That is a constant question when reading Plato that does not come up in theories presented directly by others. — Paine
You'll notice in Aristotle's Metaphysics, (much of this being material produced from his school, after his death), how the Aristotelians distance themselves from those other Platonists, whom we call Neoplatonists. — Metaphysician Undercover
“For instance,” said Parmenides, “if one of us is the master or slave of someone, he is not, of course, the slave 133E of master itself, what master is; nor is a master, master of slave itself, what slave is. Rather, as human beings, we are master or slave of a fellow human. Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is of slavery itself, while slavery itself, in like manner, is slavery of mastery itself. But the things among us do not have their power towards those, nor do those have their power towards us. Rather, as I say, these are what they are, of themselves, and in relation to themselves, while things with 134A us are, in like manner, relative to themselves. Or do you not understand what I am saying?”
“I understand,” said Socrates, “very much so.”
“And is it also the case,” he asked, “that knowledge itself, what knowledge is, would be knowledge of that truth itself, what truth is?”
“Entirely so.”
“Then again, each of the instances of knowledge, what each is, would be knowledge of particular things that are. Isn’t this so?”
“Yes.”
“The knowledge with us would be knowledge of the truth with us, and furthermore, particular knowledge with us would turn out to be knowledge of particular things that are 134B with us?”
“Necessarily.”
“But the forms themselves, as you agree, we neither possess nor can they be with us.”
“No, indeed not.”
“And presumably each of the kinds themselves is known by the form of knowledge itself?”
“Yes.”
“Which we do not possess.”
“We do not.”
“So none of the forms is known by us since we do not partake of knowledge itself.”
“Apparently not.”
“So what beauty itself is, and the good, 134C and indeed everything we understand as being characteristics themselves, are unknown to us.”
“Quite likely.”
“Then consider something even more daunting.”
“Which is?”
“You would say, I presume, that if there is indeed a kind, just by itself, of knowledge, it is much more precise than the knowledge with us, and the same holds for beauty and all the others.”
“Yes.”
“Now if anything else partakes of knowledge itself, wouldn’t you say that a god, more so than anyone, possesses the most precise knowledge?”
“Necessarily.”
134D “In that case, will a god possessing knowledge itself be able to know things in our realm?”
“Why not?”
“Because, Socrates,” said Parmenides, “we have agreed that those forms do not have the power that they have, in relation to the things that are with us, nor do the things with us have their power in relation to those forms. The power in each case is in relation to themselves.”
“Yes, we agreed on that.”
“Well then, if this most precise mastery is with a god, and this most precise knowledge too, the gods’ mastery would never exercise mastery over us, nor would their knowledge 134E know us nor anything else that is with us. Rather, just as we neither rule over them with our rule nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, they in turn by the same argument, are not the masters of us nor do they have knowledge of human affairs, although they are gods.”
“But surely,” he said, “if someone were to deprive a god of knowledge, the argument would be most surprising.”
“Indeed, Socrates,” said Parmenides, “the forms inevitably possess these difficulties and many others 135A besides these, if there are these characteristics of things that are, and someone marks off each form as something by itself. And the person who hears about them gets perplexed and contends that these forms do not exist, and even if they do it is highly necessary that they be unknowable to human nature. And in saying all this he seems to be making sense, and as we said before, it is extraordinarily difficult to persuade him otherwise. Indeed, this will require a highly gifted man who will have the ability to understand that there is, for each, some kind, a being just by itself, 135B and someone even more extraordinary who will make this discovery and be capable of teaching someone else who has scrutinized all these issues thoroughly enough for himself.”
“I agree with you, Parmenides,” said Socrates. “What you are saying is very much to my mind.”
“Yet on the other hand Socrates,” said Parmenides, “if someone, in the light of our present considerations and others like them, will not allow that there are forms of things that are, and won’t mark off a form for each one, he will not even have anywhere to turn his thought, since he does not allow that a characteristic 135C of each of the things that are is always the same. And in this way he will utterly destroy the power of dialectic. However, I think you are well aware of such an issue.” — Plato, Parmenides, 133e, translated by Horan
Do you have a source that touches on how Aristotle's text was produced? — Paine
Are you suggesting that when "Platonists" are mentioned in Aristotle that others are speaking in his name? — Paine
While we can guess the first Academicians would have taken issue with Aristotle challenging the separate land of the forms, it is unlikely they would have disagreed with Parmenides who sharply protects the boundary between the divine and the world of becoming that we muck about in: — Paine
This is a far cry from the mono-logos of Plotinus where the divine is a continuity from the highest reality to the lowest. The dialectic descends into the silence of contemplation. — Paine
“Indeed, Socrates,” said Parmenides, “the forms inevitably possess these difficulties and many others 135A besides these, if there are these characteristics of things that are, and someone marks off each form as something by itself. And the person who hears about them gets perplexed and contends that these forms do not exist, and even if they do it is highly necessary that they be unknowable to human nature. And in saying all this he seems to be making sense, and as we said before, it is extraordinarily difficult to persuade him otherwise. Indeed, this will require a highly gifted man who will have the ability to understand that there is, for each, some kind, a being just by itself, 135B and someone even more extraordinary who will make this discovery and be capable of teaching someone else who has scrutinized all these issues thoroughly enough for himself.”
“I agree with you, Parmenides,” said Socrates. “What you are saying is very much to my mind.”
“Yet on the other hand Socrates,” said Parmenides, “if someone, in the light of our present considerations and others like them, will not allow that there are forms of things that are, and won’t mark off a form for each one, he will not even have anywhere to turn his thought, since he does not allow that a characteristic 135C of each of the things that are is always the same. And in this way he will utterly destroy the power of dialectic. However, I think you are well aware of such an issue.” — Plato, Parmenides, 133e, translated by Horan
We have differed in the past on what the consequences of De Caelo are on the divinity of the celestial sphere and I remember you do not accept the account of divinity in Metaphysics book Lamda. So, I will leave all that be. — Paine
I am glad we could find common ground on the role of forms in the dialectic. — Paine
The expression the "One" has a different life in different texts as do so many other ideas and perspectives. — Paine
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