I wish this statement was not so broad. As I have said before, I would prefer the response to a tactical nuke be the enforcement of a no-fly zone by NATO and cutting the supply lines into Ukraine from Russia. If a source should fire at Ukraine, then fire back at that source. Being discriminate gives more chances at de-escalation.

Those who say NATO is imperial through the process of inducting new members depict Putin as the one who is being attacked.

But it's not up to me. That's up to the people of Ukraine. No negotiation is going to be easy, and both sides will have to give something up. It cannot be that Russia simply gets everything it wants in exchange for peace, no. But then those aren't really negotiations. — Xtrix

It is the role of Ukraine in possible negotiations that has consumed so many pages of debate here.

For those that view the conflict as principally a proxy war being waged by the U.S., the terms are said to be ultimately between Russia and the U.S. For those who see Ukrainian's actions as directed by their own decisions and goals, their terms are seen to be central to any deal.

While it is obvious that the fighters cannot be decoupled from what supports them, treating Ukraine as merely a pawn in a geopolitical game is not going to lead to an end of the war.

The most scary thought is that if Putin would have stopped there, he might have gotten away with it. It might have taken a decade, but the likelyhood of the West accepting de facto the annexation of Crimea would have been likely. But a gambler doesn't know when to stop. He had to have that land bridge to Crimea and Novorossiya. — ssu

One of the elements that could have made that de facto condition become normal is that back then, Putin was skillfully engaged with European powers to become integral to their economies, as depicted in your post upthread with Putin hanging out at the G8.

As Russia keeps doubling down after each lost hand, the chances of that relationship returning is shrinking exponentially, no matter the outcome of the war.

One of the things Arendt focused upon was how international visions of a world fueled many local events. And thus, her distinction between mutual ethnic hatred from antisemitism as a phenomenon.

Why is it the US being castigated for Putin acting aggressively. — schopenhauer1

Having monitored this thread since its inception, I think the following axes of rotation are underway:

The argument over whether, and to what extent, the expansion of NATO membership is or was an existential threat to the Russian Federation.

To what extent or not is the conflict a proxy war to achieve U.S. objectives versus a fight for Ukraine for the sake of Ukrainians.

How much those first two issues reflect the element of 'globalization' and Russia's participation in it.

Who has done shittier things, Russia or other Nations, but especially the U.S.

It comes up a lot less in recent arguments but whether Ukrainians are more righteous than Russians, vis-a-vis rules of engagement.

So, your straightforward question has been diverted to other ones.

Being an anonymous source, it could have been intended to be leaked or done without authorization. If it was the latter, the motive could have been a desire to gloat.

Authenticity is not a question yet since there is no way to verify the report.

Washington Post has a similar report.

Yes. Surprisingly Ukrainians are not an homogeneous mass of one hive-like opinion. Some disagree with the war effort. — Isaac

It is unlikely that the leaked report was an anti-war statement when surrounded by all the celebration of the strike.

It is a break in established policy for either of the sources to speak of it. If it was an anonymous senior official, that could be an intended leak. I don't see the value in doing that since it helps the Moscow messaging.

Do you have a link from the Times story? I cannot find it.

I follow the New York Times and I didn't see such a claim published there. This would have been front page news everywhere if true. Notably, there is no link or any other reference. — SophistiCat

Yes, that would have been breaking news everywhere if confirmed. My second thought after reading the claim is that the Ukraine forces have been very disciplined about not saying stuff without approval. It would have been very surprising to have that fall apart on such an important issue.

The article's rhetoric was so infused with Lavrov descriptors that I double checked to make sure it was not a piece from the Onion.

Where is the verification of the following claim in the article:

"The Ukrainian special forces immediately admitted having carried out the attack to the New York Times."

Surely, there must be a distinction between listing motives for why somebody might have committed a crime and that such an event went down.

That the scenario exhausts what you are able to imagine is not an advance toward understanding what happened.

You are the one who presented it as a fact when it was only an opinion about the matter.

Now that you are not presenting it as a fact, it doesn't mean anything to argue against why you think it is one. I don't know what actually happened.

Got it. You are merely speculating.

In the sense that they allowed the US to blow up the Nordstream pipeline. I don't know if Germany was aware of this, but, I think that's counterproductive. — Manuel

Asking again why you are convinced of this.

In the sense that they allowed the US to blow up the Nordstream pipeline — Manuel

I was not aware that had been established as a fact.

but Ukraine shouldn't be allowing other countries to blow up the pipeline. — Manuel

In what sense has this happened?

But, alas, it will continue until the US and Russia decide to talk, absent intervention from another third party. It's not Putin alone. Europe too, especially the leaders of the western countries should be less bellicose. — Manuel

No Ukrainians were mentioned in this proposal. So the negotiations you promote means cutting off their efforts. You are in the Isaac camp who says the quicker the Ukrainians lose, the better off they will be.

The sound of one hand clapping empties the air.

Russia does not have the capability to cause significant damage to US soil if at all. — Deus

On what basis do you make this bold claim?

Conceding territory for such idealistic reasons is misguided. — Deus

I don't understand. Which territory and what ideology are you referring to?

I prefer the present approach toward minimizing the scope of the war. Your impatience would destroy billions of lives along with the ecosystem.

While NATO can help (without fighring directly) countries outside of the alliance to withstand aggression, Article 5 only applies to defense from attack on member states.

If Poland attacked Russia unilaterally, the Article does not require the other members to help.

Maybe Poland can start demonstrating their capabilities with or without infantry. — Deus

One irony of NATO participation is that each nation is tied to a collective force and is not free to fight unilaterally. The conditions for Article 5 allow Putin to ignore the surrounding nations.

What’s holding us back from an attack on Russian Soil at the moment is the nuclear threat…I’d say risk it for a biscuit. — Deus

Mutually Assured Destruction is not a biscuit.

If discourse and public debate is to be productive it must avoid descending into a contest - until proven otherwise - we should assume the very best of our interlocutor. — yebiga

What constitutes the condition of "until proven otherwise"?

For example, for one who does not see any gap between Heidegger's philosophy and his political declarations, why is it incumbent upon me to separate the two? He does not do that anywhere that I am aware of. If the burden of proof does not fall upon him, what else is left?

That was just an example. The first question about proof is what confronts all in regard to the situation in Ukraine.

Yes. I wonder how they would have reacted if told beforehand.

Whatever the overall intention of the operation, this report presents a sharp contrast to the U.S. doctrine on Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

The emphasis on keeping the element of surprise was blown via U.S. Intelligence.
Isolation of the 'lodgment' from enemy forces was not achieved.
Being told what was happening on the way to battle is a far cry from the 'rehearsals' called for in complex force integration.
The collection of tactical failures suggests that not much 'red team' process went into the planning.

So what happens in the Ukraine is important but is only one part of a much larger game. What we know about Putin and the war is filtered by our media thru this lens. — yebiga

If that is the case, your observations cannot be supported as evidence by appeal to any resource.

The article is helpful in showing how the misfortune of war will play out in Russian society. A countervailing perspective from the game of Risk underway in many minds:

During an internal struggle for power in Russia, Putin and other Russians will have other things on their minds, and the war will give way to those more pressing concerns. Sometimes you change the subject, and sometimes the subject changes you.

Another smoking accident has happened, this time on the Kerch bridge.

I figure future accounts will confirm your view. All airborne infantry missions are very risky. Many have failed.

Until that time when more has been revealed, Tzeentch's argument amounts to saying nobody could be that stupid to try it. And when that becomes the measure of what is conceivable or not, we are forced to compare that action with other actions and notice that a lot of those other tactics are stupid.

I don't know, linking to a source that says it does not know does not inculcate confidence.

This was a feint, remember? Your story was there was no intended future use at all. Kyiv was a ruse to fix Ukrainian forces who might otherwise head for the Donbas. — apokrisis

I would like to reassert my previous point that arguments about the intentions of the Hostumel operation are not evidence for or against a 'feint'.

An argument for the 'feint' needs an identification of the forces who would have headed east if not held at Kiev. No such identification has been provided. My attempts to find sources on this point have yielded nothing so far.

The use of airborne forces does suggest it was part of a particular plan. On the other hand, the Russians have demonstrated so many bad tactical practices, easily confirmed by the ubiquitous explosions of tightly grouped armor vehicles, that arguing that another tactic is incomprehensively stupid is no guarantee that it was not attempted.

Russia has conquered, occupied, pacified, and defended strategically important territory for 7 months now while inflicting, by any count I've seen, several factors more casualties on Ukraine than suffering itself. — boethius

What is your source for this?

Yes, I see the dance between claims regarding particular circumstances. My point is only to say that once one has retreated from arguing what the actual planning happened to be by means of providing evidence for it, further discussion of what is conceivable or not is no longer germane to the original question.

And that problem of using the language of inconceivability reminds me of scenes in Princess Bride.

For Tzeentch, the question of intent and planning seems to be on hold until the day documents and investigations can prove one view against the other. He has ruled out any reports presently available to us as being valid. Also, he has said that he is not providing a competing assessment of actual intent but only offering 'speculation' of what might be the purpose of the operation.

So, his or her claim that using airborne troops to secure an airport in order to establish an airbridge is simply inconceivable in this situation is not an argument for an alternate purpose. By the rules of evidence being demanded by him or her, that cannot be stated.

How does this pragmatic approach get started when one side is run by a man in a bunker calmly loading his revolver for the final scene? You make it sound like something his opponents could initiate by themselves.

and if there's no good reason to think that doing so will create a major loss in welfare — Isaac

That's the sticky wicket there. How can the good faith be extended to the Russians in this regard when Putin has played so many for fools for doing it in the past?

Yes, I spoke too broadly on that. But my point is that what is shared is horror at what Russia is doing.

We do not share their national pride and it's obscene to pretend we do. — Isaac

Pride? What is being shared is the desire to exist as a people and to defeat an organization that is really good at erasing such people. That is why borders are defended.