Sorry, I must have misunderstood what you were originally trying to convey; as I thought you were contesting my OP with the use of categorical norms. Are you agreeing that moral obligations begin with tastes, but that one should desire to abide by some set of categorical imperatives?

Hello Alkis Piskas,

A fact cannot be moral or immoral. Not for the reasons you are stating but by definition.
A fact is something known to exist or having occured.

Interesting point! Yes, you are correct that my OP presupposes that facts can be of the ‘moral’ type. I would say that a ‘fact’ is a proposition of which its content appropriately agrees/corresponds to reality. In other words, it is a thought that corresponds to something which exists (or occurred, as you put) and not just something which exists. In light of that definition, I would say that a ‘moral fact’ would be an obligation, asserted in thought, that correponds to something in reality. This would entail, I would say, that there exists an obligation mind-independently; that is, it is not contingent on any will. As an example, this could be a platonic form.

Even in terms of your definition (i.e.,, “a fact is something known to exist or having occured”), I still think there is a possibility for a moral type of fact because nothing about that definition negates the idea of an obligation which is mind-independent (e.g., it doesn’t rule out that there could be a ‘fact’, in this sense, that is a platonic form of goodness).

Hello Mww,

Ok, but why are desires not simply synonymous with tastes?

They are; and I apologize if I suggested otherwise.

Moral obligation: that interest of will, by which the worthiness of being happy is justified.

I think the crux of this definition rests on “worthiness of being happy”: how does one define what is worthy of happiness without appealling to values (fundamentally)?

Hello Tom Storm,

How do you establish the truth of the correspondence theory of truth?

One does not, under any theory of truth, establish truth of the theory of truth without any circular logic. I only claim that the evidence is stacked in favor of truth itself as being equivalent with this theory, which, of course, entails that I will interpret the truthity of a proposition via the lens of this theory. This is no different than epistemology: how does one know what it means to know, without divulging in circular logic? They don’t.

I take a correspondence theory of truth, so I would say that truth is a relationship between subject (viz., mind-dependence) and object (viz., mind-independence) such that truth is the uncovering of what is.

As Aristotle put it, to say that which is is or that which is not is not, is true; and to say that which is not is or that which is is not, is false.

Truth, according to this view, is neither purely objective nor subjective, but is absolute.

I agree with the proposition that moral obligations do not begin with desires.

I see, and what do you mean by a "moral" obligation, as opposed to a mere obligation?

I would say the contrary, that moral obligations are rooted in tastes. In other words, "morals" is rooted in "values", not vice versa.

All good, nevertheless my only objection is here: fundamental obligation is categorical, represented as a command of reason, re: shall, whereas hypotheticals are mere ought’s.

Do you believe, then, that obligations do not begin with a desire?

My point is that even if there are categorical imperatives, we only are obliged to them if we desire them; and that is the hypothetical imperative that stands morally deeper than the categorical imperative; and, as such, is one's fundamental obligation. If one's obligation to the categorical norm is hypothetical and one has committed themselves to the antecedent, then the most rational thing to do is to simply commit oneself to whatever is objectively implied by that hypothetical commitment and to do so irregardless of what the categorical imperatives are.

Why not take up…..? Mostly because it’s all-too-often very much easier not to.

Well, I am not disputing that people tend to take the easiest way out; but that is not the purpose of this OP. I am arguing for the de-valuing of moral facts (as useless in moral discourse).

Hello Plaque Flag,

In order to further the conversation, I would appreciate it if you could define (generally) what you mean by "rationality"; because your position seems to be that what is rational is ethical. So far you still have not provided a definition but, instead, are providing examples of rational discourse--but that just begs the question!

To reciprocate what I am asking of you, here is my definition of rationality: "to be, in all matters of assessment, closely married to reality to the best of one's ability, and, consequently, to deploy principles which best achieve such". That which irrational, is that which, in matters of assessment, deviate from what reasonably gathered about reality. Of course, what one thinks is is reasonably gathered about reality is dependent on one's core epistemic principles (so there is a subjective aspect to it in that sense), but the epistemic principles that are best suited for being closely married to reality is certainly objective. Rationality, put another way, is to commit oneself to the hypothetical imperative of being as closely married to reality as possible. Now, what is your definition?

Hello Ciceronianus,

I take it you don't mean what one should want. If that's the case, though, I'm not sure how helpful "moral discourse" would be.

In the sense that I cannot say they are objectively wrong for what they want, or even if I can appeal to a moral fact it would be useless, you are correct; but I don’t find anything talking in terms of “you should want...” because it is a colloquial expression of trying to convince somehow either (1) of what one suspects they will agree with given proper contemplation or (2) something that one believes is worthy of imposement on the other. Sometimes people argue that moral anti-realism, and positions similar to what I argued for in the OP, explode into #2; but I find that #1 is still largely intact, as most people agree on fundamental obligations (they just don’t agree on how to achieve it) (and of course there are exceptions).

Hello Schopenhauer1,

For we can never get out of our physical, cultural, and social choices that were already laid out for us. Every birth is a political move. This world is supposed to mean something. Otherwise, why would you bring more people into it? Can you imagine if people brought people into a world and thought it a useless endeavor?

I guess I am just not following how this ties to the OP, as I would say that the meaning that actually matters is one’s fundamental obligations (which are tastes), and that is why people are begotten by other people. Are you claiming that it requires an objective meaning to actually matter?

Hello Plaque Flag,

I have not been able to penetrate into what you mean by “rationality”, as it seems to be some sort of logos, so please give me clear and concise definition (so that I can assess). — Bob Ross

...a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification

It's not so unlike a demystified version of logos in the sense that science and philosophy dialectically and autonomously determine / reveal / establish / revise the conceptual aspect of our shared reality.

You didn’t provide a definition of “rationality” here. The paragraph you shared uses the term without defining it. So let me ask again: what do you mean by the term “rationality”? Saying there is an “ideal communication community” that is a “metainstitution of rational argumentation” tells me nothing of what you mean by the term “rational” itself.

If it's only a private logic in which you prove the unreality of norms, your 'conclusion' is a personal 'superstition,'

It’s not private logic: logic is logic. I am not saying that we make up the laws of logic, I am saying that what one uses to determine that there are laws of logic is subjective. You seem to be under the impression that using hypothetical norms as one’s fundamental obligations results in everything becoming subjective, which is not true.

an opinion that doesn't aspire to any 'justification' beyond effective sophistry.

It’s about conversing to ‘convince’ people of one’s position (and not to scam them or maliciously argue with them), where by ‘convince’ I mean get the person to see that they themselves already agree with it in the depths of their psychology. Most people share the same fundamental obligations or very similar ones without necessarily realizing it.

The rational community is founded on (is structure by) communication norms

I don’t agree with that one bit, but, then again, I still don’t know what you mean by ‘rational’. For me, I mean, for simplicity’s sake, “being closely married with reality” (which entails using normative principles that are better suited for that). So, for me, rationality has absolutely not dependence on a community; however, it may be more rational to collaborate—but that “rationality” qualification there is just that one is “being closely married with reality to achieve their goals”. This is why I said a psychopath can be very rational, but nevertheless really unethical.

Claims are justified within a 'public' logic which members, as members, take for granted willingly [ autonomy ] as an authority.

This reminds me of Nietzschien ethics.

A 'mind-independent judgment' sounds like a judge-independent judgment --- indeed an absurdity

Just like how there can be laws without an author, I find no reason to believe that there cannot be a law (judgment) of morals without a judge (author).

The same style of argument reveals 'mind-independent reality' to be absurd in the same way, since the world, so far as we know from experience, is only given to subjects [who are themselves within this same world that is given to them, a strange loop.]

I disagree. Just because everything we gather about the world is via the filter of our minds, does not in any way entail that the world itself is mind-dependent. As a matter of fact, there must be something which is mind-independent, even in the case that the world is fundamentally mind-dependent (in the sense of what eternally exists is a Universal Mind), for the brute fact (or facts) of reality would be necessarily mind-independent.

Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right.
...
While moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

Notice the lack of mention of mind-independence.

Facticity is mind-independent existence. Moral realism is the idea that there are objective moral judgments, according to standard definitions, like the one you quoted, whereof ‘objective’ is mind-independent (sometimes called stance-independent) existence. Another simple reference is Wiki:

Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion)

Irregardless of definitions, it wouldn’t make sense to say something is objective if it is dependent on one’s mind, for that is exactly what subjectivity means. What is real is that which is mind-independent, which includes mind operations insofar as the operations it is true that those operations occurred independent of any mind current operations; that is, in other words, that something contingent on a will, being itself subjective, is objective insofar as it is a fact that it happened (and no one can change that): it is a part of existence, which is mind-independent itself.

The point is just that those logical norms themselves must be real in order for you to appeal to them as authoritative, therefore making your own conclusions significant

I don’t think this is true: this presupposes that what is objective is only worthy of any moral force, which just begs the question (as I am literally arguing against that). I am saying that subjective norms are significant, and that objective norms are the insignificant ones (truly).

Hello Frank,

I think your point is that moral realism is associated with a conundrum: it assumes that we don't know right from wrong innately, so we need an external set of rules. But how do we know which rules to embrace if we're morally vacuous to begin with?

This is also a good point, but not the point I am trying to make. Instead of questioning how reliably a person could obtain knowledge of the moral facts, I am questioning why anyone should care about the moral facts (regardless of how easy or difficult it is to know).

I was looking at the cultural roots of the conundrum, as opposed to trying to resolve it. I don't think it has a resolution. :razz:

I see!

Hello Frank,

I'm sure neither of us wants to dissect Christianity

I am more than happy to discuss Christianity if you find it relevant to the OP: can you tie it back to the OP so I understand where we are headed with this?

Hello Plaque Flag,

Sure. But I already did. Maybe you missed it ? I gave a nice, long quotation above.

I have not been able to penetrate into what you mean by “rationality”, as it seems to be some sort of logos, so please give me clear and concise definition (so that I can assess).

If they aren't fundamental, your own claims about them lack leverage or 'force.' It's like going before the court to argue that argument itself is not to be trusted.

I never said that they aren’t fundamental nor that they cannot be trusted: I said that they are tastes. Some tastes are better for acquiring truth and some are better for survival.

But the problem is the status of that claim itself. It suits you (it's pleases your taste) to believe that it's all just taste

In the underlined sentence, please expound what is incoherent or logically inconsistent with it—as I am not seeing it. You are absolutely correct that I am saying that we use norms as the bedrock to what we do, which includes epistemology, and that, yes, my assessment of norms is contingent on what norms I used to assess them: I don’t see any logical contradiction nor internal/external incoherency with that position. If you disagree, then please elaborate on where the contradiction or incoherence is.

I think you are imagining a kind of logic that is untainted by normativity

No. I am agreeing that the use of logical principles is contingent on one’s tastes; but I am not saying that those tastes are untrustworthy (in virtue of being tastes) nor that they are not fundamental (to one’s derivations of reasoning).

so that you can get logical leverage on normativity itself

You can assess normativity, as a concept, while using normativity as a necessary but incomplete analysis: what is wrong with that? This is no different than analyzing ‘being’ as ‘substance’.

Just because one must use norms to perform logic does make those norms objective.

Only 'ethical' rationality (the essence of science) can do this.

How does science give us a viewpoint of normativity beyond that normativity? I don’t think it does.

The philosopher as such can't earnestly question the reality of normativity.

Anyone can question the reality, in the sense of being mind-independent, of normativity; they just can’t question normativity (independent of consideration of its mind dependence/independence). With all due respect, I think you are confusing the analysis of normativity in general with its objectivity (or lack thereof).

Like I said, respectfully, magic stones in a hidden dimension, assumed to be cognitively inaccessible from the very beginning

I’ve already clarified this, so I am confused why you are still straw manning moral realism: the idea is that there are true mind-independent moral judgments, which do not necessarily have to be tangible.

It's (nonobviously) mystic talk about a round square.

Then demonstrate to me the incoherence (just like the “round square”, which is an incoherence in terms) of talking of mind-independent moral judgments.

What does the world look like from no perspective at all ?

Just because no one has directly come to know the world-in-itself does not imply that mind-independent morals, just like objects, are incoherent like a “round square”.

Hello Janus,

I'm not committed to the laws of nature: I'm saying that regularities are observed everywhere; if you want to study things and try to understand how they work, what alternative is there to observation?

Where I am confused then, is why you said:

There do seem to be laws of nature; there are constantly observed regularities, and very little, or perhaps even no, transgression of those laws

Saying “there do seem to be laws of nature”, by my lights, is admitting that you believe in laws of nature, am I misunderstanding? Irregardless, if you are saying that you don’t believe in laws of nature, then I am asking you: do you agree with me, by your own terms, that believing in laws of nature is on faith?

To me, it seems like you are denying this as well, am I wrong?

Are you saying that logical consistency coupled without observation is all that we can know? That would exclude all laws of logic except for the law of noncontradiction (which, to me, seems like special pleading), the laws of nature, and literally any other metaphysical claim. Why? — Bob Ross

Why can you not carry on a discussion with me without distorting what I've said?

Janus, how can I distort what you have said (in any meaningful sense), if I am asking you questions? What you quoted is me asking for clarification! I am not saying you said that, I am asking if that is what you are saying.
To try and be as fair as I possibly can, to demonstrate to you that I am genuinely trying to understand you, I will layout the core of the issue here. You just said this to clarify “my distortions”:

I've said that what we can know via observation, logic and mathematics is all we can know.

But also said (a while back):

And faith-based beleifs cannot be argued for, because there is no publicly available evidence for them.

There is not publicly available evidence of the laws of logic nor the principles that guide mathematics; therefore, under you view, they are faith-based. No?

To me, it seems like you are special pleading that somehow only faith-based logic and math is acceptable as knowledge, but all other metaphysics is out the window. Why? There literally can’t be observable proof of logic, as it is presupposed in any observation!

If you think there is some other kind of knowledge which can actually be demonstrated to be such, as opposed to being merely speculation, then please offer up an example.

I think we know metaphysical things as well, with principles such as parsimony, logical consistency, coherence, reliability (of the data being used for justification), intuitions, and explanatory power.

I think we can know that every change has a cause, that objects have persistence, that there is a transcendent world (i.e., no solipsism), that there are other proper subjects than oneself, that there are laws of nature, that there are laws of logic, etc; all of which are apparently unwarranted faith-based reasoning since we haven’t observed it—unless we, for some reason, exempt logic from that rule.

More distortion!. That is not my view at all, and nothing I've said states or implies that it is. How will I know what you think if your argument is not coherent, consistent and does not contradict itself? This has nothing to do with faith, but with coherency and intelligibility

I will outline it again. You said:

And faith-based beleifs cannot be argued for, because there is no publicly available evidence for them.

Public evidence is things which are observed. The law of noncontradiction is not justified under any publicly available evidence; and since “faith-based beliefs” are ones which have “no publicly available evidence for them”, then it logically follows that the law of noncontradiction is faith-based (which is the basis of logical consistency). How is this a distortion of your view? It follows plainly from what you have said, and I quoted you to prove it.

I've said many times that all metaphysical positions, including materialism or physicalism, cannot be tested by observation, and so are faith-based, How does this refute the principle of logical consistency and what are the many other principles you claim it refutes?

The law of noncontradiction cannot be tested by observation, therefore it is faith-based (according to you terminology: not mine).

Hello Plaque flag,

I don't mean simple instrumental rationality.

Then what do you mean? Can you please define “rationality” for me (in the sense that you are using it)? For me, I was referring to rationality as (something along the lines of) being closely married to reality.

Respectfully, you are appealing to rational norms as you attack them.

That’s fine. I am appealing to epistemic norms, fundamentally, to demonstrate how those epistemic norms are either (1) not fundamental or (2) are tastes. What is wrong with that?

The alternative is that your are a cynical manipulator beyond good and evil, just trolling us. I of course think you are sincerely seeking truth here.

I appreciate that you believe that I am sincere, and I can attest that I am; however, I don’t see how this is the only alternative to what you said.

You seem to assume that norms are Real unless they exist like stones.

Not at all. I am saying that one’s fundamental obligation is always a taste (and not objective): it is mind dependent (and more specifically will dependent).

If semantics is even partially explained by inferentialism, you can't even think without real norms.

Sure, I can’t think properly without norms, but why are they objective? And why would it matter if they were? My point is that it wouldn’t matter, because one’s fundamental norms are always tastes, irregardless of whether there are factual norms or not.

You'd need the reality of those norms in order to intelligibly and paradoxically deny them.

Yes. Norms are “real” irregardless of whether they are objective or not; but that’s not what “real” means in the metaethical debate: it means something which exists mind-independently.

Any statement that can be understood is apriori false.

With all due respect, I was not able to make sense of this portion of you argument—as if this statement you claimed here is true, then it thereby false (and thusly leads to a paradox). I don’t see any benefit of holding this belief, which no different, in its structure, to saying that “all statements are false”.

This questioning itself is an expression of the autonomy norm that makes philosophy intelligible

What autonomy norm? Are you claiming it is objective?

Why should I regard @Bob Ross as more than a monkey using instrumental reason to try to get a banana

I like bananas (; . On a serious note, I am not more than a “monkey” in the sense that I am an ape; but how does this tie to the OP?

Because philosophy is founded on a deeper, ethical rationality

So you do think rationality somehow produces objective norms, correct?

Do we not apriori seek knowledge...justified true belief ?

Not everyone.

Hello Frank,

A moral realist says that people are dependent on external rules for guidance. There is benefit to seeing things this way because people are vile, and hard rules draw them toward something better. We should encourage people to ignore their instincts and follow the rules.

The thing is: somebody is picking those rules. That somebody is human. How did they pick the right rules if they were born vile and have no innate sense of rightness?

Yes, so it appears we do claim for humanity the ability to choose the right path, it's just that some people have this special talent and everybody else just needs to follow them.

This is a pretty fair summary. I would add that each person is actually determining the norm insofar as they are implicitly agreeing to it, and fundamentally, in the deepest depths of their pyschology, it is a reflection of sociological and physiological factors. We try to project morality onto something other than ourselves, but, by my lights, we end up just ignoring the fact that even when there are moral facts they are useless in any of our actual decision making (other than potentially a superficial ease-of-use tool that is guided by our fundamentally obligations).

The most fundamental Christian view, like from the gospels, is that Jesus says you do have an innate knowledge of right and wrong. You have the whole of the law in your heart, since the fundamental rule is to love others as you love yourself. As Augustine said, "Love, and do as you will." In heavily mythical language, Christianity says you were not born vile. You were born innocent.

Interesting. I agree that Christianity does advocate that we have the moral code written on our hearts, but I just don’t buy that: what about psychopaths (at the very least)? Also, I don’t think Christianity argues that we are innocent, as most Christians believe in innate sin.

De gustibus non est disputandum

I partially disagree: most people have false beliefs about their own tastes, so moral discourse is helpful for really honing in on what one truly wants.

My concern is that rationality itself is fundamentally ethical.

So, then, would it be ethical for me to murder someone if I abided by the most rational course of action to achieve it?

It seems to me that being rational can be utilized for good or evil; so it can't be fundamentally ethical.

...in which the claims implicit in the speech act are tested for their rational justifiability as true, correct or authentic.

Firstly, again, one can be incredibly rational in their justification of mass genocide; but that doesn't thereby make it morally permissible.

Secondly, "rationality" itself, I would argue, is normatively loaded; and is itself rooted, just like morals, in a taste (as its fundamentally obligation). For you cannot define what it means to be rational without importing what you fundamentally think one should be epistemically doing, which shifts the conversation back into the same normative issue I expounded in the OP with morality. For example, perhaps you think that what is rational is to be logically consistent, internally/externally coherent, to have intuitions which seem to correspond to reality, etc.: why should one be logically consistent, etc.?

Hello Janus,

There do seem to be laws of nature; there are constantly observed regularities, and very little, or perhaps even no, transgression of those laws

Do you agree that your commitment to the laws of nature is faith-based and not a publicly observed piece of data? Observed regularities not laws: these are two different things. One is the absolute principle which affects entities within its jurisdiction, and the other is simply something we have observed many times.

I have said that both what is publicly observable and the principle of consistency (validity) in logic are unarguably important in those domains of inquiry where knowledge is most determinable

Are you saying that logical consistency coupled without observation is all that we can know? That would exclude all laws of logic except for the law of noncontradiction (which, to me, seems like special pleading), the laws of nature, and literally any other metaphysical claim. Why?

Secondly, that one should be logically consistent, since it is not publicly observed, would be a matter of faith under your view as well. Again, either, I think, you will have to concede that we can know things without observation (and then open the door to metaphysics proper) or get rid of all principles which are beyond observation (including logical consistency).

They are pragmatically necessary if you want to have a coherent and consistent discussion about anything is all.

Correct. But it would be faith based on your view irregardless: you were arguing that metaphysics (such as idealist theories) are faith-based because they are not publicly observable evidence. My point is that this self-refutes many principles (such as logical consistency) under your own view: you are cutting your own head off (and this is why full-blown empiricism, which is just scientism, is self-defeating).

But they cannot determine what is true. This is a basic understanding in logic; that you can have valid arguments which are unsound, because although the conclusion(s) are consistent with the premises, the premises may be untrue, or even nonsensical.

Logical principles determines what is true insofar as they are the form of the argument; so I can say that an argument with a logical contradiction in it is false because it violates that logical law. Logic itself, as you noted, cannot invalidate nor validate arguments past their form. But, why does this matter for you claim? If you admit that using logic is not faith based, then I can equally claim that using occam’s razor is not faith based; and just use the argument from parsimony to argue for idealism, which you said was somehow faith based!

Honestly, I just didn't know, way back when, what to use as my handle; so I just went with Bob Ross (after the painter you mentioned before). Of course, there is no connection between him and I ):

I can assure you that they are not referring to me, although that would be cool (;

Hello Darkneos,

But I am observing the number 1, right now.

Let’s take an example (of what I believe you are referring to here): there’s a red block on the table in front of me and I say “there’s one red block!”. Did I thereby experience the number 1? I would say: no! Why? Two reasons. Firstly, and the most common argument, is that the object is distinct from the number 1. There is an object which is 1 object, but that is not the number one: it has the form of one; so, what you experience is an concrete object, which is not the number one, with the form of one (i.e., unity: a whole) and never the abstract object of one (or the abstract concept, if you are nominalist, of one). Numbers are abstract, they aren’t concrete. In other words, you will never bump into the number 1, but you may bump into one (concrete) object.

Another, secondly, is because singling out an object within the sea of experience is not equivalent to experiencing a quantity of one. I can easily split the ‘red block’ into two red blocks without manipulating it whasoever by simply conceptually divvying the red block in half: no different than how I can single out 1 finger or 2 parts of that finger—it’s all just nominal.

Kinda sounds like a flaw in reason, I mean why should anyone take your word for it? What makes your reasoning better?

I don’t want anyone to blindly follow me: please see the above arguments—let’s start there.

Allegedly, I get by fine without reason.

You must use reason, in the sense that you cannot avoid it. You are using your faculty of reason to argue against me right now; and you use it in practical life every time you so much as think (implicitly or explicitly).

Hello Plaque Flag,

Note please that you are assuming your own framework -- talking of 'representations' of the world -- in the presentation of the 'problem.' For various reasons, I frame awareness on terms of the direct apprehension of the world --not representation but good old fashioned seeing and smelling and ..

So, under your view, the brain is not representing anything? ‘Seeing’ and ‘smelling’, by my lights, are senses: are you saying we have senses without perceptions (i.e., formulations of those sensations)?

He's feeling no pain, because they gave him morphine.

I am particularly interested in this one, as this demonstrates that ‘he’ is representing the world, and that is in the form of his conscious experience; for giving him morphine has inhibited his sensory receptors and cognitive functions and thusly he has lost his ability to represent pain (i.e., and lost his ability to have the sense of touch in general). How would you explain it if his body is not responsible for representing unpleasurable and unwanted damage to his body in the form of pain?

Pain and 2–√ are just entities in a 'flat' ontology inferentially related to other entities like Paris and protons

I read your OP on flat ontology, and I don’t understand it yet. Is it a form of quantitative monism?

Pain, as the qualitative sensation, is not in the world like, for mathematically realists, the square root of two is; so I don’t understand how it is ‘flat’ in that sense.

We 'scientific' ontologists in our demand for justifications are not on the outside looking in --that's a failure of self-consciousness, an 'alienated' failure to notice our own central role.

Science can’t afford ontology: it afford a map, not the territory. Ontology is metaphysics, not physics.

I don’t think anyone in contemporary metaphysics thinks that they are on the outside looking in: we are on the inside looking out.

I understand why you want to say that, but I think you are reifying the [ discursive, dramaturgical ] subject. Are we gremlins in the pineal gland ? Do you sit behind your eyes, looking out the windows ? But then the tiny actual you must also have eyes that a tinier man sits behind, ad infinitum.

No we are not gremlins in a pineal gland. No I do not sit behind my eyes. I am a collective organism that represents the world to itself via sensibility, receptivity, and the understanding. The eyes are what are used to see, and there is no reason to posit another set of ‘eyes’ within them, so no ad infinitum here (by my lights).

Or our we always already on the 'public stage' of the rational conversation ?

What do you mean by ‘public stage’? Rational conversation is of our representations. What else would it be?

Are you saying that our brains just let the data of experience 1 to 1 pass-through? — Bob Ross

Our linguistic-conceptuals selves are more like softwhere on the crowd than the lardwhere they run on.

I did not understand your answer to this question: could you elaborate? I am not asking about language nor concepts (in the sense of our faculty of reason taking in our perceptions as input and derive ideas/concepts of them in our native language)—I am talking about representations (i.e., our faculty of understanding producing a filtered representation of the world).

I don’t think beliefs can be justified or proven with reason.

You can only ever use reason: you have no choice. How else would you suggest that you can prove something or warrant a belief?

Reason is rooted in emotion fundamentally and even then we did make up the rules for it as well. So that sort of blows a few holes in its reliability.

It is true that reasoning is rooted in emotions; however, we do not makeup the rules of logic: we discover them; and we can certainly fumble our way through such a discovery.

I mean just look at flat earth and vaccine denialism.

It was not a flaw in reason that these were wrong, but, rather, in one's reasoning. Our faculty of reason is our deployment of logic, modality, etc.: it is not a particular chain of derivation.

Your example doesn’t show you know things beyond mere observation, it’s more just assertions like 1=1.

You will never observe the number 1, ever. Nor that 1 must equal itself.

Science was able to show us the holes in our reasoning through the myriad of unconscious biases we employ each day.

I think you are conflating our faculty of reason with the term 'reasoning'.

A sophisticated direct realism is more parsimonious still.

But it isn't: you can't account, by my lights, for the fact that our brains are representing the world to us. For example, how do you account for the fact that if your brain is damaged in a particular way, then you lose your ability to see red if you aren't experiencing a representation of the world?

This is exactly because nothing is higher than reason (for philosophers) AND because the rational discussion is primarily concerned with worldly public objects (the stuff in our world)

You are right that our faculty of reason is using one's perceptions as input, but in order to account for many of those perceptions (and their relation to one another) the brain (and, more generally, the body) is best posited as representing the world (i.e., experiencing it via a filtered result from the understanding). You are basically throwing away, by my lights, the vast majority of biological and neurological knowledge that we have gained in the past 2 centuries and saying that, somehow, we are actually not filtering the world but, rather, directly experiencing it. Are you saying that our brains just let the data of experience 1 to 1 pass-through?

Hello Janus,

I have never claimed that our understanding that every change has a cause is universally applicable, or that it tells us anything beyond how things seem.

You said:

”It is just as much of a 'faith-based' reasoning as PSR or that there laws (as opposed to mere observed regularities): do you reject those as "unprovable" as well?” – Bob Ross

What is observable can be confirmed by observation: no faith required

Either you (1) believe there are laws (which are inductively affirmed by science) and philosophical principles (which are presupposed in science) or (2) you don’t. Laws are not observed regularities: the latter is evidence of the former. If #1, then you are admitting that a significant portion of science is (1) based off of faith and (2) unprovable because it is not observed (as it is an intellectual inference we make inductively). If #2, then you have to reject science, as it cannot function if you reject PSR (at least of becoming: that every change does have a cause); but if you accept it then, according to you, it is based off of faith (because you never observe that every change has a cause). Janus, although you may not explicitly subscribe to it, scientism doesn’t work, which is what you seem to be expounding here.

To me, ‘beliefs’ can be justified and proven with reason, and observations supplement those arguments. I can know things beyond mere observation (e.g., 1 = 1, a = a, p → q, laws of nature, laws of logic, PSR [of becoming], etc.). According to your view, as I understand, we are forced to claim that anything not directly observed is epistemically unjustified (as so-called ‘non-public’ evidence).

What logically follows is what logically follows, no faith required unless we want to claim that what logically follows tells us something more than the premises, and their entailments, from which it logically follows.

This is incoherent with your belief that anything which is not directly observed (and thusly so-called ‘non-public evidence’) is not epistemically justified: laws of logic is not something you directly observe and would consequently be a ‘faith-based’ absurdity under your view.

Hello Plaque Flag,

I was asking whether you were the real Bob Ross himself or just Bob Ross for Bob Ross.

I don’t follow what you mean. If you are talking about my body, then I would say that my body within my conscious experience is a representation of my body-in-itself: thusly, the my-body-for-me is the former, and my-body-in-itself is the latter. Is that what you are asking?

I feel like you are using logic to prove that you should be allowed to use logic ?

See:

Just like reason, senses are impossible to completely untrust or doubt. I don’t see how the use of comparison representations is any form of circular logic, and it seems to be how we penetrate into the world-in-itself indirectly. — Bob Ross

There is nothing higher than reason (epistemically). You cannot dethrone her without thereby trusting her to be able to dethrone herself, and, thusly, the position of a hard skeptic pertaining to logic is self-refuting.

How do you know that it is good enough for survival purposes ? If the real you and real everything is hidden, you may be doing very badly down there. What's going on 'up here' in representation might be a escapist daydream from starvation down there.

I know this because it is much more parsimonious to explain the data of experience by believing that one’s conscious experience is an indirect window into the world-in-itself. Contrariwise, one has to makeup crazy alterative stories to suffice the point you are trying to make; for example, to account for the fact if your representations are completely inaccurate, then it seems that you have being able to live a persistent life in an observably regular world without dying or seeing other people randomly drop dead (since their representations are just a hallucinated-like la-la-land) would be to posit an absurdly epistemically costly explanation of something like “well, it’s because we are in a matrix and stored safely in a encapsulated container in the real world” or “the simulation is fabricating the existence of the people died in the real world, which appear random in the dream world” or, worse yet, “there are no other people”.

Moreover, you didn’t answer my question:

How can you be a direct realist if everything you come to know is filtered through your representative faculties?

As far as I can tell, there's no possible evidence for any kind of relationship

The evidence is that you are experiencing a regular, persistent world and only when your faculties are damaged do you appear to lose one’s ability to accurately-enough represent the world to themselves; and, not to mention, that we have loads of evidence of evolution, which entails that your brain evolved to represent the world for survival purposes: otherwise, you would have been dead by now.

What is observable can be confirmed by observation: no faith required, unless we want to claim that what is observable is real beyond the context of its observability. What logically follows is what logically follows, no faith required unless we want to claim that what logically follows tells us something more than the premises from which it logically follows.

Please demonstrate to me how you are able to empirically verify that every change has a cause.

Also, logic is never empirically verified definitively. You cannot observe that there is a law whereof an object must equal itself; nor that no two objects can be in the same place at the same time. All of this must be taken on 'faith', I would argue, under your view. I don't think it's faith, but if you are going to say metaphysics is all 'faith', in the sense you described, then so is literally every philosophical prerequisite for all scientific and practical inquiries.

Wait a minute, are the Bob Ross -for Bob Ross or the Bob Ross -in itself ?

I didn’t follow this sentence: could you please restate it?

Can you trust logic if you are the first ?

First what?

Or why should a realm of appearance include trustworthy logic ?

Prima facie, it doesn’t. However, upon investigation, there are strong inductive arguments for our (1) at least our representative faculties using logic and (2) I would go so far as to say that reality has logic, as a Platonic form, which conditions the universal mind. The ‘realm of appearance’ is informationally-accurate (enough for survival purposes) and, consequently, is an indirect window into the world-in-itself.

Weird things happen when you put illusion closer to you than reality as a matter of principle.

I agree; but I never claimed to put illusions closer to me than reality (as a matter of principle). Appearances are not synonymous with illusions.

I'm a direct realist. I quoted Hume to give an example of what I oppose. What I finally escaped !

How can you be a direct realist if everything you come to know is filtered through your representative faculties?

The classic problem is that you are trapped on the side of appearance with no way to compare. You end up with (at best, IMO) a kind of instrumentalism or 'coping' pragmatism/irrationalism.

I would say that it is based off of parsimony, explanatory power, intuitions, etc.; there are many unfalsifiable claims (such as solipsism) which are incredibly unparsimonious and go against strong intuitions. My position is neither of what you stated: it is a form of objective idealism.

But you only associate representing with brains due to what you've seen in mere appearance. It's circular, perhaps a slipknot, seems to me.

Just like reason, senses are impossible to completely untrust or doubt. I don’t see how the use of comparison representations is any form of circular logic, and it seems to be how we penetrate into the world-in-itself indirectly.

You are smuggling in common sense. That's my fundamental objection to indirect realism.

Trust me, I don’t think anything about my objective idealism is considered common sense (; . However, there’s plenty of evidence that your brain (and more generally body) is responsible for representing the world to you: I don’t see how you could argue against that. Are you saying it is circular to use representations to understand that they are representations? If you are right, then how would one even know they are appearances?

The whole game depends on direct realism in the background. Brains and eyes and apples and their causal relationships. Seeing others see with eyes. And so on.

Not at all: the causal relationships that we perceive are indirect representations of events ‘happening’ (whether that be atemporally or temporally) in the world-in-itself. We do not have direct knowledge of the world as it is.

Let's try this. What right do you (do we) have to believe in the brain-in-itself ? Why can't the hidden reality be 57 dimensional ? Why can't we all be made of purple homogenous hypergoo there ?

We could be 'hypergoo', but that is an incredibly unparsimonious account of reality (and, not to mention, completely unwarranted). Moreover, even if there is 57 dimensions to reality, that wouldn't negate that one is representing a vital aspect of themselves (their brain) to themselves and that that brain is not a mere phantom of the imagination: that is all that is required (i.e., an objective world being represented) to prove that there is a 'brain-in-itself'.

Hello Plaque Flag,

This quote from Hume is what I have in mind:

Oh I see: are you arguing that the only thing one can directly know is the result of their brain’s processes (and thusly are immersed in ideas)? If so, then I would say that is epistemic idealism and not a form of solipsism; but I could be misunderstanding you.

With Kant, even time and space are placed 'in' the mind. So the brain-in-itself may not even be 3-dimensional. There may be no such brain. One can try to imagine (perhaps 'illegally') a radically different reality without brains that we experience as (represent as ) including brains.

But, regardless, the brain is a informationally adequate representation of a vital aspect of oneself, as a product of oneself representation an aspect of oneself to oneself.

Hello Plaque Flag,

Given that we can't look around our own cognition, the brain-for-us just is the brain-in-itself. I think we have a nonobvious roundsquare situation here.

But the brain-for-us is not the brain-in-itself, exactly because it is a representation of it.

It is just as much of a 'faith-based' reasoning as PSR or that there laws (as opposed to mere observed regularities): do you reject those as "unprovable" as well?

Hello Janus,

we cannot come to any warranted conclusions about the in itself.

Since we have already discussed this, I will be brief here: I disagree that we cannot come to know things at all in-themselves. It does not follow that because “We have no idea what it, or anything else, is in itself apart from how it appears to us” that we are likewise not acquiring indirect knowledge of the in-themselves (which, in turn, negate the idea that we cannot know anything about the in-themselves).

Quantities and qualities are merely different categories of appearances

Quantities are not a category of appearances. You, nor I, have ever experienced a quantity.

Whatever we might think about that must remain a matter of faith

Just as a side note, in the same manner, I take it up on faith that gravity will still operate on me the next time I try to jump into the air: there is no field of study which is exempt from this so-called “faith” you speak of.

that an ontological juxtaposition will lead to incommensurability.

I am not a substance dualist.

Hello Plaque Flag,

It's the familiar experience of the brain in causal relationships with other familiar objects that motivates [ a paradoxical ] indirect realism in the first place.
…
It's because indirect realism makes the brain it depends on an 'illusion' that it fails.

As an indirect realist myself (of an idealist flavor), I agree; but this exactly my point!

The brain-in-itself (if you continue bravely along the path as you seem to be doing) starts to sound 'mystical as fuck.' I don't think it can be given meaning that it doesn't steal from 'mere appearance.'

The brain-in-itself is represented as the brain-for-us. It is ‘mystical’ only insofar as we will never come to know it absolutely with our currently evolved minds (i.e., brains-in-themselves).

I can follow your thinking to some degree. Your point is justified and fascinating within the framework of indirect realism -- but the framework don't work, seems to me.

Why doesn’t it hold?

I claim that methodological solipsism only works properly at the level of the entire species. But this gives us an anthropocentric direct realism.

I didn’t understand this part. What do you mean by methodological solipsism? And how does that lead to direct realism? By my lights, direct realism is only possible if we were not representing the world—and we clearly are (by my lights).

Hello Mww,

Odd innit? In the attempt for empirical knowledge, the irreducible origin of it is impossible to know.

Then wouldn’t it be impossible to know that one has a representative faculty, let alone that one is?

Humans don’t think/cognize/comprehend in its rational method, in the same terms as the source of their knowledge requires in its physical method.

This is fair to an extent; however, we are still able to understand that world, which certainly is not of the same rational construction as our own faculties, better.

The resolution to this "hidden dualism" is to recognize that the brain and its functions are also representations and, thusly, the brain-in-itself is not what one ever studies in a lab. E.g., neurons firing is an extrinsic representation (within our perceptions) of whatever the brain-in-itself is doing.

The next step is to realize that the brain-in-itself cannot be quantitative (for quantities never produce qualities and we know directly of qualities as our conscious experience).

After that, all that is left is to decide what is most parsimonious: a material (i.e., tangible) & physical (i.e., mind-independent) brain-in-itself, a immaterial & physical brain-in-itself, or immaterial & mind-dependent brain.

Hello Philosophim,

There is a difference between one apple, one pear, and one penny. The quantity is the same, but its the qualities that separate them right?

There distinguishable properties are what separate them; and depending one’s metaphysical theory they may be completely quantitative, qualitative, or a mixture of both.

For example, for those who believe that the world is fundamentally quantitative, a blue table has properties that are qualities (e.g., blueness, feeling of roughness or smoothness, etc.) and quantities (e.g., its width, height, etc.). Importantly, the table exists fundamentally (ontologically) with definite, quantitative properties (e.g., it has a definite size mind-independently) and the qualitative properties emerge as a result of a mind experiencing it.

For example, for those who believe that the world is fundamentally qualitative, a blue table has no quantitative properties itself (e.g., width, height, etc.) but, rather, they are a mind’s cognitive estimation of them.

For the former example, measuring the table as having a width of X meters is an estimation of whatever the actual, definite width is of the table (let’s say: A meters). For the latter example, the X meters is an estimation of something with no definite width.

The identity of the concept of "apple" cannot be quantitative, because no two apples are quantitatively alike

Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but the concept of an apple is the singled out of a group of entities in the world by virtue of their similar attributes, which, in turn, are the singling-out of certain aspects of those entities. So I would say the concept itself is quantitative (definite) although there may be no mathematical relationships in the concept other then the concept and its attributes being quantitatively, numerically one (i.e., an attribute is one attribute and a concept is one concept).

If we were to add two apples and compare them, we would see one is slightly lumpier than the other.

I agree that the concept of an apple does not every fully capture the particular apples in existence.

The redness would not be the same, nor the height and size. All of these seem to be qualities.

If by height, for example, you are referring to an actual definite size of the apple beyond our mere ability to estimate the apple with math in our heads, then I would say that is a quantity which pertains to the world beyond our mere ability to cognize about it (which would entail a quantitative world to some degree or another).

But qualities can be processed as quantities. After all, remove the qualities from the quantity, and you are left with a qualityless abstract number.

Correct. I think qualities are processed as quantities (via our ability to cognize) and quantities do not exist beyond that. Furthermore, I think positing the world as fundamentally quantities (whereof the qualities emerge from brains) is incoherent because quantities can never produce qualities (viz., the brain cannot be fundamentally quantitative and produce the qualities of our experience).

One the flip side, some qualities do not make sense without some quantity. Saying "apple" doesn't roll off the tongue like "an apple does".

If I am right (and the world is fundamentally qualitative), then the world is an inextricable non-numerical one; for there is absolutely no way to non-nominally parcel up reality. So, I agree, in order to navigate and comprehend reality, we are forced to parcel it nominally (or cognitively); but that doesn’t mean reality is itself those distinctions we make (nor that it is quantitative like the nature of our cognition).

But then what about adding two piles of sand together? Is this not a mix of quantitative and qualitative?

I would say that mathematically adding (in my head) the X granules of sand (in pile 1) and the Y granules of sand (in pile 2) is a quantitative process that will produce (in my mind as a mathematical result of that operation of addition) X + Y. However, all of that is a estimation of the fundamentally qualitative piles of sand in a inextricably linked qualitative world; and I merely call it X and Y granules of sand (and add them together mathematically) for the benefit of getting a better estimated understanding of what is going on.

Ontologically, the sand is qualitative; and our minds cognize that quantitatively.

Let us remove the quality again however, and what are we left with? Isn't "oneness" itself a quality then?

If one removes all the qualities from an object, then I would say they would be left with nothing but the concept or idea abstracted of that object which, again, does not pertain to the object itself (but, rather, is strictly how one is able to try to comprehend that object). Oneness in the sense of a number does not exist, I would say, outside of our minds’ cognition; but oneness as a non-numerical unity would be all of existence itself—which is absolutely infinite under my view (for to admit it is limited would entail that there is an ‘other’ and thusly, a quantity).

I will try to answer faster next time, I am busy as of late.

Absolutely no worries!