I apologize if my responses were confusing, let me try to explain it more proficiently.

You are saying that there cannot be a predicate of existence because any answer would entail existence itself? Thus, it would be a contradiction?

So, as you previously pointed out, I am making two claims: (1) "existence" is not a valid predicate, and (2) "existence" has no valid predicates. In terms of #1, I think you are already understanding what that means (but, as always, I could be utterly wrong on that, so feel free to inquire further if you want). In terms of #2, I don't think there are any valid predicates to "existence": it is essentially a priori (or transcendental), which is necessarily presupposed in every manifestation of reason.

For example, any predicate offered for "existence" necessarily presupposes existence itself: existence is X, became X, was X, was caused by X, etc. is, became, etc references existence as its a priori presupposition.

In the op, I offer another option, instead of saying that there is a predicate of existence, you could say that existence was always here.

I may be misunderstanding you, but my critique here is that I don't think what you are offering truly is an alternative to a predicate of existence. To say "existence was always here" has a predicate (which is in bold). I'm not sure how that is separate solution from "a predicate of existence" (they are both predicates). If I say "existence was caused by X" or "existence has always been here", they both produce the same contradiction (as they are both predicates of existence).

I suppose what I do not understand is, why is it useful to you, to say that the question is illogical?

Are you saying that existence was always here? Or are you only saying that the question is illogical, but ignoring (I do not mean this in an accusatory sense!) the option of an eternal universe?

This is fair, my contention has been with the question itself. But in this case, although I understand how disappointing this is going to sound, the question is invalid (so I don't think there is a solution). If I asked you "how far can I throw a square circle?", you can't provide a valid answer because it is not a valid question (albeit enticing of a question). So if I am right (emphasis on if), then the question cannot be answered in a valid manner, because it is an invalid question. It would entail that it is a wasted effort to try and discover the answer to "what color is a triangular rectangle?" ("existence was caused by X"--was caused by X is a predicate which presupposes existence).

Now, I don't want to completely disappoint you: we can ask mind-boggling, thought-provoking questions pertaining to what pertains under the apodictically true references of our manifestations of reason (such as where did the "universe" come from). But existence in its entirety, is simply the ever referenced (a priori if you will) aspect of our reason. In terms of the universe (if posited as dis-synonymous with "existence" in its entirety), I think that it is a potential infinite: that would be my explanation. Zoom out, zoom in, go forward, go back, etc it will always be a potential infinite.

Does that help?

Bob

Disclaimer:

Bob, this was a very long post. Please make sure to read to the end before starting your response. I think that once you read the post in full, you will see that I cleared up all the confusion. Thanks!

I appreciate the disclaimer, but I would like to assure you that I will always read your posts in their entirety before making any assertions: I would not be giving you nor your ideas the proper respect it deserves if I didn't. You can always expect this of me, and if I fall short then you have permission to slap me through the internet (:

That being said, I am going to respond in chronological order (I find it easier that way), but if that is an issue just let me know and I can try a different approach.

Well, if there is no predicate for existence that is certainly one thing. If it is a contradiction to ask the question that would be another thing. And of course it could be both as well, hehe (3 options you are alluding to).

Yes, I think you are right here: I would be positing the combination of both.

Hmm, not exactly. You see, you are creating a trap for yourself. When you say that something existed without existing, that would merely be an oxymoron. I would not be so silly as to ask a question that was merely an oxymoron. :)

Asking for the predicate of existence is asking what created existence in the first place. I suppose to you, that sounds the same as "what existed without existence". :)

I understand that it is silly, when posited in the manner I did, to ask such a question: but that is my point. When you state "Asking for a predicate of existence is asking what created existence in the first place", I think you are thereby conceding that whatever created existence exists prior to existence. Now, you may be referring to maybe a different underlying meaning for "existence" for the creator vs the creation (so two different meanings for "to exist"), but nevertheless they would both be underneath the universal "being" reference (but you talk about this later on, so more on that later).

Let me ask you a question, what does "existence" mean to you?

I am not sure how in depth to explicate here (so feel free to inquire more in you would like), but I would consider "existence" as "to be" (or "being"), which, for me, has no relation "the external world" specifically. My imaginations exist. My thoughts exist. However, it exists only insofar as it is not contradicted. For example, a unicorn that I imagined in my mind exists as an imagined unicorn, but does not exist as a concreto in "the external world". Still exists, just abstractly. I think we (as in humanity) like to make meaningful distinctions between a unicorn "existing" in the sense of in my head and in the so called "real world", but both are engulfed by the ever present, unescapable "existence". Colloquially, for example, people may argue that "unicorns don't exist"; however, as you are probably already gathering, I would say that they are referring to a concept of "existence" under the holistic concept of existence. Hopefully that makes a bit of sense.

Well, on the surface of it, it would seem that "nothing" creating anything other than "nothing" is an oxymoron, indeed. :) Nevertheless, there are Physicists who believe that this is what happened.

This is just a side note, but I honestly don't think Physicists (for example, Lawrence Krauss) are actually referring to "true nothingness", but an altered version (especially in Krauss' case: he just can't seem to grasp that he isn't solving the philosophical dilemma pertaining to such because he is not defining nothing in the same manner).

As far as something causing existence...I think you're getting too caught up on what is considered to be logical, versus illogical, non-logical, etc. It does appear as well, that you conflate non-logic as being synonymous with illogic. Something could be non-logical and that does not automatically entail that it is illogical.

Very interesting! I don't think, as of now, I agree (I don't think it is a conflation). It may be, however, that we aren't referring to the same "logic" (semantically), but if something is non-logical it is illogical. In turn, something that is illogical is irrational. But to dive into that, let's take your example:

You do realize that first of all, the universe could be illogical, right (or non-logical)? For all intents and purposes we can't even disprove a solipsistic existence (no, I am not advocating for solipsism, I can already see you saying, "that's another debate" :)).

You know me too well already (that's another debate) (:. But all joking aside, I first want to explicate back to you what I think you mean by "illogical" vs "non-logical" (so you can correct me if I am wrong). "illogical" is that which is violated during the process of "logical inquiry", whereas "non-logical", which is where I am not clearly seeing the definition, is when something doesn't directly violate "logic" but, rather, is simply something that lacks "logic" altogether. Did I understand that correctly?

I think that (to keep it brief) something is "logical" if it is not contradicted and something is "illogical" if it is contradicted. "non-logic", in the sense of an absence of "logic", is subject to the same critique as before: it is only our logical derivation of what the negation of logic would be. Maybe if you explain it in further detail I can respond more adequately, but I don't see when something could be non-logical.

In terms of solipsism, I want to separate two claims that are typically made therein: we have no good reasons to believe other people are subjects and we are the only subject. The former I have no problem with (and actually agree), the latter is a leap (a giant leap). The latter is where solipsists get into trouble, and that's where the contradictions arise. I think (and correct me if I am wrong) you are positing solipsism as an example of something we don't hold, but nevertheless can't be dis-proven (logically): it is dis-proven in the sense of the latter, and proven in the sense of the former. I genuinely don't see how anything pertaining to such was "non-logical".

And whatever did create the universe would obviously have to surpass the normal laws of Physics that we abide by.

So when I speak of something never surpassing the universal being, spatial, and temporal references, I don't mean "physics". I am perfectly fine, for all intents and purposes, agreeing with you that such a being (if they exist) would have to transcend physics (I don't hold that "physics" or "laws of nature" are synonymous with "logic").

For a lot of what this question asks, logic will totally fly out the door.

If what you mean by this is "physics will fly out the door", then I agree. I do not hold that "logic" flies out the door, as it is utilized to derive everything (including "everything" itself). There's never a point at which I can conclude that I've derived a situation where the principle of noncontradiction is false, because even if I could do that it would be contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place (i.e. this hypothetical situation where pon is false, is contingent on me utilizing that very principle to derive it in the first place).

The art of this is to properly identify what is the most rational line of logic, if any, that we can apply to it. But do not forget that the very question will blur the lines of reality (since we are asking for the origin of reality itself).

I hate to be reiterative, but it blurs lines, I would say, because it is contradictory (albeit not self-evidently contradictory).

This is simply not true. An omniscient entity need not abide by the rules of our physics. The possibilities are as far as the imagination can go.

I think that we are utilizing "logic" differently. I have no problem, for all intents and purposes, conceding that an "omniscient entity" would not need to abide by the rules of our physics, because I don't hold "physics" as synonymous with "logic". Imagination abides by logic (I know, it may sound crazy). That doesn't mean that my imagination abides by physics (it definitely doesn't: I can fly on my imagined earth).

"Nothing" does not reference existence. Nothing is the complete opposite of that. "Nothingness" has no reference in the first place.

"Nothing" is not an existence. Nothing would be the complete opposite of that. Nothing is not a spatial reference. Nothing has no reference in the first place. The more you try to describe nothing, the less it is the true idea of nothing :)

Well, we are "something" so it is very hard to conceptualize "nothing". As you are saying, whatever concept you have, it will be of "something". That's how you know what nothing is (it's the exact opposite). Do you see how that works? :)

This is merely more of the same. The key to understanding "nothing" again, is not to envision the "combination of concepts" as you say, but rather, the deletion of them. When you get good at conceptualizing the "absence", then you will have a decent understanding of nothing.

Sure, it is ultimately impossible to conceptualize nothing, but that is exactly what you need to understand. :)

It's the exact opposite of everything you know. The more you fight it, the less it is "nothing". Embrace the "absence". Btw, do you know what would happen if you could actually conceptualize "nothingness"?

I think you are agreeing with me that we cannot conceptualize or fathom "nothing". However, I think you are stilling positing that it somehow exists apart from existence. Would you agree that "nothing" is simply the potential infinite of "deleting" concepts? My point is that that potential infinite would merely, at best, approach the limit of "nothing", and I feel like you are agreeing with me on that. However, that previous sentence is partially wrong, there is no "actual nothing" that is apart from "nothing" as a potential infinite of removals (we aren't approaching "true nothingness").

Likewise, the process of achieving a potential infinite of removals is simply the removal of something from space. That is what I mean by nothing being spatially referenced. Obviously nothing would negate "space": but would it? No. It would negate a conception of a spatial framework under the uniform space. Every attempt to negate "space" would follow that pattern for a potential infinite of times. Do you agree with me on that?

So, to recap, to say that one gets decent at understanding nothing by practicing the deletion of concepts, that is all "nothing" is. There's no "actual nothing" that we are approaching the limit of when we perform such actions.

Where you make your mistake is in assuming that because we are "something" that we cannot learn about "nothing". But we can; nothing is the complete negation of everything that we know to be something.

I don't have a problem exploring the practice of the absence (in a potential infinite fashion) of concepts. My point is that "nothing" in the sense of a potential infinite is not the same as positing a "complete negation of everything": that is attempting to achieve something which doesn't exist (an actual infinite of removals). That is recognizing the potential infinite of removals and leaping (in my opinion) to the idea that we are moving towards (approaching in a limit style) "true nothingness".

And here you are telling me that we cannot understand nothing. We are the only ones that can! Because we are something!

Hopefully I cleared up some of the confusion: I agree that we, as something, can explore the concept of a potential infinite of removals, but that's not "true nothing" in the sense of an actual infinite of removals. I would refurbish "true nothing" as simply the former and deny the latter.

I look forward to hearing from you.
Bob

Absolutely! You have it right, it's just that ever since Einstein described time as a fourth dimensional property, time was seen as something existing outside of the 3 dimensions we currently live in. :smile:

In terms of what we've been discussing (which it is a great discussion by the way!), I have no problem with either postulations (it being outside of 3D or within it), as my main point is that both postulations have no bearing on my assertion. They would both still be conjectures that are under the uniform spatial reference. It could very well be that I am missing something, so please feel free to point it out if you think I am misunderstanding (:

The article is merely stating that they are trying to prove that time can be used as a measurement within 3-d space. Nevertheless, time would still be separate from space whether in a fourth dimension or as a measurement.

Ah, so if it is indeed postulating that time is nevertheless "separate" from space in a fourth dimension or third, then I think it is subjected to the same exact critique. But to get into that, let me address the rest of your post.

I guess my larger point to your contention (Physics experiments aside :)) regarding notions of "nothing", and things that do not have a cause, self-creation, etc., is that such descriptions are actually possible.

Just because something cannot exist does not mean it cannot be described.

With regards to the second quote here, I actually (generally) agree: I may determine that, in hindsight, something that I thought was possible was actually impossible given the circumstances, and I nevertheless can describe them. However, I wouldn't quite agree with the first quote (which I think is in connection to the second): a predicate that contradicts its subject is describable only insofar as it demonstrates the contradiction itself. For example, a "circle that is square" only describes my ability to conceive of a "circle", a "square", and the joining of non-contradictory shapes (e.g. a square rectangle, two circles overlapping one another, etc). These three concepts are arranged in a particular order that produces a predicate that contradicts its subject (i.e. "circle is a square"): I take both concepts of the shapes and determine they are impossible. Moreover, more importantly, when I truly try to conceive of a "circle that is a square" I attempt to join the two shapes together, and given I can't, I never conceive of it. Now, I think what you are getting at (correct me if I am wrong), is that I nevertheless was able to describe what a circular square would be. To that I would agree only insofar as I am able to explicate the contradiction (and therefrom the three aforementioned concepts), but never what a "circular square" actually is. All I obtain, as described, is a "circle", a "square", and the joining to non-contradictory shapes. So I wouldn't completely disagree with you, but I wouldn't agree either.

Sure, we can accept that the universe was always here, but it will still lead to very difficult questions to be answered.

I would say that it depends on what you mean by "universe". Can we potentially explain the big bang? Or something else in the causal chain? Yes. If by "universe" you mean holistically all of "existence", then no. I think that causally speaking it is all a potential infinite. We are never going to get to a point where we can rest our heads and proclaim "we've find the first starting point!". All within the causal order is potentially infinite. So, I am not accepting that the universe was always here in the sense of an actual infinite but, rather, I would explain it in terms of a potential infinite. However, that potential infinite, if granted as the explanation, doesn't explain all of "existence", only merely that which is in the causal order.

It must be said that "nothing" is far easier than "something". For nothing to exist there is no friction, no energy that need be applied, no mathematics, no logic, no suffering, no agony, no dismay, no death and destruction, no moral arguments, no restitution nor justice. There needn't be any struggle for survival, betrayal, striving for immortality, fighting against the odds...there would merely be nothing. Nothing is far easier. It is the highest paradigm of Occam's razor.

Why need there be something when there can be nothing?

I understand what you are conveying here, and it is worthy question to ask. However, I would like to firstly disclaim that whether "nothing" is easier than "something" (which, as you are well aware, inevitably invokes Occam's razor) is a separate debate (albeit I am more than willing to participate). The only reason I say that is because it also has no bearing on what I was meaning to convey in my original post. Nothing, in terms of how you are using it in your example, is not "true nothingness", which is what I was trying to dispute. Your consideration is exactly in agreement (I think at least) with what I was saying: you are simply conceiving of "nothing" as the negation of all "things", which is the absent of all conceivable concepts. My original point was that that is not "nothing" in a pure sense (as it can't be postulated in a pure sense).

Anyways, back to what you were saying. I think that "nothing", in the sense of conceptualizing complete absence, is dependent on "something". For I would hold it is "something". If I conceptualize the negation (as you did) of all concepts, there's inevitably a spatial reference left over (i.e. no energy, no mathematics, etc are simply the conceptualization of something without that concept--such as something without mathematics). This hasn't "escaped", so to speak, the uniform spatial reference: to posit something as not there, I am referencing "a there". So, if what you mean by "nothing" is describable is that we can describe the negation of all concepts (in a potential infinite fashion), then I agree. However, I don't see how that negates what I am saying either. However, the problem with me saying "nothing" is "something" is that "nothing" would negate that "something" (it is a contradiction to claim that "nothing" is "something"), but my point is that the negation is this without that.

In terms of whether "nothing" is truly "easier" than "something", I am not so sure of that. Again, I don't think there is "nothing" without 'negating something'. Even stating "nothing without negating something" is utilizing the uniform spatial reference.

So when you ask "why is there something rather than nothing?", I think, holistically, you are asking "why is there something rather than the removal of concepts from my inevitable spatial reference?". But, in terms of causal order, we can ask a potential infinite of questions pertaining to why this was cause by that rather than that simply not causing this.

Certainly we are not here to just accept it all. I mean, plenty of people do, and that works out just fine for them. But to have a brain and be surrounded by countless inanimate matter, in an environment where we seem to be the pinnacle of intelligence, we are thus obligated to question how we got here and why.

I don't see how we are "certainly not here just to accept it all". However, I am not entirely sure what you are meaning by "accept it all". In terms of the causal order, we can most definitely try to explain why the universe is the way it is, or what caused the Big Bang, or something like that. However, the entirety of existence cannot be explained in that manner.

Providing the sound principle of "Occam's razor" we must admit that something is far harder than nothing.

As far as I understand his principle, it is "entities should not be multiplied without necessity", not that the simplest answer (or easier answer) is better. Also, I don't think that Occam's razor derives any sort of qualifications for comparing two theories in terms of complexity (in other words, Occam's razor speaks to if something rather than nothing is more complex than nothing without necessity, then we should hold that the latter is true over the former). Later, any arguments one may give for that actually being the case (something being harder than nothing) is an attempt to apply that rule (that there should actually be nothing). Otherwise, the razor itself simply points out that the belief that has minimal necessary specifications should supersede others. So, in other words, accepting Occam's razor does not necessitate that something is far harder than nothing (that's a separate argument, I would say).

And if this is not the case, then what is it that is stopping nothing from existing?

I see this no different than asking what is stopping a square circle from existing: it can't (not only that, but it can be only conceived of and described insofar as a contradiction, which wouldn't be what it would actually be).

If we are the power that defeats nothing then we must be the power that creates inquiry.

I am not sure how the impossibility of nothing necessitates that we create inquiry: how is that so?

Wonderful points (:, I look forward to hearing from you.
Bob

I appreciate your response. Although I may just be misunderstanding the article you referenced, it seems as though they are disputing time being that of 4D (and positing it as apart of 3D), not that time is "separate" in the sense of time being truly separate from "space" altogether:

Time is 'separated' from space in a sense that time is not a fourth dimension of space. Instead, time as a numerical order of change exists in a 3D space. Our model on space and time is founded on measurement and corresponds better to physical reality.

In terms of what I said in my post, I don't find anything wrong with positing time "in a 3D space".

Hypothetically (just in case I misunderstood the article), let's say they were arguing for a time which is "outside of space" (or "beyond space"), then I think it would be subject to the same critique I made in my original post.

It also depends on what you are referring to by "space". I am not considering it in the sense of "outer space", "string theory", "special relativity", etc (although they are really interesting and worthy considerations): I am referring to the universal spatial reference of everything (including "everything" itself"). Which I think physicists tend to be more interested in distinctions of "space" under the uniform, inevitable spatial reference (which, to be honest, I think they should be: they're profession is science not philosophy).

Briefly speaking, I would argue that there is no predicate to "existence" and to ask for one I think is a contradiction: it is asking for what existed without existence. Therefore, "existence was caused by nothing" is just as much of a logical contradiction as "existence was caused by something". Nothing can be posited that isn't engulfed in the universal reference of "being", and, consequently, it is not possible to actually posit the question "what is the predicate of existence": it can be uttered, but nevertheless references something causing something under the universal spatial (and "being") reference. Even "nothing" itself is referencing existence, but merely an existence most absent of all things (i.e. a spatial references with absolute minimal things contained in it). I can nor could I fathom whatever an "actual nothingness" would be because I am simply cogitating a concept of "nothingness" as without something (i.e. zero apples is simply a reference, still to existence, of something that can't be identified with "apples"). And the reason I am able to even assert (and contemplate) "true nothingness" or "actual nothingness" is simply due to my ability to conceptually combine concepts together: "actual" implies that something isn't what I deem "fake", and when I concatenate that to "nothingness" (the absence of as much as fathomable) I get a false hope that I have somehow achieved some other concept than "nothingness" ("nothingness" as itself, apart from all illusions)(that I could "actually" conceive, even partially due to the very utterance, "nothing"). "Nothing itself" (just like "true nothingness") is no more than the concatenation of concepts that produces a fallacious belief in producing a new concept. For example, "what is outside of space?" produces an illusion that I have somehow achieved a question that suggests something beyond space, but really I have conjoined the concept of "space" with my concept of "outside" (which is spatially referencing). What really is being posited in "what is outside of space?" is a spatial framework under the universal spatial reference that may be distinct from yet another spatial framework (i.e. "outside"): thereby getting no closer to even fathoming anything beyond space (and "beyond space" is subject to the same critique).

@Philosophim,

I decided to give it a couple days to mow it over in my head, as I didn't feel like I am completely understanding you, and now I think I understand what you are trying to convey. As always, I could be utterly wrong, so I am going to explicate it here (along with some suggestions that presuppose I am correct in my inference).

Firstly, "distinctive knowledge" is "deductions". "Applicable knowledge" is merely referencing the means of achieving that "distinctive knowledge" (i.e. the transformation of an inductive belief into deductive knowledge--belief into knowledge) and, therefore, is unnecessary for this distinction you are trying to convey. If it was induced and confirmed via a deduction, then that is "distinctive knowledge" (an induction that transformed into a deduction). Therefore, the dividing line I think you are looking for is "deductions" vs "inductions", so "knowledge is what is deduced" and "beliefs are what are induced": I honestly don't think it gets any clearer or more concise than that. Therefore, I suggest removing the terms "distinctive" and "applicable" knowledge outright in exchange for "deduction (knowledge)" and "induction (belief)". That would also resolve my confusion with abstraction vs non-abstraction, as abstraction can be induced and deduced (i.e. I can induce about my capabilities of reason or imagination, etc or I can deduce that the principle of non contradiction is a necessity). The dividing line of abstraction vs non-abstraction doesn't line up with deduction vs induction, which it doesn't have to in your case (unless I am wrong here).

But I want to be very careful here, as I would not agree that all deductions are knowledge. For all intents and purposes here, I am going to elaborate with a distinction of "categorical" vs "hypothetical" deductions (not married to the terms, just for explanation purposes). Although they are both deductions (and, consequently, their conclusions necessarily follow from the overlying principle and subsequent premises), they differ in the validity of the overlying principle itself. If a deduction was "categorical", then it is necessarily (categorically) true. However, if it was "hypothetical", then the conclusions are only true in virtue of granting the overlying principle as hypothetically true. This can be demonstrated (both of them) in one example:

1. All cats are green
2. Bob is cat
3. Bob is green

If I am asserting this as "categorically" true, then I am actually defining "greeness" as an essential property of "cat", therefore this deduction is necessarily true unconditionally. However, if I am asserting this "hypothetically", then I am thereby asserting in virtue of hypothetically holding that it is true that all cats are green. In your terms, it would be that "greeness" is an induced unessential property of "cat", which has thus far been true of all "cats" (let's just hypothetically say). Likewise, deductively obtaining the properties of an object doesn't necessitate that you deductively obtain that it is or isn't something (i.e. you don't necessarily obtain knowledge). if I define "glass" as having the essential property of being "(1) clear and (2) made from melting sand", then, assuming I didn't watch it get made, I can't assert that this pane in front of me is actually "glass": it would be an induction. So, although I deductively discover the properties of the presumably "glass pane" in front of me, I do not deductively obtain that it is thereby "glass" (I inductively assert it is).

So, I would hereby agree that "distinctive knowledge" should actually simply be "categorical deductions" (it can semantically be whatever term you want), which encompasses "knowledge". Inductions (and abductions) are beliefs, and hypothetical deductions are not knowledge, but with respect to what hypothetically follows they are (which doesn't mean one "knows" anything beyond the logical consequence of the overlying principle being taken in virtue as true--aka the logical consequences, or premises, are "categorically" true in the sense that they logically follow, therefore knowledge but the hypothetical is not).

I would also like to briefly clarify that my square root of 25 example was meant as a "solo context", as it can be posited as either one (but I should have made that clear, so that's my bad). The dilemma is still there if we were to presume that I came up with the mathematical operation of the square root. I came up with it a year ago, by myself, and began memorizing the answers of the square roots of like 100 integers (or what have you). Then, a year later, I ask myself "what's the square root of 25?". I immediately assert it is "6" in reference to what I believe was what I memorized a year ago (in accordance with the mathematical rules I produced). That's an induction. I then deductively invalidate it by means of actually performing the mathematical operation in accordance to how I defined it a year ago. Same dilemma. It is trivial in the sense that I could semantically change it, but I would still be incorrect with respect to what I constructed a year ago.

If you agree here with me (presuming I understood what you were trying to convey correctly), then this inevitably segues into "essential" vs "unessential" properties. Even in the sense of what you were explicating in the sense of "premises" and "conclusions" (in an attempt to ground them absolutely), we will need to revisit what essential properties are. I think in theory they sound great, but I'm having difficulties actually implementing them. For example, what is the essential property (or properties) of a "dog"? I get that I could, in a solo context, categorically define it. But soon enough I would realize it is insufficient, as I would be necessarily excluding a predominant population of "dogs" no matter how I try to divide the line (create essential properties). The only feasible means I've found is making one essential property that is a combination (conjugation) of all properties of being a "dog". Thusly, there's no unessential properties, and every "dog" is compared abstractly to what my mind comes up with as a "perfect dog". Otherwise, I could keep performing a reductive approach where I never derive a true essential property of being a "dog". For example, if I cut a "dog" in half, neither side shares anything I would imagine even remotely has to with an essential property of a "dog". Nevertheless, I would reference them as "two halves of a dog". But in referencing it to "dog", I've thereby implicitly conceded it resembles a "dog". But resemblance necessitates a communal property (in this case, a communal essential property). So even if I were to claim that I have different "essential properties" for "bottom half of a dog" and "top half of a dog", I am still implicitly conceding they necessarily share a trait with "a dog" (but with essential properties it is impossible they share anything related to such--and I truly hope you can prove me wrong here). Therefore, I am starting to think the resemblance is my mind's abstract "mapping" or "consideration" of both halves, whereby I am able to assert they are halves "of a dog". That's essentially my dilemma.

I think that the aforementioned consideration of "essential properties" is important to distinguishing "hypothetical" vs "categorical" (or what have you) deductions.

But now, I think with my further realization of the difference, I can finally remove "reality".

I agree, I think that the term was causing (me at least) confusion.

Knowledge ultimately is a deduction. A deduction is a conclusion which necessarily follows from its premises.

Hopefully I demonstrated that this is not necessarily true. Yes, a deduction is what necessarily follows from its premises, but that isn't necessarily knowledge with respect to the initial principle(s).

Any legitimate contradiction to a deduction, means its not a deduction any longer.

In terms of it's logical consequences, yes. Any contradiction to the overlying principle(s) does not revoke it as a deduction.

A zero point is the origin of an X and Y graph. When you are looking at a line pattern, putting it to the zero point can give clarity on comparing its symmetry and slopes. What we're doing with definitive and applicable knowledge is putting knowledge on a zero point, and noting the X and Y dimensions. It is in essence a drawn line or parabola, but charted in a graph in such a way as to break it down into an easier calculation.

I think this contradicts the whole purpose of the epistemology (especially in terms of essential properties), which entailed clear and distinctive terminology. The terms can share inheritance, but not definitional essential properties. For example, a square and a triangle are mutually exclusive, however they share the trait of being a "shape". I don't think this is what you meant by (0, 0): I think you are arguing for the allowance of minimally ambiguous terminology.

And when you combine the two, that result cannot be obtained without both an induction, and a deduction.

I don't think this is true (or maybe I just am not following). An induction that transforms into a deduction is no different than a deduction (ultimately). If I induce that that object over there is a potato and then I go over there an deduce it actually is, this is ultimately the same exact thing as if I had it in my hands to begin with and deduced it was a potato. Both are "distinctive knowledge". Only what is deduced is verified in the induction, anything else would remain an induction. "Applicable knowledge" means nothing more than I happened to create a belief prior to deducing any knowledge about it. The induction is not constituted in any of the "knowledge" aspect.

What you are missing here is another ingredient we have not spoken about very much, but is important.

I understand why you went to societal contexts, but it can be posited (and was supposed to be posited) as a solo context.

I feel in a self-contained context, the descriptors of distinctive and applicable are clear

I don't think they are. I think "inductions" and "deductions" (and "hypothetical" vs "categorical" deductions therein) are clear. But maybe that isn't what you are trying to convey.

An induction, who's conclusion has been reached deductively, is applicable knowledge.

I don't find any meaning in this definition. If it was deduced, then it is distinctive, not applicable. If it happened to be an induction previously, well then it was an induction previously. I don't see how this is a meaningful distinction to make.

In terms of the coin flipping example, that was distinctive knowledge that is being semantically refurbished as applicable simply because you happened to preemptively determine a belief towards what will happen. If you didn't guess it would land on heads, it would have been purely distinctive knowledge (nothing was induced). Why does it matter if I preemptively guess?

Finally, it is essential to note how the induction is concluded. Having an induction that happens to be correct is not the same as knowledge in any epistemological analysis I've ever read. And for good reason. A guess that happens to be right is not knowledge, its just a lucky guess. We can have knowledge that we made a guess, and we can have knowledge of the outcome of that guess, but that is it.

I don't think this is a relevant point to your epistemology, as it doesn't claim inductions are knowledge. The moment you deduce what actually is, that's what you know. Even if it aligns with your induction and you have legitimate reasons to conclude you were on to something with that induction, you didn't know anything--you had an inductive belief. Even in hindsight, you didn't know. At best, you now know that you lucked your way into aligning with real knowledge, regardless of how solid your evidence was for the induction you held.

I still believe distinctive knowledge always comes from applicable knowledge

If distinctive knowledge is a categorical deduction (and maybe potentially also the categorically true logical consequences of the premises of a hypothetical deduction), I agree.

I would clarify that the applicable is not the attempt to verify inductions, it is the deductive result of an induction

If this is the case, then it is distinctive knowledge. A "deductive result of an induction" is simply distinctive knowledge when it happened to be preceded by a belief on the position, which could very well not have asserted (and the deduction would have still occurred). For example, if I am walking around and pick up an object off the ground, without any prejudgments of what it is, and deduce it is a potato, this is no different ultimately than if I spot it at a distance, claim it is a potato, and then deductively discover it is a potato (it just has more extraneous steps involved).

This is the part you might like Bob, as I believe you've been wanting some type of fundamental universal of "reason". This logic of induction and deduction is reached because we are able to think in terms of premises and conclusions. This is founded on an even simpler notion of "predictions" and "outcomes to predictions". Much like our capability to discretely experience, this is an innate capability of living creatures. I believe this coincides with your definition of "reason" earlier as "decisions with expectations".

I still think we are slowly converging in our views, it is just taking a while (: . I wouldn't put it that way (in terms of reason), but I think you are starting to explore recursively reason on itself and, thusly, realizing that "deductions" and "induction" are innate in us. I'm not entirely sure how you are planning to ground it, but I definitely think you can (assuming it remotely aligns with my conception of reason).

Just to be brief, I think you are going to have to ground it in fundamental logic, which is something I don't think you agree with yet (I think you believe it all to be constructed). That fundamental logic, whatever you want to semantically call it, is going to (I would anticipate) resemble the basic transcendental properties of reason (as in that which is deductively obtained as necessitous and apodictic of the mind, which is concluded to be such due to its ever present--potential infinite--nature in all forms of thoughts). But I will let you navigate the conversation as you deem best fit.

Can we define this in a way that is undeniable, like discretely experiencing?

As of now, and this goes back to way back when we first started having this conversation, I don't think you have grounded "discrete experience" except that it is "undeniably there". But I think you will have to ground both in the same manner (if it is going to be an absolute grounding), and I definitely think you can do it. I think your initial usage of pon is a perfect start (but there's some things, I would say, that precede distinctions--aka discrete experience). I think "discrete experience" is a convenient clumping of many aspects of the fundamentals of the mind, but to achieve your grounding of deductions, premises, conclusions, induction, predictions, etc, I think you are going to have to at least conceptually analyze the sub-categories.

I agree that we may need to save "will" for later and I concur that "reason" hasn't been discussed too much yet. I can do so if you want, otherwise I will simply respond to wherever you navigate the discussion. Likewise, although I think it will be inevitably discussed soon in relation to your "actions" and "premises" and such, I will allow you do decide if you want to discuss "fundamental logic" or not.

I look forward to hearing from you!

Bob

@Kuro,

To briefly answer your original question, I think that most people nowadays default to materialism (physicalism). But since this discussion forum has seemingly naturally segued into an actual debate between more idealist minded individuals vs more materialistic minded individuals, let me give you my two cents (for whatever they are worth) on the topic. I think that a vast majority of what we know is empirical, but necessarily never solely such: some things are presupposed in any empirical investigation. To be clear and concise, let me provide one example: connectives (as the components of a conclusion which act as the connections, whether that be synthetic or analytic) is always necessarily presupposed in any empirical evaluation. To keep it brief, I think that reason is always met with a recursive potential infinite of connectives when attempting to empirically explain any given connective. For example, if A is connected (in any fashion or form) to B, we then can very well ask why that connective is valid. But when, let's say, explanations for the connective(s) involved in connecting A to B are derived (such as C and D or what have you), we can always ask the very same of those connectives utilized to derive such, and we can perform this for a potential infinite of times, thereby we never get any closer to explaining connectives (i.e. the actual connective's validity, for any further explanation necessarily utilizes connectives itself which are presupposed as valid in explaining the original connective); Only as we trudge along the path of the recursive potential infinite of explanations of connectives do (I think) we realize that the most cogent solution is that of connectivity being transcendental (as in not completely separate from reason--aka not transcendent--but proposed as necessarily an unconditional absolute grounding of reason itself as derived from reason), whereby we still freely concede that this was also a connection and, consequently, the connective(s) involved in that conclusion reveal connectives, as a whole, as truly something of a potential infinite prerequisite of reason itself. So, in relation to reason, it is reasoned that connectives can only be proficiently explained in reference to its potential infinite nature, which necessitates that it be conceptualized as transcendental of reason. Furthermore, this entire investigation into connectives was obtained empirically by analysis of reason on itself to determine that, actually, this entire process of empirical investigation always (for a potential infinite) presupposes the validity of all connectives. So, that which is transcendental (in this case, connectivity) is necessarily obtained empirically, but reveals that which is necessarily presupposed for empiricism in the first place (that which is not empirical). So, I hold, even if we could hypothetically explain (which involves connections) the mind as reduced to the brain, we would not have gotten any closer to explaining the connectives utilized in that empirical investigation: therefore, at best (hypothetically), the mind holistically being derived of the material brain (holistically in the sense that seemingly every manifestation of reason is properly explained by science--i.e. we could tell when you think of a car vs a cat, decide to do something, make you angry, etc) would only be in relation to reason and the connectives presupposed as valid in the first place and, consequently, only ever pertaining to what is manifested by reason and not what is transcendentally true of all manifestations of reason itself--therefore not truly holistically (as in completely) explanatory (there's always an aspect that will never to be explained).

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I really appreciate your elaboration, as I think I am starting to grasp the "distinctive" vs "applicable" distinction you are making. Your uncovering of inductions vs inductions verified via deductions is marvelous (and not to mention, helped me understand your viewpoint better)! However, sadly, I am still having troubles truly concurring with you. Let me try to explain (slash simply ask you questions).

Firstly, I am not finding it self-apparent that your definitions of "distinctive knowledge" and "applicable knowledge" are mutually exclusive:

When you can hold onto your definitions of logic, and decide your outcome, this would be considered distinctive knowledge.

I suppose an induction which has a deductively concluded outcome is applicable knowledge.

Let me give you an example where I am finding these definitions problematic (and you tell me where I am getting it wrong, because I am fairly confident it is probably just me misunderstanding). Imagine I am contemplating the square root of 25. Let's say I immediately (without performing the math) assert that it is 6 (because I memorized the square roots of certain numbers previously and, albeit incorrect, associated my memory of one particular square root problem as being answered by 6 with it being the square root of 25). My assertion here is a belief (that it is 6), and is therefore an induction (my premises do not necessarily constitute the conclusion). To determine my assertions validity, I perform the necessary mathematical operations, which is how I am able to deduce that my inductive belief was incorrect (5 * 5 = 25, 6 * 6). Since this example abides by the form you have defined for "applicable knowledge", it was "application" (all of which was pure, abstract reason).

However, if I had never asserted anything (i.e. that it was 6), then it would have been "distinctive knowledge" because it was a pure deduction (which is entirely within my control, as it is abstract).

But in either case the belief (or lack thereof) was irrelevant. If I say 1 + 1 probably equals 2, and then perform addition to determine (deductively) that it actually is, then technically that is "applicable knowledge". If I merely hadn't guessed anything prior to the deduction of mathematical principles, then it would have been distinctive knowledge.

Furthermore, I think you are claiming that distinctive knowledge precedes (always) applicable knowledge, but in this case (depending on whether a belief is conjured) applicable knowledge could be obtained without using any prior distinctive knowledge (e.g. without asserting a preliminary belief, the deductive application of addition to 1 + 1 would produce distinctive knowledge, but with a preliminary belief it would have produced applicable knowledge without any preceding distinctive knowledge).

I think, if I am understanding you correctly, what you are more trying to convey is abstract vs non-abstract knowledge, and you seem to be arguing that line is drawn by what you do or do not control. But abstract knowledge under your definitions would not be exclusively distinctive.

Likewise, an induction that is verified via a deduction is not a "deduction which is not contradicted by reality": it an induction which is not contradicted by reality, but is distinguished from other inductions by the manner in which is confirmed (deduction). So it seems like distinctive and applicable knowledge do not, after all, utilize the same method (but nevertheless utilize pon). To make it more confusing on my end, it also doesn't seem like you are strictly claiming an abstract divide either, because the coining of a term in reference to an object in front of me would be a pure deduction (which pertains to something non-abstract) and, thusly, would be distinctive knowledge. Whereas my belief that some object that isn't in front of me is the same as the one that is would be merely an induction (that happens to be verified/unverified by means of a deduction), therefore applicable knowledge. And, moreover, when I go verify that that other object is indeed like the other one that I previously saw (thereby using deduction), that would be distinctive knowledge in the sense that it is a pure deduction. And my consideration of that object, grounded in a pure deduction, being that of the same as the previous object would be a purely abstract consideration (i.e. I am comparing the properties of this object, gathered deductively, to the previous properties I deductively found of the other object--none of this is non-abstract). It is almost like a pure deduction is always distinctive, regardless to what it pertains, and applicable is really the attempt to verify inductions. Don't get me wrong, I share many examples with you where this dividing line seems clear, but upon deeper reflection I am left with nothing but confusion. Did you not also distinctively know the two A's over there when you verified your inductive belief about them? Then didn't you abstractly compare those properties to the A's you conjured up in your mind (which is still within the realm of "distinctive knowledge")? When they abstractly matched (in essential properties) you thereby asserted it valid (wouldn't that be distinctive knowledge?). So really "applicable knowledge" is inductions which you distinctively know to be true, no?

As this is foundational, I'm trying to embrace definitions that any person could come to on their own. So in the beginning, reality is simple. If everything went according to my will, there would be no need for the identity of "reality". Everything I willed would happen. But, there is an existence which can counter my will. Sometimes it does. Sometimes it does not. Regardless, it has the capability to deny my will. Reality is the existence that can, or does not counter my will. That's all there is to it.

I admire your desire to keep it fundamentally easier to comprehend (and honestly that is your prerogative, I respect that), but I find your "will" incredibly ambiguous (I am gathering it might be purposely so?). For example, if "reality" is simply "what I do not control", then my body could very well not be apart of "reality". Moreover, my imagination may be apart of and not apart of reality (depending): what if I can't control my imagination, or maybe only particular aspects? What if I could control my breathing in my dream, but not the my arms movements: are my imaginative arms apart of "reality" but not my imaginative breathing? This also opens the doors to everything being consumed by "reality": if I will that my next thought be a continuation of the subject I am currently contemplating and the very next thought segues into something completely irrelevant, then my thoughts are also "reality", which inevitably begs the question of what isn't "reality"? All I have are thoughts, what is left? I think, like you are saying, at a surface level "control vs no-control" seems intuitive, but upon deeper reflection it isn't that solid (nor clear) of a distinction. Objects, regardless of who is willing their actions, are still objects. Objects are "reality". I am having a hard time seeing (beyond simply trying to keep it intuitive for the layman) how this distinction has any bearing on control? Even if my body always was aligned with my will, it would still be apart of reality. I honestly don't think what you are trying to convey really has any bearing on control either (unless I am just misunderstanding): abstract vs non-abstract knowledge is still a meaningful distinction regardless of who willed what. But at the same time, maybe you aren't making such a distinction (abstract vs non-abstract), because you definitions seem to be implying other things (a deeper divide) than what I am understanding (I think).

Abstract logic is something you create. You will that a particular definition means X.

I agree that we can create abstract logic, but it follows from necessary logic. IF X -> THEN Y is logically constructed in the sense that I can choose to reject the relation of X to Y (i.e. Y does not follow from X). In that sense I agree, but the form of IF THEN conditional logic is necessarily already there, and cannot be rejected. I can always innately, whether I like it or not, construct logic which is built off of a conditional (something not asserted as true, but assumed as such for further exposition). To even try to negate IF THEN in terms of its form, I would have to conditionally assume a hypothetical where I don't necessarily utilize IF THEN, which thereby solidifies its necessity. It is easier to see with pon: I can construct logic utilizing pon, but pon is necessarily the bedrock of logic itself. Maybe it should be distinguished as a different kind of logic (but then we might start getting into controversial terminology, such as transcendental logic or something like that, which we both may not agree with). But I see your point and agree: we can make up, built off of the fundamentals of logic, what we conceptualize as "logic".

In other words, no inductions are created and tested. This is distinctive knowledge.

Again, this I find problematic (see original examples: it seems, so far, to be a superficial distinction). Sometimes the induction conjured up doesn't matter at all.

Like tier 1 knowledge is distinctive while tier 2 is applicable. Instead of 'applicable', maybe another word? Processed? Gleaned? I'm open to suggestions!

Hopefully I've demonstrated that it isn't always tier 1, but application could be tier 1 as well. It really seems like you are distinguishing a deduction from an induction (that can only be verified by deduction--which would be thereby something verified distinctively). I still think, so far, that the only clear distinction here would be reason and everything referred to by it (aboutness vs about).

This is not the same thing as using your logical set to induce an outcome that you must then confirm. By this I mean you are holding onto your definitions of logic, but cannot decide the outcome

Again, if it is about being able to decide the outcome, then my original examples are distinctive knowledge, but if it is about whether it is an induction verified by deductions, then it is applicable knowledge. I can have inductions that do not pertain to objects (i.e. are abstract) which I can then thereafter determine whether they are true via abstract deduction.

Bob, I can't thank you enough for your keen and pointed comments on this. I always knew distinctive and applicable knowledge worked, but I always felt it lacked refinement or a clear way to explain and demarcate it. I think I've found that now thanks to you. I hope this clarifies this issue for you as well!

I am glad I was of service! However, although it did clear things up a bit, I still am not fully agreeing with it nor do I think it is a clear distinction.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

@Philosophim,

Bob, I admit, this tripped me up at first. I had to think a while on your post, to try to get to what felt like was missing.

I am glad that my responses are thought-provoking (and I assure you that I find yours equally so)! I would hate for our conversation to not be fruitful for us both.

I think I am still not quite able to pin point what you are conveying with "will" or the dividing line for distinctive vs applicable, so let me try to explain my position on the topic.

What I meant to convey was the only reason we can have a concept of reality as something separate from ourselves, is because there are things that go against our will. If everything went in accordance to our will, there would be no need for the term "reality".

If I am understanding you correctly, I think you are claiming that something being a member of "reality" must have at least gone against our will once before, which means that something that is apart of "reality" can go in accordance with our will but as long as it has gone against our will once before then it is a member of "reality". If that is not what you are claiming, then I am not quite following. Because you then stated:

No, I define reality as what is. Sometimes "what is" is when our will happens. Sometimes "what is" is when it does not happen.

This makes me believe the aforementioned is what you are claiming because, otherwise, "what is" that is in accordance with our will would not be a member of "reality" (but, rather, a member of ourselves). I'm thinking you are claiming that it is a member of "reality" regardless of whether it was in accordance with our will as long as it went against our will previously (at least once): am I correct here?

Moreover, I am also trying to hone in on what you mean by "will". When you say:

I will to wave my hand, and reality does not contradict that will. I will to fly by my mind alone, and reality contradicts this.

This makes me think you may be using "will" as one shared will between the mind and the body, but, given that the body doesn't have to abide by the will of the mind, I don't think this is what you are saying. I think you are trying to keep this a bit more high level, conceptually, than I am.

I make a distinction between the body's will and reason's will. The latter is that which manifests in the head in relation to reason (obtained by recursively analyzing reason on its previous manifestations), and the former is the will of the body extrapolated from its actions by reason. I think it was Nietzsche that first exposed me to a preposterous claim pertaining to "free will" being like that of a man who awoke in the morning, stepped outside, and "willed" the sun to rise. Seeing it rise, he determined it was from his will. Taking that example seriously, I honestly don't see how we can know whether any given object's (including the body) actions were from reason's will or whether it was simply assumed due to continual repetition. If the sun always rose every time I freely willed it to, would I thereby know that the sun actually abides by my will? Or is it that the action happened to correlate purely consistently with my will. Likewise, imagine two people who act in accordance to the exact same intentions, without any deviation. Do we really "know" whether they act in accordance to a shared will or simply two separate identical wills? In terms of inductions (and cogency therein), my best inductive belief is to side with the repetition (but I definitely still need to think about it more). So, on a daily basis, I believe that when I think "I should lift my right arm" and my arm actually lifts, that it was from my will (reason's will) even though I do not, in fact, "know" that. Likewise, there's actually, as you are well aware, incidents where my body doesn't abide at all to what I willed. Therefore, I separate them as two wills (body and reason) while holding the belief that most of the time, whether by repetitive happenstance or by actual accordance, my body's will aligns with my own (reason's).

Now, I think that you are getting at (correct me if I am wrong) is that I won't conceptually separate something else from myself if it abides by whatever I will (regardless of whether it is happenstance or in actual accordance). Honestly I am not convinced of this either. Let's take the two people acting in the exact same manner (intentions) (without deviation) example: if I were to claim that they are actually of the same will, then I would still identify them as separate objects with a shared subjective will (i.e. "those two objects are of the same will"--I would not refer to them both as one object). Likewise, if I were not analyzing two separate wills from me (to determine, like in the previous example, whether they are one or two wills), but, rather, analyzing this in accordance to mine, I would still distinguish the objects regardless of their connection to my will. If my intentions always align with my body's and some other body's, then, at best, i would connect them to my will but as two objects connected to one will. I don't see how the separation really, at a physical-objective level, dissipates. I only see that, at best, it dissipates at the level of the subject (or, to be more specific, reason). If there were two body's that abided repetitively to my will, my wanting to investigate the inner workings of those bodies would be abided by both, but I will still be acknowledging thereby (in wanting an investigation) that there's a separation of parts within the bodies (and the separation of me from those bodies).

Just to really hone in on this. Imagine I am walking on a concrete sidewalk and will that it become concrete. Is it now concrete because it already was or because I willed it to be? It was going to be concrete either way, but how could I "know" or "not know" that it didn't abide by my will? I think the same is true of bodily actions. I think "lift arm", arm lifts. Was the arm going to lift anyways or is it lifting because I willed it? How do I "know" or "not know" whether it did abide by my will? I separate them as two wills because I do think there is evidence that the body doesn't abide by my will, but can coincide with it most of the time. But the real question is whether or not I would be able to claim either way if the body always, without any deviation, coincided with my wants. If every time I command "lift the arm", the arm lifts, then would I claim that they are of the same will? Either way, the separation of arm and thoughts (object and reason) would be intact, wouldn't it?

Maybe, on the contrary, you are referring to everything having my reason? Everything concluding thoughts as if they are from me? I am presuming you mean is that my will from my reason as is were to always coincide with what happens in what we call "reality".

I think this could also derail into omnipotence dilemmas as well, but don't think that is the main focus of this discussion. But there's a level to this where the logical contradiction of "I want a square circle" is what I think you are referring to as "reality" going against my will. However, I don't think that reason's will (as manifestations in thoughts) has any provable bearing on the relation between objects. Again, how would I distinguish that which is repetitive coincidence and that which actually abides by my will. Reason is the aboutness, which pertains to conclusions about the objects and its relations. I can conclude a "belief" that my arm, when it lifted, actually abided by my will by accepting repetition as a more cogent belief than coincidence, but that's all just reason making connections pertaining to objects, not it actually doing anything in the physical world. I observe that my arm moved, I now try to analyze the connections to gather an explanation of that physical action. Does that make any sense? I'm not sure if I am explaining this very well.

I believe I understand a bit. In that case, would every living thing reason? At the most fundamental level, an organism must decide whether X is food, or not food. I'm not saying its advanced reason, but reason at its most fundamental?

Although I haven't pondered it nearly enough yet, I think this is fair and plausible. If an animal (or even plant maybe) decides whether X is Y, or is not, then it thereby used the principle of noncontradiction--which would entail some level of reason I would presume. This would get into solipsism though, as I would hold that reason can never verify other reason, only obtain an inductive belief that there are other "reasons" by means of analyzing it's body's actions in relation to another body's actions (to see if it makes sense that it has reason). Does that make sense? Just like how there is no distinction between repetitive coincidence and actual accordance, I cannot distinguish the two in other people or animals or plants either. I just believe it is the case.

When I introduced the idea of discrete experience to you, you had to distinctively know what I meant first... But if it is ever contradicted in application, while we will still have the distinctive knowledge of "distinctive knowledge", we would applicably know that it was contradicted in its application to reality, not contradicted distinctively.

I am not entirely sure what you mean here. I conclude that I must have differentiation, that distinctiveness, before I could even conclude anything in the first place. If the converse was concluded (legitimately), the closest thing I can conceive of would be oneness. If we concluded the converse with respect how even reason itself operates now, which is not unified into oneness, then we would simply be mistaken (probably haven't realized that the very thinking process requires differentiation). Is that what you mean? Distinctive knowledge would still be there even if we concluded it wasn't there because we are simply mistaken?

Do we need application to distinctively know things? No, distinctive knowledge it what we use to find if we can applicably know it.

I think I am following, and I agree. But that was also concluded. I can distinctively think that I should envision an elephant, but it turns out I envision a lion instead. But by application, I know that my reason manifested a thought which introduced a will to envision an elephant and I know that the object that appeared in my mind was not an elephant. Even to claim that I initially had to use that distinctive knowledge of wanting to envision an elephant requires, thereafter, application (consideration of that previous manifestation by reason). I don't hold that what is "in the mind" is equivocal to reason. I don't think that what "I" envision (or imagine) is apart of reason, it is, just like any other object, what is concluding about that envisioning that is reason. I think what you are trying to get at is that I hold this on principle to the fact that I don't control those images (or that they have gone against my will at least once previously). I think that even if what I want to will (in reference to visions) always repetitively comes to pass, there's still a distinction between the object (the about) and what is asserting the aboutness.

Distinctive knowledge and applicable knowledge are both discrete experiences as is any "thing".

I apologize, I should have used my words more carefully. I think that you are making a meaningful distinction, but it is still, in my eyes, all application. I think that you are saying I distinctively know the words you right, but don't applicably know the contents of those words until I apply them to "reality" without contradiction: is that right?

But I could just distinctively know that 1+1=2 purely as a set of symbols. If later I see that set of symbols and state, "Ah yes, that is 1+1=2", then I applicably know that math if my claim is not contradicted.

I understand, and it is a meaningful distinction. But to claim to know a set of symbols purely as distinctive knowledge is application of reason. I have no problem with this distinction you are making though. I would also say that the abstract consideration of the operation of addition is applicable knowledge (in your terms)(and identifying the shapes again, like you said), but the recognition of the shapes of "1" "+" "1" "=" "2" is distinctive knowledge: is that correct?

The problem I have is that it seems as though you are claiming distinctive knowledge is not "application to reality without contradiction". How is it not? How did I not apply the recognition of symbols to reality? "reality" is just the principle of noncontradiction. I contradict the idea that I did distinctively recognize "1", then I didn't distinctively recognize "1". I can't, however, contradict the idea that I distinctively recognized some symbol, therefore I distinctively recognized that symbol. To you, is this all application to reality, with a meaningful subdivision?

Distinctive is simply knowing we have every logical reason to believe that we are experiencing the discrete experience itself. If however, the discrete experience implies something beyond the act of having the experience itself, this is when application occurs.

I understand your distinction here, but the claim that "the act of having the experience itself" I see no different than claiming something beyond the act itself. I must not be able to contradict it. Once I've obtained the act of having the experience itself as true, I can meaningfully distinguish that from whatever is utilizing that experience to attempt to derive something else (which I think is what you are getting at ). I am having a hard time distinguishing the two as not really the same thing (fundamentally).

Essentially, distinctive knowledge is the rational conclusion that what we experience, is what we experience..."I distinctively know 1 banana +1 banana =2 bananas, and I'm going to apply it to those two bananas over there," you can see this dividing line.

To me it just seems like you applicably know (not in your terms) that you distinctively recognize things, and then anything built off of that is "applied": but both were, no? Don't get me wrong, your distinction is something I distinguish as well (I hold that I distinctly recognize things as well).

If I conclude that I discretely experience, it is not by application to something beyond itself...
So we are not applying discrete experiences, when we are recognizing that we know we have discrete experiences in themselves.

I think this is the difference: you are making a subdivision in application in terms of what recursively refers to itself vs what refers beyond itself. I am pointing out that it is still application, albeit meaningful distinctions. And nothing ever refers to itself in a literal sense. The distinctive knowledge of 1+1=2 was analyzed by reference in a subsequent thought.

And logic on its own, is a set of rules we construct

I think there are fundamental rules of logic we do not construct.

When we are trying to assert more than the experience itself, such as applying the experience to another that we say results in X, we are applying.

Then applicable knowledge is always inductive then? I believe applying one experience to another will hold, but it may not.

A question for you Bob, is can you see this dividing line? Do you think there are better words for it?Do you think there is a better way to explain it?

I think some further elaboration would be useful: I don't think I am still quite understanding you.

Is it referencing contradictions of an abstract logic? Or is it the contradiction of reality against my will?

I think to properly address your elaboration into potentiality, I need to hear your feedback on what you mean by "will". I hold that there is one kind of "contradiction" and it is pon. There's no difference between a contradiction in abstract logic vs against my will. Is there?

Firstly, I don't think you can construct a distinctive context where something is at two places at once: it would be two identical things, which I don't think is the same thing. But let's say that I could imagine the same chair in two different places (and they weren't identical clones), then I would applicably know that my imagination can hold the same thing in two different locations and, when applied to objects outside of imagination, that there cannot be the same thing in two different locations in non-imagination.

A -> B
A exists.
Therefore B

It's more like:

A -> B
A is not contradicted, thereby true
Therefore B

The same thing in two different locations is not contradicted in imagination (hypothetically), but is in what you call "reality" (what I would call non-imagination to be precise). It would be a contradiction to transport the conclusion pertaining to the imagination to non-imagination because they don't hold the same identity in terms of essential properties (hence "non"-imagination). To hold that they are the same, would be contradicted by reason (potentially, someone may not ever realize it). Even if I could apply the same thing in two different locations as true in non-imagination and imagination, I would still have to deal with the contradiction that I they, by definition, are not correlated to one another: they share an unessential property.

It terms of your santa example, you know by application that modal statements like IF...THEN are true in terms of their form, but not necessarily that the IF conditional is automatically true. You and I had to conclude that we both implicitly utilize IF...THEN style logic even prior to us realizing it: that is application. I don't think we are ever knowing anything without applying to "reality" because reason recursively analyzes itself in the exact same manner.

I'll stop here for now: this is getting long!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

@Kuro,

To be completely honest, I am not sure if I agree or disagree. By "time never beginning", I am interpreting him to be positing an actual infinite, which, in that case, I would disagree. However, if he is stating that time is potentially infinite, as in change (and subsequently causality) is potentially infinite, then I agree. I haven't read up enough of on Aristotle, I do admit. Maybe you know which he is referring to? Likewise, I interpret "eternal" as "unchanging with respect to any notion of time/change", which is also (I would say) subjected to my same dilemma as previously depicted (potentially eternal or actually eternal?).

For something to be epistemically possible, is for us simply not to know whether it is, or is not the case. It is epistemically possible for next week's lottery numbers to be 1,2,3,4,5,6, for instance.

Although I don't find anything necessarily wrong with this, I want to clarify that epistemology does not solely pertain to what exists or does not exist (if that is what you are referring to by "is, or is not the case"): it is also whether something could exist. So, given your lottery example, I would state that the consideration of (1) the lottery numbers could be 1,2..., (2) the lottery is 1,2..., and (3) the lottery is not 1,2... to all be epistemic claims. If that is what you were stating by "is, or is not the case", then we agree here.

When I say 'metaphysically possible' I simply mean that nothing stops it from being actualized in reality.

Although I understand better what you mean now, my problem with this is that it isn't clearly defined. I don't think you mean it this way (correct me if I am wrong), but the epistemic impossibility of a square circle prevents a square circle "from being actualized in reality". If I am correct, I don't think this is what you are trying to convey: I think "reality" probably encompasses much more for you than I am envisioning. So a further elaboration on your definition of "metaphysical possibility" would be much appreciated.

Now, God is the author of the laws of logic. How do I know that? Well, two ways, but one will suffice here. I know it because the author of the laws of logic can do anything, including things forbidden by those laws, for they are her laws to make or unmake as she sees fit. And a person who is not bound by the laws of logic - not bound to be able, at most, to do all things logically possible - is a person who is more powerful than one who is. And thus God, as an omnipotent being, will be the author of the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything, include making square circles.

If I am understanding you correctly, you are essentially positing that there is a metaphysical instantiation of the physical world, which is governed by God, and thusly is the origin of the "laws of logic" (as you put it) that are in the physical world. Therefore, supposing that God is omnipotent, then God, being the metaphysical instantiator of the physical (thusly "laws of logic"), is the determiner of that very logic itself. Am I correct here? If so, I think the fundamental flaw here is that you are trying to posit via logic that there's a realm of which isn't constraint to that very logic. In other words, you are always inevitably, in even giving this argument (if I were to grant it in its entirety, hypothetically), utilizing the "laws of logic" to even put it forth (to conclude it is valid): therefore, at best, the metaphysical possibility of that which is illogical is only true (again, if I grant it here hypothetically) in relation to the logic utilized to provide the argument in the first place. You are essentially positing a Logic (I'm just arbitrarily denoting it with a capital L to distinguish it from the logic within the physical world) that exists completely separate from logic wherein God can metaphysically instantiate whatever she desires in the physical world because she can alter the "logic", but this entire argument is completely contingent on the logic utilized to get to that conclusion: positing something overlying or beyond logic completely is a contradiction in itself, because any argument given to attempt to prove it inevitably utilizes that very logic it is supposed to proving isn't required whatsoever. Likewise, when you say:

it is metaphysically possible for God to make the law of non-contradiction false

This is contingent, if granted as true (at best), on the principle of non-contradiction. You are claiming that there is a metaphysical reality, so to speak, where it is not a contradiction to hold that square circles are possible: thereby you are utilizing logic to try and prove something that is allegedly out of bounds of logic itself. Any argument either of us can utter is in relation necessarily to the principle of non-contradiction, therefore a truly completely separable Logic which allows for the principle of noncontradiction to be false is not even actually possible: that very argument just used the principle of noncontradiction, therefore it is still relative to the principle of noncontradiction. Furthermore, this is also evident in the claim that the law of non-contradiction can be false, since the falseness is contingent on there either being a contradiction or no contradiction in the argument. In other words, positing a realm in which logic is not fundamentally bound to the law of non-contradiction is impossible to even posit (without it being contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place).

Incidentally, 'empirically' means 'by means of the senses'. When I said that we can be sure no square circles exist - an epistemic claim (epistemionium claimonium) - it was on the basis of just how strongly our reason represents them to not exist (nonium existio). It was not because I have looked, smelt, touched, listened to and tasted everything and concluded that no square circles exist.

This is completely fair enough, and I agree that we can claim there are no square circles without every empirically testing it everywhere.

For instance, it is certain I exist. I, anyway, can be certain I exist. But it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist.

If you exist, then it is impossible for you to metaphysically exist unless you are referring to God revoking your life hereafter, but the very moment you "know" you exist, you "know" necessarily that it is not metaphysically possible for you not to exist right now. In terms of God maybe never metaphysically instantiating you, that would entail that you never existed at all (which you concede you exist).

Show me how I am committed to affirming an actual contradiction. Don't keep pointing out to me that square circles involve a contradiction - I know they do. But I don't think any exist - so I am not affirming any actual contradiction.

As noted earlier, if it is epistemically impossible for a square circle to exist, then it is metaphysically impossible necessarily. This is because any logically argument you can attempt to provide justification for a separate Logic which allows for different logics necessarily depends on logic itself. You thereby are always operating under one universal, fundamental form of logic which neither of us can escape. Likewise, you nor I can claim that the principle of noncontradiction can ever be false because that would require our argument to be contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place, which would mean we didn't get any closer to negating it whatsoever.

THis is unlike those who insist that an all powerful being can't do some things - they are saying something that is actually contradictory and thus being totalium idiotiums.

This is not only disrespectful towards those who hold that logic at least fundamentally comes into play with omnipotence, but it is also unproductive. I don't mind if we end up never agreeing on anything, except the principle that we should treat each other (and others) with respect. Calling someone a "totalium idiotiums" is obviously insulting. I have no problem if you think that it is indeed a contradiction, but please do not start name calling. I am genuinely attempting to understand your position while equally trying to convey mine, with as much respect as I can possibly give: that's how philosophy should be.

What i mean by that is that you must no invalidly go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x'

Although I understand (I think) what you are trying to say, I don't think this is equivocal to what we were discussing (in terms of "metaphysical" vs "eptistemic" possibility). Although I originally misspoke in my first post to the OP maker (by claiming "square circle exists"), I quickly refurbished it to "square circles are possible". Stating that epistemic impossibility directly entails metaphysical impossibility is not to "go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x'", it is to go from 'epistemically impossible that x" to "metaphysically impossible that x". "to 'x'" refers to it actually existing in the objective world (or in the mind as conjured by it in the imagination), whereas possibility simply notes that it could exist, not that it does. So if I am making some sort of mistake, it will be related to the relation between "metaphysical possibility" and "epistemic possibility", not "metaphysical possibility to epistemically true that it exists".

Now, you asked, I think, whether God could commit suicide, to which the answer is a straightforward 'yes'. You have not yet explained why this answer is false.

I think you have me confused with someone else: I never mentioned that example. I mentioned the example of God making a rock so heavy she/he/it/them cannot lift it (which you never responded to). But in relation to killing himself, the more pressing dilemma is: can God kill himself and then rise himself from the dead metaphysically? I think your answer is yes, which leads us back to the more fundamental dispute about positing Logic which allows for multiple kinds of logic.

Bob

@Gregory A,

Atheism as a non-belief in something never shown to exist is intangible in itself

This is a critique of theism, not atheism. Atheism is the lack of belief in God/gods. If you think that God/gods have never been shown to exist, then you would be an atheist (unless you choose to believe with, self admittedly, 0 evidence). Atheism cannot be tangible in a literal sense by definition, just like not-stamp collecting is just as real as the number zero: neither are tangible yet are very real.

Atheism is if anything a product of the Bible, a rejection of religion.

The Bible is not holistically religion. Atheism is the rejection of theism (or, more generically, yes, religion): not just merely Christianity.

Theism offers an explanation for our existence, atheism offers no explanations of its own, a weaker position.

It is not a weaker position because it doesn't positively assert anything (it is a doctrine of negations). Is it a weaker position to not-stamp collect, or be an avid stamp collector? Neither. Atheism is not meant to provide anything beyond simply lacking a belief in God/gods. This doesn't mean in the slightest that someone should be a theist because "atheism is a weaker position", nor does it have anything to do with naturalism.

Naturalism is the counter-position to theism

No it is not. Traditional physicalism or materialism would be an appropriate counter argument. Naturalism is a philosophical theory that rejects supernaturalism, while not necessarily negating metaphysics. Naturalism is not the claim that all there is is definitely the material world, it is the theory that all natural events must be explained by natural laws, logic, reason, etc.

atheism occupying a non-existent middle ground

You either believe something, or you don't (principle of noncontradiction). Therefore, each person either believes in God/gods, or doesn't. Theism is the belief in such, atheism is the negation. These are, in terms of beliefs, the only two options.

If atheism were valid, atheists would not be able to open their mouths.

Atheism is opening your mouth and claiming you don't believe, that is it. Other philosophical theories have to invoked to claim further. If I'm not a stamp collector, that is all I am going to be able to say about the matter, but that has nothing to do with other, completely unrelated, positions I may voice.

Atheism is in being a-theistic making them a-theists.

What exactly did you prove here? Atheist is the term for those who subscribe to atheism. I'm not following the logic here.

The invalidity of atheism does not validate theism, as naturalism may still be right, but atheism needs to be invalid for theism to be right.

It is not "theism" vs "naturalism". You can be an atheist and subscribe to metaphysical truths (you can also not be a naturalist and be an atheist). Likewise, naturalism is a philosophical theory pertaining to epistemic claims, theism is pertains strictly to belief. Not all theists claim to "know" God exists. Lots do, but some don't (some are agnostic theists). Some prefer, contrary to a 2 dimensional labeling system, a 1 dimensional representation: atheism - agnosticism - theism. However you fancy, none of it implies naturalism.

Anyhow, why should we listen to those who reject a God (a relatively simple addon) but then continue to believe in mermaids, unicorns etc.

Atheism does not necessitate that one should believe in mermaids. I honestly haven't met a single atheist that does, nor does it pertain to atheism in any way imaginable: that would be a separate assertion.

Atheism is a rejection of free-speech (primarily another element of the Left).

Not at all. Again, atheism is the negation of theism. Theism is the belief in God. Gnosticism (not in the sense of the gnostics) is the claim of knowledge (epistemically) either way, agnosticism the negation thereof. This has nothing to do with "Left" (I would presume you are referring to politics) nor free-speech.

On the contrary, your argument now fails. For you can generate no actual contradiction from that claim. I claim that it is possible for there to be square circles. Not epistemically, of course - we can be totally certain none exist, for their existence would constitute an actual contradiction and we can be sure there are no actual contradictions. But it is metaphysically possible for there to be some, for God exists and God can do anything.

A square circle is a logical contradiction epistemically and metaphysically: metaphysics is simply the extrapolation of the overlying instantiation of the physical world via reason which abides by logic (which are epistemic claims, unless you aren't claiming to "know" the metaphysical assertions you put forth, then it may just be beliefs). The shape of a circle cannot be that of a square, a "square circle" is a contradictio in adjecto. When you say it is metaphysically possible, what exactly do you mean? Likewise, what do you mean by epistemically impossible? When you say "we can be sure none exist", that is an empirical claim (pertaining to the objects) and a claim pertaining to the mind (a circular triangle, for instance, can't exist in the mind either), but it is important to note that we can only obtain metaphysical claims via logic and reason. Metaphysics is directly constraint to the basic principles of logic. Furthermore, if you agree that we "know" there cannot be square circles (which would be an epistemic claim), then God can't instantiate one in the universe (we "know" this).

to generate an 'actual' contradiction you're going to have to make the mistake you previously made: you're going to have to confuse being 'able' to do something with actually doing it.

If a being is 'able' to make a square circle, then it is epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. It is not epistemically possible for a square circle to exist, therefore a being is not able to make a square circle. The idea of a square circle is a contradiction, metaphysically (whatever you are implying there) and physically (whatever may be implied there).

There is nothing contradictory about an omnipotent being.

There is if one is positing literally an omnipotent being. Can it create something so heavy it cannot lift it? Can it make a nonbrick brick? No. An omnipotent being is constrained or inherently supplied with logic.

If you think otherwise, show it without assuming that the omnipotent being has actually realized a contradiction.

I am not following you here. "being has actually realized a contradiction"? The realizations of a being have no effect on the fact that it will never be able to conjure up a square circle.

What I would ask you is: what distinction between metaphysics and eptistemology makes you think a square circle is possible in one, but not the other?

That's false. Being able to make a square circle is obviously not equivalent to actually making one

You are correct here: I should have said "possibility" not "exists". However, this doesn't negate my point whatsoever: I can refurbish my statement as "it is equivalent to holding that a square circle is possible" and nothing changes in my argument.

I am not affirming the actual existence of square circles

Fair enough. However, a being that is literally an omnipotent being is self-contradictory, therefore my point pertained to it being equivocal to claiming a square circle is possible. I would say a square circle cannot exist, not simply that it doesn't exist in the real world right now.

But it doesn't matter what it involves, for no matter what it involves, an omnipotent being is going to have it.

As I've hopefully demonstrated in my previous post, this is not the case when one dissects it at a much deeper level.

@Agent Smith,

Free Will (can do anything one wants) = Omnipotence (can do anything one wants)

I don't think your definition of "free will" is accurate. First of all, I am presuming that you are referring to libertarian free will, because compatibilism has no problem admitting that a being can have "free will" without ever being able to do whatever they want (i.e. soft determinism). Second of all, in relation to libertarian free will, at its most basic definition, it is not the ability to do whatever you want: it is the ability to do whatever you want in relation to oneself. I could, hypothetically, have full control over my own thoughts (thusly will them as I please) and yet have zero control over objects: I would still be an agent of "free will" even though I cannot do as I please in relation to the totality of existing things. Third of all, omnipotence can be interpreted two ways: that which is literally all powerful or that which is logically all powerful. In regards the former, it is equivalent to holding that a square circle exists and, therefore, that is how odd, logically impossible, paradoxes arise (due to non-truth-apt claims being evaluated as if they are truth-apt): great example is can an omnipotent being create a rock it can't lift? This is only puzzling, just like asking "how far can I throw a square triangle", if one doesn't realize that it isn't truth-apt due to its logical impossibility. With regards to the latter interpretation of omnipotence, the rules of logic and reason dictate not that the being necessarily does or does not have "free will", but that it cannot "have and not have" "free will". I think a key aspect to consider here is the fact that tying will to complete power (as I think you did in your definition:"can do whatever it wants", so to speak) requires that we consider the motive when contemplating whether such a being would require "free will" or not (as it can't have both). Imagine there's two omnipotent beings: the first's will is motivated towards controlling the second's actions. As long as the second's will never fixates (becomes motivated) on breaking from the grasp of the other, there's no contradiction here to be found and, logically subsequently, the second would be omnipotent without "free will", whereas the second would have "free will" (as far as the given context provides). And since the first is omnipotent and is fixated on controlling the second, the second will will never become fixated on the first and, therefore, will never acquire free will as long as first persists. The reason this is the case is because when you define "free will" in relation to the will and its produced action, then it is a matter of what that being's will exerts, not that that being is aware of all the possibilities that it could, being omnipotent, exert. If the omnipotent being's will fixates on knowing all logically possible exertions it could perform, then it would necessarily acquire them. But, however, if that being's will never fixates on it, then it will not acquire such knowledge. In other words, a logically omnipotent being has full power to do as he wills, which is in relation to the motive behind that will: if the will manifests that action A should occur, then it will, but if it doesn't manifest it, then it won't. This means quite literally that an omnipotent being is necessarily of "free will" if it wills that it should be--prior to such, it is only known, given what I have hitherto stated, that the being either (1) has "free will" or (2) it does not (but not both).

Hello @tryhard,

I think that your OP is a notorious dilemma that many have and many will argue about. Unfortunately, it seems as though (for the most partl) the discussion reply posts have derailed quite swiftly into a heated insult match, which isn't very productive nor thought-provoking. Hopefully I can provide a bit of exposition into the problem of evil from my understanding of the issue. Now, I should disclaim that I am not a theist, but this would be my counter arguments to yours.

It seems that the problem of evil is the most powerful argument against the theist argument.

Personally, I don't find the problem of evil as the most powerful argument against theism, but this isn't the main focus of your OP, so I am not going to elaborate too in depth here (unless you would like me to). I think this is a great argument for very specific conceptualizations of a monotheistic God (typically within an abrahamic kind of God), but not all of them.

The support for the first premise is the assumption that God is a perfect being by definition.

I think it would be beneficial for you to specify exactly what you mean by "perfection". But for all intents and purposes, I am going to assume (correct me if I am wrong) that you are referring to a omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient God.

God has the ability to remove evil, and the attribute of benevolence attached to his nature seems to compel God to remove evil.

I think this is where the first issue I would have lies: what is evil? and what aspect of omnibenevolence compels God to remove it? Both depend on one's definitions. The problem of evil, as I understand it, boils down to axiology. Likewise, I typically view it as an internal critique and, therefore, "evil" would not be defined by what the opponent (who is providing the argument of the problem of evil to the theist) deems is "evil", but, rather, uses the definition that the particular theist holds for "evil". I think this is important because, although i would agree with you that the examples you give throughout your post are acts of evil (e.g. holocaust), none of your examples are necessarily considered acts of 'evil' by a theist in relation to God. I've never met a theist that thinks that the holocaust wasn't 'evil' in relation to human on human atrocities, but I have met theists that do not hold God to the standard of which He himself commands: in other words, he is not a law giver and obeyer. It is not a contradiction to hold that God's commandments are with respect to humans, not himself. Therefore, it is not a contradiction to hold that God can strike people down where they stand, but a human cannot do such to another human. I think this starts involving what I would presume you meant by:

It seems that the only hope of combatting this objection is for the theists to justify evil's existence.

My complaint would be, although I understand what you are saying, that your statement here is using your definition of evil. If a theist does not hold God to the same standards he proclaims for human-to-human interactions, then it logically doesn't make sense to claim they are "justifying 'evil'" in relation to their own definition because there's no dilemma for them (thereby no justification required in the sense you are using it). An issue only arises if they accept your definition of "evil". Furthermore, their definition (as previously defined) shares your moral rejection of the holocaust (because it was human to human mass genocide, not God to human mass genocide), thusly the issue now refurbishes into a discussion of how/why God could/does allow human-to-human evil. My only emphasis here is that it is no longer about God's direct actions but, rather, his seeming negligence. So it becomes whether or not the theist now needs to justify God allowing evil with respect to humans performing actions on other humans (or, if we wanted to broaden it, animals, etc).

As you are probably already anticipating, if the theist holds that "benevolence" does not directly entail direct interference with human-to-human evil, then there's no dilemma (i.e. if "all-good" is equivocal to "all-loving" then it is a more complex task to discern whether or not a being that truly infinitely loves you would allow you to suffer or not). As you mentioned, if the theist holds a libertarian or compatibilist view of free will, then this may be the part where they start invoking God's allowance of 'evil' as necessary for us to choose to follow him. If "all-good" is "all-loving", a loving being would not force you to follow it: you must choose it (or, at least, that's how the argument goes). My main point here is that loving something is not equivocal (necessarily) to trying to always prevent that something from feeling pain or from suffering--whether that be psychological or physiological. For example, let's say my best friend is a drug addict and is at the point that they take pills simply to prevent unwanted suffering in the form of withdrawal. Now I know that, considering the trajectory, they will die if I don't intervene. To oversimplify it, let's say I have two options: let them overdose on opioids in the most painless (and most absence of suffering) death imaginable or have an intervention and put them in rehab. Considering I love my mate, I will choose the latter option although it will obviously cause tremendous amounts of pain and suffering as they take back their life from addiction in rehab (it's not an easy process getting one's life back together after addiction, let alone detoxification). Now this is obviously an oversimplification, but notice how it is not concrete that we try to always avoid suffering. Likewise, there are people who enjoy pain, but we could easily posit that the "best possible world" is not that which has no pain, but no suffering (where "suffering" is that which someone doesn't enjoy doing--or something to those effects). Therefore, maybe the "best possible world" is where the person who likes to stick themselves with needles can do so and those who don't never have to, etc. But then we inevitably end up with a dilemma of impeding wishes of individuals: in this "best possible world", does one person's enjoyment of raping people overrule the person's hate for getting raped? I think not! To keep this brief, positing linguistically a "best possible world" is a whole lot easier than actually coming up with a viable "best possible world" and, even in the event that you can do it, it would only be a relative "best possible world" (relative, at best, to what humans could best come up with, which can surely not be confidently posited as absolutely the best possible world).

Let me break down your argument's premises:

If God exists, he would have created the best possible world.

I would like to emphasize that, as God is posited typically in a theistic worldview, we would not have any clue what the "best possible world" is in terms of what absolutely is the best possible world. We could both agree on what we think would be best, but not the absolute "best" (which would require the perspective of a omniscient being). Likewise, as previously mentioned, it is not clear that a best possible world would be devoid of pain nor suffering.

There are cases where evil does not lead to the fruition of some greater good (ex: holocaust, starving children, etc.)

Although it was tragic and horrible, humanity did learn something, no matter how small or great, from the atrocities we have committed. Prior to the holocaust, people holistically didn't fully grasp how humans can be psychologically and sociologically manipulated into literally being complacent or, worse, an active participant in mass genocide (although there have been previous genocides to the holocaust, that one is generally the one that hit everyone's radar and is subsequently the most remembered). My main point here is that if a theist is positing an omniscient being, then we legitimately have 0 clue if there's no meaningful, worthy fruition of some greater "good" from the worst atrocities we can both conceive of. It is essentially a comparison of relative knowledge to absolute.

God could have created a world without these types evil

How do you know what God could have done? Maybe it is necessary for an all-loving God to allow evil. Again, theists typically posit a being that is "above our pay grade" in terms of knowledge and wisdom, so why should they concur that He could have done otherwise?

Therefore, God did not create the best possible world [2,3]

Again, what are you constituting as "best possible world"? Absence of pain? Suffering? Both? I would appreciate a little elaboration into what you mean here. Secondly, how do you know what the best possible world is without knowing all possible perspectives, contexts, and knowledge? Or are you merely referring to what would be better than our current world (which is also relative to what we know)?

Can anyone provide an argument that provides justification for the existence of evil while taking into account the unnecessary evils, or gratuitous evils, that we seem to observe throughout our life experiences?

Again, from a theistic perspective that asserts God as outlined previously, how are the 'evils' unnecessary? What logically contradicts the idea that they are necessary (from a theistic perspective)?

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I am glad you dived into "applicable" vs "distinctive" knowledge, because I think I was fundamentally misunderstanding your epistemic claims. I was never under the impression anything was related to a "will" in your epistemology, albeit I understand the general relation to the principle of noncontradiction.

I think we have finally come to a point where our fundamental differences (which we previously disregarded) are no longer so trivial. Therefore, as you also stated, it is probably time to dive into "reason", which inevitably brings us back to the general distinction between our fundamentals. Previously, I understood the distinction between our fundamentals like so (as an over-simplification):

Yours: object <- discrete experiences -> subject
Mine: object <- discrete experiences <- subject

However, "subject" was, and still is, a term with vast interpretations, therefore it is more accurate, as of now, to demonstrate mine as:

object <-discrete experiences <- reason -> subject

However, now you seem to be invoking "will", which adds some extra consideration on my end to my interpretation of your fundamental (and I am invoking "reason" which probably is confusing you as well). When you say:

All I noted in the beginning was that there was a will, and that reality sometimes went along with that will, and sometimes contradicted that will.

I didn't understand this from your essays (unless, and this is completely plausible, I am forgetting): the fundamental was "discrete experience" which was postulated on the principle of noncontradiction. A "will", in my head, has a motive, which is not implied at all (to me) with "discrete experience". I think we are actually starting to converge (ever so slowly), as I would claim that there are "wills" (as in plural) is in relation to reason. I think I would need a bit more explication into your idea of "will" to properly address it.

The only reason we have a definition of reality, is that there are some things that go against our will.

Reality is the totality of existence that is in accordance with our will, and contrary to our will.

I think you aren't using "reality" synonymously throughout your post. The first statement seems to contradict the second. You first claim that we only can define "reality" as that which goes against our "will", yet then, in the second, claim that "reality" is both what goes against and what aligns with our "will"--I don't see how these are reconcilable statements. Your first statement here is only correct if we are talking about the distinction between "object" and "subject", generally speaking, not "reality" in its entirety. The entire "reality" could be aligned with all of my "will" and still be defined as "reality". I sort of get the notion that you may be using "will" synonymously with "principle of noncontradiction"--I don't think they are the same.

Because there are things we can do in our own mind that go against our will. Lets say I imagine the word elephant, and say, "I'm not going to think of the word elephant." Despite what I want, it ends up happening that I cant' stop thinking of the word.

I was misunderstanding you: distinctive knowledge is what you are claiming is given because it is simply discrete experience, whereas applicable could be within the mind or the external world.

First and foremost, I need to define "reason" for you, because it probably is something vague as it currently stands. Reason is "the process of concluded". This is not synonymous with "rationality", which is a subjective and inter-subjective term pertaining to what one or multiple subjects determine to be the most logical positions to hold (or what they deem as the most logically process to follow in terms of derivation): "rationality" is dependent on "reason" as its fundamental. "Reason" is simply that ever continuing process of conclusions, which is the bedrock of all derivation. 1 + 1 = 3 (without refurbishing the underlying meaning) is an exposition of "reason", albeit not determined to be "rational". If, in that moment, the subject legitimately concluded 1 + 1 = 3, then thereby "reason" was invoked. As a matter of fact, "reason" is invoked in everything, and a careful recursive examination of reason by reason can expose the general necessary forms of that reason: it abides by certain inevitable rules. To be brief, principle of noncontradiction, space, time, differentiation, and causality (and debatably principle of sufficient reason). The first and foremost is the principle of noncontradiction, which is utilized to even began the discovery of the others. To claim that I discretely experience, I concluded by means of pon. This was "reason" and, depending thereafter how "rationality" is inter-subjectively defined, may have been "rational". There's definitely more to be said, but I'll leave it there for now.

Distinctive knowledge comes about by the realization that what we discretely experience, the act itself, is known.

I think this is false. The act itself is not just known (as in given), it is determined by means of recursive analysis of reason. You and I determined that we discretely experience. And, if I may be so bold, the act of discretely experiencing does not precede reason: it becomes a logical necessity of reason (i.e. reason determines it must be discretely experiencing multiplicity to even determine in the first place--but this is all dependent on reason). When I say logical, am not referring to "rationally" determined logical systems, merely, in this case, principle of noncontradiction (I cannot hold without contradiction that the aforementioned is false).

Basically, when your distinctive knowledge creates a statement that the act of the discrete experience alone cannot confirm, you need to apply it. I can discretely experience an abstract set of rules and logical conclusions. But if I apply those abstract rules to something which cannot be confirmed by my current discrete experience, I have to apply it.

I think, as I now understand your epistemology, I simply reject "distinctive knowledge" in literal sense (everything is always applied), but am perfectly fine with it as a meaningful distinction for better understanding for the reader (or as a subset of applied knowledge). Anything we ever do is a concluded, to some degree or another, which utilizes reason, and any conclusion pertaining to reason or discrete experience is application.

So, if I construct a system of logic, then claim, "X functions like this," to know this to be true, I must deduce it and not be contradicted by reality.

The only reason this is true is because you have realized that it would be a contradiction to hold that the contents of the thoughts of a mind can suffice pertaining to what the mind deems objects. This is all from reason and, depending on what is considered rationality, rational.

Once it is formed distinctively, It must be applied, because I cannot deduce my conclusion about the world from the act of discretely experiencing alone. I can discretely experience a pink elephant, but if I claim the elephant's backside is purple, until I discretely experience the elephants backside, I cannot claim to applicably know its backside is purple. This is all in the mind, which is why I do not state applicable knowledge is "the external world".

I think I understand, and agree, with what you are saying--with the consideration that they are both applied. We can define a meaningful distinction between "distinctive" (that which is discrete experience) and "applicable" (that which isn't), but only if we were able to reason our way into the definitions. No matter how swift, I conclude that I just imagined an elephant--I am not synonymous with the discrete experience of an elephant (I am the reason).

When you say we know our discrete experiences by reason, I've already stated why we know them.

We know discrete experience by reason: the principle of noncontradiction--therefrom space & time, then differentiation, then causality.

We know we discretely experience because it is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality.

Your using reason here. You applied this to then claim we have distinctive knowledge that is not applied, but there was never anything that wasn't applied. In other words, you, by application, determined some concepts to be unapplied: given. That which you determined was given, was not given to you, it was obtained by you via application. Nothing is given to you without reason.

However, I've noted that "reason" is an option. It is not a necessary condition of being human.

For me, reason is a necessary condition of being human. Not "rationality", but reason.

There is nothing that requires a person to have the contexts of deduction, induction, and pon

We can most definitely get into this further, but for now I will just state that pon is the fundamental of everything: everyone uses it necessarily.

You are a very rational person, likely educated and around like people. It may be difficult to conceive of people who do not utilize this context. I have to deal with an individual on a weekly basis who are not "rational" in the sense that I've defined.

Thank you! I appreciate that, and I can most definitely tell your are highly rational and well educated as well! To be clear, I am not disagreeing with you on how people are not all rational: I am also around many people that shock me at how irrational they are. I am making a distinction between "reason" and "rationality" to get more at what is fundamental for everything else (reason) and what is built off of that as the best course of action (rationality). One is learned (the latter), the other is innate (reason). It may be confusing because being "reasonable" and "rational" are typically colloquially utilized the same: but I am not.

So I have defined the utilization of reason as having a distinctive and applicable context of deduction, induction, and lets go one further, logic. I have also claimed that there are people who do not hold this context, and in my life, this is applicably known to be true. But, that does not mean that is what you intend by reason. Could you give your own definition and outlook? Until we both agree on the definition, I feel we'll run into semantical issues.

I agree, I think there is much to discuss. I think that, in terms of logic as derived from rationality (such as classical logic)(which may require the subject to learn it), you are absolutely right. But in terms of logic in the sense of pon, I think everyone necessarily has it. Now I know it's obvious that people hold contradictions (in colloquial speech), but that isn't what pon is at a more fundamental level (I would say).

What is addition in application, versus abstraction?

I find nothing wrong with your potatoe analogy anymore, I think I understand what you are saying. The application is the abstraction, which, in your terms, is not "distinctive" knowledge--so we agree on that (I think).

We distinctively know math.

I think we applicably know math. Reason derives what is mathematical and what doesn't abide by it. Solving x = y + 1 for y is application, not distinction. Even the understanding that there's one distinct thing and another one is application (of pon). What exactly is purely distinctive about this? Of course, we can applicably know that there's discrete experience and that we could label discrete experience as "distinctive knowledge", but all that is application. There's never a point at which we rest and just simply know something without application. Is there?

In terms of space, I am not completely against the idea of labeling the holistic space as distinctive, but that was also applied. To know that space is apodictically true is application of reason inwardly on itself in an analysis of its own forms of manifestation. I could rightfully distinguish apodictically true forms of reason as "distinctive knowledge" and that which is derived from them as "applicable knowledge", which I think (from my perspective) is what you are essentially doing. But my point is that they are all applied: when do I ever not apply anything?

In regards to when is something cogent enough to take action, that is a different question from the base epistemology. I supply what is more rational, and that is it.

My question essentially pertained to when something is considered a "historical fact", considering most historical facts are speculations, when we are simply determining which induction is most cogent. I think you answer it here: seems that you think that it isn't a base concern of the epistemology. I think this is a major concern people will have with it. Everyone is so used to our current scientific, historic, etc institutions with their thresholds of when something is validated that I envision this eroding pretty much society's fundamental of how knowledge works. It isn't an issue that it erodes the fundamentals of "knowledge" hitherto, but not addressing it is. You don't have to address it now if you don't want to, but feel free to if you want.

Explicitly, what you are stating is, "I believe Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket." But what is the reasoning of "could have" based on? A probability, possibility, speculation, or irrational induction?

The point is that it isn't based off of any of them. And it isn't simply using a different epistemology, it is that your epistemology completely lacks the category. The way I see it, "could have" was colloquially "possibility". Now "possibility" is about experiencing it before, which is only half of what possibility used to mean. The other "could have" was not that the person had seen it before, it was that it had potential to occur because they couldn't outright contradict it. This is still a meaningful thing to say in speech: the only affirmation being the affirmation that one cannot contradict the idea outright. However, I think I may be understanding what you are saying now: potentiality isn't really inducing an affirmation. It is more like "I cannot contradict the idea, therefore it may be possible". Maybe it is the possibility of possibility? But that wouldn't really make any sense (in your terminology). For example, mathematics. I could abstractly determine that I could fit that particular 5 foot brick into that particular 100 x 100 foot room, but, as you noted, until I attempt it I won't know. What I am trying to get at, if I haven't experienced it before then it is not possible. If I have no denominator, then it isn't probable. If I can't contradict it, then it is not irrational. I guess it could be called a speculation, but I am not saying that I can fit the brick in the room, just that I can't contradict the idea that it could. In other words, I am thinking of "speculation" as "that brick will fit into that room" (given it is possible, probable, or irrational), but what about "I can't contradict the idea that that brick will fit into that room". Are they the same? Both speculations?

"There's a difference between claiming there is colloquially a possibility that something can occur and that you actually believe that it occurred." -- Bob

Just to ensure the point is clear, both situations exist in the epistemology.

I'm not sure if they both do. You do have "something can occur" in the sense of experienced before, but is "something can occur due to no contradictions" simply a speculation without affirmation?

If something did not have potential, this translates to, "Distinctive knowledge that cannot be attempted to be applied to reality." This seems to me to be an inapplicable speculation. Which means that any induction that could attempt to be applied would be considered a "potential', even irrational inductions.

As I have proposed it, inapplicable speculations do not exist: they have been transformed into irrational inductions. Speculations entail that it is applicable. Therefore, this is not an appropriate antonym to potentiality. The antonym is "that which is contradicted".

Exactly. So Jones is claiming, "I have an induction but I'm not going to use the hierarchy to break down what type of induction I'm using".

Leaving the individual voiceless in a perfectly valid context is not purposely not using the epistemology: it is the absence of a meaningful distinction that is causing the issue. There is a meaningful distinction, as you noted, between asserting affirmation, and simply asserting that it isn't contradicted. Or is that simply not within the bounds of your epistemology? Or is it also a speculation? I am having a hard time accurately defining it within your terminology.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Edward235,

I am seeing reply posts that are generally inspired towards what I wanted to say, but I would like to provide further explication. Firstly, I am not a Christian myself. No offense meant, but I think that your post is over generalizing Christianity as a whole into on oddly specific classification (flavor, if you will) called biblical literalism. However, even biblical literalists wouldn't subscribe to most of what you said (I would say). Here are my thoughts:

The Bible presented among Christian believers, is a collection of stories written by supposed divine inspiration...yet Christians sit here and preach that we must do what the Bible tells us word for word

Although I may just be misunderstanding you, "divine inspiration" is not equivocal to inerrancy ("word for word"). Some Christians claim that the bible is divinely inspired with the careful consideration that, due to it being produced by faulty humans, it is not inerrant. Others claim both. To be quite frank, most Christians do not, even if they claim inerrancy, believe that one should obey the Old Testament literally: they typically either believe it is merely allegorical/metaphorical or/and the New Testament is a "New Covenant". The biblical literalists typically view it in the latter sense, which means they will not agree with you that, although they do think it literally happened, every one should slaughter an animal for God to forgive them of their sins. This is of the "Old Covenant", not "New Covenant" that succeeds Jesus' sacrifice. I've never met a single Christian biblical literalist that genuinely believes that every should follow the rules decreed in the Old Testament without the consideration of the New Covenant.

The stories within the Bible show us scenes of gore, rape, slavery, and so many more violent acts

As others have pointed out, it can be interpreted metaphorically, allegorically, or as a parable. Sometimes stories are not meant to be analyzed literally. Although I understand your quarrel with the Old Testament (in a literal sense) and share your frustration, which I do concede has many abhorrent depictions of actions, most biblical literalists take a position that typically holds that essentially when God does it, it cannot be morally wrong: He is the standard of good. They typically subscribe to a very absolute objective morality. Now, I'm not advocating that they are right, I merely attempting to provide you with a bit more exposition into Christianity (specifically biblical literalism). From their perspective, if God outright strikes you down where you stand, He can do so because He created you and you will ascend into heaven for eternity. Imagine that you genuinely believed that if God zapped you dead where stand right now, you will be freed from this life of suffering and ascend into a paradise forever. That is, from my conversations with many literalists, what they generally claim in a nutshell.

Imagine if the Bible wasn't written as a prophetic work, but instead a warning from the divine.

There's also the Gnostics who believed that the Old Testament God was actually Satan and the New Testament God was the true God that sent his son to fix the damage. My point is not that any of these interpretations are necessarily right, just that there are indeed many interpretations. Personally, I only find any value in what is metaphorical or allegorical in the Bible (simply the literary aspect), so I am hesitant to agree with you that the Bible is holistically a warning message from an actual "God" and none of it is prophetic. I guess it depends on what you mean by "prophetic" as well: I don't think there's any truth to any alleged prophecies in the Bible, but prophets are a literary archetype, which is common amongst all the most well known western books of literature (which I find nothing wrong with at all).

A warning like Noah. Noah was created to warn the people of the flood, and no one listened. Then, after Noah built the ark, God flooded the world. It doesn't seem like a prophecy, but a warning instead

The main objective of the Great Flood was for God, in a literal sense, to press the reset button. He was so horrified by the evil that humanity had produced that he decided to wipe it out (quite frankly, and this is my bias coming out, mass genocide). As far as my knowledge goes, it wasn't a prophecy or really a warning at all (sure, there's a bit of dialogue about people laughing at Noah building the ark, but God wasn't really interested, as the story goes, in getting Noah to convince everyone to get on the ark: they weren't welcome): God was simply sparing Noah's life (8-9 people, if I remember correctly). Holistically, it may have been a warning to the reader to hope humanity doesn't get evil enough where God decides to hit that reset button again, but, besides that, I'm not sure I follow you here.

Every person mentioned in the Bible died, yet God promised they would live forever if they relied on Him.

If I may be so bold (and no offense meant): this is utterly incorrect. God never once in the Bible promised that anyone would live forever on earth. Although the Bible does claim two men never died as a result of their unwavering faith to God; For example, Elijah was ascended into heaven without ever dying in a chariot of fire (according to the Bible, of course). God promises in the Bible "everlasting life", which has no correlation to how long one lives on earth: it is an eternity in heaven.

Maybe, just maybe, the Bible tells us what the men and women of that time were doing was wrong.

I think I would need you to go a bit more in depth here to properly respond, as I would say most Christians would agree with you to a certain extent. Many verses in the Bible pertain to exactly what people were doing that was considered "evil", and proclamations to not do it. But the Old Testament is not so clear about what I am presuming you are talking about (such as slavery).

They turned God into an idol.

I think the terminology is incorrect here: an "idol" is defined as that which is deviation from God. In other words, "idol" only has a meaning relative to what one thinks they should be giving to God. That is why money is considered an idol: it can possess a man into deviation from worshiping God. Therefore, it makes no sense to say God is an idol: that is the same thing as saying that one is deviating from worshiping God to worship God instead.

Maybe, Christians are misunderstanding the text

I am honestly not seeing how anything you said supports this claim. What Christians? Which sector? Which flavor? All of them? When you say "They coveted their neighbor's houses", most Christians agree that coveting is a sin.

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I think we are still misunderstanding eachother a tad bit, so let's see if I can resolve some of it by focusing on directly responding to your post.

They are both obtained in the same way. Knowledge in both cases boils down to "Deductions that are not contradicted by reality." Distinctive knowledge is just an incredibly quick test, because we can instantly know that we discretely experience, so what we discretely experience is known. Applicable knowledge is distinctive knowledge that claims knowledge of something that is apart from immediate discrete experience. Perhaps the word choice of "Application" is poor or confusing, because we are applying to reality in either case. Your discrete experience is just as much a reality as its attempts to claim something beyond them.

This is why I think it may be, at least in part, a semantical difference: when you refer to "application", you seem to be admitting that it is specifically "application to the external world" (and, subsequently, not the totality of reality). In that case, we in agreement here, except that I would advocate for more specific terminology (it is confusing to directly imply one is "application" in its entirety, which implies that the other is not, but yet claim they are both applications).

The other issue I would have is the ambiguity with such a binary distinction. When you say "Applicable knowledge is distinctive knowledge that claims knowledge of something that is apart from immediate discrete experience", fundamental aspects of the "external world" are necessarily aspects of our experience (as you note later on). This is different (seemingly) to things that solely arise in the mind. My imagination of a unicorn is distinctive knowledge (pertaining to whatever I imagined), but so is the distinction of the cup and the table (which isn't considered solely apart of the mind--it is object). It blends together, which is why certain aspects cross-over into the external world from the mind. But more on that later.

Likewise, when you state "Your discrete experience is just as much a reality as its attempts to claim something beyond them": the subject cannot rationally claim anything beyond discrete experience, that is all they have. I cannot claim that the table is a thing-in-itself, nor can I claim it is purely the product of the mind: both are equally inapplicable. However, if what you mean by "attempts to claim something beyond them" is simply inductions that pertain to the discrete experience of objects, then I have no quarrel.

It is why I avoided the inevitable comparison to apriori and aposteriori. Apriori claims there are innate things we know that are formed without analysis. This is incorrect. All knowledge requires analysis. You can have beliefs that are concurrent with what could be known, but it doesn't mean you actually know them until you reason through them.

This is not how I understood Kant's a priori vs a posteriori distinction: it is not blindly asserted. It is analyzed via reason by means of recursively examining reason upon itself, to extrapolate the apodictic forms it possesses. This is applied and, to an extent, true. A priori actually salvaged the empiricist worldview, as even Hume noted that empiricism is predicated on causality (which is a problem if one is asserting everything must be applied to the external world to know it). Kant, generically speaking, simply provided (although he was against empiricism) what logically is demonstrably true of the form of reason itself (of subjectivity in a sense). We applicably know, via solely reason, that we are within an inescapable spatial & temporal reference. We are constrained to the principle of non contradiction and sufficient reason, and, with the combination of the aforementioned, presuppose causality in any external application. We cannot empirically verify causality itself: it is impossible. Nor pon, etc. I do have to somewhat agree with you that Kant does extrapolate much further than that, and claims things about a priori that cannot possibly be known (like non-spatial, non-temporal, etc), but within the logical constraints that are apodictically true for the subjects reason, it logically follows from the usage of such that there are certain principles that must exist for any observation to occur in the first place. Obviously there's the issue that we can't escape the apodictic rules of our reason, which is being utilized reflexively to even postulate this in the first place, and therefore it is only something that logically follows. But this applies to literally everything. To say that it makes the most sense (by a long shot) that we are derived from a brain is only something that logically follows (that which also does not escape our apodictic rules of reason).

Distinctive awareness - Our discrete experiences themselves are things we know.
Contextual logical awareness - The construction of our discrete experiences into a logical set of rules and regulations.

To clarify, our discrete experiences themselves are things we know by application via reason. Our awareness of the distinctions is also known by the same sort of application: reason. If that is what you are stating here, then I agree: I am just not finding this sentence very clear at what you are trying to state. It could be that you are claiming they are essentially given, which I don't think you are stating that, which means it logically follows the stemming is from reason. Moreover, I think the problem here is that both are constructions of logical rules and regulations: distinctive awareness is derived from reason and reason is, upon reflexive examination, regulated by necessitous rules, whereas the "logical set of rules" you reference in "contextual logical awareness" is rules that, I think you are claiming, are not necessitious (as in a diversity of contexts can be produced, but it is important to remember that it is derived from those necessitous rules that reason manifests itself, apodictically, in).

We distinctively know both of these contexts. Within our specially made contexts, if Gandolf is a good person, he WILL do X. The only reason Gandolf would not save the hobbit if it was an easy victory for him, is if he wasn't a good person. Here I have a perfectly logical and irrefutable context in my head. And yet, I can change the definitions, and a different logic will form. I can hold two different contexts of Gandolf, two sets of contextual logic, and distinctively know them both with contextual awareness.

This is all fine, with the emphasis that this is applicably known via reason. IF conditionals are an apodictic instantiation of our reason: one of the logical regulations, upon recursive reflection, of reason itself. Depending on how you are defining those two conditional claims, it may solely pertain to reason or it may also pertain to the form of objects. If you mean in this example to define logically that a "good Gandolf" directly necessitates him doing X and, logically, if he doesn't do X, then he isn't "good", then is not only known in the mind (via reason pertaining to solely what lies in the mind), but also to all objects (all discrete experience of "objects"). You know, without application to the external world that the logical defining of person P is "good" if they do X and P is not good if not X will hold for all experience (including that which pertains to the external world). This is "applicably known" and "distinctively known" (as you would define it) without "applying" to the external world due it relating to the necessary logical form of discrete experience.

Of course, I could create something illogical as well. "Gandolf is a good person, therefore he would kill all good hobbits in the world." Do I distinctively know this? Yes. But I really don't have contextual logical awareness. I am not using the "context of logic".

It depends on what you mean by "logic". If you are referring to an adopted logical system (such as classical logic), which I should emphasis is based off of reason (which everyone has), then you are right. But you did still have a context of "logic" in the sense of the apodictic necessitous forms of the instantiation of reason. Firstly, if you define "good person" in a contradictory why (previously) to killing what is defined as "good hobbits", then you do not know that sentence distinctively--you know the exact contrary (the statement is false). However, one can hold such a contradiction if it is reasoned, no matter how irrational, to no longer be a strict contradiction. Maybe I decide that the end justifies the means: now that sentence is perfectly coherent. However, I could very well accept that sentence as "true", although I know it is contradictory, solely based off of "it makes me sleep better at night thinking it is true": this is still a reason. I could claim to hold it as a lie to annoy you, or just because I like lying: these are all reasons (not rational, but reasons). But my main point is that a person cannot conceive of whatever they want: they cannot hold that they are seeing a circle and a square (pertaining to the same object) at the same time. They can lie, for whatever reason, about it, but I know that they also do not distinctively "know" this. They may distinctively "know" that they want to lie about it for whatever reason, but they do not distinctively actually "know" that they are seeing two completely contradictory things. Likewise, even in the realm strictly pertaining to the mind, they cannot distinctively know a circle as a circle and a rectangle. They can lie about it, or convince themselves it is somehow possible, but they cannot actually distinctively know this (this is not merely my contextual interpretation--unless they are no human).

The rational behind thinking logically, is when you apply logical thinking to reality, it has a better chance of your surviving.

In a general sense, I agree that my survival is more likely if I abide by a coherent logical system (such as classical logic or something), but "survival" alone doesn't get you to any sort of altruism.

You can see plenty of people who hold contexts that do not follow logic

It doesn't follow a logical system that we have derived from our ability to reason. Everyone reasons. Not everyone is rational. There are apodictically true regulations of reason (which are obtained by analysis of a recursive use of reason on reason).

and when they are shown it is not illogical, they insist on believing that context regardless. This is the context they distinctively know.

They do not necessarily distinctively "know" the content of the entirety of the context they hold. Again, they cannot hold they imagined a circle that was also a rectangle that was also a triangle.

It doesn't work in application to reality, but that is not as important to them as holding the context for their own personal emotional gratification

I agree, but what you mean by "application to reality" is "application specifically to the external world".

1. Some things they can know in the mind which is not known in the external world.
2. Some things they cannot know in the mind nor the external world.
3. Some things they can know in the mind and the external world (by means of what is known in the mind).
4. Some things they can know by means of application to the external world.

I think you are trying to reduce it to simply 2 options: application to the mind, or application to the external world.

So to clarify again, one can hold a distinctive logical or illogical context in their head. They distinctively know whatever those contexts are. It does not mean that those contexts can be applied beyond what is in their mind to reality without contradiction. We can strongly convince ourselves that it "must" be so, but we will never applicably know, until we apply it.

You are right in the sense that we cannot claim that my imagination of a unicorn entails there is a unicorn in the external world, but doesn't negate that discrete experience itself is the external world. Therefore, certain forms are apodictically true of the mind and the external world by proxy of the mind. A great example is causality.

No, that is what our context of the world depends on. The world does not differentiate like we do. The world does not discretely experience. Matter and energy are all composed of electrons, which are composed of things we can break down further. Reality is not aware of this. This is a context of distinctive knowledge that we have applied to reality without contradiction. It is not the reverse.

Again, discrete experience is the world. We cannot claim that an electron exists as a thing-in-itself (apart from the subject) nor can we claim that it doesn't exist as a thing-in-itself (completely contingent on the subject). We can claim certain aspects of objects, which are apart of discrete experience, are contingent on particular objects that we deem obtained our sensations and produced our perceptions (i.e. color is not an aspect of my keyboard, it is a matter of light wavelength directed through my eyes which are then interpreted by my brain--all of these are objects that are apart of discrete experience). All of it logically follows, but that is just it: logically follows via reason. Without such, which is the consideration of the absence of reason by reason itself, we can only hold indeterminacy. The "external world", object, is simply that which reason has deemed out of its direct control, but those deemed "objects" follow necessary forms (discrete experience) that form from reason.

I've noted before that math is the logical consequence of being able to discretely experience. 1, is the concept of "a discrete experience." That is entirely of our own making. It is not that the external world is contingent on math, it is that our ability to understand the world, is contingent on our ability to discretely experience, and logically think about what that entails.

I think, given that discrete experience is the world, that you agree with me (at least partially here). Nothing you said here is incorrect, your positing of a external world that is a thing-in-itself is where you went wrong. Just as someone could equally go wrong by positing the exact opposite.

Does this mean that reality is contingent on our observation? Not at all. It means our understanding of the world, our application of our distinctive knowledge to reality, is contingent on our distinctive knowledge.

Again, we cannot claim either. We have reason, and from it stems all else: this doesn't mean that there are no things-in-themselves or that there are. Only that we discretely experience things, which are deemed objects, and all of those objects abide by mathematics because, as you said, discrete experience is what derives multiplicity in the first place. Therefore, certain aspects of the external world are known by reason alone because certain aspects of the external world abide by, necessarily, those regulated forms of reason. This is not to say that you are entirely wrong either, as we can claim "objects", what are out of our control, but with the necessary understanding that mathematics is true of all objects (because it is discrete experience).

Exactly. If you use a logical context that you distinctively know, there are certain results that must follow from it. But just because it fits in your head, does not mean you can applicably know that your logical context can be known in application to reality, until you apply it to reality by adding two potatoes together. To clarify, I mean the totality of the act, not an abstract.

I am having a rough time understanding what you mean here.

When I add these two potatoes together, what happens if one breaks in half? Do I have two potatoes at that point? No, so it turns out I wasn't able to add "these" two potatoes.

I feel like you aren't referring to mathematical addition, but combination. Are you trying to get at that two potatoes aren't necessarily combinable? Like meshing two potatoes together? That's not mathematical addition (or at least not what I am thinking of). We know that one potatoe and another potatoes make up two potatoes. Even if one breaks in half, one half + one half + one entails two. Combining two potatoes won't give you two distinct potatoes, it will give you one big potatoe (assuming that were even possible) or two potatoes worth of smashed potatoes. If that is what you are referring two, then I would say you are talking about what must be empirically verified about the cohesion of "potatoes" in the external world, which definitely requires an empirical test to "know" it. However, to perform the mathematical addition of one potatoe to another, where two distinct potatoes are the result, is known about the external world by means of the mind via reason.

But do you applicably know that you can fit this square and circle I give you in that way before you attempt it? No. You measure the square, you measure the circle. Everything points that it should fit perfectly. But applicably unknown to you, I made them magnetized to where they will always repel. As such, they will never actually fit due to the repulsion that you would not applicably know about, until you tried to put them together.

This is 100% correct. It is pertaining directly to objects themselves, which requires empirical observation. However, that does not negate my claim that the ability to fit a circle in a square is known in the mind. Shape itself is a form of all discrete experience, and therefore can pertain to the external world with merely reason. I know that rectangular shapes take a specific form, and that pertains not only to what I imagine but necessarily objects as well. Think of it this way: I can also "know" what cannot occur in the external world without ever empirically testing it based off of shapes--which encompass the external world as it is discrete experience. Can you fit a square of 5 X 5 inches in a circle of radius 0.5 inches? No. Now, I think what you are trying to get at is that I will not know this about a particular circle and square in the external world until I attempt it--as my calculations (dimensions) may be off and they can fit because they are not the aforementioned dimensions. However, this does not negate the fact that I cannot, in the external world, fit such dimensional shapes into one another as specified. I know this of the external world as well as the mind without application to the external world. However, if the same ruler is utilized in both readings, then I do not need to even apply an attempt to fit them together in the external world because I do know it will not happen. Firstly, if "inches" is consistent (which is implied with using the same ruler), then it doesn't matter if my measured "in" actually is what we would define as an "in". Secondly, the significant digits is a vital consideration with determines whether one actually has to attempt fitting them together to "know" if they can fit. In this case, the significant digits can, with solely reason, be determined to not have an effect that would allow for such a margin of error that would allow it to fit. 5 "whatevers" (inches) by 5 "whatevers", will not fit in 0.5 "whatevers". Even if the significant digit, which would be 5.X and 0.5X (where X is the estimated digit) will not allow for any sort of variance that will allow either of us to claim we could have a large enough margin of error to presume we need to physically test it. If it were that it was a square of 1.X "whatevers" by 1.X "whatevers" and the circle had a radius of 1.Y "whatevers" (where Y is estimated smaller than X), then we now can reason that we could be wrong.

Now, I like your example of magnets to show that I still wouldn't know, even if I new the dimensions checked out, that they would fit. However, I can "know":

1. That dimensions that cannot mathematically fit, considering the margin of error as uneffective, cannot fit in the external world (this is a reason consideration within the mind which necessarily translates to the external world, as it is simply discrete experience).

2. That a square can fit in a circle (this is sole consideration of the mind, but also translates into what cannot happen in the external world). I know, if that is true, that nothing pertaining to the shape of an object will necessitate that an object of shape "square" cannot fit into shape of "circle". As you noted earlier, it is true that to know two particular shapes fit into one another in the external world requires empirical observation, but I still nevertheless know that circularity and squareness, in shape, do not necessitate that they cannot be fit together: this is true of the external world as much as my mind.

I understand. But your inability to conceive of anything else is because that is the distinctive context you have chosen. There are people who conceive of different things. I can make a context of space where gravity does not apply. I can conceive of space as something that can allow warp travel or teleportation.

This is not the uniform, holistic, spatial reference I am referring to. Yes, people can conceive of spatial frameworks under the holistic spatial reference that do not abide by the same principles as that which we discover of the external world. My inability to conceive something else is not distinctive context I have chosen. Yes, I could choose to envision a spatial framework under space where I can fly and, yes, this would be a distinctive context. However, distinctive contexts themselves are depending on a regulated unescapable form which is space which cannot be contradicted: it is not chosen, it is always demonstrably true. Even the imagined spatial frameworks abide by space itself. This is not to be confused with it abiding by "outer space" or "string theory" or "my made up gravity free world". A necessary rule of the manifestations of reason is that it is spatial referenced (inevitably). Does that make sense?

To hammer home, that is because of our application. When you define a logical context of space that cannot be applied and contradicts the very moment of your occupation of space, it is immediately contradicted by reality.

Again, you are right, but this is not relevant to what I am trying to say. I am not referring to me being able to attempt my an application of my gravity free spatial framework to the external world to be met with gravity. I am referring to that which is discovered, projected, and conceivable--holistically all experience. You don't apply the holistic reference of space to anything (you cannot), it is that which necessarily always utilized by reason, in its manifestations (like thoughts), apply anything in the mind or in the external world. With respect to what you were getting at (or at least what I am understanding you to say), you are right.

I think you misunderstood what I was trying to state. I was not stating a scientific theory. I was stating a theory. A scientific theory is combination of applicable knowledge for the parts of the theory that have been tested. Any "theories" on scientific theories are speculations based on a hierarchy of logic and inductions.

I am not following what you are trying to say here. I was under the impression we were discussing science and the theories therein: those are all scientific theories. When you say "I was stating a theory", what do you mean? Colloquially a "theory"? What else is there in science that is a theory besides scientific theories? My point was that we do not simply accept that which is most cogent, it must pass a threshold of cogency in terms of a vast majority of institutions that are in place for developing knowledge. At what point is it cogent enough for me to base my actions off of it? How cogent of an induction does global warming and climate change have to be for me to change my lifestyle? How cogent does evolution need to be for me be base biology off of it? Just simply the most cogent? Scientific theories require much more than that, no?

If they are using knowledge correctly, then yes. But with this epistemology, we can re-examine certain knowledge claims about history and determine if they are applicably known, or if they are simply the most cogent inductions we can conclude. Sometimes there are things outside of what can be applicably known. In that case, we only have the best cogent inductions to go on. We may not like that there are things outside of applicable knowledge, or like the idea that many of our constructions of the past are cogent inductions, but our like or dislike of that has nothing to do with the soundness of this epistemological theory.

I think I following what you are saying now. We don't ever, under this epistemology, really state "historical facts" other than that which is deduced. Everything else is simply a hierarchy of inductions, which we should always simply hold the most cogent one. The problem is that there's never a suspension of judgement: we also claim a belief towards whatever is most cogent. Again, when is it cogent enough for me to take action based off of it?

No, that is not "truth" as I defined it. That is simply applicable knowledge. And applicable knowledge, is not truth. Truth is an inapplicable plausibility. It is the combination of all possible contexts applied to all of reality without a contradiction. It is an impossibility to obtain. It is an extremely common mistake to equate knowledge with truth; as I've noted, I've done it myself.

Again, this isn't true. "truth" being the "combination of all possible contexts applied to all of reality without contradiction" is the definition of that which is apodictically true for the subject. Again, take space, or causality, or pon: this is true of all reality because I am not just talking about the external world, I am referring to everything, which is discrete experience (as you put it). the world is reason. This doesn't mean that we can obtain "truth" of anything sans reason, but we must understand that we can't even conceive of such a question: without (sans) reason is considered via reason and its necessary form (i.e. without is a spatial reference and the entire question is via reason).

To explain, I am limited by my distinctive context. I can take all the possible distinctive contexts I have, and apply them to reality. Whatever is left without contradiction is what I applicably know. But because my distinctive contexts are limited, it cannot encompass all possible distinctive contexts that could be. Not to mention I'm limited in my applicable context as well. I will never applicably know the world as a massive Tyrannosaurus Rex. I will never applicably know the world as someone who is incapable of visualizing in their mind. As such, truth is an applicably unobtainable definition.

I think you are positing an objective world that is a thing-in-itself, where "truth" is if we were essentially omniscient with respect to the understanding of an object via all contexts. In that sense, I agree. But I don't think you can posit such.

The problem here is in your sentence, "he speculates it could be the case". This is just redundancy. "Speculation" means "I believe X to be the case despite not having any experience of applicable knowledge prior". "It could be the case" means, "I believe it to be the case", but you haven't added any reasoning why it could be the case. Is it the case because of applicable knowledge, probability, possiblity, etc? I could just as easily state, "He speculates that its probable", or "He speculates that its possible".

I don't think really addresses the issue. I used the terminology "speculates it could" because you used it previously, and I was trying to expose that it is the same thing as possibility (in a colloquial sense). It is redundant: to say "it could" is to say "it is possible" (in the old sense of the term). And, no, "it could be the case" is not equivocal to "I believe it to be the case". If I claim "Jones could have 5 coins in his pocket", I am not stating that I believe he does have 5 coins in his pocket. I am saying nothing contradicts the idea that he has 5 coins in his pocket (e.g. the dimensions dictate otherwise, etc). My reasoning for why "it could be the case" is abstract, but has nothing to do with reasons why he does have 5 coins in his pocket (or that I believe he does). In my scenario, he can't claim it is probable or possible. There's a difference between claiming there is colloquially a possibility that something can occur and that you actually believe that it occurred. Does that make sense? The dilemma is the latter is non-existent in your epistemology. Smith, in the sense that he isn't claiming to believe there are 5 coins in Jones' pocket, is forced to say nothing at all.

It is a claim of belief, without the clarification of what leads to holding that belief.

Potentiality is very clear (actually more clear, I would say, than possibility): that which is not contradicted in the abstract which allows that it could occur. Now, I don't like using "could" because it is utilized in colloquial speech in the sense of possibility and potentiality (possibility as something we could colloquially claim has been proven to occur and potentiality being that which simply hasn't been contradicted yet).

I felt I did use your example and successfully point out times we can claim probability and speculation, but that's because I fleshed out the scenario to clarify the specifics. If you do not give the specifics of what the underlying induction is based on, then it is simply an unexamined induction, and at best, a guess.

I felt like I made it clear. Smith is not claiming it is probable: there's not denominator there. He isn't claiming possibility: he has not seen 5 coins in Jones' pocket before. He isn't going to claim irrational induction, because he hasn't found any contradictions. He is not claiming speculation that Jones has five coins in his pocket: he is claiming that Jones' could potentially have five coins in his pocket. So what does he claim? As you agreed, saying he "speculates that it could happen" is redundant: either he is claiming that it "could" happen in the sense of possibility (as in he has experienced it once before)(which he is not in this case) or he is claiming that he can't contradict the idea that potentially has five coins in his pocket. He isn't asserting that he does, just that it could be the case (given his current understanding).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

First of all, an apology is due: I misunderstood (slash completely forgot) that you are claiming that abstract reasoning is knowledge (as you define it, “distinctive knowledge”). Our dispute actually lies, contrary to what I previously claimed, in whether both types of knowledge are applied.

For starters, this may very well merely be a semantical dispute: only time will tell.

When you state:

What you have been trying to do, is state that distinctive knowledge can be applicable knowledge without the act of application.

I think you are simply semantically defining your way into an obvious contradiction. As you are probably already well aware, if it is true that there is no act of application, then it logically follows that there is no application. I am claiming the contrary: distinctive knowledge is applied. However, using that terminology (distinctive) may be causing some issues (I’m not sure), so let me try to explicate my position more proficiently. First of all, I don’t think we are using the term “reality” equivocally: you seem to be referring to what I would deem “the external world” (to be more precise: “that which is object”--which includes the body to an extent), whereas I refer to “reality” as holistically the totality of existence (which includes the subject and object). Therefore, when you state “applicable knowledge”, I interpret that as “that which refers to the external world and is thusly applied to it for validity”. When you state “distinctive knowledge”, I am implicitly interpreting it as “that which refers to the mind, or that which resides in it, and thusly is applied to it for validity”. Please note that I am using “subject” and “object” incredibly, purposely loosely: simply for explication purposes of two major distinctions I think you are making. So when you talk about how what I reason in my mind doesn’t grant me knowledge about how that thing truly is in “reality” (i.e. your hydrogen + oxygen example), I proclaim “that is true!”. But why is this? It is because, I would say, the reasoning is pertaining to objects specifically. Therefore, the application necessarily cannot be merely from the mind. There are three types I would like to expose hereinafter:

1. That which is in relation to a specific object
2. That which is in relation to an object, but pertains to the general form of all or some objects
3. That which is in relation purely to the subject

Everything is derived from reason (or at least that is the position I take) and, consequently, the distinction between the external world and the internal world (so to speak, very loosely) is blended together (in to those three aforemented types). Certain aspects that do not directly pertain to an object can, and potentially must, be derived purely from reason. For example, when you say:

What I am saying is you can distinctively know that if you have an identity of 1, and an identity of 1, that it will make an identity of two. But if you've never added two potatos before, you don't applicably know if you can

The deductive assertion of “two potatoes” (as conceptualized without refurbishment from the standard definitions) necessitates the operation of addition: regardless of whether (1) the operation has been applied in the external world or (2) potatoes even exist in the external world. If we are utilizing distinction (which is implied with “potatoes” in “two potatoes”, as well as multiplicity in terms of “two”), then pure reason can derive knowledge that “one” potatoe + “one” potatoe = “two” potatoes. This is, as you are already inferring, simply the exact same thing as your first sentence (in the quote): 1 + 1 = 2. As far as I understand your example here, you are referring specifically to the addition operation and not the existence of potatoes (“you’ve never added two potatos before, you don’t applicably know if you can”): but, as I’m hopefully demonstrating, you definitely can know that. In simpler terms, math applies before any application to the empirical world because it is what the external world is contingent on: differentiation. This application, although it can be better understood with the use of objects, can be solely derived from reason (1 thought + 1 thought = 2 thoughts, this abstractly applies to everything). Therefore, if I distinctively define a potato in a particular way where it implies “multiplicity” and “quantity”, then the operation of addition must follow. The only way I can fathom that this could be negated is if the universality of mathematics is denied: which would entail the rejection of differentiation (“discrete experience” itself). Notice that 1 + 1 = 2 is of type #3, but, due to the intertwining nature of subject-object, is also utilized in #2 without any application to the external world. The object presupposes mathematics (differentiation): without it, there is no object in the first place. Differentiation is a universal, necessarily so, form of experience: thusly, mathematical operations (to go back to your example) applied in the abstract are, thereby, also applied (if you will) to the external world.

Likewise, consider shapes: these are universal forms (not in the sense of Universals in philosophy, they can be, and I think they are, particulars in that sense) of experience derived solely from reason. I can know, in the abstract, that a circle can fit in a square. I do not need to physically see (empirically observe) a circle inscribed in a square to know this. Not only can I know, applied via reason in the abstract, this in relation to subject, but, since it abides by type #2, also in relation to object. Again, the universality of differentiation would have to be refuted for this not to hold for both subject (that which is conjured) and object (that which isn’t).

Moreover, consider mathematical equations. If I have x + y = 1, I can, purely with reason, solve for x to see what x = ? is. Prior to this abstract application of the process of thoughts, I did not “know” what x = ? entails; afterwards, without any external application, I figured it out: this was abstractly obtained, not given.

Now, the consideration of whether a “potatoe” exists in the external world, just like your hydrogen-oxygen example, requires empirical observation and, therefore, pertains to type #1 only. The mere form of the instantiation of objects will not get you to knowledge about a particular object you have the ability to imagine. But this does not negate the fact that we are able to apply in the abstract. I would also like to note that this also entails that you do know, by application, that your best guess, from reasoning abstractly, is whatever you deemed your best guess.

To quickly cover #3, the knowledge that I did imagine a unicorn in my head, regardless of it is or isn’t instantiated in the external world, was applied strictly by reason (no empirical observation). It was not given, it was obtained. No matter how swift the conclusion was, I had to reason my way, which is the application of the principle of noncontradiction (along with other principles), into knowing such.

With this in mind, I am not referring to objects when I assert space is purely apodictically true. Nor is it in relation to other spatial frameworks we can hold within the uniform spatial plane (like string theory, etc): I am referring to that which reason will always apodictically find true of all of its thoughts and, subsequently, all of its experience holistically—the inevitable spatial reference. Yes, we can conceive of multiple spatial frameworks, but they are necessarily within space. Nothing I can conceive of nor can I claim will ever not be within a spatial reference. Although this is slightly off topic, this is why I reject the notion of non-spatial claims: it is merely the fusion of absence (as noted under the spatial reference), linguistic capability (we can combine the words together to make the claim), and the holistic spatial reference (i.e. “non-” + “spatial”). This is, in my eyes, no different than saying “square circle”. So when you say:

No, space in application, is not proven by distinctive knowledge alone. I can imagine a whole set of rules and regulations about something called space in my head, that within this abstract context, are perfectly rational and valid. But, when I take my theory and apply it to a square inch cube of reality, I find a contradiction. I can distinctively have a theory in my head that I know, but one that I cannot apply to reality.

I am not referring to what we induce is under our inevitable spatial references (such as the makeup of “outer space” or the mereological composition of the space), but, rather, the holistic, unescapable, spatial captivity we are both subjected to: we cannot conceive of anything else. Does that make sense?

The layman already misuses the idea of knowledge, and there is no rational or objective measure to counter them. But I can. I can teach a layperson. I can have a consistent and logical foundation that can be shown to be useful. People's decision to misuse or reject something simply because they can, is not an argument against the functionality and usefulness of the tool. A person can use a hammer for a screw, and that's their choice, not an argument for the ineffectiveness of a hammer as a tool for a nail!

Fair enough.

I want to emphasize again, the epistemology I am proposing is not saying knowledge is truth. That is very important. A common mistake people make in approaching epistemology (I have done the same) is conflating truth with knowledge. I have defined earlier what "truth" would be in this epistemology, and it is outside of being able to be applicably known. I can distinctively know it, but I cannot applicably know it.

Completely understandable. I would also like to add that even “truth” in terms of distinctively known is merely in relation to the subject: it is still not absolute “truth”--only absolute, paradoxically, relative to the subject.

To note it again, distinctive and applicable truth would be the application of all possible contexts to a situation, and what would remain without contradiction after it was over.

I am a bit confused by this quote: you conceded that “distinctive..applicable truth is the application of all possible contexts to a situation”, which concedes that it is applied. I am presuming this is not what you meant.

1. Inductions are evaluated by hierarchies.
2. Inductions also have a chain of reasoning, and that chain also follows the hierarchy.
3. Hierarchies can only be related to by the conclusions they reach about a subject. Comparing the inductions about two completely different subjects is useless.

I am still hesitant about #3, but I will refrain for now (and let you respond to the rest first).

So, I can first know that the hierarchy is used in one subject. For example, we take the subject of evolution. We do not compare inductions about evolution, to the inductions about Saturn. That would be like comparing our knowledge of an apple to the knowledge of a horse, and saying that the knowledge of a horse should have any impact on the knowledge of this apple we are currently eating.

I think for now, I will refurbish my initial analogy to your other one (because I think mine was deviating from the main purpose):

So we pick evolution. I speculate that because certain dinosaurs had a particular bone structure, had feathers, and DNA structure, that birds evolved from those dinosaurs. This is based on our previously known possibilities in how DNA evolves, and how bone structure relates to other creatures. To make this simple, this plausibility is based on other possibilities.

I have another theory. Space aliens zapped a plants with a ray gun that evolved certain plants into birds. The problem is, this is not based on any applicable knowledge, much less possibilities. It is also a speculation, but its chain of reasoning is far less cogent than the first theory, so it is more rational to pursue the first.

This is more in line with the main point I am trying to convey: theories are not what is most cogent, they are what has passed a threshold. Whether either of us like it, we do not claim “theory”, scientifically, to the most cogent induction out of what we know: that is a hypothesis at best. Even in relation to the same exact claim (so forget the saturn comparing to a horse for now—although we can definitely talk about that too), we hold uncertainty in most fields of study until it is considered worthy of the title “theory” or “true” or “fact” (etc). It isn’t necessarily bad that your epistemology erodes this aspect, if, and only if, it addresses it properly (I would say). As another example, historians do not deem what is historically known based off of what is the most cogent induction (currently), it has to pass a threshold. We don’t take the knowledge of one reference to a guy named “bob” and go with best speculation we can rationally come up with. As of now, your epistemology doesn’t seem to account for this. We do not accept all contextually “most cogent” inductive beliefs, we are typically selective. Are you claiming we should just accept all of the most cogent beliefs (with respect to each hierarchical context)?

Within the context you set up, you may be correct. But in another context, he can claim it is possible or probable. For example, Smith sees Jones slip five coins into his pocket. Smith leaves the room for five minutes and comes back. Is it possible Jones could fit five coins in his pocket? Yes. Is it possible that Jones did not remove those five coins in the five minutes he was gone? Yes. We know Jones left those coins in his pocket for a while, therefore it is possible that Jones could continue to leave those coins in his pocket.

I don’t think you really address my issue (I probably just didn’t explicate it properly). In my scenario with Smith, he isn’t speculating that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket: he is claiming it has the potential to occur. The dilemma is this:

1. He can’t claim possibility (in my scenario)
2. He can’t claim probability (in my scenario)
3. He can’t claim irrationality
4. He can’t claim speculation

So what does he claim in your terminology? They are all exhausted. If he claims that he speculates it could be the case that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket, then he is literally claiming the colloquial use of the term possibility. I am salvaging this with “could” referring to potentiality. I am not quite following how you are reconciling this dilemma?

Again, to keep this relatively short, I will address the rationality vs reason parts later. I would just like to point out that I agree, but you were referring to rationality, not reason. But more on that at a later time (I think we need to resolve the previous disputes first).

I think you're getting the idea of contexts now. The next step is to realize that your contexts that you defined are abstractions, or distinctive knowledge rules in your own head. If we can apply those contexts to reality without contradiction, then they can be applicably known, and useful to us. But there is no one "Temporal context". There is your personal context of "Temporal". I could make my own. We could agree on a context together. In another society, perhaps they have no idea of time, just change.

Time is change. What you are referring to is our abstraction of time into clocks (I presuming), which is most definitely correct. However, assuming I can converse with them (or communicate somehow somewhat properly), they will not be able to contradict the notion of space and time. You are right that they may reject any further extrapolation of mereological structures other than what they immediately see, but that would have any effect on my definition of “context” since any mereological consideration would thereby be omitted anyways. I’m not quite following how you can create a different “temporal context” than me, other than semantically refurbishing the underlying meaning. You can surely deny abstract clocks, but not causality.

To answer your next question, "What is useful", is when we create a context that can be applied to reality, and it helps us live, be healthy, or live an optimal life. Of course, that's what I consider useful. Perhaps someone considers what is useful is, "What makes me feel like I'm correct in what I believe." Religions for example. There are people who will sacrifice their life, health, etc for a particular context.

Convincing others to change their contexts was not part of the original paper. That is a daunting enough challenge as its own topic. In passing, as a very loose starting point, I believe we must appeal to what a person feels adds value to their lives, and demonstrate how an alternative context serves that better than their current context. This of course changes for every individual. A context of extreme rationality may appeal to certain people, but if it does not serve other people's values, they will reject it for others.

This is feels like “context” is truly ambiguous. The term context needs to have some sort of reasoning behind it that people abide by: otherwise it is pure chaos. I think the main focus of epistemology is to provide a clear derivation of what “knowledge” is and how to obtain it (in our case, including inductive beliefs). Therefore, I don’t think we can, without contradiction, define things purposely ambiguously.

My inability to apply something, is the application to reality. When I try to apply what I distinctively know cannot be applied to reality, reality contradicts my attempt at application

This is an application in the abstract. You didn’t observe any contradiction with respect to objects, you reasoned that, in this case, that the term “non-” + “material” + “being” cannot exist in what is deemed a “material” + “world”. This is a contradiction that did not get applied to any objects.

If I were to apply what I distinctively know cannot be applied to reality, and yet reality showed I could apply it to reality, then my distinctive knowledge would be wrong in application.

In your example, specifically as you outlined it, this impossible. You defined your way into a contradiction, which means you are abiding by type #3: pure reason. Saying there is a non-material unicorn in a strictly material world is just like the consideration of a square circle. Now, to claim that a material unicorn, as imagined, cannot exist in the material world would be something that abides by the quote here (that you said), because there’s no pure reason that can be applied (at least not without further context): empirical observation is required.

No, it at best proves the possibility that the Earth is round. If you take small spherical objects and show that shadows will function a particular way, then demonstrate the Earth's shadows also function that way, then it is possible the Earth is spherical. But until you actually measure the Earth, you cannot applicably know if it is spherical. Again, perhaps there was some other shape in reality that had its shadows function like a sphere? For example, a sphere cut in half. Wouldn't the shadows on a very small portion of the rounded sphere act the same as a full sphere? If you are to state reality is a particular way, it must be applied without contradiction to applicably know it.

It is true that it does not prove that the earth is completely a sphere, but it does prove it is spherical (round and not flat). It isn’t merely a possibility, it cannot, even under what you described, be a flat plane. Sure it could be even 3/4ths a sphere, but it is nevertheless spherically shaped. Maybe that is what you were getting at, in that case we agree.

Science does not deal in truth. Science deals in falsification. When a theory is proposed, its affirmation is not what is tested. It is the attempt at its negation that is tested. Once it withstands all attempts at its negation, then it is considered viable to use for now. But nothing is science is ever considered as certain and is always open to be challenged.

This is not true. What you have described in a really vigorous form of the appeal to ignorance fallacy. Science does not deal with solely falsification; however, it does holistically deal with falsifiability (which is not equivocal). It is necessary that something that is claimed is falsifiable, but we do not assert “theories” as that which hasn’t been falsified in tests. We not only try to falsify the hypothesis, but we all verify that what should be expected is the results. We confirm, not by simply saying we can’t negate it in terms of this piece of evidence directly contradicts the idea of it. It pertains to “truth” relative to objects, which are relative to subjects.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I think the notion of something abstract is it is a concept of the mind. Math is abstract thinking, and we discussed earlier how "1" represents "an identity". We really can't apply an abstract to reality without greater specifics. I need to apply 1 brick, or 1 stone. The idea of applying 1 is simply discretely experiencing a one.

I am not sure what you mean by applying distinctive knowledge in the abstract. All this seems to be doing is sorting out the different ideas within my head to be consistent with what I know. Math again is the perfect example. I know that 1 + 1 make 2. Could I add another 1 to that 2 and get 3? Yes. But when its time to apply that to reality, what specifically is the 1, the 1, and the 2?

So I think I have identified our fundamental difference: you seem to be only allowing what is empirically known to be what can be "known", whereas I am allowing for knowledge that can, along with what is empirical, arise from the mind. I think that the flaw in taking your approach here, assuming I have accurately depicted your position, is that certain aspects of knowledge precede empirical observation. For example, try applying without contradiction (in the sense that you seem to be using it--empirically) the principle of noncontradiction. I don't think you can: it is apodictically true by means of reason alone. Likewise, try to empirically prove the principle of sufficient reason (which can be posited equally as "causation") by applying it to reality without contradiction (in the sense you are using it): I don't think you can. The principle of sufficient reason and causality are both presupposed in any empirical observation. Furthermore, try proving space empirically: I don't think you can. Space, in one unison, is proven apodictically (by means of the principle of noncontradiction) with reason alone. Moreover, try to prove time without appealing to causation, which in turn cannot be empirically proven, without appealing to reason. Maybe we are just using the term "reality" differently? I mean the totality of existence: not just the "external" world. Again, just as another example, try creating a logical system, which is utilized by everyone (whether they realize it or not) every day, without appealing strictly to reason.

To take your example of mathematics, there are two completely separate propositions that I think you are combining into one in your example. The abstract consideration of mathematics, regardless of whether it is instantiated in the "external" world, is still known (which I think you admit just fine): this is an abstract consideration (meaning within the mind). I find your example a bit confusing as I think you are agreeing with me, but yet arguing against me. If you say that "I know that 1 + 1 make 2", that seems like you are agreeing you can know things without "applying them to reality" (as you use that term), but yet then you attempt to use a (completely valid I must say) argument for why abstract numbers don't necessary map to real quantities in the external world to prove we must apply things without contradiction to reality to "know" them. If we have a mathematical formula, we can "know" it will work in relation to the "external" world regardless of whether it actually is instantiated in it. As we have previously discussed, mathematical inductions aren't really inductions, they are true with an if condition: but that if condition doesn't mean I can't claim to know that N + M abides by certain rules regardless. This is done with reason, which is what I mean by abstract consideration.

That leads me to what I think is our second fundamental disagreement: whether inductions are knowledge or not. Initially, I was inclined to adamantly claim it is, but upon further contemplation I actually really enjoy the idea of degrading inductions to beliefs with different credence levels (and not knowledge). However, I think there may be dangers in this kind of approach, without some means of determining something "known", in terms of inductions, vs what is merely a belief, I am not sure how practical this will be for the laymen--I can envision everyone shouting "everything is just a belief!". Likewise, it isn't just about what is more cogent, it is about what we claim to have passed a threshold to be considered "true". Although I'm not particularly fond of that, it is an obvious distinction between a rigorously tested scientific theory and any other speculation.

Plausibilities are not deductions though. They are inductions. And inductions, are not knowledge. Now can we further study inductions now that we have a basis of knowledge to work with, and possibly refine and come up with new outlooks? Sure! You have to realize, that without a solid foundation of what knowledge is, the study and breakdown of inductions has been largely a failure. I wouldn't say that not yet going into a deep dive of a particular induction is a weakness of the epistemology, it just hasn't gotten there yet.

This the aforementioned in mind, when I stated your epistemology hasn't quite addressed the pressing matters, I was claiming that without the full understanding that you are claiming inductions are not knowledge: therefore, your epistemology does cover what "knowledge" is holistically. However, I don't think this fully addresses the issue, as it can be posited just the same now in terms of "belief". I find myself in the same dilemma where the theory of evolution and there being a teapot floating around Jupiter are both speculations. What bothers me about this is not that they both are speculations, but, rather, that there is no distinction made between them: this is what I mean by the epistemology isn't quite addressing the most pressing matters (most people will agree that which they immediately see--even in the case that they don't even know what a deduction is--but the real disputes arise around inductions). This isn't meant as a devastating blow to your epistemology, it is just an observation that much needs to be addressed before I can confidently state that it is a functional theory (no offense meant). I think we agree on this, in terms of the underlying meaning we are both trying to convey.

Correct. And I see nothing wrong with that. Once he slides the coins into a pocket, then he'll know its possible for 5 coins to fit in a pocket of that size.

Although I understand what you are saying, and kind of like it, I think this is much more problematic than you are realizing. Firstly, he most likely won't know the size of Jones' pockets. Even if he did take the time to measure them, then even with the consideration that he has witnessed 5 coins in Johns' pockets for size L * W * D, he cannot claim it is possible for those 5 coins to fit in a pocket of (> L) * (> W) * (> D). He could abstractly reason that if he experienced 5 coins in a pocket of some size, that, considering mathematics in the abstract, it is possible for 5 coins to fit in a pocket that is greater than that size (assuming the pocket is empty): but he didn't experience it for the greater sized pocket. To me, it seems wrong to think that I cannot reason conditionally that, regardless of whether the pocket of greater size is instantiated in the external world, it is possible to fit 5 coins into that greater sized pocket. Likewise, if I have experienced 1 coin, know the dimensions of that coin, and know the dimensions of Johns' pocket, I can claim it is possible to fit 5 coins in Johns' pocket with the consideration of math in the abstract. The only way I can fathom countering this is to deny the universality of mathematics, which seems obviously wrong to me.

Again, I'm not seeing how we need the word potential when stating, "Smith speculates that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket."

Firstly, claiming "smith speculates that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket" is completely different from claiming "smith thinks it is possible for 5 coins to be in Jones' pocket". One is claiming there actually are 5 coins, whereas the other is claiming merely that 5 coins could be in his pocket. These are not the same claims. But notice that, within your terminology, Smith cannot claim it is "possible", "probable", or "irrational". Therefore, by process of elimination he is forced to use "speculation"; however, as I previously just explained, this does not represent what he is trying to claim: he is not necessarily claiming Jones' actually has 5 coins in his pocket. Likewise, stating it as "smith speculates that there could be 5 coins in Jones' pocket" is just to claim "possibility" in wordier terminology. Speculations are not just claims about "what could", as "could" is purely abstract consideration: speculations pertain to positive or negative claims with respect to what actually is (not what could be). That is why potentiality is a prerequisite to speculation: you must not be able to contradict your claim about what is in the abstract, as that would negate it, but, thereafter, you are necessarily making a claim about "reality".

We have to clarify the claim a bit. Does Smith know that Jones' pocket is the correct size to fit five coins?

Again, empirically speaking, he cannot claim "possibility" based off of a pure abstract consideration of sizes unless that pocket is the exact same size as that which has been experienced before.

Is he saying he knows Jones' pocket is big enough to where it is possible to fit 5 coins?

Again, this is only considered possible if pocket size X = Jones' pocket size, not if pocket size X > Jones' pocket size. But clearly (I think) we can still claim it is possible (just not under your terminology, therefore it has the potential).

The epistemology is not telling Smith to do what he wants. The epistemology recognizes the reality that Smith can do whatever he wants.

He can only do whatever he wants in so far as he doesn't contradict himself. If I can provide an argument that leads Smith realize he is holding a contradiction, then he will not be able to do it unless he uncontradicts it with some other reasoning. Therefore, if we can come up with a logical definition of "contexts", then I think we ought to. This is really the root of the problem with possibility and contexts: they are not clearly defined (as in, the subject gets to do whatever they want).

We can somewhat resolve this if we consider "possibility", in the sense of "experiencing it once before", as "a deductively defined concept, with consideration to solely its essential properties, that has been experienced at least once before". That way, it is logically pinned to the essential properties of that concept. I may have the choice of deductively deciding concepts (terms), but I will not have as much free reign to choose what I've experienced before. To counter this would require the subject to come up with an alternative method that identifies equivalent objects in time (which cannot be logically done unless they consider the essential properties).

Although I am not entirely certain about contexts yet, I think I have distinguished two types: mereological context and temporal context. The former is what the subject typically deciphers as contextual structures of objects, whereas the latter is the summation of time up to present. Therefore, in terms of temporal contexts, I can claim that I am in a particular context now, which is the summation of my knowledge up to the present moment, which influences my judgements. Therefrom, I can also posit the charity of considering temporal contexts in relation to people (including myself). For example, this is my justification for claiming I may contradict what was considered "true" today by new knowledge that is acquired tomorrow (and, likewise, to people who came historically before me). In terms of mereological contexts, there is an aspect of contexts that has no relation to temporal frameworks: the structures of objects. I can equally claim that what is known now in terms of an object in relation to what is immediately seen does not in any way contradict that which is supposed in terms of an underlying structure of that thing now (i.e. it can be a table and be much less distinctly a table at the atomic level). In summary, I can claim that contradictions do not arise in terms of time as well as structural levels. These are the only two aspects of contexts and, therefore, as of now, this is what I consider "context" to be. It is important to emphasize that I am not just merely trying to advocate for my own interpretation of "context": I am trying to derive that which can not be contradicted in terms of "context"--that which all subjects would be obliged to (in terms of underlying meaning, of course they could semantically refurbish it).

The problem isn't the reality that anyone can choose any context they want.

I think they can do whatever they want as long as they are not aware of a contradiction. Therefore, if I propose "context" as relating to temporal and mereological contexts, then they either are obliged to it or must be able to contradict my notion. My goal is to make it incredibly hard, assuming they grasp the argument, to deny it (if not impossible). Obviously they could simply not grasp it properly, but that doesn't negate the strength of the argument itself.

The problem is that certain contexts aren't very helpful. Thus I think the problem is demonstrating how certain contexts aren't very useful.

I agree: but what in the epistemology explicates "usefulness"?

If Smith isn't claiming that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket, then he's speculating Jones could, or could not have 5 coins in his pocket.

To say "speculate could" is to say it is "possible" in the colloquial sense of the term. Therefore, if we are using it that way, you have only semantically eradicated the ambiguity from "possibility". Otherwise, speculation cannot refer to "could", but what is.

The purpose of the original paper was simply to establish how knowledge worked.

Again, since you are defining "knowledge" strictly in the deductive sense (which I partly think is correct), then technically you have achieved your goal here. But, for the reader, I don't think it is quite accurate to say that the epistemology holistically covers all it should: we've merely semantically shifted the concern from "speculative knowledge" to "speculative beliefs".

When you think of something in your head that you distinctively know is not able to be applied. For example, if I invent a unicorn that is not a material being. The definition has been formulated in such a manner that it can never be applied, because we can never interact with it.

But you can apply the fact that you distinctively know that it cannot be applied without ever empirically applying it (nor could you). So you aren't wrong here, but that's not holistically what I mean by "apply to reality".

In your opinion you do, but can you disagree in application? Based purely on this experiment, its plausible that the Earth is round, and its plausible that the distance calculated is the size of the Earth. The actual reality of the diameter of the Earth must be measured to applicably know it. You have to applicably show how the experiment shows the Earth is round and that exact size. The experiment was close, but it was not the actual size of the Earth once it was measured.

I think you are conflated two completely separate claims: the spherical nature of the earth and the size of the earth. The stick and shadow experiment does not prove the size of the earth, it proves the spherical shape of the earth. You do not need to travel the whole planet to know the earth is a spherical shape: the fact that sticks of the same length can throw different shadows contradicts the notion that the earth is flat. It cannot be the case that the earth is flat given that.

It only undermines them if there are other alternatives in the hierarchy. If for example a scientific experiment speculates something that is not possible, it is more rational to continue to hold what is possible. That doesn't mean you can't explore the speculation to see if it does revoke what is currently known to be possible. It just means until you've seen the speculation through to its end, holding to the inductions of what is possible is more rational.

I sort of agree, but am hesitant to say the least. Scientific theories are not simply that which is the most cogent, it is that which has been vigorously tested and thereby passed a certain threshold to be considered "true". I think there is a difference (a vital one).

No, you can distinctively know that a logically unobtainable idea is irrational to hold. A logic puzzle must be reasoned before it can be distinctively known. Only applying the rules in a logical manner gets you a result.

I disagree. You do not need to empirically apply rules in a logical manner to get a result. I obtain knowledge that never leaves my head: principle of noncontradiction, principle of sufficient reason, consideration of mathematics, space, time, causality, logical systems (such as classical logic), etc. What I think you are referring to is claims about what actually is vs what actually can be: both are obtained knowledge. Likewise, not all is claims are proved empirically. Again, try to prove space without presupposing it in an empirical application.

While we could invent a result in our heads to be anything

This is not true, we are subjected to certain rules which are apodictically true for us. However, I do see your point that we don't "know" what is by what can be. Also, somethings aren't just determined to be abstractly something that "can be", we also determine things as necessary. I abstractly conclude the concept of space itself from its apodictic nature: this is not something that can be empirically tested--"tests" presuppose such.

it fails when the rules of the logic puzzle are applied

I agree in the sense that what is applied to the external world may end up exposing contradictions that we hadn't thought of, but this doesn't negate the fact that there is such a thing as non-empirically verified knowledge (abstractly determined knowledge).

Can I clarify that I agree, but people have the capacity to reason with varying levels?

I agree, but when you say:

Some people aren't very good at reasoning.

I don't think we are using the term in the same sense. I don't mean what is rational, which is what we define inter-subjectively as a coherent form of reasoning. I am referring to that which necessarily occurs in all subjects, lest they not be a subject anything related to me. To put it in a sentence (admittedly from Kant, although I don't holistically agree with him at all): I can believe whatever I want as long as I don't contradict myself. This is the grounding I am trying to subject epistemology to (to the best of my ability). You absolutely right that people aren't very good at rationalizing, but when I refer to reason: we all have it.

But it cannot convince a person who does not want to reason, or is swayed by emotion.

The ability to act on emotion first must be decided by reason. Not to say it is rational, but it is always necessarily routed in a reasoning. I agree with you though, in terms of underlying meaning, but I am trying to emphasize that, once it is realized we are all reasoning beings, there is at least something to work with: something to ground in. That's all I am trying to say. But I think we are in agreement.

Also, no worries! Enjoy your weekend!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Fantastic points! To keep this condensed into one response, I am going to try and address your points more generally (but let me know if there's anything I didn't properly address). Just as a side note, this is entirely my fault, as I was the one who double posted (:

Firstly, I think some exposition into "potentiality" is probably necessary. In general, although I may just be misunderstanding you, I think that some of your concerns are perfectly warranted (and thus I will be trying to resolve them) and some are simply misunderstandings of what I mean by "potentiality". First off, potentiality is an abstract consideration. You seemed to be trying to apply potentiality distinctively and applicably (and finding issues with it): abstract considerations are always applications to reality. I don't think that "application to reality" is limited to empirical verifications: abstract considerations are perfectly reasonable (I think). For example:

For example, if it is possible that a person who wakes up every day at 8 am could potentially wake up tomorrow at 8 am, that's a distinctive potential. But if unknown to us, they died five minutes prior to our prediction, there is no applicable potential anymore.

I think this is a misunderstanding of potentiality. Firstly, what do you mean by distinctive potential? Anything that "isn't contradicted in the abstract" (assuming it isn't directly experienced as the contrary) is something that got applied to reality without contradiction. I might just be misremembering what "distinctive knowledge" is, but I am thinking of the differentiation within my head (my thoughts which haven't been applied yet to see if the contents hold). If that is the case, then potentiality can never be distinctive knowledge, it is the application of that distinctive knowledge in the abstract. If I have a belief that unicorns exist, I can abstractly verify whether it is "true" that I have a belief that unicorns exist. If I can't contradict the idea that I am having a belief that unicorns exist, then that is applicable knowledge (because I applied it to reality without contradiction). Secondly, this objection you are voicing also applies to possibility. If I have experienced person X get up at 8 am before, then I can say it is "possible" for X to get up at 8 am tomorrow morning. However, unbeknownst to me, they actually died today: therefore it isn't possible for them to get up at 8 am tomorrow. I don't see this as a flaw in potentiality or possibility, because it is not about what you don't know: it is about, contextually, what you do know. Let's take the same situation, for possibility and potentiality, but add you to the mix. Let's say that I don't know X died today, but you do. For me, it is the most cogent position for me to hold that X can "possibly" (and "potentially") wake up at 8 am tomorrow. For you, it is the exact contrary. The way I interpreted "no applicable potential anymore" is that of something objective, which isn't what I am getting at with potentiality or possibility.

However, I think you are right in potentiality seems to be consumed by other terms, but I'll get into that in later on (I think we need to hash some other more fundamental things first). I've realized that, although your epistemology is great so far, it doesn't really address the bulk of what epistemologies address. This is because your epistemology, thus far, has addressed some glasses of water (possibility, probability, and irrational inductions), but yet simply defined the whole ocean as "plausibility". Even with a separation of "inapplicable" and "applicable", I find that this still doesn't address a vast majority of "knowledge". So I don't think keeping a concise, one-word description of "speculations" is productive unless we dive into the subparts of that gigantic ocean.

Now, with that in mind, I want to really explicate how narrow "possibility" truly is. I think it is, as of now, not clearly defined. Let's recall that possibility is "that which has been experienced at least once before". Now, let's dive into your example you gave about the coins:

"Smith thinks Jones potentially has 5 coins in his pocket, but we the audience knows, that he does not (thus this is not an applicable potential).

Again, as a side note, the audience would claim it has no potential and Smith would (no contradiction here). But at a deeper level, imagine Smith has never experienced 5 coins in a pocket, but he's experienced coins before. Therefore, Smith cannot claim that it is "possible" for there to be 5 coins in Jones' pocket. He can speculate based off of the possibility of coins and the abstract consideration that he can't contradict the idea that 5 coins could be in Jones' pocket. Therefore, his position is a possibility (coins) -> speculation (5 coins in pocket). What would he say? He can't say it is "possible". Normally, Smith would have, in colloquial speech, deemed this abstract speculation as a "possibility", but now it seems as though he has been stripped of his words. Therefore, I introduced something back from the old word "possibility": the abstract consideration. He can claim "it is potentially the case that Jones' has 5 coins in his pocket". But this can get weirder. Imagine Smith has experienced 5 coins in his own pocket, but not 5 coins in Jones' pocket: then he hasn't experienced it before. Therefore, it is still not a possibility, it just has the potential to occur. Now, I think we are both inclined to try and reconcile this with something along the lines of "contexts, bob, contexts". But what are "contexts"? If we allow Smith to decide what a context is, then it seems as though the epistemology is simply telling him to do whatever he wants (as long as he doesn't contradict himself). But then we could make this much, much weirder. Imagine Smith has experienced 5 coins in Jones' pocket yesterday, but he hasn't today. Well, if the context revolves around time, then Smith still can't claim it is possible. It is only potentially the case. Likewise, Garry could have a location based contextual system, where he's experienced 5 coins in Jones' pocket in location X, but Jones' is now in location Y. Garry and Smith would agree that it is not "possible" (not to be confused with "impossibility") that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket--but for completely different reasons. Moreover, as you can imagine, without clearly defined meaning of "context", Smith could claim it is "possible" while Garry claims it isn't. But to take "experience it at least once before" literally, then possibility is incredibly narrow. And to take it not literally is to create a superficial boundary with no clear meaning (as of yet).

Also, I would like to point out, it wouldn't really make sense for Smith, although it is a speculation, to just merely answer the question with "I speculate he has 5 coins in his pocket", because Smith isn't necessarily claiming that Jones does have 5 coins, he is merely assessing the potentiality. Again, at a bare minimum, he would have to had experienced 5 coins in Jones' pocket before in order to claim it is possible. Most of the time we don't have that kind of oddly specific knowledge, therefore potentiality was born: it is a less strong form of possibility. It is to apply a concept to reality, in the abstract, without contradiction. Likewise, imagine Smith has experienced 4 coins in Jones' pocket, but not five. Then it also wouldn't be a possibility that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket: it would be an abstract consideration that is not contradicted.

Furthermore, I would like to revisit the 8 am dead person example: it isn't necessarily the case that it is impossible either just because they are dead. Let's say I heard from a trusted friend that they died today: I didn't experience their death. This would be an abstract consideration. Do I trust them? If I do, what logically follows? It logically follows that there's no potential for them to wake up tomorrow at 8 am. But notice that in doing so, I've necessarily revoked any "possibility" as well, but not on the basis of "impossibility".

To sum it up, I think we need to clearly and concisely define "context", "possibility", "impossibility", and "potentiality". If I can make up whatever I want for "context", I could be so literally specific that there is no such thing as a repetitive context, or I could be so ambiguous that everything is possible. Then we are relying on "meaningfulness", or some other principle not described in your epistemology, to deter them from this. If so, then why not include it clearly in the epistemology?

I had inapplicable plausibility defined as "that which we are unable to apply to reality at this time."

I think that, in this sense, I agree. But originally it encompassed two senses: that which can't be applied right now, and that which never will be. The latter is irrational. The former may be rational in the sense that it isn't an irrational induction, but it isn't necessarily the case that it should be pursued either. It would merely be a speculative potential: specifically, given no further context, an incredible speculative potential. Which leads me to my next question: when you say "unable to apply", what do you mean? I think that if nothing can be applied at all, then it isn't worth pursuing. If you can't find any evidence for that concept or idea at all, why pursue it? The great inventors of the past, albeit invented "crazy" "impossible" things, had some sort of evidence backing their speculations. They didn't tell themselves: "I am trying to discover a teapot 100 billion light years away in another galaxy, of which I have no evidence to support it is there, but I am going to incessantly keep trying anyways".

For example, let us say that a man uses a stick and shadows to determine the Earth is round, and calculate the approximate circumference. The only way to applicably know, is to travel the world and measure your journey.

I disagree. The journey across the world is not the only way to verify the spherical nature of the earth. The stick and shadows is just the beginning. One can find many more forms of scientific evidence (that doesn't require a round trip): it would be, given that kind of evidence it has, a "credible speculative potential".

However, I do have my worries, like you, about even calling them "speculations": a lot of enormously backed scientific theories would be a "credible speculative potential", which seems to undermine it quite significantly. This is honestly the main issue with "plausibilities": it is really where epistemology mainly lies. It may be in our best interest to just dedicate more terminology, more explanations, towards speculations: there has to be further hierarchies within it. This is why, upon further reflection, although it is great so far, I don't think your epistemology really gets into any of the pressing dilemmas an epistemology is supposed to address. Now we must determine the thresholds of evidence that would constitute a scientific theory as significantly more reliable than, let's say, simply a man speculating with a stick and shadows (both of which could potentially be considered "credible speculative potentials"). Don't get me wrong, your epistemology does a splendid job at the fundamentals, especially in terms of inductions, but there's a lot of work needed to be hashed out in terms of speculations.

I believe irrational inductions should remain a contradiction with what is applicably known

I disagree, if what you mean by "application" is empirical evidence. I am claiming potentiality is applicably known (always). I can applicably know, in the abstract, that a logically unobtainable idea is irrational to hold. For example, take an undetectable unicorn:

1. A truth-apt claim is a claim that has the ability to be falsifiable (true or false).
2. An undetectable unicorn is unfalsifiable.
3. An undetectable unicorn is not truth-apt.
4. The pursual of a claim implies it is truth-apt.
5. An undetectable unicorn is not pursuable.
6. Therefore, to attempt to pursue the idea of an undetectable unicorn, leads to a contradiction: the pursual implies its truth-aptness, but yet the claim itself is not truth-apt.

I have tried to avoid using the word "objective" within contextual differences, because I think there is something core to the idea of "objective" being something apart from the subject, or in this case, subjects. As you have noticed, there is a dissatisfaction if a person re-appropriates a word that is too far from our common vernacular. I believe a way to avoid this is to try to find the essential properties of the word that society has, and avoid adjusting those too much. In this case, I think objective should avoid anything that deals with the subject, as I believe that counters one of the essential properties that society considers in its current use of the word.

Although you are right that I am refurbishing the term "objective", I think it is a step in the right direction. I think this is actually what people implicitly are doing when they say something is "objective": it is something they've deemed to out of their control (an object). Some people will go a step further and claim there's actual an absolute something out there, of which is separate from all subjects: this is a speculation that lacks potential. For a color blind person, I think they will be more than happy to accept that what is objective for them, isn't objective for other people. So, although I agree and you are right, I think society needs to stop making such bold, unnecessary claims that there's some sort of absolute instantiation of objects. It is something that is unfalsifiable.

That the person decides to be rational. You can never force a person to be rational. You can persuade them, pressure them, and give them the opportunity to be, but you can never force them to be. Knowledge is a tool. Someone can always decide not to use a tool

This is true. But I want to be careful with the term "rationality": I find too many people using it in an ambiguous way to justify their reasoning (without actually justifying it). For me, "rationality" is a inter-subjectively defined concept. Therefore, we are not all rational beings (like Kant thought), but we are all reasoning beings. My goal, in terms of epistemology, is to attempt to make the arguments based off of reasoning, so as to make it virtually impossible for someone to deny it (if they have the capacity to understand the arguments). I agree that people don't have to be rational, but they are "reasonable" (just meaning "reasoning").

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I apologize for the double post here, but I've had more time to think and wanted to share a bit more with you (so you can mow it over in your head).

1. "Accidental Properties" should be "Unessential Properties". If I am remembering correctly, your epistemology utilizes the terms "essential" and "accidental" to refer to properties. However, although I understand the underlying meaning, I don't think "accidental" properly addressed what is trying to be conveyed. The way I am thinking about it, there's nothing "accidental" about properties that may be decided to be removable from the term. I would say those properties are "unessential", and they are predefined. If an "essential property" turns out to be something I deem unworthy of such a title, then that term is being fundamentally altered to mean something different (and not merely a refurbishment).

For example, let's say I am defining "monitor" with the essential properties of ["displays things on a screen"] (where [] denotes a set). I think I am logically constrained to the following with consideration to object O:

IF O lacks the potential to have had the essential properties necessary to be a monitor, then it is not a monitor. (i.e. in the abstract, if O lacks the necessary components, even in the sense of dysfunctional components, that make the essential property of displaying a screen, then it is not a "monitor")

IF O has the potential to have had the essential properties necessary to be a monitor, then it is a monitor--"dysfunctional monitor". (i.e. in the abstract, I can consider O, given just a slightly torn wire or a completely empty wire port, if it were intact, to would have produced the essential property of displaying things).

IF O has the essential properties, then it is a "monitor" ("functional monitor").

The reason why this is of particular importance to me is that I was encountering essentially the issue of the Ship of Theseus again, but with doors. What makes a door a door? It doesn't seem like there is really, in colloquial speech, a clear line that is drawn (no real essential properties). Is it that it has a knob? No, doors can not have knobs. Is it that it has rectangular shape? No. Does it need to open? No. Does it need to close? no. Does it need hinges? no. But then I realized, and I'm pretty sure you probably meant this when we previously discussed the ship paradox, that essential properties are the exact same, in terms of arbitrariness, as unessential properties except that they are determined to be the fundamental aspects of the term. Therefore, if an essential property turns out to not be essential, then what is actually happening is that the subject is completely disbanding from that term and creating a whole new one (it is not a refurbishment, that can only occur with unessential properties).

Therefore, I think each term must have at least one essential property, and that is the anchor, so to speak, of the term. So, for example, if I define a "door" as "that which can open", then it doesn't matter anything else (such as the shape, texture, color, material, etc). And if I decide that, actually, that essential property is no more, then so is the term "door". Now, there's two important things to note here: (1) I can most definitely still, after disbanding the term "door", define "door" again with different essential properties (it is just that it is no longer the same concept) and (2) the essential property, as previously defined, is constrained to potentiality (so even if a "door" won't open, that doesn't mean it hasn't qualified as "that which can open").

Further, quite frequently when we say "that is a door", "that is a fake door", or the like, what we really are referring to is "likeness", which I consider to be only useful for anticipation purposes (strictly hypotheticals), and are not actually assigned to the term "door". For example, given my previous essential property qualifier for "door", if I see an object that resembles all the unessential, stereotypical, properties of a "door", I may be inclined to treat it as such--or, in the case that treating it as such produces no meaningful results, I may be inclined to define it as a "fake door". But my emphasis is that that which does not contain all the essential properties is not included in that term. So I would be inclined to say "it is like a door" when there is an object that lacks any potential to open but yet resembles a door.

2. I think it is finally time to address "plausibilities". "Plausibility" typically means "Seemingly or apparently valid, likely, or acceptable; credible". I don't think this even remotely resembles what you are trying to convey in the epistemology and, although we could legitimately rebrand the term, I think it is in our best interest (or at least my best interest) to use more pertinent terminology. I hereby propose terminology more resembling "speculative potentials", which directly eliminates "credibility" and "likelihood" from the terminology (as I don't think either should be attributed to a "plausible induction"). Therefore, I think "plausibilities" are actually "speculative potentials". A "speculation" is "Reasoning based on inconclusive evidence; conjecture or supposition" and "potentiality" is referring to "that which is not contradicted in the abstract". To say something is "plausible" is not, as you are probably well aware, to claim something only based off of it having potential (it is weightier than that).

Moreover, since "inapplicable plausibilities" have no potentiality (because they can be contradicted in the abstract: namely that they are not truth-apt, which contradicts the investigation of the claim in the first place), they will be hereby moved to "irrational inductions" and, most importantly, the terminology would now reflect that concisely and clearly ("speculative potential" directly explicates that it necessarily involves potentiality).

Likewise, there needs to be some subcategories of "speculative potentials", for they are all not equal claims (potentiality is quite a low bar to pass). I hereby propose we separate it as follows:

Divide "speculative potentials" into two subgroups: "considerable speculative potentials" and "inconsiderable speculative potentials". "Considerable" being defined as that which is worthy of consideration, which would be constituted by "a speculation, that has potential, that provides some form of negative and/or positive evidence beyond its mere potentiality". "Inconsiderable" is simply "that which has not provided anything beyond its potentiality as a basis of evidence".

Now, it will have to probably be voiced in greater depth in a subsequent post, but I would like to briefly point out that I would like to also refrain from accepting "inconsiderable speculative potentials".

Within "considerable speculative potentials", we can split it further into two subcategories: "credible speculative potentials" and "incredible speculative potentials". "Credible" being defined as "that which, upon consideration, (1) passes a threshold as defined in an axiomatic contract, (2) abides by a well defined and coherent logical system, or/and (3) directly abides by the principle of noncontradiction". Anything that doesn't constitute as "credible" is thereby "incredible".

3. I am still not sure if I am right in trying to logically tie the subject down to avoid deadlocks (as discussed in the previous post), but I have thought a starter point. Firstly, in order to be a "societal context", there must be some sort of inter-subjective or inter-objective agreement. If not, then it is not a "societal context"--and thereby is a "personal context". This cannot be contradicted as it is a deduced term. Secondly, the subject can hold a subjective claim and it's inter-subjective converse without contradiction. Likewise, the subject can hold an objective claim and it's inter-objective converse without contradiction.

My initial flaw, I think, in my contemplation of societal context deadlocks was my fundamental viewing of it as all "objective". However, I think we can split it into two meaningful terms: "objective" and "inter-objective". "Objectivity" is "that which the subject considers object in relation to itself", whereas "inter-objectivity" is "that which is agree upon, by a collective of subjects, as the object in relation to themselves as a shared experience". For example, when a red-green colorblind and non-colorblind person fundamental disagree (thus seemingly at a deadlock), they are actually disagreeing "objectively", but not necessarily "inter-objectively". The colorblind person could very well hold that it is "objectively" "true" that they are seeing green, while also holding that it is an "inter-objective" fact that what they are seeing is red--meaning they accept that it would be a contradiction for them to claim that it is green for the majority of people, but, nevertheless, it is not a contradiction to apply it to reality for themselves. To keep it brief, I think that "inter-objectivity", just like "inter-subjectivity", is a complicated subject that isn't merely "the majority deem what is inter-objective". No, I think it pertains more to a power dynamic, which tends to end up being the majority deem it so in more representational government systems. But that is for a later discussion. My main point here is that someone could reject someone else's claim at the "objective" or "subjective" level, but not be able to do so with respect to the inter-levels. I can apply to reality without contradiction that I value this particular loaf of bread at $100,000 (or pounds or pesos, whatever you fancy), but I cannot apply without contradiction the claim that that loaf of bread is valued inter-subjectively at $100,000 (it's probably not).

Now, none of the aforementioned completely solves anything, but I thought I would get it on your radar so you can mow it over too.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Don't worry, I am enjoying myself in these conversations. That being said, if you tire of them, feel free to let me know without any guilt or worry. I would like you to enjoy them as well, and not feel forced or pressured to continue.

Likewise, I thoroughly enjoy our conversations! I have a lot of respect for how well thought out your positions are! I don't think enough people on this forum give you enough credit where it is due! I just wanted to make sure that you are just as intrigued by this conversation as me (:

Moreover, I agree: I think our different outlooks on the "fundamental" is trivial enough, to say the least. I think it is time to continue to different aspects of the epistemology.

The main objection, or more like issue, that I am internally thinking about pertains to the ambiguity, or almost incredibly limited scope, of what is covered in the epistemology as is. Again, as always, I may be just misunderstanding (you tell me!), but, although the epistemology is rock solid hitherto, it doesn't really provide a concrete structure for societal contexts (I would say--or at least that's how my internally raised dilemma goes). In light of your chinese poem example (which is a great find by the way!), I don't think I need to go too into depth about what I mean by ambiguity with respect to defining (more like creating) terminology. Just as a quick example, in the abstract, I can legitimately determine essential properties X, Y, Z and (distinctly different) essential properties A and B to the same term. So when I refer to that term, it could be in relation to either one of those two essential property sets (so to speak), and there is no contradiction here to be found: ambiguity is not a contradiction (in the form of A is A and not A).

Although I think we both agree that the definitions that provide the most clarity should prevail, my dilemma is: "what justification do I have for that?". What in the epistemology restricts the other person from simply disagreeing? I found nothing stopping them from doing so. That is a worry for me, as it seems like, if I follow the trajectory of the epistemology in this manner, we end up with incomprehensible amounts of deadlocks (stalemates).

I actually think I have come up with a solution to this. I think that the subscription to the pon actually provides more rigidity than I originally thought. I think that we can clearly argue that ambiguity is actually wrong (or, more specifically, best clarity right) if the individual subscribes to pon. They cannot hold both. The argument, loosely, is as follows:

1. Ambiguity does not represent experience in the most clarifying manner.
2. Every "thought" the subject has is motivated towards acquiring an explanation.
3. The explanation that provides the most clarity for the subject becomes the explanation they accept. ("most clarity" being what they cognitively decipher as such, I'm not saying it is with respect to other subjects)
4. Defining ambiguously contradicts providing the most clarity.
5. Therefore if a less ambiguous definition is provided (that they also consider less ambiguous), it must be accepted by the subject.

In my thinking, very premature I do admit, I think that even to provide a counter to this would be an attempt to provide a better clarifying explanation (conclusion), therefore it is self-defeating to reject this given pon. But, to dive in deeper:

#1 This is based off of pon: "ambiguity" is defined as the contrary to that which provides clarity. Therefore, to reject this, I think one would be obligated to reject pon.

#2 This is also based off of pon: I don't think this can be contradicted. Conclusions of any kind are an explanation. The sole purpose of questions is a "thought" driven towards the goal of explanation. Even to say "it just is", or anything like that that provides no real good explanation, is still an explanation--in a generic sense. A statement, blunt and without a question, is still an explanation. I don't mean "explanation" in the sense that we deem it "sufficient" in the sense of academia. Therefore, I think they would be obliged to reject pon in order to reject this.

#3 Any attempt to counter this is implicitly trying to provide a better explanation than my proposition here, so even in the case they reject this, their rejection is quite literally them accepting the explanation (counter) they deemed to provide better clarity. Therefore, this cannot be contradicted.

#4 This is honestly just a reiteration of #1. I'm not sure if it is even needed.

#5 Again, even if they reject this, they would be acting it out implicitly, therefore it cannot be contradicted.

Therefore, I think this argument conforms to a specific protocol, so to speak, which is simply use of pon. The only thing they must accept is pon to be obligated to accept that ambiguity is actually wrong. I can actually tell that person they are wrong even within their own context IFF they accept pon. That is our common ground.

Accordingly to this kind of pon argument anchoring (where they must choose to accept whole heartedly or reject pon), I think we could most definitely add principles like these (as long as they conform properly) to the epistemology and, thereby, provide stronger, more structured, system for people to abide by.

Likewise, I was wondering: "couldn't the other person just reject possibility (or some other induction hierarchy) as more cogent than plausibility (or some other induction)?". I think, as is, although you argue just fine for it, they could. They could utilize the most basic discrete and applicable knowledge principles in your epistemology to reject the hierarchy without contradiction. However, I think I can provide yet another pon anchored argument that forces them to either accept or reject the pon:

1. Anything you experience requires a conclusion.
2. Therefore, in order to concede objects, the subject is required.
3. Therefore, that which is closer to immediate experience the subject can be more sure of.
4. Therefore, possibility (as defined in epistemology) is more cogent than plausibility (ditto) because it is closer to the subject's immediate experience.

This is just a raw rough draft, and it definitely could use some better terminology, but I think you get the general idea:

#1 This cannot be contradicted. It would require a conclusion.
#2 Just a specific elaboration of #1
#3 Must reject 1 in order to reject this, which cannot be contradicted.
#4 This logically follows. They would have to reject pon in #1.

I think this kind of pon anchoring could really expand the epistemology with respect to a lot of other principles the subject would be bound to (unless they reject pon). Let me know what you think.

The second idea I have been thinking of, to state it briefly, is what I can "axiomatic contracts". What I mean is that, in the case that something isn't strictly (rigidly) pon anchored, two subjects could still anchor it to pon with respect to an agreed upon axiom. For example, although my previous argument is much stronger (I would say), we could also legitimately ban ambiguity IFF the other subject agrees to the axiom that they want to convey their meaning to me. With that axiom in mind, thereby signing an "axiomatic contract", they would be obligated to provide as much clarity as possible, otherwise they would be violating that "axiomatic contract" by means of violating the pon. In other words, they would be contradicting the agreed upon axiom, which would, in turn, violate the contract. Just some food for thought!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Let me start off with a concession: you are 100% correct here. I apologize for the confusion; I am currently slapping myself upon the head!

I most definitely have to utilize the principle of non-contradiction (pon for short) to claim anything. To claim that there was a manifestation, or that I am currently having one, requires pon. Therefore, I would argue that it all starts with pon.

However, most notably, I don't think pon and "discrete experience" are synonymous with one another: the latter is formed from the former. I think there is actually something in between the two, so to speak: the realization of the manifestations themselves. Let me put it forth bluntly:

1. Starts with pon
2. Utilizes pon to immediately realize the "thoughts" themselves.
3. Utilizes those thoughts to realize that I "discretely experience"

Therefore, my only adjustment is the insertion of #2. Again, I apologize for the confusion, the missing piece for me was realizing I am utilizing pon to get to 2, so I was just starting with 2.

I would also like to respond to your elaboration on "fundamental":

Using a higher level concept to discover a lower level concept does not mean the higher level concept is more fundamental than the lower level concept.

The converse is exactly what I am saying. This is why I was using the egg and chicken analogy so much. This is also why I identified two types of chronological derivation (two types of derivations in terms of fundamentals).

We only discovered atoms because of science that was not based upon upon understanding atoms. Does that mean that the science that discovered atoms, is more fundamental than the atoms themselves?

Yes. This is exactly what I am trying to point out. There's two kinds of derivation, and I find people typically focusing on only one of the two. One "fundamental" is in the sense of the highest level thing which derives all else, the other "fundamental" is what the highest level thing concluded is lower levels. Likewise, it is only the "highest level" thing in relation to the latter form "fundamental", where it concluded there are lower level things, so to speak, than itself or what it is discretely experiencing. Moreover, it is the lowest level in relation to the former kind of "fundamental": everything is contingent on it. But that doesn't mean it controls everything, or that it isn't a fair point to conclude other contingencies in terms of other objects. It is fair to conclude tables are contingent on atoms, but both are contingent on the subject insofar as it may or may not be there absent the subject. Likewise, the atom is more fundamental than the table, but it is also less fundamental to the table. The microscope used to see a germ is more fundamental than the germ itself insofar as it is necessarily contingent on such a tool for its discovery. It may very well be, in 1000 years from now, that a much better tool we come up with renders our previous view of germs obsolete (not saying it definitely will, but it is possible). That microscope which you can immediately see for yourself is a much more concrete, sure fact than anything it produces for you to see. Likewise, although this may never happen either, we may, in 2000 years, determine that our view of atoms was completely off. The "atom", conceptually, is contingent on more "fundamental", "higher level" objects we use to discover them and could very well "undiscover them", if you will. Furthermore, this isn't to say we don't consider the "atom", conceptually, as more "fundamental" than the table, it is just with careful consideration that they both fundamentally contingent on one another in two different regards. Does that make sense?

I do not mean a fundamental as a means of chronological use. I mean its smallest constituent parts.

Firstly, you are 100% correct in your inference that I am using "fundamental" in a totally different way, as previously described. However, with respect to "discrete experience", I don't see how you are using "fundamental" in the sense of "smallest constituent parts". "Differentiation" is not the smallest parts. Just like how it was posited that the scientific tool utilized to discover the atoms are not more fundamental than the atom itself, differentiation is not more fundamental than the atoms that are discovered therefrom. I am probably just misunderstanding you, but if the goal is to use the smallest constituent parts, then you would have to derive back to a quark or something. Differentiation is in terms of my sense of the term "fundamental": it is scientific tool used to discover the item (analogously, not literally a scientific tool of course). In that case, it is pon.

But there is one assertion which cannot be countered. There is discrete experience. I am a discrete experiencer.

I would like to agree, but also emphasize pon -> thoughts -> discrete experiencer. You first must be convinced of the thoughts themselves to then conclude you are a discrete experiencer.

It doesn't matter that I used thoughts, language, and my brain to discover that I discretely experience.

I am hesitant here. There's a difference between the thoughts themselves, as immediately known via pon, and those thoughts concluding they are being produced by a brain. Same with language. I am not trying to constrict this to internal monologue. You must necessarily "know" your thoughts, via pon, before you can conclude you discretely experience. I am not referring to any inferences to where the thoughts themselves, or the use of pon, is coming from. I would say the fundamental is pon (after further contemplation and a couple slaps to the face).

As I definitely overcomplicated this into a much longer discussion than it needed to be, although I am more than happy to continue the conversation, I don't want to squander any of your time. So, I will leave it up to you if you would like to terminate our conversation now, or continue the quest. I have much more to say pertaining to the ambiguity that worries me within your epistemology. Seems as though I really can define whatever I want, because "meaningfulness" is no where to be concretely found in your epistemology. There's a lot one can do without violating pon. Likewise, I can quite literally define two unique sets of essential properties to the same name without contradiction: there's nothing in your epistemology stopping me from doing this. But, again, I will only continue down that road if you would still like to continue our conversation.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I am also sorry that I did not tackle a few of your points within the envelope arguments that I think had merit. It is just that in doing so, I think it would have presented confusion because of the flawed premises within the envelope argument they were tied with

No problem! I do think that you aren't quite following what I am trying to convey. So I am going to keep this response incredibly brief so you can fire back with your thoughts (without having to decipher a long reply).

I think that, although we both have good intentions, we are mostly talking over each other. I feel like I followed everything you stated in your last post, and mostly agree, but I must be missing something as well. When you state:

The question is, "Can you come up with something more fundamental that you can distinctively and applicably know, prior to being able to discretely experience?"

I think this is missing my point, as it is framed in a way where it is impossible for me to do so: "distinctively and applicably know" is within the discrete experience "framework", so to speak. And, as far as I am understanding you, this coincides quite nicely with your view of discrete experience being something of which I cannot possibly counter with a more fundamental.

For all intents and purposes, I am going to simplify my "conceptualization" to "thoughts". I think, as far as I understand your point of view, you are viewing it like this:

"discrete experience" -> "subject" -> *

Where '*' is just a placeholder that can be filled with nothing or something else (objects). Whereas I am viewing it like:

"discrete experience" <- "subject" -> *

When you state that it starts (at the fundamental) with "discrete experience", I am thinking, from my point of view, that that is a "thought". You are "thinking" that everything requires "differentiation", "a discrete", which is where, I would argue, it starts. Even when you state (rightfully so) that "thinking" is a process of discrete experience: that is a "thought". So even if we go with:

"discrete experience" -> "thought" -> *

I am viewing it as:

"discrete experience" <- "thought" -> *

Obviously, there are many problematic issues with substituting "thought" with "subject", but I am just trying to convey the bare bone difference between us (stripping away everything else). From my view, you cannot claim "discrete experience is the fundamental" without "thinking it", where "thought" is the fundamental. This is why I think we are deriving in two completely different senses of the term. This is the challenge: you are not starting with a "discrete experience", you are starting with a "thought". The "thought" which states that thoughts itself are "discrete experiences", etc.

I will let you fire back with what you think. I think this is the bare bone difference between us.
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I think we are both struggling here to convey each other's intentions.

I agree. Furthermore, I really appreciate your elaboration as I now understand better where exactly you are coming from. Likewise, I will do my best to keep this response concise and aimed at conveying my point of view.

Now imagine that everything you do, thoughts, feelings, light, sound, etc, are the light that streams in from a lens. You don't comprehend anything but the light. The sea of existence. But then, you do. You are able to separate that "light" into sound and sight.

I am understanding this as what is scientifically typically considered "sensations". Am I correct?

Technically, this is the brain. If you had no brain, all the pulses from your eardrums and the light hitting the back of your eyes would mean nothing. The brain takes that mess of light, and creates difference within it.

This seems, generally speaking, to be "sensations" vs "perceptions"--the former being the raw input and the latter being the interpretation (in your case, I think you are more stating "differences" instead of "interpretations", but I think they essentially convey the same thing here). My point is that, although you are right in everything you have said, this is all obtained knowledge pertaining to how you derived yourself (or how you, thereafter, derived someone else in relation to themselves). This is the chicken figuring out it came from an egg (or the chicken concluding another chicken must have come from an egg). Maybe instead of calling it "extrapolated chronological precedence" we could call this simply "that which was obtained or determined to be true regarding what must precede itself (itself being the "subject")". This is contrary to “just chronological precedence”, which maybe we could call this simply "that which is deriving or that which is required for the consideration in the first place". The chicken derives that it came from an egg: that derivation requires it in the first place. It could very well be, even given that it makes the most logical sense (or may even be considered necessary) that the chicken came from the egg, this is all formulations of that chicken. What if this "truth", that it must come from the egg, is simply that which is a product of cognition? What if it is a product of the chickens ability to differentiate things (and not “objectively” known, or absolutely apart of the “universe”)? What if it is only necessary in relation to itself? When we analyze a brain, it is an interpretation of a brain via a brain. Therefore, you will only know as much as is allowed via your brain's interpretation of that brain it is analyzing. Although I don't like putting it in those terms (because I am utilizing what I am criticizing to even put this forth), maybe that will make more sense (I'm not sure). Do you think it must necessarily be the case that it comes from the brain, or that it must necessarily be the case in relation to itself? I agree with the science you are invoking here (no problem), but hopefully my proposition here is making a bit of sense.

What are the essential properties of a manifestation? If its not a discrete experience, can you explain what makes it different?

Although your definitions are all splendid, I don't think your use of "manifestation" quite fits what I am trying to convey. I was using "manifestation" and "conceptualization" interchangeably (I apologize for the confusion there). For all intents and purposes right now, I am going to try to explain it in terms of "conceptualization" by means of a poor analogy.

Imagine that an envelope (mail) pops into existence out of thin air into your hands periodically. You don't know the contents of the mail initially or where they came from or how they came to be, but you open them. In each envelope, which occur in succession to one another (and only once you read the one currently in your hand), there is a message that you read. Imagine you (1) necessarily always participate in this periodic reading of the contents of envelopes and (2) that you are always immediately convinced of the contents that you read. This is essentially how I view you (for all intents and purposes right now: "thought"). Let's take it for a spin.

Let's take your pink elephant example. When you say you had a basic discrete experience of a pink elephant, I am going to map that to an envelope, of which you have no clue where it came from or how it is, which you necessarily opened and read--immediately convinced of its contents: the discrete experience of the pink elephant. Now, as the envelopes are in succession of one another, you are unable to continue until the next envelope pops into your hands and you can be convinced of its contents. Therefore, when you say you could (1) be in doubt that what you manifested was a pink elephant or (2) you could apply a tool of knowledge to determine whether you did in fact manifest it, these both (whichever occurs) would be the next envelope's contents (or an envelope simply after that envelope). So, for example:

**discrete experience of "pink elephant"**
envelope 1: I just discretely experienced a pink elephant [convinced]
envelope 2: did "I" really just discretely experience a "pink elephant" [convinced you are doubting envelope 1]
envelope 3: "I know I" discretely experienced a "pink elephant" because I can apply it without contradiction to reality [convinced]

Notice the succession of envelopes and how you cannot (in this hypothetical) be convinced without the use of reading an envelope. Now, this would mean even if 600 million years or 2 seconds go by between manifestations of these envelopes (between when you get convinced via reading one), for you that time would never have occurred. If envelope 2 was read 600 million years after envelope 1, it would be no different for you than reading it 10 seconds after the other. Notice that the **discrete experience** is not “known” (or may “recognized” is a better word?) until envelope 1, not at the point of discrete experience. If envelope 1 never occurred, then the discrete experience “would have never occurred”. That envelope 1 is what enabled you to even logically consider the discrete experience in the first place. When I say “it never would have occurred”, I mean in the sense that even if hypothetically it is still objectively (or absolutely) occurring without the envelopes, it would be completely unverifiable and thereby meaningless to the subject.

The conceptualization I am referring to is (more or less) the envelopes: a concept manifested in the same essential manner that is immediately convinced of. Even if I read an envelope, get convinced of it, and then immediately in the next envelope am unconvinced of the previous one, this process still occurred. Also notice that the correspondence, so to speak, of each envelope is necessarily one off: envelope > n can pertain to envelope n, but n cannot pertain to n. For example:

envelope 1: I just discretely experienced a pink elephant
envelope 2: I was convinced I was discretely experiencing a pink elephant when I read envelope 1

Notice the convincement that one was convinced during envelope 1 occurs, at a miminum, n + 1 later and cannot occur at n (at 1 in this case). Likewise:

envelope 1: I am convinced of this very sentence right now as I say it

I have not solidified, so to speak, that very assertion until > 1 envelope pops up with a message pertaining to it. In other, more confusion, words: I am immediately convinced of “I am convinced of this very sentence right now as I say it”, but necessarily not immediately convinced of my convincement of that very statement until (if at all) envelope > n.

Last thing to briefly elaborate on is, if this is the case, then how would the reader get convinced of the envelope process? Wouldn't this also be an extrapolation of some sort? The 'egg' of my analogy, so to speak? I think not. This is because, although envelopes can only pertain to each other in chronological order (> n pertains to n) (therefore I would be using the contents of those envelopes to verify the process itself in a logical manner, which is an extrapolation of some sort: a use of logic to derive the logic), I am not basing the argument (or at least not trying to) off of the process of the envelope as extrapolated, but by the form of the envelopes themselves. In other words, by means of the contents of the envelopes, all of these previous and currently continually manifesting envelopes assume the same form--that is, something of which I am immediately convinced of (which can equally be unconvinced of later on). The form is the concept in a pure sense (but I like your definition as well, but notice yours, as you rightly point out, is within discrete experience whereas the convincement of these envelopes I would argue is not). Also, it is important to note that "convincement" that I am referring to is being used not necessarily in terms of an envelope that explicitly contains "I am convinced of X", for that very statement is immediately convincing you of X and not itself. So when I "prove" conceptualization, I am merely reading the contents of envelopes and I assert I was convinced immediately of the content of envelope n by means of another envelope > n--and, in turn, everything in this general sense is a conceptualization (an envelope). I cannot break this immediate conceptualization loop that seems to occur ad infinitum.

Likewise, when we talk about differentiation, I agree with your definition, but when we provide any logic, or illogical, or rationale, or irrationale, or absurdity, etc, we are doing so in a manner of reading envelopes that we are convinced of immediately, which can most definitely be unconvinced of later. Therefore, what you said is true pertaining to discrete experience, but the whole argument, including differentiation in the sense of experience being discrete, is a succession of envelopes. Actually, I would refurbish it to "is a succession of envelopes without conceding a succession of envelopes beyond the reading of the envelopes themselves". But I think that may be confusing (not sure).

The manifestation itself is not contradicted by reality.

So, to keep this as fundamental as I think possible, the idea of "contradiction" is read via an envelope. However, the important aspect of it that makes it "special", so to speak, is that it can be later on the contents of another envelope that asserts the necessity of the principle of noncontradiction and, most importantly, every envelope that manifests pertaining to such will assert the very same thing. This is why it is an axiom: you cannot apply the principle of noncontradiction to itself because that always leads to the use of it in the assertion.

I can also differentiate the pink elephant manifestation from a grey elephant manifestation. "This" is not "that". Finally, I can start conceptualizing that I will call both "elephants" and one is "pink" while the other is "grey".

What I am trying to get at is more fundamental than this, the differentiation of "this" is not "that" and the conceptualizing (in your use of the term) "elephants" and "pink" and "grey" are both contents of an envelope (or several). They take the necessary form of an idea popping into existence, so to speak, manifesting, that is immediately convinced of. I think your use of the terms, within discrete experience, are fine though.

But your introduction of more identities does not introduce the idea of "implicit knowledge". One cannot have knowledge, without following the process of knowledge. If one follows the process of knowledge without knowing they are, that is accidental knowledge, not implicit.

So there's two aspects needing to be addressed here. One aspect, which was my initial intention for the term “implicit”, is simply the acknowledgment that we, once we say we "know" something, may induce that that thing we know now was occurring the whole time prior to us knowing it (in light of us knowing it). This isn't to say, prior to us knowing it, we knew it. Just that, for example, when we due say "we know that differentiation necessarily occurs", we extrapolate that as occurring prior to when we even knew that. It is "implicit", with respect to this first aspect, in the sense that we are claiming differentiation was occurring, implicitly without our recognition, the whole while prior to our recognition of it. I think my concatenation of "implicit" with "knowledge" was confusing and wrong, so I apologize. My point was that we don't "know" it until we conceptualize it (until it pops up in an envelope). If we had never conceptualized it, it would been as if it never existed (it very well could have never existed). I think, now in hindsight, this is more or less what you meant by "accidental", but this leads me to the second aspect: it ended up, somewhere along the way, sort of morphing into a conversation about if you can "know" something without applying it to a tool (this is separate from my initial intention for the use of the term “implicit”). This sense, although I don't think "implicit" is the best word, I was meaning that the envelope itself is a given, without conceding a giver in the sense that any derivation of a giver would, well, be a derivation, which is derived from the content of the envelopes. This aspect, admittedly, isn't really "implicit", it is "manifested", or "given", or something. For all intents and purposes, this:

"how do I know of my previous envelope I read?" -> "because I remember reading it"

and this:

"how do I know of my previous envelope I read?" -> "because I can apply that belief to reality without contradiction"

Are of the same form. This form, this conceptualization, is the most fundamental in terms of "that which is deriving or that which is required for the consideration in the first place". On a separate note, I would even argue (and the argument itself was read from envelopes) that there is a difference between applying A to B within "reality" without contradiction, applying A to A within "reality" without contradiction, and applying "reality" to "reality" without contradiction. I think your use of "without contradiction" is utilizing the latter (with respect to immediately “known” things). Technically you are right though, I can't contradict that I had read previous envelope n, but how could I contradict it? How do I apply reality to reality? How do I pass a test through itself to see if it passes? My point is that it is impossible. Imagine you forgot that you read envelope n, then you wouldn't be applying anything in the first place: it would not become a consideration until an envelop > n pops up with a manifestation of that consideration. If an envelope pops up with a manifestation about whether a previous envelope occurred, and it is resulted with another envelope that concludes you did, then you did. Likewise, if we were to postulate that an envelope manifests asserting your use of drugs during envelope n's contents being read, and thereby questioning whether it is "objectively true", the fact that you had the envelope n occurred is necessarily solidified as true regardless of whether it is "objectively true". By example of yet another poor analogy, imagine our tool for determining motion was based off of a specific train, T, which is continually moving at a constant speed. Everything we characterize as “moving” or “not moving” (or any consideration of “how fast” or “how slow”) is relative to T. I am having a hard to understanding how we aren’t, when trying to applying an envelope succession to itself “without contradiction”, trying to determine whether T is moving. T is the standard, it is that which springs the very notion of “movement”. When we try to apply A and B, or even A to A, relative to reality (“to reality”), we can determine whether it is a contradiction; However, when apply “reality to reality” I don’t see how we are actually performing any “applying”, just like trying to “apply” T to T relative to T to see if T is moving.

Perhaps the ant follows a process with its manifestations to know that sugar is edible, while dirt is not. And perhaps that process, is the process of knowledge put forth. But can the ant "know that it has knowledge"? With our current understanding of ant intellect, no.

I'm thinking now in terms of "accidental knowledge", as you put it. My point is that the "accidental" or "unaccidental" knowledge we deem it to have has no relation to what it has in relation to itself. It may be the most logical thing for us to deem, but that has no impact on whether it knows anything. So I think you are right, but with careful consideration in relation to ourselves, not in relation to itself.

How do you know that what is manifested is knowledge? Without a process of knowledge, you don't.

To keep this brief, there’s two means of looking at this. One is the envelope succession is a loop the subject cannot break. The other is the envelope succession is what manifests any tool of knowledge we can come up with and process of acting out that tool, which necessarily means “know” those manifestations are “true” (aka, convinced of immediately) in order to do either of the two aforementioned.

Likewise, I would argue certain aspects of this envelope process are necessary in the sense that the contents of the envelopes always conform to a specific convincement, such as the principle of noncontradiction.

But building off of that, in terms of a tool of knowledge, I think we can also prove we have “implicit” knowledge in the sense of exactly what you were depicting with light and the brain: your brain, or to be more specific you as the subject, conforms to specific motivations which require “knowledge” in that sense. But this would be getting into the “why” of discrete experience—nevertheless, this is an innate form of knowledge that we obtain via the tool of knowledge (i.e. that your “tool of knowledge” would never have been created in the first place if you didn’t have some sort of motive to differentiate). I don’t think we are in any disagreement here, as this would have to be obtained via a tool of knowledge that there is “implicit”, innate knowledge in the first place.

I will stop here for now: hopefully this exposes a bit better what I am trying to say.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

A pine tree and an oak tree are different trees. But they are still trees. Discrete experience is a tree. Differentiation an oak tree. Conceptualization is a pine tree. At the end of the day, they are both trees.

If I am understanding your analogy correctly, then I would say (1) you are agreeing with me that discrete experience is not synonymous with differentiation (oak tree is derived from a tree) and (2) I would say, with respect to what I am attempting to convey, conceptualization would be a tree (not a pine tree). With respect to 2, this leads me to agree with you that we are essentially in agreement with one another; however, I am hesitant to completely agree with you as 1 directly entails to me that the fundamental is not differentiating "this" from "that", which I generally think your epistemology begins with such (that and the principle of noncontradiction). When you say "tree", in this analogy, I am arguing it is specifically not differentiation: it is the point of manifestation (and I think there is a difference). When I read your essays, "discrete" in "discrete experience" tended to be implying differentiation is the tree: maybe I just misunderstood you.

For a certain context, identifying types of trees is not important.

I agree, but I wouldn't constitute conceptualization as a pine tree, it would be the tree. Most notably, it would not be anything directly pertaining to a "discrete" anything.

And this is what I'm noting with differentiation and conceptualization. They are both still at their core, discrete experiences.

Again, I am interpreting this (1) as agreeing discrete experience is not differentiation directly (in that case, why use the term "discrete" if not to imply differentiation as apart of the fundamental) and (2) I think the ability, or act, of discretely (in the sense of differentiation) experiencing things comes after the experience itself. You first have a manifestation, an interpretation, and then, only after, can it be concluded that one necessarily discretely experiences. I think you may be attempting to use the term "discrete experience" synonymous with my attempted use of "conceptualization", however I find "discrete experience" to have confusing, almost contradictory, implications (no offense).

If conceptualization is useful as a word, then simply follow the process. Discretely experience the word in your mind. Make it have essential properties that are non-synonymous, or distinct enough from another word as to be useful so that it is distinctive knowledge. Then, apply it to reality without contradiction. If you can do it once, then you have applicable knowledge that such a word is useful in reality.

I think this is another big difference between us both: I don't think you can apply a tool of knowledge to that which is immediately known. I think you are attempting to acquire, holistically, all the knowledge you can claim to have via a tool: I don't think it makes sense to claim you can "know" something via a tool, yet you "do not know" the manifestations that were required for the tool of knowledge in the first place. Now here's where it gets a bit complicated (and you are right to point out my confusing terminology), because there's a difference between the manifestations and anything built off of those manifestations. For example, when I state that you "do not know" the manifestations that were required for the tool of knowledge in the first place, I am not referring to anything concluded to precede that tool of knowledge; in other words, a concluded manifestor by means of the manifestations. I think this is what you were meaning by the "I" and how it doesn't constitute knowledge: a concept of a manifestor must be subject to the tool of knowledge. We are in no disagreement there. However, the manifestations themselves are necessarily not subject to the tool of knowledge: it is the point of absolutely no movement (metaphorically speaking)(point of manifestation). It is the point of neither deduction nor induction, it is given. However, to emphasize this a bit more, when I state "it is given", I am doing so without conceding a giver. A giver would (metaphorically speaking) require movement and, therefore, would be subject to the tool of knowledge. I wanted to try and make that clear, first and foremost, that the division I am seeking is that of no movement vs movement, all of which is "knowledge"--but the former is given (with restraint from conceding a giver) while the other is obtained (via a tool of knowledge). So, with that in mind, I think you are not addressing my point here (and it is not your fault, I am doing a poor job of explaining it), which is self-evident to me due to you attempting to apply it. Anything applied is subject to the tool of knowledge. Conceptualization is not subject to such: it is absolutely no movement.

From discrete experience, I define thoughts, sensations, and memory. Then I apply them to reality.

Again, I think we agree that we can't apply discrete experience to reality because it is reality. However, if that is the case, I don't see how we could logically attribute something acquired via it as knowledge without conceding it is itself knowledge. Also, although you can apply thoughts, sensations, and memory to reality, you don't obtain that you know of them themselves and, thusly, cannot (not just do not) apply them to anything. It is like, you can apply a belief to reality to see if it stands, but necessarily without application you "know" you have a belief. I'm not sure if we are in agreement here or not. In other words, there are two aspects to those terms (thoughts, sensations, and memory), you are right with respect to one aspect, but I think you are disregarding the other.

The issue with your current definition of conceptualization, is it isn't clear enough to show how it is separate enough from other useful words that can be applied to reality, and I'm not sure you've successfully applied it to reality yet without contradiction.

I think, again, the confusion lies in the fact that I will never attempt, nor can I, to apply it to reality.

There does seem to be something different from the act of first identifying "this" from "that", then adding a concept to it.

For clarification purposes, I am not married to the term "conceptualization", it is just the best term I've come up with so far. But conceptualization is the identification that is the point of no movement I am trying to convey. "something different from the act of first identifying "this" from "that"" requires movement. I'm not really trying to address it in the sense of "well I have this discrete experience, let me induce/deduce a useful concept out of it". I am more trying to address it in the sense of the actual manifestation in the first place (without initially conceding a "manifestor")(without ever initially conceding a differentiation of "this" from "that"). I think you are more arguing that this cannot be done, namely without conceding differentiating "this" from "that", and that is where I think we mainly differ.

So please do not take my notes as discouragement. Continue please. I just think the clarity isn't quite there yet on the definition, so lets keep trying!

I completely understand: fair enough! I've been definitely making things more confusing, and I apologize, I'm trying to make it simpler, but haven't quite gotten there yet.

It is why I note we do not need to know why we discretely experience, it is simply an undeniable fundamental that we do.

This is fair and true. However, I would like to emphasize it is "an undeniable fundamental" (as in one of many, of which are not the fundamental in terms of the point of all manifestation) and thusly is derived from the manifestations themselves, the point of no movement, the point of manifestation, without conceding a manifestor, interpreter, etc (as those would be subject to the tool of knowledge to obtain it).

This is simply a discrete experience as I describe it. "This" is not "that" is known by fact, because it is not contradicted.

I would ask, how are you able to state it is not contradicted? Because the point of manifestation is cognitive in a sense; in other words, this is derived from a point of manifestation. "this" is not "that" is known because it is an immediately given, you seem to still be claiming you are applying it without contradiction, and that is how you have obtained it as known. I would say you necessarily cannot apply it, it is what you apply to. I think your use of the principle of noncontradiction is simply assumed, but I think it actually exposes the true point of no movement. You are first utilizing something that necessarily derives everything else: this is not the differentiation of "this" from "that", it is what allows for "this" is not "that" (without conceding an allower).

Are the desk and keyboard in front of you both 100% separate and 100% not separate? If this were the case, you could not discretely experience them. At best, you can make a new word that describes both concepts together.

I agree, but I would argue you are using the fundamental, point of manifestation, which dictates (without conceding a dictator) the necessity of the principle of noncontradiction. It isn't differentiation itself, nor the ability to "discretely experience" (in terms of the use of "discrete").

The question after you realize you discretely experience is, "How do I know I discretely experience?" You try to contradict it. And as I've noted before, you cannot.

Again, the question itself, the act of attempting to contradict it, and the realization is all "the tree", it is the point of manifestation, the point of zero movement. That is the fundamental of everything. This is why I would argue you can't actually even try to contradict it, it's just the fact that nothing happens that makes us feel like we successfully passed it through a test, but the manifestation of the "test" itself is what we were trying to pass through. It cannot be done. It is no different than trying to justify the principle of noncontradiction by trying to contradict it, it literally cannot occur (even as an attempt).

With this, you can discretely experience whatever you like as long as it follows a few rules. It must be a distinct discrete experience that is in some way different from other discrete experiences in your head to avoid being a synonym, and it must not be contradicted by other discrete experiences you hold in your head.

I agree, but these rules themselves require movement, which is derived from the point of no movement. They are manifestations which require a point of manifestation. Without conceding a mover or manifestor initially, as that would be subject to the tool of knowledge to be either rejected or obtained. It is essentially a thing recursively exploring itself, using it's own manifestations and rules to determine it has manifestations and rules.

And of course we've covered inductions in depth. The reason why I wanted to go over your definitions, is underlying those concepts, are my concepts. Lets not even say underlying. Concurrently is probably better. My context and definitions serve a particular purpose, while yours serve another. The question is, while your definitions can be distinctively know, can they be applicably known? I am not saying they cannot, they just haven't really been put to the test yet.

I am hesitant to say we are meaning the same exact thing, or that I am implicitly holistically using your epistemology yet, because I think you are still determining knowledge to be holistically that which must be tested. I am never going to test what is immediately known. And, likewise, I would consider just as much knowledge as any tool of knowledge we can conceive of. Although I may just be misunderstanding you, I am not attempting to apply your tool knowledge to the point of no movement, the point of manifestations. Also, I am only in agreement with you on "applying to reality without contradiction" if we are using "reality" in the sense of holistically all experience (which I think you are arguing for, but just wanted to clarify). Your thoughts are enough to create mathematics (in a general sense, obviously not for the derivation of math equations that pertain to things that must be seen in order to make sense of it, but math, as being the discrete logic, requires nothing but differentiation--I don't need to see "this" from "that").

Again, I would be hesitant to state we are concurrent, because I am only agreeing with you in the sense of the tool of knowledge, which is not holistically knowledge (I would argue). You seem to be even attempting to apply our terms to a test, which I am saying there is such a thing as a known untestable piece of knowledge (specifically one: the test itself, not that which tests--again, not conceding a tester, just the test itself so to speak). I don't think we are in agreement about that.

Why did I separate the act of discrete experience from knowledge? Because as you agree, knowledge is a tool. A tool is an invention that we build from other things that allows us to manipulate and reason about the world in a better way. Discrete experience is a natural part of our existence. Knowledge is a tool built from that natural part of our existence. It is the fundamental which helps to explain what knowledge is.

Hopefully I've demonstrated that I do not think this is holistically the case. When I say "knowledge as a tool", I am meaning it as one subtype out of two distinct types. I don't see how someone could logically claim to "know" something by means of obtaining it from a tool, but yet equally claim they "do not know" that which it is built off of (again, not an interpreter, but the mere interpretation itself). I also find it wrong to claim to "know" you discretely experience by means of applying it. Likewise, that you know you hold a belief (not pertaining to the truth of the content of such), or that you know that immediate perception, thought, emotion, etc. It seems like you aren't granting these as known, or you are attempting to pass them through the tool to obtain them as knowledge (which I think you are incapable of such, we are incapable of such).

How do you know its knowledge?

My point is that you are immediately given, granted, the knowledge that you "know" that you are questioning how you know its knowledge. I am in agreement with you that a tool would be required to evaluate the truth of the content, so to speak, of the question itself, but not the question as immediately manifested.

It is no longer a tool, but the source itself.

Again, I want to careful with "source itself". In terms of movement, anything concluded, such as a source in the sense of an interpreter or manifestor, is subject to the tool. I am in agreement with you on that. However, the "source" as the immediate manifestations themselves, this is just known. And I don't think it would make logical sense to claim we can know something if the latter definition of "source" isn't known. So in a sense, you are right, in another sense, you are wrong (it is the "source" and tool, but not in the sense of any sort of movement).

How then do I separate knowledge from a belief? If I can have knowledge that is a tool, and knowledge that is not a tool, isn't that an essential enough property for separating the concepts into two different concepts?

Again, to determine the truth in terms of the content, or proposition, of a belief, it requires a tool. But you immediately know that you are having a belief as it was immediately manifested as such. In other words, the belief that there is a red squirrel in my room would require a tool of knowledge to obtain whether it is true or false, but the belief itself (as a belief) is necessarily known immediately. This doesn't erode the distinction between knowledge and the content of a belief. You can have a proposition you don't immediately know while still knowing that the very manifestation of the proposition itself is true (i.e. I don't immediately know if there is a red squirrel, but it is true that the belief--the proposition--has occurred to me). Likewise, I would say that the propositions in our thoughts, also called beliefs, are distinguished from knowledge, however the thought itself is necessarily a true fact (and thus known). Not that the proposition is true, but that the fact that there is a proposition is necessarily true.

Does the definition you use increase clarity, or cause confusion?

It most definitely creates more confusion and fair enough! And so, if the objective is to try to portray as much as possible for the masses, then it may very well be useful to start simply with the fact that we differentiate. Fair enough, however, I don't think, in terms of philosophy, our goal should be to just simplify positions due to it sometimes becoming an oversimplification--a lot of philosophical principles and achievements necessarily required at least some complex elaboration. I'm trying to say that starting with differentiation may be a necessarily false presupposition that can be used to better portray the epistemology as a whole to the masses. Fair enough.

Too detailed, and it can quickly address unimportant details that aren't important to the overall concept. Too broad and it can be misapplied.

Absolutely fair enough! It is definitely a trade off, but I am more trying to attempt this from what is the fundamental and not how to get the most conveyed to the most people. I think both are worthy considerations.

What you are doing right now is seeking that refinement. But I do not think at this point that there is any disagreement with the overall structure. The basic methodology is still applied to the terms you propose.

Again, I am hesitant here to agree. For these reasons:

1. You seem to be deriving from differentiation, not the point of manifestation
2. You seem to be claiming knowledge is strictly obtained and never given without conceding a giver

I don't think I can really say I subscribe to your epistemology with such fundamental differences. I think you are more speaking in terms of once we are discussing the tool of knowledge, differentiation, and the principle of noncontradiction, then we generally agree and, thereby, I am subscribed in that sense.

I would argue that it is both. It is necessary that atoms exist for the ruler to exist, whether you know it or not.

I would like to careful here as well, it seems to be implying an "objective" reality that is an absolute reality (that which is not contingent on the subject). When I state "objective" reality, it is still in relation, and thus contingent to a degree, to the subject. It is necessary that atoms exist for the ruler to exist within the constraints of what has been manifested for you as the subject. We cannot claim beyond that.

I believe this is a conclusion of applicable knowledge, not simply distinctive knowledge or merely discrete experience.

This is true, but not in relation to an absolute "objective" reality. However, as you probably agree, it is not strictly applicable knowledge either: it is a combination as it all stems from those rules and the point of manifestation (what you would call discrete experience, which I would argue isn't sounding synonymous to me yet).

As I mentioned before, we cannot discretely experience a contradiction. Because experiencing a contradiction, in the very real sense of experiencing something as 100% identical and both 100% not identical to another concept is something we cannot experience.

Again, this isn't because we applied the principle of noncontradiction and found it not to contradict, therefore we obtained such knowledge, we simply "know" it because it is manifested necessarily that way. It is no different, I would say, to trying to legitimately apply the principle of noncontradiction on itself. I don't think it makes sense to constitute knowledge as strictly what has been applied (which implies strictly that which can be applied). Don't get me wrong, there is a very real sense where you are right, we can make up plausibilities that are inapplicable (which I would argue are irrational inductions), and that will never constitute knowledge. But there is a difference between something we moved to in our reasoning that cannot be applied and the reasoning itself which cannot be applied. These, in my head, are not the same "cannot be applied".

You can discretely experience whatever you want. You know you can, because you have deduced it logically without contradiction.

Although I understand what you are stating, and I agree in a sense, those two statements contradict each other. Also, it exposes the fact that of the manifestations and the seemingly necessary contingency (which is also a manifestation) of the principle of non-contradiction.

This leads me to another point, "reality" isn't just object, it is also subject. The thoughts themselves are apart of reality. When you "apply" your thoughts, strictly in the abstract, you are "applying to reality" without contradiction because the principle of noncontradiction is ingrained in us.

Another thing to consider is your terms are causing you to construct sentences that are difficult to grasp their meaning (not that I am not guilty of this too!) "The concept of the manifestation of the consideration". This seems verbose and I'm having difficulty seeing the words as clearly defined identities that help me understand what is trying to be stated here. I can replace that entire sentence with, "However, the discrete experience of whether I hold a particular belief is not induced, nor deduced, nor applied, it is immediately acquired." It is something we simply do.

Fair enough! However, I would say that your insertion of "discrete experience" necessarily erodes some of the meaning away, albeit my definitions aren't very good at all.

"You can't even claim to know something if you haven't, to some degree or another, conceptualized (my adjustment: discretely experienced) that something."

Yes, this is exactly the point I've been making.

If you are claiming "discrete experience" is the point of manifestation--not directly differentiation, then we agree. If not, then I don't think you can perform that substitution there. — Bob Ross


No, I am not using the terms manifestation or conceptualization. I'm not saying you can't. Those are your terms, and if you have contradictions or issues with them, it is for you to sort out. All I am saying is if a being can't part and parcel the sea of existence, it lacks a fundamental capability required to form knowledge.

I am honestly not quite following your response here. It seems like you didn't really answer question but, instead, referred it back to me. Either you agree that "discrete experience" is synonymous with the "point of manifestation and not directly differentiation", or you don't. I am just simply trying to understand whether you are attempting the same thing I am with the term "discrete experience", or whether you are not. Again, when you say "a being can't part and parcel the sea of existence", you are implying "differentiation" is "discrete experience", which is not what I am trying to convey. Also, the "sea of existence" seems to me to be implying, again, an absolute reality which is considered "objective". In other words, the subject is parsing the "sea of existence". It isn't that I am arguing the subject is the sea of existence, or that the sea of existence doesn't exist, but it is that we only view it as the sea of existence from what actually is existence: the manifestations themselves. We only induce there is sea of existence from, not that which induces, but the manifestations of those inductions themselves. I think there is a big difference.

I think, in terms of your circular logic rebuttal, you are right if you are talking about the actual fundamental, but I don't think you are. I think you are taking a tiny step by means of the manifestations to prove differentiation, but then proving manifestations with differentiation (which I think is a IFF contingency, however I do see your point).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

To sum up I think you are under the impression that differentiation and conceptualization are separate identities. I am not disagreeing that you can propose such differentiation. What I am noting is that they are subsumed by both being discrete experiences, and I am unsure where differentiation leaves off and conceptualization begins. Even if it is the case, you still need differentiation before conceptualization. One cannot conceptualize before one can differentiate.

I think we may, after all, be attempting to convey the same underlying meaning with "conceptualization" and "discrete experience"; however, I find myself in only in partial agreement with what you stated. I think that it would be beneficial for me to define all the terms, their relation to one another, and an elaboration on "knowledge" in general.

Firstly, here's my interpretation of some of the definitions:

discrete - individually separate and distinct. (as depicted in your last post)
differentiation - the act of differentiating (I consider this synonymous with "the act of discretely experiencing"--as something being "discrete" is an instance of differentiation)
discretely experiencing - the act of differentiating.

Therefore, given those definitions, I think that your separation of "differentiation" and "conceptualization" as a part of "discrete experience" in your most recent post leads me to believe you may be attempting the same thing I am trying to convey with "conceptualization". As you seem to be using "discrete experience" as something more fundamental than "differentiation", but, where the confusion lies, at the same time, you seem to be also attempting to use them synonymously.

Once again, I cannot conceptualize without first being able to tell a difference. Or maybe, they are one and the same. Perhaps differentiation at even the lowest level is some type of conceptualization.

The first sentence seems to be implying you require differentiation in order to do anything else, which, in my head, directly implies differentiation is discrete experience. However, thereafter, you seem to be claiming that "conceptualization" and "differentiation" may be synonymous, and that they are apart of a more fundamental "discrete experience":

The point is, these are words that describe acts of discrete experience. Conceptualization about a discrete experience, is a discrete experience that describes another discrete experience. Discrete experience is a fundamental that underlies all of our capabilities to believe and know.

And likewise:

Differentiation, is the act of discretely experiencing. Within the sea of your experience, you are able to say, "This" is not "that".

So I am a bit confused if you are arguing for "differentiation" as "discrete experience", or whether that "discrete experience" is more fundamental than "differentiation".

I think this is a perfect time to elaborate on a couple more terms:

Concept - A general idea or understanding of something: synonym: idea.
Conceptualization - The act of manifesting a concept.
Point of manifestation - the grounds of everything in terms of just chronological precedence (contrary to extrapolated chronological precedence).

The reason I chose "concept" is that it is a purposely vague manifestation of an idea, which is (I think) the best term I could come up with for conveying a fundamental, rudimentary point of manifestation. It is like a "thought", but not completely analogous: it isn't truly thinking of itself, for that is a recursively obtained concept that one thinks--which is not necessary for a concept to manifest. Likewise, it isn't thinking in itself, because thinking of itself is required for such. Therefore, I call it "conceptualization": the act of manifesting a concept (or concepts). When I use the term "concept", I don't mean high-level discernment of things: all of it is a concept and concepts can be built off of one another. Everything is manifested as a concept, including "differentiation" itself. This may just be me using the term wrong, but I wanted to clarify my use of the term.

If what you mean by "discretely experience" is "the point of manifestation of everything, including everything itself", then I think we mean the same thing. However, my worry is any implication derived from "discretely" in "discretely experience": any extrapolation that differentiation is the point of manifestation. Notice that my definition here completely lacks any reference to "differentiation" (which, I think, includes "discrete", since it is also the separation of "this" from "that"), as I think it is manifested conceptually by means of the point of manifestation. If this is what you mean by "discretely experience", then we agree (however, I think the use of the term "discrete" in "discretely experience" has unwanted implications then").

I want to point out the definition of discrete, and why I chose it. "discrete - individually separate and distinct." I was looking for a fundamental. Something that could describe a situation as a base.

I am fine with your definition of "discrete"; however, when you say "I was looking for a fundamental", are you implying a fundamental that we must conceptualize to deem it so, or the point of manifestation required for that conceptualization in the first place? (the former I would call extrapolated chronological precedence, and the latter is just chronological precedence). I think this is a perfect segue into "knowledge". I don't think there are only either induced or deduced (or distinctive and applicable) knowledge: there is immediately acquired knowledge, mediated deductive knowledge, and mediated inductive knowledge. So when I was previously (in a subsequent post) asking it in the sense of "whether we must extrapolate differentiation, or whether it is the point of manifestation", I think I may have misled you with the term extrapolation; I am not implying that we induce differentiation, I am trying to imply that, once we conceptualize differentiation, we know it not as deduced nor induced but, rather, as immediately acquired knowledge. Let me explain a bit more on those three types of knowledge:

Of manifestation vs from manifestation of itself - First I need to distinguish these two concepts (which I previously stated as "of itself" vs "in itself", but to resolve some confusion I think these other terms are better). "of manifestation" is as it is presented (its manifestation), whereas "from manifestation" is a form of knowledge either induced or deduced based off of "of manifestation" (that which was presented).

Immediately acquired knowledge - that which is directly manifested (as a concept, I would argue) and, thereby, is immediately known. I think generally this is the principles of rudimentary logic (so to speak), perception, thought, and emotion of manifestations of themselves and, more importantly, any conceptualizations of manifestations of themselves that may stem from any of the aforementioned. I don't need a tool of knowledge, i.e. an epistemology, to "know" that I differentiate, require a sufficient answer to everything ('sufficient' can vary though), perceive, think, feel, or any form therein (within emotion, I don't need an epistemology to "know" "pain", generally, from "pleasure" of manifestations of themselves).

Mediated deductive knowledge - that which is deduced based of off immediately acquired knowledge. This, in terms of immediately acquired knowledge, is distinguished by it being from manifestations of themselves in terms of perception, thought, emotion, and any form therein in reference to from a manifestation of itself. For example, I have an immediately acquired knowledge of "emotion" in terms of manifestation of itself, but the conclusion of the concept of "emotion", holistically, required the use of the individual concepts of feeling (such as pain and pleasure) to deduce it (this is "emotion" from manifestation of itself--it is the deduced knowledge which was deduced by the of manifestations of itself). I call it mediated, because, although "emotion" of manifestation and from manifestation of itself are both conceptualized (manifested as a concept), one concept is clearly mediated by the immediate forms of knowledge while the other is, well, immediately known.

Mediated inductive knowledge - that which is induced based of off immediately acquired knowledge and meditated deductive knowledge. It is essentially the realm of hierarchical inductions. For example, I know "emotion" of manifestations of itself and from manifestations of itself so far, and I can induce why I have "emotion" in the first place (in terms of evolution or biology for example).

It is important to note that I am claiming that conceptualization is occurring in all three forms of knowledge: these are all manifestations of concepts. However, there's nevertheless a meaningful distinction that can be produced because they are all conceptualized in this necessary hierarchy. For example, mediated knowledge (both forms) adhere and obey the immediately acquired form. Differentiation and the principle of sufficient reason are two great examples of immediately acquired knowledge that is necessarily imposed on all mediated knowledge. The reason why this is the case, as you mentioned, is not the subject of our conversation (as of yet), but merely that it is. They are necessarily imposed because all concepts that conform to the mediated type are always conceptualized, manifested via concept by the point of manifestation, as obeying such. Also, it is important to note that these are in relation to after it is conceptualized. So I am not claiming that you immediately know differentiation is occurring, only that, once it is conceptualized, it necessarily is known and requires no deducing nor inducing.

So, with this in mind, when you stated:

I'm not sure there is implicit knowledge. Knowledge is a process that must be followed to have it.

There is no inherent knowledge. You can practice knowledge without knowing that you are doing it. You can have distinctive knowledge. You can even have applicable knowledge. But it is obtained because you are following the steps outlined in the epistemology. You can be blissfully unaware that it is what you are doing, and still have distinctive and applicable knowledge.

I think you are 100% right in terms of knowledge as a tool, which I would say is mediated knowledge (it is, therefore, what one can learn). What one can't learn, what one cannot rationalize or reason their way away or towards, is the immediately acquired knowledge. Although I want to emphasize this is all the act of manifesting concepts (i.e. conceptualization), the immediately acquired knowledge isn't conceptualized in terms of deduction or induction (in other words, it is not a concept manifested in relation to other, more primitive or fundamental, concepts) but, rather, it is manifested as the basis--the ultimate bedrock. What I meant by implicit and explicit is more in terms of the relation of some concept being induced or deduced to be occurring prior to its manifestation. For example, when we conceptualize that we must differentiation, then that becomes something that must have been implicitly occurring all the while (i.e. the immediately acquired knowledge of manifestation of itself is utilized to induce, therefore mediated inductive knowledge, that it was occurring all the while--it is not to say that you knew that at the time). I don't think this is what you were referring to with your example of the runner: in terms of knowledge as a tool, thusly mediated forms, i would agree that the runner lucked, or "accidentally", followed the rules of the epistemology. However, and this may be a fundamental disagreement between us, I would state that "knowledge as a tool" (and, thusly, knowledge that can be learned) is a mediated form of knowledge, not all knowledge.

Its more like accidental vs explicit. I could find a ruler on the street and not know what cm means. But I do notice there are some lines. I measure something and say its 4 ruler lines. I can safely say within that context, that I have measured length with a ruler. But I don't know its a ruler, or how it was made, or what any of the other symbols and lines mean like inch. Within your first few paragraphs, if you replace "implicit" with "accidental" I think you'll see what I'm trying to point out.

This is with reference to knowledge as a tool and, therefore, mediated forms of knowledge (I'm fine with that). But my point was that you can't induce or deduce any concept as to have been occurring implicitly all the while without it first being explicitly known.

You can discretely experience without a theory of knowledge. I am noting that to explicitly know what knowledge is, the first thing you must come to know, is discrete experience.

Your first sentence seems to be sort of aligning with my view of immediately acquired forms of knowledge, I think you just aren't categorizing it as "knowledge". I agree with the second sentence if you are defining "discrete experience" as "the point of manifestation of everything, including everything itself". I would then also like to append that the next step, after "discrete experience", in order to know explicitly what knowledge is, you have to know what "differentiation" is (and things pertaining to such: like the principle of noncontradiction). I think this is generally what you are arguing for, but I think "discrete experience" and "differentiation" are used both synonymously and not synonymously in your statements.

With this, you can build a theory of knowledge. You don't have to know why you discretely experience. Just as I don't have to know the atomic make up of the ruler I am using. I just have to know what consistent spacing is. Of course, that doesn't mean there aren't atoms that make up that ruler. It also doesn't negate the fact that without atoms, there could be no ruler. But the knowledge of atoms is entirely irrelevant to the invention and use of a ruler. So with knowledge.

This is true. But I would like to emphasize that even if it is necessarily the case that it is made up of atoms, this is all apart of extrapolated chronological precedence and not just chronological precedence. Yes, I am made of atoms, so in that sense I am derived (one way or another) from those atoms, which necessarily precede me (as a subject, reflexive self that is). However, all of this, including that previously rationalized statement, is derived from the point of manifestation, which manifests certain concepts as necessarily the case (such as our immediately acquired knowledge of differentiation and the principle of noncontradiction). So I would state that with respect to conceptualization, it necessarily follows that I am preceded by atoms. Notice that the conceptualization is required, and is the spring of life (so to speak), of that very extrapolated truth.

Basically, you are claiming (I think) that discrete experience cannot be contradicted because that contradiction also requires discrete experience. — Bob Ross

Yes! I think you have it.

If you agree with me here, then I would like to ask you how you or I derived this? I would say from a manifestation of a concept that is immediately known and is revealed, so to speak, as necessarily true absolutely. To be clear, I'm not asking you to explain why we discretely experience, only how you or I came up with that very claim. Did we just discretely experience it?

If you conceptualized (discretely experienced) a blue ball within your mind that had clear essential properties to you, then you would distinctively know the blue ball.

The essential properties themselves are concepts. When you have the belief that there is a blue ball, regardless of whether it is true or not, you know you have that belief. Moreover, if you want to take it a step deeper, if I want to determine whether I still hold a belief, then it will have to applied without contradiction; However, the concept of manifestation of the consideration of whether I still hold a particular belief is not induced nor deduced nor applied: it is immediately acquired. No process or tool of knowledge is required to know that. Likewise, if you are seeing a ball right in front of you, the belief aspect is the mediated deductive knowledge that it is a "blue ball" or mediated inductive knowledge of anything pertaining to the "blue ball", but the immediately acquired knowledge of the perception of the "blue ball" of manifestation of itself is not a belief (nor deduced nor induced).

"You can't even claim to know something if you haven't, to some degree or another, conceptualized (my adjustment: discretely experienced) that something."

Yes, this is exactly the point I've been making.

If you are claiming "discrete experience" is the point of manifestation--not directly differentiation, then we agree. If not, then I don't think you can perform that substitution there.

Once I am able to see "this" is different from "that", I can detail it.

You are either deducing or inducing this, which is not immediately acquired knowledge and, most importantly, you first must conceptualize it.

Discrete experience is a cat. Conceptualization may be a tiger, but its still a cat.

A cat and a tiger are concepts. Again, I think we may be trying to utilize the same underlying meaning here, but I'm trying to understand if you are saying the fundamental base is differentiation, or if it is a separate, more fundamental, discrete experience.

If you could try to present your argument that my proposal is circular with an A -> B -> A format, I think I could understand better where you're coming from, and we could settle that issue once and for all.

Here's my understanding of circular arguments:

1. Posited inquiry
2. Justified explanation for 1
3. Posited inquiry of that justification used in 2
4. Justified with 1

So, essentially, it is 1 -> 1 (or A -> A). Let me attempt an example:

1. Posited inquiry: Is the bible true?
2. Justified explanation: Yes, God says so.
3. Posited inquiry of 2: How do we know God tells the truth?
4. The bible says so

1 -> ... -> 4 is actually just 1 -> 1. So I think it is with discrete experience in relation to reasoning:

1. Posited inquiry: Do we discretely experience?
2. Justified explanation: Yes, because reasoning deems it so (i.e. I cannot conceive without the use of discrete experience)
3. Posited inquiry of 2: How do we know reasoning is a valid means of acquiring such knowledge?
4. Because we discretely experience, and that is all that is required to begin our epistemic exploration.

1 -> ... -> 4 is actually just 1 -> 1. I think that if you are using "discrete experience" in the same manner that I am using "conceptualization", as previously defined, then it isn't circular as it is the basis of reasoning itself, which isn't differentiation I would say. I think you may be arguing for this kind of thing with discrete experience but yet still implying differentiation in there a bit.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I agree, I think we are still not quite understanding each other, so I will try to do my best to respond to your statements (very thought-provoking as usual!).

First, I do not think that discrete experience is the most fundamental thing that explains our existence. I think discrete experience is the most fundamental thing an existence must be able to do to know, and it is a fundamental that can first be defined clearly, and without contradiction

Fair enough. I don't think that you are arguing that discrete experience is the only thing, or that we can't induce beyond (or before) that, but I am questioning your claim that it is the most fundamental thing an existence must have to be able to know. I am providing a contender: without convincement, discrete experience is useless and cannot be extrapolated in the first place. If you couldn't conclude anything at all, then you wouldn't know you discretely experience. Now, I think this leads me to a good point you made: the distinction between knowing something inherently and conceptualizing it. In other words, you don't need to conclude you discretely experience to discretely experience. However, although it is a splendid point, I think there are two different kinds of knowledge that need to be addressed here: implicit and explicit. For example, I can implicitly know that food is necessary for me to survive without explicitly knowing it at all. But once I conceptualize it to whatever degree, then it necessarily becomes explicit knowledge. I like to think of this in terms of knowledge pertaining of itself vs in itself: the former is the conceptualization of the latter (former is explicit, latter is implicit). The reason I think this to be incredibly important is that I think you are arguing for discrete experience, at its most fundamental state, as implicit knowledge (that can or cannot be made explicit)(aka discrete experience in itself and not of itself, although the latter is a possibility, the former is a necessity). Correct me if I am wrong here, but that is what I am understanding you to be, generally, claiming. I am trying to propose that implicit knowledge can only be actualized (and thus obtained) once it has been made explicit. In other words, existence (whatever thing we are talking about that exists) doesn't obtain implicit knowledge until after it conceptualizes it and extrapolates the implicit therefrom. For example, let's say, hypothetically, that I never had realized, explicitly, that I discretely experience, and, upon reading your brilliant essays, now realize it. Then, and only then, would I then know that I implicitly discretely experienced all those times prior to the moment I realized explicitly that I discretely experience. If, for example, I never realized I discretely experience, then I would never know I discretely experience (because implicit knowledge is extrapolated from explicit knowledge). But there's also a need for considering the point of reference: with respect to you, even if I never realize I discretely experience, I may be a discrete experiencer to some degree or another. This entails that, if you've conceptualized me as a discrete experiencer whereas I haven't, you know I discretely experience but I don't. The moment, if at all, that I realize that I discretely experience, which would only be by means of extrapolating the implicit in itself from of itself, is the moment I know and not before that. Likewise, when I am arguing for thinking in itself, I think I was wrong to use that as the bedrock (along with motive) because the conceptualization of thinking (and motive) is required for me to even realize I think (or have a motive) in the first place, therefore thinking of itself (which is explicit knowledge) is required for me to then extrapolate that I was implicitly thinking in itself in the first place (and that it is a necessary extrapolation)(ditto for motive). I think this is the same process (fundamentally) for all knowledge: including this very statement I am making right now. That previous sentence required that I conceptualized such a thing, explicitly, and which I can claim therefrom to have been occurring implicitly before I made it explicit in my knowledge. Basically, you are claiming (I think) that discrete experience cannot be contradicted because that contradiction also requires discrete experience. I am claiming, although that is fine, it is an extrapolation that first had to be conceptualized (explicitly) to then, only thereafter, be considered implicitly true prior to its conceptualization. Therefore, the conceptualization is required first and foremost in order to ever claim anything ever was implicit previous to something explicitly being known. To know that you think requires that you conceptualized, to some degree, thought itself and then, therefrom, extrapolated you must have been thinking prior to this realization (i.e. implicitly)--my point is that without that explicit conceptualization, you would have never known that you think. Without the conceptualization that you discretely experience, you wouldn't know that you are implicitly discretely experiencing. However, you may still, even though you don't know you discretely experience, know things that stem from discrete experience. For example, if you conclude that you are seeing a blue ball, even if you don't know you discretely experience, you still know of the blue ball because you have conceptualized the blue ball. Moreover, you could then extrapolate that the blue ball was there prior to you conceptualizing it, but my point is that you wouldn't know that it was there unless you extrapolated it from your conceptualization of the blue ball. If you never would have explicitly known the blue ball, then you would never have known it in the first place. You can't even claim to know something if you haven't, to some degree or another, conceptualized that something.

I want to be very clear, I do not think there is nothing prior to discrete experience. I also do not think that something that is not a "being" can discretely experience. I believe it is fundamental that there be a "self". One cannot discretely experience without being something.

Fair enough. I apologize if I portrayed it that way: I never thought you were arguing the contrary.

But I find that I cannot define the "self" as a fundamental, without first defining discrete experience.

I agree, but in a slightly different way: the most fundamental in the sense of conceptualized to be the most fundamental is differentiation. But again, you could make claims pertaining to differentiated things all the while never knowing that you discretely experience, and, more importantly, you wouldn't even know you implicitly discretely experience until you know it explicitly. To even try to prove anything, including discrete experience, you must conceptualize it first (to some degree or another). I am trying to state that knowledge doesn't begin its manifestation with differentiation, it begins when it is conceptualized (made explicit).

Perhaps you can prove this. Can you know something prior to discrete experience?

I am not entirely sure that it is a proof, because I partially agree with you here, but to claim that discrete experience is implicitly required for all else requires explicit knowledge of such. So, in my head, when we are conversing about when someone knows something, it isn't the extrapolated implicit discrete experience that grants the right "to know it": it is the conceptualization of that contextual thing (or even of another concept--as to know in the abstract requires the conceptualization of such first and foremost as well). I think to say it truly is discrete experience is to operate with a hindsight bias after the fact that the person claiming it has extrapolated the implicit knowledge from the explicit knowledge.

Can you know what an "I" is before you are able to differentiate between the totality of experience?

Well, it depends on what you mean by "I". Technically speaking, the "I" isn't necessarily the synonymous with conceptualization. The granting of knowledge is within each context, or avenue. So to know the "I", whatever you are depicting that as, is possible to be known without ever knowing of discrete experience (again, to say the "I" was implicitly discretely experiencing the whole time requires conceptualization of the implicit into something explicit, which is actually how I am able to claim it is the "implicit into something explicit" because I am extrapolating that the implicit must have came before the explicit in order to make sense of it). I get that it seems like I am using discrete experience to attack discrete experience (which is contradictory), but what I am really using is the conceptualized, explicit knowledge I have to base the claim that conceptualization must be the farthest we can derive without beginning extrapolation (this claim in itself is also a conceptualization).

I know that you can believe such, but can you know it?

Honestly, I think your argument is plenty strong enough to even claim that you cannot believe it without discretely experiencing. But this is only known after it has been conceptualized.

Can you know what eyes are? A mind? The difference between your body and another thing? Conscious and unconscious?

Although I understand and agree with you, oddly enough, I disagree (:. It is only after you have the conceptual knowledge (explicit knowledge) of discrete experience that you can claim that discrete experience was implicitly happening all the while when you previously conceptualized an eye ball. Prior to that, you did not know it (but yet you knew of an eye ball). I think when you say something along the lines of "try to disprove your discrete experiences without using your discrete experiences", I would like to agree (firstly) and (secondly) append "try to disprove or prove discrete experience without ever first conceptualizing it".

I can't reasonably see how this is possible without the ability to discretely experience

Again, I think this is hindsight bias: you have explicit knowledge of discrete experience (because you conceptualized it) and, only thereafter, now extrapolate that it was there implicitly all along. Without conceptualization, you wouldn't ever know anything (even if you implicitly discretely experience, for to know that you would have to explicitly conceptualize it first).

Again, I do believe there is a "self", but I cannot define or even conceive of a self without first discretely experiencing.

I understand (fair enough). But, again, you could know of a "self" without ever implicitly or explicitly knowing of discrete experience (discrete experience wouldn't be apart of your knowledge collection, so to speak). Therefore, the real contingency of knowledge is conceptualization, not differentiation. The former is utilized to conceive that the latter is logically necessary for all else. It is also a conceptualization.

On a side note, I would also like to point out that the antonym of "differentiation" is not "nothing", it is "oneness" (cohesion). It isn't necessarily true that you wouldn't exist without differentiation, you may exist as one with everything (therefore terms themselves wouldn't exist for you, but you would exist--in a sense). I would agree with you that, if you were oneness, you wouldn't know anything, but this is due to the lack of conceptualization. I think you are right in the sense that me even claiming "conceptualization", or even conceptualization in itself, is "contingent" on differentiation. However, that statement is a conceptualization first and foremost, and so it is with this statement as well. It all is. Does differentiation come first as an extrapolated truth (whereby it can be equally extrapolated to have been an implicit truth all along), or as the actual spark of manifestation? I think the former.

An ant can discretely experience. Does it know what an "I" is? Does it know it can discretely experience? No, but it can know things, because it discretely experiences.

No, within reference to itself, it knows nothing. With reference to you, it knows things. This is because, it isn't about whether it knows it discretely experiences, it is about whether it conceptualizes to any degree. If it does, to contradict what I previously stated, then it knows. It if doesn't, then it doesn't know. But its knowledge has no direct relation to your knowledge of its knowledge. It could very well be the case that it doesn't conceptualize anything, but yet you, being able to conceptualize, deems that it does based off of your conceptualizations of its actions.

It knows the sugar in front of it is good compared to the dirt that surrounds it.

Again, you conceptualized this and, therefrom, deemed that ant to know. This doesn't mean that it actually knows anything (maybe it does, maybe it doesn't). Just because it is the most rational position for you, as a being capable of conceptualizing, to hold with reference to the ant, namely that it knows to some degree or another, doesn't mean that in reference to itself that it knows anything at all. It would have to be able to conceptualize something. And, yes, again, me claiming "it must conceptualize something" is contingent on differentiation because all conceptualizations I have had are conceptualized as being contingent on differentiation, therefore I deem it so (and me deeming it so is also a conceptualization). The way I see it, conceptualization is the point of manifestation for everything (including everything), it is the point at which you can quite literally seemingly postulate it ad infinitum recursively (reflexively) (although I don't think it is an actual infinite, only potential). It is where, in my opinion, you truly hit bedrock: where anything below, above, before, after, outside, without, and those very concepts themselves is extrapolated from (conceptualized). In other words, I can conceptualize that I must differentiate, but I hit bedrock (recursive potential infinity) if I try to conceptualize conceptualization, and so forth.

I think the same thing is true of AI and other beings (to dive a bit into solipsism). To be clear, I am not a solipsist, but I think I may not be one for a different reason than you: I think that the most rational conclusion is that there are other beings like me with reference my conceptualization of them, but that doesn't mean I've proved that they can conceptualize. It only means that via my conceptualizations, the most rational position to hold is that of not being a solipsist. Again, just because I deem another person to know, or even if it is solely based off of risk analysis (which is also a conceptualization)(as in what if I am wrong and choose to be solipsist vs what if I am wrong and choose to respect other people as actually other people), doesn't mean that, in reference to themselves, they actually know anything.

While "You" must exist to discretely experience, "You" existing does not give you the fundamentals of an epistemology, it is "You" that can discretely experience that does.

I agree, but this is conceptualized and, thereby, only implicitly known after it is explicitly known. You are right that me existing does not ground an epistemology: it is the ability to conceptualize that very statement that grounds it (and the ability to conceptualize that, and this, and this, etc).

I discretely experience, because any proposal that I do not discretely experience, is contradicted.

Again, I think you can only propose this if you are able to conceptualize. First you must have explicit knowledge of this to then extrapolate it as implicit and, therefore, you are extrapolating discrete experience as an implicit truth after you have already gained it as knowledge via explicitly (aka, via conceptualization). I think this is the point at which knowledge is granted, at least initially, or manifested: when it is conceptualized.

The simple proof I put forward is that to present any counter argument to discretely experiencing, to even understand what it is you are trying to counter, you must discretely experience

I think I can use that same argument to prove you are right and that that doesn't mean it is the point at which knowledge manifests. In order to even claim that I can't postulate a counter argument without differentiation, you must have a conceptualization (and same for me). I think that they are both deeply integrated into our existence, but one is the point of manifestation (conceptualization), the other is a product of that manifestation that is manifested as a necessity to all else (differentiation). However, although I think you are using A -> A still, I think that you are actually right: there is a point at which it is circular, and that is fine as long as it is the point of all other manifestation. I think that you think that point is differentiation, I think it is conceptualization.

I hope this cleared up what I'm trying to prove

I think I understand and I hope that I demonstrated that in my responses. If I didn't fully grasp your views, please, as always, correct me!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

The goal of the knowledge theory was to find just one thing that I could "know", and use that to go from there. I can know that I discretely experience, but I explicitly did not try to determine "why" I discretely experience.

My question for you is, is there something you feel 'motive' brings to the table that challenges or puts to question the formulation of the epistemology I've put forth so far? If yes, then we'll have to explore it in earnest.

I think that, although I completely understand that it seems completely unrelated to your epistemology, the first quote pertains to my objection. I think that if you are trying to find one thing that you can "know", that this, in terms of derivation, it should be you. Nothing, in terms of just chronological viability, can be derived further than the subject. It doesn't start with discrete experience, it starts with you obtaining the knowledge that you discretely experience by means of thinking in itself: you begin with thought (but,again, in itself and not its characterization of itself). Albeit a very close connection between the two, I do believe you start with the thought that convinces you that you discretely experience, and then go from there. This is why, although I agree with your work, I think your epistemology starts at some mile other than 0 in a 500 mile race: you simply start your endeavor off of an assumption, that is discrete experience, and work your way from there without providing sufficient justification for discrete experience. I may be simply misunderstanding you, but as I far as I can tell it seems like your epistemology simply posits discrete experience as a given, but I am trying to get at that positing itself exposes a more fundamental aspect than differentiation. I truly do think that your argument (1) posits discrete experience as self-evident and (2), in actuality, utilizes the more fundamental aspect that is required to even put forth the argument in the first place which, thereby, causes your argument to really be "I think (in itself), therefore I discrete experience. I discretely experience, therefore I think (in itself)" (this is no different than A -> B, B -> A, which really is A -> A, so I do think you are essentially saying "I discretely experience because I discretely experience--hence #1). In other words, I am disputing the grounds of your epistemology, as I don't think your argument in the essays really provides any sufficient response.

When you say that you don't provide a "why" for discretely experience, I think that is fair enough if you are right in that discrete experience is the most fundamental thing, which I don't think is true. I think you are agreeing with me then that your epistemology starts with an axiom that must be assumed, but it is so effective only due it being a commonality between humans (it isn't a very hard axiom to adopt). My point is that your argument has a fundamental flaw: you are arguing that discrete experience is the most fundamental, but yet you are using thinking in itself to do that in the first place. I think the fact that you can put forth an argument at all provides direct explication into the fact that discrete experience isn't the most fundamental thing. This may just very well be a point that you don't find particularly useful in terms of what you want to portray in your essays, but it really comes down to which requires the other to be viable, thereby which is the most fundamental, the motive to differentiate (to think in itself), or the differentiation that occurs as a result of it? That is what I am trying to get at. This is why I think your epistemology fails: not because it is wrong, only because it posits discrete experience as if it actually is the most fundamental and that that is proven. If your epistemology were to simply concede that it is starting off with the assumption of differentiation, I think everything necessarily follows quite nicely. I'm not sure if that makes sense or not.

So this is sort of a descriptive order of causality, or why we arrive at the point that we are in our thinking?

Yes, it is to question our way into deriving what must precede another for it to be viable. It is to determine what is the most fundamental in terms of what, in terms of your experience, requires for all else. However, on the flip side, it can also be analyzed in the sense of extrapolated precedence. So the utilization of whatever was required to even posit the questions in the first place can be utilized to determine what even itself must logically be preceded by in order for itself to be viable. However, my point concern with extrapolated forms of derivation is that the subject ends up more sure of whatever they found logically necessarily precedes them then themselves and then, subsequently, can fall into a trap of actually doing things that they normally wouldn't do as a result. I like to think of them both as useful forms of derivation, but the derivation to what must exist for the consideration in the first place must always be a more sure fact than anything that can be necessarily, and logically, extrapolated from it (including its own extrapolation).

It is not that discrete experience causes the motive to be, but we do need to discretely experience to know what the motive is.

Yes I believe this is accurate. However, I would like to emphasize that this in no way implies that we start with the differentiation (the discrete experience): it implies that the discrete experience is concluded to be true or exist based off of the motive. I can posit that "I discretely experience", but the fact that I can posit explicates what is actually the most fundamental. If it were possible to experience differentiation (discretely experience) without motive (or thinking in itself), although I can't say it is even possible, I would say that, paradoxically, you wouldn't experience at all. If you lacked any motive to be convinced via a set of rules, then you would never know that you experience in the first place. You never would have posited this epistemological theory. We wouldn't know that we are conversing right now. etc. Now it may be that both motive and its subsequent differentiation are bi-dependent, however my point is that differentiation is subsequent to motive, or, better yet, thinking in itself. Don't get me wrong, I think your concern is very warranted: would this be really worth prepending to your essays? Wouldn't it just over-complicate things? It may very well be that the best approach to your philosophy is to start with the assumption of discrete experience, which isn't the most fundamental just to provide easier comprehension for the reader (or to keep it on point to what you would like to portray). But my point is that it doesn't seem like your essays really acknowledge this, as they actually, on the contrary, seem to be arguing that it is the most fundamental and that that is proven.

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I fully understand! It is a constant struggle for me as well. One of the reasons I respect you is you are a participant trying to understand what the underlying meaning of what I am saying is as well. I hope I have been as open and understanding back.

Thank you! Same to you! I wasn't bringing that up with any implication that you weren't attempting to understand the underlying meaning, just that, since my terminology isn't really on point yet, I wanted to notify you, so to speak, that simple acknowledgement that I haven't worked out all the kinks.

Motive can be used to describe "Why I discretely experience" There is something that compels the mind to do so. What is that compulsion?

Not quite, I would say. Motive is deeper than that: it is the underlying motivation, along with the most fundamentals rules, that must be abided by. Therefore, i consider the statement "I discretely experience" an extrapolation which utilizes this fundamental motive, and subsequently the outlined rules that constraint it, to determine that that is true in the first place. I am trying to convey that it starts, at the most fundamental aspect, with motive, and consequently a set of rules, and not discrete experience.

The issue I have is that this motive is logic. While a motive can be logic, it is unfortunately not the motive of everyone, nor necessarily a basic function of thought. Many thinking things are not motivated by logic. Survival and emotions seem to be the most basic of motives that compel us to discretely experience, and identify the world a particular way.

When I used the term "logic", admittedly, this may not be the right word to use. I am not referring to anything that is taught. When you are using the term "logic", I am thinking of "rationality". Anything that could be taught to the subject must abide by the motive, the rules, that subject necessarily has. When I say "rules", I don't mean all the rules they could ever abide by, but, rather, the rules that are necessarily the case for any convincement to occur. In other words, you can't teach them anything without them first having this motive, for that would mean they don't have any set of rules, fundamental rules that is, that they must follow. This doesn't mean that whatever they are convinced of is rational, but it does mean they are convinced of something. This convincement can only occur, I am trying to argue, given a motive, which perpetuates the rudimentary, fundamental rules that must be abided by for a claim to convince them. Therefore, I see no difference with "survival" or "emotions". If someone does something based off of "emotions", they have considered that their claim abides by the most rudimentary rules, set in place by the motive, and thereby, in the heat of the moment, they are convinced of it.

When you say:
" Survival and emotions seem to be the most basic of motives that compel us to discretely experience, and identify the world a particular way"

I think this is an extrapolation that requires the motive in the first place for you to be convinced of this. You are extrapolating claims, for example in terms of survival, based off of empirical evidence in terms of evolution (which is fine, but this is an analysis at a much higher level, because it utilizes motive in the process, than what I am trying to convey).

Logic can be done without training or thought, but it is often something learned

Again, I may be just misusing "logic", but I would consider your use of "logic" to be "rationality". Everyone, in the sense that I am using it, utilizes "logic". It is simply a rudimentary, most fundamental, set of rules that is perpetuated by a motive. Without it, the subject wouldn't be capable of rationality or irrationality.

. It is a higher order of thinking that one must learn by experience or be taught to consistently think and be motivated in such a manner.

I would characterize this as "rationality" (or something like that).

How do I take the fact that I discretely experience, and use it in a logical way?

In terms of what I am trying to convey, this proposition here is too high level. The most fundamental thing isn't that you discretely experience, it is that you are convinced that it is the case. There was a motivation, with you as a subject, to innately attempt convincement by means of a rudimentary set of rules that must be abided by. In other words, when you claim "you discrete experience" or that "the most fundamental thing is discrete experience", these claims are only possible if something has a motive to try to be convinced of these via a set of necessary rules. This set of rules doesn't have to encompass all of rational thought--so basically the motivation towards the necessary use of the rudimentary rules, along with those very rules are rational, but not all rational rules are in that set of rudimentary rules (they can be built off of them). I think you are generally correct in the sense that if I were to lump "logic" into what can be learned and what necessarily isn't learned, but is built off of, then that is true. However, if I did that then "logic" would necessarily have to have two sub-types, and motive would be associated with the aspect that isn't learned.

There is nothing to compel us to think logically, but a logical conclusion itself. A person who rejects logic entirely in favor of survival or emotions will not be able to discretely experience in terms of knowable outcomes, but in more of a selfish and basic survival satisfaction.

Again, I would say "nothing compels us to think rationally". But if I were to go with the way you are using "logic", then I would split it into two sub types, and emphasize the aspect that is necessary to learn anything in the first place. Survival and emotions are still formulated from the motive and its rules. If the subject is truly convinced that their decision to follow emotions isn't correct, then they necessarily would not follow their emotions. They may deny certain rational claims, but they necessarily utilize a particular motive, which they don't control, which perpetuates the rules by which they are convinced of anything at all. Does that make sense?

How do you convince a person to think logically?

Again, you would have to convince them, which would require that it abide by the necessary rules, from the motive, that is in place for them (I don't mean "in place" in the sense that they are choosing them--they aren't).

You've used a term a couple of times here, "chronological viability". What does that mean to you? You've noted two types. Could you flesh them out for me? Thanks for the great input!

Of course, so, in a nutshell, "chronological viability" is the attempt of the subject to derive the chronological order of what must come first before another thing. I call it "viability" because I see the derivation of things in terms of which order produces the necessary viability that I experience. For example, if I were to think that my discrete experience is derived from the car I see, in a literal sense, then that cannot be true because the viability of the car's existence as I see it depends on discrete experience in the first place. But to ask "what must come first" can be taken two different ways (I think). It is sort of like in the sense of the chicken vs the egg: which comes first? I think we can derive something in terms of extrapolated chronological viability and just chronological viability. The former would be more in terms with the egg coming before the chicken (the bedrock of the chicken is the egg, as the egg must come first for the chicken to be there), whereas the latter is in terms of what had to be there for the consideration in the first place (the chicken extrapolated that it came from the egg, therefore the chicken is required for that extrapolation to occur in the first place, therefore it must be more sure of its existence over the fact that it came from the egg). I think these are both important aspects of derivation, but shouldn't be taken into account solely without consideration of the other. I think that the motive, and its rules, is required, in the sense of just chronological viability, before the discrete experience. But once the motive is, whatever that may be, and consequently its rules, then it necessarily follows that anything I can possibly imagine requires discrete experience--including the attempted derivation of the motive itself and its rules. Does that make sense?

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Sorry for the wait Bob, busy week, and I wanted to have time to focus and make sure I really covered the answers here.

No worries! I always appreciate your responses because they are so well thought out!

I think, before I address your post (which is marvelously well done!), I need to try to convey, in terms of our discussions pertaining to thought, the underlying meaning of what I am attempting to portray. Forgive me, but I am still contemplating it and, consequently refurbishing my ideas on the subject as I go on, so the terminology is not what I would prefer you to focus on (as I try to explicate it hereafter): it is the underlying meaning (because I freely admit that these terms I am about to use may not be the best ones, but, unfortunately, they are the best ones I can think of right now).

I first would like to explain back to you my understanding of discrete experience and then utilize that to attempt to convey a problem with it being utilized as the most fundamental in terms of chronological viability (derivation of the subject, and consequently everything, in terms of viability). When I, shortly hereafter, explain your concept of discrete experience, please correct me anywhere I am misunderstanding as it is crucial to what I state afterwards!

Discrete experience is differentiation, that is the capability of impenetrability and cohesion. Without such, we wouldn't have existence, or, at the very least, it wouldn't be anything like we are now as there is nothing more fundamental than differentiation (or at least I think that is how your argument goes, but, again, please correct me!). So when you say:

The question of course is, can you even make an argument against discretely experiencing, if you didn't discretely experience?

I think this is exactly what you are arguing: differentiation is the derivative of all else. So, no matter what thought manifests in my mind to counter your claim, I must concede, as you are right, that it in itself required "discrete experience"--that is, to be more specific, differentiation.

However, I think this is wrong and right. Right in the sense of derivation in terms of extrapolated chronological viability, and wrong in the sense of derivation in terms of just chronological viability. Let me try to explain.

In terms of derivation, we first have thoughts, but, as you rightly pointed out, there is a difference between the concept of thoughts (which is an extrapolated inference of what is typically characterized as the process of thinking) and thought itself. You are absolutely right that a person could never define thought, however, they would still be thinking. This is where, as you also rightly pointed out, a distinction needs to be made: thinking in itself and its own extrapolation of itself into a characterized process. The latter is not required, the former is. Furthermore, this is why I will be disregarding the latter, the characterized process, for now and focusing on the former because I am attempting the derivation of chronological viability of the subject (myself).

With respect to thinking in itself (not to be conflated with Kant's notorious use of thing in themselves, I am making no such noumenon/phenomenon distinction--I just can't think of a better word yet), it, in turn, requires a further derivation: I can question, logically, the very discernment between the thoughts themselves, which is also a thought that relates solely to thinking in itself and not to traditional objects. In other words, I have thought A and thought B, I can ask, logically, "why was I able to have A and B and not just a blob of thought (meaning the cohesion of all thoughts)?". I think this is the level at which your argument determines that the answer to such a question in the more fundamental "discrete experience" (aka, differentiation is required for the thoughts to occur). You are right! But the derivation does not stop there. Now, in terms of the aforementioned question, I could legitimately answer myself with "differentiation must occur for my thoughts". This is 100% valid. However, now I can ask a further question: "how am I able to be convinced and why am I convinced that my answer satisfied it?". I think this reveals to the subject that the most fundamental thing, in terms of just chronological viability, is the fact that they are a motive. They are a perpetual motive towards logic, which any answer (any conclusion) that satisfies logic satisfies the subject. Now I think we are getting more fundamental than simply differentiation. There are rules, identified later as "logic", which the subject, at its most rudimentary form, is perpetually motivated to follow. Without it, differentiation is meaningless. This is because a being could have the capability to differentiate while never being motivated to utilize it within any construct of rules.

Now, I think you could counter this with "logic requires differentiation to occur in the first place", but my point is that motivation doesn't necessarily require differentiation: it is the thing differentiating--based off of that motive. Another problem is that I can answer "what is the motive?" by utilizing that motive, thereby within its motivated constraints, but I cannot really answer, as of yet, "why is there a motive?". To be clear, I don't mean motive in the sense of "I want to do this", no that is already very far away in the sense of derivation and, consequently, utilizes the motive and discrete experience to conclude such a "want". This is what I was trying to get at with rudimentary reason, but I am not sure anymore if that is the best term for it.

I think you are arguing that differentiation is the key to everything (in terms of derivation), I am saying you are right if we are talking about derivation in the sense of extrapolated chronological viability, contrary to just chronological viability. The reason I think this is the case is because, from this motive we differentiate, and thereby, it is something we conclude by means of the motive that we have discrete experience in the first place. In more simple terms, the fact that either of us can argue either way requires a motive we did not choose, for it is our bedrock, which constraints us to logic, which we don't ever have to define to know it is true. That is why we can create a vicious absurdity of questioning where we demand a logical explanation for everything--including the concept of everything. My point is that this demanding requires a motive which precedes differentiation in terms of viability: differentiation requires a motive. However, in term of extrapolating where that motive came from (the "why is the motive there"), I think the best explanation is what you are arguing for: differentiation is required. This is because I could very well counter this with "well, motive itself is a differentiation of sorts". This is true, but I am trying to convey that that is utilizing the motive to even make that statement in the first place, and therefore, everything points back to this motive. But if I ever want to attempt to explain the motive, then I will be bound to its rules, logic, which I must be convinced is being obeyed and, therefore, it will require that I extrapolate, within the inevitable use of the motive, that it all requires differentiation--including itself. Notice that this doesn't actually mean that motive depends on differentiation, only that the use of motive to derive itself will always result, due to abiding by its own rules, that it requires differentiation. Does that make any sense?

So, with that in mind (hopefully I did a good enough job of explaining it for now), when you say:

Can you disprove that you discretely experience?

I cannot, because my use of my motive to derive my motive will inevitably be constrained to its logic, which will require that it be convinced that itself is derived from differentiation. This is not the same thing as stating it actually is derived from differentiation. Do you see what I am, in underlying meaning, trying to convey?

It is the ability to take the entirety of your experience, and divide it into parts.

Again, this requires a motive.

If that didn't make sense, please let me know! But if it did, I think it demonstrates quite effectively that, regardless of how we want to define thought, we are logically bound to utilizing thinking in itself, via the motive, to derive differentiation in the first place. Therefore, I still do think you are arguing "I think, therefore I discrete experience, and vice versa", but "think" in the sense of itself, which requires no defining. In other words, I don't think you are arguing in your paper that the concept of thinking, as defined in your paper, is what derives discrete experience, but, rather, you are implicitly utilizing thinking in itself throughout the entirety of the derivation.

This is incorrect. Thoughts have nothing to do with the ability to discretely experience. I never say, "First I think, then I discretely experience."

I think you are talking about the concept of thoughts, and in that sense I think you are right. But not in the sense of thinking in itself.

I eliminate thoughts, and arrive at the idea that discrete experience is the one thing I cannot eliminate.

You cannot eliminate motive, subsequently thinking in itself, without utilizing it to attempt to do so. I think you are talking about the concept of thoughts, which is a defining, and you are right in that sense, but I am not trying to argue against that at all.

Since this is becoming entirely too long, I will address the possibility and "first cause" points you made after I let you have proper time to respond to the aforementioned comments. Again, splendid post! I really enjoy reading your responses as they are incredibly well thought out!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

The reason why I haven't yet lumped it into an irrational induction, is there is an essential difference between the two. An inapplicable plausibility is unable to be applied, while an irrational induction is a belief in something, despite the application contradicting the belief. But as you've noted, niether have potential, so I think they can be lumped together into a category.

Yes, but I don't think an "irrational induction" is "despite the application contradicting the belief" anymore, it is when is is impossible and has no potential. However, I do see your point, I don't think all inapplicable plausibilities are irrational, depending on how we define it. There's a difference between claiming something that cannot be applied now or even in one's lifetime (or 30,000 years from now) and something that can be proven to lack potential (meaning it can be abstractly proven to never be able to be applied). For example, the belief in a magical unicorn that can fly and has invisibility powers isn't necessarily an inapplicable plausibility in terms of the latter, it could be that, as our technology advances, that we can actually detect invisible things somehow or maybe we find one on another planet or something. However, the belief that there's an undetectable unicorn is an example, I would say, of the latter: we can, in the abstract, since it is undetectable, determine it is an irrational induction because it lacks potential. If we define inapplicable plausibilities in the manner of the latter, then I would advocate that all inapplicable plausibilities are actually irrational inductions. However, if the former is also utilized to a certain degree, then further consideration is required.

I think a more accurate comparison would be "Claiming there is a first cause is the same as claiming there is a smallest particle that can exist." Comparitively, claiming, "This thing is a first cause, is the same as claiming this particle is the smallest particle." Each have different claims of existence and logic behind it. While I believe the most cogent belief is that there is at least one first cause, I find the bar to prove that any one thing is a first cause, may be extremely difficult to claim.

Although I understand the distinction you are making here: it is still an irrational induction based off of the same logic. I can abstractly prove that when you say it "may be extremely difficult to claim" "there is a smallest particle that can exist" that that can never been applicably known. Therefore, it lacks potential and, subsequently, is an irrational induction. Stating "there is a smallest particle that can exist" is no different than stating "there is an undetectable unicorn". You can never verify either, nor can you disprove it, because it is actually a form of irrationality (I don't need to disprove it beyond demonstrating it lacks potential). I think the only way to amend this is if you were to accept inapplicable inductions, in the manner where they can never be known, as rational. I would disagree (although, yes, this kind of irrational induction targets potentiality and not impossibility).

The reason is simple. A first cause has no prior reason for its existence. But there is nothing to prevent it from appearing in such a way, that a person could still interpret that something caused it to exist. If a particle appeared with a velocity, how could we tell the difference between it, and a particle who's velocity was caused by another? We would have to witness the inception of the self-caused particle at the time of its formation. But a historical analysis would make the revelation of certain types of self-caused things impossible.

I think that you are starting to demonstrate why this has no potential. It can never be applicably known. It is simply a belief within the mind, like an undetectable unicorn.

1. One must have distinctive knowledge first. Distinctive knowledge is the essential properties you have decided something should be. I can define a "tree" as being a wooden plant that is taller than myself.

2. Experience something, and state, "That is a tree." To applicably know it is a tree, your essential properties must not be contradicted. Turns out the plant I'm looking at it wooden, and taller than myself. I applicably know it as a tree. Therefore I know it is possible that there are wooden plants taller than myself.

I have no problem with #1, but #2 is where the ambiguity is introduced: you are clumping "trees" together as if that is a universal, it is a particular. To "experience something, and state "that is X"", is something someone can do with virtually anything. To say that the only requirement in #2 is that the essential properties are not contradicted is like using potentiality is if it is possibility. Just because the essential properties don't contradict doesn't mean I am justified in claiming X and Y are similar enough for me to constitute it as the same experience on two different occasions. Although I am probably just misunderstanding you, there's no real justification here that gravity as experienced here is similar enough to say it is the same there. Sure, we could say that it has the same essential property that it falls both times, but that does not mean they are identical enough to constitute it as the same experience: experiencing it on a mountain isn't the same as in a valley. Can I say, after experiencing it in a valley, that it is possible on a mountain?

I don't believe this is the case. Circular logic is when a reason, B, is formed from A, and A can only be formed from B. Thus the simple example of, "The bible states God exists. How do we know the bible is true? God says it is."

Let's break this down in the proper circular logic format as you described:

A is because of B, B is because of A.
Bible states God exists, We know it is true because God says so.
I discretely experience because I concluded it in my thoughts without contradiction. How do I know I think? Because I discretely experience.

You argument, as I understand it, is also circular. In order for any of the epistemology to work, you must conclude, which is a thought. So you conclude you have discrete experiences. But then it can be posited "how do I know I think?", your answer is: "I discretely experience". They are dependent on one another: this is the exact same thing as A proves B, B proves A. Maybe I am just missing something though.

My definition of "thoughts" does not prove discrete experience. My definition of thoughts comes from discrete experience.

Here is it in action (I think): you are saying you don't prove discrete experience with thought, because you simply discretely experience. But the whole thing, including the acknowledgment that you discretely experience, is dependent on you have a conclusory thought. I think your argument is along these lines:

1. I think, therefore I discretely experience
2. I discretely experience, therefore I think

I don't think this is explicitly what you were arguing for, but, nevertheless, I think your argument is implicitly utilizing this kind of circular logic. You use your ability to think to conclude that you discretely experience, and then you just simply justify those thoughts with the fact that you discretely experience. This is circular. My original way, "I think, therefore I think", was a bad way of demonstrating this, so I apologize for the confusion, it is more about the relationship between thought and discretely experiencing.

Thoughts, as defined here, are simply my ability to continue to discretely experience when I stop sensing. I can choose that definition, because I can choose how to discretely experience.

Again, you are concluding this, which is a thought, so you are using thought to prove discrete experiences, and then vice-versa.

It is, "I discretely experience, therefore I can define a portion of my experience as "thoughts"

Again, how did you conclude that? You thought (concluded) that you discretely experience, and then you justified the process of thinking (which you used to acknowledge discrete experience) with the fact that you discretely experience. The separation of your experience into perception, emotion, and thought in itself depends on thought (a particular kind I called rudimentary reason). If you couldn't conclude, then you would have determined that you discretely experience (I would argue that you can't discretely experience without some form of rudimentary reason).

If you think I do not know that within my self-context, can you disprove it? Can you demonstrate that I do not discretely experience?

I think this is an appeal to ignorance fallacy, I don't have to disprove it. I am simply analyzing your proof for the conclusion that we discretely experience and I think it is circular. Even if you completely agree with me that it is circular, that doesn't disprove that we discretely experience (and I don't think it has to). I am failing to understand why I would need to disprove it?

I look forward to your response,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Yes, if you're just comparing the fundamental building blocks of different plausibilities, you can determine plausibility A is more cogent than plausibility B. The problem is, if they aren't within the same context, how useful is that analysis?

I think the comparison is more relevant when you actually have to choose between the two. As a radical example, imagine someone puts a gun up to your head and tells you to bet your life on either plausibility A or B (where both are completely unrelated): I don't think you would just flip a coin, or answer with indifference. I think you would analyze which you are more sure of.

Your two examples are great. Unlimited infinities are irrational. But some limited infinities may be inapplicable plausibilities. Perhaps there is no limit to space for example. Its plausible. But it is currently inapplicable.

Excellent point! You are right: potential infinites, when asserted as if they are actual infinites, are also irrational inductions because they are inapplicable plausibilities. I think you were right in wanting to move inapplicable plausibilities to irrational inductions, because they lack potential. I can never apply the belief that any given infinite, within a limit, is actually infinite. Splendid point!

Yes. Stating that everything which has a cause, must have a cause, is an unlimited infinity. It breaks down if you examine it in the argument. All that is left, is that there must be a first cause. BUT, this is still either an applicable or inapplicable plausibility at best. It is simply more cogent to believe that there is a first cause, then not. Since we do not have any higher induction we can make in regards to the a first cause within the context of that argument, it is more cogent to conclude there is a first cause.

Now that we agree that actual infinites are irrational, you are right: the other option seems to be a first cause. However, claiming their is a first cause would be the same as claiming this particle is actually the smallest particle that can exist: it is an inapplicable plausibility. Inapplicable plausibilities are irrational inductions (because they lack potential). I can, in the abstract, prove that we will never be able to state that "this is the first cause", just like how we cannot state "this is actually the smallest thing". They are both irrational inductions. What we could say is that "this is potentially the smallest thing", and that is an applicable plausibility (if no one finds anything smaller, then it is potentially the smallest thing). So, in light of this, I think that, at best, you could only claim, rationally, that this or that thing is potentially the first cause: never that there actually is one. Then I think we would be on the same page as claiming potentials would restrict us to our true limits of experience and anything attempting beyond that is irrational. This is what I mean by explanatory-collapsibility: restraining oneself from going beyond one's capabilities, where one is susceptible to making actual claims when it is really potential. We are always in a box, and in that box we shall stay.

I'm not sure if that answered the question, but I felt this was a good example to show the fine line between what can be applicably known, possibility, and plausibility. Feel free to dig in deeper..

Although I really appreciate the elaboration, I don't think you addressed the most fundamental issue.

It is when you have concluded applicable knowledge within your context.

I consider this completely ambiguous. Although I understand what you are trying to say. I think, as of now, your epistemology is just leaving it up to the subject to decide what is or isn't possible (because they can make, in the absence on any clear definition, "experienced before" mean anything they want). If we don't draw a line at where something has been experienced before, then I think possibility loses its power, so to speak. Is experiencing that apple enough to justify this apple? Is experiencing gravity on earth enough for the moon? Is my car starting enough to justify another car starting? What if they are the same exact model? What if they are different manufacturers. We've touched this a bit before, but, mereologically, where are we drawing the line such that "experience before" is similar enough to "experience now" to the point where I can logically associated them together?

I do not claim that perception, thoughts, and emotions are valid sources of knowledge.

If you are saying that you aren't claiming your knowledge to necessarily be true, then I agree.

I claim they are things we know, due to the basis of proving, and thus knowing, that I can discretely experience.

My point is that it isn't a proof: it is vicious circle. As far as I understand it, you are stating that "I think, therefore I think", "I perceive, therefore I perceive", and "I feel, therefore I feel". These are not proofs, these are the definition of circular logic.

The discrete experience you have, the separation of the sea of existence into parts and parcels, is not an assumption, or a belief. It is your direct experience, your distinctive knowledge. I form the discrete experience of thoughts as a very low set of essential properties in the beginning, so that I can get to the basic idea of the theory.

I am having a hard time of understanding how this isn't "I discretely experience because I discretely experience".

You create an idea of a thought, and you confirm it without contradiction immediately, because it is a discrete experience.

Again, how is this not "I think, therefore I think"? This boils down to: "I know that I experience discretely, because I do". This is the definition of circular logic.

If only I could ever get the idea out there in the philosophical community at large. I have tried publication to no avail. Honestly, I don't even care about credit. Perhaps someone on these forums will read it, understand it, and be able to do what I was unable to. Or perhaps someone will come along and finally disprove it. Either way, it would make me happy to have some resolution for it.

I am truly sorry that people aren't taking your epistemology seriously: it deserves the credit it is due! I think your biggest adversary are the rationalists. They will put the a priori knowledge at a higher priority than the a posteriori, the egg before the chicken, which I think your epistemology does the reverse (although you don't subscribe to such a distinction, that's typically how they will view it).

Thanks again Bob. It has been very gratifying to have someone seriously read and understand the theory up to this point. Whether the theory continues to hold, or crashes and burns, this has been enough.

Of course, thank you for a such a lovely conversation! I thoroughly enjoyed understanding your epistemology.

Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Yes, I think this works nicely! I think potentiality nicely describes process of creating the useful distinctive knowledge we come up with. Anything which we come up with in our minds that contradicts our other distinctive knowledge, could be said to lack "potential".

Yes, I think we are on the same page now!

So if you conclude that an induction is built up of two essential properties, one having a direct grounds off of applicable knowledge, while the other has grounds on plausibilities, you can rationally reject the second essential property, but keep the first.

I agree. But I suspect that you are only referring to the comparison of plausibilities that relate to one another, so I would like to explicitly state that I am claiming that one can compare all plausibilities to one another in this manner. When comparing to completely unrelated plausibilities, it isn't a matter of choosing which one you should hold: it is about which one is stronger, more sure of. I am not entirely sure if you would agree with me on that.

In light of our recent agreements, I think it is safe for me to move on and explicate some of my other thoughts on your epistemology:

Actual Infinities Are Irrational

I think that, in light of us agreement on potentiality, we can finally prove that actual infinites are irrational inductions. To keep it brief, we can abstractly prove that actual infinites contradict logic: a great example of this is the infinite hotel problem (thought experiment). Therefore, since they contradict logic in the abstract, they lack potentiality. If they lack potentiality, then they are an irrational induction. Therefore, if any induction invokes such a principle, it must be an irrational induction unless the induction can safely separate itself from any actual infinite claims it is actively utilizing. For example, if I say it is possible for an apple to exist in all of time and space, I am holding a legitimate possibility induction because I am utilizing a potential infinite, which has limits (in this case, the limits are space/time itself). However, if I say it is possible for an apple to exist within everything (where everything has no limits), then I am holding an irrational induction because actual infinites have no potential. Therefore, I think that your epistemology quite nicely dictates that our inductions can only be rational, in any sense of the term, if it utilizes limits (which encompasses potential infinites). I think, as you may already be inferring, that this actually have heavy implications with respect to your idea of a "first cause", but I will refrain as I will not continue down that alleyway unless you want me to.

Mathematical Inductions Are Possibilities

I know we had a lot of disputes about mathematical inductions, and so I wanted to briefly continue that conversation with the idea that mathematical inductions do not require another term, contrary to what I was claiming, because they are possibilities. If I say that F(N) works for all integers, N, I am utilizing my distinctive knowledge to claim that it will hold again. This is no different than gravity: I have experienced it, therefore I say it is possible for it to happen again. At its most fundamental level, with math, I am claiming that my experience is differentiated all the time, therefore that differentiation should hold. theoretically, everywhere and everytime. In other words, math is possible. I also see know, that you were right in that probability is its own thing, because it takes it a step deeper: it isn't just a possibility.

We Need to Define The Definition Of Possibility

I think that it would be beneficial to really hone in on what it means to have "experienced something before". Where are we drawing the line? Is there a rational line to be drawn?

Distinctive Knowledge is Assumed

I think that your epistemology, at its core, rests on assumptions. Now, I don't mean this is a severe blow to the your views: I agree with them. What I mean is that, as far as I am understanding, your epistemology really "kicks in" after the subject assumes that perception, thought, and emotion are valid sources of knowledge. If they agree with that assumption, then your epistemology works. However, since we are philosophizing, I think we really need to hone in on these fundamental principles a little deeper. I think so far your epistemology essentially states:

"We think, therefore we think"
"We perceive, therefore we perceive"
"We feel, therefore we feel"

Just some food for thought! I know these are probably loaded, completely separate, propositions of mine. So feel free to guide the conversation as you wish.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,
I apologize for such a belated response: I've been quite swarmed recently.

Almost every single belief of induction is not contradicted in the abstract. Meaning at best we describe all inductions besides irrational induction.

I think that the first sentence here is sort of like survivorship bias: it isn't that almost every single induction has potential, it is that all beliefs of induction that hold any substance at all have potential, therefore all the ones that have survived enough for both of us to hear tend to have potential. Most people naturally revoke their own inductions that have no potential without ever verbalizing them, because it is the first aspect of consideration in the process of contemplation. What I am trying to say is that I wouldn't post an inductive belief on here if I was well aware that it had no potential. So I agree, but I don't think it implies what I think you are trying to imply: it doesn't mean that potentiality isn't a worthy, or relevant, consideration just because most don't make it out of our heads to other people. I agree with you that potentiality doesn't get the subject to a completely working, solid claim of knowledge.

With respect to the second sentence, I holistically agree! The point I am trying to make is that "irrational induction" is not just what is contradicted by direct experience but, rather, it is also about whether it is contradicted in the abstract. I think it may be the appropriate time to elaborate on what I mean by abstraction. A contemplation resides in the abstract, in a pure sense, if it isn't pertaining to particular experiences but, rather, is utilizing a combination of those experiences or/and a generic form of those experiences. For example, the consideration of 1 "thing" + 1 "thing" is 2 "things" is purely abstract because it doesn't pertain to particular experiences. Although we can dive in deep into what abstraction really is, I am going to intentionally keep it this vague so you can navigate the discussion where you would like. In light of this, the example of fitting malleable (as you rightly mentioned) candy bars in specific dimensions that cannot occur is not due to it having no possibility (I am not negating it based off of a direct experience), but actually because it lacks any potential. This is an irrational induction. What also is an irrational induction, but not based off of abstraction, would be if I were to hold the belief that some particular apple is poisonous, yet having experienced a person eating that exact apple and they showed 0 signs of poisoning. In this case, no abstraction is needed: the particular experience is enough to warrant it as an irrational induction. That is essentially what I was trying to convey.

Rationally, something that is not contradicted in the mind may have no bearing as to wheather it is contradicted when applied to reality.

I agree. I am not attempting to claim that something that has potential necessarily is possible (which is what I think you are getting at here). I am attempting to claim that something that has potential is more cogent than something that lacks potential.

Perhaps "potentiality" could be used to describe the drive that pushes humanity forward to extend outside of its comfort zone of distinctive knowledge, and make the push for applicable knowledge. The drive to act on beliefs in reality.

No I don't think it is the drive, it is what most subjects do inherently (and what everyone does who has subscribed themselves, legitimately, to the game of rationality--I would argue). It is an important aspect of what constitutes an irrational induction. Without it, I think your epistemology is constrained to the apple example I gave previously: what is irrational, is what is impossible. I am saying: what is irrational, is what is impossible and has no potential.

But what I think you want, some way to measure the potential accuracy of beliefs, is something that cannot be given.

To a certain degree, I agree with you. Potentiality in itself does not warrant a belief accurate, but the lack of potentiality warrants it necessarily inaccurate. In order for me to properly assess potentiality, I think that we ought to define the definition of possibility (define what it means to experience something before), because this greatly determines what is considered abstract. So, how are you defining what "you've experienced at least once before"?

There is no way to measure whether one plausibility is more likely than another in reality, only measure whether one plausibility is more rational than another, but examining the chain of reason its built on.

I think you are wrong, but actually right. I think we can most definitely compare plausibilities in terms of induction hierarchies within it--not in terms of probabilistic quantitative likelihoods. But before I can get into that, I need to do some defining. First, I need to define the relations within the induction hierarchies, so here's how I will be defining it (all of which are open to redefining if you would like):

The Induction = The induction being proposed.
the grounding inductions = The inductions that The Induction is contingent on, which ground it to the subject (derive back to the subject).
induction hierarchy = The Induction considered with respect to its grounding inductions, which can be considered a holistic analysis of The Induction.
components = The distinct claims within The Induction (more on this later).
characteristic = An attribute, descriptor within a component (more on this later).

To summarize what is defined above, The Induction is simply the actual induction that the subject is making, whereas the grounding inductions are, as we previously discussed, what the subject will consider in a holistic analysis of The Induction. The induction hierarchy should be pretty self-explanatory as it is that holistic analysis of The Induction. The components is where it gets interesting. The components are what essentially distinctively makeup The Inductions and the characteristics are, quite frankly (not to use the word to explain it, but I am definitely about to do that) the characteristics of the components.

Let's go through some examples real quick. So, for all intents and purposes right now, let's consider the induction hierarchy as a horizontal holistic analysis, like this:

possibility -> possibility -> plausibility

The two possibilities would be the grounding inductions, the plausibility The Induction, and the whole thing is the induction hierarchy. The components of The Induction are going to be formatted like this (I just made it up, no real rhyme or reason):

possibility -> possibility -> plausibility: (component1, component2, ...)

I am merely separating the components from The Induction with a colon and encompassing them with parenthesis. Also, I will put distinctive knowledge, although it isn't an induction, in the chain (for consistency) like this:

[distinctive knowledge1, distinctive knowledge2, ...] - possibility -> possibility -> plausibility: (...)

Note that I am not claiming that distinctive knowledge are apart of the induction hierarchy, just that they are grounds for it (one way or another). Also, the characteristics are within the components, so I won't have any special characters for those; instead, I am going to bold them.

Now that that is out of the way, let's dive in! Let's use our favorite example: unicorns (: . Let's say I claim this:

1. There are horses (distinctive knowledge)
2. There are horns (distinctive knowledge)
3. It is possible for animals to evolve into having horns (evolution) (possibility)
4. It is plausible that a horse with a horn could exist (plausibility)

Now, we can map this into our induction hierarchy like this:

[horses, horns] - evolution -> unicorn

But we can go deeper than this with components:

[horses, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned horse)

The components are the specific distinctive claims within The Induction itself. In this case, I limited the claim to a horned horse: that is the sole component of my induction and the characteristic is horned. To really illuminate this, let's take a similar claim:

1. There are horses (distinctive knowledge)
2. There are horns (distinctive knowledge)
3. It is possible for animals to evolve into having horns (evolution) (possibility)
4. It is plausible that a horse with a horn and the ability to turn invisible could exist (plausibility)

I can map this one like so:

[horses, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned horse, invisibility capabilities)

Now there are two components to my inductive claim. I think that this is incredibly useful for comparing two plausibilities. At first, I thought I could utilize the sheer quantity to determine the cogencies with respect to one another. I was wrong, it gets trickier than that because the components themselves are also subject to an induction hierarchy within themselves. I can claim that it is possible for an animal to evolve into having a horn, but I cannot claim that an animal has evolved into being invisible (assuming we aren't talking about camo but actual invisibility), so the components themselves are not necessarily as cogent as each other. Therefore, I must take this into consideration.

[horses, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned {possible characteristic} horse)
[horses, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned {ditto} horse, invisibility {plausible characteristic} capabilities)

Therefore, #1 is more cogent than #2, not due to the sheer consideration of quantities of components, but the quantity in relation to an induction hierarchy within the component itself. In other words, a plausibility that has one component which is based off of a possible characteristic is more cogent (doesn't mean it is cogent) than one that has component which is based off of a plausible characteristic.

For example:

[horse, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned horse, has scaly skin)
[horse, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned horse, invisibility capabilities)

The first is more cogent than the second because we can be more detailed with the components like this:

[horse, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned {possible characteristic} horse, has scaly skin {possible characteristic})
[horse, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned {possible char} horse, invisibility capabilities {plausible char})

Therefore, #1 is more cogent than #2 when analyzed from the perspective of quantities (which are equal in this case) and in relation to to type of induction the characteristic is. So:

[horse, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned {possible characteristic} horse, has scaly skin {possible characteristic})
[horse, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (invisibility capabilities {plausible char})

Even though #2 has only one component, that component is a plausible characteristic and #1 has two possible characteristics--therefore, #1 is more cogent because a possibility is more cogent than a plausibility. However, if it were the case that plausibility #1 had 3 plausible characteristics while #2 had 2 plausible characteristics, then #2 would be more cogent. I am simply applying the same induction hierarchy rules a step deeper to analyze plausibilities. When I state that a component contains a "possible characteristic", note that I am not trying to claim that that characteristic is possible with respect to subject it is describing; I am merely distinguishing characteristics that have been experienced before from ones that haven't been (some are just figments of our imagination, quite frankly). However, it isn't just about the relation to an induction hierarchy within the component itself: it is also about the quantity, but the quantity is always second (subordinate) to the consideration of the relation. For example:

[horse, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned {possible characteristic} horse, has scaly skin {possible characteristic})
[horse, horns] - evolution -> unicorn: (horned {possible characteristic} horse)

First we consider the relation in terms of the characteristics within the components, as it takes precedence over quantity, and we find that both claims utilize possible characteristics. Now, since they are equal in relation, we must consider the quantity: #1 has two components while #2 has one. Now, we must keep in our minds at all times that these are components of a plausiblity and, therefore, a plausibility with more components of the same induction type is less cogent than one that has less of that type. This is because the more I add components, the more speculation I am introducing and, most importantly, in this case, I am adding more of the same type of speculation. Therefore, #2 is more cogent than #1.

I hope that serves as a basic exposition into what I mean by "comparing plausibilities".

This is because the nature of induction makes evaluation of its likelihood impossible by definition

We aren't really using likelihoods to compare plausibilities and if we are, then it is a qualitative likelihood of some sorts. I am going to stop here as this is getting quite long (:

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

I think at this point to construct potentiality as a viable term it will need to

a. Have a clear definition of what it is to be applicably known.
b. It must have an example of being applicably known.
c. Serve a purpose that another applicably known term cannot.

I appreciate that you put your concerns (with respect to potentiality) in a such a concise manner, as it really helps me, on the flip side, really hone in on what I am trying to say. I've never been the best at explanations. So thank you! I will attempt to address this in my post hereafter.

I think, upon further reflection, we are both conflating potentiality and possibility to a certain extent in the process of trying to dissect the colloquial use of "possibility". Potentiality is "what is not contradicted in the abstract", whereas possibility is "what has been experienced before". When you define possibility in that manner, I think you are implicitly defining it as "I've experienced X before, because I've experienced X IFF X==X". Therefore, assuming we don't get too knit picky with a more strict comparison X===X, possibility is like "I've experienced an Orange before, because I've experienced an Orange IFF 'Orange'=='Orange'". Therefore, when you say:

So, if you have all of those answers, then you can state, since it is possible to line up a candy bar in X manner, then it is possible that a candy bar will be able to be lined up if X manner is repeated. Because there is no claim that the candy bar should not be able to stand if X manner is repeated, it stands to reason that if we could duplicate X manner many times, 3000 per say, the candy bars would stand aligned. But, if we've never aligned a candy bar one time, we don't applicably know if its possible

You are stating it is possible to line up X manner repeated because "You've experienced 'X manner repeated' before, because you've experienced 'X manner' IFF 'X manner repeated' == 'X manner'". But that IFF does not hold, just like how 'X + 1' != 'X'. Even if you have experienced lining up 2,999 of those particular candy bars in question, and you knew all the other things you mentioned were possible (such as aligning candy bars are possible, horizontally lined up, etc), you would not be able to claim, according to your definition, that it is possible to line up 3,000. What is missing here, and what I think you are also trying to maintain, is potentiality: the abstract consideration. What you claimed is correct, but it is because you abstractly determined, via mathematical operations of repetition, that there is the potential for lining up 3,000 candy bars. Likewise, when you define impossibility in this manner:

Applicable impossibility, is found when new applicable knowledge contradicts our previous possibilities.

What you are stating is the converse of possibility, something like "I've experienced X contradict previous experience Y, IFF X disallows Y". This would directly entail that you have to directly experience the converse, such that "I've experienced X before, which is contradicted by this experience Y, therefore X is impossible". Notice this also disallows abstract consideration. It is:

"I've experienced a cup holding water, therefore it is possible for a cup to hold water"
"I'm now experiencing cups not being able to hold water, therefore it is impossible for them to hold water"
"The most recent experience out of the two takes precedence"

But then I think you introduce potentiality here into impossibility:

Likewise, without ever experiencing it, I can hold that it is irrational to believe that one can fit 7,000 2 in long candy bars, side by side long ways, within 1,000 feet (because, abstractly, 1,000 feet can only potentially hold 6,000 2 inch candy bars side by side).

There is an asymmetry between possibility and impossibility in your usage of the terms: the former has no abstract consideration while the former does (aka, the latter allows for potentiality as a consideration whereas the former does not). What I am understand you to hold here, is that you can hold that it is impossible to fit 7,000 2 in long candy bars, side by side long ways, within 1,000 feet because you have abstractly considered its lack of potential. You have not determined this based off of "I've experienced the converse of X, which contradicts Y", therefore you haven't determined it an "impossibility" or "possibility", as they both are contingent on the experiences. No, you did not utilize anything except the abstract induction of mathematical operations to warrant it impossible (I'de say you actually warranted it, more specifically, as lacking potential). Admittedly, I have also been conflating potentiality and possibility in our discussion because it is a hard thing to separate. But they are two distinct things. Yes, I am still utilizing experience to do math in the first place, but I am not experiencing the direct converse for something to be considered lacking potential. But, according to your terms, I am also not stating that "I've experienced X before, which contradicts Y". I am stating "I've experienced X before, and the extrapolation of X contradicts Y in the abstract". For example, consider the following:

I claim something is either (1) green, (2) not green, or (3) other option

This does, eventually, boil down to the law of noncontradiction, but, in the immediate, it is the law of excluded middle. What I am trying to explicate is that the rejection of #3 as being a "possibility" isn't experiential based--as in I am not negating the usage of #3 in terms of "I've experienced X, which contradicts Y". I am considering this purely in the abstract and rightfully concluding it cannot have any potential to occur. The reason this feels like a sticky mess to me, and maybe for you too, is that this is traditionally how "possibility" was also used: it had multiple underlying meanings.

So let's go back to this:

I think at this point to construct potentiality as a viable term it will need to

a. Have a clear definition of what it is to be applicably known.
b. It must have an example of being applicably known.
c. Serve a purpose that another applicably known term cannot.

A is:

"what is not contradicted in the abstract"

Although I don't think abstraction has to be directly applicably known (like I would have to go test, every time, the usage of mathematical operations passed what has been previously experienced), but I think B is:

Abstraction is the distinctive knowledge, which is applicably known to a certain degree (i.e. I applicably know that my perceptions pertain to impenetrability and cohesion, etc), that is inductively utilized to determine potentiality.

C is:

The defining of "possibility" as "I've experienced X before, because I've experienced X IFF X==X" removes the capability for the subject to make any abstract determinations, therefore potentiality is a meaningful distinction not implemented already in possibility (and likewise for impossibility).

I think that this is a good start to spark further conversation, so I think we can revisit some of the other things you demonstrated in your post after we find some common ground on the aforementioned.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Absolutely fantastic deep dive here Bob. I've wanted to so long to discuss how the knowledge theory applies to math, and its been a joy to do so. I also really want to credit your desire for "potentiality" to fit in the theory. Its not that I don't think it can, I just think it needs to be more carefully defined, and serve a purpose that cannot be gleaned with the terms we already have in the theory. Thank you again for the points, you are a keen philosopher!

Thank you Philosophim! You are a marvelous philosopher yourself! I am also thoroughly enjoying our conversation. I agree in that our dispute is really pertaining, at a fundamental level, to two concepts: potentiality and math.

I have been thinking about this for some time. I like the word "potential". I think its a great word. The problem is, it comes from a time prior to having an assessment of inductions. Much of what you are describing as potential, are a level of cogency that occurs in both probability, and possibility. The word potential in this context, is like the word "big". Its a nice general word, but isn't very specific, and is used primarily as something relative within a context.

I agree, I definitely need to define it more descriptively. However, with that being said, at a deeper level, the term possibility is also like the word "big": it is contingent on a subjective threshold just like potentiality. Although I like your definition of it (what has been experienced once before), that very definition is also utterly ambiguous (from a deeper look). Just like how I can subjectively create a threshold of when something is "big", which you could disagree with (cross-referencing to your own threshold), I also subjectively create a threshold of what constitutes as "experiencing it before". Furthermore, I also subjectively create a threshold of what constitutes as having the potential to occur. I think we can definitely get further into the weeds about "possibility" and "potentiality", but all I am trying to point out here is that their underlying structure is no different.

Logically, I can only say inductions are more cogent, or rational than another.

I agree, I think potentiality is an aspect of rationality. If it has no potential, just like if it isn't possible, then it is irrational. Potentiality isn't separate from rationality (it is apart of rational thinking).

I have absolutely no basis to measure the potential of an induction's capability of accurately assessing reality

The basis is whether you think it aligns accurately with your knowledge. For example, although this may be a controversial example as we haven't hashed out math yet, I can hold that, even though I haven't experienced it, lining up (side by side) 2 in long candy bars for 3,000 feet has the potential to occur because it aligns with my knowledge (i.e. I do applicably know that there is 3,000 feet available to lay things and I do applicably know there are 2 in long candy bars); however, most importantly, according to your terminology, this is not possible since I haven't experienced it before. Likewise, without ever experiencing it, I can hold that it is irrational to believe that one can fit 7,000 2 in long candy bars, side by side long ways, within 1,000 feet (because, abstractly, 1,000 feet can only potentially hold 6,000 2 inch candy bars side by side). Yes, there is a level of error (mainly human error) that needs to be accounted for and, thusly, it is merely an ideal. But, nevertheless, I can utilize this assessment of potentiality to determine which is more cogent and which to not pursue (although both are not possibilities--as of yet--I should not sit there and try to fit 7,000 2 in long candy bars--side by side--within 1,000 ft since I already know it has no potential). Notice though, and this is my main critique, that the use of solely possibility (in your terms) within your epistemology strips the subject of being capable of making such a distinction (they are both not possible without further elaboration).

Much of what you are describing as potential, are a level of cogency that occurs in both probability, and possibility

I am failing to understand how this is the case? Potentiality is the component of colloquial use of "possibility" that got removed, implicitly, when your epistemology refurbished the term. Therefore, it does not pertain, within your terms, to possibility directly at all. Yes, in the sense that potentiality branches out to plausibility, possibility, and probability is true. But that is because it is a requisite (if it has no potential, it necessarily gets redirected to the irrational pile of claims). Something can't be plausible if it can be proven to have no potential (and it doesn't necessarily have to be "I've experienced the exact, contradictory, event to this claim, therefore it is an irrational induction": I don't have to experience failing to be able to fit 1,000,000 5 ft bricks into a 10 x 10 x 10 room to know that it is an irrational inductive belief). Moreover, something can't be probable (with an actual denominator) if it doesn't have potential. And, finally, it can't be possible (you couldn't have experienced it before) if it has no potential (and if you did experience it, legitimately, then it has potential). I think the main issue you may be having is that your new definition of possibility implicitly stripped this meaningful distinction out of "possibility" in favor of a new, less ambiguous term. However, now we must determine, assuming you agree with me, how to implement this distinction back into the epistemology. Otherwise, the subject is incredibly limited in what they can meaningfully induce about the world.

but I cannot use it as anything more than that before it turns into an amorphous general word that people use to describe what they are feeling at the time.

I agree: people could use it with no real substance. However, this is also true for possibility. I could make subjective thresholds for what constitutes "experiencing something before" that renders possibilities utterly meaningless. I think "rationality" isn't merely determining something a possibility, plausibility, or any other term: it is also about how one reasoned their way into the thresholds for those terms. I can dereference any term into a meaningless distinction, but how can we keep it meaningful for all subjects when it isn't a rigid distinction? I think we just have to agree, as two subjects conversing, on the underlying reasoning behind our subjective thresholds: that is rationality (what we both constitute as valid reasoning).

Now a word which could describe a state of probability or possibility, becomes an emotional driving force for why we seek to do anything.

I see where you are coming from and you are totally correct: people can de-value anything. However, I don't see how it is actually a probability or possibility: only that the distinction between what is irrational and rational (rational being probability, possibility, and plausibility) is necessarily potentiality (to one degree or another). All three terms within rational beliefs (not considering which is more rational than another, which could technically make a rational belief actually irrational if one determines another rational belief to be a better choice) inherent from this concept of potentiality: it is a requisite.

I could hold an irrational belief, and say its because its potentially true.

If we are defining an irrational belief as what has no potential to be true, then this statement is an irrational belief, within our subjective determination of what the term "irrational belief" should imply, because it directly contradicts the definition.

Potential in this case more describes, "I believe something, because I believe something (It has potential).

Awe, I see. This is what I was referring to a while ago (in our posts): people tend to make an illegitimate jump where they claim that "since it has potential, it is possible, therefore I believe it". This is not necessarily true though. Honestly, your defining of possibility as "experiencing it once before" is so brilliant for this very reason: something can have potential but yet never have been experienced, therefore it isn't possible (yet). Therefore, consequently, merely claiming something has potential ergo I believe it is true is irrational because, rationally speaking, something can't be constituted as "true" if it first isn't possible. Potentiality doesn't pertain to the "truth" of the matter, just a requisite to what one should rationally not pursue. It is a deeper level, so to speak, of analysis that can meaningfully allow subjects to reject other peoples' claims just like what you are describing.

Without concrete measurement, it can be used to state that any belief in reality could be true.

Not everything could be true. Firstly, not everything is possible (because we either (1) haven't experience it or (2) we have experienced contradictory events to the claim). Secondly, not everything has potential (because we may have experienced enough knowledge to constitute it as not having the capability to occur). Admittedly, potentiality and possibility are incredibly similar and that's why, traditionally, they are but one term. However, potentiality is a more broad claim, less bold and assertive, than possibility (if we define it as having experienced it before). Now, within this new terminology, we can boldly and assertively claim something is possible (assuming we agree on the subjective thresholds in place) because we have experienced it before. In regards to potentiality, we aren't boldly claiming that it can occur, just that there is potential for it to occur. This is more meaningful in terms of negation and not positive claims: we can meaningfully claim that something is irrational if it has no potential (assuming the subjective thresholds are agreed upon, like everything else). It isn't as meaningful in terms of two things that have potential and that's where the other terms come into play, but they only come into play once it is accepted that it has potential (that's why it is a requisite).

I think I'm going to stick with evaluating inductions in terms of rationality, instead of potentiality.

That is absolutely fine! My intention is not to pressure you into reforming it, but I do think this is a false dichotomy: this assumes potentiality is a separate option from rationality. Potentiality, and its consideration, is engulfed within rational thinking and the negation thereof is why it becomes irrational. We can't claim that something that has no potential is irrational if we aren't also claiming that if it does that it is rational to continue the analysis.

So earlier, I was trying to explain that math was the logical conclusions of being able to discretely experience. I remember when I learned about mathematical inductions, I thought to myself, "That's not really an induction." The conclusion necessarily follows from the premises of a mathematical induction. I checked on this to be sure.

"Although its name may suggest otherwise, mathematical induction should not be confused with inductive reasoning as used in philosophy (see Problem of induction). The mathematical method examines infinitely many cases to prove a general statement, but does so by a finite chain of deductive reasoning involving the variable n, which can take infinitely many values."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_induction

This is true, but that is with respect to the mathematical operations, not the numbers themselves. I can say it is possible to perform addition because I have experienced it before, I cannot say that it is possible to add 3 trillion + 3 trillion because I haven't experienced doing that before with those particular numbers: I am inducing that it still holds based off of the possibility of the operation of addition. But, yes, you are correctt in the sense that philosophical induction is not occurring with respect to the operations themselves, but I would say it is occurring at the level of the numbers.

N + 1 = F(N) is a logical process, or rule that we've created. Adding one more identity to any number of identities, can result in a new identity that describes the total number of identities. It is not a statement of any specific identity, only the abstract concept of identities within our discrete experience. Because this is the logic of a being that can discretely experience, it is something we can discretely experience.

We could also state N+1= N depending on context. For example, I could say N = one field of grass. Actual numbers are the blades of grass. Therefore no matter how many blades of grass I add into one field of grass, it will still be a field of grass. I know this isn't real math, but I wanted to show that we can create concepts that can be internally consistent within a context. That is distinctive knowledge. "Math" is a methodology of symbols and consistent logic that have been developed over thousands of years, and works in extremely broad contexts.

I agree, but this doesn't mean it holds for all numbers. We induce that it does, but it isn't necessarily the case. We assume that when we take the limit of 1/infinity that it equals 0, but we don't know if that is really even possible to actually approach the limit infinitely to achieve 0. Likewise, we know that if there are N distinct things that N + 1 will hold, but we don't if N distinct things are actually possible (that is the induction aspect, which I think you agree with me on that, although I could be wrong).

I don't believe you did in this case. If you recall, thoughts come after the realization we discretely experience. The term "thought" is a label of a type of discrete experience. I believe I defined it in the general sense of what you could discretely experience even when your senses were shut off. And yes, you distinctively know what you think. If I think that a pink elephant would be cool, I distinctively know this. If I find a pink elephant in reality, this may, or may not be applicably known. Now that you understand the theory in full, the idea of thoughts could be re-examined for greater clarity, definition, and context. I only used it in the most generic sense to get an understanding of the theory as a whole.

Yes, I may need a bit more clarification on this to properly assess what is going on. Your example of the pink elephant is sort of implying to me something different than what I was trying to address. I was asking about the fundamental belief that you think and not a particular knowledge derived from that thought (in terms of a pink elephant). I feel like, so far, you are mainly just stating essentially that you just think, therefore you think. I'm trying to assess deeper than that in terms of your epistemology with respect to this concept, but I will refrain as I have a feeling I am just simply not understanding you correctly.

I think again this is still the chain of rationality. A probability based upon a plausibility, is less cogent than a probability based on a possibility.

Yes, but your essays made it sound like probability is its own separate thing and then you can mix them within chains of inductions. On the contrary, I think that "probability" itself is actually, at a more fundamental level, contingent on possibility and plausibility for it to occur in the first place.

You distinctively know that if you travel 30 miles per hour to get to a destination 60 miles away, in 2 hours you will arrive there.

Agreed, but, depending on if I've experienced it before, it may be an induction based off of possibility or plausibility.

A probability is not a deduction, but an induction based upon the limitations of the deductions we have. Probability notes there are aspects of the situation that we lack knowledge over.

Whether or not it is a deduction or induction, probabilities are derived from two separate claims that are not equally as cogent as one another. A calculation based off of a possibility is more cogent than a plausibility. Yes, this is still using the induction hierarchy, but notice it is within probabilities, which means probabilities itself is contingent on possibility and plausibility while the latter two are not contingent in any way on probability.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello @Philosophim,

Further, potentiality is not something the hierarchy can objectively measure. Let say that in a deck of 52 cards, you can choose either a face card, or a number card will be drawn next. You have three guesses. Saying number cards is more rational going by the odds. But the next three cards drawn are face cards. The deck was already shuffled prior to your guess. The reality was the face cards were always going to be drawn next, there was actually zero potential that any number cards were going to be pulled in the next three draws. What you made was the most rational decision even though it had zero potential of actually happening.

Although I understand what you are saying, and I agree with you in a sense, potentiality is not based off of hindsight but, rather, the exact same principle as everything else: what you applicably know at the time. Prior to drawing three face cards, if you applicably know that there is at least one number card in the 52 (or that you have good reason to believe that there is one regardless of whether you directly experienced one), then there is a potential that you could draw it. Regardless of whether it is the most rational position, it is nevertheless a rational position. However, if you applicably know that there are no number cards in the 52 (or you have good reason to doubt it), then it has no potential and, therefore, it is irrational.

Only this time, I didn't put any number cards in the deck, and didn't tell you. You believe I made an honest deck of cards, when I did not. You had no reason to believe I would be dishonest in this instance, and decided to be efficient, and assume the possibility I was honest. With this induction, I rationally again choose number cards. Again however, the potential for number cards to be drawn was zero.

Again, I understand what you are saying and I agree. However, within the context (in the heat of the moment) the numbers do have the potential to be in the deck if you have assessed that your knowledge deems it so. In hindsight, which refurbishes the context and maybe a new context depending on how one looks at it, you can now claim that there was no potentiality. But with respect to whether it had potentiality prior to this new knowledge that they lied, it is more rational to conclude that it has potentiality. I would argue, furthermore, that this assessment is actually necessary for one to even pick numbers in the first place (in terms of your example): if they don't think there is any potential for there to be a number, then they wouldn't pick numbers (and if they did, then it would be irrational). Although sometimes potentiality and "possibility" (in your terms) coincide, it isn't necessarily the case that something only has potential if you have "experienced it once before".

An induction cannot predict potentiality, because an induction is a guess about reality.

It is a part of the guess. First I make an educated guess that there is potential for water to exist on another planet somewhere, then I guess on how likely that is and, thereafter, whether it really constitutes as knowledge or not (with consideration to my discrete and applicable knowledge). Potentiality is the first (or at least one of the first) considerations when attempting to determine knowledge. If the subject determines there is no potential, then they constitute any further extrapolations as irrational and thereby disband from it.

Some guesses can be more rational than another, but what is rational within our context, may have zero potential of actually being

It isn't about what can potentially occur in light of new evidence afterwards, it is about what can potentially occur in light of the current evidence. It is perfectly fine if we find out later that what we thought had no potential actual does have some, or vice-versa. This is how it is for all contexts and even the induction hierarchies. Potentiality is a guide to what one should pursue (as one of the first considerations), and I would argue we all implicitly partake in it: that's why if you can convince someone that they hold a contradiction, they will feel obligated to refurbish their beliefs (most of the time). It is the fact that they know they are holding an irrational belief, due to the potentiality being nonexistent, that motivates their will to change. This would be, colloquially speaking, "possibility". I agree that this may just be a sematical difference, but I think defining possibility as "what one has experienced once before" eliminates the other meaningful aspect of the term (potentiality).

It is less uncertainty, but has no guarantee

Nothing is guaranteed. It could very well be that in five years we will look back, in hindsight, and "know" our understanding of induction hierarchies was utterly wrong (with consideration to new evidence). This doesn't mean that we can't use the induction hierarchies now, does it? I don't think so. So it is with potentiality. In my head, this would be like claiming that we can't utilize "possibilities" because, in the future, it may be the case that we find out it never actually was possible.

For the purposes of trying to provide a clear and rational hierarchy, I'm just not sure whether potentiality is something that would assist, or cloud the intention and use of the tool.

Personally I think it is necessary, but of course do what you deem best!

Math is the logic of discrete experience.

I agree for the most part: math deductions are the logic of discrete experience and we inductively apply that in the abstract. But I think the problem remains: where does mathematical inductions fit into the hierarchy?

This is a known function. This is an observation of our own discrete experience

It is an observation of our own discrete experience (when it is a deduction), but that doesn't exempt it from the hierarchy (when it is an induction). 1 + 2 = 3 is an observation of our own discrete experience, whereas X + Y = Z (where all of them are numbers never discretely experienced before) is based off of our own discrete experience (it's an induction, as you are probably well aware). When I state that 1 + 2 = 3, I know that these numbers are possible, whereas I don't know that is the case in terms of X + Y = Z for all numbers. Furthermore, there is actually cases where I know that they aren't possible, in the case of imaginary numbers (i), such as 1 + √-25 = 5i. We also apply math to actual infinities that may not actually exist (such as infinity and negative infinity and even PI and E, which are irrational numbers). When we take the limit approaching infinity, are you claiming that that is an observation of our own discrete experience (or a distant extrapolation)? Therefore, the function F(N) is not an observation of our own discrete experience (that would be a deduction) but, rather, an induced function meant to predict based off of our deducible knowledge (it is literally an induction put into a predictive model). This directly implies that, for N in F(N) it could either (1) be a possible number, (3) applicable plausible number (with regards to your terms: has potential and can be applied but isn't proven to be possible), (4) inapplicable plausible number (has potential and hasn't been proven to be possible but cannot be applied), or (5) an irrational number (has no potential, isn't possible, and has no potential). I think you are right in the sense that, in the abstract, X + Y = X + Y will always hold, but saying it will always hold is an induction (it is just so ingrained, as you stated, into our discrete experience itself that we hold it dear--in my terms it is one of the most immediate things, closest to our existence). Most importantly, none of this exempts it from the hierarchy of inductions and, therefore, I would like to know where you were classify it?

When I discretely experience something that I label as "thoughts" in my head, I distinctively know I have them.

My intention is not to try and put words in your mouth, but I think you are, if you think this, obliged to admit that you and thought are distinct then. I don't think you can hold the position that we discretely experience them without acknowledging this, but correct me if I am wrong. If you do think they are separate, then I agree, as I think that your assessment is quite accurate: we do apply our belief that we have thoughts to reality, because the process of thinking is apart of experience (reality). It is just the most immediate form of knowledge you have (I would say): rudimentary reason.

Distinctive knowledge occurs, because the existence of having thoughts is not contradicted. The existence of discretely experiencing cannot be contradicted. Therefore it is knowledge.

I agree!

We cannot meaningfully understand what plausible probability is, without first distinctively and applicably knowing what plausibility, and probability are first.

If I follow this logic, I still end up with a problem: without first distinctively and applicably knowing what mathematical induction is, I cannot meaningfully understand what a probability is. Therefore, why isn't mathematical inductions a category on the induction hierarchy? Why only probabilities?

Furthermore, I apologize as my term "plausible probability" is confusing: I am not referring to a chain plausibility -> probability. What I was really referring to was something we've previously discussed a bit: there are different cogencies within probabilities since they are subject, internally and inherently, to the other three categories (irrational, possibility, and plausibility). Same goes for math in general. Two separate probabilities, with the same chances, could be unequal in terms of sureness (and cogency I would say). You could have a 33% chance in scenario 1 and 2, but 1 is more sure of a claim than 2. This would occur if scenario 1 is X/Y where X and Y are possible numbers and scenario 2 is X/Y where X and Y are plausible numbers (meaning they have the potential to exist, but aren't possible because you haven't experienced them before). My main point was that there is a hierarchy within probabilities (honestly all math) as well.

Moreover, another issue I was trying to convey is why does probability have its own category, but not mathematical inductions? I think what your "probability" term really describes, in terms of its underlying meaning, is mathematical inductions. If I induce something based off of F(N), this is no different than inducing something off of 1/N chances, except that, I would say, anything induced from the former is more cogent. This is because if I base a belief on there being a 90% chance, that will always be less certain (because it is a chance) than anything based off of F(N) (directly that is). For example, if I induce that I should go 30 miles per hour in my car to get to may destination, which is 60 miles away, in 2 hours, that is calculated with numbers that are a possibility or plausibility (the mathematical operations are possible, but not necessarily the use of those operations on those particular numbers in practicality). But this is more cogent than an induction that I should bet on picking a number card out of a deck (no matter how high the chances of picking it) because the former is a more concrete calculation to base things off of (it isn't "chances", in the sense that that term is used for probability). Don't get me wrong, the initial calculation, because it is also math, of probability is just as cogent as any other mathematical operation (it's just division, essentially), but anything induced from that cannot be more cogent than something directly induced from a more concrete mathematical equation such as 60 miles / 30 mile per hour = 2 hours. Notice that these are both inductions but one doesn't really exist in the induction hierarchies (mathematical inductions) while the other is the most cogent induction (probability). Why?

1. Its plausible the dark side of the moon is on average hotter than the light side of the moon, therefore it is probable any point on the dark side of the moon will be hotter than any point on the light side of the moon.
2. Its possible the side of the moon facing away from Earth is on average colder than the light side of the moon, therefore it is probable any point on the dark side of the moon will be colder than any point on the light side of the moon.
3. The dark side of the moon has been measured on average to be cooler than the light side of the moon at this moment, therefore it is probable any point on the dark side of the moon will be colder than any point on the light side of the moon.

This may be me just being nit picky, but none of those were probable (they are not quantitative likelihoods, they are qualitative likelihoods). If you disagree, then I would ask what the denominator is here. But my main point is there is a 4th option you left out: if I can create a mathematical equation that predicts the heat of a surface based off of it's exposure to light, then it would be more cogent than a probability (it is a mathematical induction based on a more concrete function than probability) but, yet, mathematical inductions aren't a category.

Furthermore, #2 isn't possible unless you've experienced the side of the moon facing away from the earth being colder than when you experienced it on the light side. This is when we have to consider what we mean by "what we have experienced before". This is more of potentiality than possibility (in your terms). I think that your use of "possible" is more in a colloquial sense in #2.

As you can see, intuitively, and rationally, it would seem the close the base of the chain is to applicable knowledge, the more cogent the induction.

I agree!

Look forward to hearing from you,
Bob