This post is pretty up-to-date on my ethics (although I have sublated it a bit since then). Let me know if you have any questions or would like to discuss it further. Perhaps we should go into that thread to avoid derailing this one.

When you say that 'eudamonia is the highest moral good' is the ultimate underpinning, do you literally mean that nothing further underpins that? Because if so, then I must ask you, what reason do we have to believe that the proposition 'eudamonia is the highest moral good' is true?

I meant in the sense of what morally grounds it. Being the highest moral good, it is the ultimate good which everything else is assessed under. Of course, I believe there are reasons to believe that it is the highest moral good.

It doesn't appear in my view because I don't think it is morally significant.

It is morally significant if one accepts that they cannot commit immoral acts to avoid bad or produce good outcomes.

If one agrees that it is immoral to intentionally kill an innocent human being and they cannot save a person without intentionally killing an innocent human being, then the only morally permissible option is to do nothing.

He has two choices: if he doesn't turn the wheel, he will kill all four, whereas if he turns the wheel, he will only kill two. To kill four is worse than to kill two, so he turns the wheel.

He should continue and kill all four; because doing so is not an action. He is deciding to not change the course he is already on, thereby letting four die instead of swerving (which is an action resulting in intentionally killing innocent people).

The point is that not turning the wheel is just as much a choice as turning it

You are confusing decisions (or choices) with actions. Deciding NOT to do something, is NOT an action.

Ok, good points.

By “means”, I mean “a necessary utility expended to produce an desired outcome”.
By “intention”, I mean “a purposeful or deliberate course of action”.

Because I accept the premise that “if I cannot achieve A without causing B, then I cannot intend A without intending to cause B”, I reject the premise I previously accepted (that “If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q”).

You are trying to say, “If in causing P I necessarily cause Q, then Q was a means to P.”

Correct; and I like your diagrams for explaining it. I understand that, from your perspective, P is not a means to Q in V because if one removes P from A then Q is still connected to A. The problem is that when Q and P are necessary utilities for bringing about A, then A cannot exist without being connected to Q and P: you cannot remove P and keep Q connected to A—A disappears.

If I draw out your diagram without having to share a dropbox, then I would represent the V like this:

P ← A → Q

The problem is that this doesn’t completely represent the relationship whereof Q and P are necessary for A. I don’t know how to represent it this way, but in logic it would be “A → (P & Q)”: you can’t say that A → P is true when Q is false given “A → (P & Q)”.

What you are doing is conflating the necessary conditions for facilitating A in specific example E with in a general example G. In G, you are absolutely right: A → P is fine. In E, this is not necessarily true; and is false in the case of the examples we have been using.

Now, an easy way to understand the flaw in your reasoning is to reflect on your 7 diagram; because it implies that if you were to remove P that Q is still connected to A, which is not true, for example, in the case of the car swerving example. If A is “swerving to save four people” and P is “saving four people” and Q is “hitting two innocent bystanders”, then removing P does not result in A → Q. Viz, if the intention is to save four people, then the effect of hitting two innocent bystanders is no longer connected with the intention in the event that there are no four people to save.

A: Give water to the first person
• P: The first person lives (because of the water)
• Q: The second person dies (for lack of water)

If we look at the quotes from your previous post, we find that you must hold that Q is intentional killing, because you must hold that Q is a means to P

Fair enough--except for the killing part: it is not a killing. Yes, from what I have said, and I did not catch it on my last response, it follows that letting the second person die is a means towards saving the first person: I accept this.

In the water case, without the second person dying for lack of water, one cannot avoid the death of the first person. P cannot be achieved without Q. Therefore on your reasoning, Q is a means to P, and is therefore intended.

Correct.

3. Hitting the two people to save the five is an action which results in the deaths of the two; which is thereby an act of killing (as opposed to letting them die). — Bob Ross

In the water case, depriving the second person to save the first is an action which results in the death of the second person. On your reasoning, this is an act of intentional killing, where P cannot be achieved without Q.

NO! You lack a distinction between letting something bad happen and doing something bad. My action was to give the first person water to save them; and the simultaneous deprivation of water (from that act) of the second person is an inaction: it is a negative counter-part to a positive. You do not seem to have fully fleshed out this kind of distinction, and instead insist on everything being an action.

I intentionally let, in this example, the second person die: I did not kill them. This is morally permissible because (presumably) there was no morally permissible way to save them.

2. (A → (P ^ Q)) → (A → (P → Q))

This premise is false in the examples we have given: A entailing P and Q does not imply that A entails that P entails Q—you are thinking in terms of the 7 diagram instead of a reciprocated V diagram (where A cannot exist without being connected to both Q and P). Take the car example, I am actually saying (as opposed to this premise 2):

{A → (P ^ Q)} → {![(A → P) && !(A → Q)]}

If you remove Q (or P), then A no longer exists (in the diagram).

The other absurdity that results from your view is that Q is a means to P and P is a means to Q

That’s exactly what it means for a thing to be dependent on two other things that are independent of each other. Operating this computer with two screens requires two different monitors. Monitor 1 and Monitor 2 are independent of each other analogous to the V diagram, but A (which is the operation of the computer with two screens) requires both. If you remove 1 or 2, then you cannot operate the computer with two screens (A); and it is not like the 7 diagram either: the monitors are independent of each other and mutually required for A.

By murder I mean intentional killing, and by “causing death” I mean killing that is not necessarily intentional. The simple word, “killing,” is completely inadequate to our purposes given its ambiguity with respect to intention. I suggest we avoid using that word unless we prefix it with “intentional” or “non-intentional.”

I would prefer we just refer to it as intentional killing vs. killing: that is the most clear way of presenting it. Murder is usually defined differently than what you said here.

@Herg

If you are right, and the killing of Alan and Betty is required in order to save Charles and Dora, then that must mean that if Alan and Betty had not been there, the car could not have swerved and saved the lives of Charles and Dora.

Please see me and @Leontisk conversation which I am responding to here as well. I addressed this with their diagrams above.

BTW, I hope it is clear that you can give up the belief that the killing of Alan and Betty is a means to saving the lives of Charles and Dora, without also giving up the belief that it is wrong to kill an innocent person. I agree that it is wrong to kill an innocent person, except in circumstances where it cannot be avoided, or where it is necessary in order to prevent some greater wrong

I agree that an exception is when one cannot avoid it; but we are differing on what we mean by “avoid it”. I make a distinction between letting someone die vs. killing them that doesn’t appear in your view at all.

CC: @Herg

Okay good, but the key thing you need to do is explain the case in which Q is not intended. Are you saying that it is not intended whenever it is not a means to P?

I already explicated this in my response: Q is not intended if Q is not a means towards P and P was intended.

This business about judging one's responsibility for an omission vs. a commission comes from my charge that the pilot's omission of ceasing to fly the plane is a culpable omission.

No. I explicitly stated in my response that it is immoral for them to cease flying the plane.

A: Some action done by P1
• P: Some effect
• Q: P2's death

Did P1 kill P2?

I am assuming you meant to draw up a scenario where P1’s action results in P2’s death. If so, then it obviously follows that P1 killed P2.

Or to be more precise, did P1 intentionally kill P2, or else did P1's action merely cause P2's death?

Whether or not P1 intentionally killed P2 is a completely separate question, which you cannot conflate. That is going to rest on whether or not P1 deliberately did it.

So I propose we avoid the verb "kill" altogether, and talk about murder vs. causing death. "Murder" isn't a perfect word, but it's better than anything else I can think of.

By “murder” do you mean an unlawful, premeditated, killing OR an immoral, deliberate, killing? I am going to straight up reject the former (legal) definition if that is what you meant; because it is going to derail the conversation substantially.

Your argument is that <A means is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome; Q is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome; Therefore Q is a means>.

This is unwieldy. I like @Herg's definition better:
A means is something that facilitates or enables the performance of some action.

I don’t see any difference between our definitions. Everything I said in #6 still applies with Herg’s definition.

Now Herg's point was that pulling the lever is what enabled the person to save the five, and killing the one person is not what enabled the person to save the five, and I agree with him.

Everything you said in this section of your response was a reiteration of what you already said and did not address the #6 point I made; so it was unhelpful. I understand already what you both are arguing, and addressed it in #6.

A point that Herg and I have both made is that a clear case of using one as a means to save five occurs in the hypothetical where one person is killed so that their organs can be transferred to five people in dire need of an organ transplant. When this case is compared to the trolley case, it is clear that the death of the one is a means in the transplant case but not in the trolley case.

Nope. You are right to say there is a valid distinction between the two cases, but it is not that one is a means and the other isn’t: it is that one is an immediate means and the other isn’t. Again, it does not help your case to demonstrate that ideally an act can be carried out without X when X is necessary to carry out that act in the specific scenario we are discussing. You completely ignored this part of my response.

The problem with this analysis is that to discretely decide to continue sitting is an act. It is a decision to omit standing. If someone decides to omit an act then they have acted, by deciding to continue in the course they were already in. But again, I am going to leave this omission vs. commission question for another day.

This rests on a false understanding of an act. Deliberating staying seated is not an act: it is choosing to NOT act. One is choosing to NOT get up.

I actually have to run, so I am going to post what I have so far and return to this tomorrow. Most of what you say relates to the omission vs. commission question, which I think is better left for later. Still, I will try to revisit anything I have missed in your post. Hopefully what I say here will be enough to go forward.

I don't think you addressed anything really that I said, to be completely honest.

Actually I think Bob is taking the straightforward position that it is always wrong to deliberately kill an innocent person. If I understand him, he regards this as an absolute moral truth, completely non-negotiable, so that 'you must not deliberately kill an innocent person' is a moral imperative that admits of no exceptions, however bad the consequences of obeying it. He will no doubt correct me if I have misunderstood him.

This is correct insofar as it applies to beings of a rational kind.

If I have understood him correctly, then I would like to ask him what, in his view, underpins this truth? Does he, for example, think that it is a moral truth because God makes it so?

I would say the immediate underpinning is that beings of a rational kind have rights, rights are inherently deontological, and they have the right to not be killed if they are innocent. The ultimate underpinning is that eudamonia (viz., flourishing, well-being, and happiness in the deepest, richest, and most persistent sense) is the highest moral good; and the best way to pragmatically structure society is to give people basic rights to best promote and progress towards a world with the richest and most harmonious sense of eudamonia.

CC: @Herg

By “intention”, I just mean a “deliberate” or “purposeful” course of action; and I don’t know how else to explain it than that. An intention is not merely a purpose nor a deliberation: it is a deliberation or purposeful contemplation of a course of action. Perhaps that is just to reiterate what what already there in the term “intention”—but doesn’t it suffice?

I agree that “if I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q even when I know A causes Q” and I agree that “Q is intended when it is a means by which P is achieved. However, here’s what I think you are missing: letting something happen is not the same as doing something: the former is inaction which has its consequences (due to its absence), whereas the latter is action which has its consequences (due to its presence).

I didn’t explicate this very clearly before, because quite frankly I am having to dive in deeper into this (conversing with you) than I have before, but letting an innocent person die is not necessarily immoral; whereas killing an innocent person is. This is the relevant difference in your examples.

To determine whether or not one is killing an innocent person or letting them die, one needs to determine if an action which they committed is responsible for their death—viz., “if action A from P1 results in P2’s death, then P1 killed P2”. This is separate from whether or not a person intentionally kills or lets them die; and what we are discussing is the combination of one killing (i.e., taking action which results in a death) in conjunction with one’s actions being deliberate (or having knowledge which would implicate them).

To allow us to dive into our differences, I am going to pick one of our examples, specifically the car one, and dive deeper into it. If we can make ground on the car one, then we can move on the rest; because they all have the same commonalities vital to our differences.

So for the car:
• A: Swerve right
• P: Avoid hitting all four people
• Q: Hit the two people on the right

Multiple things to note:

1. Q is intended in this case because it is a means towards P. Without hitting the two people, one cannot avoid hitting the four people—that’s exactly what it means to use something as a means (i.e., it is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome). This is no different than the case where one steals the water to quench someone’s thirst.

2. Continuing to drive, thereby hitting the four, does not result in any action from the driver that caused the four to die: they are letting them die—as it is a result of their inaction that causes them to die.

3. Hitting the two people to save the five is an action which results in the deaths of the two; which is thereby an act of killing (as opposed to letting them die).

4. You might say that, in #2, continuing to drive is the act which causes the four people’s death, and so it is not a case of letting them die but, rather, a case of killing them: continuing to do something is NOT an act. If I sit down in a chair, then I have thereby acted in such a way as to sit down in a chair. Every second I am just sitting there is not another action of sitting in the chair—to continue sitting there is not an action: it is inaction. Therefore, to continue to driving, when was driving all the same before, is not itself an action; and so to continue to driving when one cannot avoid hitting four people (because they would be sacrificing other people to save them) is an inaction. On the contrary, swerving to the right is an action which results in the death of two people; and so it is an instance of killing two people, and, separately, was intentional (so it is immoral).

5. It follows from what I have said thus far, that you are right that I intend to let people die by not swerving; but I am not killing them.

6. That the act of swerving is the immediate means of saving the four, it does NOT follow that killing the two people was not a means of saving the four. If the course of action intended requires the sacrificing of an innocent person, even if it be mediated, then the sacrificing of that innocent person is a means towards that course of action (i.e., end). I understand that you are making a (valid) distinction between an effect which is vs. is not necessary ideally to bring about the end; but in the scenarios we are discussing it is necessary for bringing about the end. Saying that technically the same end could have been accomplished differently in a different scenario such that it was without X (where, for example, the two people aren’t on the side of the road) does NOT takeaway from the fact that one cannot in this scenario achieve the end without X.

Here you are actually responding to my counterclaim that if the pilot ceases to fly the plane he intentionally kills:
• A: Cease flying the plane
• P: Avoid actively killing anyone
• Q: People will die

Ceasing to fly the plane would be immoral; because it is an action which results in the deaths of (at least) the passengers. Doing nothing and continuing to fly is an inaction which results in people dying BUT not an immoral act being committed.

A should be “Continue flying the plane”.

I think what is happening here is that you are hoping that the deaths that occur via the pilot's omission are better than the deaths that occur via the pilot's commission, even if more people end up dying on the omission. But Q still occurs on the omission, it does not go away.

Exactly.

Herg’s point is that the death of the one is not a means to the saving of the five, and we know this because something could happen where the one frees himself from the track and the five would be saved all the same. This is completely different from the transplant case. In that case if the one frees himself and does not die then the five do die. In one case the bad effect is a means, whereas in the other case it is not.

This would be true if the second supposed means was, in fact, needed to save the five; but as Leontiskos has pointed out, it isn't:

See #6.

"Killing one person to save the five is what enables the person to save the five. "
This is false. Suppose at the last minute the 1 person rolls off the track and saves himself. The operator has still managed to save the other five, and that is because it was using the lever that enabled him to save them, not the presence of the other 1 person. The means is the same whether the 1 person is killed or manages to save himself.

This is changing the scenario: that’s not a valid option for the person pulling the lever. They either pull the lever, thereby sacrificing one to save five, or they don’t and five people die.

Since they know that pulling the lever necessarily results in killing one person and that this is the only way for them to save the five; then they are intending to sacrifice the one to save the five.

What you are noting is that the mechanism being used to save the five is the lever; which is uncontroversially true.

"Without being able to kill the one person, they cannot save the five."
If you mean that they would be unable to save the 5 if they lacked the ability to kill the 1, that is true. But this is not because the 1 is the means of killing the 5, it is because to be able to kill the 1 person they need to be able to switch the train, and it is this switching that is the means of saving the 5, not the killing of the 1.

You are confusing using someone as a means towards something, with the means of using them as a means. E.g., the lever is the means to using the one person as a means to avoid the bad outcome [of five dying].

Yes - I’ve changed my mind regarding the trolley case. I now hold that pulling the lever is permissible if the conditions of double effect are being adhered to.

I am glad we can at least agree on the full consequences of your view (:

I think I see a bit of the confusion and mistakes on my end; so let me explicate it more clearly.

I was originally thinking that: if a person knows A is an (reasonable and probable or certain) implication of B and they intend B; then they intend A. This is not true: an intention is a purposeful course of action; and sometimes the purposeful course of action can have consequences which are not in the purposeful plan (of action) one had.

However, I don’t think this changes much in my view at all. Let’s go through an overview of each example we’ve had so far:

1. Standard 1 vs. 5 Trolley Problem: the person who pulls the lever to save the five is purposefully taking a course of action of sacrificing one as a means to save the five. This is immoral.

2. Same as #1, but amended such that the person deciding to pull the lever (or not) is the operator of the train. The train operator that veers into the other track to save the five at the expense of the one is purposefully taking a course of action that sacrifices the one to save the five. This is immoral. The train operator continuing to steer the train on the tracks that has the five on it is not purposefully running over the five; because they are not purposefully running over the five but, rather, continuing to drive because they cannot sacrifice their passengers (in the event of steering off both tracks unsafely) nor the one on the other track to avoid a bad outcome—their intention is to avoid deaths without committing any immoral acts.

3. The Pilot Example: I would say the same as the train operator example. The pilot is not intentionally killing the group of people by continuing to fly until the plane naturally crashes because their purposeful action is to try to save lives without committing any immoral acts—their intentions does not include killing people but, rather, their purposeful course of action is to avoid doing immoral acts.

4. The Car Example: Ditto.

5. The Water Example: I agree that if one has water and has to choose between quenching the thirst of one person or another and they intend to quench one person’s thirst, then they are not intending to deprive the other of water. This is because their purposeful course of action does not include depriving them of water; whereas in my original example, it did.

This is instructive because you speak about "committing an immoral act for its own sake." This is obviously not what is happening any any of the scenarios. Not even someone who does evil for the sake of a good end is committing immorality for its own sake. :chin:

By “its own sake”, I was referring to the duty to safely fly the plane and not the immoral act.

How? Both situations have a person who knows they have to sacrifice someone to save someone else, and they act upon it. To me that is a sufficient condition to say they intended to do it. — Bob Ross

They don't intend to do it in different ways? Again, on your principles to cease flying the plane is to intentionally kill.

I would say that they don’t intend it in different ways, because both have the purposeful course of action of sacrificing one person for the sake of others.

I would also like to add that sometimes knowledge of B implying A and intending B does implicate one in intending A: the knowledge one has can implicate them in a purposeful course of action that they may not have been sufficiently aware of (self-reflectively). E.g., if I am aware that I am intending to quench the thirst of person A and I know that that requires me to steal the water from person B, then, even if I am not aware that I am intending to, I am thereby intending to steal water from person B when I intend to quench the thirst of person A. The relevant question is the actual and full course of action implied by one’s purposefulness—not what one is aware of as the course of action implied by their purposefulness.

I am seriously struggling to see how the police officer would not communicate in their report, just based off of your statement to them here, that you intended to kill the guy on the shoulder to avoid hitting the two on the median; and this is essential to your argument that you provide a basis against this. — Bob Ross

I brought up murder because it is obvious that this person would not be convicted of murder. They may be convicted of manslaughter, but not murder.

I genuinely believe that the police officer would say you intended to sacrifice the person for the other people; and I am surprised that is controversial to say. If your purposeful course of action is to save the people you are about to run into and you know the only way to do so is to sacrifice someone else, then the full course of action that you are purposefully taking is using one person as a means towards saving the other people. No?

So, this just boils down to the hierarchy of moral values. I think that rights are more fundamental than social duties (like flying airplanes, driving buses, etc.): the latter assumes the duty to protect and are birthed out of the former, so the former must be more fundamental. — Bob Ross

But this doesn't answer the question. If I have a duty to not-kill one person, then why don't I have a double duty to not-kill two persons? At stake are two duties.

What do you mean “double duty”? It doesn’t compound: one has the duty to not kill innocent people intentionally, and that duty applies to any being of a rational kind.

I am going to come back and make a full response when I have more time

No worries at all.

According to what you say here the driver should be convicted for murder, no? You seem to think he murdered the pedestrian on the shoulder.

Correct. I am assuming you disagree: the fact they are swerving to avoid other people, although they are still intending to run over other people to save them, seems to be the relevant difference for you that makes it (presumably) morally omissible.

I see! I agree that being moral is a choice; but being a moral agent, which is a choice, entails that one has, upon choosing to be such, moral responsibilities. I am NOT actually a moral agent, even if I make the decision to be one, if I don't have a duty to not do immoral acts and to do moral ones: that would be akin to saying that a firefighter doesn't have a duty to put out fires. Likewise, we determine what we are morally responsible for by way of analyzing deliberate acts and lack of acts (e.g., negligence) in relation to what is (intrinsically) good and bad.

Without moral responsibility, an ethical theory cannot supply any analysis of moral agents; which is arguably the most practical and, consequently, important aspect of ethics.

You didn't strike me as one to believe in fate. So because one innocent person would die if you saved five people, you would let the five people die because other forces that are already in motion would lead to their death. If that is your answer, how do you arrive at that decision?

I don't believe in fate; and I am not following how that relates to the trolley problem.

My position is simple: it is immoral to kill an innocent human being. In the trolley dilemma, I am not morally responsible for abstaining from committing an immoral act (e.g., sacrificing the one person) to avoid a bad outcome (e.g., the five dying). If I can only do immoral acts to prevent something bad from happening or I can do nothing, I am always going to do nothing: one cannot commit an immoral act to avoid a bad outcome or produce a good outcome.

Letting something bad happen is sometimes morally omissible.

From what you said (in the above quote), you are implying that I would be equally morally responsible for the five deaths as the one; and thusly it wouldn't make sense to, then, let the five die at the expense of the one. However, this rests on a false understanding of moral responsibility: especially how it relates to intentions and actions. Letting something happen is NOT an action, and some inactions are morally omissible exactly because no action can be taken which is morally permissible.

Does that help? I wasn't sure how fate got sprinkled into the conversation (:

Does the pilot have "a separate but related duty to cause as few deaths as possible in the event where he cannot avoid causing deaths"?

Yes, if by “he cannot avoid causing deaths” you mean his actions. If he has to either (1) kill 2 innocent people or (2) 4 innocent people; then I agree he should go with 1. But that is not the situation the pilot is in in your hypothetical.

So I am wondering if they have a second duty at all. If they do then we have a case of what is sometimes called moral perplexity, where two duties come into conflict.

I guess. I would say that the duty to fly the aircraft safely is a duty which does not obligate one to commit anything immoral for its own sake; whereas it seems like you may think that it might.

Presumably you are saying that the relevant difference between the airplane and car scenarios is that in the car scenario all of the potential victims were initially in the path of the vehicle?

Yes, that is what tripped me up for a bit.

It's not at all clear that the same thing is happening in the car scenario.

How? Both situations have a person who knows they have to sacrifice someone to save someone else, and they act upon it. To me that is a sufficient condition to say they intended to do it.

If someone is on the shoulder, and I hit them, and I knew I was going to hit them, it does not follow that hitting them was a means to avoiding the others. The circumstances here are very different from the transplant case. In the transplant case two literally need to die in order to save the four. How do you differentiate these two cases?

I think the difference you are talking about is merely that it seems like the person in the shoulder example is intending to save the pedestrians and the person on the shoulder is just an unfortunate side-effect; whereas the two in the transplant are definitely not a side-effect.

I disagree; and here’s the real difference between us: when you speak of intentions in these two examples, you are referring to only what the person is aware of what they are doing. I, on the other hand, attribute what they know into what they intend even if they don’t realize it.

For example, if I see someone in need of water (as perhaps they are thirsty) (let’s call them the first person) and I see someone else with water (let’s call them the second person) and I walk over to the second person and take their water to give it to the first person, then I am intending to take the water from the second person to give it to the first person even if my self-explicated intention is to get the first person water. You are saying, by analogy here, that if the person is just intending to help the first person in need, and isn’t executing consciously a plan to take it from the second person, that the taking of the water of the second person is merely a side-effect of the intention.

The difference between the transplant and the shoulder example, is merely that in the former the person is consciously aware that they are using people as a means. The latter example is iffy: someone may realize they have to kill the shoulder person to save the other people and continue anyways (thereby making it a conscious intention of theirs) whereas another person may not realize it and only think to themselves that they are saving the pedestrians.

A police officer might investigate and ask my why I swerved. I might say, "I swerved to hit the guy on the shoulder, because I knew that if I could hit that guy on the shoulder then I would be able to avoid the two on the median."

I am seriously struggling to see how the police officer would not communicate in their report, just based off of your statement to them here, that you intended to kill the guy on the shoulder to avoid hitting the two on the median; and this is essential to your argument that you provide a basis against this.

you would have to sufficiently demonstrate that swerving to hit two people instead of four is based on the intention to hit those two people to save the four. What say you?

If they know that swerving will most certainly (or as a probabilistic certainty) will kill those two people and they continue with their plan of swerving, then they thereby intend to kill those two people to save the other people. I am tying the sufficient knowledge the person has, to what they intend to do. I think this is pretty standard practice in law.

The plane/car will cause the death of innocents no matter what, and therefore the first act is inevitable, and one is not responsible for the inevitable.

But you are responsible if you veer the plane/car to sacrifice innocent people….. (:

(Again, I have no idea how I would square my own reasoning with the trolley :lol: )

To be completely honest, I think your line of reasoning entails that one should pull the lever.

Why is B a more important duty?

So, this just boils down to the hierarchy of moral values. I think that rights are more fundamental than social duties (like flying airplanes, driving buses, etc.): the latter assumes the duty to protect and are birthed out of the former, so the former must be more fundamental.

Interesting. So if we have the trolley problem, both sides have innocent people, and both sides plead for you to save them by throwing the switch or walk away, what would you do?

Walk away. I cannot sacrifice innocent human beings to save other innocent human beings: the consequences are not what dictates what is right or wrong but, rather, the act—and the act is immoral.

This is a completely different scenario though witli different connotations where you are introducing another malevolent agent who you are bargaining with. This makes the scenario a lot less straightforward. You have also completely complicated the choice because here it is not about an arithmetic of deaths but also torture.

This is a totally vastly different scenario to one where you're driving in a car and for whatever reason, lets say just a horrible accident, there are 4 people in the road and you can make a choice to save 0 lives or 2 lives. The scenario you have brought up just now cannot be compared and the car one is much more straightforward.

I agree they aren’t the same; but I brought it up to counter your view that: “It seems very straightforward to me that in a scenario where either everyone was going to die or only two people, it is better to choose two.”.

My point is that just because its we can mitigate much if not all of the blame for killing someone in self-defence doesn't mean that killing anyone still isn't bad. To my mind, the idea of this forfeit you talk about implies that this badness is completely removed. Thats why I dont like this language. It works better in a kind of legal context, not a moral one imo.

Are you saying that it is bad to kill a person in self-defense, to some degree, while still being morally permissible to do so (in appropriate self-defense scenarios)?

See that's the problem: there aren't any congregations for people who think deeply but don't subscribe to a mainstream religion...or at least none that I know of. Where's the aristotelian club??? (;

A means is something that facilitates or enables the performance of some action.

Killing one person to save the five is what enables the person to save the five. Without being able to kill the one person, they cannot save the five.

The biggest problem with consequentialism I have is that it rests on a false assumption of how moral responsibility works. Not sure how deep you want to get into that debate though.

This is the point I was trying to get to. For you, if the case of human agency is a non-factor, you'll pull to save the greatest number. But you favor human agency over the the greatest number. I also don't disagree with this.

For me, it is that I cannot intentionally kill an innocent person (where it is implied it is against their will) period.

I don't see the need to come up with a fixed solution to this problem if there is no fully satisfactory choice.

That’s fine. If you aren’t convinced, then suspend judgment. For me, I am convinced.

It seems very straightforward to me that in a scenario where either everyone was going to die or only two people, it is better to choose two.

Hmmm. Ok. Imagine a serial killer has 12 people in their basement and are torturing them. Imagine the serial killer tells you that they will let 11 people go if you personally go kill 1 of them: would you do it?

If so, then you do not think it is immoral to, per se, to kill an innocent person; which is incredible to me.

By black-and-white I mean it seems implied that once someone gives up their right to something like life then it removes the badness of killing them, which isn't intuitive to me

An easy example is self-defense: a person is morally permitted to kill another person if that person is an aggressor and their response is proportional. This only works with this kind of “counter-intuitive” thinking your profess here.

Well, firstly, you can't decide questions in moral philosophy by appealing to courts of law. The most a study of legal systems can tell you is what the people who drafted the laws thought was morally right; it won't tell you if they were correct.

It was an analogy, and perfectly sound.

Secondly, I agree that the operator intentionally sacrifices 1 person to save 5. Since either 1 or 5 people must die, and he can't prevent that, and since 5 lives are more valuable than 1, sacrificing 1 to save 5 is the morally right thing to do. The fact that he may be punished for doing it is irrelevant.

This rests on a false understanding of moral responsibility; that most consequentialists have.

Thirdly, you did not answer my point, which was that the 1 person who is killed is not the means of saving the other 5

It absolutely is, if you intentionally kill one person to save five. No way around that.

AI girlfriends are wholly inadequate substitutes for real girlfriends.

:up:

I would still like to strive towards finding my soulmate, although I agree it is very unlikely, while maintaining an open-mind to those who may not fit the exact description.

Fair enough.

In the trolley example, the situation is thrust upon me from nowhere and I am shown how to direct the trolley - left or right. I am sitting there, and then I have to make a decision with innocent lives about to be killed.

In the plane example, I am the pilot.

This is, indeed, a difference; but I don’t think it is a relevant difference. Let’s amend the trolley problem: imagine you are the train operator...does that change your response? It wouldn’t for me, because, as the driver, I still cannot intentionally sacrifice the one to save the five. The principle remains the same.

And if I know the plane is going down, I already have to take responsibility for innocent death, so I have killed innocent people. It’s done for me the minute I see my plane is going down. I know this before the plane lands because I am the pilot, the intentions and some of the reasons the plane is in the air at all.

This is false. Just because the plane goes down and kills people, DOES NOT mean you are responsible for those deaths—same as the train running over those people. You are not morally responsible if you abstain from saving those people because your only other option was to sacrifice other innocent people. It doesn’t matter (to me) if you are the driver or a passenger.

Your argument rests on the same false assumption as the consequentialist in the 1 vs. 5 problem: they think that they are responsible for the deaths either way, and so it becomes a simple calculation of saving the most. This is false, and misunderstands the nature of moral responsibility.

But their duty as pilot allows them to stop flying the plane, even though they know that by doing so innocent people will die?

Let me clarify, as I may have said differently before: the pilot wouldn’t let go of the steering wheel but, rather, would keep flying as best they can to avoid any collisions. My point is that they are not permitted to sacrifice other innocent people to avoid an otherwise inevitable collision with another set of innocent people. That’s no different than the trolley problem (in my eyes).

Firstly, I would like to disclaim that this is different than the airplane example because you are stipulating that the people being sacrificed are actually already victims — Bob Ross

Did I? Not that I know of...?

Maybe I misunderstood, then. Were you positing that I could either (1) continue and run over 4 people or (2) swerve and hit 2 of those 4 instead of all 4? Or were you positing that I could either (1) continue and hit 4 people or (2) swerve and hit 2 separate (to the 4) people?

Either way, I would say that I must continue driving and hit the 4 (given those options).

It seems to me that you have given two different scenarios, one to which you have given a theoretical answer and a different one to which you have given a practical answer.

Correct. The practical one was just an additional FYI; and not an intended answer to your question. The theoretical one is my answer.

We must go back to the single problem, the single scenario.

Like I said, my answer is that I would hit the original 4; because I cannot intentionally sacrifice 2 people to save those 4.

According to the standard Catholic version of double effect, one can swerve with the intention of avoiding pedestrians even though they know with certainty that they will hit pedestrians on the left or the right.

See, this is where it gets interesting; because, to me, this is a cop-out: it is a consequentialism-denier coming up with a way to be a consequentialist on some issues. If one swerves to the left to hit 2 people to avoid hitting 4, then they have absolutely intended to sacrifice those 2 people to save the 4 and, consequently, used those 2 as a mere means toward a good end. Am I missing something?

They are permitted to do this only on two conditions: 1) that the evil effect is not a means to the good effect, and 2) that there is a sufficient proportion between good and bad outcomes to justify acting thusly

This seems to sidestep the issue: to justify this “Double Effect”, you would have to sufficiently demonstrate that swerving to hit 2 people instead of 4 is not an intention to hit those 2 people to save the 4...what say you? Your analysis in the above quote just assumes it is merely an evil effect, without commenting on the intention.

In my analysis I claimed that the pilot has two duties, not just one:

A duty towards something cannot excuse a person from their other duties. A pilot’s duty to fly cannot excuse them from their duty to not intentionally kill innocent people.

... if the pilot takes your recommendation then he would apparently be without moral fault according to his first duty, but not according to his second duty.

The pilot would be without moral fault in both; because one cannot blame a person for not fulfilling their duty to A because the only way to do so would have been to violate a more important duty to B.

In the first place I would want to stress that the two effects are intended in wholly different ways.

I don’t see how…

Lol. Maybe.

I do agree that not mentioning philosophy is better at attracting women. I am pretty sure philosophizing is a turn-off for the vast majority of humans (to my shock and dismay).

Yes, this is the point I was conveying. Sometimes these kinds of paradoxes just exist.

That’s fine. I just think this indicates that your ethical view isn’t fully fleshed out; and you will have to hierarchically adjust your moral principles to fix this paradox/antinomy. I have my solution, which you already have heard, but if you don’t like it then you will have to come up with your own.

I don't even know what it really means to be obligated to do something unless this obligation is being enforced by some kind of legislative body or something like that.

I would say obligation is a duty towards something; and duty arises out of commitment to what is (actually) good (viz., commitment to being moral).

but morally it seems a bit too dispassionate for me and sometimes a bit too absolute in how you can suddenly just lose a "right".

Well, I don’t mean forever. I mean that in a given circumstance a person may be morally obligated or permitted to do something to another person which is normally impermissible as a proportionate reaction to what that other person is immorally doing. E.g., the axemen doesn’t deserve to be lied to their entire lives because of that one incident.

My thought then was that even if the man had refused to obey the rules of being on the track we wouldn't normally think he deserved to be killed by the train or that it would br acceptable for the train driver to acknowledge that there was a man on the tracks and plow him down anyway without any intent in trying to stop.

Assuming there aren’t innocent people on the current track, then I agree.

Its not clear to me either, that if we have a variation of the regular trolley problem where the 1 person on the tracks could have got off but didn't or knew they shouldn't be there but chose to, that it would be vastly more acceptable to pull the lever and run him over than in the regular scenario. I am not entirely sure.

You think that the five innocent people should die because the one person was being extremely negligent?

The 1 who dies is not the means, but merely someone who unfortunately happens to be on the other track. In this way the trolley problem differs from the transplant problem, where the healthy patient actually IS the means of saving the 5 unhealthy patients.

If one diverts a track to save 5 people knowing 1 person will die as a result of it (that wouldn’t have otherwise), then they are intending to sacrifice that 1 person to save the 5. They cannot validly say “the 1 person was merely a bad side-effect of saving the 5”. That doesn’t cut it, nor has anything remotely similar cut it in the court of law.

Does a pilot have a duty to fly his plane?

Yes, but this does not permit them to sacrifice innocent people to fulfill such duty.

Suppose you are driving your car. Four people appear on the road, two on each side. If you keep going in the same direction you will hit all four. If you swerve left you will only hit the two on the left. If you swerve right you will only hit the two on the right. You don't have time to stop. What do you do?

This is a really good example, that tripped me up a bit (:

Firstly, I would like to disclaim that this is different than the airplane example because you are stipulating that the people being sacrificed are actually already victims—which spices things up significantly (;

Secondly, I would say that one must continue to go straight, assuming they cannot try to veer away to avoid all 4 altogether (and have to choose between intending to kill the two to save the other two and letting all 4 die), because, otherwise, they would be intending to kill two people as a means toward the good end of saving two people.

A person that says otherwise, would be acting like a consequentialist full-stop: they would be allowing a person to intend to kill an innocent person for the sole sake of the greater good. I don’t see how the principle of Double Effect gets one out of this without it becoming inherently consequentialist.

Now, in practical life, since such stipulations are not in place, I would veer away intending to miss all 4 and would not ever intend to kill two to save the other two. If I happen to kill two instead of four because I didn’t manage to swerve far enough away; than that is a bad outcome but I had good intentions and thusly didn’t do anything immoral (unless, of course, there is reason to blame me for reckless driving or something).

I would highlight two things that I said earlier:
given that the pilot literally has no choice but to cause the death of innocents, the consequent death of innocents cannot be imputed to his free actions. — Leontiskos
Some might reasonably argue that this falls short of an authentic case of double effect insofar as the act with the double effect (or side effect) is involuntary (i.e. the act of landing the plane, which is not strictly speaking a choice at all).

The bolded is the important mistake you are making, that consequentialists make in the trolley problem: letting something bad happen is not the same thing as doing something bad. The pilot is not, in your example, in a situation where they are morally responsible for the deaths of innocent lives. If they keep flying because there are no ways to crash land without intentionally killing innocent people and the plane eventually just crash lands itself (by slowing falling to the ground) and it kills innocent people, then the pilot would be without moral fault. Just like how the person who doesn’t pull the lever would be without moral fault.

In the airplane or car scenario it is not at all clear that the evil effect is a means to the good effect.

You don’t think that that pilot, by intentionally veering into an area of innocent people to crash land to avoid crashing into more innocent people in a different area, is intentionally killing innocent people? I don’t see the reasoning there. It isn’t merely an evil effect: the pilot has an evil intention (to sacrifice innocent people for the greater good).

Okay, interesting. I suppose the question is whether someone can forfeit their right to life vis-a-vis a private party. A criminal forfeits their rights and then the community or state punishes them accordingly, but it's not clear that this sort of forfeiture and punishment is applicable to private citizens

I think so; but only proportionally to whatever they are doing to forfeit it. For example, the axeman should be lied to (even though one should normally tell people the truth) because one knows the axeman is using that information to actively hunt and kill an innocent person—this causes the axeman to forfeit their right to be told the truth (in this instance).

Well the pilot is flying the plane, but the person in the trolley problem is not driving the trolley. Therefore to "do nothing" would seem to be quite different in the two cases. In the case of the pilot he would not be doing nothing, but would instead (or also) need to stop flying the plane.

This is a difference, no doubt; but not a relevant difference (to me).

If one amends the trolley example such that the person who decides whether to pull the lever is actually, instead, the train operator and can choose to divert the train to the track with the 1 or stay on the track with the 5; then I would say it is immoral for the operator to divert the track. They cannot intentionally sacrifice one person to save five: they are still using that sacrificed person as a means towards an end.

Same with the airplane.

By “doing nothing” I mean that they let the train run over the five: it is stipulated that them stopping steering will do nothing to help save the five, but nevertheless they should stop steering. In normal circumstances, where this stipulation would not exist, one would be obligated to try to do everything they can besides sacrificing someone else to get the train to stop before it runs the five over.

I accept a relatively uncontroversial form of double effect whereby the unintended effect must only be possible and not certain.

Isn’t one certain, in your airplane example, that they are going to kill innocent people to save more innocent people?

With respect to self-defense, I would say that the aggressor has forfeited their rights proportionately to their assault; and this principle of forfeiture is doing the leg-work here, and not a principle of double effect.

I wasn't suggesting general in that sense. My point is that killing an innocent person could be wrong. But saving the human race could be right. At the same time. Irreconcilably.

Are you saying it is absolutely right to save the human race, and absolutely right not to sacrifice an innocent person; and that sometimes they are in conflict?

If so, then I would say that one has to trump the other; or some other principle has to supersede them both. This is a half-baked ethical system (otherwise).

I haven't been assuming anything about obligations but I struggle to see how someone who refusing to save the world wouldn't have any moral significance

You are saying that one is obligated to save humanity and not to sacrifice a person to do it. Without further elaboration, you just have a moral antinomy in your view.

I personally think that saving humanity is only obligatory if it can be done in a reasonable and permissible manner.

I am just not necessarily sold on this conceptualization or language in terms of forfeiting life.

It helps avoid morally counter-intuitive (and immoral) conclusions; like in the axeman example where someone may say “it is wrong to lie, so I must tell the axeman the truth even though it will help them find and kill an innocent person”.

The meaningful difference between lying in general being wrong and these sort of cases where it is right to lie; resides in the fact that when one should lie to a person that person is actively doing something which causes them to forfeit their right to be told the truth (for that instance). The axeman is trying to violate someone else’s rights, and so they have forfeited the right to be told the truth about where that person is.

Same with self-defense: an attacker has forfeited their right to be unharmed or killed by the fact that they are actively trying to illegitimately harm or kill another person.

Oh, so what he is guilty of in this scenario is not saving lives ans thats why he deserves to die? Yup, its a tough one for me.

I was agreeing with you: I would not pull the lever because he is presumed innocent. I would have to know, without a reasonable doubt, that he is on the tracks due to some sort of severe negligence or stupidity to find it permissible to sacrifice him to save the innocent five people.

Probably, but I am conservative.

I see, so while innocence is a factor, the an important ingredient here is self-agency.

I would say both are important. Not everything one does to themselves is morally permissible (in virtue of ‘self-agency’).

So I assume in the case of the one person on the track yelling, "Do it!" dramatically like out of a movie, you would be ok with throwing the track to hit them instead of the five who yelled, "No, please don't!".

Not necessarily. I would have to be certain that they really mean it: otherwise, I would error on the side of assuming they don’t consent.

For example, a person that would scream out for me to divert the track could quite plausibly be mentally ill; and not doing it as a heroic deed.

What if both sides plead with you to kill them and save the other side?

Assuming both parties really mean it and are in their right minds to mean it genuinely (e.g., they aren’t mentally ill, impaired, etc.), then I would pull the lever. If a person has the choice to limit the amount of human deaths in a morally permissible manner, then they should.

The five plead with you to kill them instead of save the one, while the one is pleading with you not kill them, but kill the other five?

This is just the same thing, unless I am misunderstanding, as the five, who are already going to die, telling me (assumingly genuinely and validly) that they don’t want me to pull the lever to avoid sacrificing the one person who is innocent and has not volunteered to be sacrificed: so this scenario doesn’t amend it in any way that would change the morally relevant factors. I can’t sacrifice an innocent person, absent their consent (and even then sometimes I still can’t), to save the five. Did I miss something about this scenario?

Correct. I cannot commit an immoral act to avoid a morally bad outcome. Letting them die, is morally ommissible because I cannot save them without doing something immoral.

(CC: @@Fire Ologist

To me, the principle of Double Effect rests on a vague and (typically) biased distinction between intending to do something and intending to do something which also has bad side-effects. It seems like, in every example I have gotten my hands on, a person could equally reasonably tie the known bad “side-effect” as a part of the person’s intentions.

For example, in the terror vs. tactical bomber example it is not clear at all (to me) how the tactical bomber knowing they are going to kill an innocent person as collateral damage is not intentionally sacrificing them for the greater good. What proponents of the principle seem to say, is that the tactical bomber is intending to bomb the military building and not killing any innocent bystanders: their deaths are just unfortunate “side-effects” of the good deed.

I also think that this principle Double Effect would equally justify consequentialist thinking on the 1 vs. 5 trolley problem; because a person could just say that they are intending to save the 5, and killing the 1 is a mere bad ‘side-effect’ of it.

Suppose a pilot runs out of fuel over a large music festival and his airplane will crash somewhere in the festival no matter what he does. The pilot has a duty not to kill, but he also has a separate but related duty to cause as few deaths as possible in the event where he cannot avoid causing deaths (whether or not we decide to call this "causing of death" killing). So the good pilot will land in the area with fewest people to minimize injury and death.

To me, this is no different than the trolley problem, and you are here affirming, analogously, to sacrifice the one to save the many. You are saying that the pilot’s lack of action will result in innocent deaths (just like not pulling the lever) and their actions to avoid it would result in innocent deaths (just like pulling the lever); so I am having a hard time seeing how you agree with me on the trolley problem, but don’t agree that the pilot should, in your case you have here, do nothing.

It is an easier case on account of the necessity involved: given that the pilot literally has no choice but to cause the death of innocents, the consequent death of innocents cannot be imputed to his free actions

If the plane is out of fuel, and it is not the pilot’s fault that it is out of fuel, then he has the choice not to perform any action that would kill an innocent person; instead, he can let innocent people die.

You have setup the same trolley problem with an airplane: what if the fuel runs out in an airplane and the plane is about to crash into 5 innocent people, but the pilot could divert the plane to kill one innocent person instead—is that permissible? It is the same dilemma.

The question arises: did the pilot intentionally kill (or injure) the people in that area? I think not.

If the pilot diverts the plane to kill less people, then they have intentionally sacrificed those people for the sake of other people; just like how a person who pulls the lever intentionally sacrifices the one to save the five. Am I missing something?

In this case, would you have a duty to save more lives, and that’s why you would pull the lever, or does it matter that the people tied to the tracks are innocent?

For me, it was that the five are innocent. If you are amending it such that no one is innocent; then I would have a duty to save more lives.

Good question! Voluntarily choosing to die is morally permissible because it is voluntary. In the case of myself, I cannot involuntarily force myself to do something: that's paradoxical (at best). Therefore, it is morally permissible for me to sacrifice myself to save other people.

However, it would be immoral for someone else to try to force me to voluntarily sacrifice myself to save other people because it is no longer voluntary if I do it.

When I say it is wrong to kill an innocent person, I am assuming that they are getting killed against their will. This does bring up an interesting topic of euthanasia and assisted suicide; but I will refrain for now (;

I think the same reasoning may apply in the inverse with the trolley. Whether you pull or do not pull the lever, you aren’t responsible for any of the deaths. You are not responsible for the death of the person alone on the tracks if what you were doing was trying save as many lives as possible to address a situation that was otherwise beyond your control.

But you are. If you pull the lever, you have killed an innocent person, and, worse yet, you intended to.

That is fair. Although I am not a Christian.