The philosopher is opposite the gambler.
— ucarr
What does that mean? Please be clear. — Alkis Piskas

As to my meaning above, whereas the gambler strives to beat the odds by slipping the laws of averages, the philosopher, per my thesis, strives to antagonize the odds via strategic overreaching. Even though we've all been terrorized by Alien, I nonetheless declare "nature loves a bold explorer." Make bold if you want Nature to cough up her deep secrets.

"The gambler doesn't enjoy losing. The philosopher learns to enjoy losing." — Alkis Piskas

You got me with this piercing criticism, and your couplet above is an excellent clarification of my mishegoss. Now, let me walk back my mea culpa half a step. My sentences are misaligned because sometimes interesting details are asymmetrical. Isn't asymmetry how the Big Bang got triggered?

That sounds childish. — Shwah

Regarding imprecise language, your use of "that" above refers to my entire OP, the last paragraph or some other part?

...I don't know a dualism which posits end game vs beginning game... — Shwah

I don't intend herein to set beginning game in opposition to end game. Instead, I'm trying to root my observations within the NOW, admitting however, that said NOW is elusive.

Within the perspective of life, which is the NOW, there is no beginning & no end. We the living, so far as we know life directly empirically, have always been alive & always will be alive. Of course we have thoughts about our birth & death, but these are just more life experiences.

I suppose I'm writing a POV that's away from duality and rather at eternalism as a purported bounded infinity.

I appreciate your encouragement re: my having an insight. Thank-you.

Logic is continuity, which is to say, interrelationship, rooted in inference. Would anyone have any notion of continuity & interrelationship between material things without firsthand experience of a spacially-extended, material world that affords empirical experience?

Pure math, and all other forms of signification, once uncoupled from empirical experience, become unintelligible.

Numbers, uncoupled from interrelated material objects, become random, unable to signify anything intelligible.

Abstract thought is non-specific WRT our material world; it is not uncoupled from our material world. — ucarr

Statement one above is my general statement creating context for the following three statements.

Statements two & three are a response to a debater's extreme position that numbers exist only within the human mind, without material presence within our material world.

Statement four is my acknowledgment of the connection between the abstract thought of the human mind & our material world.

Abstract thought is non-specific WRT our material world; it is not uncoupled from our material world.
— ucarr

I think the bolded statement is correct and important.

The first statement might admit some exceptions, but one must allow for the ineluctable ambiguity of the smoke signals we are trading here. (You mentioned 'Wet-gloom-shine' in the OP. I think he generalized his discovery about math to 'lung wrench' in general. But 'every talk has its stay.')
— ucarr

The above commentary upon the "abstract thought" statement is attributed to me, but I don't recognize the words as being mine. III, are they your words?

Also,

(You mentioned 'Wet-gloom-shine' in the OP. I think he generalized his discovery about math to 'lung wrench' in general. But 'every talk has its stay.') — ucarr

The above commentary re: 'Wet-gloom-shine' etc is not mine & does not appear in my OP.

If a thing has many uses within the real world, is that proof of its reality?
— ucarr

Does 'reality' have an exact, context-independent meaning? Is such a situation even possible? (And what exactly do I mean by 'possible'?) — lll

I proceed with the assumption you read the premise of my quoted line as being,

Reality has an exact, context-independent meaning.

Isn't the premise you ascribe to me a pretty good definition of Platonic Idealism?

Anyone who uses possible assumes an existence-accommodating context of some sort.

As for the degree of generality of an existence-accommodating context, I'm presently of the opinion that metaphysicians want to push that degree of generality towards infinity. So, yes. The metaphysician believes reality has an exact, context-independent meaning.

Doesn't the utilitarianism (and thus locality) folded into my quote protect it against Platonic Idealism?

It is undoubtedly absurd to talk about 'before," or to use any temporal language to describe the period (another temporal term) before God created time and space. After all, there is no time, so how can we talk about a time before time existed? — Raymond Rider

Do you not feel challenged to imagine a state of being with time wholly absent? I've made your last question appear in bold letters because you're already talking about such a state with your question.

If the theist concedes your claim that God & time are coeternal, the issue of God's authorship of time becomes interesting. I say this because the scenario featuring God willing the existence of something that has always existed, as God has always existed, suggests a type of willful causation that is timeless, and, I must admit, until this writing, I've been narrow-mindedly assuming all causation & effect relationships are both temporal & linear.

Furthermore, the scenario featuring God timelessly willing the existence of time reads like a compound paradox, along the lines of "the timeless creation of time that already exists."

We can say that God has always willed that time existed in order to maintain God's ontological priority, as time would be contingent on God's will. — Raymond Rider

Let me know if my understanding of ontic is incomplete or false. I ask this question because, given a scenario wherein God & time have always existed, how can God's existence be prior to time's existence?

Let's look at your use of contingent in our context here: (contingent on/upon) - occurring or existing only if (certain circumstances) are the case; dependent on.

It seems to me coeternal existence precludes not only priority but also contingency.

I say this because with time being coeternal with God, there's an identity of priority equating the two, thus making it impossible say which of the two terms does the willing of the other and, moreover, thus making it impossible to say which of the two terms requires causal circumstances (i.e. the causal will of the other) to exist.

Perhaps you'll admit it's pretty hard for one thing to claim it created another & yet, when asked about the two births respectively, the claimant declares, "we both have always existed." It's hard to uncouple the creator/created relationship from linearity.

Also, consider the scenario with two eternals. If two things are extant, it's hard not to assume they exist somewhere. Now, given that the somewhere houses the two eternals, and the stipulation that some type of somewhereness is a necessary accommodation for existing things, the suggestion arises that the somewhere has priority WRT the two eternals, thus throwing the scenario back into the pit of eternal regress.

The other option is that somewhereness i.e., space, like time, is coeternal with God.

If there's a kernel of truth in my reasoning here, isn't it interesting how conferring eternal existence upon a thing seemingly places it upon level ground with God?

This brings us to the Trinity. God-Son-Holy Spirit, though individual, nonetheless are one. Well, if time is coeternal with God, then time is also coeternal with Son & Holy Spirit.

Does concession to time being coeternal with God entail transforming the Trinity into the Quaternity?

If a brain was absent then counting wouldn't even be possible. — Mark Nyquist

I remember the first time I saw a number raised to a negative power. "How does that work?" I wondered. "Take the square root of a negative number? But you said..." Who thought up imaginary numbers? "Say, they look like real numbers."

:up:

As you wish. I will stop. Excelsior.

Years ago someone put me on the right track when they pointed out that consciousness is not exactly a thing, even though language forces us to talk about it as if it is.

It's real & it has impact on things, how can it not be be a thing?

The fun of consciousness studies is trying to "grasp" something foggy, ghostlike.

It's power lies within its gravitational presence.

Do you distinguish between consciousness and its contents? — unenlightened

Not really... It is more likely that consciousness is itself emergent in whatever capacity it is so emergent. "He is what he is," so to speak. You are you, singularly, in whatever productive form that happens to emerge. What do you think about that? — Garrett Travers

In your response to unenlightened, I interpret what you say as,

1) consciousness is emergent whenever it's emergent
2) He is he
3) You are you

These three statements I characterize as math identity statements in the mode of,
A = A
These math identity statements are true statements, however, in the mode of monism (which you seem to be propounding here) they shed no light whatsoever upon the above question raised by unenlightened.

I'll give my response to enlightened's question in a moment, but first, let me ask you four questions (If they've already been asked, I apologize for the redundancy.)

1) WRT to consciousness, are you a reductive materialist?

2) Is it your conclusion that neuroscience, as a whole, correctly exemplifies reductive materialism WRT to consciousness?

3) Does neuroscience believe in mind/body (brain) dualism?

4) If so, what's the interface (per neuroscience) between mind & body?

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding unenlightened's important question,

Is there a distinction between consciousness and its contents? (If this re-wording of unenlightened's question distorts his intentions, hopefully, said person will let me know.)

Consider a book of fiction of the type that features bound white pages printed with black ink.

Does the story reside there within the book? In other words, do the covers of the book contain the world of the story, with all of its various scenes filled with conscious humans surrounded by material objects of all manner of sizes, shapes, colors & sounds?

Thingliness - a material object that possesses obdurate boundaries that are discreet & local.

The physical book has indisputable thingliness.

The story that the physical book sources, however, does not.

The story of the book, although filled to the brim with human consciousness & a world of material things, does not really, in its actuality, seem to be sitting on a shelf in a library, bound between the covers of a physical book, does it?

One of the (current) mysteries of consciousness seems to be the self-to-self requirement for transmission of consciousness from one locality to another.

The world of the story seems to reside in the minds of the author & the reader and where, pray tell, is that?

The self-to-self transmission of consciousness between super-intelligent computers may come as soon as 2029. Even so, whether such transmission is via gray matter or via CPU's, the question remains, where is the consciousness?

Now, if consciousness is characterized as being only semi-discreet, non-local & in possession of boundaries as weak as the gravitational force, then the transmission of consciousness, via self-to-self,
endures presently as a mystery of non-local communication, the inspiring progress of neuroscience WRT consciousness sourcing via the physical brain notwithstanding.

Fellow travelers, when we talk about the mind of consciousness, as distinguished from the brain of consciousness, we must begin to talk about the gravitational attraction between two (or more) material bodies. This gravitational attraction, clearly, expresses a non-local phenomenon.

The hard problem of consciousness, as David Chalmers has famously written, entails the mystery of self-to-self, non-local communication.

The mind/body problem, seen through the lens of Chalmers, does not equal un-scientific spiritualism.

Important Answer - The interface between mind & body is the gravitational field.

In the first line below, I make a claim.

Being countable is part of the makeup, part of the being of material things. — ucarr

In the second line, without realizing it, you affirm the claim I make in the first line.

Could that something that makes them countable be their presence? — Sir2u

In the third line, I make the observation that your statement is an affirmation of my claim.

Here's where things get interesting because what you have written above is a full, unconditional affirmation of what I've been claiming from the start. — ucarr

In the fourth line below, you accuse me of moving the goal posts.

Could you just go back to the OP and point out exactly where you stated that... — Sir2u

In lines 5, 6, 7 I quote myself from the OP. Any reader can clearly see that my later statement, Being countable is part of the makeup, part of the being of material things. was made earlier, with slightly different wording, in the OP. To elaborate a bit further, when, in the OP, I talk about a material object's ability to hold a position as being essential to its physical attribute called number, I'm using different words to talk about the very thing, PRESENCE, which you affirm as the thing that makes material things countable.

Material Numbers – because a material object can hold a position, perhaps we can understand that any material object has a built-in property of number. — ucarr

This property of number of a material object, like its mass, is therefore understood to be one of its physical attributes. — ucarr

The number of a material object is then a kind of measure of the built-in positionality of a material object. — ucarr

There's no wiggle room here.

In my previous post, wherein I show, through your own statements, your belief in my central claim, the logic is sound.

In this post, I show, through my own statements, the fact I've never deviated from my OP.

The evidence supporting these two claims is here before the reader in black & white. Any reasonable person can evaluate the carefully worded statements and make their decision where the truth lies.

math has nothing to do with the universe. It is just the method of describing the properties. — Sir2u

If, as you say, "math has nothing to do with the universe," and, as you say, "It is just the method of describing the properties." then, by your own words, the properties described by math must belong to the material things and not to math. As you've said earlier, these material properties include length, width, height, weight, etc. So, math describes these physical properties of material things that are external to math.

Let's look at the two statements below.

First, I make a claim about material things,

Being countable is part of the makeup, part of the being of material things. — ucarr

then you elaborate what I assert with an additional detail.

Could that something that makes them countable be their presence? — Sir2u

Now, let's look again at what you said just before> math describes the properties of material things i.e., length, width, height, weight, etc. Let's remember you also said "math has nothing to do with the universe," and thus we conclude these properties are external to math.

Let us now assemble the physical properties of material things external to math. When we assemble length, width, height, weight, etc., what do we get?

We get PRESENCE. You know as well as I do that a material thing that possesses the properties just described has presence within the real world of material things.

Now, let's look again at your most important statement in this discussion,

Could that something that makes them countable be their presence? — Sir2u

I know you don't think math bestows upon material things the physical properties listed above because you've just said, "math has nothing to do with the universe. It is just the method of describing the properties."

So, if math doesn't bestow physical properties upon material things, and these physical properties add up to presence then, the presence of material things is likewise independent of math.

Therefore, given that presence is independent of math, and presence, by your own words, is that something that makes material things countable, then, by the transitive property, the countability of material things is also independent of math.

The logic here is airtight, is it not?

What judgment is there to be made? -- EugeneW

Consider, an approximation is such in relation to another thing it resembles, as a kind of isotope, or variant. As a thing in itself, it's just another thing, no less extant than the other thing it resembles.

Should we reverse engineer our thinking about the applied math models that seem to fit real things, like bridges? Is engineering a fiction that, by luck, happens to work, through no rational intent of engineering science?

Is acceleration due to gravity a fiction?

What's the pivotal evidence that all of the universe is non-mathematical, not just some of it?

Yes. My examples are supposed to show non-discrete, real boundaries, or unknown boundaries, yet to be mapped mathematically.

The fact that it can't be described exactly just means there isn't an exact structure. If the exact structure is the approximation then what is the exact structures? And what it approximates? There are many possible approximations. — EugeneW

Is someone rushing to judgment about boundary ontology?

Where's the argument, supported by evidence (Hadron Super-Collider), that the boundary ontology of, say, elementary particles, must be exact & discreet in order to be extant?

Action-at-a-distance of elementary particles raises questions about existing boundary ontology being simple, exact & discreet.

Likewise the event horizon of black holes>likewise the holographic theory of the universe.

Likewise dark matter.

Likewise the 2nd law of thermodynamics being preserved within black holes.

The fact that God hasn't showed himself only means he hasn't showed himself yet... — EugeneW

Before the 20th century, ocean floors were public, repeatable, measurable i.e., subject to scientific examination & description.

From antiquity until now, God, by definition, transcends the material.

Since science has entered into the 4D realms of spacetime & QM, further expansion in 4D might lead to an upward dimensionality of materialism that includes a 4D empirical God consciousness (which is not God) that might well serve organized religion.

In light of the above statement, the premise God consciousness has no 4D empirical existence is, in my opinion, not a well-supported conclusion.

Not subjective materialism, but philosophical dualism. The rational intelligence, nous, recognises numbers and forms, among other attributes, which are among the qualities which make material things intelligible.

“EVERYTHING in the cosmic universe is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual. Now, the process of knowledge is immediately concerned with the separation of form from matter, since a thing is known precisely because its form is received in the knower. But, whatever is received is in the recipient according to the mode of being that the recipient possesses. If, then, the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner. This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.
— Brennan, Thomistic Psychology — Wayfarer

Breaking this down,

EVERYTHING in the cosmic universe is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual.

Is Brennan herein referring to the (individual) gods? Are you polytheist? Do you hold with the premise monotheism is false?

the process of knowledge is immediately concerned with the separation of form from matter

Do you hold that such separation is empirically literal, or do you have an understanding such a separation is a benign procedural fiction of the reasoning mind? I ask this because form and matter in separation (to me) seem to be unintelligible. This bifurcation gives the reasoning mind a stronger handle on what it's trying to understand, however, we don't see such separation in our everyday world, do we?

whatever is received is in the recipient according to the mode of being that the recipient possesses.

So, humans are a mixture of the material & the immaterial i.e., a mixture of form & content? If so, this tells us humans encompass a brain/mind bifurcation. This leads us to a crucial question for the immaterialist: How do the material & the immaterial {connect, interface, bridge} to form a common ground and what does such common ground look like?

Might it be the case QM has some answers to this question?

To understand is to free form completely from matter.

Do you experience purely abstract thought without material imagery acting as a supporting substrate making it intelligible?

I'm inclined to think the easy, discrete separation of matter & form is a useful fiction, but a fiction nonetheless.

Being countable is part of the makeup, part of the being of material things.
— ucarr

Could that something that makes them countable be their presence? — Sir2u

Here's where things get interesting because what you have written above is a full, unconditional affirmation of what I've been claiming from the start.

Yes! The physical presence of material things is what makes them countable, and the language of math does the counting; it does not create or ascribe to material things their countability. The countability of material things, as you say above, is their physical presence.

In a world without material things, I suppose pure math could busy itself with the counting of abstract numbers. Of what use would that be? Might it serve as a Buddhist chant that aids in calming the mind for the sake of meditation? I say this because the counting of abstract numbers without referents is a vacuous circularity.

Mankind will have to find another way to describe the universe and they will chuck applied math out of the window as obsolete. — Sir2u

Why should applied math, that works in the real world, be chucked out the window? While it's true that Einstein physics has superseded Newton physics to some extent, the world still uses Newton physics everyday to great advantage.

When I see your raise & raise that , I'll süss the pot with gold coins featuring the faces of Einstein, Bohr & Planck.

Your central point is that numbers do not exist in the material world, apart from human mind inventing them, then using mind to count material things, right?

Recently, you've said material things are countable. So, if numbers are not a physical attribute of a material thing, and yet numbers, which are of the mind only, can count material things, then the counting of material things by mental numbers is mixing a mental thing with a physical thing, subjective materialism (Berkley).

Bear in mind, numbers as symbols must have a material thing as their referent, if they are to keep separate from material identity, otherwise, you're mixing the two.

Do you think that math cannot be applied to non material objects. — Sir2u

Following from your claim numbers are purely mental, non-material things are the only things they can count without becoming entangled with the material world.

Are you okay with science reverted back to the period before the scientific method?
— ucarr
Apart from the fact that it is a bloody stupid question, how do you think my answer would help you to prove that the universe is mathematical? — Sir2u

It's not a stupid question because the lynchpin of modern science is the belief that the physical attributes of material objects persist in the absence of sentience naming them. The three pillars of the scientific method, as you know, are public, repeatable, measurable. If the state of material things were dependent upon sentience naming them, as you claim with numbers, material things would forever be shape-shifting like mad in accordance with the many points of view of various individuals. Material things are measureable to a standard because their attributes don't change under the influence of sentience, which means said attributes are independent of sentience.

A cognitive-leap whopper is a conclusion that might be correct, but is based upon on a small volume of evidence and needs much more evidence to start becoming probitive.

If universe is non- mathematical, how does this impact status of applied math? Huge question that needs answering by your claim.

There's something external to the Big Bang singularity?

...because quarks can never be asymptotically free... — EugeneW

Asymptotic freedom ≈ forever approachable but never arrived at? Quarks are really solitary?

Since I'm curious, I'll spout off with a shot in the dark. Is there at least a faintly tangential connection between elementary particle perturbation & the introduction of asymmetry, with rapid inflation of the pre-Big Bang universe?

If there's a scintilla of truth in this speculation, doesn't that tell us the pre-Big Bang universe was unstable?

↪ucarr Pro tip: "ontological status" =/= pragmatics (or cognition) aka "the behavior that supports it ..." :roll: — 180 Proof

You're implying ontological status of a thing is metaphysical?

Regarding,

QFT in curved spacetime was used by Hawking in his description of the eponymous radiation. But the calculation is approximate. It's rather well understood, but there is no connection involved between the information inside and the radiation. — EugeneW

You say,

So the math never describes exactly and at most approximations can be made. Which simply means no exact structures exist. Which means they don't exist at all. — EugeneW

I think your above quote is the gist of your premise our universe in not mathematical. With these three sentences, I think you're conflating the signifier with the signified.

If we look retrospectively at Newtonian physics through the lens of Relativity, we can assert that, beyond a certain region of velocity, Newton's Laws are (now) unacceptable approximations. To go on from there to say,

Which simply means no exact structures (for near-light velocities) exist. Which means they don't exist at all. — EugeneW

Entails making a cognitive leap that is a real whopper.

I say you make the same cognitive-leap whopper when you claim the present day limitations of the Hawking Radiation measurements amount to probitive evidence the universe in non-mathematical.

Math, by definition, does make material things countable. — Real Gone Cat

Numbers do not represent objects they specify the quantity of objects, the length of object, the weight of objects. But not the objects themselves. — Sir2u

Do you know you're entangling mental objects with physical objects? I suspect your premise here is rooted in subjective materialism.

Subjective Materialism -- The only knowable reality is the represented image of an external object. Matter as a cause of that image, is unthinkable and therefore nothing to us. An external world as absolute matter unrelated to an observer does not exist as far as we are concerned.The only knowable reality is the represented image of an external object. Matter as a cause of that image, is unthinkable and therefore nothing to us. An external world as absolute matter unrelated to an observer does not exist as far as we are concerned.

An external world as absolute matter unrelated to an observer...

I think this is the lynchpin of the scientific method. Are you okay with science reverted back to the period before the scientific method?

Okay. Very clear. Can I think of Kuhn as one who examines the (scientific) zeitgeist?

Since you've made this statement, do you acknowledge that material things are countable?
— ucarr

Of course they are, did I not make it clear enough that was the reason for inventing numbers. — Sir2u

I think your affirmation here forms the heart of our discussion.

We both know that material things are countable. This means material things can be counted.

Something about material things makes them countable.

Mind you, the language that does the counting, math, does not make material things countable.

Being countable is part of the makeup, part of the being of material things.

Math, the language of counting, only entails the means of counting; it doesn't create the possibility of something being countable; it merely provides a means for doing the counting of countable things.

We know this because, as you've been saying, human mathematicians are still struggling to count certain things for which the mathematical expression is not yet resolved.

We suspect that these as yet uncountable things will eventually become countable, when their mathematical expression gets resolved, but the fact of their being countable prior to math being able to actually do the counting makes it logically clear that math does not impart countability to these material things, otherwise we would not struggle to count them. Instead, all we would have to do is create some math that imparts countability to these things and then they would be countable.

We both know that's not how the world works.

f a thing has many uses within the real world, is that proof of its reality?
— ucarr
I suppose you're indirectly asking if Reality is necessarily Material or Physical. — Gnomon

I don't take it that far. With the above I'm implying that establishing the physicality of a thing is a good means of establishing the reality of a thing.

I haven't jumped to the conclusion physical reality precludes non-physical reality.

...most of the universe has no mathematical structure. Already three bodies interacting gravitationally do not move on mathematically well-defined ways, unless specific boundary conditions are fulfilled. So a mathematical universe is a fiction, a myth. — EugeneW

I say "not mathematically well-defined" and "non-mathematical" are two different things. Moreover, "not mathematically well-defined" does not do away with the abundance of mathematically well-defined physics. (Is not the warpage of spacetime by celestial bodies well-defined?)

This tells me your conclusions that, "most of the universe has no mathematical structure" and "the mathematical universe is a fiction," in light of the evidence provided, are cognitive leaps. Can you support them with evidence more decisive?

P.S. You can throw open the shutters onto a new vista for me by detailing a non-mathematical physics.

Wittgenstein has elaborated an argument against numbers being metaphysical.

My questions originate from the opposite end of the continuum. — ucarr

I take this to mean you think numbers are metaphysical — Mark Nyquist

Your inference about my intentions makes perfect sense, however, my language is faulty, and thus your conclusion is opposite of what I tried & failed to communicate.

In the above statement, I was trying to say that while Wittgenstein was promoting the physicality of numbers by attacking their metaphysicality, I am promoting the physicality of numbers by establishing their objective materiality.

What you inferred is much closer to what I wrote but didn't intend, hence you correctly misinterpreted what I incorrectly expressed. (How's that for labrynthine mishegoss?)

All of the above is to inform you that, given my physicalist intentions re: numbers, your position & mine are not on opposite sides of the aisle.

I'm not perfectly clear on whether or not you allow that number is a physical attribute present in material objects. Since the brain is a material object, and you believe information is answered by brain state and brain state only, this would seem to indicate you do make such allowance.

But then you conclude by saying,

If your brain projects some meaning to the external environment that would be a false perception and it is still only a physical brain state holding a concept of numbers. — Mark Nyquist

Since you put stock in the physicality of numbers via neural networks, how do you reconcile this with saying the ascription of numericality to the external environment is a false perception?

They are modular , but in a different sense than relative space-time location. The latter is a relativity defined as objective relations structured mathematically. Kuhn’s paradigmatic relativity isnt based on objective structures but subjective values systems. — Joshs

I'm thinking subjective values systems, almost by definition, are rooted in relativity, as subjectivity is always local to the individual. Paradigmatic subjectivity therefore implies zeitgeist, ethos. How does Kuhn separate his ideas from such?

So, our sense of good & evil, no less than our sense of true & false, gets instantiated by neural processing?

Does the literature of neural concept processing say anything about neural networks doing something akin to statistical analysis of individual instances of "right" and "wrong," leading to a model?

...numbers were invented for counting... — Sir2u

Since you've made this statement, do you acknowledge that material things are countable?

Could something be described mathematically if math has not been invented? — Sir2u

Could something be described fluxmatically if math has not been invented? Could something be described noxmixically if math has not been invented? Could something be described (fill in the blank with your own word) if math has not been invented? Could something be described...

Colors have always existed, drab brown being one of the worst ever imagined. But until someone invented a method of naming them. Now it has the illustrious name of Pantone 448 C. Could it be possible that the same has happened to numbers? — Sir2u

Since I can write a sentence in parallel to your sentence, do you acknowledge that if your sentence is valid, then my sentence is valid? See my parallel sentence below.

Numbers have always existed, 3.1415929... being one of the worst ever imagined. Then [but until] someone invented a method of naming them. Now it has the illustrious name of Pi. Could it be possible that the same has happened to colors?

We now use math to describe the universe... — Sir2u

Since you have made the above statement, do you think if follows that the universe, which pre-dates human math, has always been describable via the language of math?

we had to invent the math(numbers and equations) to explain it, to make the calculations fit reality. And a lot of explanations turn out to be wrong. — Sir2u

Do you agree that when you say, "humans had to invent the math to explain the universe," you are saying, again, that math was invented to explain the innately mathematical nature of the universe?

Do you agree that from this it follows that math expresses its form and content in connection with the form and content of the universe?

Do you agree that when you talk of math striving to fit reality, and sometimes failing, you imply that math fails in its core mission when it doesn't fit reality?

I have asked you if you would give 2-stone and 3-stone the same number. Are you unwilling to answer this question?

Since I acknowledge that humans spoke of the numbers of things (perhaps without using the word "number") thousands of years before they developed the writing of numbers, you, therefore, per your stipulation, acknowledge that humans put numbers onto material objects to describe what was already there before they developed the writing of numbers?

Does the Kuhn content you've quoted contain a component of relativity?

Is Kuhn's statement implying that just as the rate at which time elapses is specific to a local inertial frame of reference, so is an artistic or scientific paradigm (frame of reference) comprised of local beliefs and local evidence that warrant consideration on ther own terms, thus crediting such paradigms as being modular?

You say,

Modern neuroscience puts the idea that they cannot be accounted for to sleep, definitively. — Garrett Travers

I infer that they has moral values for its antecedent.

and then you provide us with,

By leveraging well developed computational models to interrogate neural mechanisms and representations, this work has significantly advanced our understanding of concept learning by characterizing the nature of the component mechanisms and their underlying neural machinery. The result is a converging neurocomputational account of concept learning that integrates brain systems involved in attention, memory, reasoning, cognitive control, and reward processing. — Garrett Travers

Is the above quote the section of your evidence that specifically accounts for moral values (through the lens of materialism-physicalism) neuroscientifically?

Is the upshot that moral values are one example of concept learning that is processed by the neural machinery of the brain?

Are the component mechanisms of concept learning physical or conceptual? I ask this question because "component mechanisms and their underlying neural machinery" suggests a bifurcation, with "component mechanisms" being conceptual and "underlying neural machinery" being physical.

↪Sir2u Sorry for butting in, but the universe was behaving in a mathematical way (physics + chemistry) long before humans (biology) even entered the fray so to speak. I dunno, just saying. — Agent Smith

:grin: :up:

Nothing has numbers as part of their make up, numbers were invented... — Sir2u

Seeing pile-of-2-stones and pile-of-3-stones, would you give each pile the same number? — ucarr

If it were discovered that Germany has already established Fluxmax-stones = 3-stones, would the equation 2-stones = Fluxmax-stones have to be changed to 2-stones ≠ Fluxmax-stones? — ucarr

That is sort of like asking if the cowshit you found was discovered to come from a bull would we have to call it NOT COWSHIT.
No, we would just call it bullshit. — Sir2u

Do you agree that COWSHIT ≠ bullshit?

When you look at 2 material objects, say, 2 stones, do you see 2 stones, or do you see the number 2 as it is written on paper?

Since writing first appeared thousands of years after human first started walking the earth, do you accept that 2 stones first appeared long before the first appearance of number 2 as it is written on paper?

And of course we see numbers everywhere, we put them there. — Sir2u

Do you acknowledge that the numbers we put onto material objects describe what was already there before human started writing numbers?

we do see number everywhere in the everywhere, — Janus

:up:

Giving them a label is the key there, if the number label where part of the stone no one will need to "give" them anything — Sir2u

Pile of 2-stones sits on a red square. Close by, pile of 3-stones sits on a green square.

Seeing pile-of-2-stones and pile-of-3-stones, would you give each pile the same label?

Do you think 2-stones can be replaced with Fluxmax-stones and would make no difference?
— ucarr

Of course it could be replaced with anything, as long as it is universally accepted. Fluxmax-stones could quite easily be 2-stones in some sort of technical language. — Sir2u

If it were discovered that Germany has already established Fluxmax-stones = 3-stones, would the equation 2-stones = Fluxmax-stones have to be changed to 2-stones ≠ Fluxmax-stones?

We were discussing the materialistic qualities of numbers, which is no existent. — Sir2u

What about the materialistic qualities of number?



There's a stone sitting on a red square. Close by, there's a stone sitting on a green square. A person sees them and gives them a label. Label = 2-stones.

Do you think 2-stones describes something that's there in the stones?

Do you think 2-stones completely different from stone on red square and stone on green square?

Do you think 2-stones is a label randomly given to stone on red square and stone on green square?

Do you think 2-stones can be replaced with Fluxmax-stones and would make no difference?

If you think the replacement makes no difference, what can be done to let people know
2-stones = Fluxmax-stones?