Bob. We burn corpses. We bury them. Are you saying this is immoral?

1. This is a red herring: you are purposefully avoiding my line of questioning.

2. No, burying them is not immoral per se. This doesn’t violate any of their rights which are applicable to dead people.

What reasons? This is the problem with your position: you have no moral reasons to punish or rehabilitate them because you deny that anything wrong is happening to that corpse. Having sex with it is morally on par with having sex with a sex doll (for you).

To admit someone as mentally ill, you must have a proper moral reason or reasons for doing so. What are they doing that is wrong?

I appreciate your response.

I understand you will probably reject this, because of the overwhemingly nominalist cast of modern culture and philosophy. But that's OK, and thanks for reading.

I think we are currently in different headspaces: you view this as a dispute between nominalism and realism, whereas I see it as a semantic note. For me, ‘reality’ is the ‘totality of what exists’; and ‘existence’ is the primitive concept of ‘being’. What I understand you to be doing, is trying to convey an interesting point with (in my opinion) bad semantics by making a distinction between existing qua the universe (or what is phenomenal) vs. qua the form of that universe. The problem with this is the same as @Mww: you are positing that something can not exist but is, when, in truth, what you are really trying to convey is that something can exist which is not a part of the physical universe. It is impossible, still yet, for me to coherently parse your semantics since you confirm the existence of things which do not exist (according to your schema)—e.g., the square root.

I was not, and am not, suggesting that nominalism is necessarily true: I wasn’t intending to comment on that whatsoever, and still don’t feel the need to given my complaint above. However, if I must, then I would say that the rationality which we perceive as the form of the universe, to me, is the transcendental ideality of human a priori cognition. To me, I struggle with providing any proofs about reality as it is in-itself. To me, to take a ‘realist’ account, in the medieval sense, is to necessarily posit that the a priori ways by which we experience is a 1:1 mirror of the forms of the universe itself; and I have absolutely no clue why I should believe that. Likewise, to posit a nominalist account, I don’t see any reason to believe that, given the modern perspective, we understand that reality in-itself lacks any forms. Perhaps you can give some insight into this.

Things that exist as phenomena. And recall, 'phenomena' means 'what appears'.

Perhaps I am too stuck in the Kantian mindset; but the Peirceian perspective you quoted was, by my lights, about reality in-itself—not phenomena.

Eric, with all due respect, you are not understanding what I am saying. I can tell, because:

And on that note we will have to agree to disagree. I understand and respect your principled opinion. But I (along with many other people) consider a brain dead body to be a hunk of meat, not a person.

You asked:

Do you consider a brain dead individual on life support to be a member of the human species?

I never once claimed that a dead human being is a person. I said it is uncontroversially true that a dead human being is still a member of the human species. This is not a matter of opinion: biologists do not think that you magically are no longer a member of Homo Sapiens when you die, just as much as a dead dog is not thereby no longer a dog.

To be fair, in colloquial speech, we use "person" and "human being" interchangeably and loosely sometimes; but we have to separate these conceptions to have a proper discussion of rights.

You said that dead people have no rights; therefore, your position necessitates that it is not impermissible, in principle, to do those horrific things. That was my point.

So you believe someone can have sex with a dead corpse? So you believe that a person's organs can be harvested even if they did not previously consent?

Yes; and that is uncontroversially true. Where it gets controversial, is what rights (if any) a brain dead human being has (and, likewise, a completely dead human being has).

The whole point of having a discussion about abortion is to test and discuss our ethical theories. You are copping out with blanket assertions. If you want to engage in a productive ethical discussion, then hit me up.

I want to here, Banno, your moral theory. Explain it, so I can see what I am working with here. How does the graduations of rights work?

Then, Michael, you are literally arguing that there is no point at which a human being acquires rights.

Even if you grant that a being is a member of the human species, that does not mean they count as a person or as a moral agent.

I never suggested it did. I don’t know why everyone is coming at me with straw mans after I gave a very specific argument that addressed this very point. I will say it again. Not all human beings are persons, and not all persons are necessarily human beings. The obvious rejoinder to my position, prima facie, is the personhood-style arguments; but I think they fail for many reasons (which I will skip over for now) and that the best way to ground rights is in the Telos (ps: I know that’s a dirty word now) of a being such that it marks them out as a person (as opposed to being currently a person). In short, I take a hybrid view between animalism and these personhood-style positions.

children's legal status is also different

When talking about abortion, this point would imply that, it is possible that, an unborn child’s legal status is that it can be killed. At that point, it doesn’t a legal status; which is what a personhood-style position is going to want to argue.

People's status as an agent may change if they go into a permanent coma, we have next of kin rules, waivers, and even (arguably) the ability to extend our capacity for consent after our death with organ donation and wills.

These are all good points. I would say that that:

1. The morally relevant differences between these examples and abortion is NOT that people’s status’ change but, rather, that, when properly understood, they are toto genere different moral dilemmas.

2. Euthanasia does not involve, when properly understood, the killing of an innocent person in the sense which happens in abortion: the person who wants to die is giving consent from a rational state of mind, whereas the unborn child is not. I think it is implied in “innocence” that the person is not partaking in whatever is in question; but, if you want, we can just tack-on “it is wrong to kill an innocent person who isn’t properly consenting to being killed” (and, yes, “properly” is doing a lot of work here).

3. Killing a person who is in a permanent coma, who had not properly consented to being killed prior to comatose, is being murdered; and, no, a family member should not have the power to command their execution.

4. Consent for organ donation and wills are examples of consent which are properly crafted during a rational mind-set; and so this is perfectly fine. However, to use a person’s dead corpse to experiment on or donate in ways which were not consented would be immoral; even if it could save someone else’s life.

Moreover, unfertilised gametes and severed limbs are recognisably of the species homo sapiens and are not treated as moral persons

Unfertilized gametes and severed limbs are not members of the human species: they are parts of humans.

The unfertilised gametes, severed limbs and dead bodies aren't even conscious, the former two have no moral agency and the latter are treated as moral agents (as if they were alive) in a limited fashion.

According to personhood-style arguments, I think you bring up a good point here (although I know this is not what you are intending to convey) that dead bodies would not have any rights whatsoever; because rights are associated with actual personhood—current persons. So it should be, under their view, morally permissible to do anything to the dead corpses (such as having sex or using it as a punching bag).

It only makes sense to give it EVEN PARTIAL respectful treatment, other than as a mere subjective taste, if one is thinking about it like an Aristotelian: that being was a member of a species which marks it out as a person, and this means I still have to respect this being even after death.

To summarise, each of those entities counts as a member of the species homo sapiens, but they are not a moral agent

What is a moral agent is different than what is a person; and the former has nothing to do with grounding rights. Moral agency is about which agents are held responsible for their free acts and to what degree; and personhood is about features of the mind which ground certain innate rights.

This is still circular logic. What makes one collection of cells and protoplasm a member of the human species? It is not merely the presence of a particular set of genes/chromosomes - there must be something else.

A genetically unique individual which has the genes of a human is, standardly, considered a member of the human species. I don’t see anything circular here.

Thus, a purely logical concept can still have reference to something concrete, even if cognition of something concrete belonging to that conception, is not determinable from such mere reference alone.

I think we are saying the same thing, then. I am saying that the concept refers to something concrete.

Space, a purely logical concept if there ever was one, would be useless if it didn’t refer to concrete things, so……there ya go.

Nooooo. The concept of space refers to extension—I think you are thinking it refers to something concrete because it is used to represent objects.

So, no, I do not deny the thing-in-itself references something concrete, while maintaining the thing-in-itself is a purely logical conception.

If by “pure logical conception” you just mean that it is a concept which is derived from pure reason; then I agree.

"It's human, so you mustn't kill it",

I never argued that: this is a blatant straw man.

ignoring capital punishment and war and euthanasia.

What?!? :sad: You are making me sad, Banno, with all these blatant straw mans.

It does nto have the moral standing of the person carrying it.

So your view is based off of degrees of moral standing for persons? Is that the idea? So a elderly person has less rights than a person in their prime?

It's not true that all women who have sought abortions denied the humanity of what they were killing, and this is still true today.

Interesting story, and very heartfelt. I don’t think that even women in the West necessarily abort while denying the humanity of their children: I think there are people who just don’t understand ethics (or disagree with my ethics [;) and they sincerely believe they are doing the right thing.

Also, I will say that, to your point, your example exemplifies a rare occurrence in abortion-situations in the West (if we were to map it over) because in your example the women are doing it solely for the benefit of the child—so it is a complete sense of respect for them (even though I think what they are doing is immoral).

For that of which I merely think, which would be that thing which for me cannot be real because I have no intuition of it, there’s no difference in my internal treatment of a real and a non-real thing, insofar as the only representation for either of them is a conception or a series of conceptions, in accordance with a rule.

Why isn’t it real for you if you have no intuition of it??? Your car in the garage isn’t real right now, even though you have every reason to believe it is there, because you can’t currently sense it?

The real, then, is the set….not a subset…..of existent things given to the senses, which says nothing at all about things not given to the senses, and for which, therefore, the real has no ground for consideration.

This is incoherent though: you are saying that there could be a thing which is in reality but is not (i.e., does not exist because it cannot be given to the senses). Do you see what I mean? You are playing around with ‘being’ in ways that are not fundamental enough (:

Hence to reason about experience, and to know things not directly perceived from that reasoning alone, is a posteriori reasoning.

Then, you are claiming that all a posteriori knowledge is about non-existent things; since only directly perceived things exist, and knowledge of not-directly-perceived things constitutes a posteriori knowledge.

Your answer doesn’t respect the question. Trust me, it’s pertinent, at least to the theme we’re immersed in up to our eyeballs in right now.

How so? Isn’t it epistemically justification enough to claim that the car is in the garage (even though I don’t see it right now) because I had just drove it in there 5 seconds ago?

The pre-structure here, re” “all bodies are extended”, is an empirical principle, in that it applies to things alone, and is only susceptible to natural proofs, but our knowledge of this arises through separate pure principles of universality and necessity, in that without these pure principles, the empirical principles cannot have natural proofs at all, from which follows the possibility some bodies are not extended, and we are presented with a contradiction and our knowledge of empirical things becomes forever undeterminable.

Correct; and I believe this is exactly to say that “all bodies are extended” is true for human experience; but not for reality as it is in-itself.

Ok, then: A blastocyst is not a human being. The blastocyst is alive. It can be considered as a seperate entity - it might be moved to another host, for example. It has human DNA and so on, but it is no more a "member of the human species" than is your finger.

My finger is not a beginning stage of human development: that’s the difference.

We have on the one hand a woman, perhaps a nurse, perhaps a CEO, perhaps a sister, mother, daughter, perhaps a care giver or volunteer.

All red herrings, my friend.

Someone who can express their needs, who makes plans and seeks to fulfil them and who has a place in our world.

You don’t think a baby has a place in the world? You don’t think that a baby would express, if they could, that they don’t want to be murdered? Irregardless, this is all irrelevant to my position: I don’t think it is morally relevant to this moral dilemma whether or not the mother or baby can express their needs, is capable of planning, nor “has a place in the world”.

What exactly morally are you suggesting? I think I’ve made my argument clear: in a standard abortion case, we have a woman that wants to uphold their right to bodily autonomy and can only do so by means of murdering another human—and to do so is always morally impermissible because murder (viz., killing an innocent human being) is a bad object for actions (and so all actions of that species are wrong). What’s your position? Are you make a consequentialist-style argument that we should justify the good end (of upholding the woman’s bodily autonomy) via a bad means because the end consequentially outweighs (perhaps significantly) the bad means? Is that the idea???

What exists is what you can meaningfully encounter.

I appreciate the elaboration!

The only issue I have is with your semantics: I think you are using ‘existence’ as if it is reserved for only things which exist materially (or perhaps physically). E.g., the monetary value of a diamond exists because there is a monetary value to a diamond; my feeling of pain exists even though it is not located anywhere in material (or perhaps physical) reality; the agreement which a contract represents exists because there really is an agreement being made between both parties; etc. Nothing about this suggests that these things exists as a different type of existence nor that they are real but don’t exist. Something exists if it is—that’s the only and nicely circular way of defining being.

As to things that exist but aren't real - well, fictional characters would fit the bill. We will both know who Bugs Bunny and Sherlock Holmes are, so we have a common reference point, but they're not real. Nowadays we're constantly bombarded by unreal imagery.

Technically, fictional characters exist and are real fictional characters. What you are doing is conflating this with colloquial language where one would mean by “is this fictional character real?” “is this fictional character referencing a person or thing which existed beyond a mere work of fiction?”. I think your “real” vs. “existent” distinction collapses once the ambiguity in colloquial speech is resolved.

How do you explain what it means to be a Homo sapiens?

a homo sapiens is a contradiction in terms: it is a species.

The typical definition of a species, which holds generally for its members and absolutely for its healthy members, is "A group of organisms that share similar physical and genetic characteristics and are capable of interbreeding to produce viable offspring".

There are ways to tell: I was saying to the naked eye. We can examine it in the lab and determine if it is a human being (or, if you prefer, human fertilized egg).

A member of a species has to be an organism, taken as a whole, of that species — Bob Ross


This is circular.

No it is not. In order for X to be a member of the set of all existent square blocks, it must be a square block.

This is basic biology. It is a member of the human species if it that certain kind of animal: homo sapien. — Bob Ross


Well, I wouldn't say that homo sapiens are single-celled animals.

This is basic biology: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Homo-sapiens . When, for you, does an organism become a member of its species? Anything you say is going to be utterly arbitrary, if it is not conception.

Not to the naked eye---so?!? The point is not whether or not one can tell if it is a human being: the point is whether or not a fertilized egg is a human being.

What does it mean to be a member of the human species? Is the placenta a human being? It has human DNA, is a living organism, and develops from the blastocyst. Is the heart a human being?

This is basic biology. It is a member of the human species if it that certain kind of animal: homo sapien.

A member of a species has to be an organism, taken as a whole, of that species: so obviously, e.g., a human heart is not a human being.

If a blastocyst separates into twins, is that one human being becoming two?

Technically, yes. Just like how, likewise, siamese twins are one human being. I think you may be confusing persons with human beings—e.g., siamese twins are one human being, but (usually) two persons.

Lets break this down.

I appreciate the elaboration!

Firstly, “a priori” refers, within the context of transcendental investigations, as “that which is independent of any possible experience—viz., independent of empirical data”. “Knowledge” is just a justified, true belief (with truth being a version of correspondence theory) or, more generically, ~”having information which is accurate”. Knowledge a priori, then, is when one has a true, justified belief about something which was not derived from empirical data (but, rather, the means by which our representative faculties intuit and cognize that data). The proposition “all bodies are extended” is universally true for human experience and a priori because the way we experience is in space (necessarily); and so this is a priori known. Now, to your point, of which I concede, in order to acquire this a priori knowledge one must have the self-reflective cognitive abilities to reason about their experience transcendentally; and so a baby, I agree with you, necessarily does not have a priori knowledge even though they necessarily have an a priori means of experiencing and the a priori propositions are true of their experience as well (e.g., “all bodies are extended”). I was conflating, I think, that which is a priori with that which is a priori knowledge. E.g., intuition (necessarily) in space is a priori but is not knowledge, but some propositions are true a priori and are grounded in it (such as “the line drawn between two points is the shortest path” in geometry).

Secondly, I recognize that you reject the JTB theory of knowledge; so let me try to address yours as it relates hereto.

This is why in my knowledge theory I broke down what knowledge is into two camps.

When we ask “what is knowledge?”, we are expecting an monistic answer—e.g., “it is <…>”—and not a plurastic answer—e.g., “it is <…> and <…>”. You are saying that knowledge doesn’t have one fundamental identity but, instead, is two separate irreducible ones—namely “applicable” and “distinctive”.

This immediately incites the question: “if A is knowledge and B is knowledge, then aren’t they inheriting the same type of knowledge and, if so, thereby the question of ‘what is knowledge?’ is still unanswered?”. That’s like me saying knowledge is a priori and a posteriori. Ok. But we are asking “what is knowledge?”; so how did that answer the question?

Of course, you probably have an answer to this that I don’t remember….it has been a while (;

Briefly, I will also say, that your schema doesn’t negate the possibility of a priori “knowledge” (in your sense of knowledge): it would be applicable knowledge, as the whole metaphysical endeavor of transcendental investigation would be applicable knowledge. The question becomes: “why don’t you think that we can apply a priori knowledge without contradiction and reasonably to the forms of experience (viz., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of experience) given that we both agree that our experience is representational?”.

For example, we applicably know math through 'base 10'. But math can be in any base. Base 2, or binary, is the math we use for logic circuits.

The fact that we can do math in different bases does not negate that the same mathematical operations are occurring, and that they are synthetical, a priori propositions.

The ability to think is not generally prescribed as 'knowledge'. Just like the ability to 'move my limbs' doesn't mean I know 'how to move them to walk'.

Correct. I was using the phrase too loosely.

It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known.

Ehhhh, then you cannot claim to know that there must be a thing-in-itself at all; or otherwise concede that you can know applicably, through experience, that if our experience is representational then there must be a thing-in-itself.

"The thing in itself" is a space alien

Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. @Mww is denying this, and I thought so were you.

I am not familiar enough with quantum physics to comment back: I don't understand how to reconcile qp with practical life---it seems incoherent.

…..“that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity)”
-Mww

Is this “real thing” the object which was given to the senses? — "Bob

Yes.

So a ‘real thing’ is real because its existence is given, and a ‘fake [viz., non-real] thing’ is an existence which is not given? How, then, do you distinguish from a fake thing which is does not exist, and one which does (but of which both are not given to the senses)?

It is necessary that some thing exists, which becomes the experience of, in this case, cup.

Agreed; but you are also saying that this necessary thing that is given not only exists but is real; which implies that a thing which exists but is not given is not real.

You’re explicitly demanding neurons send the feeling of a mosquito bite, when the science legislating neural activity will only permit neurons to send quantitative electrochemical signals.

Those are the sensations, no? What, then, is a sensation?

Errrr….wha??? We don’t care what neurons do when talking about speculative transcendental architecture.

True, but the sensibility must have some pre-structured way of sensing before anything is intuited or cognized—i.e., without reason. Talking about neurons is just a nice analogy.

I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist. — Bob Ross

That was never a contention; believing in a thing is very far from knowledge of it.

I think we have good reasons to know, e.g., that electrons exist.

The real and the existent are pretty much already interchangeable

Not at all under your view! The real is only a subset of existent things which are given or (perhaps) possibly given to the senses. I have no clue why we would assume that most, if not everything, can be sensed by our sensibility—viz., given to the senses.

Because you’re talking sensing, the only knowledge you’re going to get from it, if you get any at all, is empirical.
…
That’s all it’s ever meant to me. I use empirical to describe a kind of knowledge, rather than a posteriori, which prescribes its ground or source.

What else does it refer to for you?

But, then, you would have to deny any a priori knowledge; since we only know that empirically. That which is a posteriori is not the same as that which is empirical---don’t you think? E.g., I must use experience to extrapolate the a priori structure by which I experience, which is technically empirical, and yet it is not itself derived from what is given to the senses.

All knowledge starts with experience, but that does not mean all knowledge comes from experience—as Kant would say.

Even if you think the empirical is the same as what is a posteriori, then I think you still see my point: we can reason about our experience to know things which are not directly perceived.

For me it’s unjustified to call it knowledge.

What do you really know, with respect to the car itself, when somebody tells you he put your car in the garage?

I know it, because I have a true, justified belief. E.g., I just drove it into the garage, went inside, and now am being asked “is the car in the garage?” 5 seconds afterwards—yeah, I think I have a justified belief which is true (i.e., corresponds to reality).

If I take your position, then we have virtually no knowledge of anything. You don’t know you exist, that you brushed your teeth this morning (even though you remember doing it), etc. All knowledge ultimately is probabilistic and uncertain, except for maybe a small set of things (like logical axioms).

Representing objects in space is a priori; it is intuition, which isn’t knowledge.

What makes something a priori and knowledge, then? I know that “all bodies are extended” because of the way my brain represents objects a priori in space; and I know that “the shortest line between two points is the line drawn between them” because my brain <…>.

I think I may get what you are saying a bit, though. Are you noting that the act of synthesis in space that our brain does when intuiting is not itself knowledge, because there is not agent acquiring information but rather there is just a pre-structure for doing so, and that propositions that we (qua agents) know a priori because of that pre-structure (e.g., “all bodies are extended”)? I can get on board with that.

Please elaborate, as I am not following. Give me an example of where something is real but does not exist (if applicable); and where something exists but is not real (if applicable).

Banno, my position is that a blastocyst is a human being, not that it is a person. Can you please critique that instead of a straw man? I want to hear why you don't think that the blastocyst is alive, a separate alive entity than the mother, and is a member of the human species. It is really weird, to me, to say that it is not a new member of the human species.

For that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity)

Is this “real thing” the object which was given to the senses? I am not following.

Why would it be necessary that a cup exists because we experience a cup? I don’t see the necessity you are talking about here.

Sensibility has an a priori structure for representing; sensing is entirely physiological, real physical things called organs being affected by real physical appearances, called things.

The way we sense is prestructured (e.g., neurons) in a certain way to react to stimuli; and I would consider that a priori insofar as, transcendentally, there must be some prestructured way to react to stimuli (i.e., to sense). Otherwise, you are suggesting that somehow our sensibility can sense without any physiological means of sensing.

Technically, though, the a priori structure of sensibility itself, as the faculty of empirical representation, resides in reason, insofar as the matter of sensation is transcendental.

I don’t see how it would be. Our neurons send the sensations to the brain; not vice-versa.

Or is that we are scientifically aware of second-hand representations of those objects? We don’t perceive electromotive force, re: voltage, as a real thing, but do perceive its manifestations on devices manufactured to represent it. Even getting a real shock is only our own existent physiology in conflict with a force not apprehended as such.

Ahhh, so you are a scientific anti-realist; this makes more sense now. I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist.

Why not, though, just use ‘real’ and ‘existent’ interchangeably and note, instead, that not all the models and concepts we deploy to explain experience necessarily exist in reality (i.e., are not real)?

Why convolute it with an uncommon distinction between two very obvious synonyms?

If we can't sense it, can’t indicating an impossibility, how would we know it exists?

Through empirical tests with the help of self-reflective reason. That’s how we discovered, e.g., germs (even before we could see them with a microscope).

if follows that if an existence is impossible to sense, it is then contradictory to say that same existence is real

Wouldn’t it be “if it follows that if an existence is impossible to sense, it is then necessarily presupposed that it still exists because we stipulated it as an existence which is impossible to sense”?

Anything else is merely logical inference given from direct represention of an indirectly perceived, hence contingent, existence.

It seems like, for you, all that is real is perception. When the Real is usually what is perceived.

We can think things we cannot sense, which is to say we can conceive things we cannot sense, from which the logical inference for the possibility of things we cannot sense, but in its strictest relation, there is no experience, hence no empirical knowledge, of things we cannot sense.

That’s an equivocation. (1) I wasn’t asking just about empirical knowledge and (2) your using the term ‘empirical’ to only strictly refer to what is sensed—that’s not what it usually means.

I know that my car is in my garage even though no one is sensing it. For you, this is invalid knowledge.

Well….that’s just the system functioning without regard to empirical conditions.

Then, representing objects in space is a priori knowledge; which I thought you were denying because it is intuition.

Oh, I know, Bob. It’s just that this stuff is so obviously reasonable to me, yet I cannot get either inkling nor epiphany from you from its exposition. Which means I’m not presenting it well enough, or, you’re of such a mindset and/or worldview it wouldn’t matter what form the exposition takes. Nobody’s at fault, just different ingrained perspectives.

We are getting there (;

You can't prove objects exist. We take it for granted for the sake of convenience, but the proof is not established. It may sound excessively skeptical, but is nonetheless a serious issue.

Depends on what you consider a proof. If you mean a scientific or otherwise empirical verification through an experiment, then obviously no. But it can be proved by empirical evidence in all probability: I don’t have any problem with your idea that our a posteriori knowledge is probabilistic.

If not Kant himself, then his predecessors are on the right track, the world is representation (Kant, Schopenhauer), notion (Burthogge), or anticipation (Cudworth).

Those are all very, very different positions; but you said it like they are all claiming the same thing.

We can then say we have high confidence that our notions are real things in us. But as to the objects which cause these anticipations, we know very little if anything.

The very idea that objects cause these “anticipations” (or more accurately: representations) is itself subjected to your own critique; which you seem to have overlooked.

Are you conceding that you are an ableist? That quote was a consistent consequence of your own thought.

No confusion. A moderately well-educated person will understand that there is the 'domain of natural numbers' yet this is not an 'supersensible realm' in any sense other than the metaphorical. It is not some ethereal ghostly realm. Numbers and logical principles are not physically existent and yet our reason appeals to them at practically every moment to navigate and understand the world.

I thought you were taking a Platonic stance: I must have misunderstood. It sounds like, then, you believe that numbers are real a priori? Either way, they exist and are real. That's confused and muddied language to make a distinction between what is real and what exists.

To some extent, yes: Aristotle thought that we should not just eradicate the passions but, rather, cultivate them towards what is good. That isn't a real thing in Stoicism.

I was hoping that you would say something like this because I think it goes to the heart of the matter. You grant a human zygote fully developed human status but don't grant a seed fully developed plant status. Why? Because you don't care about seeds nearly as much as you care about your own species. A million seeds could be destroyed and you wouldn't bat an eye.

A nourished seed is analogous to a fertilized egg. A seed and the nourishment required, taken separately, are the egg and sperm, taken separately, respectively (in the analogy).

If I grant your view, then every single cell in my body is its own human being. Do you see how absurd that is?

A cell of a human is not the same as a human. A fertilized egg is a human being because it is the earliest stage of development of a completely separate organism of the human species. This is no different than how a nourished seed in the ground is the first stage of a continual process of development for a plant. The seed is not a plant; the water is not a plant; the oxygen is not a plant; the soil is not a plant; but seed in combination with these things produces a seed which begins to grow, and this growing seed is a plant.

If you deny this, then you have to arbitrarily define a point in the process, which has begun, to say "that's exactly where the developing seed is now a plant". That's what a pro-choice person is trying to do when they deny that human life begins at conception.

The modern version of Stoicism is "give me the strength to endure what cannot be changed and also the delusion of believing I can't really change anything, and also the wisdom to be able to find some pussy from time to time".

I am not following what you are critiquing of my comment; but I didn't suggest this "modern version" of Stoicism (which, FYI, isn't a version of Stoicism at all).

Not quite, although I appreciate the elaboration. Dogs are cloned by conjoining a dog egg with a dog cell, which is a synthetic version of egg fertilization. What you are thinking, is that somehow a dog's cell can just become a dog---that's not how that works. Even in cloning dogs, my view is the correct one: a new living dog is created upon fertilizing the egg of the surrogate mother with an artificially manipulated tissue sample from the dog that one wants to clone.

And in what sense do concepts exist?

Depends on your metaphysical views. For me, I would say concepts exist in minds; and those concept reference existent things when those things really exist. I don’t see anything problematic here nor puzzling. My concept of an apple exists in my mind, as I have formulated it, and it references something which does exist (beyond that mere concept) which is called an apple.

Numbers exist a priori.

Your response does help though, as you seem to be using a similar schema to @Mww. Perhaps Mww’s point is that the ‘real’ for him is phenomenal, and existence is noumenal (roughly speaking).

Nevertheless, the basic point remains: if concepts such as number and logical laws are included, then the scope of 'what is real' far exceeds the scope of 'what exists'.

Ehhhh, I don’t buy that. If you take a platonic account (like you did in your quote here), then numbers, e.g., exist in a supersensible realm. For plato, numbers are real and exist; and specifically are real and exist in the sense that they are abstract objects in a supersensible realm. I think trying to separate ‘real’ from ‘existent’ adds unnecessary confusion: I think you could easily convey your point by noting that these abstract objects would not exist in the universe.

Stoicism doesn't teach apathy: it teaches equanimity. That's a common misconception.

A person that is temporarily knocked out (from getting punched) can't tell us what they want us to do and a person next to them that wants to rape them while they are unconscious can: is this "unequal standing" of communication morally relevant to you?!? What you just argued is that we don't give as much moral weight to people that can't communicate with us. What about deaf and mute people? Do they have less rights?!?