I think we can blame people for obvious negligence; so if you are stipulating that a person was informed clearly that they should not be on the tracks, that they have the freedom to easily move off of the tracks, they refuse with no good reason to be on the tracks, and the other five people (on the other tracks) do not have the freedom to move nor are they being negligent; then, yes, I would pull the lever because I am no longer killing an innocent person. — Bob Ross
I think a question is whether someone can be justified in doing something they think is generally morally impermissible because there is a benefit which is morally right.
Maybe one factor is that we tend to talk about moral claims in terms of absolutes which are context-independent - "killing is wrong" - but realistically, everything happens in a context and some contexts really test the limits of those principles. I'm inclined to the view that maybe we create these rules as a way of simplifying the moral process even though realistically, things aren't so simple in some contexts.
"If Killing an innocent person is wrong you can't do it". But then on the otherhand, can you not easily make a claim something like "Saving the human race is right and you should do it."
But a question is whether if it was more normal for these contexts to overlap, we would find it more permissible to kill an innocent life to save humanity
. Do we not already do this with regard to animals? Other innocent living things we kill to survive?
Actually seems pretty brutal. Now obviously I completely get this reasoning and it is very pragmatic, but it seems that this pragmatic pull doesn't seem to be something that was already in place in the scenario. What does no good reason even mean here? If they believe the track is a sacred religious site is that a good reason?
What if they just feel extremely passionate that they have to sit on this track for no good reason through no fault of their own, is that any different?
What does innocent mean here?
Surely, if this was just a man on a regular rail track you would not run him over and you would say he had not necessarily forfeits his life... or would you?
I think the same reasoning may apply in the inverse with the trolley. Whether you pull or do not pull the lever, you aren’t responsible for any of the deaths. You are not responsible for the death of the person alone on the tracks if what you were doing was trying save as many lives as possible to address a situation that was otherwise beyond your control.
In this case, would you have a duty to save more lives, and that’s why you would pull the lever, or does it matter that the people tied to the tracks are innocent?
Those aren’t general principles — Bob Ross
Saving humanity is morally permissible but not obligatory: it is not wrong, per se, to not save humanity. You are forgetting about moral omissibility. — Bob Ross
I happen to think that only beings of rational kinds have the right to not be killed if they are innocent. — Bob Ross
I was keeping it generic on purpose: one doesn’t need to know what exactly counts as a morally relevant factor or reason to understand that what obviously isn’t is stubbornly sitting on a track just for the fun of it (or whatever).
...
How is that no fault of their own? You just said they are standing on the tracks because they desired it. Are we not held accountable for our actions, even if they spring from our desires? — Bob Ross
It means that the person, in the event which is being analyzed, has not done anything which would cause them to forfeit certain rights. — Bob Ross
No, because he is innocent until proven or reasonably demonstrated to be guilty. — Bob Ross
The complications come in when you consider the value of the individuals on the tracks — Philosophim
However, it would be immoral for someone else to try to force me to voluntarily sacrifice myself to save other people because it is no longer voluntary if I do it. — Bob Ross
This seems like a slippery slope here, assigning individuals "value." To believe that someone is objectively more valuable than another is — Frog
While it is my belief that yes, we are all simply variables in a grand calculus, and that we don't truly matter, to reduce another man to a number is to waste the power you have to make him truly valued. — Frog
We are all insignificant to the universe, and we can only ever be significant to one another, and by refusing to acknowledge them as people, you waste this power. — Frog
There must be an objective morality I'm not aware of.
Now, I don't mean to say that all people of these cultures act and value the exact same, and these are simply observations I myself and those around me have noticed, one must admit that there are different "objective" moralities around the world. — Frog
I would instead argue for a sort of cultural morality, wherein the morals of a person are shaped by their culture mainly, rather than being completely innate. — Frog
Then with the human race gone, morality has gone with it - what was the point of upholding that moral decision then! — Apustimelogist
You make a good point. Thank you for your response! — Frog
If morality is truly objective, and our emotions are guides to help us follow this morality, then why does this "objective" morality differ from culture to culture? Why do the Chinese value upholding their honour more than we in the west do? Why do the Slavics find it correct to hold in their emotions rather than to "burden" others with them? Why is politeness and discipline considered a core trait in Japan, and not so much in, say, the Baltics? — Frog
Suppose a pilot runs out of fuel over a large music festival and his airplane will crash somewhere in the festival no matter what he does. The pilot has a duty not to kill, but he also has a separate but related duty to cause as few deaths as possible in the event where he cannot avoid causing deaths (whether or not we decide to call this "causing of death" killing). So the good pilot will land in the area with fewest people to minimize injury and death.
It is an easier case on account of the necessity involved: given that the pilot literally has no choice but to cause the death of innocents, the consequent death of innocents cannot be imputed to his free actions
The question arises: did the pilot intentionally kill (or injure) the people in that area? I think not.
I see, so while innocence is a factor, the an important ingredient here is self-agency.
So I assume in the case of the one person on the track yelling, "Do it!" dramatically like out of a movie, you would be ok with throwing the track to hit them instead of the five who yelled, "No, please don't!".
What if both sides plead with you to kill them and save the other side?
The five plead with you to kill them instead of save the one, while the one is pleading with you not kill them, but kill the other five?
To me, this is no different than the trolley problem, and you are here affirming, analogously, to sacrifice the one to save the many. You are saying that the pilot’s lack of action will result in innocent deaths (just like not pulling the lever) and their actions to avoid it would result in innocent deaths (just like pulling the lever); so I am having a hard time seeing how you agree with me on the trolley problem, but don’t agree that the pilot should, in your case you have here, do nothing. — Bob Ross
To me, the principle of Double Effect rests on a vague and (typically) biased distinction between intending to do something and intending to do something which also has bad side-effects. — Bob Ross
I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (II-II:43:3; I-II:12:1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists [...], "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above. . . — Aquinas, ST II-II.64.7: Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
I wasn't suggesting general in that sense. My point is that killing an innocent person could be wrong. But saving the human race could be right. At the same time. Irreconcilably.
I haven't been assuming anything about obligations but I struggle to see how someone who refusing to save the world wouldn't have any moral significance
I am just not necessarily sold on this conceptualization or language in terms of forfeiting life.
Oh, so what he is guilty of in this scenario is not saving lives ans thats why he deserves to die? Yup, its a tough one for me.
Well the pilot is flying the plane, but the person in the trolley problem is not driving the trolley. Therefore to "do nothing" would seem to be quite different in the two cases. In the case of the pilot he would not be doing nothing, but would instead (or also) need to stop flying the plane.
I accept a relatively uncontroversial form of double effect whereby the unintended effect must only be possible and not certain.
This is a difference, no doubt; but not a relevant difference (to me). — Bob Ross
If one amends the trolley example such that the person who decides whether to pull the lever is actually, instead, the train operator and can choose to divert the train to the track with the 1 or stay on the track with the 5; then I would say it is immoral for the operator to divert the track. They cannot intentionally sacrifice one person to save five: they are still using that sacrificed person as a means towards an end.
Same with the airplane.
By “doing nothing” I mean that they let the train run over the five: it is stipulated that them stopping steering will do nothing to help save the five, but nevertheless they should stop steering. In normal circumstances, where this stipulation would not exist, one would be obligated to try to do everything they can besides sacrificing someone else to get the train to stop before it runs the five over. — Bob Ross
Isn’t one certain, in your airplane example, that they are going to kill innocent people to save more innocent people? — Bob Ross
given that the pilot literally has no choice but to cause the death of innocents, the consequent death of innocents cannot be imputed to his free actions. — Leontiskos
Some might reasonably argue that this falls short of an authentic case of double effect insofar as the act with the double effect (or side effect) is involuntary (i.e. the act of landing the plane, which is not strictly speaking a choice at all). — Leontiskos
This intersects with the trolley scenario via the difficult question of whether the evil effect is a means to the good effect. — Leontiskos
With respect to self-defense, I would say that the aggressor has forfeited their rights proportionately to their assault; and this principle of forfeiture is doing the leg-work here, and not a principle of double effect. — Bob Ross
This is incorrect. The means they are using to save the 5 is the lever by which they divert the train. The 1 who dies is not the means, but merely someone who unfortunately happens to be on the other track. In this way the trolley problem differs from the transplant problem, where the healthy patient actually IS the means of saving the 5 unhealthy patients.If one amends the trolley example such that the person who decides whether to pull the lever is actually, instead, the train operator and can choose to divert the train to the track with the 1 or stay on the track with the 5; then I would say it is immoral for the operator to divert the track. They cannot intentionally sacrifice one person to save five: they are still using that sacrificed person as a means towards an end. — Bob Ross
If so, then I would say that one has to trump the other; or some other principle has to supersede them both. This is a half-baked ethical system (otherwise). — Bob Ross
You are saying that one is obligated to save humanity and not to sacrifice a person to do it. Without further elaboration, you just have a moral antinomy in your view. — Bob Ross
It helps avoid morally counter-intuitive (and immoral) conclusions; like in the axeman example where someone may say “it is wrong to lie, so I must tell the axeman the truth even though it will help them find and kill an innocent person”. — Bob Ross
I was agreeing with you: I would not pull the lever because he is presumed innocent. I would have to know, without a reasonable doubt, that he is on the tracks due to some sort of severe negligence or stupidity to find it permissible to sacrifice him to save the innocent five people. — Bob Ross
Does a pilot have a duty to fly his plane?
Suppose you are driving your car. Four people appear on the road, two on each side. If you keep going in the same direction you will hit all four. If you swerve left you will only hit the two on the left. If you swerve right you will only hit the two on the right. You don't have time to stop. What do you do?
I would highlight two things that I said earlier:
given that the pilot literally has no choice but to cause the death of innocents, the consequent death of innocents cannot be imputed to his free actions. — Leontiskos
Some might reasonably argue that this falls short of an authentic case of double effect insofar as the act with the double effect (or side effect) is involuntary (i.e. the act of landing the plane, which is not strictly speaking a choice at all).
In the airplane or car scenario it is not at all clear that the evil effect is a means to the good effect.
Okay, interesting. I suppose the question is whether someone can forfeit their right to life vis-a-vis a private party. A criminal forfeits their rights and then the community or state punishes them accordingly, but it's not clear that this sort of forfeiture and punishment is applicable to private citizens
The 1 who dies is not the means, but merely someone who unfortunately happens to be on the other track. In this way the trolley problem differs from the transplant problem, where the healthy patient actually IS the means of saving the 5 unhealthy patients.
Yes, this is the point I was conveying. Sometimes these kinds of paradoxes just exist.
I don't even know what it really means to be obligated to do something unless this obligation is being enforced by some kind of legislative body or something like that.
but morally it seems a bit too dispassionate for me and sometimes a bit too absolute in how you can suddenly just lose a "right".
My thought then was that even if the man had refused to obey the rules of being on the track we wouldn't normally think he deserved to be killed by the train or that it would br acceptable for the train driver to acknowledge that there was a man on the tracks and plow him down anyway without any intent in trying to stop.
Its not clear to me either, that if we have a variation of the regular trolley problem where the 1 person on the tracks could have got off but didn't or knew they shouldn't be there but chose to, that it would be vastly more acceptable to pull the lever and run him over than in the regular scenario. I am not entirely sure.
nice :strong:Yeah again, you don't actually believe this. Here's the thing. Emotionally? I hardly care about anyone. I could kill, steal, and lie to people and it wouldn't impact me negatively. Also, I don't feel any particular joy or triumph from committing evil to another person either. Meaning, I have every right to believe that there is no objective morality and that nothing matters, but I don't. Why? Because emotions are guides, but they are not ultimately why we should make rational decisions — Philosophim
hmm, interestingSince the complex parameters always matters in real situations, I'd much rather try and find a method of thinking that can incorporate variables and speed up decision making — Christoffer
interesting...you are onto something but although I have an opposing overall take (I believe an objective reality) I think what you bring up is and has been before worthy of mention.Now, I don't mean to say that all people of these cultures act and value the exact same, and these are simply observations I myself and those around me have noticed, one must admit that there are different "objective" moralities around the world. I would instead argue for a sort of cultural morality, wherein the morals of a person are shaped by their culture mainly, rather than being completely innate. — Frog
"Belief does not have to exist in the purpose on intentions, but the purpose of the individual with intentions linked to beliefs can be traced to a foreseeable outcome but that outcome itself is both cause and effect...the causality is also not grounding enough to be a base alone, perhaps it is when intentions are properly judged and considered along with the causality in a relevant realm of reality. — Kizzy
This is getting to be word salad to me, I admit.
Reality is only one thing, and it is relevant. There are no other relevant realms. Imagination and all of its devices and objects are WITHIN reality, not, as most poor thinkers might think, outside of it.
Belief DOES have to exist in any choice, any act, any purpose. Either that or the definition of belief is wrong/not-what-I-mean-by-belief.
The outcome IS NOT EVER the cause and effect. That is because there is error in the choice. The objective nature of a consequence leave it surprisingly unrelated to the belief or intent. Your statements here are part of consequentialism, a deadly lie.
The cause is a belief, only and always. The belief is partly in error, always. But the belief side is informed by the ideal of perfection, sensed erroneously, but still sensed. Over time this process narrows towards perfection and that again is evolution. But the sensors and the choosers other inputs to choice, other beliefs, all causal, are all flawed and by degrees. They fail to care enough, to be aware enough, to be in harmony enough (beauty), and in being accurate enough. That is not a complete list of the virtues. It is only a set of examples. So the consequential outcomes IS NOT as predicted. If it is as predicted the prediction itself was flawed. It (the prediction) was too vague, too undemanding, too wrong. — Chet Hawkins
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