In the more traditional Aristotelian formulation, matter was construed not as res extensa, nor as a bare substrate, but rather as the principle of individuation and potentiality in the world. In this view, a material object is not mere matter (which cannot not exist on its own), but a compound of matter and form. The mind gains knowledge of material objects via the processes of perception and understanding (intentional acts), through which it comes to grasp the very same forms inherent in the material object itself. — Esse Quam Videri
assertions that morality doesn't really exist. — Leontiskos
That read doesn't seem to align with right/left categories. — Leontiskos
So we get a vacillation between moralizing and assertions that morality doesn't really exist. — Leontiskos
Tolerance is a terrible word. To be 'tolerated' sounds judgemental. — Tom Storm
I am a US taxpayer. I have to file my income tax with the IRS every single year. — NOS4A2
↪Paine, ↪Hanover, you both presume an adversarial model of discourse. Now fun as that is, it might be interesting to explore other possibilities... — Banno
I just don't understand why one would posit a private sub-symbol that computes and then attaches to a public post-symbol I can see. By mentalese, I would think he would mean the stuff that precedes the sub-symbol, the computation itself, not some strange layer of first symbol to follow a second symbol. — Hanover
In transcendental philosophy, however, there are no questions other than the cosmological ones in regard to which one can rightfully demand a sufficient answer concerning the constitution of the object itself; the philosopher is not allowed to evade them by pleading their impenetrable obscurity, and these questions can have to do only with cosmological ideas. For the object must be given empirically, and the question concerns only its conformity with an idea. If the object is transcendental and thus in itself unknown, e.g., whether the something whose appearance (in ourselves) is thinking (the soul) is in itself a simple being, whether there is a cause of all things taken together that is absolutely necessary, etc., then we should seek an object for our idea, which we can concede to be unknown to us, but not on that account impossible.*
The footnote:
* To the question, "What kind of constitution does a transcendental object have?" one cannot indeed give an answer saying what it is, but one can answer that the question itself is nothing, because no object for the question is given. Hence all questions of the transcendental doctrine of the soul are answerable and actually answered; for they have to do with the transcendental subject of all inner appearances, which is not itself an appearance and hence is not given as an object, and regarding which none of the categories (at which the question is really being aimed) encounter conditions of their application. Thus here is a case where the common saying holds, that no answer is an answer, namely that a question about the constitution of this something, which cannot be thought through any determinate predicate because it is posited entirely outside the sphere of objects that can be given to us, is entirely nugatory and empty. — ibid. A479/ B 507
Assuming you haven't ignored the quote of Kant I presented, the noumenon (transcendental object here) is the cause of appearance, phenomenon. — Sirius
Going back to a very old objection. For Kant, the transcendental object is the CAUSE of all appearances & clearly not an appearance. — Sirius
Plato revised his government ideas in "Laws" — ProtagoranSocratist
