept of "A is equal to B" ("A = B"). To realize that I actually synthetically connected the concept of A and the concept of B in a relation of equivocation I must first analytically dissect the created concept of "A = B" to determine that there's a synthesis that occurred. Likewise, I could then counter myself with "well, bob, you just performed synthesis in determining that you analytically discover synthesis". And I would be correct, however I didn't realize that necessarily until after I analytically observed the claim (i.e. that I analyze to discover what is synthesized). I am always one step behind the synthesis, so to speak. Hopefully that made a bit of sense.

The act of experiencing a memory is part of the act of discrete experience itself. For example, "I remember seeing a pink elephant." Whether the memory is accurate when applied is irrelevant. It is the memory itself that is distinctive.

The act of experiencing imagery in ones mind is part of discrete experience: the conclusion that it is a remembrance of the past is not. It would be more like "I am imagining a pink elephant right now" as opposed to "I remember seeing a pink elephant before". The further consideration of whether it is a remembrance is synthetic as I am doing essentially "A = B". The discrete experience of the pink elephant would be analytic, at least prima facie, because it is simply analyzing what is contained in the concept. But any labeling would be synthetic of the contents of the concept.

"Pink elephant" combines our distinctive understanding of "pink" and "elephant".

The definitions of "pink" and "elephant" would be analytical. But the new concept of a "pink elephant" would be synthetic. The problem is that "pink", in isolation, is "distinctive knowledge". So there's no clear distinction here that "pink" -> therefore "pink elephant" is wrong because it doesn't enter the domain of "applicable knowledge". In other words, your epistemology essentially allows full knowledge claims in the realm of distinctive knowledge and emphasizes the incorrectness of indexical conflations, but yet the latter can occur in the former. Imagine I never imagined a "pink elephant" but, rather, I envisioned "pink", in isolation, and "an elephant" in isolation. If I then claimed "pink elephant", it would make just as little sense as envisioning a "pink elephant" and claiming "there's a pink elephant in my backyard". The a/s distinction, I think thus far, does the best job of constructing the most precise line that exposes indexical conflations holistically.

The hypothetical is a possible resolution to an induction. If there was no induction, there would be no hypothetical. The coin can land either heads or tails. We can hypothetically deduce that if it lands heads, X occurs, and if it lands tails, y occurs. But the hypothetical cannot exist without the induction as a source of alternative outcomes. A deduction leads to a necessary conclusion, not a hypothetical conclusion. Only inductions can lead to hypothetical conclusions. That's the whole point of the IF. If there was no uncertainty in the outcome, we would not need the IF. I don't think we're in disagreement here beyond semantics.

Unfortunately, I don't think we are merely semantically disagreeing on this either. I think you are conflating "uncertainty" with "induction". You can have deduced uncertainty. Therefore, a premise that is hypothetical is not necessarily, when stripped of its if conditional, an induction. It could be a deduction or an induction. If I say Premise 1 = IF X, I am not thereby implying necessarily that X is an induction. I could have deductively ascertained that I simply don't know if X is true, therefore I need an IF conditional to ensure that Premise 1 validates the form of the deduction.

To correct this, I am saying inductions are necessary premises to create a hypothetical deduction. The IF implies uncertainty. If you remove the IF, it is no longer a hypothetical, it is not a deduction.

I would refurbish this to "uncertainty is necessary to create a hypothetical deduction".

Hypothetical: IF the penny lands on heads (Implicit uncertainty of the initial premise happening)
Non-hypothetical: The penny lands on heads (A solid and certain premise)

Again, I agree with this analogy, yet it doesn't prove that the hypothetical is an induction when the if conditional is removed: I might deductively not know whether or not the penny will land heads.

Can an induction ever resolve then? If I say, "I believe the next penny flip will land on heads" will I ever find out if I was correct in my guess? All I'm noting is how we figure out the outcome of the guess. That must be done applicably.

Yes, so with further contemplation, you can resolve an induction, but is resolved deduction -> induction (or induction <- deduction), not induction -> deduction. Again, this is implying to me the indexical conflation consideration: it seems to me you are implying, rightly so, that "a guess" entails uncertainty which entails that some sort of empirical observation (analysis) is required. I am simply noting that this is true of both "applicable" and "distinctive" knowledge. "a guess about A", G, implies that G is not contained in the concept of A, which was analytically ascertained and thereafter a new concept of "G != A" was synthetically created. Therefore, claims about A that are contained in A cannot be extended graciously to G: further empirical observation is required. This process can and does occur abstractly.

I'm simply noting the accuracy of the induction. I think you're taking two steps here, noting the accuracy of the induction, and then deciding to dispense or retain it. For example, I could deduce the penny lands on tails, but still insist it landed on heads by inventing some other induction like "an evil demon changed it", or simply not caring and insisting it landed on heads regardless of what I deduced. The second step of deciding to stick with or reject the induction is a step too far from what I'm saying. All I'm noting is the deduced outcome after the induction's prediction comes to pass.

Fair enough.

I have already concluded that you cannot make any knowledge claim about the future. You can only make inductions about the future. The smartest way to make inductions is to use the most cogent inductions we already know of. So we would make our decisions based on the hierarchy of the inductions we have at our disposal. Just because we can speculate that the rules of reality may change in the future, doesn't mean its possible they will. Since we know what is possible and probable, it is possible and probable they will continue to happen in the future.

Then I think you may be agreeing with me that we do not know that a possibility is more cogent than a speculation in the relation to the future, we only know that it is true of the past. The grounds of the induction hierarchy in relation to the future (which is the whole purpose of it is for the future) is an induction.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Firstly, I think your deduction is incorrect: you cannot deduce that 9 out of 10 are wrong. — Bob Ross


That's why I wrote "at least".
...
We are not talking about absolute certainty or even only 1 σ certainty. In the example we have at least 90% uncertainty (in reality much higher).

I apologize: I did not see that you wrote "at least", which is indeed an important distinction. However, I still think your deduction is incorrect. At least 9 out of 10 does not equate to 90% uncertainty: this would only be the case iff 10 is holistically the denominator that accurately represented the entire set of possibilities on the given subject; however your analogy is not postulating those 10 experts as proposing the only 10 possibilities in relation to the given subject. In other words, deducing that at least 9 out of 10 experts are incorrect, does not mean that any given expert is 90% certain they are incorrect: there is not a 90% chance they are incorrect.

To really hone in on this, let's take a trivial example of probability. There's three cards: two kings and an ace. As you are well aware, if they are randomly shuffled, then the odds of picking a king is 66%. To choose to guess that the card will be an ace is to deductively know that there's a 66% chance one is wrong. Most importantly, I think you are trying to use this in your example but this is not analogous to what you proposed (in analogy). This is because the sole reason that choosing to guess ace has a 66% chance of being wrong is because we deductively know that the only possibilities are those 3 cards., whereas in your example the 10 hypotheses are not the only possibilities.

That means no evidence, no argument could convince another. Being able to maintain the illusion of knowledge under those circumstances requires a lot of arrogance (or a lot of stupidity).

Again, this is not an accurate representation of knowledge holistically. It would, indeed, be either arrogant or ignorant (I would not say necessarily stupid) for any given expert in your analogy to claim that there is a consensus among them all; however, it would not be necessarily arrogant or ignorant if one were to claim they know X about subject S even though the other nine have proposed hypotheses that contradict it. There is not a 90% chance they are wrong. Furthermore, to be specific, I think that it is only possible to determine a quantitative likelihood (probability) of that which has a deductively ascertained denominator and numerator. In your example, we only have a deduced numerator, not a denominator: therefore the probability is indeterminate because the denominator is inductively ascertained.

I addressed both:

So each single one has to doubt her hypothesis and can't be sure to know and as a group they have to admit they can't contribute to the body of knowledge. — ArmChairPhilosopher


"God" is purposely an incredibly vague, ambiguous term.

I did not interpret it that way, but I apologize. If you are referring to individual vs societal in the aforementioned quote, then I think, although you are making such a distinction, you are misusing them. When you state "each single one has to doubt her hypothesis", I think you are suggesting (and correct me if I am wrong) that the absence of a consensus entails that they should doubt their hypotheses (as opposed to not doubting them if there was a consensus): it shouldn't matter how many people agree, if you didn't deduce it then you don't know it. A million people could collectively agree claim X about subject S and they are all incorrect. Quantity of agreement doesn't suggest that it is correct, it is the evaluation of the actual claim that determines whether it is knowledge or not in relation to an epistemology.

Likewise, when you state "as a group they have to admit they can't contribute to the body of knowledge", I am interpreting that as "knowledge" equates to societal knowledge: am I misunderstanding you? Just because 9 out of 10 must be wrong (at least) does not mean that a given expert cannot or should not claim to "know" their claim: what determines that is whether it was deduced or induced (abduced). If all 10 hypotheses are inductions, then none of them know. If they all, by their nature, necessitate that the others are wrong if one is correct, then if one of them is deduced then the other 9 are induced. If two or more are deduced (validly), then that would mean that they aren't contradictory after all (but in terms of your hypothetical, this has no bearing).

Moreover, it is possible that two are deduced but don't necessarily need to be agreed upon societally. For example, if one of the experts postulates that semantically "1" should refer to what we would consider (in terms of underlying meaning) 2 and another expert postulates that semantically "1" should refer to what we consider 3, then they can both know within their own individual contexts. It isn't that either one knows or the other, it's that they must understand that they haven't thereby gained any communal knowledge (inter-subjective agreement). Thusly, just because two hypotheses contradict each other societally does not entail that neither can know anything, which is what you seem to be claiming.

As long as you have "an incredibly vague, ambiguous term", you don't know - you can't know - whether a concrete example falls under the category.

Firstly, I was referring to generic "theism" and why it isn't a suitable candidate for your claim in terms of in-group consensus. I would agree that there are many denominations and such, but they do agree on basic tenants which constitute them under that specific religion in the first place (so there is a consensus to a necessary degree amongst a given label and the more specific the label the less ambiguous the claim is). Even if, hypothetically, every theist had a completely contradictory view of "god" in relation to each other, this would not mean that no one knows anything. This is because of what I stated previously in this post: I can deduce something which holds individually which is contradicted by someone's else equivalent in their individual context: we both have knowledge, yet it contradicts. This is because it contradicts societally (which is a different context, which I am not claiming to know). At best, I would say, completely unique contradictory views of "god" would prove that we have no societal knowledge of "god", in the sense that we have no consensus. This is not "knowledge": it is one of two general subcategories of knowledge.

Knowledge is contextual. We may not know X inter-subjectively, but do know it subjectively.

Imagine the following scenario: on a conference 10 experts propose 10 different, contradicting hypothesis. Neither of the speakers can convince her colleagues. I can deduce that at least 9 out of those ten have to be wrong (don't know what they are talking about). The same goes for the experts. When they are honest, they have to admit that their hypothesis has a 90% chance of being among the wrong ones. So each single one has to doubt her hypothesis and can't be sure to know and as a group they have to admit they can't contribute to the body of knowledge. Even if one of the hypothesis turns out to be true, neither can be justified in believing that it's hers.

Firstly, I think your deduction is incorrect: you cannot deduce that 9 out of 10 are wrong. You could hypothetically stipulate that for all intents and purposes, but it is not deduced via the fact that all 10 are proposing contradictory hypothesis: they could all be wrong. As your analogy is explicated in the above quote, there is therefore not a 90% chance that any given expert is wrong (nor a 10% chance they are right): as the analogy was given, there's an indeterminate probability (quantitative likelihood) of any given expert being right or wrong.

Secondly, regardless of whether we assume 9 out of 10 are wrong or that it is indeterminate as explicated thus far, they should always be doubting their hypothesis (their inductions) as, by definition, the premises do not necessitate the conclusion. In terms of anything they deduced, they would know it, but they still should doubt those as well. By "doubt" I don't mean incessantly deny ever knowing anything but, rather, that anything deduced is categorized as "knowledge" with the careful consideration that they have not obtained 100% certainty. There's never a point at which someone should think that they have 100% definitively obtained knowledge of anything possibly imaginable.

Thirdly, your analogy is conflating a subject's knowledge with societal knowledge: I think these are two very different contexts. I can know something of which you only believe (and vice-versa), because I may be able to deduce it while you induce it. Society is simply a collection of individuals and, thusly, societal knowledge requires consensus: maybe that is what you were referring to by "knowledge"? I don't think "knowledge" or "truth" or what have you is a real, objective, body in the universe. Societal knowledge is inter-subjectively agreed upon deductions. "objectivity" is, in terms of societal knowledge, an inter-subjectively agreed upon classification of a concept as an "object", and, in terms of individual's knowledge, that which is deduced by the subject (without any regard for what other may think). These are both knowledge.

Fourthly and finally, let's assume, as a hypothetical (which isn't deduced, but simply stipulated as a presumption), that only 1 out of the 10 is right (guaranteed)(9 out of 10 are wrong in other words). Then, at best, they must agree that they have no consensus (which I think that's what you are referring to by "good faith"), which entails that there is no societally agreed upon knowledge of the subject S. However, this is also stipulating that S is actually narrow enough of a context to warrant the agreement that there's no consensus. In terms of religion, all theists do not have to agree for there to be a consensus about "god" in relation to a specific definition of such. "God" is purposely an incredibly vague, ambiguous term. So this analogy, at best, would apply to a specific subbranch of theism (e.g. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, etc), wherein none of the experts (1) agree and (2) they have contradictory claims. #1 and #2 are not necessarily the case in terms of disagreement. Either that or I think your analogy only is valid if one were to compare it to general "theistic" concepts of god, which do have a consensus.

Even if you are right, it is irrelevant to the topic at hand. We don't deal with the last man on earth, we deal with a myriad of god claims and the possibility of the claimants to communicate

What I am disputing is that a necessary tenant of "knowledge" is "transferability". If I am correct, holistically in what I said (not just merely the last man on earth analogy), then the disputes pertaining to a claim within an in-group only suggests there is not a proper consensus, but never that an individual in that in-group cannot "know" the claim they are specifically making. The last man analogy was meant to explicate the issue of "knowledge" having a necessary "transferability" characteristic, which does pertain directly to "possibility of claimants to communicate".

What I am trying to convey is that the non-consensus amongst an in-group simply entails that they haven't been able to get each other to agree, not that one doesn't know something: they are two very distinct things in my mind. Likewise, "in-group" would need to be further defined, because everything is contextually an "in-group" to some other "out-group", and I don't think a generic "theism" would suffice as a valid "in-group" to your critique (it is incredibly ambiguous to be placed in "theism" just as it is to be a member of "atheism").

And, as I explained in my answer to @Nickolasgaspar, none can, in good faith, be justified in his belief of knowledge.

I do not know what post you are referring to, but if you would like to invoke whatever argument you made with someone else, then please feel free to share that argument with me. Likewise, I have no frame of reference to what you mean by "none can, in good faith, be justified in his belief of knowledge". A subject can derive an epistemology and, in good faith, be justified in it. Also, deriving an epistemology is not necessarily grounded in a belief (mine is certainly not).

You are confusing transferable (potential) with transferred (actual). True knowledge could be potentially transferred from the last human to the next sapient recipient (alien or evolved rat) in writing.

Even if there is not potential for transference, I would still argue an individual could know things. It depends on what you mean by "potential" though, because I would characterize the possibility of transmittance as requiring a receptor (whether actual or potential); If (1) there are no receptors and (2) there is no possibility of any receptor every actualizing, then technically (I would argue) there would be no consensus yet there could be knowledge. Even if it were literally impossible for anyone to comprehend my knowledge, i would still know it. This is because, I would argue, knowledge is that which is deductively ascertained (as opposed to abductively or inductively ascertained) and, therefore, can be acquired individually (although the dialectic is nevertheless important).

"If you can't show it, you don't know it." as AronRa would say.

It depends entirely on what you mean by "show" whether I would agree with you or not. Something can be "shown" relative to the subject without ever having the possibility of being demonstrated to another being (e.g. contemplation whilst stuck in a coma). I could demonstrate, strictly to myself, that I have deductively ascertained something and, consequently, know it without necessarily having the capability to escape my own thoughts to write it down or speak it out loud. It could never have the possibility of even being transmitted and/or it could not have the possibility to be received (yet could be transmitted) and yet I would argue I can still "know" things. I don't base what I know on consensus.

Suppose you wake up and you remember dreaming about raiding the fridge. Then you are not sure if that was real. Then you are convinced it was real. Do you "know" you raided the fridge or do you have an illusion of knowledge? To be sure, you have to show it (if only to yourself).

My only point, as of now, here is that you could "show it" to yourself (as you noted) and never have the ability to demonstrate it to anyone else (which would entail it is not transferable nor transferred). Likewise, you could transmit it (broadcast it, so to speak) legitimately yet no one ever did nor had the possibility to receive it. Likewise, you could transmit it, somebody can receive it (possibly, potentially, or/and actually), yet it was never possible that that somebody could accept the contents of your transmittance as true (which is a completely separate consideration). What is most correct doesn't necessarily have to align with consensus, but, nevertheless, it tends to. Furthermore, on a different note, even after "showing it" to yourself that it either did or did not happen, you may still not know it: did you deduce that you did raided the fridge, or did you induce it? Without further context, I have no way of providing further elaboration.

Another example: you have studied for a maths test. You think you know the formulas and how to use them. Do you "know" or do you have an illusion of knowledge. You will be sure after the test.

You may or may not be sure after the test, if by "sure" you mean "know". Did you deduce that you did, in fact, comprehend the formulas appropriately or are you inducing such? It is entirely possible to induce a conclusion to another induction and mistake it for knowledge.

The principle works reasonably well in science.

Sure, the scientific method works well. However, to clarify, that is not the only means of achieving knowledge: I do not subscribe to scientism.

That is right. I think it is fair to ask the believers to come to a common definition among their "in-group" before they address the "out-group".

Fair enough; however, my contention would be that consensus does not equate to knowledge.

And sorry, also to Nickolasgaspar, for mixing your posts in my recent answer.

No worries my friend! It did trip me up at first a bit, not going to lie, but no worries.

Someone once defined knowledge as "justified, true, belief". Not the best definition but it will do for the argument.

Personally, I don't hold the contemporary epistemic views. As you kind of alluded to, it is an incredibly ambiguous definition and, subsequently is full of paradoxes. For the sake of conversation, I will likewise address your points in terms of that view.

The other important thing is that knowledge is transferable. You can argue about a fact and you can convince an open minded interlocutor as is done in science all the time.
Theology had thousands of years to come to a consensus. The fact that it didn't shows that what you think is knowledge isn't justified.

I think the problem I would have here (even in the sense of using the contemporary epistemic views) is that knowledge doesn't have to be transferable. In terms of the contemporary view of knowledge, I don't think there's anything defined in it (traditionally) that necessitates that "justification" requires a tenant of "being transferable" (correct me if I am wrong though).

But I would presume that when you state "knowledge is transferable", it is implying (1) that you are arguing for that as an amended tenant of "justification" and (2) that it is transferable to quantitatively equivocal recipients in relation to the sender. For, I would presume that it would be a straw man to your argument that obviously knowledge cannot be transferable from, hypothetically, the sole human in existence to a rock: if one human remained on the planet, then that person wouldn't know anything (if we are taking "knowledge needs to be transferable to be justified" literally). At a deeper level, since I am presuming that is not what you mean, I still am not quite seeing yet why knowledge would need to be transferable, even amongst equivocal recipients: even if the last two humans on the planet disagreed on some subject S, one could possibly be right and other wrong even in the situation where they could be proven to have the same IQ (for example). Moreover, it is possible that one human obtains a legitimate proof of S but, due the major disparity between themselves and every other human being on the planet, no one agrees with them. Would they not "know" it then?

Likewise, "transferability" only necessitates that a message can be transmitted from a sender to a recipient, which has no bearing on (1) whether the recipient accepts the received message as true nor (2) that it be transmittable to multiple recipients. What I am gathering you to mean (if I am understanding you correctly) is more that it be transferable to the point of majority consensus within a given in-group, which I don't think is the same thing as "knowledge being transferable".

It is mostly a concession towards the theists. They might complain that atheists have a straw man vision of god. I don't require that theists convince atheists to acknowledge that they might have knowledge about god, just that they come up with a consensus among themselves. I think that is a fair criterion to falsify my position.

I think I was misunderstanding you: I was thinking "atheist views" in terms of epistemic positions traditionally voiced in terms of atheism, but you seem to be referring simply to the fact that you do not require a consensus amongst in-group and out-group, just in-group. Is that right?

Correct, it seems we are on one page now.

I am glad I am understanding you correctly (:

It wouldn't directly disprove Agnosticism but it would deprive me of my best Argument. The obvious existence of a myriad of contradicting descriptions of a god is evidence and proof that the believers don't know what they are talking about.

I am not sure how contradicting descriptions of god proves that, on an individual level, that one doesn't know what god is. At best, I would imagine that ample contradicting views would prove that society hasn't come to a consensus, but I don't see how that has any relation to whether or not someone can accurately describe god. As of now, although I'm sure your argument goes deeper than your brief explanation, I think it is totally possible that someone can describe accurately what "god" is and yet societally no one agrees. Just like how someone could have an elaborate grasp of Einstein's general relativity whilst the vast majority (1) have contradictory views to the real theory and (2) can't agree with one another.

(I discard atheistic views because they are biased.)

I am not sure I am understanding you correctly here. What do you mean by "atheistic views"? Do you discard all of them? Why? I understand that every position possibly conceivable has bad arguments, but they tend to also (generally speaking) have much stronger ones (with at least some merit worth contending with).

Hello @Philosophim,

In light of your post and upon further reflection, I think that your "applicable" vs "distinctive" knowledge distinction is becoming ever so clear to me. In fact, I am now fairly confident we are essentially conveying the exact same thing in terms of underlying meaning, but we are semantically disagreeing. Or I am misunderstanding you yet again and we aren't on the same page: only time will tell (:

While I think we use applicable knowledge to resolve inductions, the act of resolving inductions in a deductive manner is not applicable knowledge itself. Applicable knowledge is when we attempt to match an experience to the distinctive knowledge we have created, and deductively resolve whether there is, or is not a match.

I believe, alas, I understand your distinction, which is simply that which is created vs that which is matched. I have no problem with that distinction (in terms of the underlying meaning). I have a similar view for myself, albeit not in the form of that terminology. However, which this is reverting back to one of my original contentions in our discussion, I find the terminology you use confusing (in light of what it is meant to structurally convey).

"Distinctive knowledge" is misleading (in my opinion) because all of knowledge is "distinctive" in the sense of what the term actually means (but I understand you are implying more than that with it as you define). Likewise, "applicable knowledge" is misleading (I would say) because all of knowledge is "applied". Therefore, I find (as of now) the distinction to be most accurately represented as synthetic (~projected) vs analytic (~discovered) knowledge, whereof synthetic knowledge is a child of analytic knowledge (not to be confused as a sibling). synthetic generally means (philosophically) "a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept but related", which clearly describes (in my opinion) the extension of one's own "creations" (projections) onto the "world", so to speak. For example, the concept of a rock (or just a rock, so to speak) on the floor doesn't have any inherent properties that necessitate it be called a "rock": I synthetically projected that property onto it. Likewise, analytic expresses the contrary: "a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept"; I think that clearly describes something which cannot be a mere projection (or extension of a concept).

No, distinctive knowledge is when I create an identity when I flip the coin. There are no limitations as to what I can create. I can call it one side "feet" and the other side "hands", with their own essential and non-essential properties.

I am presuming you meant "no limitations" loosely, which I would agree with. But, to clarify, there are limitations. In terms of my example, I think you are right if I am understanding your terminology correctly now: since it has no bearing on the induction and it is analytical, it is applicable knowledge.

This is the induction I'm talking about. When you believe that what you've seen matches distinctive knowledge, this is an induction, not a deduction. The act of checking, understands that you don't know the answer until after you've checked.

I would agree, but clarify the implications of this postulation: this directly entails that a lot of topics traditionally viewed as "controlled" by the mind can also be applicable knowledge (analytical knowledge)(e.g. imagination, thoughts, etc). I'm not sure if you would agree with me on that. For example, thoughts are analyzed (~discovered), not synthesized (~projected). However, those thoughts can analytically discover, so to speak, the fact that each inferred "current" thought seems to be "projecting something which is synthetic in relation to a given concept". In other words, and this goes back to my subtle disclaimer that "synthetic knowledge" is a child of "analytic knowledge", we analytically discover that we synthetically project.

Moreover, going back to our discussion of whether "distinctive knowledge" can be induced, this also implies that the deduced validity of a subset of memories (in relation to another subset) is applicable knowledge (discovered: analytic), as opposed to being distinctive knowledge (projected: synthetic): which would be where, if I am currently understanding your view, we went sideways (our argument was presupposing the analysis of memories as "distinctive", which is incorrect). I have a feeling this is not what you are intending, but I nevertheless think it is the necessary implications of what you are distinguishing. For example, my assertion that memory A is valid in relation to the set of memories S would have to be analytical (because I am discovering the "truth" of the matter), whereas labeling it as "memory" + "A" and "memories" + "S" would be synthetic.

But I realize I am stretching what it means to be an induction here. The idea of deductively matching to the identities you distinctively know, vs creating identities you distinctively know, was the original way I described applicable knowledge.

I think that if you are reverting back to that definition (and I understand it correctly), then you are not stretching the definition of inductions, since it has no bearing on the distinction anymore.

I also still claim that one can only resolve an induction applicably

If I am understanding you correctly (as I have elaborated your distinction hitherto), then I actually agree. Because "distinctive" is no longer meaning what I thought it meant. On a separate note, I still do not think we can ever validate the entire set of memories S: we can only validate a subset in comparison to another subset. But I'm not sure how relevant that is anymore.

An induction can be resolved with another induction, or a deduction. If one "resolves" an induction with another induction, its not really resolved. In the case of an induction's resolution being another induction, we have taken a belief, and believed a particular answer resulted. In the case where we applicably resolve an induction, we have removed uncertainty. Of course, this has never meant that knowledge could not change at a later time as new distinctive knowledge is learned, or we obtain new experiences and deductions that invalidate what we knew at one time. But the future invalidation of a deduction does not invalidate that at the time it was made it was a deduction, and what a person could applicably know in that situation with what they had.

If I am understanding your distinction correctly, then I agree here except that applicable knowledge is not relatable to an induction directly. So when you state " In the case where we applicably resolve an induction, we have removed uncertainty", it seems a bit like you may be implicating inductions + uncertainty + applicable knowledge again, which I think is incorrect.

This example was only to demonstrate the importance of looking at the chain of thinking, and how it is important to realize that deductions in isolation do not necessarily tell the full story of what a person knows.

I would now attribute this to a synthetic vs analytic distinction: your example demonstrates the conflation many people have with claims that are contained in the given concept, and those that extend beyond it.

This again is more of an example to demonstrate the importance of resolving a situation that is "unknown". While originally I proposed the resolution of the induction was applicable knowledge, I feel confident at this point to go back to my original meaning, which was that one could solve this uncertainty applicably, or distinctively. The point here is to emphasize once again that resolving inductions with deduced resolutions is an important societal need and should be considered in any theory of knowledge.

I would agree in the sense that "deduced resolutions" are induction ~> deduction, which I think you are agreeing with me on that. It is indeed vital to have a means of "resolving" inductions in any given epistemology, however I would personally describe it as "having a means of dispensing of inductions for knowledge" to really hone in on my position thereon.

As I've noted so far, I believe the decision to create an identity, vs match to an identity one has already created is a meaningful distinction that is important when trying to resolve knowledge questions. We can go into this deeper next discussion if needed.

Assuming I have finally grasped what you were trying to convey, I agree!

I did not mean to imply that science marks as "true" whatever is not disproven. It simply notes such alternatives are not yet disproven. I don't want to get into the philosophy of science here (We have enough to cover!), as long as there is an understanding science takes steps to disprove a hypothesis, that is the point I wanted to get across.

Fair enough.

A hypothetical deduction is when we take an induction, and take the logical deductive conclusion if it resolves a particular way.

I don't think this is true. A hypothetical deduction is a deduction wherein each premise is hypothetically granted as true: it is a valid deduction due to it conforming to the necessary form of a deduction. It is not constructed of inductions where we presume they resolve one way or another (it could be that, if we were to disband it from its hypothetical roots, it has deductive premises as well). I think this is where it is vital to distinguish "resolution" in terms of induction -> deduction vs induction ~> deduction again: the former implies inductions are valid premises of a hypothetical deduction (which is wrong), whereas the latter implies we can dispense of that induction. I think it may be even more clear when "induction ~> deduction" is postulated as "induction <- deduction", as that is really what I think it is. In pseudo formal logic:

D = deduction
I = induction

¬(I →D) ∧ ¬(I →¬D)
D →(I ∨ ¬I)

I was a bit confusing previously, because there is truly no ~> relation between inductions and deductions, it is really a relation of the deduction to the induction.

This deduction is not a resolution to the induction, this is a deductive conclusion if the induction resolves a particular way.

I'm not certain I agree with this. The induction does not resolve a particular way: the deduction resolves the induction insofar as we can reinterpret the induction via our apperception. The induction does not resolve into a deduction (which I think you are agreeing with me), but, rather, a deduction can resolve an induction by either dispensing of it (as now it is known that the induction happened to be accurate or it wasn't) or retaining it as not directly pertinent to what is newly known.

But, does your distinctive context escape the epistemology proposed here? I would argue no. You still need a set of definitions. You can create a distinctive logic using the definitions you've come up with. The question then becomes whether you can applicably know it in your experience. If you can, then you have a viable distinctive and applicable set of knowledge that works for you. I of course can do the same with mine. If I expand the definition of the I to also include "will", then I can prove that I can will my arm to move, and it does. And in such a way, my definition of "I", and having control over particular things is applicably known as well. I personally find the idea that I control things useful to my outlook in life. You personally do not. For our purposes here, I'm not sure this difference between us is all that important to the main theory.

I don't think our free will differences matter anymore either, assuming I understand your distinction correctly. "control" is irrelevant to synthetic vs analytic knowledge.

The hierarchy of induction is distinctively known based on the logic proposed earlier. I have always stated that despite our conclusions of what is more cogent, they are always still inductions. Meaning that choosing a cogent induction does not mean the outcome of that induction will be correct.

First I want emphasize that you did a more than adequate job of proving the induction hierarchy in terms of first order. However, I wasn't referring to the first order derivation of it (I have no problem with your example of empirically verifying that probability based propositions tend to pan out more than possibilities): I was referring to the second order (a deeper consideration). To really explicate this, less assume we have empirically obtained (via your extensive test) that each scenario resolves to accurately prove that each respective induction type was always in the postulated relation of probability > possibility > speculation > irrational. We thereby have a satisfying first order proof that this hierarchical structure works (I would, on a side note, argue that such a test is not required to prove it, but that's irrelevant right now). However, now we must deal with a second order proof pertaining to why we ought to believe that because they related in a particular way in the past that it will hold in the future (aka hume's problem of induction). If, for example, given the probability of drawing a king out of three cards which contains two kings and a non-king is 2/3, I were to obtain via trials that over time the continual simulation of drawing a king out of such approaches 66%, then I have a first order proof. However, I don't have any reason thereby to claim that my knowledge of 66% = 2/3 (trials matched abstract) in the past holds true in the future. This is the area that I don't think we have addressed (and, if I'm remembering correctly, your essays briefly gloss over). In other words: do we know the hierarchy of inductions is true (in terms of the cogency relation) or is that in itself also an induction (again, in terms of second order analysis)?

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I'm not sure but you seem to confuse the distinction of "inner state" versus "position" and "hard" and "soft". They are orthogonal. The former tells whether you are making a statement about yourself or the world, the later is talking about how something is (actuality) versus how something could (not) be (potential).

What you described isn't quite what I was thinking by "inner state" versus "position". If the former is "talking about how something is" and the latter is "how something could (not) be (potential)", then I don't see how this relates holistically to an inner state. Claiming "I can prove X could be Y or Z" is not equivocal to "I just think X could be Y or Z". The latter is almost, but not actually, noncognitive insofar as it is assumed that there's nothing to negate nor affirm (it is just what I think), whereas the former is something which still asserts potentiality (could/ could not be) but is actually open to criticism (more cognitive in a sense). I was thinking "inner state" would refer not just to a noncognitive claim, e.g. an emotion, but any claims that only indexically refer to the individual at hand. In other words, I was envisioning both my X examples as inner states, but it seems as though you may mean it in a more in the sense of the second example, is that right?

The stronger position would of course be the "hard" variant (we don't know and we will never know).
I can't defend that position. In fact, I see my position being falsified one day. When the last-but-one theist dies or de-converts there is only one (valid) definition of god left and soft Agnosticism would be wrong.

I agree that the stronger position is that of a "hard" variant, but, as far as I am understanding so far, that would include some that refer to "could be" (as previously shown). On a separate note, I am not entirely sure how unified definition would disprove Agnosticism, but I am interested to hear why you think that is the case.

Exactly. (And for the agnostic there is no way to claim that s/he and only s/he is unable to gain that knowledge without special pleading. So there are no "hard" agnostics.)

I think I am slowly starting to understand what you mean (and the meaningful distinction therein). I am not sure though how it would be special pleading for an "agnostic" to claim they cannot know God exists, while still refraining from postulating that is true of all other humans. Maybe another person's intellectual capacity greatly surpasses there own? Maybe someone has access to information that they will never obtain. These are all worthy considerations (albeit hypotheticals) that, I would say, at least at face value, would not be special pleading.

I realized that Agnosticism is a stronger position (really, a position instead of just an inner state) than mere atheism.

Without a doubt, claiming to know (or even believe) that (1) no one can know, (2) no one currently knows, or (3) "I" cannot know whether God exists is a position that produces a burden of prove (and, in that respect, is stronger for sure), but I am not really sure how this isn't a distinction of "hard agnostic atheist" vs "soft agnostic atheist", or something along those lines. Admittedly, I am starting to see how the two-dimensional labeling system needs a bit of refurbishment to more concisely and accurately represent such views as yourself (or maybe potentially a new labeling system may be required), but "soft" vs "hard" would accomplish such a distinction: wouldn't it? Or am I missing something? I think the only hiccup would potentially be your agnostic "inner state" distinction, but wouldn't that just be a "soft agnostic atheist" (or something like that)?

Also, on a separate note, I am still not sure why your terminology is "colloquial" vs "philosophical" agnosticism: although this is merely semantics, why is that?

(It also makes me lonely. Neither atheists nor theists know how to handle my arguments so they just ignore me.)

Well that is disheartening indeed. I think I still need to really hone in on what you mean in relation to your terminology, but thereafter I would love to hear what those arguments are if you would like to share them.

I agree. And I said so in the OP. I was primarily focused on the distinction of inner state versus position.

That is fair. I was under the impression that Agnosticism and agnosticism were supposed to serve the purpose of being a terminology system (what you outlined I thought as the most prevalent distinction) wherein one is either accurately depicted as Agnostic or agnostic. My contention, I suppose, is that, although you do mention that there are many other definitions (as there always are), the terminology is incomplete. But if you are simply focusing on two distinctions among many, whereby conceding that the terminology does not represent a complete labeling system, then I simply misunderstood (I apologize if that's the case).

Agree again. The former is often referred to as "soft" and the later as "hard" Agnosticism. But both are only ever possible options for the Agnostic, not the agnostic.

Before I comment, let me ask for some clarification: is your Agnostic vs agnostic distinction about whom the claim is indexically referring to? As in, when you say "god is not known" is "soft Agnosticism", do you mean "[no person knows god exists"? Whereas "god is not known" in an "agnostic" position would really mean "[I do not know god exists, but I do not know if any other person does or does not know god exists"?

I also did before changing to / relabelling myself as Agnostic.
(And I also remain an atheist - by definition, not by choice.)

very interesting, what made you decide to change?

I don't think that your terminology quite accurately depicts all the positions available with respect to the topic at hand. Firstly, I think that "Colloquial Agnosticism" can, in terms of its definition you proposed, be applied to many philosophical positions. So I would like to semantically note that holding the position "I do not know" is not merely restricted to colloquial speech.

Secondly, "Philosophical Agnosticism" seems to lump two drastically different claims into one, which I would argue thereby warrants two separate terms (at the very least): "god is not known" is not equivocal to "god can't be known". The former asserts a humbler position that we (or potentially "I") have not obtained knowledge of God existing nor not existing, whereas the latter asserts the impossibility of ever acquiring knowledge of God's existence: these are two very different claims. Consequently, "I don't know what god is- and neither to you" could be merely asserting the former or the actually asserting the latter, which would be vital to distinguish in a conversation (i.e. "I don't know what god is - and neither do you and neither will us both ever know").

Thirdly, I think your two terms are a false dilemma: either I accept that I am merely claiming "I do not know God exists", or I am obliged to accept "We do not know nor can we know God exists or his nature". But I could very well claim many other permutations of these positions, here's just a few:

1. We do not know God exists (implies we don't know his nature).
2. We do know God exists/doesn't exist, but do not know his nature
3. I do know God exists/doesn't exist, but do not know his nature
4. I do not know God exists (implies I don't know his nature).
5. I do not know God exists, but I believe a God exists.
6. I do know God exists, don't know its nature, but believe certain characteristics to be of its nature.
7. etc...

Fourthly, an agnostic only has a burden of proof IFF they are asserting they know that we or they can't know, which the only other option to this assertion is to take a "inner state" approach in your terms, which I don't think is the only other option.

To summarize:

Do you agree with these definitions?

I don't. I think generically agnosticism is the suspension of asserting either way pertaining to a knowledge claim, regardless of whether they believe either way.

Are you an agnostic/Agnostic?

I would personally use a two-dimensional labeling system wherein one axis is knowledge (and lack thereof) and the other is belief (and lack thereof). In such a system, I would most accurately label myself an agnostic atheist. I do concede that it is highly controversial, but nevertheless that's the closest representation of my views I have found to date. As of now, I cannot confidently assert I know god doesn't exist, but I do not believe it does.

Hello Moses! First I would like to welcome you to the forum!

I agree with some of this post but I don't know where you're getting the "ascend into heaven for eternity" bit. The OT says next to nothing about the afterlife; is that NT stuff? In the OT when Korah challenges Moses God opens up the Earth and all of Korah and his family fall in and are destroyed. God often strikes down evil people in the OT and nothing would lead me to believe that they end up in heaven. He also sends plagues and poisonous snakes on the Israelite community because they start complaining ("grumbling") about conditions in the desert and thousands are recorded as dying

Firstly, I would like to clarify that I was not making an argument from my own opinion on the topic at hand, nor an argument that was geared towards asserting that it is true in relation to the Bible: I was providing some further context to the OP about what biblical literalists typically believe (with regards to the excerpt you quoted from me). My entire response wasn't meant to convey that my points therein were true of the bible (in terms of my own interpretation of such): only that they are true representations of many Christians, and specifically (in terms of what you quoted) what biblical literalists believe (typically). In other words, the intents and purposes of my post (in relation to literalism) was not to portray biblical literalists as correct, only that they do indeed exist (as the OP seems to have a disposition that completely lacks most Christian perspectives beyond quite a rudimentary interpretation of the bible).

Secondly, in terms of whether the Old Testament "says next to nothing about the afterlife", it depends on what you mean whether I would agree. It references that there is an afterlife (heaven) countless times. Just as a quick example, 2 Kings 2:11 (King James Version):

And it came to pass, as they still went on, and talked, that, behold, there appeared a chariot of fire, and horses of fire, and parted them both asunder; and Elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven.

As another example, Daniel 12:2-3 (King James Version):

And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt.

And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever.

Now, if what you meant was that the Old Testament doesn't give incredibly vivid descriptions, nor honestly detailed descriptions whatsoever, of what "everlasting life" truly is beyond being in the present of God for eternity, then I would agree with you on that. In the New Testament, it goes in somewhat deeper detail, but I would still say that (unless I am misremembering) the concept of heaven isn't vividly detailed in the bible in a literal sense (mainly metaphorical--but I guess that is up for debate).

Thirdly, it is a completely separate question from my original post whether or not we have reason to believe that anyone that God striked down in the Old Testament went to heaven. Again, I would like to emphasize that I wasn't attempting to address that issue in my post: in terms of biblical literalism, I haven't spoken with a biblical literalist that utilized examples in the Old Testament of people going to heaven after being struck down to support their argument. Likewise, the absence of any example of the Bible explicitly stating that some person went to heaven after God striked them down does not imply its impossibility. They typically, from my encounters with them, argue that it is possible, regardless of whether it has happened before. Likewise, quite a few examples of God killing people doesn't even bother to mention where they got sent to in the afterlife, so an analysis of this is typically done by inspecting God's attributes to infer its possibility/impossibility.

Which leads me to my fourth and final comment: the excerpt you quoted was in relation to moral justification (i.e. it is moral for God to strike someone down even if they would have gone to heave, so to speak), which was not meant as a proof that there exists a specific example of God actually striking someone down and sending them thereafter to heaven.

Bob

@Philosophim,

Wonderful post!

"Applicable knowledge is the conclusion of an induction". Add in "Deductive conclusion" because it is possible to believe the conclusion to an induction is another induction.

With respect to the first sentence, it depends on what you mean by "conclusion" whether I would agree. Again, by "conclusion" are implying there is an actual connection between an induction and a deduction, or is it simply that the latter followed the former, but was necessarily not a result of it? I think that we colloquially assert that in the event that deductive knowledge follows an induction pertaining to the same subject we have thereby concluded our induction was correct or incorrect, but I don't think that holds formatively. In other words, if you mean "induction" -> "deductive conclusion", then I disagree. However, if you mean "induction" ~> "deductive conclusion" -> "analysis of induction", then I agree. "->" is how I am signifying a strict entailment, whereas "~>" is a loose entailment (e.g. I induce A, A motivates me to investigate the subject B pertaining to A, I then ascertain knowledge K on subject B deductively, and then analyze A through my newly acquired K to determine how aligned it was with knowledge, however A does not directly entail K in any way beyond the loose entailment of motivation or incentive).

With regard to the second sentence, I think you are suggesting that Applicable Knowledge can be a conclusion that is an induction, which I would strongly disagree with (if I am understanding that sentence correctly). If "Applicable knowledge" is a "conclusion of an induction", and "conclusion" is purposely not restricted to "deductive conclusion", then I can substitute it in and get "applicable knowledge is (or can be) an inductive conclusion to an induction", which I think cannot be true since an induction is not knowledge. One can most definitely formulate a "conclusion" to an induction which is also an induction, but it would not be "applicable knowledge".

Yes, you could have. But that does not negate the situation in which there is an induction that you are actively trying to discover the end result.

I think I am starting to understand better what you are conveying. Essentially (and correct me if I am wrong) you are utilizing "applicable knowledge" as a distinction to emphasize that which is not in our control and, thusly, must be discovered as opposed to projected. Although I think there is a meaningful distinction between "discovery" and "projection", I think ultimately it is all discovery. I can recursively analyze my thoughts in the exact same manner, and so I don't think the distinction between "induction" ~> "deduction" has any bearing on what you trying to convey. If one claims knowledge pertaining to something that does not indexically (contextually) refer to the proof they provide, then therefrom a contradiction arises which invalidates such.

The induction in this case is the belief that what I am observing matches a previous identity I have created. Does this side of the penny match heads? That is "the question". The result, "Yes it does, "if deduced, is "the answer".

The "question" you posited here is not an induction. You are correct, however, that the induction in your example was "see a symbol that seems familiar", but that is not simply just a question. "Does this side of the penny match heads?" is a completely neutral assertion, because it isn't an assertion at all. I am not inducing that it does match or that it doesn't. So that "question" coupled with the "answer" would be, in this case, distinctive knowledge. But in your previously example (asserting it is familiar) would be applicable. That's why I can easily refurbish your example as distinctive and still obtain the same exact knowledge:

I can also flip a penny, look at the result and wonder if I've seen it before. I then try to match the symbol to what is considered "heads" in my mind, and I do so without contradiction. This is distinctive knowledge.

When you stated "seems familiar", I can see how that could potentially imply an assertion that it actually is familiar, which would imply that it has been seen before (which is an induction). But wondering is not an assertion either way in itself.

If I had believed that the penny would result in heads, then the answer is the resolution to the induction. Identifying an induction that has not yet resolved, versus an induction that has a resolution in our chain of thinking is incredibly important!

I 100% agree it is important to understand whether an induction has been resolved or not; however, I don't see how that is a comparison of an unsolved induction vs a resolution in our chain of thinking (it would simply be, in my head, identifying an unsolved vs solved inductions). "resolution" of an induction is simply utilizing our knowledge to ascertain how aligned it was with true knowledge, which is a spectrum (it isn't a binary decision of "I resolved that it was true or that it was false): my induction could have been correct to any degree, and incorrect to any degree. Likewise, it is a continual process, we simply take the knowledge we have and utilize it to determine how "correct" our induction was, but we can very well keep doing this as our knowledge increases. So, I'm not sure where the line would be drawn for when an induction truly is "resolved" vs when it is still "unresolved". I think colloquially we simply roughly discern the two as "inductions with very little knowledge grounding it" vs "inductions that have lots of knowledge grounding it". I think that it can seem like a binary situation when considering really trivial examples, such as flipping a coin. But when considering something really complicated like evolution, it is much harder to see how one would ever holistically know such: it is more that we have ample knowledge grounding it (such as evolutionary facts and many aspects of the theory), but there's never a point where we truly can deduce it holistically.

I could come up with an entirely fool proof deductive point about Gandolf in the Lord of the Rings. Isolated, no one would care. But if at the very beginning of my deduction I started with, "I believe Gandolf is a real person," that puts the entire "deduction" in a different light!

I'm not sure what you mean by "no one would care". Sure, people may not be interested in Gandolf from the movie, but, if you truly came up with a fool proof deductive argument, then that argument would be true of Gandolf in the movie (regardless of who is interested therein). And, yes, inducing that Gandolf is a real person does put it in a different light, which is simply that it no longer indexically refers to a movie. I'm not sure how this necessitates that this distinction ought to be made as "induction" ~> "deduction" vs "deduction". I know deductively the indexical properties of the given proposition, and thereby can ascertain whether my assertion actually does pertain to the subject at hand or whether I am misguided.

Knowledge is about a chain of thinking.

I would say only insofar as knowledge is strictly deductions. It is within the realm of inductions where I would say we are claiming chains of thinking matter (in terms of cogency), but inductions aren't knowledge (as you are well aware).

When people make a bet on what horse will win the race, there is active incentive to find out what the actual result of the race is

Incentives do not entail knowledge in themselves. If I state that my horse won the race (simply what you would call distinctively), then obviously I do not know this in relation to the "actual" race, because there's a contradiction here: all I know is that, at best, I am convinced my horse won the race (or I am imagining a race within my mind which is not the "actual" race), not that it actually did win because there is an indexical consideration, of which I am therefrom accidentally committing a conflation.

People also don't want to hear, "Oh, Buttercup lost? Well I'm going to redefine my bet that when I bet on Princess, I really bet on Buttercup"

Although I see the meaningful distinction here, I don't think this has any direct correlation to your "distinctive" vs "applicable" knowledge distinction. Firstly, someone could actually have meant to bet on Buttercup but instead associated the wrong horse with the name on accident. Secondly, they could be simply trying to change because their bet was wrong. It isn't that we want definitive "deduced answers", it is that we want definitive answers (which can be inductions). In most places, even if everyone knows that I have pure intentions and truly meant to bet on the winning horse but mistakenly bet on a different one, they take my induction definitively with pre-agreed upon definitions. No one cares if I deductively ascertained it or inductively ascertained it, they just care what I said and not what I meant.

Contextual, yes. Specifically distinctive and applicably contextual. We could view it as distinctive and applicably indexical if you wish. Although I may need to refine the meaning of those terms within contexts now that I've tweaked the meaning of applicable.

Contextual is fine, no need to redefine it as "indexical", I understand. The problem is that there aren't only two contexts (as you are trying to posit). What exists in my thoughts may not exist in my imagination, and it may not exist in "reality" either. Likewise, what may exist in "reality" here may not exist there, likewise what exists in "imagination" here may not exist there, and ditto for thoughts. Just because I can rightfully claim knowledge of X in "reality" here doesn't mean it is not a contradiction to thereafter claim X there. This critique, a very important critique you are making at that, is subjected to a potential infinite of contexts. I am failing to see how hyperfocusing on one contextual distinction (distinctive and applicable) amongst a potential infinite of contextual differences is meaningful. I am starting to see that it really boils down to control for you (I think): distinctive is what is in our control vs applicable is what is not (i.e. discovery vs projection), but, as we will see in a bit, I find this to be an incredibly difficult line to draw.

It is when I make a belief that X matches Y definition in my head that I am making an induction, and need to go through the steps to deduce that this is true

I hate to reiterate, but I could very well simply omit the belief and see if X matches Y, thereby obtaining distinctive knowledge.

At the point the coin is flipped, the induction happens when I attempt to match the result to my distinctive knowledge.

Not necessarily. An induction only happens in this scenario if you propose a belief towards if it matches. If you simply attempt to match a result to "distinctive knowledge", then that is purely deduced.

The implicit induction is, "I believe the result could match to what I distinctively know."

This is very interesting, because it is not an affirmation nor a denial of the result. It is merely whether one is capable of matching non-abstract symbols to abstract ones (such as memories). I think this is deduced as true and if one happens to deduce the opposite then they don't pursue trying to match them. I don't believe that I can match non-abstract symbols to abstract ones, I know I can. Are you saying you don't know if you can, you simply believe you can?

Science does not seek to prove a hypothesis, it seeks to invalidate a hypothesis. A hypothesis must be falsifiable. There needs to be a hypothetical state in which the hypothesis could be false. Science attempts to prove a hypothesis false, and if it cannot, then we have something.

I partially agree with you here. but it is vital to clarify that science does not solely seek to prove something is false and, in the event that it can't, deem it true (that is the definition of an appeal to ignorance fallacy). Science deals with "positive" and "negative" evidence: the former are tests conducted to see if the results match what should be produced to support the hypothesis (as in it is what is expected if it were true), whereas the latter are tests conducted to see if one can produce results that negate the possibly of the hypothesis being right. Both of which are technically attempts to falsify the hypothesis because positive and negative evidence are two sides of the same coin. The mere falsifiability of a hypothesis is simply the preliminary verification step. Peer reviews do not just seek to verify that the tests conducted produced negative evidence: they also make sure there is positive evidence for the hypothesis. In other words, just because something hasn't been falsified does not mean scientists take it seriously.

I think there is a meaningful distinction here. Categorical deductions involve no potential inductions. Hypothetical distinctions take a potential induction, and conclude a deduction based on a hypothetical outcome of the induction

What do you mean by "potential inductions"? I would hold that there are no inductions in deductive premises. If conditionals are not inductions.

Any time you attempt to match your identity of "red" to something else, you are making an implicit induction

Only if I formulate a belief then this is true. If I state "I think this is red", and then attempt to match it to "redness" abstractly am I making an induction (originally). However, I can see something and ask "what is this?" or "I wonder if this is a color?" and then match it to "redness" abstractly to deduce it is red. An induction is not necessary, but can occur.

I am not saying that an induction becomes knowledge. I am stating the deduced result of the induction becomes knowledge.

I apologize if I was misrepresenting you, I understand. What I am depicting is that this doesn't mean we have a "induction" -> "deduction" relation, nor do I find any meaningfulness in a "induction" ~> "deduction" relation.

I am simply noting that when one decides to induce, applicable knowledge is the deduced resolution to that induction.

This makes sense (as in it is a working definition), but I don't think this has any direct correlation to the critiques you are claiming towards "breaking out of the old epistemologies".

What proof is there that we do not have control over certain things?

First I need to say that I am talking about libertarian free will, but we can get into different definitions if you want.

At face value, something is only in one's control if we can prove that it is. If we can't prove it, then we don't know that we control anything. At this point, it doesn't mean we don't control anything, it simply means we don't know whether we do or not. Likewise, the default belief should be that which is the most intuitive, so to speak, so libertarian free will would be the default (I would say).

At a deeper level, there's many different reasons (I will briefly overview here) why the "subject" does not control anything as defined by libertarian free will:

1. To control one's thoughts, one would have to think of those thoughts before thinking them. Which inevitably leads to an infinite regression (potential infinite that is) of which we do not have: thoughts simply manifest.

2. The natural order either (1) abides by causation, which inevitably proves causal determinism, or (2) is a result of true quantum randomness (which also produces determinism, just not causal determinism in a traditional sense).

3. To know why reason manifests how it does, one would have to literally transcend their own reason, which is impossible. If we think of it in a more materialistic mindset, one would have to truly transcend their own reason to bridge the gap between mind and brain to determine the manifestations of reason. From a more idealistic mindset, one would have to truly transcend their own reason metaphysically to determine what powers (or what not) is determining such manifestations. Either way, it is impossible.

Now, for number four, I am actually going to address your proof:

I can will my arm to move, and it does. I can will against my emotions to do something more important

This doesn't prove (in the sense of libertarian free will, which I have no clue if you subscribe to it or not) you have control over your emotions nor your bodily movements: it proves that your mind's will can align with your body's will--which is not the same proposition (I would say) at all. Yes, there's a plethora of situations in which I genuinely know that my will aligned with my body's actions (which is typically referred to as "intentions" and "actions" alignment), but that doesn't mean that I have any reason to believe that my will was the manifestor of those actions. In other words, something aligning with my will does not in the slightest mean that something was in accordance with my will. There are two separate questions: was my arm lifting in alignment of my will or/and from my will? You just proved the former and not the latter. This would be point 4 and, to keep it brief, I will stop there.

Are you saying that you have control over nothing Bob? I don't think you're intending that, but I think I need clarification here. And if you are intending that we can control nothing, it would be helpful if you could present some evidence as to why this is.

I am most aligned with soft determinism, also called compatibilism, which dictates that the natural world is determined, but that at least one form (or definition) of free will is compatible with it. So I hold that libertarian free will is incorrect and incompatible with determinism, but that doesn't mean we can't still make meaningful distinctions pertaining to acts of "free will" vs "unfree will" (i.e. just because it is determined, doesn't mean we are completely unfree either). I think I will just end here for now on that to serve as merely an introduction.

Again I'm confused here. I'll need this broken down more.

I hold that the "subject", or reason, is that which makes the synthetic and analytic connections of objects, which are manifested in the form of a concept. This is why I do not hold that "consciousness" is equivocal to "reason", because there are numerous aspects of consciousness that are more than adequately accounted for via the brain (materialistic origins). At best, I would say, we could induce that repetitive alignments of the will of the mind and the will of the body reasonably suggests that they are actually one and the same (however I think there are problems with it, too great for me to commit myself to that view).

It was a while back, but I believe I did cover this. It had to do with chains of inductions away from the induction. A probability is one step from a deduction, a possibility is a less focused induction that probability, because it cannot assess the likelihood of it happening. A speculation is an induction introduces not only a possibility, but the induction that something that has never been confirmed to exist before, can exist. And then you remember irrational inductions.
...
The hierarchy cannot determine which induction is more likely to be. It can only determine which induction is more cogent, or least removed from what is known. Cogency has typically been defined as a strong inductive argument with true premises. Here cogency is measured by the length and degree of its inductive chain away from what has been deduced.

I think your hierarchy of inductions boils down to two key principles, one of which that is important here is: the deductive groundings of an induction dictates its cogency level in comparison to other inductions within the induction hierarchy. But what is this principle based on? Knowledge or a belief? This is the presupposition of which I don't think we quite explored yet. I don't see how it is necessarily deduced (therefore knowledge) for them. In other words, do we "know" that the strength (or cogency) of an induction increases due to an increase in deductive groundings, or are we inducing such?

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

@Philosophim,

However, if there's one thing I think we can conclude from the epistemology, its the reasoning and path we take to get there that matters as well. This is why there is a hierarchy for inductions.

I am not particularly sold on this quite yet. The hierarchy of inductions analyzes the "paths" in relation to its epistemic groundings, which is a relation of deduction -> induction (which I think is fine), but this relationship is not symmetrical (i.e. induction -> deduction). We can create meaningful labels pertaining to deduction -> induction, but not vice-versa (i would say). I think you are seeing it as symmetrical, whereas I see it more asymmetrical.

Applicable knowledge is the deductive result of an induction. It is not a deduction that follows an induction.

You explicated the dilemma much more elegantly than I did here! From what you said here, I am arguing the exact converse: to claim a deduction is a result of an induction is to necessarily concede that they are not mutually exclusive (there’s at least one relationship, no matter how weak or strong, being claimed to be validly made). I am claiming that a deduction can follow an induction, but never is a result of one. The results of a deduction can prove how aligned an induction was in relation to knowledge, but an induction never produces a resulting deduction.

I believe the next penny flip will be heads. (Induction) ->
I have a penny in my pocket. (Deduction)

...

I believe the next penny flip will be heads. (Induction) ->
I flip a penny I found in my pocket and it turns up tails. (Deduction)

I think these are truly the same: the latter just feels connected, but isn't anymore connected than the former. I could have just as easily, in the case of the latter, not posited a belief and flipped the penny from my pocket and it turns up tails (which would thereby no longer be applicable, yet I obtained the exact same knowledge distinctively).

So why is this an important/needed distinction? Because it can help us realize our limitations. I noted earlier that one can create a fully deductive abstract in one's head. I could create an entire world with its own rules, laws, math, and it be a purely deduced achievement. A set of knowledge which has no inductions with deduced resolutions in its chain of reasoning is circumspect. The reality is we face uncertainty constantly. Our deductions which are reasonable at the time, may be countered in the face of new information. Part of reality is uncertainty, and our reasoning should reflect that. Arguably, the uncertainty of life is why we have the concept of knowledge at all.

For the most part, I agree with the underlying meaning I think you are trying to convey (i.e. recognizing our limitations), but I think your "distinctive" vs "applicable" isn't a true representation thereof. What I think you are really trying to get at is that "knowledge" is always indexical. I am not certain what the result of flipping a coin (non-abstractly) will be until I do it, because my abstract simulation does not refer to non-abstract consideration (although I can definitely conflate them as synonymous). I can, therefore, have a belief prior to my deductively ascertained knowledge that it flipped tails, but that has no bearing on how I obtained that knowledge. I could equally have not posited a belief and obtained the exact same result, which indexically refers to something relationally beyond my abstract consideration. I am failing to see how the induction provided a meaningful difference, because even if I didn't induce anything prior to flipping the coin, thereby labeling it as "distinctive", does not equate to "categorical": I still had to obtain it non-abstractly in the exact same manner as applicable knowledge.

If there was no uncertainty in whatever we concluded, wouldn't we already know everything?

Firstly, I don't think "uncertainty" directly entails that one has to formulate an induction: I can be neutrally uncertain of the outcome of flipping a non-imaginary coin without ever asserting an induction. So when I previously stated that inductions and abductions only provide the uncertainty, I was slightly wrong: we can deductively know that we do not deductively know something and, therefore, we are uncertain of it (to some degree). No induction is technically needed (but definitely can be posited).

Secondly, yes, we would, without uncertainty, know everything. However, where are you drawing that line? I think you are trying to draw it at "distinctive" vs "applicable", but I don't think those definitions work properly. As previously discussed, the non-abstract flipping of a coin could be either form and still be obtaining knowledge pertaining to something uncertain.

Lets look at science. Science is not a success because it has carefully crafted deductions. It is a success because it has concluded carefully crafted deductions to inductive situations. Science seeks not to deduce, but to induce and then find the result. Science's conclusions are essentially applicable knowledge.

Yes, science does claim to "find the result" after a test, but the "result" has no relation to the induction (hypothesis) itself: that was merely posited as the best educated guess one could make prior to any knowledge deductively obtain after/during the test. Most of the time, science never reaches the point where we have verified the entire hypothesis (deductively) before it gets translated into a "theory": scientists obtain enough deductively ascertained knowledge that supports the hypothesis (or hypotheses) to warrant stating it is more than just a hypothesis (but, most importantly, it is not holistically knowable most of the time).

Although I may be misunderstanding you, if you are trying to claim that "applicable knowledge" is something scientists obtain about the holistic hypothesis, then I think you are (most of the time) incorrect. Unless the test is something really trivial (like "this will fall if I let it go"), then it generally doesn't make it to knowledge, just a stronger version of an induction (more thoroughly tested which entails more knowledge that it is grounded in). Sometimes they do categorically deductively ascertain during experiments, such as if I were to test whether this particular bottle is made of glass, which would inevitably be tested against my definition of "glass" and the means of verifying it meets each criteria of "glass" is also categorically defined. But i don't see how any of this proves in any way that they obtained something other than one form of knowledge (and, further, although I see the underlying meaning useful in terms of indexicals, I don’t see how there’s really a distinction between the two forms you are positing).

I meant it as purely the emotional sense of doubt. You can doubt anything, whether its reasonable or unreasonable to do so. Yes, we are in agreement that despite having doubts, one can reasonably conclude that one's doubt is unfounded or incorrect. So to clarify, I was not talking about a reasonable doubt, which is limited, but the emotional non-reasonable doubt. In this epistemology, reasonableness is not a requirement of any person, it is always a choice. However, their unreasonable choices cannot counter a reasonable argument for those who are reasonable.

That's fair enough.

In regards to hypothetical deductions, I believe we are in agreement! It just seems we had some slight misinterpretations of what each meant.

I think we are in agreement then! My question for you is: do you find it a meaningful distinction (categorical vs hypothetical), and what terminology would you translate that to in your epistemology? I don't think it is the same distinction as what you are trying to convey with "distinctive" and "applicable", but I could be wrong.

So I can state, "Assume that the essential property of a cat is that its green." I'm putting a hypothetical outcome to an induction, not a deduced outcome of an induction. The hypothetical property can be a part of a deduction, but it is a deduction that has avoided the test of induction.

In terms of underlying meaning, I understand and agree, but I don't think this is being described correctly. Everything is tested, abstract and non-abstract alike, but what makes the error you are explicating correct is that the tests are indexical. Testing in my mind in terms of my imagination, for example, does not automatically hold for that same "label" in non-abstract considerations. So I wouldn't say that "avoiding an induction" is a mistake, it is "avoiding the indexical consideration" that is the mistake. If I deduce that a "card" exists in my imagination with the color red on it, it would be a mistake for me to thereafter conclude there is a "card" in the non-imagination. Now, in terms of obtaining whether a "card" that is red exists in non-imagination takes the form of all other tests (including testing that belief in the abstract in terms of my imagination), and so I don't necessarily have to pre-judge whether or not I think there actually is one. If I look down and see a "red" "card", then I just deductively ascertained (without an induction) that non-abstractly there exists a "red card". I am failing to see how this is contingent on inductions. If I cannot deductively ascertain that there is such a thing as a "red card", then I am left with nothing else but to induce my best guess and, if push comes to shove, I bank my money on it.

In the second case where I state, "The next cat I will see will be green", I am putting something testable out there

But that belief has no bearing on uncertainty. You can have easily have simply deductively noted that you have no clue what the next cat will be, and then saw it was green (and you would know that you have no clue deductively). If you do submit such a belief (as you did), then yes we can deductively ascertain how aligned your induction was with real knowledge, but it never becomes knowledge. Even if you guessed right, you didn't know. Not even in hindsight. In terms of the induction hierarchy, we are simply inducing that given that the inductions more grounded in knowledge seem to produce more aligned results (with knowledge) that we are more rational to hold those over other, less grounded, inductions. We do not deductively know this. There's nothing that deductively tells me that a possibility actually is more certain of a claim than a speculation, only that I should rationally bank my money on it because that has tended to work out better. I have no deductive reason to believe that because something has been experienced before that it has a higher chance of happening again over something that has never been experienced: that is an induction (similar, if not exactly like, Hume's problem of induction).

So I could deduce the conclusion that I would be correct if I found the next cat was green, and I could deduce a conclusion if it was the case that the cat is not green. But neither of those deductions are the resolution to the induction itself. They are deductions about what is possible to conclude from an induction, but they are not the deduced result of the induction itself. I find this distinction key to avoid ambiguity when someone claims they "know" something.

Again, i see this not as "a result of an induction" but, rather, the importance of understanding knowledge is indexical. There's nothing wrong with positing a hypothetical deduction, but, as you rightly pointed out, that has no meaning if the IF conditionals are removed. By definition, it would no longer be hypothetical, so it would either have to be categorical or an induction.

"Since I changed my definition of heads to tails, my induction was correct." But, the induction was not correct based on the distinctive knowledge at the time. In this, applicable knowledge acts as a historical marker of one's chain of thoughts.

So, firstly, the induction is never "correct", it is just a "best guess" (or potentially not the best guess but no less "a guess"). It can happen to align with knowledge to any degree, but it isn't knowledge.

Secondly, you are right that the terminology is sometimes deductively (categorically) defined before the induction and that does shed light into their intentions, but this has no bearing on inductions. I could categorically define "cat" as "1 square" and then, without inducing anything, see what one would usually refer to a cat and decide to change my terminology. There's still a historical marker here, and it is memory (oh boy, which gets us back to that dilemma), not inductions. It's not that you induced X that provides a historical marker for me that you had other intentions prior to deductively ascertaining about X, it is that I remember you using terminology in your induction in a manner that suggests you weren't meaning it in that way, which I deduced. Now, we could get into whether I truly can deduce your intentions (it may just be an induction), but hopefully you see what I mean here.

But what we cannot do is claim applicable knowledge of, "Society doesn't actually believe that the color of a cat is non-essential" I can distinctively know my own definitions. I can distinctively reject societies definitions.

I think what you really mean here (and correct me if I am wrong) is that society's definition and my definition do not have to align (because knowledge is indexical). I can induce that society doesn't hold that a cat is essentially defined by "color", or I could categorically define "society" as necessarily not holding color as an essential property of cats. The problem is that when I define "society", it is in relation to what I've deduced, which indexically refers to my abstractions, and the definition someone else may have deductively defined indexically refers to themselves (and it would be a conflation to think they are necessarily bound to one another).

I could distinctively know that society does not define something a certain way.

This is where you sort of lost me. If by "distinctively know" you mean that you can categorically define "society" in a way that necessitates that they don't hold that definition of "cat", then I agree. But this has no relation to any sort of induction, the conflation arises when knowledge isn't viewed as indexical.

But I cannot applicably know that society defines something a certain way, when the result of that claim would show that they deductively do not.

I would agree insofar as the distinction being made is that my deduced abstract consideration of what a "society" or "cat" is has no indexical relation to non-abstract considerations, but I am failing to see how this has anything to do with necessarily positing an induction prior to deducing.

Correct, if you decide to use reason, then you cannot reasonably be convinced that you are not convinced of anything. If you decide not to use reason, then you can. Its like a person who states, "Everything is absolute". Its completely unreasonable, but there are some who forego reasonableness, even when it is pointed out, and insist on their belief. Fortunately, we can use reasonableness, but this does not deny the fact that a person can reject all that in favor of what we might call insanity.

This is true in a sense, but I think you are agreeing with me that this doesn't mean someone can actually do whatever they want just because they claim it.

There are unreasonable people that we still label as people. Holding reasonable positions is non-essential, meaning if a human is biologically or willingly an unreasonable person, there is nothing we can do to make them.

I would say that you are correct that people can feel as though they can be without reason, but they necessarily are. Someone can look a table, and then say they didn't just look at a table, but they did (and I think you are agreeing with me on this). It is an essential property of "human being" that they are a reasoning being, but I think how you are using "reasonableness", they don't have to have it. But they nevertheless abide by certain rules, which is their reason, even in the most insane of circumstances, which is apart of the definition of being human.

I think so. My understanding of abductions is that it is an induction that is the most reasonable one a person can hold given a situation. From the Stanford Encyclopedia, "You may have observed many gray elephants and no non-gray ones, and infer from this that all elephants are gray, because that would provide the best explanation for why you have observed so many gray elephants and no non-gray ones. This would be an instance of an abductive inference."

I apologize, I was too hasty to slide that into the discussion, we have much bigger fish to fry. I think we should not proceed to that conversation yet (that's my fault).

Despite cases in which you cannot easily decide to part and parcel, there are other instances in which you can. Look at one of your keys on your keyboard. Now look at the letter. Now look at any space next to the letter. Draw a circle in your mind around that space. You could if you wish mark a circle, and have created a new identity on that key. You can look at my writing. The page. The screen. The computer system. The room. You can focus and unfocus, and create new identities distinctively as you wish.

I don't think any of this proves that I was in control of anything. What discerns actual accordance from coincidental repetition?

We do, colloquially, make distinctions between something like "intention" and what the body actually is capable of, but ultimately I fail to see how we truly control any objects (which includes all concepts, so thoughts, imagination, the body, etc). What proof is there that you are not along for the ride?

No, I am noting that while we have an incredible amount of power within our own agency, there are things outside of our control

This isn't quite what I was trying to get at, I do think that you think that some things are outside of our control (if not a lot of things), but you do think that there is a clear divide between "incredible amount of power with our own agency" and that which isn't: where is that line drawn at? Do you think you control your thoughts? Imagination? Bodily movements? Maybe not absolutely, but sometimes at the very least? I am trying to hone in on what you mean, because I do not hold that the subject, reason, has any control over objects.

But I can imagine that I am able to. I have a world I can create, a logic I can form, and conclusions that will never apply to reality, but be valid in my mind.

Do you think that you sometimes can control your "dream world" within your imagination, or all time? Or never?

The distinction you are making in terms of what a proposition references (indexicals) is still valid if one doesn't control objects whatsoever.

And you agree with me by stating there are things you cannot choose to part and parcel. Can it be granted at this point that we both believe there are things outside of our mental control?

I cannot quite remember what I stated previously, but my contention isn't really "is there anything outside of our control" but, rather, "is there anything inside our control" (which is different). To say "outside our control" is fine, and I would agree that there are, but where I am failing to understand you is where is the line drawn? When you say "outside of our mental control", this leads me to believe that you think that you control your mental, or abstract considerations, but I do not think you do. There is no point at which, in reference to any object, where we "know" that we controlled it. It is an induction at best.

Correct in that both are deductions. I hope I clarified here that the real distinction is the in the chain of reasoning.

I think that what you are trying to convey (if I am understanding it correctly) is right, but it is wrong to postulate it as having anything to do with a chain of reasoning (I would view is asymmetrical to induction chains).

Distinctive knowledge: Discrete experience or
A deduction that leads to a deduction.

Applicable knowledge:
An induction that leads to a deduced resolution

If by "leads" you are saying "results", then I disagree. We deduce knowledge and, in hindsight, see how close our inductions were (if we even posited any) to that deduced knowledge. Deductions can "lead" to inductions, but never vice-versa in a literal sense (like "results"), but if you mean a loose sense like an induction can "lead" someone to investigate further in some circumstances, then I agree. If "lead" is being used loosely, then I wouldn't consider something sparking your interest as something that then results in a deduction (another deduction could have just as easily sparked my interest).

But we can obtain the actual outcome of the induction. When an induction resolves, we have the outcome.

The outcome is not apart of the induction, that is knowledge which is a deduction (which I think you would agree with me on that). There's no entailment from induction -> deduction. You don't need to state a belief either way before flipping a coin. The flipping of the coin and its conclusion is all deductively ascertained (thusly knowledge) either way.

The first part is part of the reason, but I did not understand what a "dispensable entity" was.

Essentially occam's razor.

We distinctively know the hierarchy of inductions, we do not applicably know if the claim is true.

Upon further reflection, I don't think we deduce the hierarchy holistically (either as distinctive or applicable--either way they are both considered deductions). Nothing about the premises necessitates the conclusion that "possibility" is more cogent than "speculations". Nothing about experiencing something once deductively necessitates that it is more likely to happen again over something that hasn't been experienced (and isn't an irrational induction). I think some of them may be deductively ascertained (such as irrational inductions since they defined as contradictions, which would necessarily always be known as the worst option), but I don't think it holds for all of them (but I need to ponder it a bit deeper).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Now take away humans, take away animals. We get a view from nowhere. Here is true metaphysics. What then exists in the view from nowhere? If you’re imagining a world as perceived and inferenced and synthesized by humans you would be mistaken. What is a non-perspective world? In what way can we talk of it intelligibly? Planets planeting? Particles particling? What does that even mean when there’s no perspective?

Although I could be misinterpreting you, I think that your OP is primarily associated with the ontological aspect of this and not metaphysical: you are essentially asking what exists apart from observance (which I would argue is ontological not metaphysical, but I can see how it could bleed over into metaphysics the deeper one contemplates it). With that being said, I think you have formulated a question which is itself a contradiction: you are asking for a "perspective" (as I understand your definition) when their are "no perspectives" available. Therefore, to answer "nothing is there" or "something is there" are both incorrect because the question itself is contradictory. It is like if I asked "what does a square circle look like?": no matter what one posits in terms of the appearance of a square circle, they are inevitably wrong (doomed from the start). To be brief, I think that the question "what is a non-perspective universe" is nothing more than the combination of concepts in a manner that merely (and only) produces a description of a contradiction (albeit sometimes enticing to pursue as if it did postulate something more than that).

How is information akin to perspective? Perspective, a point of view, seems to be attached to an observer, not an information processor. How can information processing simpliciter be the same as a full-blown observer? I think there are too many jumps and "just so" things going on here to link the two so brashly.

I would agree that, indeed, "understanding" is non-computational. The verification of something being true is computational, but the understanding that it should be accepted as true is non-computational. So, in other words, yes: information processing is not synonymous with "perspective" in the sense outlined previously.

So if not information, where is this "perspective" in the view from nowhere?

Again, I think this, specifically speaking, is nothing more than a description of a contradiction. However, if one were to contemplate what their "perspective" (or "understanding") is, then it inevitably becomes a question of metaphysics (however, the contemplation of your OP question I would say is ontological because it is questioning what is left when "perspectives" are removed--regardless of any metaphysical inquiry into what "perspectives" actually are).

If localized interactions, "what" makes the perspective happen from these interactions?

I think that you are thinking of it in the wrong order. "from these interactions" seems like you are trying to derive where "understanding" (or "perspective") arises from what has been produced from the understanding itself. I can never look at a brain, which is an interpretation derived from understanding, and figure out my understanding therefrom. The best I can do is inquire recursively (i.e. reason upon itself) to understand the mechanisms of my understanding via that understanding. That's the best that can be done.

@Philosophim,

I hate to double post, but just to explicate more clearly my dilemma with "applicable" vs "distinctive" knowledge, let me explain a bit more (now that I've been thinking more and more about it).

I don't think that there are two "forms" of knowledge and, to my understanding, I don't think your epistemology truly posits two different forms (even though I think you are arguing for such).

For example, let's use your "Go Fish" example. Abstractly, I can determine that a game, which I will define as "Go Fish", is possible according to the rules I subject it to: thereby I "know" "GoFish" is possible in the abstract. However, as you noted, it is an entirely different claim to state that "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly" (as I conjured up "Go Fish" according to my rules) (e.g. it turns out a totalitarian regime burned all the playing cards, what a shame, or my rules do not conform to the laws of nature). I think, therefrom, you are intuitively discerning two forms of knowledge to make that meaningful distinction.

However, I believe it to be an illusory distinction, albeit intuitive: the claim of knowledge towards abstract "Go Fish", and more importantly the "cards" therein, is a completely different conception than "cards" being utilized when claiming "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly". The conflation between the two (what I define abstractly as "a card" along with its existence presupposed in reference to the abstract vs what coincides non-abstractly) is what I think you are trying to warn against. I may define "card" as "floating mid-air" and quickly realize that this is only possible in relation to "abstract cards" and not "non-abstract cards".

Consequently, "distinctive" and "applicable" are the exact same. If I claim that "Go Fish is possible abstractly", I know this deductively. If I claim that "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly", I also know this deductively. I could, however, posit "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly" as knowledge when I do not in fact know it because it is an induction, which would be illegal in the sense of your epistemology. If I induce that "Go Fish is possible non-abstractly", then I believe it and it is subjected to the hierarchy of inductions. If I deductively obtain sufficient knowledge pertaining to the possibility of Go Fish in the non-abstract, then I thereby have "knowledge".

In the event that I did induce then deductively affirm that induction (holistically, as in verify the entire induction was true in the sense that I have since then deduced its premises and conclusions) (let's hypothetically say), then I am still only gaining knowledge via a deduction and the induction was merely coincidentally correct.

In other words, it is possible to ground an induction in knowledge (deductions), but not possible to ground a deduction in beliefs (inductions): the relation, therefore, is uni-directional. Furthermore, I now can explicate much more clearly what the hierarchy of inductions is grounded upon (assuming I am understanding correctly): the induction with (1) the most knowledge (deductions) as its grounds and (2) no dispensable entities is the most cogent within that context. This is exactly why, for example, "possibility" is more cogent than "speculations": "possibility" is (1) grounded in more knowledge. However, upon further reflection, I am not entirely sure that you would agree with #2: what if a "speculation -> speculation" is justified as necessitous? What if it isn't multiplying entities without necessity? What if the opposing induction "speculation" is eroding some necessary components of the induction chain?

But an even deeper dilemma arises: the claim, and I would say key principle, underlying the hierarchy itself is an induction (to hold that the inductions that are more acquainted with, grounded in, knowledge is an induction, not a deductively concluded principle). Which inevitably undermines the hierarchy, since there is necessarily one induction (namely inductions grounded in more knowledge are more cogent) which is outside of the induction hierarchy (since it is itself contingent on it in the first place: we construct the hierarchy from this very induced principle). So, we do not "know" that the hierarchy of inductions is true, under your epistemology, I would say, because it is induced and, therefore, we "believe" it is true. If knowledge is only deductions than I think we are forced to conclude this.

Anyways, I thought I would share my thoughts you can see more clearly what I am thinking here.

Bob

My understanding of the term atheist is the point of view that nothing supernatural exists, most particularly a deity, and this is expressed as an absolute. — Elric

The definition of "atheism" varies depending on what one is trying to convey. Some use a labeling system wherein "atheism" is the affirmative denial of gods, "theism" is the affirmation of at least one god, and "agnosticism" is no affirmation whatsoever. Others use a two-dimensional labeling system wherein one is plotted on a graph, so to speak, in relation to an axis representing "agnosticism/gnosticism" and the other axis representing "atheism/theism": this typically separates more clearly the claims of "knowledge" from those of "belief". In the former labeling system, you would be more or less correct: an atheism would be affirming there are no gods and not merely lacking a belief. However, if the latter labeling system is being utilized then you would be incorrect: an "agnostic atheist" does not affirm there are no gods, they simply lack a belief in any gods.

Some will claim that every person is an atheist in their own regards, to some particular subset of gods, to more clearly explicate the difference between "lacking a belief" and "believing".

To be quite frank, this is a hot topic, eternal semantical feud, amongst many out there in the community. For me, I worry more about the underlying meaning the person I am conversing with is trying to convey. For me, I would fit more with the "agnostic atheist" label than "atheist" (in regard to its one-dimensional usage). But if one were to insist that, semantically, "atheism" is the expression of the affirmation of no gods, then I simply am "agnostic".

I would also like to emphasize that, even if one is expressing the affirmation of no gods, they are not necessarily positing it as an absolute. Not all epistemologies allow for "absolutes" and, therefore, they may be claiming to "know" there are no gods while retaining that it is not an absolute judgment.

Moreover, "atheism" does not entail the denial of the "supernatural" nor "metaphysical", it is simply either the affirmative denial of gods or the lack of belief in all gods or the lack of belief in a particular subset of gods (again, depends on whom you are speaking to).

My perspective is that both points of view are asinine, as neither can be proved. The fact that you have not found evidence of the supernatural isn't conclusive proof that it does not exist.

I think that the views you are attacking are "gnostic" absolute claims either way: which are not the only two options. I think that we tend to default to something "does not exist" until we have proof that it does. So, although, yes, simply lacking any evidence whatsoever does not necessitate that supernaturalism is false, it would entail that we shouldn't belief it is true.

If feelings are a valid tool to perceive factual reality, and you FEEL that the supernatural exists, then it would be equally true that it does NOT exist, because someone else FEELS that it does not.

I think I would need further elaboration on what you mean here. What are "feelings"? Sensations? It seems as though you are trying to convey that "feeling" either way is not proof (either way), which I would agree with. I think the problem is that one cannot be in a middle space between holding a "belief" and "not believing". Sure, we could distinguish "disbelief" as the negative affirmation and "not believing" as merely the lack thereof, but nevertheless there is no truly neutral space here: either you belief something, or you don't.

You cannot gain knowledge of consciousness through quantums and relativity, because consciousness is you, the subject, the one who is waiting to be met. You cannot meet yourself through quantums and metaphysics. Rather, what Pascal suggested was "esprit de finesse", spirit of fineness, or we can just say spirit.

I think that it depends entirely on what you are referring to by "consciousness". I do not hold that exploring, empirically, consciousness is a self-defeating (absurd) task (to that like continually running into a brick wall). Certain aspects, at the very least, of what I would consider consciousness is obtainable via empirical observation. For example, we can discover that this aspect of the brain has some role in color interpretation (e.g. damage that and they can't see red anymore). However this may merely be a semantical difference between us because I hold that reason is the "subject" and, therefore, is the bedrock. Moreover, the investigation (empirically) of reason inevitably fails (only in the sense of grounding it absolutely in the brain) because it is that which is presupposed (which is what I presume you were trying to convey), but I don't think that "reason" is generally synonymous with "consciousness": we can causally evaluate consciousness to see how it relates to conscious states. Maybe "reason" is what you are referring to by "spirit"?

We can even consider noble, honourable, this pseudo-science, because science is research that, as such, improves human knowledge and human condition.

I don't find anything "pseudo" about empirically observing my own mind recursively to evaluate what seems metaphysical or transcendent (or what isn't): in fact, I think it is progressive and insightful into understanding itself. However, I do agree that this is always performed with careful consideration that it is being logically derived from reason itself (or from "me" as you put it) and, as you stated, everything is always conceptualized as an object and, therefore, even both of our arguments entail that we are providing an explanation which is an objectification of subjectivity, because, I would say, there is no subjectivity in that sense of the term--for "subjectivity" is simply manifested, conceptualized, as what is manifesting the manifestations. Therefore, even to argue "consciousness" is "me", as I think you did, is to merely conceptualize the manifestations, ever active conceptualizations, as an object manifesting them. Something truly "beyond reason" is something relatable to "indeterminate", "impossible", "undescribable", or "unfathomable". However, even those concepts do not transcend reason, in a literal sense, and so there is not a truly transcendent concept. With that being said, we can still logically derive the objective relation of "subjectivity" to the "objects", for they are both inevitably objectified (e.g. reason is metaphysical in relation to the physical, but neither truly transcends reason as they are both conceptualized as objects).

In short, I do not really see the dilemma, or contradiction, in binding "consciousness" to the brain, albeit that nothing transcends reason (not even the very concept of "transcendence" and "nothingness"). I don't think it is hypocritical, stupid, etc to empirically investigate anything, including the brain and "consciousness" and "reason", for that is all we have (nevertheless, we can thereafter, naturally, have things, i.e. chains of reasoning, which produce a convincement of metaphysical aspects that transcend things). But once we begin empirical, recursive examination of reason on itself, we quickly realize that, in relation to reason, it logically follows that reason itself is not a "thing" but, rather, metaphysical. But this was obtained empirically, because it all is.

Is your frustration more towards people who are more that of materialists? Those who claim the brain and the mind are one and the same? That we will be able to causally examine a brain so in depth that we discover all truths of the mind therefrom?

@Philosophim,

I apologize, the week has been quite busy for me.

Firstly, I think we need to revisit the "distinctive" vs "applicable" knowledge distinction holistically because I am still not understanding why it is important. Hypothetically, if I were to grant you that abstractions never are inductions, and subsequently that there are two distinct methods of arriving at a deduction, I don't see the meaningfulness behind such a distinction. I went ahead and re-read your past two posts, and, to just quote you briefly, this is generally what you stated (although I could just be missing it as I am re-reading):

I would not mind renaming the words within that distinction, but that distinction is absolutely key to breaking out of the previously failed theories of knowledge. I will see if I can show you why in our conversation.

Even after re-reading the whole post (this is two posts back), I don't see how this achieves nor is necessary to "break out of the previously failed theories of knowledge". I understand (at least I think) what you are referring to by what failed in previous theories, but I see this evidently clear in two key principles of your epistemology: (1) inductions are not knowledge and (2) inductions are not equally cogent as one another. These are the two principles, as I see it, that are vital to breaking out of such failed epistemologies: nothing pertaining to the distinction between methods prior to deducing knowledge. Yes you could technically, if I grant that abstractions are not inductions themselves, make a distinction between a deducing after conjuring an induction vs abstractly deducing, but this has no bearing on what I think is the bedrock of your epistemology. Principle #1 demonstrates exactly what you have been outlining in your examples (such as inventing a game with cards abstractly vs non-abstractly): if I induce it, I do not know. I think it is that simple and, thusly, am failing (even in terms of granting your argument as far as I can imagine) to understand the importance of distinguishing that I can thereafter obtain knowledge of what I deduce in relation to that induction. Again, principle #1 outlines this clearly already.

I guess where I am confused is: why not just say "if you didn't deduce it, you don't know it" instead of "you don't gain applicable knowledge until it is deduced"? It seems like the latter is obviously given (at least to me) in the former: regardless of when we can, as subjects, conjure an induction and when we can't. My question for you is, given that you clearly see it as vital to the epistemology, what am I missing? I'm sure I am just missing something.

Likewise, I don't think "applicable knowledge", in the sense of a deduced conclusion pertaining to an induction, has any actual relations to the induction. The induction and deduction are completely separate: mutually exclusive. To say I induced something, then deduced knowledge that happens to fall under that same category of inquiry is just that: a coincidence or, at best, the induction was merely the motivation but necessarily has no direct relation to the obtaining of knowledge whatsoever.

I think clearing that up will help with what we are currently conversing about. Now on to your most recent post:

I don't want this to come off as dismissive or unappreciative of the great argument you've set up. It is just the goal of this endeavor is to create an epistemology that can be applied and supply an answer to any epistemological question.

Absolutely no problem! Do what you wish with my responses: I never want you to feel obligated to address it in a specific manner (or in its entirety).

According to the foundational epistemology I've proposed, you can doubt anything you want.

So this is tricky. If by "doubt everything" you mean that everything is technically falsifiable, then yes I agree. However, once we endeavor on our journey of doubt, we realize that we have obtained that certain things cannot be doubted. So, in another sense, I disagree: you cannot doubt everything. You cannot, as outlined in my previous post, the "present thought". Sure, you can doubt my assertion of it, disagree with it, etc, but you will nevertheless always be trusting your "present thought" to the degree I mentioned before. If you are claiming that your epistemology allows for "pure doubting" of literally everything, wherein the subject never obtains anything which it realizes it strictly cannot doubt, then I think that is simply false (but I have no problem if you mean it in the sense of everything is falsifiable).

The entirety of this would still be distinctive knowledge. Only after the 2 induced premises had a deduced conclusion, would we call the result applicable knowledge.

Although I want to agree with what you are proposing here, upon further reflection, the hypothetical deduction has no inductions (not even in the premises)(nor do deductions in general). To state that "IF an essential property of cats is that they are green" is not an induction: it is simply a logical conditional. I am not asserting that given repetition I think that an essential property of cats is "greeness", I am simply stating that IF it is, then this is what logically follows. My main point here is that you would be correct if they were inductions, in terms of how you defined applicable knowledge, but the premises are logically verified (i.e. IF) and are thereby certain. In other words, although I was onboard with the idea of deductive premises being inductions, I think that "IF ..." conditionals are deductively verified to be true: "IF .." is not incorrect. Even if I stated "IF a square circle ...", that is valid, but if I stated "a square circle ...", that is invalid. This is because I am not asserting that the contents of the IF are true or actually can be true, only that if granted as true what would follow logically. So, I don't think this hypothetical deduction's premises would ever become applicable knowledge.

Now what I think you were trying to get at (and correct me if I am wrong) is that if we were to remove the IF conditional and try to verify the content, then it is either deductively ascertained or inductive. If it is inductive, then we do not know it until it is deduced (thereby becoming applicable knowledge). My point is that the premises, when postulated with IF conditionals, are not inductions. Now let's go back to your original example (because I think I can more adequately address it now):

1. An accidental property of cats is they are green. (Could or could not)
2. An essential property of Bob is that they are a cat. (Must be)
3. Therefore, Bob is green.

This is not a deduction. Why? Because premise #1 does not logically necessitate the conclusion (which is the definition of a deduction). You haven't posited IF all cats are green, you've posited it logically as not necessary for a cat to be green, which means it does not necessarily follow that Bob is green. Therefore, this is not actually a deduction.

1. An essential property of cats is they are green.
2. An essential property of Bob is that they are a cat.
3. Therefore, Bob is green.

However, this would be a deduction, because you have posited it in a way that necessitates the conclusion. But my main point is that this is not "necessitated" in the sense the premises are being argued as actually true, only that, at the very least, are granted as true in an IF conditional.

So, although they would both be valid deductions, this is not quite the same as your previous example (in the above quote):

1. IF an essential property of cats is they are green.
2. IF an essential property of Bob is that they are a cat.
3. Then bob is green

This is also a valid deduction, but is not asserting that the premises are actually true, which is why I distinguished this as a "hypothetical deduction". But what I was missing in my previous response is that a deduction cannot, by definition, have an induction as a premise (that would mean the conclusion does not necessarily follow).

The question will be when those first two premises are "inductions", and when they aren't.

They never are inductions, unless it wasn't a deduction to begin with.

In the solo context, the answer to the "inductions" is whatever we decide. We decide if they are essential properties or not. They are not inductions, their conclusion is certain to whatever we decide.

Again, they are never inductions. I think you are conflating an induction with logical if conditionals, I don't think they are the same. Sure, we can decide what is categorical and what is hypothetical insofar as we do not contradict ourselves. I cannot willy nilly conjure up whatever I want.

If however, we pull another person into the equation, a society with written rules, then we have an evolution. I cannot conclude whatever I want. I must make an induction, a belief about what society will decide. The answer to that, is applicable knowledge. Even then, the abstracts of society that it creates, that I must test my beliefs against, are its distinctive context, not applicable context.

The same critique you made of solo contexts applies to societal contexts: I can deny whatever society throws at me, just like I can deny whatever I throw at myself. Ultimately I have to decide what to accept and what not to. If someone else came up with:

1. IF an essential property of cats is that they are green
2. IF an essential property of bob is that they are a cat
3. THEN bob is green

We are still in the same dilemma. I don't think the process is as different as you may think.

In the solo context, the answer to the "inductions" is whatever we decide.

the answer to anything is what we decide (ultimately). This doesn't mean we are right and it surely doesn't mean (in either solo or societal contexts) that we are actually completely free to do whatever we want.

If you are a purely abstracting being, then you decided it was a coherent sequence of reason. You just as easily could have decided it was not.

I agree. But this doesn't entail what you are trying to entail. Just because I can utter the words "I decide that it was not a coherent sequence of reason", does not make it so. Just because I convinced of it, that does not make it so. And as an example, your next sentence is a great explication of this:

You could decide to never be convinced of anything

This is true in the sense that I can be convinced that I am not convinced of anything, however I am definitively wrong because I am thereby convinced of something. The danger of the mind is that it can fail to grasp things, not that it can do whatever it wants. Reason is not relative, it is absolute in relation to the subject at hand. I can utter and be convinced that "pon is false", but thereby it is true. I can fail grasp that, or it may never pop into my head, but that is still an absolute grounding for me (the subject).

It is a hypothetical deduction as you noted earlier. The question comes into play when we consider what appears to be an induction in premise one. There is one key here. You determine whether you remember correctly that the previous answer is six. If you do, then you do. If you remember that it is 7, then it is 7.

I should have made it more clear:

1. IF I am remembering correctly that I previously answered 6.
2. IF the correct answer must abide by what I remember the square root operation is
3. THEN the answer to the square root of 25 is 6

This is not a valid hypothetical deduction because it is not a deduction (the premises do not necessitate the conclusion). But, I apologize, my original formulation of it was wrong and you are correct there that it was a hypothetical deduction.

In light of my position that premises cannot be inductions in a valid deduction, then I think you are right in just that respect. But I can induce that what I remember being 6 does align with what I remember is the square root of 25 (when the operation I remember is applied) without first applying it. However, I would only know they align via a deduction (remembering the 6 and applying the operation to 25): which would be completely separate from the induction (which I would consider abstract).

Likewise, I want to be clear that I do not think that the induction component and deduction component of "applicable knowledge" are in any way related. Just like how I can induce that 6 and square root of 25 align (and my knowledge they don't was a completely separate deduction/deductions), so it is with "applicable knowledge": whatever was induced that isn't contained in what was deduced remains induced, and whatever is contained in the deduction is now verified via the deduction where those inductive conclusions get thrown out into the garbage can. There's no relation between an induction and a deduction: they two completely separate forms of reason.

I would also like to note very briefly that we have been kind of ignoring our friend "abductions", which is not an "induction" nor a "deduction". I'm not sure where you have that fit into this equation: is it simply merged with inductions?

To be very clear, this is because an abstraction has no rules besides what you make. There is no one besides yourself who can tell you your own created abstraction is "wrong". No one to tell you but yourself that your memory is "wrong". In short, abstractions are our limitless potential to "part and parcel" as we like.

I think where we disagree fundamentally is that you seem to be positing that we control reason (or our thoughts or something) in the abstract, but we do not. I do not decide to part and parcel in a particular way, it just manifests. There are rules to abstract though (again, pon). I can linguistically deny it, but nevertheless my reason is grounded in it. I cannot literally conjure whatever I want, because conjuring follows a set of rules in itself.

There must be something outside of our own power and agency that creates a conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premises we've created.

It seems like you are arguing you do have power over your thoughts (and potentially imagination): I do not think you do. They are all objects and reason is the connections, synthetic and analytical, of those objects.

Moreover, if I have a deduction, and it is sound, then nothing "outside of my power" (whatever that entails) cannot reject it (in the sense that "reality" rejects what "I want", or what have you). The deduction is true as absolutely as the term "absolute" can possibly mean. Inductions (and abductions) are the only domains of reasoning that can be rejected. We are still dictating "what is outside of our control": I decide that it holds without contradiction that my friend bob jr. has a totally different definition of "pancakes" than I do. I could fail to understand this, or straight up deny it, and claim that we both actually have the same definition, where mine is "round object" and his is "square object", but that doesn't mean I am right. Same thing is true of thoughts: they are objects. I can tell myself "I can do whatever I want abstractly", but that doesn't make it so. It is no different than "reality" or "other powers" scenario. My main point here is that your criticism of "we can make a dream world of 'reality'" is just as valid and can be posited for "we can make a dream world of our thoughts".

I will address your points on the mind-bender dilemma of the reliability of thoughts after the aforementioned is resolved because I do not feel that I can substantively respond without understanding the rest first.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

@Philosophim,

I want to disclaim that this post is going to be quite complicated, as you brought up an incredibly valid, and thought-provoking, dilemma which deserves an adequate response. The reliability of memories was a keen insight Philosophim!

Before I dive into that dilemma, let me first address deductions.

But I'm not sure the hypothetical is an actual deduction. Let me point it out

A deductive argument is that which has a conclusion that is necessitated from its premises, not that the premises are true. So, a better way to propose my cat example, at first glance here, is:

1. IF all cats are green
2. IF bob is a cat
3. THEN bob is green

You are absolutely correct that #1 and #2 could be false (even an induction), but that doesn't mean it isn't, by definition, a deduction. I understand what you were trying to get at with your refurbishment, which looked like:

1. An essential property of cats is they are green.
2. An essential property of Bob is that they are a cat.
3. Therefore, Bob is green.

1. An accidental property of cats is they are green. (Could or could not)
2. An essential property of Bob is that they are a cat. (Must be)
3. Therefore, Bob is green.

My response is tricky here, because you are sort of right when you posit #1 like that. But I still don't think you are right that deductions can't have incorrect (or inductive) premises (deductions are defined by their form, not truth value). The first deduction here I think we both agree is a "categorical deduction", but #1 in the second one isn't really a deduction (I would agree) because it is not positing IF. In my head, it is equivalent to:

1. Not all cats are green
2. Bob is a cat
3. Bob is green

That isn't a deduction because it doesn't have the logical necessitous form (has nothing to do with whether they are true, just that the premises necessitate the conclusion). My main point here is that this would be a hypothetical deduction:

1. IF an essential property of cats is that they are green
2. IF an essential property of bob is that they are a cat
3. THEN bob is green

This was not categorical, in the sense I was meaning it, because I am not, in positing it, affirming the truth of #1 and #2 (however it is still indeed a deduction that may or may not be true). This is different than actually claiming that I am categorically defining cats as must having an essential property of greeness (as in cats actually are all green). So, in short, I think you are right that, in the manner you depicted it, it would not be a deduction but this is not based off of truth value: it is about the form. However, I still think hypotheticals are different than categoricals. A deductive argument is denoted by IF the premises are agreed, then it necessitates the conclusion. The premises could be inductions.

Alright, now it is time for the main dilemma you posited: the reliability of memories (which I would extend as thoughts as well). Fair warning that this gets complicated fast, but I know you can handle it (: So, firstly I want to give a brief overview of what I think and then dive into what you said.

Here's a brief overview first:

1. I cannot doubt a thought until after it becomes apart of the past (therefrom an absolute grounding of trust is established).
2. Any given past thought is always recollected as a reliable memory (in virtue of #1).
3. The validity of a given past thought is deduced insofar as it relates to other past thoughts.
4. The reliability of the total set of past thoughts is never established (inductively nor deductively) because it is an illusory transcendent concept.
5. Inductions can arise pertaining to deduced memories.

Let's talk about #1: I cannot doubt a thought until after it becomes apart of the past. The "present thought", which I will define as 0, is always necessarily granted as trustworthy, and this is apodictic. However, the proof for this is not an easy feat. The problem is that to claim a "present thought" is taken as trustworthy (albeit potentially questioned thereafter by even the very next thought) requires that its immediate trustworthiness be evaluated by a subsequent thought--thereby rendering it a past thought (which it means, at face value, the very last thought is being utilized as reliable to deduce that when it was the "present thought" it was necessarily trusted). However, the proof for the immediate trustworthiness of the "present thought" cannot rely on the reliability of a past thought (because that would defeat the whole purpose). Therein lies the difficulty. But I realized this can nevertheless be proven (I think at least), because I can deduce (regardless of the validity of any thoughts) that if a past thought hypothetically was at one point actually the "present thought" and it wasn't immediately trusted (prior to another thought succeeding it) then I would never have a coherent sequence of reason. Therefore, I would never be convinced of anything. But since I am convinced of things, and thusly have coherent sequences of reason, I know that I must be trusting the "present thought". In short, I think there are two logically true statements we can make regardless of the reliability of the total set of past thoughts:

1. Regardless of the validity, my past thoughts are always in succession, therefore in a sequence, which necessitates boundaries. Which in turn, necessitates the "present thought".
2. if any given past thought was actually at one point in time the "present thought", then it is necessarily the case that it was trusted immediately. For, otherwise, I would not have obtained the coherent sequence of past thoughts, regardless of the validity therein.

This brings us to the vital understanding of #4: The reliability of the total set of past thoughts is never established (inductively nor deductively) because it is an illusory transcendent concept. I can only merely prove that, given the sequence of past thoughts I have, if any given past thought was the "present thought", then I would logically be obligated to trust it immediately prior to another thought manifesting. But this doesn't speak to whether the sequence of past thoughts I am analyzing are indeed reliable (for all I know, my "present thought" is referencing a completely false previous past thought or the whole set is fallacious). The main problem is that I am always inferring the "present thought" by virtue of the sequence of past thoughts. Therefore, the concept of a past thought existing objectively as itself does not exist, for I am always potentially infinitely referencing memories via other memories.

My brain hurts (:

Now, this means, if I am correct (emphasis on if), then it is deduced that the absolute grounding of trust is the "present thought", which can, admittedly, be doubted fervently thereafter.

Now on to #2: Any given past thought is always recollected as a reliable memory (in virtue of #1). Recollection is the process of retrieving a past thought, which inevitably brings it forward as the present thought. Therefore, as the memory loaded into the present thought, it is granted trustworthiness (although it can be questioned thereafter). Recollection, although it does bring forth past thoughts as a present thought, does not "refresh the time stamp" so to speak: the memory itself is merely referenced in relation to when it is thought to be in the sequence of past thoughts, but the recollection itself, being a present thought, is always appended to the succession of thoughts separately. For example:

1. if I remember memory A, I am recollecting it.
2. Recollection entails A being presented as the “present thought”, 0
3. therefore, 0 is referencing A (i.e. the recollection is not A, it is 0 which references A)
4. therefore, A is still referenced in the sequence of past thoughts where it is remembered to have occurred relative to the others, but 0 will become a new past thought (aka: memory of remembering A)
5. This occurs recursively for a potential infinite


Moreover, #4 here is not completely explained (as noted by the emphasis on “remembered”): in immediate recollection, whatever is referenced from A in 0 is immediately trusted. If A contained holistic or partial references to where it is in the collection of past thoughts, then that is immediately trusted as well. However, if A doesn’t contain where in the collection it should be (i.e. its index), then a subsequent thought will be required to attempt to deduce what is remembered as its index (which is subjected to the same process as previously described).

Now, the doubting occurs when a remembrance of a memory (0 now as a past thought) is examined by 0 (the present thought) in relation to what could potentially be the difference of A and &A (A being the memory, &A being the reference to A in 0). In other words, &A is posited as potentially not holistically referencing A as what it initially was, therefore is potentially A != &A, and therefrom the dilemma occurs. But, to invoke #4 (from my original generalization of my views), the validity of the thoughts is never obtained nor actually performed outside of a relation between past thoughts and, therefore, the answer to the reliability of all thoughts is unobtainable. The apodictic nature of referencing past thoughts in the present thought entails that the concept of a thought as itself vs how it was referenced (A vs &A) is illusory. It would only ever be how A is considered by some subset of past thoughts vs how &A is considered by some subset of past thoughts: thereby never achieving a transcendent concept of “a true thought in-itself”.

As we already established #4, #3 (in my original generalization) simply denotes that what really happens when we question our past thoughts (and sometimes determine some to be unreliable and others reliable and still others undetermined) is that we are only establishing "reliability" as it relates to other past thoughts: it is the analysis of the sequence of past thoughts via the present thought (which is always granted as trusted immediately). The procedure of determining what is reliable or not is not relevant to the dilemma itself, so I will leave it there.

Now, how's does that all relate to what you said? Well, I think you are partially right:

Case 1. I remember that what I remembered yesterday, is what I remember today.
Case 2. I remember that what I remembered yesterday, is not what I remember today.
Case 3. I conclude "I'm unsure if what I remembered today is what I remembered yesterday."

if your cases are referring to one memory’s validity in relation to the set of past thoughts, then you are right that we can deduce such. If you are trying to derive the validity of the entirety of the set of past thoughts, then you are wrong (it is an illusory concept that acts as if it has transcended reason). They seem to be lacking the consideration that it is a recursive dilemma. The first two cases are explicitly self-contradictory ("I remember"), and the last case is essentially the same thing: they all beg the question of the validity of those memories being utilized to resolve the conflicting memories. It is a recursive operation that is inevitable, but can be accurately portrayed in a non-absurd manner if one realizes that it is all relative to the absolute point of trust: the present thought.

Now, let me address your main contention here:

In short, in what we conclude in a prior reference to our memory, an abstraction, is a deduction because it is whatever we experience.

I think you are partially correct. In terms of the process of thinking as outlined previously, the reliability in relation to another past thought is deduced. Likewise, it is deduced that there is a "present thought" and that it necessarily is trusted. However, the reliability of set of past thoughts is not determined. Also, I still think that an induction is possible abstractly, however your definition of "abstraction" doesn't allow it by definition (and I would say it is not a main stream definition of abstraction). None of this entails that something cannot be an induction pertaining to two deduced subsets of memories.

So at the time when you state, "the answer is 6", that's still distinctive knowledge and deduction.That is because what you experience remembering as the answer, is the answer.

This is where #5 (from my original generalization) comes into play: this is simply not true. I deduce that I remember the answer being 6, but that does not mean I deduced that that memory must be correct in relation to what I remember are the rules of the operation of the square root. I induced that it was correct, based off of the fact I remember the answer being 6. Nothing about me remembering that the answer is 6, even if it could be proven it was 100% accurate that I did indeed answer it as 6 before, necessitates that the answer actually is 6 (in accordance to what I remember is the mathematical operation). Deductions are what necessarily follow from the premises. Now, it is deduced that the answer must follow my pre-determined operation of the square root, which is subjected to your critique that I may not remember that operation reliably, but nothing about my memory of answering a particular way necessitates that it is the answer. I think what you are missing is that both the operation and the answer are deduced memories, which are compared, and you are correct in the case of questioning the memory of the operation (whatever I remember is the square root operation, is the square root operation), but the connection of the memory of the answer 6 being accurate to the memory of the operation of the square root is an induction. If I remember the operation of the square root (whatever that may be) and remember answering six, I can logically, abstractly, derive whether my memory of answering six actually aligns with the correct answer (as derived from my memory of the operation).

Look at it this way:

1. IF I am remembering correctly that I previously answered 6.
2. THEN the answer to the square root of 25 is 6

Does the conclusion necessarily follow from the premise? No. Therefore, it is not a deduction. I think your critique is perfectly valid, and very thought-provoking, in terms of the reliability of the operation of the square root. Likewise, let’s say I remember that there was a mathematical operation of the square root but I can’t remember what it was at all, then it may be the case that the most cogent induction is to go with what I remember answering with before: but it is not a deduction.

I think I may need to stop here for now. Wonderful post Philosophim!
Bob

Spectacular :) So the way that people such as myself would say it, is "all concepts exist beyond time".

I'm interpreting this as an agreement, but refurbishment, of what I said. However, I do not hold that "all concepts exist beyond time".

Your answer to the op would be, "existence was always here".

I don't want to be reiterative, and if you would like to close the discussion that perfectly fine (I am enjoying our conversation, but if you would like to end it that is fine too), but I want to clarify that I do not hold that position. If you would like to explain why you think that I am somehow implicitly arguing for that statement then please feel free: but I explicitly stated I am not in agreement with that proposition.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Excellent. Do you think the concept of "being" has always existed (or do you think that this concept had a beginning)?

Depends on what you mean. If you are referring to "being" as "existence" (as I depicted it), then you are again asking "do you think "existence" has always existed": which is an invalid question. If you are referring semantically to the word "being" in english, then yes it had a beginning. Concepts under the existential reference can be posited as "existing" or "not existing" in reference to in space and at a particular duration of time, but "existence" itself cannot be posited as "existing" or "not existing".

Has that concept of a unicorn always existed? Or does that concept of a unicorn only exist for a certain amount of time (such as while you imagine it)? If the concept of the unicorn did not always exist, does that mean the concept of the unicorn had a beginning?

Yes, any concept under the uniform existential reference can "be" or "not be" in relation to time and space. "not be" is a negation in reference to existence (in space and pertaining to a duration of time), and "be" is an affirmation.

Do human beings exist? Do you think the existence of human beings had a beginning? Or do you think human beings always existed?

What do you mean by "human beings"? If you mean "human being" as in the animal (as taken and thusly analyzed as an object), then they had a beginning of existence (with respect to many, I presume--as in the evolutionary definition would produce a beginning roughly of the first homio sapiens, or a different beginning time with regards to the first multi-cellular life, etc).

As in the subject (which I would specifically hold is reason, which is metaphysical), it is not subjected to the same analysis as the consideration of a "human being's" body (taken as object). But that might derail our conversation quite a bit, so I will leave it there and let you decide what you want to talk about.

Bob