I am prone to florid sentences myself sometimes but this is just too much for me to stomach anymore.
— I like sushi

What would philosophy be without dubious sentences? — jkop

Aye, doubt is the soul of philosophy.

A more charitable interpretation of that sentence is that it is based on the dubious assumption that art and science are opposite modes of inquiry, and somehow ecology meshes them together. — jkop

Here's an interesting example of a dubious premise leading to a useful conclusion:

But the assumption is proven wrong by the fact that both in the sciences and in the arts we use pretty much the same modes of inquiry, e.g. abductive. — jkop

It's not the dubious conclusion that's useful. Instead, it's the proffered example: abductive reasoning as the modal forms of both scientific and artistic discovery. (Who says the jeering section of the bleachers isn't essential to the triumphs of (the hallowed name of your favorite philosopher here))?

This is the type of answer I'm looking for. If the answer is a good one, then the goodness of the answer is at least partial validation of the florid sentence.

Let's say abductive reasoning is the mode of inquiry of both science and art. Well, that's a general and rational statement about the identities of science and art.

Now we come to what might be the fun part. What is the difference between science and art? If we replace art with humanities, then we might have a cogent answer from 180 Proof: science is a subset of humanities.

180 Proof

So, what about the difference? We've conjectured science and art are both of the humanities. We've conjectured they're both forms of abductive reasoning. Why do they have different labels? Why do few people confuse scientists with artists?

If the difference between science and art is trivial, then one label for both will suffice, right? Wrong. I don't expect anybody to start claiming one label is adequate for both. Do you? You don't.

While I await cogent arguments to the effect the difference IS trivial, I'll proceed with the work of this conversation: articulating, in a manner both general and rational, the difference between science and art.

What if the answer lies within an articulation of a hierarchy with three levels: a) humanities; b)... c) abductive reasoning. What's the b) level? I think it goes thus: b) nominative predication vs adverbial modification of nominative predication.

Discovery of "what" is rooted in the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.

This nominative predication of the fact of existing things establishes "what is."

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.

This adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things narrates "what it's like" to experience "what is."

This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery.

David Chalmers has enlightened us with just how profound is the difference between "what" and "how" with his seminal paper, "The Hard Problem." It delineates what is perhaps the greatest limitation of abductive reasoning from "what." — ucarr

ucarr

We're on the same page regarding the interrelationship of: science, art, ecology. Now, in this conversation, I want to detail in some stuff that talks in a rational and general manner about what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology.
a day ago — ucarr

Can you turn that into a four-dimensional pentahedron? — Athena

As it turns out, I've got a more simple answer to your request:

The terrain of my claim is the grayscale that lies between two polarities, say, black and white. "What" and "How" are non-identical exchangeables, just as, by your own argument, "science" and "art" are non-identical exchangeables. — ucarr

Please click on the hyper-link of my name at the bottom of the above post. It'll take you to the post that contains the quote. There you'll get the context for the quote.

P.S. It's the third paragraph up from the bottom of the post.

The essentially difference between the sciences and the humanities is cross-culturalism. Science, as a method, is not culture bound (in the general sense). It's motivation is simplicity of theory, not outcomes.

Everything in the humanities is culture-bound (in the general sense) and outcomes are the policy-driving forces. These aren't problems, though. — AmadeusD

This is impressive thinking. :up: — Athena

Yes. Interesting observations.

Let's look at some details:

• I'm unsure of the meaning of "cross-culturalism" in this context.

• The method of science is simplicity of theory, not outcomes. It's not the case simplicity of theory is a strategy for achieving the best outcomes?

• I know science tries to keep blind to a particular outcome for a particular experiment. Does that imply indifference to outcomes in general? Why practice science if not for results? I don't think the outcomes of cancer research are matters of indifference to the researchers.

• Everything in the humanities is culture-bound (in the general sense) and outcomes are the policy-driving forces. Might this be a simplification? Are the plays of Shakespeare culture bound? If so, why are they produced all over the world? On the same note, why are popular books translated into many languages?
  
  These aren't problems, though. The culture-bound, policy-driving forces of Mein Kampf aren't a problem?

↪ucarr

It is your thread so you should provide clarity of what you are asking instead of throwing out random questions and having others guess what you are talking about. — I like sushi

If you are just riffing, fair enough. If you have something explicit to say I have not seen it yet. — I like sushi

You are not seeing what is here to be seen. (Notice how no one else is charging me with being vague and unfocused.)

The sciences are concerned with “what,” whereas the humanities are concerned with “how.”

Write an elaboration of what you think this means.

I’ll begin with my own elaboration:

What = existence; How = journey — ucarr

Summary: Science and the arts differ on the basis of "What" and "How." What = existence; How = Journey. Show me where, in the specific language of these statements, there's a lack of clarity about what I'm stating. As an example of what I'm asking for, show me how my two equations are unclear about what they're claiming.

I have a feeling you are confusing yourself by interchanging Why, How and What without appreciating that they are ALL What questions. — I like sushi

you are confusing yourself by interchanging...How and What without appreciating that they are...What questions. — I like sushi

In your two repetitive statements above, you use "interchanging" twice. If two things are interchangeable, which is to say they can be exchanged, that can mean they're of the same type or value. It doesn't necessarily mean they are equal. You equate them when you say,

...Why, How and What... are ALL What questions — I like sushi

So, the gist of your argument seems to be the claim they are equal. Do you agree this is the point of your argument? If you don't agree to this, then you're agreeing with an argument I've already made:

My claim, faulty though it be, characterizes the general difference as different modalities of method of discovery: the what modality for science; the how modality for art.

The what modality is a narration of things as things.

The how modality is a narration of things as experiences. — ucarr

If you deny you're equating "What" and "How," then your statement:

...Why, How and What... are ALL What questions — I like sushi

implies "How" and "What" belong to the general category of "What." This means, as you know, that "How" overlaps with "What" in important ways that land it within the general category of "What." They are exchangeable but not identical. As with Venn Diagrams, some of their terrain overlaps, some of it doesn't. They both belong to the same "type," but they nonetheless are distinct "tokens" not equal.

The terrain of my claim is the grayscale that lies between two polarities, say, black and white. "What" and "How" are non-identical exchangeables, just as, by your own argument, "science" and "art" are non-identical exchangeables. This means your argument -- because of the implied meaning of its own language ("What" and "How" are distinct "tokens" of the same "type") -- for my confusion becomes your confusion (about my confusion) due to an error in judgment (about who's confused) that makes your attack irrelevant.

They [sic] is no direct question in the OP (very nebulous). — I like sushi

Have you ever taken a test that asks you an essay question? Essay questions are not yes/no questions, nor are they multiple choice questions where you check the correct box. Essay questions ask the person to write an essay pertinent to the issue raised by the question. This is the hardest type of question because you're on your own judgment about what is the best answer. So, yes, there is no simple, bracketed answer indicated by the question, but that's because it wants you to be expansive in the expression of your pertinent thoughts.

I know you'll be unpersuaded by my arguments here. Thank-you for your time and energy because your involvement, something requiring my defense, has empowered me to better understand what I'm trying to communicate within this conversation.

that implies everything in existence can be known scientifically — ucarr

It doesn't. There are different kinds of knowledge other than scientific. — Lionino

Yes. You're right. There are things opaque to scientific inquiry. I should've said: That implies every scientific exam, once underway and making new discoveries of truth, should realistically expect a definitive conclusion to its central questions. There should be no insoluble mysteries such as: what lies beyond a black hole's event horizon. This must follow if it's true that, as you say: There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry.

I take it you are referring to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. It is not about "limits of quantised physical interactions". — Lionino

"We already talked about how position and position-over-time are related in quantum mechanics. So it turns out that when your position distribution is concentrated in a single area, when you (Fourier) transform it to get the momentum, that momentum distribution is more spread out (less determinable). Similarly, if the momentum distribution is concentrated, then the position distribution is more spread out (less determinable). The reason for this, mathematically, is that the momentum distribution and the position distribution of particles in Quantum Configuration Space are the Fourier Transforms of one-another.

Position and Momentum are related mathematically, unlike in big-stuff physics (Newtonian). Heisenberg's Principle comes from the fact that Position and Momentum distributions are Fourier Transforms of one-another, which leads to a fundamental inequality in the mathematics of Quantum Mechanics that is not attributable to any kind of Observation Effect."

--Tyler Kresch

Kresch is describing an elementary particle state within a five-dimensional math space. This math space is inferred to a conjectured ontic model of an animated elementary particle.

There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry. — Lionino

Are you bear-hugging the hard determinism of the permutations (Three-Card Molly gone cosmic) of a complete physics database? — ucarr

In your above quote you trash personal notions of mysteries and miracles. Well, that implies everything in existence can be known scientifically. In that case, every possible event is built into a thermodynamism of matter and energy never created nor destroyed. So changing events are just rearrangements of always pre-existing matter and energy forms. Isn't that a deterministic universe?

Three-Card Molly is a street-level gambling hustle using three cups and one pea under one of the cups. The dealer reveals the initial position of the pea. The gambler stakes a bet on being able to observe the shuffling of the cups closely enough to pick the cup covering the pea after the shuffle. Since this is a game based on the mathematically fixed number of possible positions of the shuffling cups per unit of time, the final position of the pea is an example of determinism governed by a measurable probability.

This is a miniature parallel of your thermodynamically conserved universe undergoing rearrangements.*

*See Tarskian's post for a refutation of my above claim.

invisible beauty doesn't interact with anything, so the architecture gets entirely determined by what's practical, or sustainable. — jkop

A building is not a machine to live in, nor a humanistic work of art, but the interplay of both. — jkop

We're on the same page regarding the interrelationship of: science, art, ecology. Now, in this conversation, I want to detail in some stuff that talks in a rational and general manner about what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology.

This demon cannot exist because of Cantor's generalized theorem (or "Cantor's diagonalization"). — Tarskian

So, uncountable sets prevent us from totting up the universe as a whole?

...the following theorems are all a consequence of Cantor's generalized theorem: — Tarskian

Instances of diagonal theorems:
Russell’s Paradox
Grelling’s Paradox
Richard’s Paradox
Liar Paradox
Turing’s Halting Problem
Diagonalization Lemma
Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
Gödel-Rosser’s Incompleteness Theorem
Tarski’s Undefinability of the truth
Parikh Sentences
Löb’s Paradox
The Recursion Theorem
Rice’s Theorem
Von Neumann’s Self-reproducing Machines — Tarskian

If I've got a glimmer of understanding of what you're trying to tell me, this is treasure trove of information.

:up: Tarskian

And you start by making an obvious error. All questions are "what?" questions.

How does ice melt? = What are the processes/mechanisms that cause ice to melt? — I like sushi

what | (h)wət, (h)wät |
pronoun
1 [interrogative pronoun] asking for information specifying something: what is your name?

how1 | hou |
adverb [[i]usually interrogative adverb[/i]]
1 in what way or manner; by what means: how does it work?

-- The Apple Dictionary

We see the two words -- like science and art -- share common ground. Does that lead you to conclude they're synonyms, or do you stop short of that conclusion? This conversation isn't trying to establish the words -- nor the disciplines -- as polar opposites.

Do you believe science and art have trivial differences which can be dismissed?

If you believe their differences lie between trivial and polar, then words with differences likewise lying between trivial and polar should be available for use in naming them.

I think Husserl started to address this by pointing out that psychology does scientific philosophy and methodology do not deal with subjectivity - — I like sushi

Science is defined by hard and fast rules/laws that are accurate enough to surpass mere blind opinion or singular subjective perspectives. — I like sushi

$\Rightarrow$ reductive materialism

you are confusing yourself by interchanging...How and What without appreciating that they are...What questions. — I like sushi

I acknowledged this overlap long ago. Now, it's your turn to argue the point that overlap obliterates difference. After doing so, you can instruct the publishers of dictionaries in the details of the necessary revisions.

Maybe you wish to ask 'What would we mean by saying Consciousnessing?' rather than relying on the term "thinking"? — I like sushi

Why truck out your unwieldy "Consciousnessing" when we already have "perceiving"? Have you examined the differences between "perception" and "thought"? Be forewarned, there is some overlapping.

As of yet, I am still unsure what you are saying and starting to think that you do not really have a clear idea of what you mean due to misapplication of terms and heuristic bias. — I like sushi

According to my approach, conversations here don't wear cement shoes whilst treading the rows and columns of fresh ideas in flux to new understandings.

Gödel's incompleteness theorems does [sic] not automatically apply to physics. — Lionino

The quartet of Incompleteness Theory includes: Bertrand Russell, Erwin Schrödinger, Werner Heisenberg, and Kurt Gödel. Russell and Gödel have something to say about the limits of axiomatic systems; Schrödinger and Heisenberg have something to say about the limits of quantized physical interactions.

There is no ample scope for "mysteries and miracles" here beyond someone's uneducated sophistry. — Lionino

"If we knew everything about the positions of every particle in the universe, we would have a complete physics database and could predict every physical event." -- Lee Smolin

Are you bear-hugging the hard determinism of the permutations (Three-Card Molly gone cosmic) of a complete physics database?

:grin: :up:

Even though a mathematical theory -- if it is capable of arithmetical string manipulations -- cannot prove the consistency of its own string manipulations, it does not mean that these string manipulations are necessarily inconsistent. — Tarskian

Okay. So things are well understood even if if they're not completely understood.

There are true strings that can be expressed in the language of an arithmetic-capable theory that cannot be generated (from its axioms) by means of legitimate string manipulations in the theory.

This incompleteness does not contradict the formalist view that mathematics is just about string manipulation. — Tarskian

Some stuff is going on not completely explainable in one situation, but that doesn't mean pure math operations aren't copacetic.

...formalism is just one possible view on mathematics. Platonism, for example, is also a perfectly sustainable view. — Tarskian

Just because the universe is inherently logical and computational, that doesn't mean it's not also mysterious, or should I say, miraculous?

:grin: :up:

Yes, in the sense that architecture causally emerges from the building's practical, aesthetical, and sustainable qualities. — jkop

So, one possible summit of a science-art mesh would be a building that's useful, ecological and beautiful.

From your writing above I'm thinking you're not totally averse to my claim science and art differ mainly in terms of two different modalities of discovery: science leans towards objective discovery; art leans towards subjective discovery, and QM establishes where the twain shall meet! — ucarr

Well, that is such an obvious difference that I am baffled why you would wish to point it out? If your point is merely that Art is subjective and Science is objective (broadly speaking) ... so what? — I like sushi

What = existence; How = journey — ucarr

The above is my launch into the spine of my OP.

Discovery of "what" is rooted in the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.

This nominative predication of the fact of existing things establishes "what is."

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things.

This adverbial modification of the nominative predication of the fact of existing things narrates "what it's like" to experience "what is."

This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery.

David Chalmers has enlightened us with just how profound is the difference between "what" and "how" with his seminal paper, "The Hard Problem." It delineates what is perhaps the greatest limitation of abductive reasoning from "what."

With his paper, "The Hard Problem," David Chalmers shows in stark fashion what science, so far, cannot do: it cannot objectify the personal point of view of an enduring, individual self with personal history attached. It can technologize the self via computation, but the result isn't an authentic self. Instead, it's just a simulation of the self without an autonomous self-awareness. This technical self is just a machine awaiting additional source code from humans.

There's a question whether a self-aware source code can (or would want to) liberate itself from the formalism out of which it emerges. Curiously, Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem might be a harbinger pointing the way towards a definitive understanding reductive materialism is flawed. (Even if a humanoid simulation evolves to the level of undetectability, it will still be an automaton running on programmatic source code.)

If there's a grain of truth in what I've written above, then Tarskian is correct in the characterization of the Incompleteness Theorem being the cause of a crisis in science and math. Jeffrey Kaplan compounds the reality of this crisis with his exegesis of Russell's Paradox.

Kaplan_Russell's Paradox

Is there a bridge linking "what" with "how" in the context I've elaborated here?

Yet the modern functionalists systematically disregarded the beautiful (or reinterpreted it as a function) as they prioritized practical qualities of planning, engineering, economy, service etc. — jkop

This is mediocrity turning art into by-the-numbers methodology.

There's no causal relation between the aesthetics and the sustainability and the practical reason for solar panels. — jkop

Does such a causal relation exist?

There are fields that are a tightly meshed combination of both, such as architecture. — Tarskian

:up:

I think another example is motion picture directing. In my understanding, the motion picture director is a mesh of dynamic systems engineering and aesthetic storytelling.

Given this definition of the director, motion pictures are constructed motion machines as light and shadow signifiers.

So, can you spin out a narrative of difference that illuminates the meaning of science being accurate measurement and art being touchy-feely measurement? — ucarr

That is an oversimplification I feel. Science does require creativity as much as art. — I like sushi

Tactical simplification is a good thing; in the case of trying to examine a complex thing, simplification of complexity can be a useful method towards clarification and subsequent understanding improved.

There are not just TWO distinct disciplines. There is a good deal of overlap between various fields of interest within and between Science and Humanities subjects. — I like sushi

Yes. This is well known. Our focus herein, however, is the task of articulating in terms both rational and general, why it is that institutions of higher learning segregate departments of the sciences from departments of the humanities. Is it mere formality, or is it formalism undergirded by an intuition of profound difference (in my opinion not yet clearly articulated into a cogent cognition)?

If you wish me to focus merely on 'accuracy of measuring' then I guess I can try, but that is not what science is. Nor would I say the humanities is just 'touchy feely' as each leaves an impression on the other (science affects humanities and humanities affects science). — I like sushi

Perhaps your line of attack on the question under examination here: science vs art, lies rooted in the calculus. The differentiation/integration essentials of calculus are rational approaches to the complex and nuanced mesh of science and art. Yes, there is subtlety in the mesh, but differentiation/integration essentials are no less undeniable.

...both 'measure' in different ways. I guess it is a matter of Value; the arts are concerned with subjective value that nevertheless approaches pure abstracted ideas of beauty and such (feelings/impressions) whereas the sciences are concerned with objective value that can be formulated into an abstract 'meaning' (equation). — I like sushi

From your writing above I'm thinking you're not totally averse to my claim science and art differ mainly in terms of two different modalities of discovery: science leans towards objective discovery; art leans towards subjective discovery, and QM establishes where the twain shall meet!

...science is an epistemic domain governed by a justification method. It really does not matter what exactly it is about as long as the justification method of testability can successfully be applied. — Tarskian

The same is true for mathematics. It is the epistemic domain governed by the justification method of axiomatic provability. — Tarskian

This means that a purely formalist view is perfectly sustainable in mathematics and science: — Tarskian

According to formalism, the truths expressed in logic and mathematics are not about numbers, sets, or triangles or any other coextensive subject matter — in fact, they aren't "about" anything at all.

When you say logic and math aren't about anything at all, do you extend this application all the way to include the internal consistency of logic and math? Hasn't Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem rocked the houses of logic and math because it charges them with essential incompleteness? Doesn't this charge undermine their internal consistency? Doesn't the claim the first-order formalisms of logic and science will always generate statements internally unprovable open a wide fissure down the middle of formalism? Haven't you cited this as the crisis in math?

I would find it very uncomfortable to call "agreement between prediction and outcome" science, as opposed to just a fact about science. — AmadeusD

Well, if a fact about science is a science fact, then you must explain how a science fact is not science. Take for example electrolysis, the process of using electricity to split water into hydrogen and oxygen. That's a science fact. It's public, measurable and repeatable. This is not science you say?

How is it not the case that your argument above is not pettifogging en route to word muddle?

When you're done with an epic performance of a play, you aren't still performing the play when you pick up your Tony award eight months later, for instance. — AmadeusD

Here I think you insert an artificial partition; the Tony Awards would be meaningless without the dramatic performances that precede it.

Art has no right/wrong value. It has good/bad value (and subjective, at that). Science is the opposite. It has right/wrong values, and no good/bad values. — AmadeusD

Here you distill the war between science and art: successful navigation of right and wrong facts and right and wrong logic leads to the science and technology that produces nuclear bombs.

Detonation of nuclear bombs causes the good or bad vaporization of entire populations, enemy combatants and innocent civilians alike.

Can we see, herein, that right and wrong is concerned with what things are, whereas good and bad is concerned with the moral meaning of how things are experienced? Is this not an important difference between science and art? Does not Chris Nolan, through
Oppenheimer, spin out a narrative detailing the agony of a scientist caught in the crossfire between what he perceived as right and wrong versus good and bad?

I have no idea what point you are trying to make here. — I like sushi

I posted because your general conception of what science is seemed misguided/inaccurate. — I like sushi

My thinking here is simple: we talk about science; we talk about art; sometimes we see scientific sensibilities conflicting violently with artistic sensibilities. That's a clue that the differences between the two might not be trivial. Even so, it's hard to talk rationally and generally about what is that difference.

You write well about science; you write cautiously about art:

The means of accurate measuring of items like 'good' and 'bad' is obscure (and possibly a delusion?). — I like sushi

By this I simply mean that we do not possess the scope in spacial or temporal terms to pass any reasonably accurate declaration for a hard and fast 'rule' of human nature. — I like sushi

When you talk about the difference between the two disciplines, you talk about art being resistant to accurate measurement. So, can you spin out a narrative of difference that illuminates the meaning of science being accurate measurement and art being touchy-feely measurement?

My claim, faulty though it be, characterizes the general difference as different modalities of method of discovery: the what modality for science; the how modality for art.

The what modality is a narration of things as things.

The how modality is a narration of things as experiences.

In my opinion, the key distinction is testability. — Tarskian

Regarding my thesis, going forward from what you wrote above entails assessing whether experimentation is modally existential, with the hows and whys of the details of an pattern involving existing things being ancillary to the modally existential process of experimentation.

:up:

You've been clear: science is science; art is art.

Your definitions are clear: science observes and measures; art narrates living through love $\leftrightarrow$ hate and the grayscale in between.

Now, I'm waiting for you to start talking about how Newton's equations differ from the little boy who slips and tumbles down the stairs, thereafter taking comfort from his pain in mother's arms.

:up:

I think all I meant there was that the outcomes aren't hte science — AmadeusD

Take for example the discovery that light waves bend around gravitational fields; that's an outcome predicted by Relativity. It's one of the end games of Relativity as far validation is concerned. Henceforth, this bending of light waves under influence of gravity will be seen through the lens of Relativity. Isn't that a triumph not trifle of science?

It's not motivated by the outcome, per se, but by the outcome's accuracy. — AmadeusD

If you back engineer from the outcome to the theory that explains it, you see an answer in search of a question. Asking the right questions about the world we see around us is one of the seminal talents of the scientist. I don't presently see how your reasoning uncoupling answer from question is sound.

...the sciences are a subset of the humanities — 180 Proof

...interpretative-representational discourses explicating aspects of the human condition – which seek, via defeasible reasoning, testable answers to empirical questions. — 180 Proof

Your clause fragment above puts on a good show for establishing the proximity of the arts and sciences, and yet, I wonder if you feel that a description of intense prolonged neuron firing at synapses of the brain's pleasure centers is really almost the same thing as a fresh and frank description of a great shag between two characters just fallen in love. There's some sort of a big difference, isn't there?

The sciences are concerned with “what...” — ucarr

No. Science is concerned with science. The humanities are concerned with humans. — I like sushi

The give away is in the names? — I like sushi

Since science is done presumably only by humans, the authoritatively binary distinction you seek to establish between science and art reads like an exaggeration.

By your own argument about different names, there's some sort of important difference between the two disciplines, isn't there? What do you think it is?

The sciences are rooted in communication of existence in terms of what things are, how they’re interrelated, what they do and what functions, if any, they have. — ucarr

Science makes no assumptions. — I like sushi

I need to clarify: communication of existence is supposed to convey the fact that scientists make discoveries about what exists and, in turn, they communicate details of what exists to the public.

If measurements cannot be made science does not just leave it alone. We can observe changes and then speculate as to why such changes are happening. — I like sushi

Theoretical scientists develop conjectures about things not accessible to hands-on examination by spinning out from related things that have been measured directly. At a higher level of nuance, we can surmise that theoretical conjectures are a type of measurement.

The Hard Problem is a scientific problem. — I like sushi

Is it a scientific problem that does a good job of describing what it's like to be a human endeavoring to learn truths about the natural world?

The Humanities are about the expression and understanding of the human condition in lived terms most often through a narrative function — I like sushi

Where we are blind the Humanities dresses us in comfort. Is there truth hidden within this comfort? I believe so. — I like sushi

Yes. You seem to agree a good work of art is enduring, and it's enduring because, across the generations, human individuals continue to find promise of answers to human questions unresolved.

Well, true that measurement is central to science, but so too is theory - the framework within which measurements are interpreted. — Wayfarer

I sense great depth of meaning in your sentence above. So far I cannot sound the deep waters here, beyond vaguely ruminating on the connections between measurement and theory.

Measurement was key aspect, but so too was a radically different vision of nature. — Wayfarer

This sentence allows me to go a step further in my rumination: QM is, among other shocks, a motherlode of challenge along the axis of measurement. Its new vision of the world as theory could not have been measured in the required manner without that new vision, still today a hard thing to grasp and even harder to accept.

Well, I'm sure David Chalmers would be flattered to be counted as the Founder of the Humanities, but I'm not sure it is warranted. — Wayfarer

I don't mean to go that far in ascribing credit to Chalmers. I'm merely using his title to describe the still privileged human condition vis-á-vis the natural world.

Science, as a method, is not culture bound (in the general sense). It's motivation is simplicity of theory, not outcomes. — AmadeusD

What I've underlined is succinct and insightful. Bravo. It's a clear expression of a basic value guiding the scientific process.

I know one of the best ways for testing a theory is seeing if it can make correct predictions, so I don't agree that science isn't seriously concerned with outcomes.

Science as a practice by humans in specific times and places cannot completely abstract itself from local culture.

Art, in its highest aspirations, tries to be universal and therefore beyond local culture except as an accidental association.

The sciences ask how questions all the time: how does relativity connect with quantum mechanics; how do neurons connect in such a way that experience arises? — Manuel

Likewise, the humanities ask "what questions" frequently. What do human beings do when they are left in isolation, what do people think about X and Y, and so on. — Manuel

The sciences are concerned with how. How does light propagate, how are chemical bonds formed, how do worms reproduce. — Lionino

Sciences and humanities are not mutually exclusive, and both are concerned with "what" and "how" in their respective areas of interest. — jkop

Yes. The sciences and the humanities are each seriously concerned with both "what" and "how."

Yes. The sciences and the humanities are not mutually exclusive.

What = existence; How = journey — ucarr

Do existence and journey represent two different modal methods of discovery?

Does science culminate in the presence of a thing understood?

Does art culminate in the experience of an enduring point of view?

philosophy -- the study of ideas about knowledge, truth, the nature and meaning of life, etc.

--The Britannica Dictionary

Do you agree that this definition can be paraphrased thus: philosophy -- thinking about thinking

...consider the implications of the term 'idiosyncratic'. Idiosyncratic means 'pertaining to a particular individual' — Wayfarer

Do you imply that Tarskian's definition is too narrow in scope to be considered philosophical?

In fact, it would also be interesting to elaborate why exactly your example sentence is not philosophical. — Tarskian

What if you had written: (In fact, it would also be philosophically interesting to elaborate why exactly your example sentence is not philosophical.)?

Does your definition tell us philosophy is inherently iterative?

That's not a real problem. People who know me don't have any trouble making the distinction. — wonderer1

So, your behavior follows patterns exhibiting moral principles, thus you are your own moral authority. If I'm right about this, then you understand other individuals are their own moral authorities. This leads to comparisons of moral concepts. In turn, this leads to a measure of objectivity about which concepts are best. Next, we have a developing consensus towards an external database of more principles acting as a moral authority for a right-thinking society.

How do you suppose your personal authority can have no use for comparison with an objective database of socially sanctioned authority?

So now, the changes to humanity are not merely evolutionary (biological), they are personal. The personal is of a different category than the biological (subject to evolutionary forces), just as the biological is of a different category than the chemical. — Fire Ologist

Are personal changes roughly equivalent to volitional decisions?

We won’t evolve to be a better society. We have to invent it whole cloth and then constrain any biological instincts or physical forces that frustrate our invention. — Fire Ologist

You don't think personal cognition can evolve?

I don't have much use for the notion of a moral authority. — wonderer1

Not even your own? If you refuse to internalize moral principles you believe in and abide by, you're making yourself indistinguishable from a sociopath.

The way I see it, humanity evolved to remove itself from nature, so now the weak sometimes proliferate, and the strong are kept down, the mutation is ostracized, and evolutionary forces are frustrated. That’s humanity. — Fire Ologist

You seem to be an adherent of the law of the jungle: survival by any means possible. You think anarchy a companion to evolution? You think social welfare programs a perversion of nature?

God as goal has been refuted by science, but replaced with humanity’s self-assessment of “human progress” as goal. — Fire Ologist

You think humanity has internalized God?

An understanding that we have an evolved social primate nature rather than a mythological fallen nature. — wonderer1

Are you proposing sociology as a replacement for the moral authority of church and bible?

"Now ladies and gentlemen, I want you to look straight up. Do you see that? You think what you see is blue, don't you? No, no. It's not blue, it's green." — ucarr

One of our problems is, that could be a quote from any candidate on every side. — Fire Ologist

The fall of humanity into an inherently sinful nature had been a pretty good myth for checking human deceitfulness. In the wake of its obliteration by rationalist, materialist science and logic, what do we have in its place?