There is no 'thing in itself'. 'A world of the unknown' is contradictory because how can we know of such a 'world' and in what way would something posited as absolutely unknown, constitute a world? — Tobias
There is a passage in
Logic that describes that as the problem of the 'knower' determining the conditions of cognition independently of the attempts to know:
This thought, which is proposed as the instrument of philosophic knowledge, itself calls for further explanation. We must understand in what way it possesses necessity or cogency: and when it claims to be equal to the task of apprehending the absolute objects (God, Spirit, Freedom), that claim must be substantiated. Such an explanation, however, is itself a lesson in philosophy, and properly falls within the scope of the science itself. A preliminary attempt to make matters plain would only be unphilosophical, and consist of a tissue of assumptions, assertions, and inferential pros and cons, i.e. of dogmatism without cogency, as against which there would be an equal right of counter-dogmatism.
A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy bids us pause before proceeding to inquire into God or into the true being of things, and tells us first of all to examine the faculty of cognition and see whether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is to be employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our trouble will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has won for it general assent and admiration; the result of which has been to withdraw cognition from an interest in its objects and absorption in the study of them, and to direct it back upon itself; and so turn it to a question of form. Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can try and criticize them in other ways than by setting about the special work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim.
Reinhold saw the confusion with which this style of commencement is chargeable, and tried to get out of the difficulty by starting with a hypothetical and problematical stage of philosophizing. In this way he supposed that it would be possible, nobody can tell how, to get along, until we found ourselves, further on, arrived at the primary truth of truths. His method, when closely looked into, will be seen to be identical with a very common practice. It starts from a substratum of experiential fact, or from a provisional assumption which has been brought into a definition; and then proceeds to analyse this starting-point. We can detect in Reinhold’s argument a perception of the truth, that the usual course which proceeds by assumptions and anticipations is no better than a hypothetical and problematical mode of procedure. But his perceiving this does not alter the character of this method; it only makes clear its imperfections. — Hegel's Logic, Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of The Philosophical Sciences, page 116
Learning to swim while in the water is to become aware of the movement in which 'subject' and 'object' occur in life experiences:
With self-consciousness, then, we have therefore entered the realm of truth. We have now to see how the shape of self-consciousness first makes its appearance. If we consider this new shape of knowing, the knowing of itself, in relation to that which preceded, viz. the knowing of another, the knowing of an other, then we see that though this other has vanished, its moments have at the same time no less been preserved, and the loss consists in this, that here they are present as they are in themselves. The [mere] being of what is merely 'meant', the singleness and universality opposed to it of perception, as also empty inner being of the Understanding, these are no longer essences, but are moments of self-consciousness, i.e. abstraction or distinctions which at the same time have no reality for consciousness itself, and are purely vanishing essences. Thus it seems that only the principal moment itself has been lost, viz. the simple self-subsistent existence for consciousness. But in point of fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from otherness. — Phenomenology of Spirit, B. Self-Consciousness, IV. The Truth of Self-Certainty, 167, translated by Miller
The way the
Phenomenology passage nestles the 'objects' referred to in
Logic prompts me to qualify your statement:
Yes, Hegel goes beyond those limits. — Tobias
The "simple self-subsistent existence" is what was being sought "outside the water" by Kant. For Hegel, however, the isolated ego is no longer juxtaposed by 'true' objects.
Independent beings are seen through a process of living. the sections from 168 to 173 of the Phenomenology lay out how this Life generates our experience. In 170, Individuals are described as:
The independent members are for themselves; but this being-for-itself is really no less immediately their reflection into the unity than this unity is the splitting-up into independent shapes. The unity is divided within itself because it is an absolutely negative or infinite unity; and because it is what subsists, the difference, too, has independence only in it. — ibid. 170
The limits to knowledge for an individual are depicted as floating in a larger sea:
Life in the universal fluid medium, a passive separating-out of the shapes becomes, just by doing so, a movement of those shapes or becomes Life as a process. The simple universal fluid is the in-itself, and the difference of the shapes is the other. But this fluid this fluid medium itself becomes the other through this difference; for now it is for the difference which exists in and for itself, and consequentially is the ceaseless movement by which this passive medium is consumed: Life as a living thing. — ibid. 171