Compressed Language versus Mentalese I just don't understand why one would posit a private sub-symbol that computes and then attaches to a public post-symbol I can see. By mentalese, I would think he would mean the stuff that precedes the sub-symbol, the computation itself, not some strange layer of first symbol to follow a second symbol. — Hanover
I wonder where linguistics, as a science, fits into Pinker's model. Before trying to map a "mental" substratum for the activity, it would be good to have the empirical study of grammar and expression established as a starting place. It is not a settled area of theory.
That is not the same starting place of Wittgenstein working out that our understanding of meaning is more than naming things we all can recognize alone. Unless, of course, one understood Wittgenstein to be
reducing the problem to a set of criteria.