Have any of these mathematical conveniences ever been detected? — jgill

...they can be thought of as disturbances in underlying fields, they don't persist for long – and can't be directly detected. — New Scientist

I'm not sure what the foundational order of thinking is or even whether there is one. — Ludwig V

Note - "foundational order" is a pun with two senses: 1) the order inherent in thinking is foundational to the human identity; 2) the essence of thinking is its natural orderliness

I feel inclined to claim that order is thinking. Following this line, I want to say the world appears to us orderly because it's rendered to our awareness through our thinking. An idealist wants to establish the world is only ordered through thinking.

Neuroscience has no conjectures about the superstructure of neuronal communications?

But it is true that we are so reluctant to accept "no cause" that we try to corral it by speaking of probability, which at least establishes a sort of order in the phenomena. — Ludwig V

Consider the following sentence: Origin boundary ontology is a gnarly puzzle.

Is it sufficiently suggestive to give you a clear impression of what it's trying to communicate?

Are you inclined to believe origin stories must discard causation at the start point?

I'm saying at least one first cause is logically necessary, and the consequences of that being so. — Philosophim

Is the following rephrasing acceptable: At least one cause and its causal chain are necessary.

There is no prior or external cause. Typically saying, "self-cause" implies that there is first a self, then a cause. That's not what I'm intending. There is no conscious or outside intent. — Philosophim

I'm guessing you're excluding consideration of self-organizing, complex systems that are not conscious. — ucarr

I'm not including or excluding anything but defining what a first cause is, and what that means for us. — Philosophim

Is this interpretation correct: The definition of a first cause and whatever that entails is an acceptable object of examination within this conversation.

Is this a reasonable conclusion: A self-organizing, complex system is an acceptable object of examination within this conversation if it is not logically excluded from the definition of first cause.

If there is a first X in a causal chain, there cannot be something prior which causes that first X. A -> B -> C A is the first. You can't then say 1 -> A because then A was never the first, 1 was. This is about discovery, this is about what actually is first, whether we know that its first or not. — Philosophim

Is this interpretation correct: A principal first cause constrained by the laws of physics cannot imply anything external, antecedent or contemporary with itself. However, if the laws of physics logically necessitate all instantiations of causation entail externals, logical antecedents and contemporaries, then its a correct inference there are no first causes.

You can't... say 1 -> A because then A was never the first, 1 was. — Philosophim

Is this interpretation correct: The above claim ignores mereological issues associated with the work of defining a first cause.

Finding limits is part of completeness. — Philosophim

Do you agree with this interpretation: This claim needs to be investigated as a possible false analogy. Argument: It's one thing to find the systemic limits of a discipline such as science. It's another thing to suppose a permanent partition within a discipline: first causes author causal chains, but they cannot be investigated because they simply are. First causes inhabit the phenomenal universe and create consequential phenomena in the form of causal chains, and yet the examination of causation as a whole comes to a dead end at its phenomenal starting point. The implication is that either within or beyond the phenomenal universe lies something extant but unexplainable.* Is this a case of finding the boundary of scientific investigation, or is it a case of halting scientific investigation and philosophical rumination by decree.

*The notion of total randomness causing something-from-nothing-creations suggests a partitioned and dual reality. The attribution of dualism to this concept rests upon the premise that total randomness cannot share space with an ordered universe without fatally infecting it.

Are you sure an unsearchable beginning doesn't dovetail with eternal existence? — ucarr

Positive. Our ability to know it is irrelevant to what it is. Its entirely possible a first cause could start to exist at any time. That would be its beginning. If one does, has, or will, whether we discover it or not does not deny its logical possibility and then existent reality. — Philosophim

Our ability to know it is irrelevant to what it is. — Philosophim

Interpretation - Our ability to know is irrelevant to what we know. Supposition - This claim ignores QM entanglement.

Given QM entanglement, it may be the case that what can incept is limited by what exists. An everyday parallel is the fact that certain microbes don't spawn and proliferate in liquid solutions with a pH above a certain level.

Something happening by just-ising from nothing seems to preclude energy, animation, forces and material, not to mention an environment of similar composition. — ucarr

Its not that all of these things can't incept, its just that nothing else causes them to incept. — Philosophim

Something-from-spontaneously-occurring-self-organization preserves the laws of physics; something from nothing seems to violate physical laws: such a phenomenon suggests incept of energy to animate the creative process and energy suggests mass transformed to create the energy and mass transformed suggests energy to transform the mass...

...a small adjustment to physics is not a reason to deny a logical conclusion — Philosophim

You think it reasonable to characterize something-from-nothing as "... a small adjustment to physics..."?

The possibility of first causes does not destroy what physics is. — Philosophim

I've been examining your definition of first cause as something-from-nothing within a closed system wherein matter-mass-energy are conserved. Again, I ask if you think it reasonable to characterize something-from-nothing as a small adjustment.

You seem to be implying a priori knowledge permanently partitioned from empirical experience of ultimate causes and therefore uncorroborated independently is sufficient for belief in unsearchable first causes. — ucarr

You do maintain the standard of empirical proof of first causes. Nonetheless, you firmly assert their possibility. Since all you have at present is speculation via reasoning, I think it germane to the vetting process to invoke arguments like the one about conservation laws being preserved within a closed system. It's your job to explain logically how something-from-nothing happens. Merely stating that inception of a first cause is a case of: "It is what it is." amounts to a case of you dodging behind axiomatic jargon that's first cousin to street vernacular: "Hey, man. I don't know what else I can tell ya. It is what it is."

Here's the dodge: You claim a priori knowledge of the reality of first causes, then evade the work of empirical investigation by claiming the just-ising of first causes into our phenomenal universe. By using this dodge, you don't have to do any explaining of specific changes to known physics concepts that would have to be adjusted for the advent of empirical proof of first causes. You claim to support empirical proof of first causes, but you show no inclination to do any of the work entailed.

Normally, a priori theorems get vetted by the concepts established in the pertinent field. You preclude this vetting process by fixing on a theorem that specifically defines its subject as something that its pertinent field -- physics -- cannot investigate. By excluding causation as a whole from any examination of first causation, you dump the conversation into the field of Kant's noumenal ontology, a field that excludes not only science but knowledge in general.

It sounds like a hypothetical conjecture that excludes physics. If true randomness has no relationship with first causes, why do you even mention it? — ucarr

Because its the logical consequence of nothing coming from something. — Philosophim

You can't establish it as a logical consequence if you can't show and explain how randomness morphs into a dynamic organizer of something. You're hiding another homunculus. It's the homunculus that confers onto randomness organizational powers.

Also, you need to argue why something-from-nothing as a logical consequence is not an ad absurdum reductio. If you can't defend against such a conclusion, then first cause is non-existent.

Why does reality exist at all? Was there anything outside of reality which caused reality? Of course not. Meaning there was nothing that ruled that it had to be this way. — Philosophim

Your conclusion is not a self-evident truth -- since you claim to disavow self-evident truths, why are you claiming one here? Also, don't jump to the conclusion something outside of reality is self-evidently absurd: $√-1= i$

Why are we in the reality we observe? The simple answer: It's because we observe it. I'm saying what's real to us is a matter of perspective. We ask a natural question: Why is our reality what we perceive? The answer is that we ask the question because we're able to ask it. Even if we speculate about another kind of reality, we ask why it's not our reality because we're able to speculate about it.

It seems likely your use of randomness facilitates circular reasoning within your head. — ucarr

I don't see how this is circular. Please explain. — Philosophim

There's no organized run-up to the just-ising of first causes, so they are because they are. Your tautology is your shield.

Ucarr, something I've noticed is you say I'm implying or asserting things that I have not implied or asserted. — Philosophim

It's your job to refute my interpretations of what you write with cogent arguments.

Can you explain how first cause -- sourced in nothing -- and causing subsequent causal chain which cannot exist without its sourced-in-nothing first cause, can spawn anything other than nothingness? — ucarr

Sure. Because there is no constraint as to what a first cause can be. — Philosophim

So, first cause, like a deity, can create anything. Also, first cause, like a deity, cannot be explained causally. Instead, first causes and deities just are.

If the source of something is nothing, how can it cause anything other than what caused it, nothingness? — ucarr

Because that's what it is. — Philosophim

You don't need an argument to support this because its nature is by definition, right?

A first cause is simply the start of all other causation in that chain. You're over complicating it again. A -> B -> C Nothing caused A. Keep it simple Ucarr. — Philosophim

You're the one suggesting randomness caused first cause. You're the one suggesting the questionable equation between randomness and nothingness.

Your first causes from nothing might be invoking Wittgenstein's silent vigil over what cannot be spoken of. — ucarr

This again doesn't explain anything to me. What specifically in Wittgenstein's silent vigil is being evoked as you see it? Lots of people have very different opinions on what Wittgenstein was referring to. So I'll need your particular take to understand what you mean. — Philosophim

I'm speculating about your first causes just-ising into being as examples of ineffable creation.

On the contrary, I'm suggesting true randomness cannot be contemplated because it deranges the foundational order of thinking. — ucarr

It simply causes us to consider something we have not considered before. This does not disrupt thinking or logic. Its merely a continuation and updating of what we can consider. — Philosophim

It doesn't disrupt thinking or logic because it's thinking about randomness, not randomness.

You mean that randomness that is not an unknown explanation is the only "true" randomness. What makes it true, as opposed to an illusion? — Ludwig V

On the contrary, I'm suggesting true randomness cannot be contemplated because it deranges the foundational order of thinking.

Wittgenstein's silence in the Tractatus is defined against a very limited concept of what can be said - that is, of what "saying" is. — Ludwig V

Suppose I succeed in stopping my internal dialogue, have I earned a nod from Walter White?

That's the entire point of the post. :D I thought you assumed the logic leading to this conclusion was correct, then asking about the consequences of it. I'll summarize it again.

If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...

Lets say there's a finite chain of causality. What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.

Lets say there's an infinite chain of causality. What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.

It is impossible for there to not be at least one first cause. Therefore we know that first causes are possible, and have no reason for their existence besides the fact they exist. — Philosophim

You're saying the domain of this conversation is a logical examination of what follows within a causal chain in the wake of its first cause?

There is no prior or external cause. Typically saying, "self-cause" implies that there is first a self, then a cause. That's not what I'm intending. There is no conscious or outside intent. — Philosophim

I'm guessing you're excluding consideration of self-organizing, complex systems that are not conscious.

ts illogical to claim that something which has nothing prior that caused its existence, has nothing prior that caused its existence. Only the minds rebellion based on previous experience thinks otherwise. You understand the transition because it happened. That's it. That's the start of causality and the end of our questions up the causal chain. — Philosophim

I'm guessing you're saying first causes can only be interacted with as givens. There's no way to approach a first cause mentally. The only mental reaction possible to the existence of a first cause is acceptance of it as a given, as an unsearchable fact.

Its illogical to claim that something which has nothing prior that caused its existence, has nothing prior that caused its existence. — Philosophim

Is this your description of circular reasoning?

If you say first-cause entities have no causation whatsoever, and yet are not eternal, then you're positing a universe wherein science is not possible. — ucarr

Incorrect — Philosophim

Since first causes author causal chains, their just-ising into existence erects an impenetrable partition around the origins of our univese. If just-ising is the dead-end of physics and its examinations, then, yes, the domain of causality post-first-cause suspports science. However, the fundamentals as first causes are beyond reach of science. This renders post-causality science permanently incomplete.

Permanently incomplete science demotes it to local laws ultimately shrouded in mystery, and thus these local laws, having no metaphysical grounding, amount to little more than conjecture. Not knowing ultimate sources, local science must countenance the possibility that mysteries beyond the partition are really magic dissembling as science.

We just have to keep open that possibility that a first cause could happen. — Philosophim

Maybe this sentence exemplifies one of those language problems you've mentioned. Something happening means -- under normal circumstances -- an energetic, animate phenomenon employing forces and materials within a surrounding material environment. Something happening by just-ising from nothing seems to preclude energy, animation, forces and material, not to mention an environment of similar composition.

This might be the point where the homunculus in your argument is hiding out. When you exhort the reader to instantaneously accept the just-ising into being as a something divorced from everything save nothing, you're cryptically doing away with physics-yet-magically-assuming-it because you present without explanation some means of a human perceiving this change out of nothingness with his/her powers of perception intact, or is QM entanglement of observer/object not in effect with observation of a first cause aborning?

Virtual particles pop out of a vacuum attached to a QM universe. Moreover, they have physical causes.

We both know that's not our universe. — ucarr

No we don't. — Philosophim

You seem to be implying a priori knowledge permanently partitioned from empirical experience of ultimate causes and therefore uncorroborated independently are sufficient for belief in unsearchable first causes.

Not caused doesn't mean a first cause doesn't have a beginning. — Philosophim

Are you sure an unsearchable beginning doesn't dovetail with eternal existence? If just-ising into being is unsearchable, how can we know its not eternal? You seem to be ignoring that human perception of just-ising empirically assumes real physics, something you magically dispense with in your pure randomness.

True randomness is a description to understand the possibilities of a first cause. It is not a thing that exists that causes first causes. — Philosophim

It sounds like a hypothetical conjecture that excludes physics. If true randomness has no relationship with first causes, why do you even mention it? You need it to think about first causes, but having no physics, inception of first causes have nothing to do with us. It seems likely your use of randomness facilitates circular reasoning within your head.

Now, you're going to say first causes might govern our lives through the causal chains they author. Well, you have another homunculus transporting first causes across the bridge from no-physics to physics. I don't expect you can explain how no-physics shakes hands with physics. No, you can't. That's why you must say first causes do just-ising as their way to enter our world.

How can you perceive nothing then something with nothing temporal or existential or directional? — ucarr

I did not understand this question, could you clarify please? — Philosophim

Since first causes just-is their way into our world, there's no physics -- time, matter or vectors -- attached to their arrival. Sounds like a priori speculation without possibility of corroboration.

I don't see how you conclude this. If a causal chain is A -> B -> C, B causes C, A causes B, but nothing causes A. That's a clear distinction. — Philosophim

Can you explain how first cause -- sourced in nothing -- and causing subsequent causal chain which cannot exist without its sourced-in-nothing first cause, can spawn anything other than nothingness? If the source of something is nothing, how can it cause anything other than what caused it, nothingness? Yes, this is a logical argument, but you've stipulated that logic pertains within the causal chain. To continue, if nothing becomes something and causes subsequent somethings, how can you claim causal supervenience across a causal chain? Don't you have to maintain that original nothingness in order to claim supervenience? If so, then causal chains are really nothing. On the other hand, if you break the causal chain of nothing-to-something (you said it first: (from= causal) nothing to just-isness), how does first cause continue causality? Didn't Hume say something akin to this?

Randomness won't countenance links in a causal chain, so talk of links in causal chains is distraction which cannot distract from Wittegenstein's silence. — ucarr

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here either, could you go into more detail ucarr? Thanks. — Philosophim

Your first causes from nothing might be invoking Wittgenstein's silent vigil over what cannot be spoken of.

Do you acknowledge embracing the realist doctrine abstract concepts have an objective experience inhabiting its own reality? — Gnomon

realism - | ˈrēəˌliz(ə)m |
noun Philosophy
the doctrine that universals or abstract concepts have an objective or absolute existence; the doctrine that matter as the object of perception has real existence and is neither reducible to universal mind or spirit... — The Apple Dictionary

Your opening question describes a "realist doctrine" that sounds more like Idealism (or alt-reality) to me : postulating a mental realm of "abstract concepts" that exists in parallel to material reality, and may be considered more real than sensory reality. — Gnomon

I don't subscribe to that worldview [Idealism]. For all practical purposes, I am a Materialist and Realist. Yet for philosophical considerations (ideas about ideas) I must necessarily think somewhat like an Idealist. — Gnomon

No. As you see from The Apple Dictionary, my use of realism adheres to Platonic realism.

Maybe you are interpreting Descartes' "stuff" and "things" as referring to material objects. — Gnomon

No. I've seen how "substance" in a philosophical context holds a different meaning from the one known in the vernacular.

Nevertheless, the bottom line is that abstractions are not real : you can't eat an ideal cupcake, and an imaginary rose would not smell sweet. — Gnomon

Now you contradict your claim to be a realist.

"Potential" is not an objective thing out there in an ideal realm, but merely a mental projection of statistical Probability. We don't perceive Potential with our senses, but conceive it with our rational mind. — Gnomon

My personal -ism is Enformationism, which has a tentative foot in both worlds [material/immaterial]. — Gnomon

Please explain how -- given your endorsement of this seamless continuum from enformation to mind to matter -- the first two links in the chain -- both immaterial -- connect with material brain? — ucarr

Ah! That is the "Hard Question" for which materialistic science has no answer, and that idealistic philosophies merely take for granted. My thesis postulates an explanation --- not scientifically, but philosophically --- for "how" Mind & Matter interrelate. By analogy, the relationship is similar to that between fluid Water and solid Ice ; the are merely different Forms of the same Essence : The Power/Potential to cause change in Form. — Gnomon

essence | ˈes(ə)ns |
noun
the intrinsic nature or indispensable quality of something, especially something abstract, that determines its character: conflict is the essence of drama.

Philosophy a property or group of properties of something without which it would not exist or be what it is.

Now you seem to be pitching your tent on the ground of the immaterial.

Yes. The metaphorical "homunculus" in my thesis is Causal EnFormAction, the hypothetical precursor of physical Energy, and of biological Matter, and of metaphysical Thought Processes. The "explanation" for how the "little man" came to live in the human mind is expounded in the website & blog & and is on-going in this forum. It's not a final Theory of Everything, but I'm working on it. — Gnomon

Now you're being forthright and clear about where you really stand. I thank-you for your candor here.

In spite of your many evasions, nuanced qualifications and circumspect language affording escapes from slam-dunk opposing arguments, you acknowledge being a dualism-adjacent theoretician.

Yes. The metaphorical "homunculus" in my thesis is Causal EnFormAction, the hypothetical precursor of physical Energy, and of biological Matter, and of metaphysical Thought Processes. — Gnomon

Praiseworthy indeed is your admission you don't really know how enformation is functionally structured into an interweave with matter. At present you can't give practical directions to researchers seeking to illuminate the passageways leading from computational neuroscience to abstract consciousness.

Deacon's realm of the ententional, populated by phenomena intrinsically incomplete yet interwoven with future states by end-directed goals, paves forward across a no-person's realm into a practical monism of matter-mind-concept.

...there is something prior that exists within the causal chain of the first cause up to the first cause itself. — ucarr

Okay, for the record, this isn't you intending to say something exists prior to the first cause? Can you restate your intended meaning; I don't know how to read your above quote except as you saying something exists prior to the first cause.

A causes B causes C is a causal chain. Every point within that chain has a prior point except the first cause. — Philosophim

I don't know how to read this except as a contradiction to the statement I addressed directly above.

The logical conclusion is that there must be at least one first cause. — Philosophim

How can you justify logically the existence of a first cause that simply is? This statement tries to make explicit that nothing causal or sequential is involved in the appearance of a first cause, but logic is specifically concerned with justifiable connections linking things together.

I don't use the term self-causation because that can convey the intent that the first cause actively caused itself. That's not what I'm saying here. — Philosophim

I think you imply self-causation in the case of a first cause. Since, by definition, nothing causal leads to a first cause, it follows implicitly that a first cause, if not eternal and uncaused, causes the inception of itself. What else could be the agency of the inception of a first cause if not itself?

...we do not identify a hydrogen atom as being able to create ex nihilo. — Philosophim

What about a first-cause hydrogen atom? Doesn't it have to incept ex nihilo? Let me repeat my earlier question in a different way: Doesn't every first-cause entity have to self-incept ex nihilo? If not by self-inception, how do first-cause entities incept? Perhaps you'll say: "We don't know." If you play that card, then you have to stop saying first causes are logically necessary. How can you claim to know the logical necessity of existence of an entity whose agency of existence is totally mysterious?

Again, this is not what is intended. A first cause does not cause itself. A first cause is not caused by anything. Its just there. Its extremely simple, don't overcomplicate it by adding in the term 'self'. :) — Philosophim

Firstly, what you write -- regardless of the intentions in your head -- controls the content of your communication.

Secondly, from the limitations you impose: a) not self-caused; b) not caused by anything else; c) possibly extant, it follows logically that your first-cause entities, if they exist, have always existed. Given your limitations, can you name any other possibilities?

Let's look at your first-cause entities from a slightly different angle: with your description, they're not eternal, and thus they must begin. If there's a point where something doesn't exist, and then a later point when it does exist, its logically necessary that this something began to exist by some means. How else can we understand the transition from nothing to something? If you say first-cause entities have no causation whatsoever, and yet are not eternal, then you're positing a universe wherein science is not possible. We both know that's not our universe. So, it follows that your thesis is inconsistent with the universe we know. Moreover, your two limitations -- a) not caused; b) not eternal -- are inconsistent with each other. Finally, by the two previous arguments, first cause as you define it is self-contradictory: not caused means no beginning; no beginning but not always existing means not beginning to exist, so existing means not not beginning to exist, which means not not caused...

No will. No self. No other. Nothing then something. That's it. — Philosophim

There is nothing prior. — Philosophim

anything goes randomness — Philosophim

True randomness has nothing to measure. There are no prior constraints. There's no set up. There's nothing, then something. That's a first cause. Completely unpredictable and unlimited as what it could be before it happens. — Philosophim

Why is true randomness -- completely unpredictable and unlimited, but active -- not the cause of what you call first cause? But it is: something, then nothing.

How is true randomness intelligible as a named activity if its nothing? Nothing cannot have a name.

How can what you call first cause be the resultant of intelligible activity if there's no causation? There's nothing to look at but the ultimate pretense of looking at.

How can you detect and measure levels of unpredictability and freedom from limitation with nothing unpredictable and unlimited? Rohrschach Test.

How can you perceive nothing then something with nothing temporal or existential or directional? If time is not essential then: Nothing then something is the cheating liar homunculus in the randomness.

Since every link in a causal chain is sourced in nothing, there's ultimately no distinction between first cause and links in a causal chain. The artificial partitioning into a causal chain is the abyss calling the nothing by a name unhearable.

There are no constraints in nothing, so constraint and causality cannot erase the signature of nothing stamped upon them.

Randomness won't countenance links in a causal chain, so talk of links in causal chains is distraction which cannot distract from Wittegenstein's silence.

To argue that our consciousness is highly emergent you must show that the features of our consciousness are supervenient over the underlying complex structure of neurons. This would mean that any damage to the brain has consequences for consciousness. I didn't think this is the case. But I admit that the distinction between weak and strong emergence is not a strong one. — Ypan1944

Do you accept selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors -- SSRIs -- an established medication treatment for major depressive disorder -- as an example of the deep interweave of mind and brain via supervenience? SSRIs can greatly relieve long-term depression, a state of consciousness embedded in the empirical experience of some individuals. They achieve their effect by increasing the volume of serotonin, a neurotransmitter that carries signals between neurons. — ucarr

In my opinion this is certainly a case of supervenience. But supervenience can both exist in weak and strong emergency. — Ypan1944

You say if damage to the brain has consequences for consciousness, then this is evidence consciousness is highly emergent, with supervenience over neurons.

So, I provide a well-documented example of deficient serotonin levels in persons with clinical depression. This deficiency is tied to brain malfunction that in turn causes strong negativity of personal experiences in the mind of the afflicted person. This evidence meets your standards of supervenience over neuronal activity with gross changes in consciousness.

You say you don't believe damage to the brain has consequences for consciousness.

You emphasize the strong versus weak emergence distinction, saying there's little difference, thus implying strong emergence is only slightly stronger than weak emergence.

Since supervenience -- whether strong or weak -- evidences emergence of mind, you presumably accept it as fact. Is your goal in this conversation denial of strong emergency?

At any moment in time, there is something prior that exists within the causal chain of the first cause up to the first cause itself. — Philosophim

With this claim how are you not deconstructing the central premise of your thesis?

To specifically state, "This first cause must have happened" requires us to prove it exists/existed. — Philosophim

Are you saying knowledge of a first cause can only be empirical, not a priori? So, this gives your claim the status of a proposition made as a basis for reasoning, without any assumption of truth?

Lets carefully define what we mean by a contradiction. A contradiction is often defined as "Two things that cannot coexist". So can two things that cannot coexist co-exist? No. Because that's what they are. Would there be things that might seem contrary to us? Yes. But if they both co-exist, they are not contradictions. — Philosophim

This is correct reasoning, but it suggests your claim needs to be altered to: Any logical first cause is possible. Again, this adds nothing to the database of established knowledge.

A first cause does not need to have any imposition, consciousness, or awareness of itself. It simply is. — Philosophim

Again, this is either self-causation or eternal existence without creation.

...its not a hydrogen atom as we currently define it, because hydrogen atoms cannot do that. — ucarr

Re: a hydrogen atom creating existences other than itself: it's not creation absolute, but hydrogen plays an essential role in causing the existence of many compounds. Chemistry tells us elementary particles, like stem cells, can be re-purposed across the spectrum of the periodic chart. So, nitrogen -- even as a first cause -- is not really a unique thing. That's because nitrogen, which has, like hydrogen, neutrons, protons and electrons, consists of types of stuff already extant. As a birth, its a new arrangement of familiar stuff.

.we do not identify a hydrogen atom as being able to create ex nihilo. — ucarr

You're not talking about causation of something within an established causal chain, such as our sun assembling hydrogen atoms within its elements-generating furnace. If you were, you wouldn't have used the verb: create.

The first cause is not free of causal logic either, it is the start. — Philosophim

This is more evidence you imply first causes are self-caused.

...a first cause must act causally — Philosophim

Do you agree the above contradicts:
A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything. — Philosophim

No, can you add a little more to what you mean here? — Philosophim

You've saying a cause, first or otherwise, must act causally. So why do you also say (per the above quote) that it isn't necessary that a cause be able to to anything, which is a way of saying it's not compelled to act causally. Do you mean if it acts, it must act causally? If so, can you call something a first cause if it does nothing?

I think there's a difference between saying, "There's a reason for everything" and then spelling out what that reason is or how it must unfold. — Philosophim

Do you agree that:
...because all things are possible as first causes, its equally possible a hydrogen atom, as we identify it, just forms and exists as normal. There is not the need for anything out there... — ucarr

None of what I'm stating invalidates the scientific method. — Philosophim

As I understand you, your main claim is that first causes can happen sequentially in time. When describing these phenomena, you say vague things such as: a hydrogen atom forms ex nihilo, or you say even vaguer things such as: a hydrogen atom as first cause simply is, or There is no prior imposition. Its just existence. Does an atom will itself to exist? It is by the forces outside of its control. This is axiomatic jargon, not science. An example of scientific support for your argument might be something along the lines of saying: Because our phenomenal universe is open, it can continually increase its total volume of matter-mass-energy by absorbing such from other universes populating the multi-verse. Moreover, we know this because by calculating the total volume of dark matter within our universe at distant points in time from its inception to the present day, we see the total volume of dark matter steadily increasing.

I believe it may be possible in some instances for us to find a first cause scientifically. — Philosophim

Can you elaborate some specific details pertaining to how cosmologists can go about finding a first cause?

"Self-evident" means "human's can grasp them without needing to prove them". I do not believe in that. — Philosophim

Can you provide a proof for:

truth is what it is — Philosophim

As for axioms, I believe axioms must be proven, not 'given'. — Philosophim

You should consult your dictionary, unless you want to start a conversation explaining how you're redefining "axiom."

c) the universe, because it continues to incept new matter-mass-energy into itself, exists as an open system. — ucarr

No. I've said this several times now and its very important that you understand this. I am not saying, "X first cause happened, will happen, or has happened". Its possible, but it must be proven. It is equally as possible that no other first causes have happened, or will happen. You cannot predict if a first cause will happen. You must conclusively prove that a specific first cause has happened to say it has. — Philosophim

I make no claims that any one particular first cause happened, only that its logically necessary that there must have been at least one. — Philosophim

Since you think first causes are logically necessary, why do you say they're possible instead of saying they're necessary? Consider this tautology: all bachelors are unmarried men. Can you describe a set in which first causes are necessary members by definition?

I have been enjoying the philosophical exercise of our on-going give & take dialog. — Gnomon

I get great value from my dialoguing with you. I look forward to its continuance.

Do you acknowledge embracing the realist doctrine abstract concepts have an objective experience inhabiting its own reality? — ucarr

No. — Gnomon

Energy + Matter transforms on level Two into the dynamic organic systems we call Life... And eventually, that same Potential power-to-enform evolves into the immaterial non-dimensional thinking stuff (res cogitans) that we experience as Mind — Gnomon

If this quote directly above is what you believe -- and not just your paraphrasing of Information Philosopher -- please explain how it is consistent with your answer to my opening question.

Are you claiming top-down causation from Enformation to matter_mass_energy? — ucarr

Yes. But by means of natural laws, not divine intervention. — Gnomon

We can agree with Deacon that ideas and information are immaterial, neither matter nor energy, but they need matter to be embodied and energy to be communicated. And when they are embodied, they are obviously present (to my mind) — Gnomon

So, from your above quotes: a) you believe there is top-down causation from enformation -- ( meta-physical Information instead of physical Matter. -- to mind and then to body; b) you think the connection natural, not supernatural; c) you believe enformation, mind and matter form one interwoven continuum. Please explain how -- given your endorsement of this seamless continuum from enformation to mind to matter -- the first two links in the chain -- both immaterial -- connect with material brain?

Energy + Matter transforms on level Two into the dynamic organic systems we call Life... And eventually, that same Potential power-to-enform evolves into the immaterial non-dimensional thinking stuff (res cogitans) that we experience as Mind — Gnomon

You seem to be utilizing some of Deacon's absentialist materialism in the bottom-up causal chain articulated above. However, going either way, there's no explanation how immaterial connects with material.

I understand Deacon to be articulating a thesis that explains how all dynamical processes through all of their higher-orders remain within the domain of the material systemically. This approach addresses the mind/body problem by establishing a continuum that excludes problematical dualism.

With your articulations of causation -- in both directions -- you appear to do what Deacon indicts in the early part of Incomplete Nature: sneaking into the system an unannounced homunculus who -- without explanation -- brings about a material/immaterial interface.

The entirety of our universe may very well be explained by several first causes over time culminating in today. — Philosophim

So, the universe is still growing?

A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything. — Philosophim

So, a first cause may not trigger a causal chain? Should it instead be called a birth? You imply it's logically possible for the universe to continue growing for a period of time so far unspecified?

I just noted that there is no limitation on what could incept as a first cause. — Philosophim

But once its incepted, it is what it is, which is possibly limited. — Philosophim

Do you agree you imply a first cause is the means of its own inception? If you agree with this, do you acknowledge you also imply anything is possible? Do you acknowledge all possible inceptions implies contradictory inceptions can coexist, and thus the universe allows existence of paradoxes?

...it is that identities are imposed limitations — Philosophim

I just noted that there is no limitation on what could incept as a first cause. But once its incepted, it is what it is, which is possibly limited. — Philosophim

These two claims, taken to together, suggest first causes, if self-actualized, impose identities upon themselves. Do you agree this implies the universe comes into being as self-will unlimited?

Do you agree that if the means of an unprecedented inception is separate from the thing incepted, then the latter is not a first cause? Do you agree that, moreover, in this situation, the means of an unprecedented inception is an immaterial and all-powerful will to create, i.e., a deity?

I just noted that there is no limitation on what could incept as a first cause. — Philosophim

...we do not identify a hydrogen atom as being able to create ex nihilo. — Philosophim

How do you explain the above two quotes as non-contradictory?

How do you explain the last of the two above quotes as being a negation of the central tenet of your thesis: There is no limitation on what could incept as a first cause. Specifically, how do you explain the coming into being of a first cause if not ex nihilo?

"That is really similar to a hydrogen atom and it creates other existences besides itself". Sure. But its not a hydrogen atom as we currently define it, because hydrogen atoms cannot do that. — Philosophim

Explain how the above is not weakened by the existence of water, as well as the other organic compounds containing hydrogen?

...because all things are possible as first causes, its equally possible a hydrogen atom, as we identify it, just forms and exists as normal. There is not the need for anything out there... — Philosophim

Do you agree the above is evidence you think first causes self-caused?

...While anything could have been possible, (and would still be as a first cause could happen at any time)... — Philosophim

Do you agree the above is evidence you think the universe allows paradoxes? Do you agree, moreover, that a universe continually growing with new first causes can eventually become filled with paradoxes?

a first cause must act causally — Philosophim

Do you agree the above contradicts:

A first cause does not necessitate that it be able to do anything. — Philosophim

Do you agree that:

...because all things are possible as first causes, its equally possible a hydrogen atom, as we identify it, just forms and exists as normal. There is not the need for anything out there... — Philosophim

And

I think there's a difference between saying, "There's a reason for everything" and then spelling out what that reason is or how it must unfold. — Philosophim

do not connect because the former does not spell out what the reason is or how first causes unfold? Do you see that, instead, it's presented as a axiom from which your thesis proceeds. As such, it says in effect, eventually everything will be everything because things, like hydrogen, simply are. Do you see that this -- the core of your thesis -- precludes scientific investigation?

I do not believe in self-evident truth. Truth is what is. — Philosophim

Do you see that in the above quote, immediately following your claim to dis-believe self-evident truths, you support this claim with a self-evident truth: "truth is what it is"?

I believe some of the things about first causes are beyond experimentation or observation — Philosophim

Do you see that you, like scientists, sometimes take recourse to things beyond science in order to begin doing science (or philosophy). Science and philosophy are systemically dependent upon axioms.

Do you accept that some major implications of your thesis include:

a) the universe allows paradoxes; b) the conservation law re: matter-mass-energy, instead of actually being a law, is merely a plank within a working hypothesis still liable to refutation; c) the universe, because it continues to incept new matter-mass-energy into itself, exists as an open system.

To argue that our consciousness is highly emergent you must show that the features of our consciousness are supervenient over the underlying complex structure of neurons. This would mean that any damage to the brain has consequences for consciousness. — Ypan1944

Do you accept selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors -- SSRIs -- an established medication treatment for major depressive disorder -- as an example of the deep interweave of mind and brain via supervenience? SSRIs can greatly relieve long-term depression, a state of consciousness embedded in the empirical experience of some individuals. They achieve their effect by increasing the volume of serotonin, a neurotransmitter that carries signals between neurons.

A first cause is the inception of a causality chain. — Philosophim

Do you accept the following argument: Since by definition a first cause can't have any derivative first causes, each first cause is a discrete causality chain, and therefore the universe is coming into existence sequentially in time, and thus the big bang and its inception of the entire universe in an instant is wrong.

What is the metaphysics of materialism? — ucarr

Any generalization of principles (all things are . . . .) from less than comprehensive experience is considered a metaphysical concept, not a physical or empirical fact*1. Also, portraying some principle as universal, implies either a First Cause or Eternal Being. — Gnomon

Do you accept that each discipline of study has a database governed by principles organized logically, and that that logical organization of principles is its grammar? I'm asking if you accept "grammar" as a synonym for "metaphysics."

Do you acknowledge embracing the realist doctrine abstract concepts have an objective experience inhabiting its own reality?

Is the gist of your response to Deacon the assertion that mind DID NOT emerge from matter? — ucarr

No. I have repeatedly denied that unwarranted implication. However, I do assert that Matter is not the primary cause of all phenomena in the world. My thesis goes into great detail to support the idea that Causal Information is prior to both physical Energy and malleable Matter. — Gnomon

Is Causal Information a label for metaphysics as a whole, or is it a subdivision of general metaphysics?

Enformationism resolves the [mind/body] problem by a return to Monism, except that the fundamental substance is meta-physical Information instead of physical Matter. — Gnomon

Are you claiming top-down causation from Enformation to matter_mass_energy?

Your mundane examples may be "substantial"*6 enough for scientific endeavors, but lack the essential "qualities" or general principles necessary for philosophical purposes. — Gnomon

You're saying you don't see connections between my examples and philosophically engaging metaphysical principles?

Conversely, the brain is also damage tolerant and in some cases is able to rewire itself to compensate for damage. So perhaps there is both supervenience and some form of strong emergence? — Pantagruel

Yes.

...if you consider the brain as a physically complex system, with "consciousness" as a (weak) emergent phenomenon, then there is nothing to worry about. — Ypan1944

Do you think your description of weak emergence the closest fit for: a) sentience; b) reason as mental emergences from the brain? If so, why?

I ask this question because I think strong emergence the closet fit for: a) sentience; b) reason as mental emergences from the brain. I think this because: a) the human brain is the most networked system imaginable; b) the supervenience of sentience and reason is so strong that minor changes in brain tissue can radically alter practice of sentience and reason.

You seem to interpret his Absentialism as-if it remains safely within the orthodox metaphysics of Materialism — Gnomon

What is the metaphysics of materialism?

The main reason I & others have had difficulty understanding your Absential Materialism worldview, is that it seems to be a vain attempt to squeeze a metaphysical philosophical concept into a physical scientific box, and to describe intangibles in materialistic language. — Gnomon

Never mind my absential materialism label. Is the gist of your response to Deacon the assertion that mind DID NOT emerge from matter?

...he was often forced by his own reasoning to include unscientific concepts, such as end-directed "Teleology" of Evolution... to convey his metaphysical interpretations of "hidden connections" that exist right in front of us. — Gnomon

Please elaborate your refutation of his unscientific concepts of end-directed "Teleology" of Evolution. Also, please check out this conversation re: its pertinence to teleodynamics:

Emergency

Ideas do not exist in the same sense as Real things, and can't be adequately described in materialistic language --- although some may try. That's why your real world examples (post above) of your own neologisms seemed superficial to me, and missed the philosophical essence of the concept. — Gnomon

Here's another notable difference between us. Whereas you see my examples of ententional properties as being superficial due to a lack of philosophical essence, I see them as being substantial due to their mundanity. Understandings of the highest value tend to seep into the lexicon of the general public because of their ready application to the familiar things of the everyday world. Most people have some notion of relativity without deep immersion into either science or philosophy.

This is a useful assessment of both the phyics/metaphysics dialogue and Deacon's role within it.

Deacon didn't include a glossary of his ad hoc new-words in the book, but a few others have posted their own Deactionaries on the net to supplement their own interpretations of his unconventional meanings* — Gnomon

In my edition of Incomplete Nature Deacon's glossary does include his neologisms. I don't know if the list is complete, but he does define those he uses in the book.

You say, Inception of creation proceeds without limitation. — ucarr

Why do you say above statement is not knowledge of the identity of the first cause? I ask this question because you identify first cause as what acts without limitation in causing the inception of creation.

How is claiming first cause is what acts without limitation in causing the inception of creation different from claiming God is what acts without limitation in causing the inception of creation?

...my point is that such an existence wouldn't be a hydrogen atom as we define it today. Whatever it is could exist, and to an untrained eye it might look like a hydrogen atom, but it cannot have the same exact composition as a hydrogen atom, or it would not have the special qualities you note. — Philosophim

If first cause proceeds without limitation, why do you imply that first cause, acting to cause hydrogen atom, must follow limits that humans use to make sense of the world? If first cause proceeds without limitation, then why cannot it incept a hydrogen atom that is not a hydrogen atom? You imply that first cause must act logically. Why do you not think that's a limitation upon the actions of first cause? Why do you not think implying first cause must act rationally is not a case of you projecting your logical thinking onto first cause?

Anything that does not exist as a hydrogen atom, is not a hydrogen atom. Once the existence is in reality, its rules are set. — Philosophim

Why do you think first cause, acting without limitations, must conform to humanoid logical thinking in causing a hydrogen atom to enter causality delineated as a stable and specific entity?

...if an object can incept other things, it must do so within the limitation of what it is. — Philosophim

Why do you not think the above quote is a contradiction of earlier saying:

Inception of creation proceeds without limitation. — Philosophim

Even if you're not talking about cosmic first cause and instead are talking about one of the subsequent first causes, why must cosmic cause acting without limitation incept a subsequent causality that resembles human logical thinking. Being without limitation, it might do so, so why do you say it must do so?

Why do you not agree that positing an infinity of individual causes of an infinity of individual things is a trivial and circular statement about the universe as it's generally known by the public (everything is everything)? — ucarr

Sorry Ucarr, I did not understand the question. I'm not sure what statements I've made that you're referencing here. — Philosophim

The following is my paraphrase of something you said earlier: A cause that's the first of all first causes doesn't prohibit subsequent non-cosmic first causes for other things.

If this is so, then our universe can be filled with a vast number of non-cosmic first causes. This is similar to saying, "there's a reason for everything that happens." This is a trivial truth agreed upon by the multitudes. "Everything is everything (for a reason)." Below is another one of your statements about the universe being stocked with myriad first causes.

It does not need to be eternal. A first cause has the potential of happening five seconds from now. A first cause could have happened 10 seconds ago. What formed may very well be completely unstable and exist for a nano-second. Or five seconds. Or 500 years. Or eternal. — Philosophim

Why do you not think a universe filled with first causes is a conception of the universe that explodes the following conservation law: matter_mass_energy are neither created nor destroyed. If non-cosmic first causes can pop material objects into the universe from nothing, then the total volume of the mass_matter_energy of the universe is constantly fluctuating instead of remaining constant through conservation. If you say incept of every new first cause disappears an earlier, established first cause, the problem is solved. However, this is very close to merely repeating the conservation laws for matter_mass_energy.

A first cause could have happened 10 seconds ago. What formed may very well be completely unstable and exist for a nano-second. Or five seconds. Or 500 years. Or eternal. — Philosophim

Does this hold true for the cosmic first cause, with cosmic first cause = the first of the first causes?

How do science, logic and reason examine what simply exists without the possibility of explanation? — ucarr

I think this question is too broad and you'll need to focus on something specific. What are you referencing in particular that you believe is outside of explanation? — Philosophim

I'm referencing axioms.

I'm saying its axiomatic, but not beyond the domains of science, logic, and reason. — Philosophim

Some characterize axioms as self-evident truths. This characterization is a preface to saying the assumption upon which we're building our working premise lies beyond the reach of experimentation, observation, collection of data, compiling of data statistics, analysis of data and building logical arguments supported by data. In short, it's saying our science follows from the axiom, but cannot penetrate into it.

A cause, by definition, has an effect on something. The thing which it has an effect on must preexist the cause. In other words, "cause" implies "change", and "change" implies something which changes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you think rain pre-exists a saturated cloud that starts releasing droplets of water?

there is no limitation upon what can be incepted — Philosophim

You're saying inception equals a supernatural deity? — ucarr

No, I'm saying there's no prior cause for a first cause to exist, so there cannot be any prior limitations as to what a first cause had to be. No prior cause means no restraints as to what could have been. — Philosophim

You say, Establishment happens by first cause of the starting point of creation. You say, Inception of creation proceeds without limitation. How does what you say differ from what is said by the rabbi, the priest or the minister?

You're saying inception can incept a hydrogen atom not limited by its parts and the rules of itself? — ucarr

01) No, because then its not a hydrogen atom anymore. A hydrogen atom has a clear definition and limitation of what it can be. — Philosophim

02) I'm saying there's no prior cause for a first cause to exist, so there cannot be any prior limitations as to what a first cause had to be. No prior cause means no restraints as to what could have been. — Philosophim

Given the part of your quote underlined above, why cannot a first cause incept a hydrogen atom not limited by its parts and the rules of itself?

Why is your 02) quote not a contradiction of your 01) quote immediately above?

03) If a hydrogen atom incepts as a first cause, its still a hydrogen atom because that's what it is. — Philosophim

Do you agree that if a hydrogen atom has its own unique definition, then all that is not defined as a hydrogen atom is other?

Do you agree that if a hydrogen atom as first cause is utterly alone, and yet nonetheless can cause things not a hydrogen atom to exist, as its definition of first cause requires, then its ability to cause subsequent inception of all things without limitation is indistinguishable from the creative power of a supernatural deity?

04) Do you agree that if first cause of a hydrogen atom can only cause subsequent hydrogen atoms, then there is no general first cause of all things, only an infinity of first causes of every individual thing?

It doesn't mean that a first cause hydrogen atom cannot later bump into a first cause helium atom. But this influence is only after the inception of each, and neither can incept the other. — Philosophim

Do you agree that your above quote examples you saying first causes are parallel, meaning they don't interact? I repeat this question because the first time I asked you denied their parallelism.

Why do you not agree that positing an infinity of individual causes of an infinity of individual things is a trivial and circular statement about the universe as it's generally known by the public (everything is everything)?

You're saying that first cause, having no cause, took possession of its form by means of a non-existent cause? — ucarr

It did not exist by any prior cause. It has no intention or possession, as that would be prior to its inception. It simply is, no prior cause. — Philosophim

Why do you not think the underlined portion of your above quote implies something that simply is is eternal and thus has no inception? I ask this with the understanding inception implies establishment which, in turn, implies a process which is a cause.

I'm saying its axiomatic, but not beyond the domains of science, logic, and reason. — Philosophim

How do science, logic and reason examine what simply exists without the possibility of explanation?

...there is no limitation upon what can be incepted. — Philosophim

You're saying inception equals a supernatural deity?

lets say a hydrogen atom appeared as a first cause. As soon as it exits, it is a hydrogen atom. Its limited by its parts and the rules of itself. — Philosophim

You're saying inception can incept a hydrogen atom not limited by its parts and the rules of itself?

the necessary network of self/other, upon which first cause depends for its existence as a self, prevents the solitary, temporal primacy of that said self. — ucarr

I don't think that's quite it. The network of its continued self existence is bound by its formation. — Philosophim

Your saying inception can incept a first cause that possesses a boundary of selfhood beyond which there is no otherness? Moreover, you're saying the boundary of selfhood is simultaneously not a boundary since there is no otherness?

After a first cause exists, it enters into causality with everything it can interact with. — Philosophim

I'm staying there can be no prior cause which influences the inception of the first cause. — Philosophim

With the above two quotes you're saying each family of causation runs parallel with all other families of causation? Moreover, you're saying there's no general causation that applies to all causal sequences?

I've described before that with multiple first causes, the intersection of their consequential causality over time ends up being more like a web with the start of a strand representing the first cause. — Philosophim

You're saying pre-existing causal chains suggesting general causality predating a new first cause have no pertinence to a new first cause? Moreover, you're saying each new first cause requires a new study of causation starting from scratch?

You're saying a first cause can enter into causality in spite of it having no cause?

You're saying that first cause, having no cause, took possession of its form by means of a non-existent cause?

...something prior could exist, but if none of what exists causes a new existence, that new existence is a first cause. — Philosophim

You're saying a new causeless existence, post-dating prior existences with causes, nonetheless has no interaction with general causation? Moreover, you're saying each new causeless existence initiates a new family of causation unlike any pre-existing causation?

I'm staying there can be no prior cause which influences the inception of the first cause. — Philosophim

A first cause is when there is a point in which there is no prior cause. It is irrelevant whether we measure it or realize it. And, as the argument shows, its logically necessary that there eventually be at least one. — Philosophim

You're saying the number line has an end?

I've described before that with multiple first causes, the intersection of their consequential causality over time ends up being more like a web with the start of a strand representing the first cause. — Philosophim

You're saying being able to intersect doesn't imply merging causal chains share a common first cause?

A first cause cannot pass through time. — Philosophim

You're saying first causation is a phenomenon that transpires with time interval equal to zero?

...there is no prior cause which would prevent a first cause from appearing that does not follow conservation laws. — Philosophim

You're saying first causation is free to violate the conservation laws?

You're saying first causation is axiomatic and thus beyond the domains of science, logic and reason?

There must be something prior to the first "cause..." — Metaphysician Undercover

Please articulate an argument supporting this premise.

Because there is no prior cause for a first cause, there is no limitation on what a first cause could be. — Philosophim

Regarding no limitation, what about the selfhood of the first cause? If selfhood establishes a boundary between self and other, and the first cause is a self, then: a) it's limited by the boundaries of its selfhood; b) the necessary network of self/other, upon which first cause depends for its existence as a self, prevents the solitary, temporal primacy of that said self.

The key to being a first cause is that it is not caused by something prior. — Philosophim

That does not mean that other things prior to a first cause cannot exist like other first causes. — Philosophim

The photon did not cause the big bang; they are both first causes of their respective causality chains. — Philosophim

You're saying a particular first cause can have a non-causal relationship with other things prior to it?

Moreover, you're saying the attribute of first cause generally allows for a multiplicity of independent first causes temporally sequenced across a positive interval of time?

Does this not imply that a particular first cause has a bounded domain of first causal influence upon a sub-set of the totality of existing things?

For example, a photon appears with no prior causality here. Five minutes later and thousands of miles away, a big bang appears uncaused as well. The photon did not cause the big bang; they are both first causes of their respective causality chains. — Philosophim

Your above quote answers my question directly above it in the affirmative.

Is this not a description of everyday causes such as: a) a virus causes pneumonia; b) a cloud saturated with water causes rain?

Why is it not the case your argument now is merely a description of causation in the everyday world replete with many causes not casually linked to each other? You advance your argument by lopping off "first" and thereby turning first cause into everyday cause.

Am I mistaken in my understanding of your purpose as being an examination of the first cause of all existing things, including existence itself?

...a) no existing thing exists in isolation; b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement); c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. — ucarr

I don't believe so if my point has been clarified.

a. No existing thing exists in isolation

To clarify, there's a reason I call it a first cause. Because immediately after its existence it enters into causality. Meaning one time tick after, its has its own reference at a prior time tick to explain why it state of existence is as it is at the second tick of time. Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory. Nothing I'm noting is negating the universe as it is today, and we clearly have a lot of things. :) — Philosophim

If first cause passes through time from its first tick to its second tick, time is co-equal with it.

Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory. — Philosophim

I'm inclined to think the conservation laws forbid the total isolation of a thing. A truly isolated thing means all of mass_energy, being a singularity, negates equilibrium. If our universe defaults toward equilibrium, as the conservation laws confirm, then absolute singularity is an infinite value never reached.

b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement)

Once a first cause exists, it is within causality within its own temporal changes, or if there are other resulting chains of causal existence from other first causes. — Philosophim

Is self-causation is meaningful, its an attribute shared by all existing things.

c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. True. Though as you mentioned earlier, " when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence." — Philosophim

That takes us back to saying all of existence is its own first cause which is like saying "everything is everything," trivial.

The first cause is only in the first time tick. — Philosophim

From this I conclude you're grounding the primacy of first cause within temporal sequence. So, the first cause is first in time before all other things existing in time.

The universe cannot always have existed co-temporally as a first cause. The first cause is only in the first time tick. — Philosophim

Let's revisit something you said earlier:

Lets imagine that we first spy a hydrogen atom that forms with apparently no prior cause. Any time tick before this, the atom is not there. — Philosophim

Sidebar 1 - Notice I've made "forms" bold. If there's a "forms" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "forms" (i.e. physical processes) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom.

Sidebar 2 - Notice I've made "there" bold. If there's a "there" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "there" (i.e. spacetime) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom.

Main focus:

Once it is there, we know an atom is composed of particular parts. Lets pretend, for simplicities sake, that protons, neutrons, and electrons are fundamental particles. We say, "What causes this atom to exist?" We note the protons, neutrons, and electrons in a particular order. But this is not a prior cause, just the inner causal make up of the atom in general. — Philosophim

If you can posit theoretically the popping into existence of an atom as first cause, why cannot you posit theoretically the popping into existence of a universe as first cause?

In either case, when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence.

If there's no reason to partition atom and universe with respect to which collective can be first cause temporally, then first cause in terms of temporal sequencing is meaningless. In other words, existence in general, being first cause, makes the notion of a first cause in terms of temporal sequencing meaningless. Everything that can and does exist popped into existence at the same time.

If, on the other hand, you posit an innate temporal sequence of existing things, with some things not existing in any conceivable way prior to a specific point in one-directional time, then you must ask yourself if positing any first existing thing generates an infinite regress of prior existing things because: a) no existing thing exists in isolation; b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement); c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. In sum, all of this draws a circle back to saying temporal primacy of existence is meaningless.

"What causes this atom to exist?" We note the protons, neutrons, and electrons in a particular order. But this is not a prior cause, just the inner causal make up of the atom in general. — Philosophim

This is a common sense answer. Let's consider details. A proton is not an atom. Likewise, a neutron is not an atom and, etc. Also, we know that elementary particles combine, split apart into other particles, change orbital shells and, etc. Furthermore, we know atoms combine to form compounds and they combine to form radicals and, etc. All of these phenomena are differentiable. Pretty soon, you've got the entire phenomenal universe as you and I know it today popping into existence as the first cause. But the phenomenal processes I've been describing happen in time. If you remove the time element for an atom, or for a universe, either way the primacy of being first becomes meaningless.

Let's suppose the entire universe is the first cause. If everything has always existed co-temporally, then first cause is meaningless.

Why do you not think the logical necessity of a first cause positions it as an antecedent to the first cause it necessitates?
— ucarr

Could you clarify this with an example? You definitely make good points ucarr, I'm just not quite getting it here. — Philosophim

In this example, logical necessity is, by definition, logically prior to the ontic status of the first cause it necessitates. It is the logical cause of the "first" cause. This is what you're implying with the wording of you OP title: "A First Cause Is Logically Necessary."

You yourself are doing exactly what you say below must not be done:

My point is that there is no way to predict when or how a first cause would form or exist. To say a first cause must form a particular way (e.g. via logical necessity) or is likely to form at a particular time would require a cause outside of itself. — Philosophim

Does any type of priority negate first cause? Is it only temporal priority that negates first cause?

Please give me a functional definition (what it does) and a real-world example (what it is) of the following terminology : a> "end oriented constraints" ; b> "absentially tied" ; c> "Physically compelled strategic constrainsts via design" ; d> "blockchain of nested dynamical systems". — Gnomon

An everyday example of an end-oriented constraint comes in the example of a woman who decides she'll eliminate dairy products from her meals. By constraining her eating behavior to exclude dairy products over an extensive interval of time she drops quite a few pounds, the end her constraint was forwardly directed towards. Weight loss is what it does causally. A non-dairy diet is what it is.

Absential binding is exampled by a controlled burn in a forest. During the spring season at a national park, park staffers do a controlled burn to eliminate dead leaves, tree limbs and debris. During the summer season, park visitors enjoy enhanced safety bound to what's absent, dangerous kindling strategically removed. Hazardous materials removal is what it does. Land clearance is what it is.

A physically compelled strategic constraint via design is exampled by encrypted data communications protecting online money transfers. Transmission of currency value signifiers (bits) via open/closed gate sequences astronomical in their possible permutations proceeds to receptors with matching open/closed gate sequences extremely resistant to random duplication (due to improbability). Biasing towards far from equilibrium probability statistics is what it does. Privatized monetary data is what it is.

Blockchaining of nested dynamical systems is exampled by human metabolism. Ingested food is
broken down from starches to sugars. This thermodynamically released energy in turn is aggregated from the cellular level to a morphodynamic distribution across a network of chemical complexes regulating the major organ systems. Next, the neuronal networks of the brain's hemispheres alert the individual to the slaking of hunger in the presence of a surplus of necessary nutritional supplies. Finally, the teleodynamically empowered feedback looping of the brain's memory modules informs the individual of his happy feeling while resting before going to bed. Vertical stacking of higher-orders of Shannon Information is what it does. A successfully prepared supper is what it is.

...a photon can appear without any velocity — Philosophim

Do you dispute that a photon with rest mass entails infinite quantities, and that equations describing practical situations break down upon approach to functions with infinite input/output values?

A first cause may be already in motion.. — Philosophim

Why is it not the case that if a first cause instantiates already in motion, then spacetime, mass_energy, velocity and a host of other physical fundamentals (spin, charge, up/down quarkiness, color, charm, etc.) co-exist with it, thus stripping it of being "first?"

More generally, how can something be first cause if its essential makeup entails differentiable constituent components co-equal in primary status?

Does this thought suggest to you a first cause as abstract concept must be a pure singularity and, as such, exists as a conceptual limit approachable only through mind via imagination?

Why do you not think the logical necessity of a first cause positions it as an antecedent to the first cause it necessitates?

...a first cause would be a Y with no other X entity as its cause for existence. — Philosophim

Why do you not say a first cause is Y & ~Y in superposition? I ask this particular question with the assumption that a first cause must instantiate motion.

If motion is essential to a first cause no less so than to its effects, then said first cause must be self-transcendent. If self-transcendence entails change of position, then first cause must paradoxically encompass itself and the negation of itself in a state of superposition placing the contradictions in two places at once. Superposition is then, by my argument here, the means by which a first cause (presumably a single) effects essential motion.

A question is whether a self-transcendent cause in superposition is paradoxically a first cause and not a first cause due to the bi-directional, paradoxical causation of the two iterations of a single self vis-a-vis itself.

Do you agree that causation is the natural form of shape-shifting within the our phenomenal world of material things?

In that moment, that duplicate, even if qualitatively identical to you, is numerically distinct. Therefore, that someone else gets to live your life is slim comfort in the face of the fact that you will be killed. — hypericin

Yes. It seems to me that duplication entails splitting.

No. Kirk wasn't also split. Kirk was split. Riker was not. Two entirely different scenarios.

Kirk was, indeed, split in two. His yin and yang halves were separated.

Riker was duplicated. — Patterner

Are you sure duplicating doesn't entail splitting?

If you duplicate a man without simultaneously splitting him, in the Newtonian scenario you have identical copies synchronized. Has any human seen this in 3D?

If you duplicate a man without simultaneously splitting him, in the QM scenario you have upwardly energized that man into superposition. In that situation, meeting one or the other duplicate means being in one or the other of two alternate realities. Moreover, these alternate realities, with respect to the duplicates (whatever that is) are indistinguishable. So, when one duplicate is met, the other duplicate collapses, and vice-versa. Now you have branching trajectories of multiple witnesses who are necessarily paradoxically lying about the simultaneous identical yet differential circumstances of meeting one or the other duplicates, both equally and identically yet differentially true.

If you duplicate the man and simultaneously split him, one man being in one place and moving about out of sync with the other man being in another place and also moving about out of sync with the first it's clear they are extremely similar in form and content but not duplicates. As they continue to be in different places having different experiences, even as the same man they, like twins, will continue to grow apart.

Furthermore, the observing mind-brain-body is physically entangled with the object of its observation — ucarr

I say that mind in philosophical thought exists emergent from brain-body. I think this position lies closer to the truth than the position claiming mind in philosophical thought exists independent from brain-body.

That's why I prefer to avoid getting tangled-up in materialistic physics, on a forum designed for discussion of meta-physics. The object of a physical experiment is a material Object, external to the Brain, but the object of mental "observation" is a Subject, internal to the Mind. — Gnomon

Your above quote expresses the crux of our disagreement about the correct approach to practicing philosophy. You say, "Do philosophy by avoiding materialistic physics." I say, "Do philosophy by embracing materialistic physics."

I think you're ensnared within a self-defeating struggle in your efforts to straddle materialistic science and metaphysical philosophy. That's your actual approach to doing philosophy: inhabit the middle position, not avoidance. I cite the following as an example of the most recent evidence of this internal conflict:

The "Hard Problem" of consciousness is only made more complicated by including the entangled neurons in the definition of Mind. Unfortunately, the philosophy of Materialism does not allow us to make such categorical distinctions. — Gnomon

You want to make metaphysical discoveries about abstract thought while skipping over the discoveries of neuroscience? This attitude parallels an automotive engineer saying, "Hey, man. Those mechanics with their heads stuck under a hood can't tell me anything."

inferred Photons — Gnomon

or

infra-red Photons — Gnomon

...the photons, while moving at lightspeed are massless, and electrons are both non-local and massless while "flowing". — Gnomon

I see online that photons are paradoxical with regard to their wave/particle status. Speaking paradoxically, photons are matter without mass. As you know, they don't exist at rest.

Electrons have mass and they're only stationary at wavelength infinity, so under natural conditions electrons are matter with mass.

So, in its (photon) normal invisible & massless state, does it qualify as materially Absent"? — Gnomon

Photons and electrons, being particles, hold place as parts of presential materialism.

The strategic constraints of upwardly evolving dynamical processes, in contrast to photons and electrons, exemplify absential materialism.

The neuronal circuitry of the brain, acting as the platform for the mind, connects with the furture states of being of end-directed design through physically caused contraints on higher-order dynamics. These constraints are contra-grade forces impelling emergence of mind, a dynamical process substrated by but independent from brain.

Let me make a distinction between materially absent and materially absential. The difference is parallel to the difference between 2 - x versus 2i = 0 + 2i. In verbal grammar this is the difference between something simply distanced, as in the first example versus something distanced-yet-complexly-connected, as in the second example. — ucarr

The mind, like an imaginary number, has a distanced-yet-complexly-connected-with-its- base relationship: imaginary number to real number and mind to brain. In both instances, the distanced thing, because it has parameters that violate its substrate, seems therefore necessarily separate from it and thus the perplexing bifurcation of things implicitly connected. Understanding emergence as a phenomenon that imparts category transgression within the domain of inter-dependence between the transgressor and the transgressed lies at the heart of understanding absential materialism.

I'm gradually coming to realize that Materialism is an unprovable metaphysical Axiom (presumption), not an empirical scientific Theory (inference from facts). It's more of an attitude or belief than a fact. So, I guess I can't expect such beliefs to make sense in an objective manner. — Gnomon

So, you think materialism is objectively non-sensical.

Terrence Deacon said "Materialism, the view that there are only material things and their interactions in the world, seems impotent here" {my emphasis}. He also referred to “the antimaterialist claim” that “like meanings & purposes, consciousness may not be something there in any typical sense of being materially or energetically embodied, and yet may still be materially causally relevant” p7.{my bold} — Gnomon

Your concept of Absential Materialism may be related to the notion of “materially relevant”. :smile: — Gnomon

Since we both agree on the material relevance of thought, again I say we're not far apart in our beliefs. I further think thought absentially material whereas you hold fast at thinking thought materially relevant.

I can provisionally agree with the first part of your assertion above : "mental functions are dependent on material things" ; but not with the second part : "because they {mental functions} too are material things, albeit absentially". How can something "absential" be material? Isn't Presence an essential element of the definition of "material" — Gnomon

Consider the modulated EM-field that populates your tv screen with audio-visual phenomena. Does the EM-field have presence within your den? How about when the tv set is off. Does the EM-field still have presence within your den? Now, let's take a step further from the foggy presence of a waveform energy field to the absential presence of an absence strategically constrained by the design intent of a teleodynamic process compelling the strategic absence via its physicality. We have a physical system propagating through physical spacetime towards a desired future state of being.

Deacon's "absence" seems to be a commonsense reference to the philosophical concept of "potential". — Gnomon

potential | pəˈten(t)SH(ə)l |
adjective [attributive]
having or showing the capacity to become or develop into something in the future: a two-pronged campaign to woo potential customers. — Apple Dictionary

If my argument above your last quote has truth content, then it applies here also.

Life is a function of Causation in a material substrate. — Gnomon

But those Absential products are not made of Presential matter. So, my question is not about the walnut-shaped Vessel, but about the contents we call Mind : the "Substance" or "Essence" of subjective Ideas, as defined by Aristotle*3. — Gnomon

In a functional relationship, there's an operator that transforms input into output. For sentients with minds generating abstractions, they, no less than the other orders of life, function with the operator as the nested hierarchy of self-organizing dynamical processes articulated by Deacon. Furthermore, the observing mind-brain-body is physically entangled with the object of its observation. Still furthermore, the medium propagating the object/observer relationship is material-physical spacetime. Absential materialism, possessing both properties of waves and of particles, presents itself as a knot of complexity fostering the-glass-is-half-full-half-empty debates.

In what meaningful sense are Abstract Nouns*1, such as Absence, Function, and Causation, referring to material things, and not to ideas about things or processes? Of course, mental abstractions are dependent on a material Brain, but scientifically, their referents have no objective material substance, only subjective meaning. It's the material stuff that is Absent or Absential. — Gnomon

If end-oriented constraints compel self-organizing reciprocal processes, with constraint bottom-up and supervenience top-down, then the physical products of these nested processes of higher-order dynamics are absentially tied to these absent contraints because without them, these products wouldn't exist. Physically compelled strategic constrainsts via design constructs the bridge linking physical dynamics with physical things. This blockchain of interwoven dynamical causes examples absence, i.e., non-physicality causally linked to physicality.

This seeming break between mind and body is in reality absential materialism. Below is Deacon's blockchain of nested dynamical systems bi-directionally linked across space and time:

The dynamical reflexivity and constraint closure that characterizes a teleodynamic system, whether constituting intraneuronal processes or the global-signaling dynamics developing within an
entire brain, creates an internal/external self/other distinction that is determined by this dynamical closure. Its locus is ultimately something not materially present—a self-creating system of constraints with the capacity to do work to maintain its dynamical continuity—and yet it provides a precise dynamical boundedness.

The sentience at each level is implicit in the capacity to do self-preservative work, as this constitutes the system’s sensitivity to non-self influences via an intrinsic tendency to generate a self-sustaining contragrade dynamics. This tendency to generate self-preserving work with respect to such influences is a spontaneous defining characteristic of such reciprocity of constraint creation. Closure and autonomy are thus the very essence of sentience. But they are also the reason that higher-order sentient teleogenic systems can be constituted of lower-order teleogenic systems, level upon level, and yet produce level-specific emergent forms of sentience that are both irreducible and unable to be entirely merged into larger conglomerates.2 It is teleogenic closure that produces sentience but also isolates it, creating the fundamental distinction between self and other, whether at a neuronal level or a mental level.

You seem to have been confused between your mind and the objects of your perception. — Corvus

A visual artist walks a country road early morning one day. Through the light, blue-gray fog he sees the dark-spotted, white "blanket" at the center flank of an Appaloosa. It's running circles around the paddock in a frolic with neighing.

Come evening, the artist finishes a charcoal sketch of the morning Appaloosa just as his wife comes into his studio with news of supper being ready. She praises his work by way of commenting upon the vitality of the captured image.

He smiles at her. "I have a sticky mind for pretty pictures, my dear. Especially for horses at daybreak. Something smells good. Roast beef?" He puts his arm around her as they stroll towards the kitchen. Glancing back to the studio, she smiles, looking at her charcoal portrait next to the Appaloosa. "Now that you've got me just right, and the horse just right, maybe we should go down to that ranch and buy that horse."

Hecuba, Hesperia’s mother, stands up from the gathering and the elder dares not deny her the floor.

“Please, grand dam, speak to us.”

“It’s clear to me the looking glass favors no one beyond the person it happens to reflect upon in the moment.” — ucarr

What you see and hear, the content of your perception is not your mind. — Corvus

At the dinner table, between mouthfuls of roast beef slathered with horseradish, he makes an admission to her. "You know, the grain of my charcoal pencil is too coarse. The appaloosa has a much finer coat. But there's no way to change the grain of my pencil, so I had to rough up the appaloosa." She comforts him. "Well now, that's not to worry about. Roughing up the appaloosa makes a pretty visual."

Observer Effect

...your incumbent job is to define what mind is. What does mind mean to you? Please define. — Corvus

The curious villager comes forward. "It's you duty to tell what you believe about mind."

"Narrative holds up a mirror to nature." -- Shakespeare

Chorus:

The speed of light is constant. It’s absolute in its velocity. All other velocities refer to it.

Photons have no rest mass. Light is the animation of the universe. All other animations refer to it.

The popular question is “What?” The mysterious question is “How?”
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The elder, after venturing across the lake to the far island of the mysterious, flashing lights, returns to his village. He carries a large, rectangular shape underneath a sackcloth.

After supper, the villagers gather round the elder for the unveiling of the gift from the far island, now held for hours of painful suspense underneath the sackcloth.

The elder calls on Glaucon, his favorite student, to come forth before the gathering inside the cave and remove the sackcloth.

Upon doing so, the villagers start gasping with excitement as they see images of themselves on the surface of the looking glass just unveiled.

Andrew, Glaucon’s friend, exclaims, “I see a man who moves just as I move.”

Hesperia, arriving just as the sun behind her is deepest gold, answers Andrew. “You are looking upon yourself.”

“I am in that shiny surface?”

“You are,” the elder explains.

Glaucon, suddenly jealous, shoves aside Andrew and now his image inhabits the shiny surface.

Before long, a gaggle of men fight amongst themselves for a place in the shiny surface.

Sebastian, clever and observant, exclaims “It is the lake, the deity that gives us our fishing, made solid. Have we not seen shadows moving just as we move in the daylight water?”

The elder spoke up. “Not shadows, but rather reflections, just like you see in the daylight water.”

Hesperia chimed in. “But this lake become solid doesn’t let us see through our doubles down to the lakebed below.”

“Listen to me, students. Our gift, from the dwellers on the island across the lake, has a name. They call it a looking glass. It has a special magic that lets you look backwards at yourself. When it looks at the sun, it makes you look backwards at the great source of life. The blinding lights from across the lake have us looking backwards at the sun.”

Hesperia laughs when Glaucon, turning around and facing her, exclaims, “I can’t see myself by looking backwards!”

When the elder beckons her to come to the front and stand beside him, she obliges him.

“Hesperia, gaze into our looking glass and tell us who it favors within itself.” The elder keeps his stern gaze upon her as she stands there suddenly affrighted.

“The cave grows quiet as she contemplates the reflection of herself for a long time.

Andrew can’t hold his peace any longer. “Hesperia, most beautiful maiden of all! The looking glass favors you!”

The elder next beckons Daphne, the cook still wearing her bloody apron, to come forward. She too gazes at her reflection for a long time.

Hecuba, Hesperia’s mother, stands up from the gathering and the elder dares not deny her the floor.

“Please, grand dam, speak to us.”

“It’s clear to me the looking glass favors no one beyond the person it happens to reflect upon in the moment.”

The elder, delighted, smiles, nodding his approval. “Yes, Lady Hecuba. You speak truth.”

After Hecuba seats herself, the elder makes his move. “Who can tell us something about the looking glass most memorable?”

Glaucon rises to the occasion. “The looking glass favors no one.”

“Anyone else care to speak?”

Hesperia rises. “The looking glass, if it has time enough, will favor everything in creation that might be looked upon.”

The elder is now very excited. “Who else can speak?”

Daphne’s voice suddenly starts intoning. “The looking glass wants to take a journey throughout all of creation! It wants to see everything.”

Hecuba rises. “A journey throughout all of creation? That’s a journey without an ending.”

Now the elder is ready to deliver the closer. “Consider a journey without an ending. It is constant, moving at the speed of possibility, and it never rests. It’s not primarily concerned with what to look at, but rather how to look at. And what does it tell us about how to look at?”

Glaucon has the last word. “Look at everything.”
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Chorus:

When looking glass looks at looking glass, not only is what they see not local, it’s not localizable.