I do recognize the difference in kind between neurological processes and mental experiences. I just don't think it matters. I don't think neurological processes are the same as conscious experience. I think neurological processes express themselves as conscious experiences in the same sense chemical processes express themselves as biological processes. — T Clark

So I'm going to push back on this "mental states 'emerging' from neurological states is the same as biology 'emerging' out of chemistry" in 3 distinct but related ways:

1) Questioning strong emergence in biology from chemistry. I think in principle, even if the level of mechanisms are different, there is at essence, a reducibility by way of organic chemistry from biological formations to chemical ones. This cannot be said of mental states to its physical components. No matter how hard I try, the "sensation of red" or the "perception of an object" or a "sound" does not seem reducible to the realm of neurological activities (that is to say, things like networks, potentiations, neurochemistry, genetics, and the like) the way that organic molecules, and biological systems, reduce to chemical systems.

2) Point of view. That is to say, emergence itself has in the background, the fact that there is already an observer of the "emerging". This does get into ideas of "does a tree make a sound if there is no observer", but there is a reason that trope is so well-known. We always take for granted that we have a certain point of view already whereby events are integrated and known.

3) Taking seriously the difference in kind. As it says, that mental events are such a different type of phenomenon, that it would be an abuse of the concept to equate it with the physical correlates without explanation other than "other things in nature work thusly". But other things in nature don't confer qualities itself! They are the predicates with which the mental events interpret the very world! That is quite a different and unique thing.

Is that not exactly how the universe was constructed? — Patterner

The universe wasn't constructed, it grew up from itself, from within. That's what reductionism misses.

I think in principle, even if the level of mechanisms are different, there is at essence, a reducibility by way of organic chemistry from biological formations to chemical ones. This cannot be said of mental states to its physical components. — schopenhauer1

I don't see any reason to believe this is true. What makes you think it is?

2) Point of view. That is to say, emergence itself has in the background, the fact that there is already an observer of the "emerging". This does get into ideas of "does a tree make a sound if there is no observer", but there is a reason that trope is so well-known. We always take for granted that we have a certain point of view already whereby events are integrated and known. — schopenhauer1

I don't understand. How is this different in my way of seeing things verses your way?

As it says, that mental events are such a different type of phenomenon, that it would be an abuse of the concept to equate it with the physical correlates without explanation other than "other things in nature work thusly". — schopenhauer1

I've acknowledged that mental events are different kinds of things than physical, chemical, biological, and neurological events and processes. I think you're saying that those differences mean that the analogy I am making doesn't work. I don't agree. It's like the old SAT questions - chemistry is to biology as neurology is to [X]. Correct answer is C - psychology.

Actually that universe has always existed according to cosmological evidence.

2) Point of view. That is to say, emergence itself has in the background, the fact that there is already an observer of the "emerging". This does get into ideas of "does a tree make a sound if there is no observer", but there is a reason that trope is so well-known. We always take for granted that we have a certain point of view already whereby events are integrated and known. — schopenhauer1

People have to stop with the "does a tree make a sound" line as it doesn't mean what they think it does.

It's like the old SAT questions - chemistry is to biology as neurology is to [X]. Correct answer is C - psychology. — T Clark

Before I answer, I'm just going to point out, since the SAT isn't interested in metaphysical analysis, the superficial connection of the analogy was good enough to include that question. However, if it said something like, "Neural networks is to neuroscience as the color red is to psychology", I think that would be more apt. It is precisely that jump from "neural networks, et al." to the color red, that is a difference in kind, not degree.

People have to stop with the "does a tree make a sound" line as it doesn't mean what they think it does. — Darkneos

I'm using it by way of "What I am saying sounds like this trope..." which it sort of does. But my focus was not on that particular idea, so you can move beyond that and ignore it if you want.

Is the hard problem of conscious just (or equivalently) the hard problem of being ? The being of the ashtray is ultimately mysterious, but we can't talk with the ashtray about it. We can talk to other humans who see/know that things are. We think that things must be for bats too, because of their shiny mammalian eyes. But bats probably can't get distance on this being. They are immersed in the object.

We 'transcend' not only entities but the world / being as a whole.

Can science explain that there is being in the first place ? As opposed to finding patterns in the movement of changes of entities ? Being is endlessly presupposed, so it's hard to say yes. Being is given perspectively, not to just any objects it seems, but is it not given as the same world to all ?We are thrown into wonder when we are ejected from immersion in the practical and see the strangeness in things existing.

With the hard problem of conscious, our own consciousness is always presupposed, so it's always (especially?) the weirdness of not-mine-flesh being like me but not, also seeing being.

Is the hard problem of conscious just (or equivalently) the hard problem of being ? — plaque flag

That's actually what I think. I think what David Chalmer tries to express rather awkwardly as 'what it is like to be...' is, really, just 'being'. Furthermore that we universally assume that we know what 'being' means when actually we don't. (That's where I think it dovetails with Heidegger's 'forgetfulness of being', although not having read Being and Time, I'm not sure about that.)

Can science explain that there is being in the first place ? — plaque flag

Enlightenment naturalism always begins with the apparently obvious fact of our existence as subjects in the domain of objects. It doesn't actually question the nature of being as such although due to the forgetfulness of being, it often doesn't realise the distinction between the scientific and the existential.

Is that not exactly how the universe was constructed?
— Patterner

The universe wasn't constructed, it grew up from itself, from within. — T Clark

Yes. But it grew up from itself within the framework of laws. Physics expresses itself as chemistry. But the new laws of chemistry are not unrelated to the laws of physics. If the laws of physics were not what they are, the laws of chemistry could not be what they are. The laws of chemistry emerged from, and are dependent upon, the laws of physics.

Same with chemistry expressing itself as biology.

But it grew up from itself within the framework of laws. — Patterner

Well, not really. It grew up from within itself in accordance with it's nature and then we called the pattern of that growth "laws." I don't think this is a trivial or nitpicky distinction.

Physics expresses itself as chemistry. But the new laws of chemistry are not unrelated to the laws of physics. If the laws of physics were not what they are, the laws of chemistry could not be what they are. The laws of chemistry emerged from, and are dependent upon, the laws of physics.

Same with chemistry expressing itself as biology. — Patterner

You say "not unrelated to." That makes you seem like a spokesman for reductionism, which I know you're not. I say "not predictable from." To me, that is the essence of why reductionism doesn't work.

Here's a snippet I will sometimes quote. It's from Ernst Mayr, who is a mainstream scientist, and it's about the fundamental difference between living organisms and inanimate matter. It has to do with the ability of DNA to store and transmit information for which there is not an analog in the mineral domain.

Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern (neo-darwinian) synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. In The growth of biological thought [15], p. 124, he made this point in no uncertain terms: ‘… The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’ — What is Information?

On a more general level, it is an instance of the principle that information-based systems, which includes organisms, embody a level of organisation which defies reduction to physics and chemistry. There's an often-quoted meme by Norbert Weiner, founder of cybernetics, to wit, 'The mechanical brain does not secrete thought "as the liver does bile," as the earlier materialists claimed, nor does it put it out in the form of energy, as the muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.'

I'd have some quibbles as what is "science" but it would be going on a tangent. — schopenhauer1

In a discussion of theory of mind, consideration of neuroscience would be going on a tangent?

Do you see yourself as particularly well qualified to judge what is science?

Rather, I want to focus on the idea of the difference between what is going on in the Chinese Room experiment and an actual experiencer or interpreter of events that integrates meaning from the computation. — schopenhauer1

Why do you want to talk about what is going on in a Chinese Room rather than what goes on in brains? I thought I had already explained that the Chinese Room argument is an argument against computationalism, and not particularly relevant.

I'm getting the impression that you are wanting to beat on a straw man, rather than have an enlightening discussion of the topic. Say it ain't so.

On a more general level, it is an instance of the principle that information-based systems, which includes organisms, embody a level of organisation which defies reduction to physics and chemistry. — Quixodian

I have no problem agreeing with this. I agree that it makes sense to recognize that living matter is fundamentally different from non-living matter. I don't think it says anything that resolves the differences between our ways of seeing things.

It is just as much of a 'faith-based' reasoning as PSR or that there laws (as opposed to mere observed regularities): do you reject those as "unprovable" as well?

In a discussion of theory of mind, consideration of neuroscience would be going on a tangent? — wonderer1

Not what I was saying. Rather if information processing is strictly a science or something else applied to science...

Do you see yourself as particularly well qualified to judge what is science? — wonderer1

You are getting mighty close to arguing from a place of bad faith. But please do continue...poison well commence I guess.

Why do you want to talk about what is going on in a Chinese Room rather than what goes on in brains? I thought I had already explained that the Chinese Room argument is an argument against computationalism, and not particularly relevant.

I'm getting the impression that you are wanting to beat on a straw man, rather than have an enlightening discussion of the topic. Say it ain't so. — wonderer1

Ok, either you can make an argument or you will continue with the bad faith rhetoric. If so, prepare for me to ignore you. Clearly I don't ignore 99% of posts that are out of good faith if you look at my posts. Meaning, we can disagree but not poison wells whilst we do so..

But to "good faith argue" your "bad faith arguing".. I'll answer your questions, "in good faith" (to demonstrate disagreement without being disagreeable):

Why do you want to talk about what is going on in a Chinese Room rather than what goes on in brains? I thought I had already explained that the Chinese Room argument is an argument against computationalism, and not particularly relevant. — wonderer1

If you don't like the Chinese Room argument because it seems too narrow, then call my version, the "Danish Room Argument". That is to say, my point that I wanted to take away was that processing can miss the "what-it's-like" aspect of consciousness whilst still being valid for processing inputs and outputs, whether that be computationalist models, connectionis models, both, none of them or all of them. I don't think it is model-dependent in the Danish Room argument.

That's actually what I think. I think what David Chalmer tries to express rather awkwardly as 'what it is like to be...' is, really, just 'being'. — Quixodian

:up:

Furthermore that we universally assume that we know what 'being' means when actually we don't. — Quixodian

:up:
And possibly we can't. Maybe we can get clearer ? Or do we only ever keep reminding ourselves that it's not an entity, but that there is that entity or any entity in the first place ? But to experience the wonder seems important even if we can't. The 'world' or 'being' or the 'there' or the 'shining' of any and every tautology.

The experience that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not experience.


To say 'I wonder at such and such being the case' has only sense if I can imagine it not to be the case. In this sense one can wonder at the existence of, say, a house when one sees it and has not visited it for a long time and has imagined that it had been pulled down in the meantime. But it is nonsense to say that I wonder at the existence of the world, because I cannot imagine it not existing. I could of course wonder at the world round me being as it is. If for instance I had this experience while looking into the blue sky, I could wonder at the sky being blue as opposed to the case when it's clouded. But that's not what I mean. I am wondering at the sky being whatever it is. One might be tempted to say that what I am wondering at is a tautology, namely at the sky being blue or not blue. But then it's just nonsense to say that one is wondering at a tautology. — Wittgenstein

Hello Plaque Flag,

Given that we can't look around our own cognition, the brain-for-us just is the brain-in-itself. I think we have a nonobvious roundsquare situation here.

But the brain-for-us is not the brain-in-itself, exactly because it is a representation of it.

But the brain-for-us is not the brain-in-itself, exactly because it is a representation of it. — Bob Ross

Let's try this. What right do you (do we) have to believe in the brain-in-itself ? Why can't the hidden reality be 57 dimensional ? Why can't we all be made of purple homogenous hypergoo there ?

Hello Plaque Flag,

This quote from Hume is what I have in mind:

Oh I see: are you arguing that the only thing one can directly know is the result of their brain’s processes (and thusly are immersed in ideas)? If so, then I would say that is epistemic idealism and not a form of solipsism; but I could be misunderstanding you.

With Kant, even time and space are placed 'in' the mind. So the brain-in-itself may not even be 3-dimensional. There may be no such brain. One can try to imagine (perhaps 'illegally') a radically different reality without brains that we experience as (represent as ) including brains.

But, regardless, the brain is a informationally adequate representation of a vital aspect of oneself, as a product of oneself representation an aspect of oneself to oneself.

Wait a minute, are the Bob Ross -for Bob Ross or the Bob Ross -in itself ? Can you trust logic if you are the first ? Or why should a realm of appearance include trustworthy logic ? Weird things happen when you put illusion closer to you than reality as a matter of principle.

Oh I see: are you arguing that the only thing one can directly know is the result of their brain’s processes (and thusly are immersed in ideas)? If so, then I would say that is epistemic idealism and not a form of solipsism; but I could be misunderstanding you. — Bob Ross

I'm a direct realist. I quoted Hume to give an example of what I oppose. What I finally escaped !

But, regardless, the brain is a informationally adequate representation of a vital aspect of oneself, as a product of oneself representation an aspect of oneself to oneself. — Bob Ross

The classic problem is that you are trapped on the side of appearance with no way to compare. You end up with (at best, IMO) a kind of instrumentalism or 'coping' pragmatism/irrationalism.

Let's try this. What right do you (do we) have to believe in the brain-in-itself ? Why can't the hidden reality be 57 dimensional ? Why can't we all be made of purple homogenous hypergoo there ?

We could be 'hypergoo', but that is an incredibly unparsimonious account of reality (and, not to mention, completely unwarranted). Moreover, even if there is 57 dimensions to reality, that wouldn't negate that one is representing a vital aspect of themselves (their brain) to themselves and that that brain is not a mere phantom of the imagination: that is all that is required (i.e., an objective world being represented) to prove that there is a 'brain-in-itself'.

that is all that is required (i.e., an objective world being represented) to prove that there is a 'brain-in-itself'. — Bob Ross

But you only associate representing with brains due to what you've seen in mere appearance. It's circular, perhaps a slipknot, seems to me. You are smuggling in common sense. That's my fundamental objection to indirect realism. The whole game depends on direct realism in the background. Brains and eyes and apples and their causal relationships. Seeing others see with eyes. And so on.

It is just as much of a 'faith-based' reasoning as PSR or that there laws (as opposed to mere observed regularities): do you reject those as "unprovable" as well? — Bob Ross

What is observable can be confirmed by observation: no faith required, unless we want to claim that what is observable is real beyond the context of its observability. What logically follows is what logically follows, no faith required unless we want to claim that what logically follows tells us something more than the premises, and their entailments, from which it logically follows.

Anything else is either mere speculation or the result of intellectual intuition into reality, but we cannot determine which; so here we have entered the realm where faith rules. This also applies to scientific theories; we don't know if they tell us anything about how things are beyond the context of appearances.

Wait a minute, are the Bob Ross -for Bob Ross or the Bob Ross -in itself ?

I didn’t follow this sentence: could you please restate it?

Can you trust logic if you are the first ?

First what?

Or why should a realm of appearance include trustworthy logic ?

Prima facie, it doesn’t. However, upon investigation, there are strong inductive arguments for our (1) at least our representative faculties using logic and (2) I would go so far as to say that reality has logic, as a Platonic form, which conditions the universal mind. The ‘realm of appearance’ is informationally-accurate (enough for survival purposes) and, consequently, is an indirect window into the world-in-itself.

Weird things happen when you put illusion closer to you than reality as a matter of principle.

I agree; but I never claimed to put illusions closer to me than reality (as a matter of principle). Appearances are not synonymous with illusions.

I'm a direct realist. I quoted Hume to give an example of what I oppose. What I finally escaped !

How can you be a direct realist if everything you come to know is filtered through your representative faculties?

The classic problem is that you are trapped on the side of appearance with no way to compare. You end up with (at best, IMO) a kind of instrumentalism or 'coping' pragmatism/irrationalism.

I would say that it is based off of parsimony, explanatory power, intuitions, etc.; there are many unfalsifiable claims (such as solipsism) which are incredibly unparsimonious and go against strong intuitions. My position is neither of what you stated: it is a form of objective idealism.

But you only associate representing with brains due to what you've seen in mere appearance. It's circular, perhaps a slipknot, seems to me.

Just like reason, senses are impossible to completely untrust or doubt. I don’t see how the use of comparison representations is any form of circular logic, and it seems to be how we penetrate into the world-in-itself indirectly.

You are smuggling in common sense. That's my fundamental objection to indirect realism.

Trust me, I don’t think anything about my objective idealism is considered common sense (; . However, there’s plenty of evidence that your brain (and more generally body) is responsible for representing the world to you: I don’t see how you could argue against that. Are you saying it is circular to use representations to understand that they are representations? If you are right, then how would one even know they are appearances?

The whole game depends on direct realism in the background. Brains and eyes and apples and their causal relationships. Seeing others see with eyes. And so on.

Not at all: the causal relationships that we perceive are indirect representations of events ‘happening’ (whether that be atemporally or temporally) in the world-in-itself. We do not have direct knowledge of the world as it is.

What is observable can be confirmed by observation: no faith required, unless we want to claim that what is observable is real beyond the context of its observability. What logically follows is what logically follows, no faith required unless we want to claim that what logically follows tells us something more than the premises from which it logically follows.

Please demonstrate to me how you are able to empirically verify that every change has a cause.

Also, logic is never empirically verified definitively. You cannot observe that there is a law whereof an object must equal itself; nor that no two objects can be in the same place at the same time. All of this must be taken on 'faith', I would argue, under your view. I don't think it's faith, but if you are going to say metaphysics is all 'faith', in the sense you described, then so is literally every philosophical prerequisite for all scientific and practical inquiries.

Please demonstrate to me how you are able to empirically verify that every change has a cause. — Bob Ross

I have never claimed that our understanding that every change has a cause is universally applicable, or that it tells us anything beyond how things seem.

Without logic, whether inductive, deductive or abductive, we might as well give up discussion altogether. Logic is what demands that we be consistent, coherent and not contradict ourselves.

I think in principle, even if the level of mechanisms are different, there is at essence, a reducibility by way of organic chemistry from biological formations to chemical ones. This cannot be said of mental states to its physical components.
— schopenhauer1

I don't see any reason to believe this is true. What makes you think it is? — T Clark

Mental states are things such as feelings, sensations, thoughts, concepts, ideas. There is a "what-it's-likeness" to them. There is a point of view. Interesting enough, the mental states epistemically need to be in place for anything else to be "known". Known, is not a thing unless there is a point of view, something that "knows".

With that being a loose definition of mental states. It seems to me that despite the novelty of biological systems, that they are not different in kind, then their chemical substrates. That is to say, they are still not anything like the loose definition I gave of mental events. They are still physical events, despite being novel, and possibly epistemically non-reducible (meaning, perhaps we simply can't make the connections yet. But I am not caught on the fact that mind is so far "irreducible" and so are some biological systems (at the moment). That wasn't the crux of my case here. Rather it is that biological fits the definition of physical events just like every other reducible/emergent phenomenon (except mind/consciousness). Which brings me to 2 (these are all connected really so I can't really isolate 1 from 2 from 3 without the argument not making sense).

2) Point of view. That is to say, emergence itself has in the background, the fact that there is already an observer of the "emerging". This does get into ideas of "does a tree make a sound if there is no observer", but there is a reason that trope is so well-known. We always take for granted that we have a certain point of view already whereby events are integrated and known.
— schopenhauer1

I don't understand. How is this different in my way of seeing things verses your way?

I am not sure your way of seeing about this, but what I am saying is that it may be the case that "emergence" needs "something" for which to "emerge within" (i.e. a point of view). That is to say, assuming there are these "jumps" (which we call "emergent properties"), whence are these properties taking place? We, as the already-observing observer, have the vantage point of "seeing the emergence" but "where" do these "jumps" take place without a point of view? I guess, as another poster used to say, Where is the epistemic cut?. And also, how would that cut take place without an already-existing observer? What does that new enclosure (of the new emergent property) even look like without a vantage point, or point of view already in the equation?.

As it says, that mental events are such a different type of phenomenon, that it would be an abuse of the concept to equate it with the physical correlates without explanation other than "other things in nature work thusly".
— schopenhauer1

I've acknowledged that mental events are different kinds of things than physical, chemical, biological, and neurological events and processes. I think you're saying that those differences mean that the analogy I am making doesn't work. I don't agree. It's like the old SAT questions - chemistry is to biology as neurology is to [X]. Correct answer is C - psychology.

Yes, and here is the biggest reason. Indeed, going back to what I was saying in 1, these are not just differences in the complexities of chemical structures (thus loosing the a 1-1 reduction analysis to the new property) but of something else entirely. It is something that is a feeling, a point of view, and is necessary to even understand every other phenomenon. So there are quite unique things above and beyond all other natural things that are strictly "physical". Basically I am saying, we must keep in mind the incredible difference and distinction between mental and physical versus physical and other physical events. If we don't understand how incredibly different they are, the problem at hand is not as apparent.